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COGNIC TOP SECRET

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SHAPE/167/61

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PLAN OF ACTION: NATO EUROPE

1990  
1965  
1980  
1970

This document, with its attachments, sets forth a plan of action by the member nations of NATO which would rapidly improve the military strength of Allied Command Europe. The proposed undertakings are considered in two time phases: The first phase emphasizes those actions which could produce concrete results before 1 January 1962; the second phase comprises actions which, under emergency conditions, could produce results during 1962.

1962  
1969  
1972  
1973

Attachments identify for each NATO nation the specific actions which could accomplish emergency improvements in Allied Command Europe within the two time categories. Information provided by the nations in connection with the 1961 Interim Annual Review was considered in determining the proposed national actions set forth herein.

1974  
1975  
1977  
1979

In formulating the specific actions indicated for each country, I have adhered to the following sense of priority: First, strengthening the personnel and equipment levels of existing combat units; second, adding necessary combat units not presently available to Allied Command Europe; third, adding necessary combat and service support units and supplies at a minimum level; and fourth, improving the status of reserves and reinforcements, both combat and support types.

1983  
1984  
1985  
1986

The attachments for each country contain tables showing (1) the current status of forces, (2) the specific actions needed to produce by 1 January 1962 the results proposed for that period, and (3) the specific actions needed to produce during 1962 the results proposed in that year. Equipment and personnel requirements for each time phase are indicated. Footnotes comment on special problems requiring immediate action.

1987  
1988  
1993  
1994  
1995  
1996

Associated with the attachment for each country is a statement of proposed actions selected as being of highest importance in the case of that particular country.

1997  
1998

This document consists of 57 pages

2005  
2003  
2007  
2000

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~~COSMIC TOP SECRET~~

SHAPE 167/61

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BELGIUM

SHAPE recommends that by 1 January 1962 Belgium should:

- a. Raise manning of two (2) M-Day divisions to at least 90% and 1st echelon support units to at least 65% and insure the readiness of the remaining mobilization increment.
- b. Man Control and Reporting units on twenty-four hour basis.
- c. Raise aircrew/aircraft ratio to 1.5 to 1.
- d. Increase balanced logistic support for all services in phase with force improvement.

Expedite completion of bilateral exchange of atomic information agreement with the United States and complete training of Strike squadron.

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BELGIUM - LAND FORCESI. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strengths (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel(1)	Units	Personnel(1)	
<u>M-Day</u>						
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	170 (32%)		304			(1) Additional personnel needed to reach at least 90% for M-Day units and 65% for 1st Echelon units.
1st Div (2)	11,820 (86%)	Complete organization of Div Troops	1,433			
16th Div (2)	12,515 (87%)		1,219			(2) Now reorganizing along the lines of the NATO Standard Division concept.
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	24,335 (87%)		2,652			
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	10,720 (74%)		2,156			
<u>Total M-Day</u>	35,225 (82%)		5,112			
<u>1st Echelon</u>						
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	990 (58%)		104			
<u>Total 1st Echelon</u>	990 (58%)		104			

II. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. Generally, TO&E equipment is adequate, with the exception of helicopters.
- c. Operational reserves are generally below the 30-day interim level, particularly light aircraft and helicopters, tanks and ammunition.
- d. Procurement of modern equipment to support the NATO Standard Division organization should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- a. Raise the manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% of war authorized strength, and ensure immediate availability of mobilization increments to bring units quickly to 100% strength.

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BELGIUM - LAND FORCES  
(continued)

III. OTHER

- b. Take steps to conduct brigade and division exercises.
- c. Take actions to reduce the shortage of technicians.
- d. Expedite reorganization of the M-Day divisions.
- e. Improve reserve and mobilization training to meet ACE standards.

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Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadron/Aircraft Required During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB Strike/ Attack	4/100	F84F		*	-		-	-		* 1/25 to be capable of Strike role by 1-Jan 62
RECCE	1/12	RF84F		-/6	RF84F		-	-		
AWX	2/35	CF100		-/5	CF100		-	-		
IDF	2/40	Hunter		-	-		-	-		
Transport	1/16	C119		-	-		-	-		
SAM	1	NIKE		-	-		1	NIKE		
Totals	10/203		12,300	-/11		-	-		1,200	

Logistics

- a. There are only 13 days supply of 2.75" rockets.
- b. Although there are only 35 CF100 in the AWX Squadrons, a further 15 are available but are, presumably, unserviceable.

Other

- a. Expedite conversion of FB Squadrons to nuclear role.
- b. Man C&R units on a 24 hour basis.
- c. Bring aircrew/aircraft ratio up to 1.5 to 1

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CANADA

SHAPE recommends that by 1 January 1962 Canada should:

a. Review plans and insure availability of Air/Sea lift for the movement of the M-Day reserve brigade groups to Europe.

b. Insure the availability of balanced logistic support for all forces including M-Day reserve.

~~COSMIC TOP SECRET~~

CANADA - LAND FORCES

I. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel	Units	Personnel	
<u>M-Day on the Continent</u>						(1) Available on D-Day plus movement time.
4th Inf Bde Gp	4,966 (100%)					
<u>Total Major Combat Formations on Continent</u>	4,966 (100%)					
<u>Total Administrative Support on the Continent</u>	501 (100%)					
<u>Strategic Reserve Div (-1 Bde) (1)</u>	12,461 (100%)					
<u>Total M-Day</u>	17,928 (100%)					

II. LOGISTICS

T&E equipment is adequate. Operational reserves of ammunition and equipment stocked on the continent are 60 days for purely Canadian categories and 30 days for common-user British and American types, which are held for Canada by the UK and US. Procurement of modern equipment should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- a. Expedite the modernization of the 4th Bde Gp.
- b. The Div (-) located in Canada should be in a position to be immediately available for movement to Europe and insure balanced combat and service support for these units.

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CANADA-AIR FORCE

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadron/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Proposed During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB/Strike	-	-	-				1/18	CF104		
AWX	4/72	CF100		-	-		-	-		
IDF	8/200	Sabre VI	-	-	-		-	-		1/25 Sabre VI to convert to 1/18 CF 104 in Strike role in 1962
Totals	12/272		6,200			-			-	

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DENMARK

SHAPE recommends that by 1 January 1962, Denmark should:

- a. Raise manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% and insure readiness of the remaining mobilization increment.
- b. Raise combat-ready rate (now 33%) to 100% and aircraft combat-ready rate (now 55%) to at least 70%.
- c. Activate the Unified Command in the Baltic (BALTAP).
- d. Phase forward to Category "A", two (2) DE, four (4) PC, three (3) SS, and two (2) CM (with mines aboard).
- e. Procure and store in Denmark additional mines required to meet plans.
- f. Man Control and Reporting units for twenty-four hour operation.
- g. Procure thirteen (13) additional F-100 aircraft.
- h. Increase balanced logistic support for all Services in phase with force improvement.

The effectiveness of the Danish Army and Air Force would be greatly enhanced by the achievement of a nuclear capability.

