AJP-9

NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY
LETTER OF PROMulgATION

July 2003

1. AJP-9 - NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE is a NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED publication. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2600.

2. AJP-9 is effective upon receipt.

Jan H ERIKSEN
Rear Admiral, NONA
Director, NSA
## RECORD OF CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change Date</th>
<th>Date Entered</th>
<th>Effective Date</th>
<th>By Whom Entered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

This document constitutes one level in the hierarchy of NATO documents covering CIMIC policy and doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). It reflects the NATO Military Policy for CIMIC articulated by MC\(^1\) 411/1 and is coherent with the guidance for Allied joint doctrine as presented in AJP-01\(^2\). AJP-9 focuses primarily - but not entirely - on the operational level. It should be read in conjunction with the NATO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide (FPG). The application of CIMIC at the tactical level will be addressed by TTPs.

References:

A. MC 400/2 (Final), MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy, 23 May 00
B. MC 133/3 (Final), NATO’s Operational Planning Systems, 06 Sep 00
C. MC 327/2 (Final), NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 CRO, 29 Aug 01
D. MC 411/1 (Final), NATO Military Policy for CIMIC, 17 Jul 01
E. MC 334/1 (Final), NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support (HNS), 04 Sep 00
F. NATO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide (DRAFT)

\(^1\) MC: Military Committee Document
\(^2\) AJP: Allied Joint Publication
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Foreword**

**Chapter 1 - THE PLACE OF CIMIC WITHIN NATO OPERATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Definition and Application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>The Purpose of CIMIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>Core Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>The Components of a CIMIC Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Relationship with Associated Activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 2 - THE PRINCIPLES OF CIMIC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Principles Governing the Military Direction of CIMIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Principles Governing the Civil-Military Relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 3 - OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE APPLICATION OF CIMIC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302</td>
<td>Tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303</td>
<td>Article 5 Collective Defence Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 4 - THE COORDINATION AND USE OF CIVIL RESOURCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>402</td>
<td>Application</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 5 - ORGANISATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CIMIC FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>501</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>502</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>503</td>
<td>Staff at Higher Headquarters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 6 - ORGANISATIONAL CIMIC RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPERATIONAL CIMIC TASKS**
Chapter 7 - CIMIC IN NATO DECISION MAKING

701 General
702 The NATO Operation Planning Process

Chapter 8 - CIVILIAN ORGANISATIONS

801 Introduction
802 Types, Roles and Mandates
803 Lead Agencies
804 Principles
805 Relationships between Civilian Organisations, Governments and The Military

Annex A Potential Tasks of a CIMIC Group
Annex B Glossary of Terms and Definitions
Annex C Glossary of Abbreviations
CHAPTER 1

THE PLACE OF CIMIC WITHIN NATO OPERATIONS

101 BACKGROUND

1. The Strategic Concept. Civil-military co-operation is not a new phenomenon within NATO. Traditionally, however, it was seen as presenting little more than a logistic challenge. NATO’s operations beyond its own domestic borders, on territory devoid of fully functioning civil institutions or effective infrastructure present different and more complex challenges. Changes to the environment in which NATO might potentially operate have led to the development of a new Strategic Concept (SC 99)\(^3\). This recognises a much wider range of threats to international security than existed hitherto. In addition to continuing to provide for collective defence, the Concept states that the Alliance must stand ready "to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, includin crisis response operations". The Strategic Concept goes on to state:

The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations.

2. Indeed operations have underlined the requirement to co-ordinate activities with national and local governments as well as both International Organisations (IOs) and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). CIMIC supports the Commander in achieving this. CIMIC is a command responsibility.

102 DEFINITION AND APPLICATION

1. Definition. CIMIC is defined as:

“The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”\(^4\)

2. Application. Four further factors condition the application of CIMIC:

\(^3\) Articulated in MC 400/2
\(^4\) MC 411/1
a. CIMIC activities form an integral part of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) plan, are conducted in support of his mission and are related implementing the overall strategy and achieving a stable and sustainable end-state.

b. The Commander's CIMIC staffs are fully integrated into his Headquarters (HQ) and have full vision of and are authorised to co-ordinate CIMIC activities in the Joint Operations Area (JOA), theatre or region.

c. In co-operating with a potentially wide range of civilian bodies, NATO forces will, as far as possible and within military means and capabilities, accommodate and support the activities of these bodies, providing this does not compromise the mission.

d. CIMIC activities are carried out with a view to timely transition of those functions to the appropriate civilian organisations or authorities.

103 THE PURPOSE OF CIMIC

1. **Background.** CIMIC is applicable to both Article 5 Collective Defence and Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs). In both scenarios commanders are increasingly required to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting military operations. Furthermore, commanders must take into account the presence of large numbers of IOs and NGOs with their own aims, methods and perspectives all of which may have to be reconciled with those of NATO. The context and profile of CIMIC will alter according to the nature of the crisis or operation. In combat operations, the focus of CIMIC is likely to be narrower than in other operations. In a CRO, the focus of CIMIC will be broader and more complex, enabling a commander to play his part in what is likely to be a composite, multi-functional approach to a complex political emergency.

