

31st August 1961

Summary of a meeting between the Secretary-General and General Heusinger, Chairman of the Military Committee in Permanent Session on Thursday, 31st August, at 3 p.m.

present at the meeting:

Mr. STIKKER	Secretary-General
Mr. CASARDI	DSG
Mr. GREGH	DSG/ASG Economics & Finance
Mr. VEST	Research Officer to the Secretary-General's Office.
General HEUSINGER	Chairman of the Military Committee
Admiral BROOKS	Deputy SGREP

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After a few words of welcome, General Heusinger stated that he had several points about which he would wish to have the views of the Secretary-General.

1. Contingency Planning

Since July several questions had been put by members of the Military Committee in Permanent Session to General Heusinger about the time when this Committee will be implicated in the Contingency Planning business. General Heusinger replied to his colleagues that the responsibility for Contingency Planning belonged first to the three Powers with special interests in Berlin. Several military representatives expressed their agreement with this view but insisted upon the fact that at one time or another some incident could develop in which countries other than the three major powers will be involved and, therefore, they would wish to be informed as soon as possible, not about details, but at least on the general ideas underlying the Contingency Planning.

At the last meeting of the Military Committee, Air Marshal Sir George Mills, Chairman of the Standing Group, replied in the same vein and told the members of the Committee that further information would be given to them as soon as possible. General Heusinger insisted on getting from Mr. Stikker an agreement on his views which are that there is no need to furnish the

Military Committee with details but certainly with the general lines of thought.

In reply to this, the Secretary-General called the attention of General Heusinger to the part of the statement delivered by Secretary Rusk to the Council on August 8th, in which he stated that "the military Contingency Planning Group known as 'Live Oak' is being brought into the SHAPE area and we can expect close co-ordination of that planning with NATO as a whole." Mr. Stikker says that this is his bible for the time being. How and when that new procedure will be set in motion he does not know, but is well assured that General Norstad will comply with the views expressed by Mr. Rusk. General Heusinger then went on to say that during the talk he had with General Norstad this morning he understood that SACEUR has now a military working group working for him on these matters, but Mr. Stikker felt that it was not yet, however, completely a SHAPE exercise.

2. General Heusinger then raised the question of the military measures to be taken in the face of the Berlin crisis. (Plan of Action as stated by General Norstad). General Heusinger is very much concerned by what the countries will be willing to do, first, till end 1961 and then during 1962. He stated in passing that there had been some "mouvements divers" in the Military Committee when the fact was known that SACEUR had been invited to appear at the Council meeting of August 21st to explain his Plan of Action, but General Heusinger himself has underlined to his colleagues that the requests from Norstad are entirely within the general planning of the Alliance. No decision has been taken on anything for which he has asked. It is, therefore, quite normal that the Secretary-General should have asked General Norstad to explain the situation to the Council; but what about further procedure? He understood that countries had been asked to give their replies by the 4th September. He understood also Norstad's willingness to send his evaluation of the measures which the countries would be willing to take, to the Council and to the Standing Group and the Military Committee at the same time. However, General Heusinger asks in what way the Secretary-General thinks that the Military Committee and the Standing Group will be involved. At the last meeting of the Military Committee in Permanent Session, it was agreed that Norstad would give his opinion to the Secretary-General and the NATO military authorities at the same time, but would the Council

consider the countries' replies and Norstad's views, at the same time, before having the views of the Standing Group and the Military Committee? General Heusinger does not think that it would be proper for the Military Committee to study or criticize the countries' replies. Their only duty and responsibility will be to pass a judgment on the implications of what a country states they are ready to do or willing to undertake.

