

NATO SECRET

EAP/CA.61/438

6th October 1961

Note for the Secretary General

In accordance with your instructions, I am sending you herewith attached the draft of a PO which could be circulated to the Council as soon as we will have received by 'phone or cable your agreement of ^{any} indications about the changes you might wish to introduce. As you have already been able to give a glance at this paper on Wednesday evening, I will just comment upon the points which have emerged since then.

1. I had to get in touch with the delegations of the 3 Powers, especially in regard to the amendment which you thought useful to circulate about the last sentence of paragraph 8 of Annex A, although you had agreed that we should state as forcefully as possible that the decision about such an amendment would be the responsibility of the 3 Powers and not of the Council. The British stated that in view of this argument they did not see any advantage in submitting in writing a proposed amendment to this last sentence of paragraph 8 of Annex A. The French stated strongly that it would most likely be impossible for them to change "enter into negotiation" into "negotiate", and finally, the Americans were also pretty strongly against the idea of laying down any text of a draft amendment. May I suggest, therefore, that the result you wish to obtain is sufficiently taken care of by the wording of the part of the paper I am sending you attached which deals with Annex A. This is a very important point and I would like you to tell me if you agree to this change or if, despite the views expressed by the 3 Powers, you still prefer to have a draft amendment inserted in the Annex to your paper. If that would be the case, I will recall that the amendment you wanted to suggest was the following: "Accordingly they will, time permitting, advise and consult with the North Atlantic Council prior to implementing these plans." For your information I wish to state that the British would be willing to drop the word "advise" and to revert to "enter into consultation". Their preference would therefore be for the following sentence: "Accordingly they will, time permitting, enter into consultation with the North Atlantic Council..."

2. I have had a long talk with Mr. Melas. He is perfectly satisfied and, even more, quite happy about the amendment we have proposed to substitute for his first amendment, that is to say, the phrase we suggest adding in the third sentence of 6(c): "... keeping in mind the risk of a possible crisis created by the Soviets by way of a diversion at any point on the periphery of Allied Command Europe." He is very thankful to you for having so well taken care of this amendment he presented on October 2nd, but naturally he was quite worried when I tried to explain to him that it would be most difficult to get his second amendment on 6(d)3 agreed to, in view of all the difficulties there have been already over this paragraph. He ended our talk in saying that he would try to explain to his authorities that owing to the quite divergent views expressed by many delegations, it would be better for the Greek authorities not to insist on this second amendment.

3. I have been able to get from the U.S. Delegation an official text of Mr. Finletter's statement about 6(d)3, and I have reproduced it in full in the cover note. To be frank, I wonder if such a statement is going to be helpful, because although it seems to have given entire satisfaction to the Norwegians and the Canadians, I am afraid that the Greeks and Turks - to speak only of two delegations - won't be too happy to see that the idea is to use the nuclear weapons only in the last resort. If, however, you would agree to this full quotation of Mr. Finletter's words, the U.S. Delegation is quite prepared to accept it.

F.D. Gregh

6th October 1961

To : Permanent Representatives

From: Secretary General

NATO PLANNING FOR BERLIN EMERGENCY

Ref: PO/61/765 of September 27

Before the Council resumes its discussion of PO/61/765, I thought it might be useful to summarize some of the points which have been made during the first discussions of this paper which took place on Tuesday, 3rd, and Wednesday 4th October.

I. Annex A

Some members of the Council have questioned the wording of the last sentence of paragraph 8 of Annex A. Although it has been recognized that this Annex is a report by the French, U.K. and U.S. governments to the North Atlantic Council, it has been suggested that a slight alteration might add more clarity to the text. Any change of this kind would naturally have to be agreed by the three governments and it will be up to them to state their views at the next meeting of the Council. ~~on the amendment which will be found at annex.~~

II. Annex B

1. The Permanent Representatives will find attached at Annex some of the amendments which have been suggested during the discussion. These amendments relate to the first sentence of paragraph 3, the last sentence of paragraph 6(a) and of 6(b) and finally to the third sentence of paragraph 6(c).

2. About the other points which have been raised during the discussions, I wish to call the attention of Permanent Representatives to the following remarks :

6(a): A question was put as to the real meaning of the sentence stating that the overall strategy applicable on a world-wide scale should include "as appropriate, political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, military and para-military measures".

