

From : J. Sagne.

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERALSubject : Comments on the military measures requested by General Norstad in his letter dated August 18th.

A very quick study of SACEUR's requests attached to his letter dated August 18th has been done by the Finance and Defense Planning Directorate. The Secretary General will find below, first a brief summary of these proposals outlining by Service the main actions requested from European countries, followed by some comments; secondly, attached, the first country studies (1).

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I. SACEUR's requests.

- A. General: - these are not called requirements, but "plan of action",
 - they are considered to be taken "under emergency conditions",
 - they are all in fact based on SACEUR's 1962-1966 country force programmes and not on MC-70. However, contrary to the previous document, no specific reference is made in the presentation to the 1962-66 programmes,
 - they are split up into two categories of actions: by end 1961 and by end 1962.
 - 3 tables attached to this note show:
- Table I: Additional personnel requested by SACEUR
from European countries
- Table II: Additional number of aircraft requested by
SACEUR from European countries
- Table III: Additional number of vessels requested by
SHAPE from European countries
- The actions requested are much more detailed and specific than in the previous document, thus much more far reaching.

(1) The differences between the two SACEUR documents appeared so considerable that it was considered necessary to remake these studies. But due to the very short time available and to secretarial difficulties, all these studies are not yet typed. In any case they will be ready by noon.

- they put also much more emphasis on the short time; in some cases almost all the actions requested are to be achieved by end 1961. (Manpower, state of readiness).

Army

- :
 - the requests cover not only M-Day units as in the previous paper, but also 1st echelon and support units
 - manpower:
 - all M-Day units to be completed up to 90% of war authorized strength which means a very large increase as compared with actual strength: see Table I.
 - this means either reassignment to NATO of national forces (possible only for UK and France), or (for all countries) recalling of reservists and sometimes increasing the length of conscripts service.
 - equipment:
 - even with less specific requests than in the previous document, a greater effort is requested by end 1961.
 - in many cases, modernization or reequipment requirements which were spread over 3 years (1962-1964) in SACEUR's 1962-66 force programmes are now to be achieved within the next 4 months or before the end of 1962.

Navy

- :
 - more than half the ships already required in SACEUR's 1962-66 force programme are to be phased forward into Category A, which means a higher standard of readiness (more manpower and equipment = increased costs)
 - acceleration of equipment and construction programmes is requested.
 - some changes in 1962-66 force goals are requested, for example :
 - reinforcement of the defence of Baltic straits (Denmark, Germany) by additional units
 - increase in number of landing craft in the South and Greece
 - UK - more submarines and destroyers than in SACEUR's 1962-66 force programme.

Air Force:

- Table II attached: in principle the additional aircraft required are already planned by the countries concerned. But the present rate of production raises doubts as to whether these plans will be implemented. For the following countries, some requests are in addition to national plans: France, Netherlands, Turkey.
- Urgent completion of reserves of critical items requested within the next few months - doubtful unless from USA, aid and anyway involving increased costs
- accelerate modernization, more than previously required: doubtful because of financial and technical difficulties for countries who produce their own aircraft, and for others presupposes an acceleration, if not an increase of aid deliveries.
- increased state of readiness formerly only required for modern aircraft, on their introduction, now asked immediately.

II - Comments

a) On the military side, SACEUR seems to request, as a whole, more than he did in his letter of August 10, 1961; that is, in many instances more than the 1962 requirements of his 1962-1966 country force programme. He is also asking for many more measures to be taken in the period up to end 1961. SACEUR is thus asking much more than Mr. Dean Rusk, who considered that the first phase should be limited to the achievement of MC.70 for Mday units only.

b) on the feasibility side, some of these measures can be achieved without difficulty if countries have the will to do so. But many of them raise political difficulties : the need for parliamentary approval, or reactions of public opinion which is not prepared for such a degree of emergency preparedness. This applies to personnel measures such as recalling reservists and extending period of service, both very unpopular. In other cases the main problem will be financial or technical, especially in the field of equipment where many suggested actions require a complete revision of present production programmes in order to meet goals within a period in somecases of a four months instead of years. This presupposes that priority will be given in ~~some~~ instances to armaments production over other economic needs, which would only be possible in a state of emergency.

c) Dependence on U.S. aid is increased inasmuch as it is necessary to have the required aircrafts and equipment by end 1961. This implies that the U.S. are ready to accelerate considerably the volume of deliveries within the next 4 or 6 months, if countries are to implement 1961 measures. Since the 1962 measures frequently ask for more than was required in the year 1962 of SACEUR 1962-1966 programm in 1962 also accelerated deliveries and increased volume of aid is implied. The recent position taken by the U.S. Senate is not along these lines.

d) On the political side, it is highly doubtful whether many European countries are ready to take such dramatic and far reaching measures within the present political international context. The only way to convince them would be for General Norstad to explain why he is asking for so much to be done in so short a time, i.e. to present to the Council his evaluation of the threat which he thinks confront NATO is over Berlin. Failing this, with the U.K. , France and Germany by no means fully accepting SACEUR's proposals, the attitude of the other European NATO countries is not difficult to foresee.