To sum up, General Heusinger requested Mr. Stikker to wait until the Council received the views of the Military Authorities before finalising the discussion by the Council of the countries' replies to Norstad's plan of action. In answer to these questions the Secretary-General explained to his visitor the reasons why he had taken the matter to the Council and considered he was responsible inasmuch as he had been informed by General Norstad that a plan of action had been established by him to cope with the Berlin crisis. He summed up the discussion after Norstad's appearance at the meeting of the Council on August 23rd, but insisted that no decision had yet been taken by the Council about future procedure. He felt that the Council was reluctant and he thought it was better now to wait and see what would be the answers from the countries on September 4th. Only then would it be possible to see what should be the further steps. He is personally convinced that the Standing Group and the Military Committee will have to co-operate. He agrees with General Norstad sending his assessment, at the same time, to the Secretary-General and to the Council on the one hand, and to the Standing Group and the Military Committee on the other. General Heusinger then stated that in his view the military representatives are not yet sufficiently informed by their Chiefs-of-Staff of what is going on.

3. SACLANT's requests to meet the Berlin crisis.

General Heusinger then asked the Secretary-General what action was he willing to take on SACLANT's requests of August 28th. Air Marshal Mills has insisted that this question should be raised during his interview with Mr. Stikker. General Heusinger and Mr. Stikker both agreed that this paper should not be brought to the notice of the governments before final action has been taken on SACEUR's request. To act in a different way would only confuse the issue and certainly be detrimental to what countries may request to be done. Admiral Brooks then

also stated that he has now/received similar requests for quick action by CINCHAN. Mr. Stikker summed up the discussion in stating that he would keep the SACLANT and CINCHAN requests in cold storage for a while and at least until the moment when a clearer situation emerges from the response of the countries to SACEUR's requests.

4. Alert measures and responsibility for the use of Atomic Weapons.

General Heusinger expressed his concern about the fact that the Military Committee has been told that measures had been put into force which would enable the Council to meet within three hours in case of urgency (six hours during week-ends). He feels that this is too long because there might be cases in which action by the Council should be taken much more quickly. General Heusinger would also be very interested to learn what would be the effect of the military paper on the responsibility for the use of atomic weapons, which was sent to the Secretary-General for his opinion.

The Secretary-General answered that as far as urgent meetings of the Council were required, he would study once more the situation (which DSG Casardi stated was not good and had worked badly sometime ago during a week-end). As far as the control of atomic weapons is concerned, Mr. Stikker pointed out that the proposal made by the German delegation had no chance at all of being approved by the other countries. He stated that this question of the control had been put in cold storage for the time being and had been agreed it would be taken up by the Council anew in October. Mr. Stikker added that he had recently had talks with a few member countries about a different problem which is also an uneasy one - the rôle of NATO during time of war.

Coming then to the question of requirements for end-1966 and the long-term strategy of NATO, Mr. Stikker explained that he had drafted a paper which he had given, for consideration, to the US, the UK and the German delegation but, except for Mr. Strauss who said he agreed with the views expressed in this paper, he had had as yet no response either from the US - Mr. Finletter had told him this morning that the answer might be a matter of several more weeks - or from the UK - Mr. Tomlinson had asked for the possibility of getting in touch with Whitehall. Mr. Stikker pointed out that he had also had some views expressed by some military authorities on his paper. If he circulates it in the near future, he will call the attention of the delegations to the amendments suggested

by the military authorities. He insisted that there was a real need now to "force the issue".

5. Finalisation of MC 96.

General Heusinger expressed his views on the timetable to be followed for the finalisation of MC 96. The German answer, long awaited, had finally been given to the Military Committee, but the US reply was still missing. Mr. Stikker stated that he was also very greatly concerned by this unfortunate situation and added that he would try to put some pressure on the US authorities.

6. General Heusinger came then to his last point. He wanted to express to Mr. Stikker his opinion very strongly that whatever would be done concerning the "Live Oak" exercise and Contingency Planning,^{it} should not destroy the defence of the whole of central Europe. He had had a talk this morning with General Norstad on these lines, and SACEUR agreed, the defence system of Central Europe should not be disturbed by concentrating too much on Berlin, which was the result of the Lemnitzer proposals of last week. General Heusinger called them very hard indeed. Mr. Stikker did not know their details, but thought also that they would have to be amended. It seemed that France and Germany were opposed to the views contained in the Lemnitzer proposals.