2. **Relationships with the Civil Environment.** Challenges will be enhanced by the presence of the media and the expectations of both the international and local communities. Therefore effective relationships with a wide range of civilian organisations as well as local populations, governments and military forces will be essential in future conflict resolution. These relationships ma include joint planning mechanisms at the strategic level. CIMIC is the Commander's tool in establishing and maintaining these relationships.

3. **The Purpose of CIMIC.** The immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander and the civilian authorities, and to support the activities of these bodies.

---

5 This is not “Joint” as applied to inter-service working such as “Joint Staffs”.
organisations, agencies and population within a commander's area of operations order to allow him to fulfill his mission. This may include direct support to the implementation of a civil plan. The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of Alliance objectives in operations. In meeting this purpose CIMIC staff will:

a. Liaise with civil actors at the appropriate level.

b. Engage in Joint planning, at the strategic as well as the operational level, with appropriate civilian bodies before and during an operation.

c. Carry out continuous assessments of the local civil environment, including local needs in order to identify the extent of any vacuum and how that vacuum might be filled.

d. Oversee the conduct of civil-related activities by military forces, including the provision of requisite functional specialists.

e. Work towards a timely and smooth transition of civil responsibilities to the proper authorities.

f. Work with other staff branches on all aspects of operations.

g. Advise the Commander on all of the above.

4. Beyond this other objectives of CIMIC will be situation dependent. Potential CIMIC tasks in both Article 5 Collective Defence and non-Article 5 CROs are addressed in Chapter 3.

104 CORE FUNCTIONS

1. The above activities will contribute towards the following core functions:

a. Civil-Military Liaison. The aim of Civil-Military Liaison is to provide the co-ordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of operations. Such liaison early in the planning process and immediately following the deployment of forces provides the basis from which the other CIMIC functions develop. It will be a fundamental part of the planning and development process of both the other core CIMIC functions. Establishment of liaison at the political level by NATO is a pre-condition of success. Liaison and joint planning at Strategic Command (SC) level and within a JOA will flow from this. Liaison with civil authorities and organisations is facilitated by, amongst other things, an appropriate public information policy. This will require the adequate and timely dissemination of the
achievements and progress made through civil-military co-operation which will in turn help obtain the support of the population, IOs and NGOs.

b. **Support to the Civil Environment.** Support to the civil environment covers a wide spectrum of CIMIC activities. For the purposes of this document this is support provided to the civil environment in concordance with a NATO military mission. Normally it is not support under the direction of civil authorities. It can involve a wide range of military resources: information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. It will generally only take place where and when it is required to create conditions necessary for the fulfillment of the military mission and/or because the appropriate civil authorities and agencies are unable to carry out the task. Decisions on depth, duration and extent of this support should be made at the highest appropriate level taking into account political as well as military and civil factors.

c. **Support to the Force.** NATO commanders, depending on the circumstances, will require significant civilian support from within their theatre of operations. As well as co-ordination of efforts to minimise disruption to military operations, such as population and resources control, the force may be partially dependent on civilian resources and information from civilian sources. Commanders will also seek as much tacit civilian support for operations as possible. CIMIC will play a major role in all these areas.

105 **THE COMPONENTS OF A CIMIC CAPABILITY**

1. **General.** In order to achieve all of the above NATO needs a dedicated CIMIC capability. This capability exists when the following three components are in place:

   a. Fully developed policy, doctrine and concepts.
   
   b. The understanding and ability to put doctrine into practice.
   
   c. The physical capacity in the form of trained personnel, formed units and supporting resources.

2. **The Conceptual.** The conceptual aspect of the capability encompasses policy, doctrine, planning and procedures throughout the NATO commands and includes the supervision and co-ordination of the conduct of CIMIC during training and operations.
3. **Training, Education, Exercises and General Awareness.** The training aspect of the capability covers, but is not limited to, courses, presentations, conferences and seminars as well as the monitoring and application of lessons learned. Most important is the full integration of CIMIC play in all relevant NATO exercises. Only by exercising the capability will the relevant lessons be learned or refinements made.

4. **Physical Resources.** The physical aspect of the capability comprises the resources the Commander needs to execute CIMIC related activities in a given situation. Because one situation will differ from another, the composition of these assets cannot be prescriptive. The minimum requirement is CIMIC staff at all HQ levels. Their role is to advise the Commander, prepare and develop the CIMIC assessment and the CIMIC lines of activities in support of the Commander’s plan and to carry out liaison. As a result of assessments, existing military forces might be tasked through the chain of command to carry out CIMIC activities. As a further option, although CIMIC activities are within the domain of all military personnel, there may be a requirement for additional CIMIC assets to be deployed into theatre in direct support of the mission. These will fall into one of two categories:

   a. **CIMIC Forces.** CIMIC forces are designed to support the NATO Commander with a structured organisation, appropriately resource to conduct CIMIC activities in support of the Commander’s mission. Their size and the length of time they may be deployed will be determined both by the nature of the task and by how quickly the appropriate civilian organisations and structures can be put in place.

   b. **Functional specialists.** Functional specialists are deployed because a specific requirement for their expertise - which cannot otherwise be found within the area of operations - has been identified. They may come from a wide range of sources and are not necessarily military personnel. They may be required to assist in assessments, analysis or the planning process or they may be required for the execution of specific projects.

