

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

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11 Aug 1961

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

1989

August 11, 1961

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Dear Mr. President:

This letter examines actions which could be taken by NATO countries to prepare for a possible Berlin crisis. It deals first with subjects generally applicable to all nations of the Alliance and then, under country headings, with the more important specific actions which could be urged on some of the countries. It is submitted on an informal basis for your information and should not be widely circulated nor used as the sole basis for initiating action with individual countries.

Manning and Equipping

Stamp: NISCA 98

In general, the nations of the Alliance should increase the manning of their existing forces, including the combat and service support components. Enclosure 1 shows the authorized and actual periods of compulsory service for each nation of the Alliance. At enclosures 2 through 12 you will find for each nation a tabular comparison of the present situation of land, sea, and air forces, with our proposed 1962 program for each country, except the United States, Portugal, Luxembourg and Iceland. These tables indicate the now existing numerical shortages in manpower and major items of equipment. There are also notes concerning existing deficiencies in training, technical personnel, etc., many of which are subject to amelioration before 1 January 1962. The enclosures also include summary sheets for each country, summarizing actions which would improve the posture of the Alliance in the next few months.

Training

Intensified training of the M-Day and mobilization increments of the forces of the Alliance to include exercises involving the deployment of elements of the Strategic Reserve could be conducted in the immediate future and would heighten readiness. It should be suggested to the Allied Governments that they immediately appropriate the necessary resources and conduct additional training exercises.

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Signal

There is an immediate emergency requirement in Allied Command Europe for 195 synchronous one-time-tape cryptographic machines. NATO procurement is presently held up by reservations on the part of France. The French should be requested to withdraw their reservation on this critical item. There is also an immediate requirement for an additional 12 transportable, single-side-band high frequency radio stations. These have been requested by SHAPE but NATO approval has been received for only 6 of the 18 required. They would be used as an alternate capability at various ACE headquarters, in the event the fixed facilities were destroyed. Early approval of the additional 12 should be obtained from NATO.

France

The building-up to strength of the French divisions now deployed in Germany and the return of three or four divisions and several squadrons of aircraft to France from Algeria constitute the most useful actions that can be taken at this time.

Although it is not desired to take new initiatives in these fields, it is a fact that the recommitment to NATO of French naval forces would be a convincing demonstration of solidarity within the Alliance, and authority to stockpile atomic weapons in France on an emergency basis would add significantly to the flexibility of the atomic strike forces.

Federal Republic of Germany

On the basis of the information currently available, the Germans can and should concentrate on bringing the eight divisions currently committed to NATO up to strength. In principle, I would like to see these divisions at 85 to 90 per cent of full strength before manpower is diverted to the creation of new divisions.

The Federal Republic has a small training squadron of Matador missiles which they had intended using to train personnel in preparation for receipt of the MACE missile. They have decided to drop the MACE program and purchase instead the Pershing missile. The

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training squadron still exists, however, and with technical assistance from the United States it could be made operational in a few months. Though the number of missiles in ready status would not be great, there may be military and psychological advantage to be gained from such a German contribution.

One of the continuing major problems of the Alliance is the acquisition of land in Germany for military installations. The problem is most acute at the moment for Nike and special ammunition storage site purposes. The Federal Republic should be urged to expedite, on an emergency basis, the provision of both temporary and permanent siting which might be utilizable in the next few months.

United Kingdom

The general provisions for improvement in the fields of manning, equipping, training, etc., apply to the United Kingdom. The British should also consider strengthening the logistic support chain for their own forces and for the Canadian Brigade. There is also the possibility that they might, on a temporary basis, commit to NATO additional light bomber aircraft for deployment either in the United Kingdom or on the Continent.

As regards commitment of naval vessels, the United Kingdom is currently short of both MC 70 and 1966 requirements. In general, however, the vessels exist and the only action required is earmarking them for Allied forces in the Mediterranean. While such earmarking would not materially change the situation from a purely military viewpoint, it can be publicized to indicate British intent.

Denmark and Norway

A great weakness in the North is the lack of a nuclear capability. However, time and the restrictions of United States' law would not permit the development of a nuclear-delivery capability in Denmark and Norway this calendar year under any circumstances.

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Belgium

Belgium has a twenty-four month legal period of conscript service but current practice is to keep officers for fifteen months and enlisted men for twelve. It is assumed that Belgium will take the action necessary to improve and to maintain the manning level of its forces, particularly those on an M-day status.

The Netherlands

The two divisions of The Netherlands Corps are now in The Netherlands, far removed from their Emergency Defense Plan positions. The Netherlands has planned to move one brigade group into West Germany and should be urged to expedite this move and supplement it with field deployment in Germany of additional elements.

Sincerely,

Lauris Norstad
LAURIS NORSTAD

General USAF

12 Encls:

1. Compulsory Military Service Chart
2. Status of Forces - Belgium
3. Status of Forces - Canada
4. Status of Forces - Denmark
5. Status of Forces - France
6. Status of Forces - Germany
7. Status of Forces - Greece
8. Status of Forces - Italy
9. Status of Forces - Norway
10. Status of Forces - Netherlands
11. Status of Forces - Turkey
12. Status of Forces - UK

His Excellency Dr. D. U. Stikker
Secretary General and Chairman of the Council
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris, France

Lauris Norstad