Moreover, the very great difference between the degree of urgency felt in many European countries and the magnitude of the actions SACEUR is requesting from them may lead them to wonder whether SACEUR is not trying to use the Berlin crisis as an indirect mean of pressure on countries to fulfil at least part of his 1962-1966 force programme, which is still under discussion. This may be pure tactics on SACEUR's part in the sense of an opening bid; but it might produce unexpected results.



J. Sagne

Additional personnel requested by SACEUR
from European countries

Countries	Additional By end 1961 (1)	Additional By end 1962 (2)
Belgium	5,216	1,200
Denmark	2,987	8,057
France	40,692	17,259
Germany	53,454	90,468
Greece	14,860	290
Italy	25,660	36,762
Netherlands	6,044	3,500
Norway	2,293	218
Turkey	1,500 ⁽³⁾	1,500 ⁽¹⁾
U.K.	23,643	8,000
<u>Total</u>	<u>176,349</u>	<u>137,354</u>

(1) as compared with personnel available in the units on July 1st 1961

(2) as compared with personnel ^{which should be} available in the units on January 1st 1962

(3) no request for increased personnel in the Turkish Army since the present reorganization is expected to make available the necessary number of personnel.

NATO SECRETTable II

Additional number of aircraft requested
by SACsUR from European countries

Countries	By end 1961 ⁽¹⁾		By end 1962 ⁽²⁾	
	New	Retained	New	Retained
Belgium	11		18	
Denmark	24		25	One IDF sq. (18)
France	39		133	
Germany	172		270	
Greece	65		9	
Italy	55		46	
Netherlands	2		16	
Norway	21			
Turkey	44		36	3 sq. of 70
U.K.	25 (3)		8	
Total	458		561	88

(1) additional to the number on hand by July 1st 1961 as given in the country replies

(2) additional to the number on hand by 1st January 1962

(3) additional to the number already decided by U.K.

Additional number of vessels requested
by SHAPE from European countries

Countries	By end 1961 ⁽¹⁾			By end 1962 ⁽²⁾		
	Forwarded in category A	New ships to be procured	Old ships to be retained	Forwarded in category A	New ships to be procured	Old ships to be retained
Denmark	3 DE, 4 PC 3 SS, 2 CM				2 DD	2 DE
Germany	3 DD, 10 FPB 4 DE, 3 CM	MP a/c 1/5		2 DE 2 PC 2 SS	VAP 1/12 MP a/c 1/5	
Greece		1 SS			2 DD 1 SS	2 DE
Italy	1 DDG 1 DD/DE	8 MP a/c 3 Helicopters			12 MP a/c 6 Helicopters	
Norway	3 DE		1 DD		1 SS 10 FPB	
Turkey	2 DD/DE 2 SS 2 CM					
U.K.	7 DD/DE 1 SS					

(1) As compared with actual status on July 1st 1961

(2) As compared with actual status on January 1st 1962

19 août 1961

B E L G I U M

I. A r m y

A. End 1961 measures

1. Personnel

Required: over 5,200 men additional, making good shortages in regulars and specialists. Is partly made good by planned reductions in non-NATO forces. No increase is planned; would be difficult for regulars and technicians owing to civilian competition. The solution can probably only be extending compulsory service from 12 to 18 months (politically difficult) or recall of reservists.

B. End 1962 measures

2. Equipment

Expediting re-equipment programme and completion of reserves will be costly in time and money. Certain mechanisation requirements have not been defined and are completely covered by Belgian planning (e.g. armoured personnel carriers and light tanks).

3. Training

Major unit training is hampered by lack of suitable training areas.

II. N a v y

No change as compared with note II of J.S. 103/61.

NATO SECRETIII. Air ForceA. End 1961 measures1. Man control and Reporting units on twenty four hour basis

Can be completed by with drawing qualified personnel from headquarters, schools and repair units.

2. Raise aircrew/aircraft ratio ratio to 1,5 to 1

Is now about 1,35 to 1. Can be completed by with drawing pilots from headquarters and flying schools.

3. Increase balanced logistic support

Deficiencies relate only to the CF 100 and Hunter aircraft both which are scheduled to be with drawn. Additional stocks would not be available before mid-1962. Additional funds required to reach a 30-day level would be about BF 75 million.

4. Exchange of atomic information

Since Autumn 1960, everything has been ready for the stock piling of atomic weapons for the strike squadron in Belgium; action depends on the U.S. government.

5. Completion of forces

- a) Six RF 84 F aircraft: only likely sources are externalaid
- b) Five CF 100 aircraft: desolate aircraft. Expedite overhaul.