5. Options for the organisation and command and control arrangements for the above assets in both Article 5 Collective Defence and non-Article 5 CROs are addressed in Chapter 5.

106 **RELATIONSHIP WITH ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES**

1. **General.** NATO CIMIC occupies one part of the spectrum of civil-military relations as addressed in MC 411/1. There are a number of associated activities within this spectrum which, although different, are either closely associated with CIMIC or can be confused with it. Principal among these associated activities are
a. **Military Assistance in Humanitarian Emergencies (MAHE)**. In the broadest sense CIMIC is primarily concerned with co-operation with rather than support or assistance to civilian bodies, although at the practical level support will, of course, take place. MAHE, for example in the context of disaster relief, can take place nationally or internationally. In both cases a national or multinational military force is called upon to carry out specified tasks for finite periods under the direct auspices of a civilian authority. That authority may be national or international in nature. Although in either case CIMIC staff may carry out liaison work, neither activity constitutes a CIMIC activity per se.

b. **Civil Emergency Planning (CEP)**. CEP is concerned with the protection of and support to domestic populations, usually in the context of disasters or war. In the current security environment, a core function of CEP is to remain responsive to military planning in both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. This includes planning for civil support such as strategic logistic and communications facilities. CIMIC within a JOA is not co-ordinated by CEP staff.

c. **Host Nation Support (HNS)**. HNS seeks to provide the NATO Commander and the sending nations with support available in the form of materiel, facilities and services including area security and administrative support in accordance with negotiated arrangements between the sending nations and/or NATO and the host government. As such, HNS facilitates the introduction of forces into an area of operations by providing essential reception, staging and onward movement support. HNS may also reduce the extent of logistic force and materiel required to sustain and re-deploy forces that otherwise would normally be provided by sending nations. CIMIC will normally be employed to facilitate the execution of HNS. This is addressed in more detail in chapter 4.

---

6 Again, this issue is addressed in MC 411/1 and MC 343.
CHAPTER 2
THE PRINCIPLES OF CIMIC

201. GENERAL

1. The principles of CIMIC are precepts that influence the conduct of CIMIC across the spectrum of conflict. They fall into two broad categories:
   a. Principles Governing the Military Direction of CIMIC. These principles guide the internal military processes, which enable the development of a CIMIC support plan and regulate its execution.
   b. Principles Governing the Civil-Military Relationship. These principles offer guidance on the establishment and maintenance of effective civil-military relationships with civilian authorities, lead agencies, organisations and populations.

202. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE MILITARY DIRECTION OF CIMIC

1. Mission Primacy. NATO conducts CIMIC in support of a military mission. CIMIC enables a commander to interface with the civil aspects of the environment within which he operates and to absorb fully civil factors into his planning. In a non-Article 5 CRO, the military will have been deployed as but one part of the International Community's efforts to resolve a complex political emergency. Indeed, the military may have been given an explicit supporting role to an overall civil authority within the JOA. Nonetheless, only the Commander can decide the extent to which military resources should be committed to CIMIC tasks. Indeed, additional tasks should not be assumed without an assessment of the resources, in coordination with civilian agencies, and the prioritisation of military tasks. Furthermore, any local CIMIC tasks planned by subordinate commanders should be coordinated and deconflicted so that they do not compromise the longer-term theatre level objectives.

2. Command Direction. It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels to direct CIMIC activities, achieve the necessary unity of command and unity of effort and recognise the importance of integrating into the overall effort. Commanders should be aware of the impact of military operations on the civil environment and the impact of the civil environment on their operations. They should prioritise and direct CIMIC activities in such a way that military effectiveness is maintained without adding unnecessarily to civil hardship or compromising civil objectives.

2-1
3. **Economy.** Commanders must seek to avoid the use of military assets on non-military tasks. Military resources are finite and care must be taken to preserve military capability; only the minimum required to achieve a given, authorised task ii support of the civilian population or civilian organisations should be used. Commanders must also guard against creating long term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, government, IOs or NGOs. CIMIC activities are often carried out in circumstances where the civil population faces an inadequate infrastructure and widespread shortages of essential goods and services. Therefore, once provided, withdrawal or reduction of resources could be difficult as it may strain civil-military relations, retard the growth of civil authority, or may cause lasting damage to public confidence in the military force.

4. **Prioritisation and concentration.** Assets available for CIMIC are likely to be limited; therefore they should be concentrated on tasks of the highest priority. Concentration has the advantage of improving civilian perceptions of the military force and demonstrating its determination to act in the civil interest. Dissipation of assets, on the other hand, may have minimal impact and runs the risk of unnecessarily prolonging the achievement of the desired end-state.

5. **Legal Obligations and Humanitarian Considerations.** Commanders have a legal responsibility to comply with Law of Armed Conflict. Legal staff will advise the Commander on these matters. Commanders should seek, within the constraints of the mission, to reduce the effect of military operations on non-combatants. This is fundamental to consolidating mission legitimacy. Human rights of individuals an groups must be respected and protected in compliance with international law and the Law of Armed Conflict.

