

4th September, 1961

NOTE FOR THE FILE

Meeting of the Secretary General with the
Permanent Representatives of France, the
United States and Germany and the Acting
Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom, on 2nd September, 1961

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (LIVEOAK)

The Secretary General said that he had studied the document they had given him the day before ("Instructions to General Norstad") and, after examining some of the details, he had decided to focus on the basic point and would study details later. He read the attached paper giving his views on it and expressed the hope that they would pass it on to their governments. The German Permanent Representative said that he recognised that the document is dynamite in its present form and would try to get his Government to delete the more difficult phrases concerning SACEUR. He suggested that it might be better to treat the Secretary General's response as merely an "aide memoire". The French Representative expressed concern at giving the Council too many details because of security considerations.

2. The Secretary General underscored his position that, in spite of their worries, he had to have his position made absolutely clear to their four governments. He could not allow the situation to get under way where there would be any doubt as to what was the political authority of the Alliance, i.e. the Council: it could not be left with a junta. Thereafter he was reasonably optimistic that some satisfactory machinery could be evolved. He would go no further at this time in giving his personal idea on the machinery than to describe it as "the Council delegating authority to a restricted group". However, the present 4-power proposal was not the right way to go about the problem. The Council would certainly not accept an outside authority giving instructions to SACEUR.

3. The United States Representative said that he frankly agreed with the Secretary General's reservation on the question of the political authority. He noted that the Secretary General did not object on a practical basis to General Norstad's planning. He said that he would frankly report to his Government along the following lines:

- (1) SACEUR's present planning authority is sufficient to do the necessary job;

- (ii) but non-planning factors in the proposed document would raise questions, which are better left unraised, so why raise them;
- (iii) the Secretary General and the four NATO Ambassadors recognised that there is a need for some workable decision-making arrangements.

4. The Secretary General reiterated that he could not accept the 4-power document as an authorised paper in its present form, although it could be used practically for planning purposes by General Norstad. He understood the General found this interpretation satisfactory.

G. VEST