B. End 1962 Measures6. Add 1 Nike unit

Included in national plans - Personnel now training in the U.S. - Equipment to be provided under external aid and delivery planned for Autumn 1962. Location of the permanent sites in Germany as yet unsolved.

NATO SECRET

19 août 1961

C A N A D A

I. A R M Y

A. End 1961 measures

1. Planning for deployment

Possible without major non-military implications.

B. End 1962 measures

2. Equipment

Procurement of equipment for mechanization, giving priority to the Brigade in Europe, should be expedited. Though orders have been placed for the Canada - produced Bobcat - armoured carrier, delivery is only expected by 1964.

II. N A V Y

No change as compared with Note II of J.S. 103/61

III. Air Force

A. End 1961 measures

1. Insure balanced support

No known deficiencies.

B. End 1962 measures

2. Modernize one Sabre Squadron

Conform to national plans - Should be fulfilled if production stays as at present.

NATO SECRET

19th August, 1961.

D E N M A R K

I. Army.

A. End 1961 measures.

1. Personnel. The sharp increase requested (nearly 3,000 men) can only be met by extending the period of military service and by recall of reservists. Both measures will probably lead to political difficulties.

B. 1962 measures.

2. Personnel. The further increase of nearly 8,000 men will be difficult to meet without emergency measures as mentioned in point 1 above. The financial impact will be considerable.

3. Equipment. See former paper point 4.

II. Navy.

Nearly all the Danish Navy are assigned to SAACEUR.

A. End 1961 measures.

1. The phasing forward of ships from Cat. B and C to Cat. A does not present too great a problem in total numbers, but there may be some difficulty in providing technicians and trained personnel, due to the shortage of regulars.

2. Many ships are obsolete and phasing up may not reach the full Cat. A standards. This is emphasized in the reply to ARQ(61) which points out that due to obsolescence 1962 force goals laid down in MC/96 cannot be reached.

3. The present emergency goals are however higher than the 1962 goals in Cat. A status, particularly in P.C.E.'s which ask for 7 compared with 3 in the 1962 goal and 4 only in the 1966 goals. Three of the present 7 P.C.E.'s are obsolete and are due to be scrapped in 1961/62.

B. End 1962 measures.

The only units required in 1962 additional to the end 1961 emergency goals are 2 B.D. which are already planned to be delivered in 1962 from U.S.A.

General

The logistic build up will mean an increase of self financed procurement and/or M.A.P.

There is at present a 30 day supply of mines and storage depots are already being established.

III. Air Force

A. End 1961 measures

1. Raise combat crew ready rate and aircraft combat ready rate.
 - a) Combat crew ready rate at present 73%, as stated in AR(61), is a matter of intensified training.
 - b) Aircraft combat ready rate at present 55%. Possible to raise to 70% by expediting procurement of critical spare parts and expediting maintenance, although there is a deficiency of technicians.
2. Man Control and Reporting units on a twenty-four hour basis.

There is a deficiency of technicians which will be very difficult to fill before the end of 1961.
3. Procure 13 additional F-100 aircraft. Only source is M.A.P. aid. Denmark depends entirely on external aid for major items.
4. Increase logistic support.
 - a) There is a lack of spare parts for all types of combat aircraft. The difficulties seem to be organisational rather than financial.
 - b) Major deficiencies are in 20mm ammunition and various types of aircraft. Involves an expenditure of about Kr.23 million (i.e. doubling the present Air Force Equipment expenditure).

5. Achievement of a nuclear capability. This could be achieved rather rapidly if political conditions permit.

6. Complete manning. Under new recruiting schemes, progress is already being made, but by end 1961 there will still be a deficiency of about 500 men, mostly technicians.

B. End 1962 measures

7. Complete aircraft strength. This implies the acquisition of 21 bomber Strike aircraft; these can only come from external aid.

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET

19 août 1961

F R A N C EI. A R M YA. End 1961 measures1. General

The French authorities state that a division returned from Algeria will soon be available for military operations in Europe, intend to return a second division and to take steps towards completion of their units in Germany. The last two measures will take considerable time to show results.

The results to be obtained by full implementation of these measures nearly cover SACEUR's present demands.

2. Personnel

As SACEUR in fact is only asking for reassignment of forces, no additional manpower is required.

3. Redeployment of 1st echelon divisions

Review of movement plans of 7 first echelon divisions, now in Algeria, is requested. SHAPE assumes repatriation of some or all, should the situation in Europe deteriorate seriously. As these units should be reorganised and reequipped for their task in Europe, their value in an emergency will be doubtful.

B. End 1962 measures4. Equipment

Same as 2 b former paper.

II. N a v y

1. Under the procedure of C-41(55)82, the French Government, by a note of 6th March 1959, withdrew from SACEUR's command the French Naval Forces earmarked for assignment to the Mediterranean. There being no French Naval Forces committed to SACEUR, he therefore makes no assessment of the situation as regards the French Navy in the present note.