The exchange of views has clearly shown that the words "political and diplomatic measures", amongst others, do not exclude in any way the possibility of using, if and when appropriate, the United Nations machinery. I would suggest that with this clear understanding there should be no need to alter the text as it stands.

6(d)(3): In answer to the suggestion that this paragraph might be cut out, and to questions raised about its real meaning, Mr. Finletter was led to give his personal interpretation in the following words:

"The language in the draft intends to create one more step at the very last minute to try to save the world from hydrogen war. This demonstration bomb would be used only at the very last minute when every other effort to persuade the Russians to avoid war had failed. The thrust of U.S. military NATO policy recently has been in large part dominated by this thought. The talk of a pause, the threshold, the build-up of conventional forces and of the increase in NATO military strength, all this has been for the purpose of making clear our determination to stand by rights and duties, but at the same time to do so in such a way as to limit the area of conflict if conflict should come, if that is possible."

Those delegates who had questioned this wording have declared themselves in agreement with the views expressed by Ambassador Finletter. I hope, therefore, that with this understanding in mind there will be agreement not to modify ~~these~~ paragraph 6(d)(3).
→ Finally, as I have pointed out in PO/61/785 of 9th October 1961, one of the aspects of the problem touched upon was that of the political authorities who would be required to take certain decisions (paragraphs 6(b), 6(d)(3), (7) and (8). ~~I hope that the necessary clarification can be made when the Council takes up again the discussion of PO/61/765 in the light of the Annexes to the document quoted above.~~

Discussion of this matter will be resumed when!

PO/

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From: Secretary General

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6(a): A question was put as to the real meaning of the sentence stating that the overall strategy applicable on a world-wide scale should include "as appropriate, political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, military and para-military measures."

The exchange of views has clearly shown that the words "political and diplomatic measures", ~~subject matters~~, do not exclude in any way the possibility of using, if and when appropriate, the United Nations machinery. I would suggest that with this clear understanding there should be no need to alter the text as it stands.

6(d)3: In answer to the suggestion that this paragraph might be cut out, and to questions raised about its real meaning, Ambassador Finletter was led to give his personal interpretation in the following words:

"This provision calls for planning for one more step at the very last minute to try to save the world from hydrogen war. The theory is that the political authorities should have available to them, if they choose to use it, this demonstration when every other effort to persuade the Russians not to drive us to the use of nuclear weapons had failed."

Those delegates who had questioned the wording of 6(d)3 have declared themselves in agreement with the views expressed by the United States Permanent Representative. I hope, therefore, that with this understanding in mind there will be agreement not to modify this paragraph 6(d)3.

Finally, as I have pointed out in PO/61/785 of 9 October 1961, one of the aspects of the problem touched upon was that of the political authorities who would be required to take certain decisions (paragraphs 6(b), 6(d)3, 7 and 8). Discussion of this matter will be renewed when the Council takes up again the discussion of PO/61/765 in the light of the Annexes to the document quoted above.

Amendments to the text of Annex B to PO/61/765

The following amendments have been suggested during the discussions by the Council on Tuesday, 3rd, and Wednesday, 4th October :

Para 3: Delete the first sentence and read :

"Every effort will be made to attain the foregoing objectives by negotiations and through the application of non-military measures."

Para 6(a): Last sentence to be read as follows:

"The selective application of these measures, agreed upon both in Europe and on a world-wide basis, is designed to contribute to the purpose of arriving..."

Para 6(b): Last sentence to be read as follows:

"At the same time the way these plans would be implemented should leave the Soviet Government..."

Para 6(c): Third sentence to be redrafted as follows:

"They must, therefore, retain the defence of the Alliance members as a central consideration, and they must not commit capabilities to the prejudice of the overall capacity to defend NATO territory, keeping in mind the risk of a possible crisis created by the Soviets by way of a diversion at any point on the periphery of Allied Command Europe."

A. Adverse factors

They are four in number.

5. Some nations state that they are prepared to take required action on request, which means that they only carry out for the time being some preliminary measures which will be implemented, if some status of emergency is officially proclaimed. This political reserve is important, and it seems that SACBUR has the same in mind when he asks for "measures to be taken for an all-out emergency". It is possible that some special decision has to be taken in this respect by the Council.

Most nations have already begun to implement the measures announced as decided by item, but a political decision of the Council could but reinforce and hasten the development of the action now under progress.