203 **PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP**

1. **Cultural Awareness.** A sustained sensitivity towards local customs, mores, culture and ways of life is of fundamental importance to all missions. In a politically sensitive environment a thoughtless violation of a local law or custom can create a highly unfavourable news event and seriously undermine the mission’s chances of success. The military must acquire a sound understanding of local culture, customs and laws. CIMIC plays a vital role in ensuring cultural awareness of the forces through education.

2. **Common Goals.** Establishing, maintaining and strengthening civil-military relationships are critical to success in an operational environment. Although those operating within a JOA may have different immediate interests, common goals shared by NATO forces and civilian organisations should wherever possible be established and recognised. Both Collective Defence and CROs take place in rapidly changing environments where decision-making processes must be
streamlined and responsive. Each participating organisation must understand the political and resource commitments required. This understanding forms the basis of civil-military co-operation and commitments are made in anticipation of achieving objectives and not in meeting deadlines.

3. **Shared Responsibility.** The ethos, structure and working practices of the civil organisations and agencies with which NATO military forces must co-operate are extremely diverse. The analysis of common goals should lead to an agreed sharing of responsibilities in order to establish and maintain a durable and mutually beneficial relationship. CIMIC must establish co-operation arrangements and transition mechanisms with the civilian organisations as soon as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings and define their respective roles and responsibilities.

4. **Consent.** Every effort should be made to secure and retain the willing co-operation of civilian organisations with which the allied force deals; coercion may have a similar effect to consent, but it achieves poor results and will not endure. Loss of consent can occur suddenly, for reasons that seem trivial and commander must be prepared to expend time and energy in its pursuit and retention.

5. **Transparency.** Successful CIMIC requires the mutual trust and confidence of all those involved in an operation. CIMIC tasks and activities should be transparent demonstrating competence, capability and resolve in order to win the trust and confidence of all elements of the civil environment. Tension between political, military, humanitarian and other components of a civil-military relationship will inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding at times. These tensions will be aggravated by political bias, media inaccuracy or distortion and poor communications. Transparency is vital in preventing and defusing such potentially volatile situations because it instills trust, increases confidence and encourages mutual understanding. CIMIC personnel will be a valuable source of local information and will be advocates of the military cause, but they will rapidly become ineffective if used for collecting information for intelligence production or as a means of propagating disinformation. It must be recognised that information obtained for the purpose of intelligence production cannot always be shared with civilian organisations and authorities. CIMIC staff must work closely with intelligence assets to obtain the most timely and accurate information that may be passed to the civilian organisations in time to be effective. Much of this information such as refugee movements, given to the civilian organisations and lead agencies may assist the commander greatly by allowing the appropriate civilian agency to react in a timely manner while minimising the diversion of military resources. Such information allows the civilian agencies to tailor themselves to the developing situation and prevents the military from unnecessarily expending its resources or from becoming unnecessarily entrenched in an operation. Specific rules and
arrangements to declassify military information and intelligence should be made in advance.

6. **Communication.** Effective communication with civil authorities, agencies, organisations and populations is vital to maintaining consent and co-operation. Differences between military and civilian organisations - whether perceived or otherwise - require an investment in time and understanding to overcome. Civilian organisations with which the military will deal are likely to pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take the view that co-operation with the military and independence are mutually exclusive. The key to minimising these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication. Clear and effective measures to establish and maintain these communication channels through CIMIC staffs with representatives of appropriate civilian organisations and lead agencies should be developed to avoid potential disruptions and misunderstandings. As civilian organisations continue to arrive throughout the operation, they should be encouraged to adapt to the established system.
CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE APPLICATION OF CIMIC

301. GENERAL

1. Relationships between NATO and Civilian Organisations. In order to harmonise the contribution of the NATO forces and civilian organisations working in an area of operations it is necessary to develop an effective relationship between them. CIMIC is the Commander’s tool for building these relationships within his JOA. These relationships will be supported by those established between NATO and respective IOs and NGOs at SC level and higher. Although institutional relationships may exist between NATO HQ and those organisations for whom such relationships are appropriate, less formal relations, based upon working knowledge of respective planning mechanisms and joint training activities, will exist. These will ensure that adequate integrated planning at the strategic level can be conducted prior to and during an operation.

2. CIMIC and the New Civil Dimension. CIMIC plays an important role across the spectrum of conflict. It contributes towards the establishment of a stable environment within which the mission may be completed more easily. Indeed a force may be at least partially dependent on civilian institutions and the population for resources and information, and rely on civil authorities to provide security in certain areas. It may be impossible to gain full freedom of action and movement without the cooperation of these civil authorities. CIMIC personnel will play a central role in the assessment of the immediate needs of the local population and the capabilities of both the local government and civilian organisations. These assessments will be key to operational planning, meeting immediate local needs, achieving stabilisation and in designing a plan for a smooth transition to full civilian authority.

302. TASKS

1. General. The application of CIMIC differs between Article 5 Collective Defence and non-Article 5 CROs. Not only will the nature of the immediate environment be different but also will the relationship between the military and civilian organisations and authorities. Nevertheless there are a number of operational level tasks, carried out by CIMIC staffs, which form the framework with which tactical tasks are conducted and which are common to all operations. These tasks can be grouped into 3 distinct but overlapping stages: pre-operational, operational and transitional.