2. The majority of French naval forces are earmarked to SACLANT and CINCHAN, from whom no reappraisal has been received. The recommitment to NATO of French mediterranean naval forces, would be a convincing demonstration of solidarity under the present circumstances. The French reply to ARQ(61) goes so far as to state that the Mediterranean forces will co-operate with NATO forces on the outbreak of hostilities.

III. Air Force

A. End 1961 measures

1. Bring two Nike bataillons to full operational status

The first bataillon is operational on temporary sites; the permanent sites are part of the general problem of the construction of sites in Germany.

The second bataillon will receive its equipment as from August 1961 and will also be installed on temporary sites; it is planned to be operational by end 1962. Building up of the second unit could probably be expedited in order to reach operational status by spring 1962.

2. Increase logistic support

SHAPE and the French authorities do not agree in their statement of deficiencies. According to AR(61), a 30 day supply of SIDE WINDER missiles is on hand and the major deficiencies seem to be fragmentation bombs and F 100 aircraft spares. The first can be readily provided from M.A.P.; the second results from production and procurement difficulties rather than from lack of funds.

3. Mating of control and Reporting units

There is only a small deficiency which could be corrected by repatriating personnel from Algeria.

4. Increase aircraft combat ready rate and combat crew ready rate

a) Aircraft combat ready rate (now 63%) would improve if F 100 spare parts situation were corrected.

b) Combat crew ready rate (now 83%) should improve by intensified training measures.

5. Complete forces

a) AWX: The French Air Force plans to reach 4/64 aircraft by end 61 (of which 2/24 Mirage III), thus more than asked by SHAPE.

b) FB/Attack : The French Air Force intends to purchase some additional F-100 aircraft but will remain about 9 aircraft under SHAPE'S demands.

B. End 1962 measures

6. Complete forces

a) FB/Attack and Strike: New SHAPE demands (total 244 aircraft) exceed ACE Forces Programme for end 1962 by 94 aircraft. The French Air Force plans to have 12/228 aircraft available by the end of the same year; this figure exceeds in fact the ACE Forces Programme by 78 aircraft.

b) Light weight aircraft: SHAPE demands agree with national plans.

c) AWX: The deliveries of Mirage III aircraft from production will not allow for the build up of units required by SHAPE except if production could be accelerated significantly. Only 4/48 Mirage III will be reached under present conditions. The FAF plans to compensate this deficiency by maintaining into service 2/24 IDF aircraft.

d) RECCE : There will be a shortage of 4 Mirage III aircraft.

End 1962, the situation will be as follows if no special measures are taken: SHAPE demand: 31/536 -- French plans: 26/432.

NATO SECRET

19th August 1961

GERMANYI. ArmyA - End 1961 measures1. General

Of 12 existing divisions 8 are now assigned. Germany plans to strengthen these 8 divisions on short term and to assign in 1962 three other at reduced strength. SHAPE seems satisfied with these measures, only asks for some additional supporting units.

2. Personnel

The number of additional personnel required by SHAPE (about 40.000 men, after deduction of present strength of one division to be assigned) will for a considerable part be met within present german plans.

3. Equipment

The promised acceleration in equipment procurement will give results only after a long lead time. Still delays in choice and delivery of equipment - particularly when NATO type equipment is involved - are likely to impede the build-up of the german army for some years.

B - End 1962 measures4. Personnel

Completion of the last three divisions to be assigned and increase in supporting units will require another 60.000/^{men}(present strength of 3 divisions deducted). This number cannot be expected within present draft and conscription possibilities. An increase in the length of military service from 12 to possibly 18 months is probably the only solution.

5. Training and depots

A solution should be found for the well-known shortfalls in training-area's and storage-depots.

II. Navy

All NATO forces are assigned to SACEUR.

The J.R.G. have proposed no specific measures regarding the Navy to meet the crisis.

A - End 1961 measures

and

1. The phasing forward of the destroyers/FPBS presents no problem in manpower as they are already manned to MC 55/1 standards. The ships themselves are already well equipped and re-equipment and replacement programme is under way. The 3 CMs are already being refitted, should be in cat. A by end 1961.

2. It is noted that the emergency goals are quite considerably less than the 1962 Initial force programme goals e.g. DD/DE : 10 c.f. 14

SS/SSC: 2 in cat. C
c.f. 9 in cat. A

FPB : 35 c.f. 39

3. Logistically storage space for the 5.300 mines may present a difficulty as all space is at a premium.

B - End 1962 measures

The additional phasing forward of units should present no difficulty.

