Background to the crisis When NATO launched its air campaign, the situation in Kosovo was one of rising ethnic violence, suppression of democracy, a breakdown of law and order, systematic human rights abuses by the ruling authorities, and a refusal by the Belgrade government to seek, or accept, a political solution. At the same time, there was evidence that the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was planning to escalate its campaign of repression. The international community could see a humanitarian disaster looming. Reluctantly, NATO decided to use force. The conditions leading to this crisis were both long and short-term. The Balkans, on the historical fault-line between Ottoman and European cultures and religions, have long been a troubled area. Centuries of tension were followed by decades of authoritarian rule under President Tito, which suppressed, but did not find solutions to, these underlying tensions. In Kosovo, the seeds of tragedy can be traced to the rise to power of Slobodan Milosovic, his now infamous speech at Kosovo Polje in 1987, and the revocation in 1989 of the autonomous status of the province, bringing it under the direct control of the government in Belgrade. In the years that followed, the majority population of Kosovo were progressively denied the right to govern their own affairs, to earn a living for themselves, to have access to the legal and judicial system, and to be able to educate their children in their own language and culture. Initially, the Kosovar Albanians struggled to cope with this situation by peaceful means. The Serbs dominated the administrative structures and the Kosovar Albanian leadership eventually formed a kind of parallel “government”. It even held elections, and tried to provide the education and medical care the Albanians were denied by the Yugoslav government. Eventually, as peaceful opposition failed to yield results, some Kosovar Albanians took up arms and organised themselves into what became known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA was, in effect, a direct product of Serb repression. But the emergence of an armed Kosovar Albanian force was used by the Yugoslav authorities to justify yet more violence, further alienating and radicalising the population. As the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, the international community became increasingly concerned about the human rights situation and its potential to spread instability to neighbouring countries in the region. International pressure is applied In December 1997, NATO foreign ministers confirmed that NATOs interest in stability in the Balkans extended beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina to the surrounding region, and expressed concern at the rising ethnic tension in Kosovo. It is important to recall the enormous effort made by NATO and the international community to avoid military intervention over Kosovo, while making clear to President Milosevic its ultimate preparedness to use force, if necessary. Experience had taught that diplomacy without the threat of force would be wasted on him. In the spring of 1998, NATO ministers called on all parties to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis, while directing the Alliances military authorities to prepare options for the use of force, should it prove necessary. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark, and the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, meet President Milosevic in autumn 1998 one of many attempts to warn of the consequences of not seeking a political settlement for Kosovo. (Photo: SHAPE - 138 Kb) NATOs actions, including subsequent demonstration flights by NATO military aircraft, undoubtedly had an inhibiting effect on Yugoslav forces, but the KLA accelerated their own military action, ultimately resulting in a Serb counter-offensive in late summer, that was conducted in a typically indiscriminate manner. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that well over 200,000 people were displaced as a result. Around 50,000 people were forced to camp out in the open, in increasingly bleak conditions. So in autumn 1998, a series of diplomatic initiatives were taken, including visits to Belgrade by NATOs Secretary General, Javier Solana, US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, the Chairman of NATOs Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Wesley Clark. In September, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1199, which expressed the international communitys concern about the excessive use of force by Serb security forces, highlighted the impending humanitarian catastrophe, and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the conflict. To strengthen these initiatives the North Atlantic Council on 13 October authorised activation orders for air strikes against Yugoslavia, in a further attempt to convince President Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and to co-operate in bringing an end to the violence. As a result of this pressure, President Milosevic agreed to limits on the number of military and security forces within Kosovo, and their weaponry. He also accepted the deployment of an observer mission to the province led by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) and a NATO-led aerial observer mission. NATO also deployed a military task force to the region to assist, if necessary, in the emergency evacuation of the KVM. Violence and repression in Kosovo escalates Despite these measures, organised acts of violence, repression, provocation, and retribution continued on both sides, particularly on the part of Serb forces and paramilitaries. In its December 1999 report Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) estimates that as many as 350,000 Kosovars, overwhelmingly Albanian, but including some Serbs, were displaced from their homes by the end of 1998. Any balanced analysis of the situation in Kosovo, particularly since 1998, would acknowledge that serious acts of violence and provocation were committed against the Serb population by Kosovar Albanians, and in particular by the KLA. By adding to the cycle of violence, they further reduced diminishing hopes of a peaceful outcome. However, as the OSCE/ODIHR report makes clear, the actions of the KLA paled in comparison to the premeditated, well-orchestrated, and brutally implemented campaign of violence and destruction conducted by the forces of the Yugoslav regime against the Kosovar Albanian population. The massacre of 40 unarmed Kosovar Albanian civilians in the village of Racak on 15 January 1999, according to the OSCE/ODIHR report, most graphically illustrates the descent into violence amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. It shocked the international community and crystallised its resolve to find a solution to the crisis. Other key events highlighted by the OSCE in the period leading up to the conflict were the killings of Kosovar Albanians by police at Rogovo and Rakovina later in January; the launch of winter exercises involving the shelling of villages and the forced expulsion of villagers in the Vucitrn municipality in February and March; a military and police offensive in Kacanik in February, which employed a tactic of burning and destroying civilian homes to allegedly clear the area of the KLA; and a violent police crack-down in an Albanian quarter of Pristina in early March, after the killing of two police officers. Alongside the killings in Racak, the OSCE/ODIHR report concludes that these events revealed patterns of grave abuses by the Yugoslav and Serbian forces against the civilian population. The Rambouillet talks fail By the end of January 1999, the Contact Group on the former Yugoslavia (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) agreed to convene talks between the parties to the conflict. NATO supported this initiative by issuing a warning to both sides of the conflict and agreeing to the use of air strikes, if required. On 6 February, the parties met at Rambouillet, outside Paris, to discuss a peace agreement. The talks lasted 17 days with a follow-on session in Paris in mid-March. The proposals offered both sides a great deal, but also required major concessions. The Kosovar Albanians were offered considerable autonomy, ensured by the presence of a NATO-led force, but no independence. The Serbs were asked to concede autonomy, but not sovereignty, with Kosovos ultimate status left open. Unfortunately, despite the enormous efforts of the international community and the decision by the Kosovar Albanian delegation to sign the Rambouillet Accords, the Yugoslav delegation refused to do so. It is clear the Yugoslav government never seriously sought a negotiated peace at Rambouillet. Even while the discussions continued, the Yugoslav military and police forces were preparing to intensify their operations against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. In breach of the October 1998 agreements, they substantially raised the level of forces and weaponry in the province. During this period, the UNHCR, the OSCE and others reported frequently on the deteriorating human rights situation. After one final attempt by Richard Holbrooke to convince President Milosevic to reverse his policies, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, knowing diplomacy had run its course, gave the order to commence Operation Allied Force. This fateful decision followed months of intense political negotiation and calls on Yugoslavia by the United Nations, the Contact Group, the G8 countries, and others to halt the repression and acts of violence that were provoking an ever-worsening humanitarian crisis. The Yugoslav regimes reckless disregard of these appeals and its campaign of terror against its own population, in direct violation of the most basic, internationally agreed standards of humanitarian conduct, and the failure of all diplomatic efforts to find a political solution, left NATO no option but to use force.