2. Pre-Operational Stage. At the earliest opportunity, CIMIC staff will help prepare the allied force to deal with the civilian conditions it will meet in the JOA. This will involve:

3-1
a. Planning. CIMIC staffs prepare the CIMIC input to the main operation plan. They will also ensure that factors relating to the civil dimension are incorporated into all aspects of planning. Inputs will be based, where possible, on reconnaissance [ ] and detailed assessment. The latter will include:

(1) Political and cultural history.
(2) The state of national and local government
(3) Civil administration and services.
(4) The needs of the civilian population.
(5) Population movement.
(6) The presence, mandates, capabilities and intentions of IOs and NGOs.
(7) Civil infrastructure.
(8) Economy and Commerce.
(9) The mind-set and perceptions of the civilian population.

b. Advice to the Commander.

c. Training and Education. Training and education will be conducted for commanders and their staff as well as those filling dedicated CIMIC posts.

3. Operational Stage. The core CIMIC task throughout operations is to secure effective civil-military co-operation in support of the Commander's mission. This requires establishing and maintaining relations with a wide range of civil actors. The existence of relations with some organisations does not preclude the need to establish effective relations with newly identified actors identified in the ongoing assessment process. Underpinning this co-operation are six activities:

a. Communication. Effective co-operation is only possible if there is constant communication at all levels. This may prove difficult due to the absence of effective communications infrastructures. The Commander is likely to be in contact with local political leaders and

---

7 See the NATO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide for further guidance.
the heads of mandated IOs and NGOs. Equally, liaison officers are likely to be deployed to the latter. It is just as important that CIMIC staff, particularly at theatre level, retain a proactive relationship with their counterparts in these organisations.

b. Information Exchange. CIMIC functions as a civil-military information exchange. Civilian sources will often provide information of operational relevance. Subject to security considerations, it is likely to be of mutual benefit to pass information in both directions.

c. Co-ordination. Given differing mandates, cultures and perspective, there will be an ongoing requirement to co-ordinate activities to ensure that congruent long-term goals are not compromised. Equally, at theatre level, there will be a need to co-ordinate individual formation or national CIMIC activities.

d. Facilitating Agreements. CIMIC staff will facilitate the drafting of any formal agreements or Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) required to underpin civil-military co-operation.

e. The conduct of CIMIC activities. CIMIC activities may have to be conducted to fill any vacuum in the provision of services or facilities required to meet the immediate life sustaining needs of the local population and/or to ensure the stability and long-term sustainability of the society within the JOA. This vacuum will have arisen due to the mandated civilian authorities’ or the International Community’s temporary inability to fulfill these needs. Any activities of this nature will be performed within limitations and capabilities and will be conducted within the context of a plan for transition of such responsibilities to the mandated authorities. Donors for some activities may have to be identified.

f. Assessments. All the above activities will be carried out on the basis of continuous assessments. These will include the scale and nature of any civil related vacuum and the identification or adjustment of workable milestones on the path towards transition of civil responsibilities.

4. Transitional Stage. The transitional stage sees the hand-over, in as smooth and seamless a manner as possible, of civil related activities to the proper, mandated authorities.

5. Specific Environments. In addition to the above CIMIC tasks, there will be others that fall out of the particular operational environment. It is therefore necessary...
to examine factors particular to each of Article 5 Collective Defence and Non Article 5 CROs.

303 **ARTICLE 5 COLLECTIVE DEFENCE OPERATIONS**

1. **General.** Although the direct threat to NATO national territories may have diminished, collective defence remains the primary mission of Alliance military forces. It is possible, however, to move from a situation where non-Article 5 conditions prevail to Article 5 conditions very quickly. Moreover, the cessation of hostilities, commanders of an Article 5 Collective Defence operation could well find themselves dealing with issues more usually associated with non-Article 5 conditions such as the provision of life support for the local population and of reconstruction.

2. **Factors particular to CIMIC in Article 5 Collective Defence Operations.**

   a. **General.** Within many NATO countries, the relationship between a NATO force and the host nation is governed by long-standing bilateral and multi-lateral agreements, most notably the NATO Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). Many NATO nations have their own structures and procedures in place to deal with most aspects of CIMIC in the event of military conflict. Moreover, an Allied Joint Force deployed in a NATO nation can expect that some CIMIC functions will be undertaken by the host nation. Support to the civil environment will be a national responsibility and MOUs may cover many aspects of support to the force. Even where a NATO nation has been subjected to significant destruction as a result of invasion, it is assumed that the national government will retain both the will and ability to organise and carry out civil reconstruction of the country, supported by international organisations other than NATO. Nonetheless, CIMIC is as crucial to the Commander in this scenario as any other staff function. This is not only because of the heightened risk to allied soldiers and the Commander’s added obligations towards the civilian population. It also reflects a change in the conditions under which such operations might be conducted compared with those perceived to prevail at the height of the Cold War. One indicator of this change is the greater access available to the world’s media today. Moreover, the pace of such operations is often so rapid that actions and their consequences can follow with little time to plan and coordinate CIMIC activities. Such conditions will therefore normally require a robust CIMIC capability.

---

8 Although CIMIC may still have a critical role to play in facilitating Host Nation Support (HNS). This subject is covered in chapter 4.
Population Movement. Although large refugee and displaced person migrations, as well as large numbers of evacuees, could well be present in all types of NATO operation, within an Article 5 situation these persons could be in particular danger and could interfere with the operations of allied forces. CIMIC efforts to facilitate the movement and relocation of these persons would play a key role in overall operations.