DENMARK - LAND FORCES

I. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel (1)	Units	(2) Personnel	
<u>M-Day</u>						
Total Major HQ's	73 (60%)		23			(1) Additional personnel needed to meet at least 90% manning for M-Day units. (2) SAM (Nike/Ajax) and Honest John units included. (3) MC 70 and Major NATO Commanders' Initial Country Force Programs require this unit to be in the M-Day category.
2nd Inf Div HQ & Div Troops	549 (23%)				1,568	
5th Inf Div HQ & Div Troops	652 (28%)				1,465	
7th Bde Gp/3rd Inf Div	4,051 (77%)		680			
4th Bde Gp/6th Inf Div	3,130 (61%)		1,551			
Bornholm RCT (M-Day elem)	922 (52%)		683			
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	9,254 (55%)		2,937		3,033	
<u>Total Non-Organic Support (2)</u>	2,520 (59%)				1,233	
<u>Total M-Day</u>	11,894 (56%)		2,937		4,366	
<u>1st Echelon</u>						
Total Major HQ's	28 (4%)					(3)
3rd Bde Gp/2nd Inf Div	159 (4%)					
10th Bde Gp/3rd Inf Div	593 (12%)				2,461	
6th Bde Gp (Indep)	171 (4%)					
1st Bde Gp/6th Inf Div	114 (3%)					
5th Bde Gp (Indep)	257 (6%)					
Bornholm RCT (1st Ech elem)	102 (12%)					
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	1,398 (6%)				3,461	
<u>Total Non-Organic Support</u>	258 (2%)					
<u>Total 1st Echelon</u>	1,656 (5%)				3,461	

DENMARK - LAND FORCES (continued)

II. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. TO&E equipment is not adequate, particularly for communications equipment and non-combat vehicles.
- c. Generally, operational reserves are well below the SHAPE 30-day interim levels for equipment and ammunition.
- d. The procurement of modern equipment to replace obsolescent WW II type equipment should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- a. Raise the manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% of war authorized strength, and ensure immediate availability of mobilization increments to bring units quickly up to 100% strength.
- b. Initiate action to improve the number of NCO's and technicians.
- c. Conduct brigade and divisional training exercises.
- d. Improve reserve and mobilization training to meet ACE standards.

DENMARK-NAVY  
(ACE ONLY)

COSMIC TOP SECRET

ACTUAL STATUS				PROPOSED STATUS						Remarks
1 July 1961				1 January 1962			During 1962			
Units			Personnel	Units		Additional Pers.	Units		Additional Pers.	
Type	Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		
DD	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	2	+ 450	Advance planned acquisition of 2 DD.
DE	B C	1 2	Cat B 60 % manned	A	3	+ 250	A	1	- 220	Delay scrapping 2 DE until new DD are in service.
PC	A B C	3 2 2	Cat A & B 60 % manned	A	7	+ 150	A	7	-	
SS	B	3	Manned to Cat A level (75%)	A	3	-	A	3	-	
CM	A B C	4 1 1	All below required manning level	A	6	+ 150 *	A	6	-	* estimated
FPB	A B C	7 1 1	Meets MC55/1 standards for Cat A	A B/C	7 2	-	A B/C	7 2	-	
Total Personnel			7,000	Est.Add.Pers.		+ 550			+ 230	

Logistics

- a. Build-up stocks of 3" ammo (7 days) and 5" ammo (13 days) to a minimum of 30 days as soon as possible.
- b. Increase POL stocks above current 30 day level.
- c. Acquire oilers to provide effective afloat support.
- d. Procure, for storage in Denmark, additional mines to meet the requirement for mining plans.

Readiness

- a. Maintain CMs in D-Day readiness with mines on board

COSMIC TOP SECRET

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Required During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB Attack	2/37 1/31	F100 F84G		-/13	F100		-/25	F100		The 1/31 F84G should convert to 1/25 F100 as soon as possible.
RECCE	1/16	RF84F		-/2	RF84F					
AWX	3/39	F86D		-/9	F86D		-			
IDF	1/25	Hunter		-	-		-	-		The IDF squadron should be kept in service through 1962.
Totals	8/148		4,600	-/24		-	-/25		-	

Logistics

- a. Less than 20 days supply of 20 mm ammunition, 10 days supply of 450 gallon droppable fuel tanks and 30 days supply of 230 gallon droppable fuel tanks are on hand.
- b. There is a critical shortage of F100 aircraft.

Personnel

- a. Personnel in combat support, electronic and mechanical operational areas should be brought up to 100%.
- b. Man C&R units on a 24 hour basis.

Other

- a. The present combat crew ready rate is only 33%. The rate should be brought to the MC 55/1 standard of 100% as quickly as possible.
- b. The present aircraft combat ready rate is only 55% and should be raised to at least 70%.

SHAPE/167/61

COPY NO. 101FRANCE

SHAPE understands that, in view of the Berlin situation, France:

- a. Has returned a division from Algeria and by September will have completed transforming it to suitability for military operations in Europe.
- b. Is considering the build-up of the French divisions now in Germany to full war-authorized strength in personnel and equipment.
- c. Is examining the possibility of returning a second division from Algeria to Metropolitan France.
- d. Is building up the Tactical Air Force in Germany (1st CATAC) and reinforcing the Air Defense Forces (DAT).

SHAPE understands further that the French Government may announce additional measures at a later date.

Taking into account the actions intended by France, SHAPE considers that, by 1 January 1962, France should:

- a. Provide additional units to meet the ACE M-day requirement of four (4) divisions.
- b. Insure the readiness of the remaining mobilization increment of the M-Day forces.
- c. Bring two (2) NIKE battalions to full operational status.
- d. Increase balanced logistic support for all services in phase with force improvement.
- e. Review movement plans of 1st echelon units in Algeria to insure prompt availability in event of need.

Although it is not desired to take new initiative in these fields, it is a fact that the recommitment to NATO of French naval forces would be a convincing demonstration of solidarity within the Alliance, and authority to stockpile atomic weapons in France on an emergency basis would add significantly to the flexibility of the atomic strike forces.

FRANCE - LAND FORCES

I. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel(1)	Units	Personnel(1)	
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	1,873 (75%)	-	567			(1) Additional personnel needed to reach at least 90% manning for M-Day units and 65% manning for 1st Echelon units.
3rd Div (59 Type Inf Hy)	12,899 (71%)	-	1,224			
1st Div (59 Type Arm Hy) (-1Bde)	12,468 (65%)	1 Bde (2)	6,030			
13 Mech Bde	5,171 (100%)	-	-			
		1-2/3 Divs (2)	27,675	1 Mech Div (3)	17,259	(2) The additional 1 3/3 Divisions, properly deployed, would bring the French Land Forces up to the M-Day requirement of 4 Divisions.
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	30,538 (75%)		34,929		17,259	(3) M-Day strategic reserve located in France.
<u>Non-Organic Support Units</u>	14,232 (76%)		3,996			(4) Although these Divisions are presently located in Algeria, it is assumed that some or all of them would be redeployed to Europe should the situation deteriorate seriously.
<u>Total M-Day</u>	46,683		39,492			
<u>1st Echelon</u>						
<u>In Europe</u>						
15th Div (- 13 Mech Bde)	7,905 (56%)					
15th Mech Bde	2,723 (50%)					
<u>Not in Europe</u>						
7 3/3 Divs (4)	92,000					
<u>In Europe</u>						
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	10,628 (54%)					
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	12,036 (30%)					
<u>Total 1st Echelon</u>	114,664					

FRANCE - LAND FORCES

II. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. Operational reserves of equipment and ammunition are generally adequate to meet the 30 day interim level, but deficiencies still exist, particularly in the case of armoured personnel carriers, transport vehicles and communications equipment.
- c. Procurement of modern equipment to support the type 59 Divisions, though planned, should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- a. Raise the manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% of war authorized strength and insure immediate availability of mobilization increment to bring units quickly to 100% strength.
- b. In addition to existing M-Day units, required M-Day units should be reorganized as type 59 Divisions as rapidly as possible.
- c. Assist in the provision of training areas for other NATO countries for Brigade and Divisional type exercises.
- d. Take immediate steps to overcome the shortage of technicians.

