

JS.104/61

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NATO SECRET

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Note for the Secretary General

Subject : Evaluation of the recent measures taken by the United States presented to the Council by Mr. Dean Rusk on August 8th 1961.

To complement the studies established for the Secretary general in preparation for the Council meeting of the 21st August on Berlin, the Finance and Defence planning Directorate have prepared the attached note which briefly evaluates the recent measures taken by the United States in face of a possible Berlin crisis.

This study contains, first, an evaluation of the military measure; and second, comments on the corresponding budgetary measures voted by the U.S. Congress.

Three points are worth underlining :

- a) an important part of the military measures decided on are additional to the requirements expressed by SACEUR in his 1962-1966 country forces program. This is an essential difference as compared with the European countries, who are only asked to accelerate the completion of these forces up to the level required by SACEUR.
- b) these measures seem to be the implementation of the new strategic concept defined by the U.S. authorities, and still under discussion by the Council, rather than extraordinary action taken in face of the Berlin crisis. In fact the reinforcements are essentially in the field of conventional forces.
- c) contrary to the statement made on August 8th by Mr. Dean Rusk<sup>(2)</sup> ("I am equally sure we all stand ready to help each other if joint action is the answer to any problem"), the U.S. Senate decided two

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(1) Note JS.103/61 dated 18 August 1961.

(2) See U.S. Memorandum page 9, last §

days ago to cut by 250 million dollars the military aid appropriations for fiscal year 1961-1962 (requested 1.8 billion - voted 1.55 billion). Moreover no action seems to have been taken on accelerating deliveries of aid already voted, whilst it appears from the country studies attached to Note II contained in the file JS.103/61 already send to the Secretary General that a prerequisite to any accelerated effort required from many European countries is in accelerating and increasing aid deliveries.



J. Sagne

19th August, 1961.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I. Evaluation of the new measures for further military build up.

1. General.

The American intentions for build up of their forces in connection with the Berlin crisis, as stated in the Council on 8-8-1961 should be considered, keeping in mind the following points:

- a. Present U.S.A. forces for all practical purposes meet the 1962 requirements and are in a state of full combat effectiveness.
- b. The American authorities wish to show their determination to strengthen their forces and to be prepared for all eventualities. Thus part of the measures seem to be psychological rather than to have a direct military impact.
- c. They intend to avoid taking measures, or taking them too early, which have such a heavy impact in the economic or financial field, or have such internal political implications that they would be difficult to maintain over a longer period.

2. Army.

A. Existing requirements and plans.

The Army is considered to be fully combat effective. The one thing SACEUR demands in his 1962-1966 Program Planning Guidance is to mechanise before end 1962 one division (in 1963 another two), and to accept the organisation of the NATO Standard Division instead of the Pentomic Division. This requires an increase in the divisional strength of about 2,000 men, which were considered available within present troop ceilings. Moreover an increase of about 500 combat vehicles per division is considered necessary by SHAPE, though this information has not been communicated in the P.P.G. It is known, though not in detail, that the ideas in the American Army are also directed towards strengthened divisions with more combat vehicles, for which orders have been placed.

B. Emergency measures

The emergency measures, announced in August, are in such general terms that the evaluation can only be very general too. Apart from filling the small personnel deficiencies of the units in Europe there is no immediate strengthening of the USA Army contribution in Europe. However, in the States far going measures are taken to increase the operational reserve. Four existing divisions will be brought to full combat readiness, five mobilisable divisions are prepared for immediate recall, while the necessary preparations for early deployment are completed. In the equipment field, the procurement action is accelerated, with priority in those fields where results can be obtained in time for a possible Berlin crisis.

3. Navy.

a. The U.S. NATO Forces are divided between SACLANT and SACEUR, the greater part being allocated to SACLANT.

b. Neither Commander has, as yet, requested extra measures to be undertaken by U.S. Navy to meet the present crisis.

c. The measures to be taken for the Navy, according to the statement in the Council, are :

- (i) Activation of additional Naval Units for anti-submarine and other missions.
- (ii) Stand-by preparation to increase active fleet personnel strength levels.
- (iii) Increasing amphibious and administrative sea-lift by retention and reactivation of ships not previously planned for the active fleet.

d. The short-falls ~~are~~ emphasised in the reply to ARQ(60) based on MC-70 are in ASW carriers, light cruisers, maritime aircraft and submarines. The 1962 initial force programme goals, however, will be met without difficulty.