III. Air Force

A - Mid 1961 measures

1. Expedite construction programme

This question has been exhaustively discussed during the 1960 Annual Review examining sessions. Mid 1961 the situation is as follows :

- a) NIKE : 72 sites planned - 12 presumably completed by end 1961 beginning 1962 - 15 additional sites expected to be completed by end 1962 (beginning 1963). This would allow installation on permanent sites of 3 battalions by end 1961 and a total of 7 battalions by end 1962.

- b) HAWK : 88 sites planned - 15 presumably completed by end 1962. 5 additional sites expected to be completed by end 1963. This would allow the installation of 4 bataillons by end 1962 and a total of 5 bataillons by end 1963.
- c) Special ammunition sites : total planned : 64 (not including the NIKE special depots which form part of the NIKE sites). Only three depots are expected to be completed by end 1961 and a further 15 depots by end 1962. It seems unlikely that this work can be greatly accelerated without taking far reaching political decisions.

2. Complete training and assign 8 additional squadrons.

The training is well under way and intensified training would permit assignment in a near future.

3. Increase logistic support

Some items of equipment are on order. It seems feasible to expedite delivery.

4. The German Air Force faces a very serious personnel problem; national plans provide for an increase of 8,800 men in 1961 and about 3,000 in 1962. There will still remain a very serious deficiency at the end of 1962.

5. Forces

a) FB/Strike and attack : Introduction of 2/50 F 104 G will be possible if training and flight trials are completed in due time.

b) Light weight aircraft : Introduction of G91 aircraft is planned but depends on timely delivery of aircraft.

c) Other types : Assignment of required units is planned but depends on completion of training.

In total, the G.A.F. plans for 31/635 aircraft by end 1961 against 22/472 required by SSAPM.

B - End 1962 measures

6. Forces

SHAPE demands are 35/729 aircraft by end 1962. The German authorities plan for 34/654 aircraft by the same date. The deficiencies will be : 2/40 light weight strike aircraft, 8 light weight reconnaissance aircraft, 36 day interceptor aircraft.

The means of correcting partly this situation is to expedite delivery of G 91 and F 104 G aircraft although this measure seems difficult to fulfill in due time even without taking into account the additional funds which would be required.

NATO SECRET

19 août 1961

G R E E C E

I. Army

A. End 1961 measures

1. Personnel

Increase required (over 13,000 men) can only be met by recall of reservists. The Greek authorities plan to maintain present manning levels (75% for M day forces) but reiterated in this years reply to ARA that they are prepared to give overriding priority to manning equipment as soon as it is delivered through H.A.P.

2. Equipment

The Greek Army is completely dependent on external aid for improving the deplorable equipment situation (obsolete equipment and considerable shortages in P.O. & E. and reserves). For this the present level of aid should be increased two or threefold. Recommendations in the equipment field can only usefully apply, not to Greece, but to its more prosperous allies.

B. End 1962 measures

3. Personnel

No additional personnel seems to be required.

II. Naval

All NATO naval forces are assigned to SACBUR.

A. End 1961 measures

1. The only measure requested is to expedite the acquisition of 1 S/M and its manning. This S/M has already been promised through H.D.A.P. to be delivered in the autumn of 1961.

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2. There is an increase in the emergency goals over the 1962 initial ~~force~~ programme particularly in P.C.L. 6 of F.O, L.S./L.C.T. 35 of 16.

3. All forces requested are reported as in Cat. A. Both to manning levels and readiness. However there is a lack of modern equipment throughout the Navy and reequipping is entirely dependent on N.A.P. . There is a shortage of technicians and due to the lack of equipment in training. However reorganisation within the Navy will go some way to making good manpower shortages and a speed-up of N.A.P. deliveries ~~tes~~ would add to the overall efficiency.

Logistic build-up is dependent on N.A.P.

B. End 1962 measures

The measures depend on N.A.P. deliveries.

III. Air Force

A. End 1961 measures

1. Convert one attack squadron to strike role

AR(60) - Memorandum reports the first strike squadron as being fully operational.

2. Expedite introduction of one G91 squadron and one F.86 D squadron.

a) AR(60) Forces tables - state that delivery of G-91 aircraft will start in July 1961 and will be completed in February 1962. Delivery should be expedited by the NAAG authorities.

b) Introduction of one additional F 86 D squadron to conform to national plans but completion depends entirely on deliveries from external aid.

3. Man Control and Reporting units for twenty-four hour operation.

There is a deficiency of technicians in spite of the recruitment measures taken. Improvements are made but training will take time.

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4. Raise aircraft combat ready rate and combat crew ready rate

a) The low aircraft combat ready rate is linked with shortages in aircraft spare parts following the re-routing of supply of spares through the NATO Agency. Measures could be taken by the NMSSA to correct this situation.

b) Intensified training and an increased number of flying hours per pilot and per year could correct this deficiency. The annual additional cost to raise the flying hours from 180 to 240 hours per year would be about 136 million Dr. (19% of the current Air Force budget).