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadron/Aircraft Required during 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB/Strike	6/144	F84F								
FB/Attack	4/60	F100		-/15	F 100		-/25	F 100		
LWSR(S)							2/40	Mystere		
Recco	3/59	RF84F								Requirement for 1 Jan 62 3/48 RF84F which should modernized with 2/36 Mi by end 62.
LWSR(R)							1/20	Mirage III R		Assumed that Mirage III be used in LW(R) role.
AWX	2/53	F86K		2/24	Mirage III		1/48	Mirage III		2/53 F86K to be re-forme 2/24 F86K and 2/24 Mirage to be introduced and 2/24 F86K to be modernized with Mirage III (Total 6/72 III) during 1962.
IDF	4/40	Mystere IV								No requirement for IDF a end 61.
Transport	3/48	Noratlant								
SAM				2	NIKE					
Totals	22/404		17,200	2/24		1,200	7/108		Nil	

Logistics

Only 2 days supply of 2.75" rockets are on hand, no SIDEWINDERS or fragmentation bombs are available, only 2 days supply of 275 gallon droppable fuel tanks are on hand and there is a critical shortage of F100 spares.

Training

- Increase aircraft combat ready rate (now 63%) to at least 70%.
- Increase combat crew ready rate (now 83%) to MC 55/1 standard of 100%.
- Bring NIKE battalions to full operational status.

Manning

- Man C&R units to permit 24 hour working schedule

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COPY NO. 10

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SHAPE understands that in view of the Berlin situation, the Federal Republic proposes to:

- a. Bring the eight (8) divisions now committed to full strength by early 1962.
- b. Provide a ninth division of two (2) brigades by early 1962.
- c. Accelerate the delivery of military equipment and supplies.
- d. Provide two (2) more divisions of two (2) brigades each during 1962.

The following additional measures are recommended for implementation by January 1962:

- a. Provide temporary or permanent sites for programmed infrastructure projects and accelerate construction.
- b. Complete training and assign eight (8) additional Air Force squadrons.
- c. Phase forward to Category "A", seven (7) destroyers, ten (10) FPB and three (3) CM.
- d. Activate the Unified Command in the Baltic (BALTAP).
- e. Increase balanced logistic support for all Services in phase with force improvement.

I. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel(1)	Units	Personnel(1)	
<u>M-Day</u>						
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	870 (59%)		425			<p>(1) Additional personnel required to raise major units and HQ's to at least 90% of war authorized strength.</p> <p>(2) These four (4) divisions are activated with an estimated strength of 6,000 each.</p> <p>(3) Steps should be taken to activate and train the 4 Covering Force Bdes during 1962. Required personnel not included in totals.</p>
1st Armd Inf Div	13,685 (78%)		2,160			
2nd Armd Inf Div	12,135 (69%)		3,709			
4th Armd Inf Div	10,729 (61%)		5,115			
6th Armd Inf Div	14,048 (80%)		1,796			
1st Mtn Div	9,744 (61%)		4,608			
1st Abn Div	6,803 (61%)		3,325			
3rd Armd Div	12,500 (76%)		2,280			
5th Armd Div	11,938 (73%)	1 Armd Inf Div (2)	2,842	2 Armd Inf Divs (2)	31,688	
			15,844	1 Armd Div (2)	14,780	
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	91,582		41,679	(3)	46,468	
<u>Total Non-Organic Support</u>	10,663		4,350		33,000	
<u>Total M-Day</u>	103,115		46,454		79,468	

GERMANY - LAND FORCES

II. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. TO&E equipment is not adequate, particularly for communication equipment, armored vehicles, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.
- c. Operational reserves for certain categories of equipment and types of ammunition are below the 30-day interim requirement.
- d. Storage depots for reserve stocks are not adequate.
- e. Procurement of modern equipment to support the NATO Standard Division organization should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- a. Raise the manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% of war authorized strength and insure immediate availability of mobilization increment to bring units quickly to 100% strength.
- b. Brigade and division-type exercises are necessary. Lack of adequate manoeuvre areas continue as a major obstacle for the FRG.
- c. Technician training must be increased and consideration should be given to the temporary retention of critical specialists.
- d. Greater emphasis must be placed on the organization and training of non-organic support units.

GERMANY-NAVY  
(ACE ONLY)

ACTUAL STATUS				PROPOSED STATUS						Remarks
1 July 1961				1 January 1962			During 1962			
Units			Personnel	Units		Additional Pers.	Units		Additional Pers.	
Type	Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		
DD	A	3	Meets MO55/1 standards (75%)	A	6	-	A	6	-	
	B	3								
DE	B	5	"	A	4	-	A	6	-	
	C	2		B	3		B	1		
PC	C	2	"	C	2	-	A	2	-	
SS	C	2	"	C	2	-	A	2	-	
FPB	A	25	"	A	35	-	A	35	-	
	B	10								
CM(LST)	C	3	"	A	3	-	A	3	-	
VAP		1/12	"		1/12	-		2/24	-	
LP		1/5	"		1/10	-		1/10	-	
Total Personnel			27,000	Est.Add.Pers.		-			-	No additional personnel required as all units are manned to Cat A standards.

Logistics

- Build-up stock levels of POL and ammo above current 30 day level.
- Procure additional mines and storage to meet the requirements for mining plans, including the 5300 mines presently stored in the U.S.
- Phase forward Cat B & C afloat support ships to Cat A in the required proportion to support operational units.

Readiness

- Maintain CM's in D-Day readiness with mines on board.
- Ships undergoing overhaul or repair should be out of service for the minimum period.

GERMANY-AIR FORCE

COSMIC TOP SECRET

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Proposed During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB Strike and Attack	8/200	F84F		2/50	F104		*			* Modernize 2/50 F84F with F104 during 1962
LWSR(S)	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/40	G91		
Recce	2/36	RF84F		-			2/36	RF-84F		
LWSR(R)	-	-		1/20	G91		3/60	G91		
AWX	-	-		2/36	F86K		2/36	F104		
IDF	2/36	SabreVI		2/36	SabreVI		2/36	Sabre VI		
Transport	1/25 1/7	NORATLAS C47*		1/25 -	NORATLAS -		2/50 -	NORATLAS -		* No requirement for C47
SAM	2	NIKE		2	NIKE		2	NIKE		
Totals	14/304		16,000	8/167		7,000	13/258		11,000	Personnel figures include in part raising manning levels.