6. In general, and in accordance with the Supreme Commanders' request, the decisions announced by nations primarily affect the manning level of their units, which will be substantially increased, especially in land forces. But as regards equipment, measures taken or envisaged are not such that they permit to get a full benefit from the increase of manning. For most nations, the status of equipment will seriously jeopardize the combat effectiveness of units, to such an extent that the implementation of manning measures for them by the country concerned, remains doubtful.

7. Almost all countries fail to comment on the recommendation: "to increase balanced logistic support in phase with force improvements". Some measures are announced to increase the level of ammunition and drop-tanks stockpiled but the situation as regards the procurement of spare parts appears to remain critical.

8. Little information is provided by countries about forecasts of additional funds destined to support emergency measures in the field of equipment and reserves. Only two countries (Denmark and Norway) state in their reply that they will allocate for this special purpose

some additional funds which without being negligible are out of proportion with total requirements to be met, other nations make an additional financial effort but purposely not referred to the plan of Action for Berlin.

9. The 3 points listed under paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 constitute the most unsatisfactory elements of the situation and rise a problem almost insuperable. Whatever be the equipment or reserves required, production needs time and money and during a period of 3 to 15 months, few improvement only may be expected in this field.

For many items, countries are just being thinking as to the choice of new equipment. Most of this new equipment is still at a research stage or preproduction stage, and countries may hesitate to place new orders for an obsolete equipment and therefore jeopardize their long-term programming. Moreover in some cases, production lines have ceased to produce (Aircraft F 84, F 86, F 100, and operating them again may be questionable.

Finally, even for nations able to do it, increasing the production entails large requirements like raw material, manpower which can hardly be covered on short-term. It is why my letter No.

_____ EF/FDP has insisted for an increase of assistance from Mutual Aid, already outlined by several countries and which may alone cover emergency requirements in the field of equipment and main reserves.

10. As regards the logistic support, the failure of HNSMA especially for aircraft spare parts has already been pointed out. Other Agencies could also be pressed to increase their effectiveness. Saccour's comments for example outlines the deficiencies existing in the level of war reserves in Sidewinder missiles. It is certain that the Air defence capability of the Alliance in Europe could be greatly increased if the production and delivery of Sidewinder missiles to the countries contributing to its coordinated production could be accelerated.

Saccour requests equally in several instances that units planned to be equipped with F 104 G aircraft be activated as soon as possible. Although it may not be possible to accelerate the work in the present stage of the project, the possibility to expedite deliveries as soon as the production has started in Europe could be examined and planned.

October 5, 1961

Mr. Gregh:

Attached you will find a memorandum approved by Ambassador Finletter giving the full thoughts he had in mind during the NAC discussion October 4 on his reasons why it is essential to retain paragraph 6 (d) (3) in the Draft Instructions.



E. Durbrow

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

October 4, 1961.

At the NAC meeting today, Mr. Leger asked why 6-D-3 was in the draft at all. Why shouldn't it be cut out? I said I would reply so far as the U.S. was concerned, but speaking personally.

I said the language was in the draft in order to create one more step at the very last minute to try to save the world from hydrogen war. This demonstration bomb would be used only at the very last minute when every other effort to persuade the Russians to avoid war had failed. The thrust of U.S. military NATO policy recently has been in large part dominated by this thought. The talk of a pause, the threshold, the build-up of conventional forces and of the increase in NATO military strength, all this has been for the purpose of making clear our determination to stand by rights and duties, but at the same time to do so in such a way as to limit the area of conflict if conflict should come, if that is possible.

cc: Mr. Durbrow

TKF/bbm

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

Private and Confidential

4th October 1961

EEF/CA.61/432

On a very personal basis I wish to draw your attention to the fact that there was a pretty harsh discussion in the Council this morning about the wording of 6(d)(3) of Annex B to PO/61/765.

Mr. Boyesen was one of those who criticized the present wording and he did so both from the point of view of the substance - a matter into which I do not propose to go - and on the basis of his certainty that it is quite illogical to say that you will employ nuclear weapons in order to demonstrate your ability to use them. If this last point is well taken, the real criticism is against the words "in order to", and I wonder therefore if we could not remedy this by suggesting the following wording for 6(d)(3) : "a specific political decision to employ nuclear weapons selectively, demonstrating thereby the will and ability of the Alliance to use them".

Please tell me frankly if you think this is sheer nonsense, or if it is not English, or American, and lastly, if there is any hope of getting the Washington authorities to approve such an amendment.

Sincerely yours,

F.D. Gregh

Mr. Joseph Wolf,
U.S. Delegation.