International and Non Governmental Organisations. In areas of high intensity conflict, there are likely to be fewer international aid organisations. During the early stages of combat, transportation into the area of operations will often be strictly limited to combat formations. Aid agency access to most of the area of operations will be limited or non-existent until well into the later phases of combat. In the meantime, military commanders may be called upon by the International Community to meet civilian needs. Consequently, planning must be initiated early for the orderly movement and security of massive numbers of displaced persons and refugees.

3. Tasks.

a. Pre-Operational Stage. Apart from the planning process already described, the CIMIC element of the force structure will also be shaped at this stage. What makes this traditional phase more challenging is the potential scope of the operation. Any Article 5 operation on or contiguous to NATO territory would involve movement of large numbers of combatants and civilians. Arrangements for co-ordination at Theatre or Regional level would have to be robust.

b. Operational Stage. CIMIC tasks during the operational stage could include:

(1) Civil-Military Liaison.

(a) Co-ordination with civil authorities and organisations.

(b) Co-operation and co-ordination with CEP staff and activities.

(2) Support to the Civil Environment.

(a) Co-ordination of plans for the evacuation of the civilian population where necessary

(b) Provision of humanitarian aid.
(c) Co-ordination and assistance in the repair of critical infrastructure.

(d) Co-ordination of refugee planning with lead civilian agencies.

(e) Organisation of refugee reception with lead civilian agencies.

(3) Support to the Force.

(a) Assistance in the negotiation of Host Nation Support.

(b) Advice on target analysis to avoid collateral damage.

Also during the operational stage, plans for transition and termination to be conducted in the transitional stage should be completed.

c. **Transitional Stage.** As the operational situation stabilises, CIMIC staff co-operates with the host nation to integrate the influx of civil aid and reconstruction organisations. The establishment of basic security in conjunction with police units may also be required. Basic civil infrastructure and life sustaining systems (such as water supply and power) may have been destroyed during the campaign or exist in such poor condition that a rapid reaction and adjustment will be needed. Co-ordination with any IOs or NGOs in theatre and those incoming will require the rapid development of and the establishing interfaces with lead agencies. Co-ordination of the arrival, storage and proper distribution of large quantities of humanitarian aid may also be required. Thereafter, CIMIC activities would bear a strong resemblance to those conducted in a non-Article 5 operation.

### 304 NON ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

1. **General - The Changing Environment.** Whilst the potential for inter-state disputes has not diminished, the changing security environment is increasingly characterised by various forms of complex, multi-party, intra-state conflicts and resulting humanitarian disasters which might constitute multi-dimensional risks or threats to regional and international security. Frequently, within such conflicts, state institutions collapse, law and order break down, banditry and chaos prevail and portions of the civilian population migrate. Therefore international activities to restore peace could include political, diplomatic, economic, military and humanitarian efforts and the use of information to promote national reconciliation and the re-
establishment of effective government. A commander requires an appropriately resourced CIMIC capability to operate in this milieu and to facilitate the creation of conditions that in turn will make eventual extraction of the force easier to achieve and to justify.

2. Factors particular to CIMIC in Non Article 5 CROs.
   a. Evolving Response. The management of these complex contingencies requires a central co-ordinating mechanism under the political leadership of an internationally mandated authority such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The involvement of regional and sub-regional organisations, governments, supra-national organisations and non-government aid agencies will almost always also characterise the operational environment. However, a successful response must be timely, suitable and supported by contributions from all parties involved in order to achieve the political objective. While retaining its primary defensive posture, NATO’s Strategic Concept acknowledges these multi-dimensional risks and challenges as potential threats to the peace and security of its members.

   b. Harmonising Civilian and Military Objectives. Success in achieving military objectives may be rapid but completion of the mission and extraction of the force will often depend on progress in the civil arena, over which the military commander will have less direct influence. In pursuing the military mission the Commander will use his CIMIC resources to shape the situation. In particular some of the condition for military success can be achieved by harmonising the military activities with those of the civilian organisations in his area. Examples include avoiding duplication of effort, not depleting the local economy, avoiding working at cross-purposes, supporting mutual goals and minimising the use of military assets where civilian ones are available and more appropriate. Military contributions in areas normally the responsibility of civilian authorities and organisations will be conducted within means and capabilities and for as short a period as possible, although it must be remembered that failure in these areas may be associated with NATO rather than any civilian organisation.

3. Tasks.
   a. Pre-Operational Stage. At the earliest possible stage before an operation, CIMIC staff will be involved in planning, education and training. Critically, they will exploit existing relationships with civilian operational partners to embark upon integrated planning. At the
same time CIMIC staff will work with all other staff branches to ensure that all civil related factors are incorporated into the planning process. Ideally there will be time to mobilise the means to perform critical functions, which the international civilian organisations and agencies cannot immediately perform so that these are available to deploy with the NATO force. CIMIC staff will be involved in preparing the allied force to deal with the civilian conditions it will meet in the area of operations.

b. **Operational Stage.**

(1) **General.** As the purpose of CIMIC is to secure effective civil-military co-operation in support of the Commander’s mission, relationships, whether formal or informal, must be established and maintained with existing civil actors, many of whom may be working in the JOA well before NATO forces arrive. It is within this context that the six tasks required in the operational stage are performed, namely: communication, co-ordination, exchange of information, setting up of agreements, CIMIC activities and assessments. Given the fluid nature of CROs, there must be continuous assessments of the capabilities and tasks of existing, newly arrived and departing civilian organisations along with assessments of the needs of the population and the progress of certain aspects of the mission. Contacts with IOs and NGOs may be more efficient if lead agencies have been assigned.