Logistics

Ground refueling units have less than 50% of TO&E requirements. Only 5 days supply of 450 gallon droppable fuel tanks for the F84F are on hand. Aircraft combat readiness is less than 70% and should be raised to at least that rate. Shortage of repair facilities for F104G and G91 aircraft is anticipated.

Training

Accelerate combat training of following units:  
 (1) 35FB Wing (2) 52 Recce Wing (3) 72 & 73 IDF Wings (4) 62 TC Wing  
 Increase combat ready state of crews (now 42%).

Manning

Raise manning levels of flying squadrons and C&R units.

Other

Expedite conversion to nuclear capability. Negotiate for faster delivery from F104 and G91 production. Accelerate acquisition of sites for SAM units.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

SHAPE/167/61

COPY NO. 101

GREECE

SHAPE recommends that by 1 January 1962, Greece should:

- a. Raise manning of M-Day combat units to at least 90% and 1st echelon units to at least 50% and insure the readiness of the remaining mobilization increment.
- b. Expedite obtaining and manning one (1) of the additional submarines now planned.
- c. Convert one (1) attack squadron to strike role.
- d. Expedite introduction of one (1) squadron G-91 and one (1) squadron F-86D now planned.
- e. Man Control and Reporting units for twenty-four hour operation.
- f. Raise aircraft combat-ready rate (now 56%) to at least 70% and combat crew-ready rate (now 82%) to 100%.

COSMIC TOP SECRET  
GREECE - LAND FORCES

I. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel(1)	Units	Personnel	
<u>M-Day</u>						
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	1,182 (62%)		355			(1) Additional personnel needed to reach at least 90% manning for M-Day units and 50% for 1st Echelon units.  (2) Light Infantry Regiment.
2nd Inf Div	9,032 (76%)		1,636			
6th Inf Div	8,739 (76%)		1,544			
10th Inf Div	9,030 (76%)		1,688			
11th Inf Div	9,031 (76%)		1,687			
20th Armd Div	7,228 (75%)		1,415			
31st Mil Comd (2)	1,712 (92%)		-			
141st Lt Inf Regt	1,502 (95%)		-			
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	46,274 (77%)		8,020			
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	13,812 (73%)		3,323			
<u>Total M-Day</u>	61,268 (76%)		11,698			
<u>1st Echelon</u>						
3th Inf Div	5,473 (48%)		247			
9th Inf Div	5,318 (48%)		402			
15th Inf Div	5,329 (48%)		391			
83rd Mil Comd (2)	27 (23%)		43			
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	16,147 (48%)		1,083			
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	1,862 (38%)		609			
<u>Total 1st Echelon</u>	18,009 (47%)		1,692			

COSMIC TOP SECRET

COSMIC TOP SECRET

GREECE - LAND FORCES (continued)

II. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. TO&E equipment is not adequate and serious deficiencies exist in tanks, artillery, communications and transport vehicles.
- c. Operational reserves for equipment and ammunition are well below the SHAPE 30-day interim requirement.
- d. A modernization program to replace existing obsolescent WW II equipment should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- a. Raise the manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% of war authorized strength, and ensure immediate availability of mobilization increments to bring units quickly to 100% strength.
- b. Intensify field training of non-organic support units.
- c. Improve reserve and mobilization training to meet ACE standards.
- d. Implement measures to improve the quality as well as the quantity of NCO's and technicians, particularly in the communications and electronics fields.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

ACTUAL STATUS				PROPOSED STATUS						Remarks
1 July 1961				1 January 1962			During 1962			
Units			Personnel	Units		Additional Pers.	Units		Additional Pers.	
Type	Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		
DD	A	4	Meets MC55/1 standards (75%)	A	4	-	A	6	+ 440	Advance planned acquisition of 2 DD.
DE	A	8	"	A	8	-	A	6	- 220	
PC	A	6	"	A	6	-	A	6	-	Delay scrapping 2 DE until new DDs in service.
SS	A	2	"	A	3	+ 70	A	4	+ 70	
CM	A	2	"	A	2	-	A	2	-	Advance planned acquisition of 2 SS.
LST/LSM/ LCT	A	35	"	A	35	-	A	35	-	
Total Personnel			17,550	Est.Add.Pers.		+ 70				+ 290

Logistics

- a. Build-up stock of 5" AA ammo above current 30 day level.  
Build-up stock of depth charges above current 19 day level.  
Build-up stock of POL above current 50 day level.
- b. Procure or earmark for requisitioning additional modern oilers to provide effective fleet support.

Manning

- a. Additional personnel required could be obtained by scrapping obsolete ships, including old cruiser ELLL.
- b. Shortages in technicians and in new training equipment exist.

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Required During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB Strike	-	-		1/25	F84F					
FB Attack	4/90	F84F								Attack squadrons are scheduled as 3/75 F84F by end-61.
Recco	1/17	RF84F		-/1 1/20	RF84F G91		1/9	RF104		Delivery of 9 RF104 expected in end-1962
AWX	1/16	F86D		1/16	F86D					
IDF	2/48	F86E		-/2	F86E					
Transport	1/15	C47		-/1	C47					
SAM	1	NIKE								
Totals	9/186		8,000	3/65		1,400	1/9		NIL	

Logistics

- a. Expedite action to provide modern aircraft (F104G and G91)
- b. Only 6 days supply of SIDEWINDER missiles and 4 days supply of droppable fuel tanks for F86E aircraft are on hand and there are difficulties with the depot maintenance of aircraft.

Manning

- a. Officer manning in electronic and mechanical fields should be brought up to at least 85%
- b. Man C&R units on a 24 hour basis.

Other

- a. Increase combat ready rate of aircraft (56%) to at least 70%.
- b. Increase combat ready crew rate (82%) to standard laid down in MC 55/1 (100%).
- c. Expedite conversion of attack squadrons to the strike role.

SHAPE/167/61

COPY NO. 101ITALY

SHAPE recommends that by 1 January 1962, Italy should:

- a. Raise manning levels of 1-Day combat formations to at least 90% and insure the readiness of the remaining mobilization increment.
- b. Expedite delivery of the five (5) G-91 aircraft needed to complete the U.S. of the first squadron and the twenty (20) G-91 aircraft for the second squadron.
- c. Phase forward three (3) DD/DE and provide eight (8) additional Patrol aircraft and three (3) helicopters.
- d. Raise aircraft combat-ready rate (now 55%) to at least 70% and aircrew combat-ready rate (now 69%) to 100%.
- e. Man Control and Reporting units for twenty-four hour operation.
- f. Increase balanced logistic support for all Services in phase with force improvement.
- g. Insure full support for the IRBM units deployed in Italy.