5. Remedy supply deficiencies

The major deficiencies are in SIDEWINDER missiles, droppable fuel tanks and aircraft spare parts. The Greek Air Force is almost entirely dependent on aid for its equipment and the solution for this problem rests with M.A.P. and NMSSA.

B. End 1962 measures6. Expedite action to provide modern aircraft

The Greek Air Force is entirely dependent on external aid for the delivery of major items of equipment. Delivery of 9 F 104G aircraft is programmed for 1962.

NATO SECRET

20th August, 1961.

I T A L Y

I. Army.

A. End 1961 measures.

1. Personnel. The new requirements are considerably higher than those in the Program Planning Guidance for 1962 and even for 1964. There a gradual build up of the manning level was required, for border units to 85% and for other M-Day forces to 75%. Now for all M-Day divisions 90% is asked by end 1961 and for the support 80% by end 1962.

To increase the manning by end 1961 with 24,000 men will necessitate emergency measures (cancelling short leave, recall of reservists).

B. End 1962 measures.

2. Personnel. Another 36,000 men are requested, mainly for supporting units, bringing the additional personnel requirement to 60,000 men (P.P.G. for 1962 some 12,000 men). This number cannot be met without emergency measures.

3. Equipment. See 4 former paper.

II. Navy.

All Forces assigned to SACEUR.

A. End 1961 measures.

The phasing forward of DD/DE should present no real difficulty. The 14 FPBs although in Cat. A at present are not all of NATO standards. The acquisition of the 3 helicopters depends on MAP and/or own financing. The acquisition of MP aircraft depends on MAP.

Emergency goals again differ from 1962 initial force programmes, particularly with F.P.Bs: 6 c.f. 14 and MP aircraft NIL c.f. 36.

Logistic measures depend on increased financial measures.

B. End 1962 measures.

These follow on from end 1961 measures and there are no great differences between the two.

Manning presents little difficulty.

III. Air ForceA. End 1961 measures.

1. Expedite delivery of 25G-91 aircraft. Some production problems seem to have delayed delivery of G-91 aircraft: the activation of the first light weight aircraft in 1961 had to be postponed. The Italian authorities should investigate the means of correcting this situation as these aircraft are built in Italy.

2. Raise combat ready rate for aircraft and crews.

a) Aircraft: the deficiency stems from delays occurring in IRAN overhaul due to shortages in spare parts. Accelerated production of spare parts can solve this problem although it will be difficult in the time due.

b) Crews: intensified training seems to be the only solution although the shortage of aircraft presents difficulties to carry out this measure.

3. Man control and reporting units for twenty-four hour operation. Improvements have been made but they are not fully satisfactory. Further personnel should be withdrawn from headquarters and schools.

4. Improve logistic support.

a) There is a shortage of aircraft on hand arising from a shortage of spare parts and subsequent delays in overhaul. Italy should be able to improve the situation fairly quickly.

b) There is a deficiency in the stocks of drop tanks and fins for bombs. These shortages could be made good through external aid.

5. Ensure full support for the IRBM units. During 1961 the activation of all satellite sites will be completed; at present 7 out of the 10 programmed sites have been completed and are operational. Some

personnel is still undergoing training as instructors in the U.S.A. and the launching units have begun training launches at Cape Canaveral.

6. Complete forces. As said above, delays in overhaul of combat aircraft and in production of G-91 aircraft, have reduced the number of aircraft on hand in the units. Italy should be able to correct this situation fairly quickly.

B. End 1962 measures.

7. Modernize forces. The introduction of 34 F104G aircraft during 1962 depends entirely on the timely delivery of aircraft from production. As production is carried out in Italy, the national authorities should be able to control production and expedite delivery if required.

NATO SECRET

20th August 1961.

L U X E M B O U R G

ARMY

SACEUR requests the speeding up of the conversion of one Infantry battalion into an M-day 105 mm. Field Artillery Battalion.

This conversion is presently planned to be completed in 1963 and during the Examining Session AR(60) the Luxembourg Representative was doubtful whether acceleration would be possible without jeopardising the project.

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19th August, 1961.

N E T H E R L A N D SI. Army.A. End 1961 measures

1. Personnel. Providing additionally one Armoured Brigade, one tank battalion and one Field Artillery battalion requires over 6,000 men. (1962 Program asked for 290 men). Feasibility doubtful, even when cancelling short leave or recalling reservists, owing to number of specialists required.

2. Equipment. Necessary equipment to build up forementioned units not complete. Procurement action for shortfalls and for modernising divisions can be expedited, but results only after long lead time.

3. Other. Movement of one Brigade to Germany held up by accommodation difficulties.

B. End 1962 measures.

4. Personnel. As first step towards balanced logistical support increase first echelon support to 10% (final goal 65%) requires 3,500 men.. Seems impossible from draft (already short). Possible through longer service or recall of reservists.