The measures suggested in para. c(i) will undoubtedly go some way to remedying these deficiencies.

e. There were two other problems relating to the efficiency of the Alliance which were unsolved in the reply to ARQ(60) and as far as is known still remain so.

- (i) The allocation of Naval Forces between SACLANT and SACEUR.
- (ii) The deployment in the Mediterranean of one ASW Carrier Group on a permanent basis in lieu of the intermittent basis now in force.

f. The other measures mentioned in c(ii) and c(iii) above, whilst adding to the overall increase in mobilisation efficiency, ~~is~~ are not related to any known shortfall.

#### 4. Air Force

a. The military considerations in the country chapter of AR(60) arrived at the following conclusions as far as the Air Force is concerned :

"During the period under review (note: up to end 1963), USAF units assigned to NATO will possess a high capability to carry out their assigned missions. They cannot be considered fully capable until the following major deficiencies are corrected:

- a) vulnerability to surprise attack
- b) some shortfalls in required reconnaissance units."

b. The only forces deficiency is a shortfall in reconnaissance units. It is to be noted that this deficiency will only occur as from 1962 when two RB66 reconnaissance-bomber squadrons were scheduled to be withdrawn. Although the measures taken or envisaged by the U.S. authorities do not include a change in plans as far as these units are concerned, the decision could eventually be taken to follow ACE Forces Programme for 1962 and maintain these units up to the end of 1962.

c. All measures taken by the U.S. authorities are additional to the requirements expressed by ACE Forces Programme and therefore constitute a real reinforcement of the NATO Air Force strength should the need arise.

d. The emergency measures taken for strengthening the forces in Europe can be summarized as follows:

- a) Preparing twelve tactical air squadrons and four air transport squadrons for deployment to Europe.
- b) Prepare the means of transportation and facilities for the deployment of these units.

e. In the production field, the measures would eventually enable the United States to expedite delivery of equipment and ammunition already programmed under MAP. This measure would add considerable strength to those countries where reserves show critical deficiencies.

f. The long term measures taken consist essentially in preparing the build up of subsequent reinforcements in the form of fighter-reconnaissance squadrons (29) and air transport squadrons (11).

5. Conclusion.

a. The measures taken have nearly no immediate influence on the American forces in Europe, which are practically at full standards;

b. The emergency preparations in USA for rapid deployment are considerable;

c. No measures are mentioned in the field of military aid, though it seems possible to expedite delivery of programmed items.

II - Tendencies shown by the U.S. Defence Budget

On 25th July, the President asked Congress for a further \$ 3.4 billion credits for defence. As approved by Congress on August 10th, total defence ~~are~~ appropriations for 1961/62 are \$ 46.7 billion - a peace time record - compared to \$ 41.5 billion in 1960/61 and \$ 41.2 billion in 1959/60. The emphasis in the revised budget is heavily on conventional arms - a very substantial increase in manpower and conventional weapons, and retention in service longer than planned of some types of ships and aircraft. On the information available, the financial measures proposed by the President are the exact counterpart of the military measures outlined in the statement by the Secretary of State.

2. The measures now announced are a logical development of the thinking in the President's first message in March, which laid much more emphasis on conventional forces than had the Eisenhower budgets. The Berlin crisis has not, therefore, changed the direction of U.S. military planning in any major respect, but has merely accelerated its progress. In doing so, it has confirmed the U.S. position in the NATO strategic debate, as favouring powerful conventional forces which will afford the maximum flexibility in dealing with recurrent crises, while the deterrent, though maintained, is not so much to the fore. It may be that the Berlin crisis, skilfully orchestrated, has not been at all unwelcome to the new military thinkers in the White House, anxious to establish their ideas.

3. It is thus surprising that military aid - which is essentially a cheap method of activating low-cost conventional forces - has received little attention from the Kennedy administration. The President has put to Congress far-ranging new plans for the Administration of non-military aid, over a five-year period, the fate of which is still unknown in the House Committee. But his request to Congress for military aid - 1.8 billion - is no higher than the previous year. It has been reduced by the Senate to \$ 1.65 billion, and the final outcome is not known. More surprising still, no action seems to have been taken on accelerating deliveries of aid already voted, and in the "pipeline" - even, if necessary, at the expense of subsequent deliveries, or by using the flexibility afforded by the large carry-overs, - which could, in certain cases, have an immediate effect on the efficacy of NATO forces.