COSMIC TOP SECRET  
ITALY - LAND FORCES

I. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel(1)	Units	Personnel(1)	
<u>M-Day</u>						(1) Additional personnel needed to reach at least 90% manning for M-Day major combat formations, 80% manning for M-Day non-organic support units, and 60% manning for 1st Echelon units.
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	1,080 (43%)		910			
'Mantova' Inf Div	11,564 (71%)		2,505			
'Cremona' Inf Div	9,717 (62%)		4,391			
'Folgore' Inf Div	10,655 (70%)		3,046			
'Legnano' Inf Div	9,735 (64%)		3,957			
'Ariete' Armd Div	6,949 (68%)		2,245			
'Tridentina' Mtn Bde	6,158 (70%)		1,758			
'Cadore' Mtn Bde	4,573 (67%)		1,567			
'Orobica' Mtn Bde	6,221 (71%)		1,665			
'Julia' Mtn Bde	8,144 (75%)		1,626			
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	73,716 (69%)		22,760			
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	43,608 (58%)				16,650	
<u>Total M-Day</u>	118,404 (64%)		23,670		16,650	
<u>1st Echelon</u>						
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	134 (29%)				146	
'Granatieri' Inf Div	9,293 (61%)					
'Taurinense' Mtn Bde	4,919 (56%)				340	
'Centauro' Armd Div	6,262 (62%)					
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	20,474 (60%)				340	
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	16,702 (28%)				19,176	
<u>Total 1st Echelon</u>	37,310 (39%)				19,662	

ITALY - LAND FORCES (continued)

II. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. TO&E equipment is not adequate, particularly in tanks, armored personnel carriers, transport vehicles and communications equipment.
- c. Generally, operational reserves are below the 30-day interim SHAPE requirement, particularly in combat and non-combat vehicles and certain types of ammunition.
- d. Procurement of modern equipment should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- a. Raise the manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% of war authorized strength, and ensure immediate availability of mobilization increments to bring units quickly up to 100% strength.
- b. Take action to reduce the shortage of signal personnel.
- c. Take action to provide M-Day units with a constant strength level throughout the year.
- d. Reduce time required for major combat formations to obtain their basic loads of ammunition.
- e. Improve mobilization and reserve training to meet the ACE standards.

ITALY-NAVY  
(ACE ONLY)

COSMIC TOP SECRET

ACTUAL STATUS				PROPOSED STATUS						Remarks
1 July 1961				1 January 1962			During 1962			
Units			Personnel	Units		Additional Pers.	Units		Additional Pers.	
Type	Cat	No		Cat	No		Cat	No		
DDC	B	1	Meets MC55/1 (75%) manning standards	A	1	-	A	1	-	Expedite SAM training
DD/DE	A	11	"	A	12	-	A	12	-	Expedite construction of new DD/DE
	B	1		C	2		C	2		
	C	2								
PCB	A	3	"	A	3	-	A	3	-	
SS	A	3	"	A	3	-	A	3	-	
FPB	A	14	"	A	14	-	A	14	-	
MP	A	28	"	A	36	+ 160	A	48	+ 240	Expedite procurement of elec- tronic equipment to improve communication capabilities
HPS	A	9	"	A	12	+ 30	A	18	+ 60	
Total Personnel			38,733	Est.Add.Pers.		+ 190			+ 300	

Logistics

- a. Build-up stocks of medium and close range ammo and diesel oil above current 30 day level.
- b. Procure additional oilers required to improve fleet support capability.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Required During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB	5/107	F84F		-/18	F84F		-	-		These squadrons should be reduced to 3/75 F86E as soon as the conversion of two AWX squadrons to 1/18 RF104 and 1/16 F104 can be achieved.
LWSR(S)	1/15	G91		-/5	G91					
Recce	3/54	RF84F					1/18	RF104		
LWSR(R)	-	-		1/20	G91		-	-		
AWX	3/39	F86K		-/3	F86K		1/16	F104		
IDF	5/107	F86E		-	-		-	-		
Transport	2/31	C119		-/1	C119		-	-		
SAM	3	NIKE		-	-		-	-		
IRBM	2/22	JUPITER		-/8	JUPITER		-	-		
<b>Totals</b>	<b>19/353</b>		<b>13,000</b>	<b>1/47</b>		<b>1,800</b>	<b>2/34</b>		<b>150</b>	

Logistics

- a. The IRAN maintenance program is causing deficiencies of aircraft, particularly FB.
- b. Stocks of droppable fuel tanks, 500 lb bombs and 260 lb fragmentation bombs with suitable fins are below the 30 day stockage level.
- c. The supply of F104 and G91 aircraft should be accelerated.

Other

- a. The combat ready rate of aircraft (55%) should be raised to at least 70%. The combat ready rate of aircrews (69%) should be raised to 100%.
- b. The critical shortage of qualified technical personnel should be overcome.
- c. Man C&R units on a 24 hour basis.
- e. Provide full technical and service support for the two IRBM squadrons.

SHAPE/167/61

COPY NO. 101

LUXEMBOURG

SHAPE recommends that Luxembourg should:

Expedite conversion of the existing Infantry Battalion into  
an M-Day 105 mm Field Artillery Battalion.

SHAPE/167/61

COPY NO.

101

THE NETHERLANDS

SHAPE recommends that by 1 January 1962, The Netherlands should:

a. Raise manning of M-Day units to at least 90% and insure the readiness of the remaining mobilization increment.

b. Move one (1) brigade group to Germany and provide one (1) tank battalion, one (1) F.A. battalion, and one (1) Armored brigade to complete The Netherlands Corps.

c. Increase manning of Control and Reporting units to support twenty-four hour operation.

d. Increase combat-ready rate of aircraft (now 58%) to at least 70% and crews (now 88%) to 100%.

e. Increase balanced logistic support for all services in phase with force improvement.

NETHERLANDS - LAND FORCESI. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel(1)	Units	Personnel(1)	
<u>M-Day</u>						(1) Additional personnel needed to reach at least 90% manning for M-Day major combat formations and 10% for 1st Echelon units.
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	582 (69%)					
<u>1st Div</u>	12,228 (85%)	1 Tr Bn & 1 FA Bn(105mm)	1,884			
<u>4th Div (-1 Armd Bde)</u>	9,325 (84%)	1 Armd Bde	4,160			
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	21,553 (84%)		6,044			
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	11,521 (75%)					
<u>Total M-Day</u>	33,656 (81%)		6,044			
<u>1st Echelon</u>						
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	390 (1%)				3,500	

II. LOGISTICS

- Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvements of combat units.
- Generally, TO&E equipment is adequate, although some of the equipment is reaching obsolescence.
- Operational reserves of equipment and ammunition are in general available to the 30-day interim SHAPE-required level.
- Procurement of modern equipment to support the NATO Standard Division organization should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- Raise the manning levels of M-Day major units to at least 90% of war authorized strength, and ensure immediate availability of mobilization increments to bring units quickly to 100% strength.
- Complete the reorganization of the 2 M-Day divisions.
- Take steps to conduct brigade and divisional level training exercises.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

NETHERLANDS - LAND FORCES  
(continued)

III. OTHER

- d. Implement measures to overcome shortages of technicians.
- e. Take necessary action to deploy elements of 1st Netherlands Corps to positions in Germany.
- f. Improve reserve and mobilization training to meet with ACE standards.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

NETHERLANDS-AIR FORCE

COSMIC TOP SECRET

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Required During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB/Strike	1/25	F84F		-	-		-	-		M refers to improved aircraft. End '61 requirement is for 3/75 Hunter.
FB/Attack	3/75	F84F		-	-		-	-		
Recce	1/15	RF84F		-	-		-	-		
AWX	3/48	F86K		-	-		1/16	M		
IDF	4/96	Hunter		-	-		-	-		
Transport	1/10	F27		-/2	F27		-	-		
SAM	1	NIKE		-	-		-	-		
Totals	23/269		12,200	-/2		Nil	1/16		Nil	

Logistics

- a. There are only 5 days supply of SIDEWINDER on hand.
- b. Maintenance problems exist for the F86K

Training

Increase combat ready rate of aircraft (now 58%) to at least 70% and crews (now 88% to 100%).