5. Training. Brigade and divisional training requires suitable training areas, preferably in Germany.

II. Navy.

Netherlands naval forces are assigned to SACLANT and CINCHAN from whom no assessment has been received.

III. Air ForceA. 1961 measures

1. Manning of Control and Reporting units for twenty-four hour operation. This should be possible by withdrawing qualified personnel from headquarters, schools and repair units.

2. Increase combat ready rate of aircraft and crews.

a) Aircraft: now 58% - results from procurement difficulties of spare parts for F86K aircraft. Will be difficult to solve, these spares being available in very small quantities only (European production problem).

b) Crews: intensified training is the only solution.

3. Increase logistic support. Major deficiency is in SIDEWINDER missiles; additional funds required to reach 30 day level are estimated at Fl. 17 million, but delivery will take a long time.

4. Maintaining 4/96 Hunter squadrons. Netherlands Government plans to reduce these squadrons to 3/75 by end 1961 and 3/54 by end 1962, which conforms to the ACE Force Programme for the same period. Maintaining 4/96 Hunter squadrons would increase technical personnel difficulties.

B. 1962 measures.

5. Modernize with 1/16 F104G. Depends entirely on delivery of F104G aircraft from common production.

NOTE: Measures proposed by SHAPE exceed ACE Force Programme by 22 aircraft for end 1961 and 56 aircraft by end 1962.

NATO SECRET

20th August 1961

N O R W A YI - ArmyA - End 1961 measures1. Personnel

The additional 2600 men requested cannot be met on short term without recourse to recall of reservists

B - End 1962 measures2. Personnel

For 1962 a negligible further increase is asked. The larger age classes will provide sufficient conscripts but qualitative increases (regulars, specialists) will be difficult to obtain.

3. Equipment

See former paper point 4.

II - Navy

All NATO naval forces are assigned to SACMUR.

A - End 1961 measures

The phasing forward to cat. A of ships at present in Cats. B and C present no manning problems quantitatively but the 3 ships to be phased forward were due for scrapping in 1961 and their state must be regarded as doubtful.

The cat. A ships now requested exceed the LC 96 1962 goals quite considerably.

e.g. DD/DE 8 c.f. 3

CM - 3 c.f. 2 except for FPN which shows a reduction from 22 to the present request for 12 in cat. A.

Qualitatively in manning there is a shortage of regulars and therefore of trained personnel.

The logistic build up means an increase in aid and self financing.

B - End 1962 measures

The only additional measure is the phasing forward of 8 FPB and expediting the new ones.

This should present little difficulty although there may be reduced standards

III - Air Force

A - End 1961 Measures

1. Remedy deficiencies in aircraft

Concerns 13 combat aircraft and 8 transport aircraft. Norway depends entirely on external aid for the provision of aircraft.

2. Raise combat ready rate of aircraft and crews.

a) Aircraft : now 60% following SHAPE, but 70% stated in IR(61), Memorandum. The Norwegian Air Force seems to be up to LC 55/1 standards.

b) Crews : Can only be solved through intensified training.

3. Improve logistic support

The spare parts situation as a whole is serious, NMSSA not yet having adequately replaced mutual aid. Some improvement could undoubtedly be effected in the near future and Norway has taken steps to that effect.

4. Nuclear capability

Norwegian forces have no nuclear capability. If the political opposition can be overcome, a rapid improvement in the effectiveness of the Norwegian Air Force could undoubtedly be achieved.

B - End 1962 Measure

None suggested.

NATO SECRET

20th August, 1961.

PORTUGAL

I. ARMY

1. SACOUR recommends that Portugal should, if possible, convert the 2nd echelon infantry division into a NATO-type M-day Brigade.

2. This project was being studied. No difficulties were to be expected in the manpower field, but for modern equipment extensive external aid was considered necessary.

3. However, the Angola difficulties seem to have postponed further measures indefinitely.

II. NAVY

All NATO naval forces are assigned to SACLANT from whom no recommendations have been received.

III. AIR FORCE

There are no SACOUR recommendations regarding the Portuguese Air Forces.

NATO SECRET

20th August, 1961.

TURKEY

I. Army.

A. End 1961 measures.

1. Personnel. No increase required, as current reorganization is considered to free sufficient men for NATO units.

2. Equipment. The Turkish Army is completely dependent on external aid to remedy shortfalls in TO & E and reserves, to replace the considerable proportion of present equipment which is obsolete, and to meet new requirements for mechanisation. For this the present level of aid should be increased two or threefold. Recommendations in the equipment field can only usefully apply, not to Turkey, but to its more prosperous allies.

B. End 1962 measures.

3. Personnel. Considerable qualitative improvement (regulars, technicians) are necessary. An education programme has been started but might be accelerated.

4. Other. Training should be intensified. Logistic procedures should be improved. Both measures can be applied without major non-military implications, but might need more advisers from Turkey's allies.