(2) **Specific Responsibilities.** In the initial phase of a CRO, critical and immediate tasks normally carried out by civilian organisations may have to be performed by the military force either for immediate logistical or humanitarian reasons or as first step in the creation of sustainable infrastructures. Action may also be required to prevent hostile, uncooperative or criminally oriented groups or factions from gaining control of key services, facilities, administrative posts or sectors of the economy, thereby inhibiting the accomplishment of the mission and extraction of the force. The force may also require CIMIC assistance in dealing with a large number of refugees and displaced persons. In addition to CIMIC functional specialists and experts brought in by the international organisations, the indigenous remaining and displaced populations will be a source of ability, knowledge and expertise on which to draw. Plans for transition and termination should be completed at this stage.
(3) **Implied Tasks.** CIMIC staff should focus on encouraging local and international civilian support agencies to assume full authority for civil implementation. Civilian organisations should be encouraged to assume responsibilities for civil functions and require a decreasing amount of assistance from the military force. The relationships established in this stage and ongoing, accurate assessments of progress achieved in civil implementation are crucial to effecting a smooth transition of responsibilities and the subsequent extraction of the force.

c. **Transitional Stage.** The primary role of CIMIC in the transition stage is to assist the appointed civil authorities in operating without NATO forces in the JOA. As the military force reduces in number and in the scope of its responsibilities, CIMIC will continue to assist in the transfer of any civilian responsibilities that the force may have assumed upon its arrival to the agencies and organisations authorised to assume those responsibilities. CIMIC staff will also cease performing any functions that are no longer necessary due to the gradual stabilisation of the area.
CHAPTER 4

THE CO-ORDINATION AND USE OF CIVIL RESOURCES

401. GENERAL

1. The role of CIMIC in the field of resource co-ordination differs from but is complementary to that of Host Nation Support (HNS). HNS concerns the provision of civil and military assistance in the form of materiel, facilities, services and administrative support to the force. CIMIC’s role is to provide co-ordination and liaison that will assist in making those civil resources available. This role fulfills a major, but by no means the entire, part of the core function of support to the force. In addition CIMIC will help to ensure a balance between the use of resources by NATO, local populations, IOs and NGOs. This is done with a view to avoid unnecessary civilian hardship. This function is referred to as Civil-Military Resource Co-ordination (CMRC) and can be described as:

The procedures and military arrangements needed in peace, crisis or war to facilitate access to civil resources necessary to support a NATO force and to balance the use of these resources between the force, the local population and International and Non Governmental Organisations.

2. Facilitating Access to Civil Logistic Resources. The J4 staff is responsible for developing HNS arrangements with a host government to establish access to civil logistic resources within an area of operations. CIMIC can facilitate the negotiation process by:

a. including J4 staff in the fact finding visits that CIMIC may conduct within the target country for data gathering, initial assessments and establishment of liaison and coordination mechanisms;

b. informing the J4 staff on the overall status and capability of the host nation’s economy, infrastructure, health care and lines of communications to support the operational logistic requirements;

c. providing the J4 staff with access to appropriate host nation authorities at the governmental level with whom negotiations will need to be conducted and at the regional and local levels with whom the execution of HNS will need to be coordinated; and

As described in MC334/1 and AJP 4.5 (HNS doctrine). See, also, the definition of HNS at Annex B.
d. advising the J4 staff of other established arrangements (Sending Nations, IOs and/or NGOs) that may compete or conflict with the proposed HNS arrangements.

3. **Co-ordination of the Use of Civil Resources.** Even where a humanitarian crisis does not exist before a military deployment, the introduction of a large military force can reduce the available civil resources to the point of hardship for the civilian population. It is the task of CIMIC to ensure that an assessment of civil resources carried out and that clear guidance is given to ensure that any unnecessary hardship is avoided. Additionally, CIMIC must assess the impact of the military presence on the local economy so as to prevent damage to the economy through misapplication of military or civilian resources. It may also be necessary to support the civil authorities in the co-ordination of the use of civil resources to ensure that there are sufficient resources available to meet both civil and military needs. In extreme cases, it may be necessary for commanders to seek civil authority to ration scarce local commodities that are critical to military operations or to the survival of the population. In such an eventuality it will be the task of CIMIC staff to monitor distribution of the relevant supplies.

402. **APPLICATION.**

1. In performing the above CRMC function, CIMIC staff will:
   a. Establish and maintain relations with civilian resource and service providers.
   b. Aim to ensure a balanced use of resources between the Force, the local population and all civilian organisations within the area so that the Commander's mission can be fulfilled without undue civilian hardship. In turn this will require the prevention of competition over resources.
   c. Assess local resource availability and inform the J4 staff accordingly.
   d. Provide inputs when required to: Strategic Command General Agreements, MOUs, Technical Agreements, Statements of Requirement, and contracts.
   e. Provide a forum for coordination with IOs, NGOs, J4 staff, and/or host nation administration, as may be required.