Manning

Man C&R units on a 24 hour basis

Other

The 4/96 Hunters should be maintained for as long as possible.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

SHAPE/167/61

COPY NO. 101

NORWAY

SHAPE recommends that by 1 January 1962, Norway should:

- a. Raise manning level of M-Day units to at least 90% and 1st echelon units to at least 20% and insure the readiness of the remaining mobilization increment.
- b. Phase forward to Category "A", three (3) destroyers.
- c. Remedy UE deficiencies in aircraft.
- d. Raise combat ready rate of aircraft (now 60%) to at least 70%.
- e. Raise combat-ready crew rate (now 76%) to 100%.
- f. Increase balanced logistic support for all Services in phase with force improvement.

The effectiveness of the Norwegian Army and Air Force would be greatly enhanced by the achievement of a nuclear capability.

NORWAY - LAND FORCESI. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel(1)	Unit	Personnel	
<u>M-Day</u> Inf Bde Gp North (2)	3,185 (59%)	Activate heavy Mortar Co, Medium Tk Squadron, AT Company and 1 Infantry Bn	1,667			(1) Additional personnel needed to reach at least 90% manning for M-Day Units and 20% manning for 1st echelon.  (2) M-day Brigade North is lacking Hvy Mortar Co, Med Tk Sqn, AT Co and one (1) Inf Bn.  (3) Insufficient strength to defend Finnmark Area.
Non-Organic Support Units (Combat)	762 (72%)		185			
Total M-Day Units	3,947 (61%)		1,850			
1st Echelon						
Total Major HQ's	280 (17%)				58	
Inf Bde Gp South	1,907 (34%)					
North Halogaland Bde Gp	478 (12%)		306			
Finnmark Inf Regt (3)	424 (10%)		443			
Total Major Combat Formations (- HQ)	2,818 (20%)		-			
Total 1st Echelon	3,098 (20%)		-		58	

NORWAY - LAND FORCESII. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. TO&E equipment is not adequate particularly in communications, engineering equipment and transport vehicles.
- c. Operational reserves for equipment and ammunition are generally well below the 30 days interim requirement.
- d. A considerable quantity of equipment is obsolescent and a modernization and replacement program should be expedited.
- e. Inadequate balanced stocks in North Norway.

III. OTHER

- a. Raise the manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% of war authorized strength and insure immediate availability of mobilization increment to bring units quickly to 100% strength.
- b. Take action to overcome shortages in NCO's and technicians.
- c. Take immediate action to provide sufficient M-Day forces in Finnmark.
- d. Improve reserve and mobilization training to meet ACE standards.

ACTUAL STATUS				PROPOSED STATUS						Remarks
1 July 1961				1 January 1962			During 1962			
Units			Personnel	Units		Additional Pers.	Units		Additional Pers.	
Type	Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		
DD	A B	2 1	Meets MC55/1 standards for Cat A (75%)	A	3	+ 180	A	3	-	Delay scrapping 1 DD
DE	A B C	3 1 1	"	A	5	+ 220	A	5	-	
SS	A B C	5 1 1	"	A B/C	5 2	-	A B/C	5 2	-	Expedite acquisition of 1 SS to replace obsolete SS
CM	A C	3 1	"	A C	3 1	-	A C	3 1	-	
FPB	A B C	12 4 4	"	A B/C	12 8	-	A	22	+ 160	Expedite acquisition of new FPB
Total Personnel			7,165	Est. Add. Pers.		+ 400				+ 160

Logistics

- a. Build-up stocks of 20mm and 40mm ammo, above current 45 day level.
- b. Increase rate of build-up of TERNE A/S rockets to reach 30 day level as seen as feasible.
- c. Fill POL storage as seen as completed (end-1961).
- d. Phase forward 3 requisitioned oilers in Cat B to Cat A.

Readiness

Ships undergoing overhaul, repair or routine maintenance should be out of service for the minimum period.

NORWAY-AIR FORCE

COSMIC TOP SECRET

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Required During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U, E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB/Attack	3/66	F86F		/9	F86F		-	-		
Rece	1/15	RF84F		/1	RF84F		-	-		
AWX	3/45	F86K		/3	F86K		-	-		
IDF	1/16	F86F		-	-		-	-		
Transport	1/6	C119		/8	C119		-	-		
SAW	1	NIKE								
<b>Totals</b>	<b>9/148</b>		<b>6,800</b>	<b>-/21</b>		<b>43</b>			<b>Nil</b>	

Logistics

The NIKE unit load of spare parts has shortages. F86F aircraft are short so that U/E's cannot be maintained. There are shortages of 450 gallon droppable fuel tanks for the RF84F.

Training

- a. Combat ready rate of aircraft (now 60%) needs to be brought up to at least 70%.
- b. Combat ready rate of crews (now 76%) needs to be brought up to the MC 55/1 standard of 100%.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

SHAPE/167/61

COPY NO. 101

PORTUGAL

SHAPE recommends that Portugal should:

If possible, convert the 3d Infantry Division (2d echelon) into an M-Day Brigade Group of the NATO standard division type.

SHAPE/167/61

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

TURKEY

SHAPE recommends that by 1 January 1962, Turkey should:

- a. Utilize personnel made available from reorganization of Turkish Army units to raise manning levels of M-Day combat formations and support units to at least 90%, insofar as the progress of reorganization permits.
- b. Improve the readiness of the mobilization increment required to bring forces to full strength.
- c. Delay planned inactivation of three (3) F-84G squadrons.
- d. Raise manning of Control and Reporting units to permit twenty-four hour operation.
- e. Phase forward to Category "A" two (2) DD/DE and two (2) submarines.
- f. Increase balanced logistic support for all services in phase with force improvement.

TURKEY - LAND FORCES

COSMIC TOP SECRET

I. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel(1)	Units	Personnel	
<u>M-Day</u>						(1) Personnel made available through inactivation and reorganization of Turkish units should be used to raise the manning levels of the M-Day major combat formations and non-organic support units. The details of this will depend upon additional information on the progress of the Turkish reorganization.  (2) Consists of two Armored Brigades.  (3) Scheduled to be reorganized during 1961 into 2 Armd Cav Regts.
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	1,703 (61%)					
4th Inf Div	7,225 (50%)					
9th Inf Div	8,534 (77%)					
33rd Inf Div	6,862 (47%)					
39th Inf Div	9,679 (87%)					
61st Inf Div	7,024 (48%)					
65th Inf Div	7,615 (68%)					
51st Mtn Div	6,837 (45%)					
29th Inf Div	6,944 (48%)					
1st Armd Div (2)	8,176 (92%)					
1st Cav Div (3)	8,326 (65%)					
2nd Armd Bde	3,170 (86%)					
4th Armd Bde	2,849 (80%)					
5th Armd Bde	3,210 (87%)					
6th Armd Bde	3,353 (68%)					
1st Armd Cav Regt	2,182 (77%)					
2nd Armd Cav Regt	2,136 (75%)					
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	94,122 (63%)					
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	52,528 (66%)					
<u>Total M-Day</u>	148,353 (64%)					