II. Navy.

All NATO forces are assigned to SACEUR.

A. End 1961 measures.

The phasing forward of 2 Destroyers and 2 Submarines should not be too difficult and the exploiting of the refitting of the 2 DDs and 2 submarines at present in U.S. would help.

Logistic build-up of stocks is entirely dependent on aid.

Stocks at present are critically low.

B. End 1962 measures.

No additional measures have been requested.

III. Air Force.A. End 1961 measures.1. Delay planned in activation of 3 F84G squadrons.

Inactivation of the three squadrons was planned for budgetary reasons. If there is no other obstacle, such as personnel, increased external aid in the form of aviation fuel and spare parts could solve this problem.

2. Man Control and Reporting units on a 24-hour basis. There exists a very serious shortage of technicians. The personnel problem is difficult to solve in view of the low basic instruction of recruits.

3. Increase logistic support. Serious deficiencies exist, of fuel, ammunition, bombs and droppable fuel tanks; some ground servicing equipment is also lacking. The means of correcting these deficiencies lies in increased and expedited external aid. Some ammunition stocks could be transferred from other countries where reserves received under M.A.P. exceed 90 days.

4. Forces. An additional 41 combat aircraft are required by end 1961 to bring the squadrons up to strength. The only source is external aid.

Activation of the IRBM squadron should be expedited. Personnel is undergoing training; the first three missiles are planned to be operational in October 1961. Activation of other missiles could be expedited with the help of U.S. technicians.

B. End 1962 measures.

5. Forces. An additional 2/36 combat aircraft are demanded by end 1962. The only source for aircraft is external aid. About 1500 personnel being required to activate the two squadrons, and a large

number of them being technicians, the personnel problem will be very difficult to solve.

NOTE: The measures proposed by SHAPE exceed ACE Force Programme by 21 aircraft for end 1961 and 57 aircraft for end 1962.

NATO SECRET

20th August, 1961.

UNITED KINGDOMI. Armya. 1961 measures

1. General. The UK intends to deploy to Germany on short term one missile battalion and two light anti-aircraft regiments (now requested by SACEUR for 1962) and to form a two Brigade Division as Strategic Reserve in U.K. (a standing requirement, but U.K. has never agreed to assign these Brigades to SACEUR).

Over and above this SACEUR requires the bringing of the seven brigades in Germany to 90% manning, increasing the existing support and bringing B.A.O.R. to full 3 division strength by adding two Brigades and the necessary support. Implementation depends on the British Government giving overriding priority to the NATO area and accepting that the actual contribution in Germany cannot be considered equivalent to three divisions.

2. Personnel. Of the additional 23,000 men required, the 11,000 men for the planned Strategic Reserve will be met by reassignment. The further increase cannot be met from new recruitment. If further reassignment is impossible the only solution seems to be retaining the last conscripts and readopting conscription.

B. 1962 measures.

3. Personnel. A further increase of 7,500 men is planned partly to be met by assignment of the air defence regiments. The increase required for completing three divisions is not mentioned, would be about 10,000 men. Point 2 applies.

4. Equipment. Equipping the additional brigades, and mechanisation of three divisions and the constant process of replacing obsolescent equipment will mean a major effort in the equipment field. In particular fulfilment of the requirement for full-tracked armoured personnel carriers will take several years; temporarily this requirement is partly met by wheeled armoured cars.

II. Navy

The majority of R.N. forces assigned to NATO are under the operational command of SACLANT and CINCHAN.

The U.K. proposals to meet the Berlin crisis do not include any measures to be undertaken by the Navy.

SACEUR's end 1961 measures

The earmarking to AFMED of sufficient additional naval vessels to meet MC-70 requirements may present some difficulty particularly for destroyers in view of the overall deficiency.

The phasing forward of DD and SS should not be too difficult. However, the conflicting demands of SACLANT and SACEUR is an added complication and the 1961 emergency goals are now more than the MC 96 1962 goals.

e.g. DD/DDE etc. 13 c.f. 9
SS 4 c.f. 2

End 1962 measures

There are no additional measures other than those for end 1961.

III. Air ForceA. 1961 measures

1. Additional aircraft for Canberra and Hunter squadrons. This measure was not envisaged by the U.K. Government. Seems feasible by drawing from the national forces.
2. Raise aircraft combat ready rate. At present 53%. Deficiency results from withdrawal of aircraft for modification. Modification programme to be completed in 1961 and combat readiness should improve.

B. 1962 measures

3. One high altitude surface to air missile unit. The United Kingdom Government has no plans for the build up of one high altitude SAM unit in Germany. Only means of fulfilling this requirement would be to transfer one unit from Fighter Command in U.K. to the R.A.F. in Germany.

Note: Measures proposed by SHAPE exceed ACE Force Programme by 8 aircraft for end 1961 and 16 aircraft for end 1962.