COSMIC TOP SECRET

TURKEY - LAND FORCESI. PERSONNEL (Continued)

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel	Units	Personnel	
<u>1st Echelon</u>						
2nd Inf Div	7,799 (70%)					
8th Inf Div	5,343 (37%)					
10th Inf Div	5,076 (36%)					
12th Inf Div	6,367 (45%)					
23rd Inf Div	4,747 (33%)					
28th Inf Div	7,870 (71%)					
66th Inf Div	5,550 (59%)					
<u>Total Major Combat Formations</u>	42,752 (46%)					
<u>Non-Organic Support Units (Total)</u>	16,670 (59%)					
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	887 (49%)					
<u>Total 1st Echelon</u>	60,309 (49%)					

II. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. TO&E equipment is not adequate, and serious deficiencies exist particularly in combat vehicles, small arms, communication equipment, transport vehicles and engineer equipment.
- c. Operational reserves for equipment and ammunition are well below the SHAPE 30-day interim requirement.
- d. The logistical and maintenance procedures are inadequate.
- e. A modernization program to replace existing obsolescent WW II equipment should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- a. Take immediate action to reduce the shortages of NCO's and specialists.
- b. Intensify training of Army, Corps and Division Headquarters.
- c. Take action to deploy forces for timely implementation of the EDP.
- d. Take measures to meet ACE standards in reserve mobilization training.

ACTUAL STATUS				PROPOSED STATUS						Remarks
1 July 1961				1 January 1962			During 1962			
Units			Personnel	Units		Additional Pers.	Units		Additional Pers.	
Type	Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		
DD/DE	A	6	Meets MC 55/1 manning standards (75%)	A	8	-	A	8	-	
	B	2								
PC	A	7	"	A	7	-	A	7	-	
	B	3								
SS	A	6	"	A	8	-	A	8	-	
	B	2								
	C	2								
CM	A	3	"	A	5	-	A	5	-	
	B	2								
Total Personnel			33,000	Est. Add. Pers.		-			-	No additional personnel required as all units are at least 75% manned.

Logistics

- a. Current stock levels of POL are critically low (about 14 days). New POL storage completed gives total storage available of 60 days for all types. This storage should be filled as soon as possible.
- b. Increase 5" ammo above current 40 day level and build-up stocks of modern mines to replace existing old type.
- c. Phase forward existing Cat B support ships to Cat A.

Readiness

Ships undergoing overhaul and repair should be out of service for the minimum period.

TURKEY-AIR FORCE

COSMIC TOP SECRET

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Required During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
FB Strike	3/50	F100		-/25	F100					
FB Attack	3/70 4/78	F84G F84F		- -	- -		- -	- -		Delay planned inactivation of 3/70 F84G Squadrons if other programs are not adversely affected
Recce	2/40	RF84F		-	-		2/36	F84Q		
IDF	3/59	F86E		-/16	F86E		-	-		
Transport	3/45	C47		-/3	C47		-	-		
IRBM	-	-		1/15	JUPITER		-	-		
Totals	18/342		26,000	-/44		1500	2/36		1,500	

Logistics

- a. On base JP4 fuel is below requirements. No 20 mm ammunition is on hand. There are only 5 days supply of 2.75" rockets, 2 days supply of 450 gallon droppable fuel tanks and 5 days supply of 200, 230 and 275 gallon droppable fuel tanks on hand.
- b. Some shortages exist in ground servicing equipment such as trucks for refueling, crash fire equipment and power generator units.

Manning

- a. There are inadequate numbers of technicians.
- b. Man C&R units on a 24 hour basis.

Other

- a. Slowness of special ammunition storage site construction is delaying attainment of nuclear capability.
- b. Expedite activation of the IRBM Squadrons.

COSMIC TOP SECRET

SHAPE/167/61

UNITED KINGDOMCOPY NO. 101

SHAPE understands that in view of the Berlin situation, the United Kingdom proposes to:

- a. Deploy to Germany one (1) Surface-to-Air Guided Weapon regiment and two (2) Light Anti-Aircraft regiments.
- b. Retain in Germany the three (3) fighter squadrons which were to have been withdrawn late this year and raise the strength of these squadrons with additional Javelin aircraft.
- c. Earmark a Canberra reconnaissance squadron in the United Kingdom for support of SACEUR if required.
- d. Form in the United Kingdom, a division, including armor, as part of SACEUR's strategic reserve. (It is understood that the two Brigades of this division are those previously considered as strategic reserve.)

The following additional measures are recommended for implementation by 1 January 1962:

- a. Raise manning level of seven (7) brigades now in Germany to at least 90% and insure readiness of the remaining mobilization increment.
- b. Provide full complement of aircraft for Canberra and Hunter squadrons now in Germany.
- c. Raise aircraft combat-ready rate (now 53%) to at least 70%.
- d. Earmark for AFMED sufficient additional naval vessels to meet MC 70 requirements.
- e. Phase forward to Category "A", seven (7) DD/DE and one (1) submarine.
- f. Increase balanced logistic support for all Services in phase with force improvement.

UNITED KINGDOM - LAND FORCES

COSMIC TOP SECRET

PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel(1)	Units	Personnel(1)	
<u>M-Day on the Continent</u> Total Major HQ's	378 (112%)					(1) Additional personnel needed to reach at least 90% manning for M-Day units. (2) Consists of two Armd Bde Gps. (3) Consists of two Inf Bde Gps. (4) To be available in U.K. (5) Includes 1 SAGW Regiment and 2 LAA Regiments.
1st Div (-) (2)	8,828 (77%)		1,547			
2nd Div	12,849 (75%)		2,656			
4th Div (-) (3)	8,977 (75%)		1,863			
<u>Total Major Combat Formations on Continent</u>	30,654 (75%)		6,066			
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units on Continent</u>	20,941 (69%)		6,353	Additional FA, AAA, Engr & Svc units (5)	7,500	
<u>Strategic Reserve</u>		1 Div (- 1 Bde + 1 Tank Regt) (4)	10,924			
<u>Total M-Day</u>	51,973 (73%)		23,343		7,500	
<u>1st Echelon</u> <u>Total Non-Organic Support Units</u>	1,410 (92%)					
<u>Total 1st Echelon</u>	1,410 (92%)					

COSMIC TOP SECRET

UNITED KINGDOM - LAND FORCESII. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. TO&E equipment is adequate.
- c. Operational reserves of ammunition, equipment, spare parts and POL for the British Army of the Rhine and the Canadian Brigade Group are maintained on the continent at a 30-day reserve level. Reserves beyond 30 days are maintained in the U.K.
- d. Modernization of equipment should be expedited.

III. OTHER

- a. Raise the manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% of war authorized strength and ensure immediate availability of mobilization increments to bring units quickly to 100% strength.
- b. The assignment of 1 Div (-) is acceptable but the addition of 2 Bde Gps and non-organic support units to BAOR would be a more efficient solution.
- c. Conduct division-level training exercises.
- d. Initiate action to build up non-organic combat support units in BAOR.
- e. Improve reserve and mobilization training to meet ACE standards.
- f. In addition to the 1 Div (-) to be available in the U.K., 2 additional brigade groups and requisite support units would be required to bring BAOR up to full 3 division strength.

ACTUAL STATUS				PROPOSED STATUS						Remarks
1 July 1961				1 January 1962			During 1962			
Units			Personnel	Units		Additional Pers.	Units		Additional Pers.	
Type	Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		
DD/DE	A	6	Meets MC55/1 standards (75%)	A	13	-	A	13	-	
	B	4								
	C	3								
SS	A	3	"	A	4	-	A	4	-	
	C	2								
MSO	A	8	"	A	8	-	A	8	-	
	B	6								B
Total Personnel			2,600	Est.Add.Pers.			-	-		No estimate of personnel required made as ships are rotated on station.

Readiness

Improve standard of readiness of CM required for minelaying in the Baltic.

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Personnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Proposed During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
MB/LB Strike	3/24 4/43	Valiant Canberra		- -/5	- Canberra		- -	- -		
Recce	2/14 4/36	Hunter Canberra		-/2 -/4	Hunter Canberra		-/8	Hunter		Bring U/E of Hunter Squadrons to 2/24 as soon as possible.
AWX IDF	2/23 1/15	Javelin Hunter		1/13 -/1	Javelin Hunter					UK intends to retain the Air Defense Squadrons in Germany and to increase the U/E
SAM	-			-			1	Hi-Alt		
MP	1/8	Shackleton		-			-			
Totals	17/163		7,000	1/25	300	-	-/8		500	

Other

The aircraft combat ready rate should be increased from 53% to at least 70%.

Notes

- a. RAF Fighter Command is not included in this table (approximate strength 12,000).
- b. It is understood that an additional Canberra Recce Squadron will be earmarked in UK for SACEUR.

SHAPE/167/61

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

UNITED STATES

SHAPE understands that in view of the Berlin situation, the United States proposes to take the following actions:

- a. Bring combat units in Europe to full wartime manning levels as soon as possible, and add, when necessary, support units.
- b. Bring active forces in the U.S. to combat readiness, so that up to a total of six (6) Army Divisions and two (2) Marine Divisions/Air Wings would be available for deployment to Europe, if necessary.
- c. Make stand-by preparations to mobilize five (5) additional divisions (2 infantry, 2 armored and 1 Marine) when needed.
- d. Increase amphibious and administrative sea-lift by retention and re-activation of ships not previously planned for the active fleet.
- e. Activate additional naval units for anti-submarine and other missions.
- f. Retain twelve tactical air squadrons and six strategic bomber wings and associated tanker units not previously planned for the active force. (Tactical squadrons include 8 fighter-bomber reconnaissance, and 4 transport).
- g. Prepare to call up twenty-nine reserve fighter-reconnaissance squadrons and eleven (11) reserve transport squadrons.
- h. Prepare arrangements for bases and facilities to support deployment of air units to Europe.
- i. Expand training and logistical base capacities.
- j. Prepare transport and facilities for deployments to Europe.

UNITED STATES - LAND FORCESI. PERSONNEL

Existing Units	Actual Strength (% of War Auth Str)	Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed by 1 Jan 1962		Additional Units/ Personnel Proposed during 1962		Remarks
		Units	Personnel	Units	Personnel	
<u>M-Day on the Continent</u>						(1) Includes 2 Abn Battle Grp.
<u>Total Major HQ's</u>	2,174 (110%)					(2) Additional personnel needed to convert divisions to new type organization.
8 Inf Div (1)	14,243 (104%)					(3) Includes SETAF.
3 Armd Div	14,464 (105%)					
3 Inf Div	13,618 (100%)					
4 Armd Div	14,564 (104%)				18,000	
24 Inf Div	14,167 (104%)				(2)	
3 Armd Bdes	11,398 (102%)					
<u>Total Major Combat Formations on Continent</u>	82,454 (104%)					(4) Includes additional personnel required for non-organic support and the U.S. Communications Zone in Europe.
<u>Total Non-Organic Support Units on Continent</u>	72,635 (101%) (3)				19,000 (4)	(5) Located in U.S. Non-organic support which would be necessary when deployed is not included in this table.
<u>Strategic Reserve (5)</u>						
2 Abn Div	23,432 (100%)			2 Inf Div	27,572	
1 Inf Div	14,568 (106%)			1 Armd Div	14,566	
1 Armd Bde	2,799 (100%)					
<u>Total M-Day</u>	198,062 (102%)				79,138	

II. LOGISTICS

- a. Increase balanced logistical support in phase with force improvement of combat units.
- b. Modernization of equipment should be expedited.

III. OTHERS

During 1962 convert divisions in Europe to new type organization compatible with NATO Standard Division.

U.S.-NAVY  
(ACE ONLY)

ACTUAL STATUS				PROPOSED STATUS						Remarks
1 July 1961				1 January 1962			During 1962			
Units			Personnel	Units		Additional Pers.	Units		Additional Pers.	
Type	Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		Cat	Nº		
CVA	A	2	Meets MC55/1 standards (75%)	A	2	-	A	2	-	
	B	2		B	2		B	2		
CVS	A	-	"	A	1	-	A	1	-	One ASW carrier group required
CG/CA	A	2	"	A	2	-	A	2	-	
	B	2		B	2		B	2		
DD/DDG	A	16	"	A	16	-	A	20	-	
	B	16		B	16		B	20		
SS	A	2	"	A	2	-	A	2	-	
	B	2		B	2		B	2		
KP	A	18	"	A	18	-	A	18	-	
MAR/DIV WING AND AMPH LIFT.		2	"		2	-		2	-	
Total Personnel			22,000	Est. Add. Pers.		-	-			

MRBM

Although a firm program for SACEUR's MRBM requirements, which includes 10/160 submarine-based ballistic missiles, has not yet been established, the U.S. has stated that 5 SSB(N) can be made available to SACEUR.

Role	Present Status of Squadrons/ Aircraft and Assigned Pers- onnel of Major Units			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft and Personnel Proposed for 1 Jan 62			Additional Squadrons/Aircraft Proposed During 62			Remarks
	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	U/E	Type	Personnel	
MB/FB Strike (1)	16/360	F/100								(1) The end-1961 requirement for F100 Acft is 13/304 and at end-1962 is 12/279. The four F100 sqdns which are thereby phased out are replaced by 6/150 F105 sqdns by end-1962.
	3/65	F/101		-/10	F101					
	3/53	B66								
	2/34	F/105		3/91	F105		1/25	F105		
Reoce	4/75	RB66								
	4/58	RF101		-/14	RF101					
AWK	4/85	F102		-/13	F102					
				1/12	F89					
TC	4/57	C130		-/7	C130					
	1/12	C124								
SSM	3	CM		1	CM					
Totals	34/799		35,800	4/147		-	1/25			

Remarks

- a. Conversion of 4/100 F100 to F105 in Strike role should be accelerated.
- b. U/Es of squadrons should be brought up to those programmed as soon as possible.
- c. Retain the B66 Strike squadrons as long as possible.