2. **Relationship with logistics staff.** The CIMIC role in the co-ordination of civil resources therefore fulfils a facilitating, monitoring and advisory function. It does not involve direct management of resources or, for example, the drawing up of
contracts. The latter remain the responsibility of J4 staff with whom CIMIC staff will liaise closely. During the execution phase, the focal point for this liaison is to be the Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC)\(^{10}\), the purpose of which is to provide effective co-ordination of the logistic activities of all Nations, Component Commanders, IOs and NGOs on behalf of the CJ4. Within the MJLC, the HNS Coordination Cell (HNSCC) is the focal point for the use of civil resources that has been agreed by the Host Nation, Sending Nation and/or the JFC through HNS arrangements. The MJLC also executes theatre level logistic plans.

\(^{10}\) See AJP 4.6: MJLC Doctrine
CHAPTER 5

ORGANISATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CIMIC FORCES

501. GENERAL

1. The requirement. The physical requirement to complete CIMIC tasks in support of a mission will vary from situation to situation. Any CIMIC organisation must be flexible enough to meet these demands. The minimum requirement common to all situations remains CIMIC trained staff who are fully integrated into headquarters at all levels. The size and structure of these staff will vary from HQ to HQ and will be mission dependent. They will include LOs to be deployed to civil organisations and agencies as appropriate. They will facilitate all aspects of interfaces between the Force and the civil environment. Therefore their activities will be fully co-ordinated with those of all other staff. The requirement to sustain a JOA level CIMIC capability over an extended period of time also assumes the existence of national assets capable of undertaking CIMIC tasks and under the required readiness states. These assets may comprise:

a. CIMIC Groups. CIMIC Group is a CIMIC unit that may deploy into the JOA or Region as part of a national contingent or Allied Joint Force (AJF). It may be national or multi-national in its composition. It will have trained and exercised using the TTPs required to conduct CIMIC activities such as assessments and the establishment of CIMIC centres. It may comprise a Group HQ, a HQ company and a number of CIMIC support companies capable of supporting the chain of command throughout the JOA or Region. The Group's primary task to support the chain of command in carrying out CIMIC activities. It is likely to contain or be able to call upon expertise in the following areas:

(1) Civil Administration.
(2) Civil Infrastructure.
(3) Humanitarian Aid.
(4) Economy and Commerce.
(5) Cultural Affairs.
A fuller range of the tasks such a Group might undertake is shown at Annex A.

b. **Functional specialists.** Functional specialists are employed to carry out specific tasks that have been identified through the assessment process. Again, their number and area of expertise will vary according to both need and availability. They will only be employed for the duration of the specified task. These specialists may be either military or civilian. The terms under which the latter are employed will be determined by the legal requirements of the donor nation. However, they must be under readiness states that enable them to deploy when required. CIMIC groups are likely to contain a number of military personnel capable of carrying out specific CIMIC functional activities. Nations have sources of functional specialists who together may provide a pool of expertise.

c. **General Forces.** The Commander may identify units under his command to carry out CIMIC tasks.

### 502. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Whether under Article 5 or non-Article 5 conditions, there may be a requirement for a joint force level CIMIC capability to enable the Commander to conduct CIMIC activities in support of his mission. CIMIC assets in support of a joint operation are normally placed under OPCON of the Land Component Commander. Under Article 5 conditions, activities of specialist CIMIC units placed in direct support of national formations will normally be co-ordinated by CIMIC staff at the Land Component Commander level. In non-Article 5 CROs, the requirement will normally be met by one or more of the following options:

   a. The allocation of a CIMIC Group under OPCON the AJF HQ. This option is more applicable to a major operation covering a large area and a wide range of tasks. In effect, the Group HQ becomes the Commander’s theatre level CIMIC asset reporting through the HQ CIMIC staff. Functional specialists, or teams of functional specialists, will usually be administered and tasked by the CIMIC Group HQ. Two further options are then possible:

      (1) The group sub-units are tasked directly as AJF component level troops, although in this case their activities will still need to be co-ordinated at division, brigade and even battalion level.

      (2) Group sub-units, or elements from the Group, are placed in support of subordinate headquarters and formations or units,
usually under OPCON. Figure 5-1 illustrates how this arrangement might work.

b. The reinforcement of CIMIC staff within a HQ by functional specialist or elements from a CIMIC Group. The requirement to fulfill JOA leve tasks might then in turn be met by the tasking of national assets through the chain of command and/or of tasking further individual functional specialists who report directly to the CIMIC staff.

c. The raising of CIMIC assets for deployment within a JOA as part of national contributions through the NATO Force Generation process by use of a Statement Of Requirement (SOR) and placed under command of the JFC. These assets might in turn be placed under OPCON of subordinate formation commanders.

2. **CIMIC Centres.** CIMIC centres are locations where liaison and exchange of information between military personnel, civilian organisations and the local authorities and population takes place. They are located on the basis of accessibility and are usually outside military compounds. They are preferably collocated with or close to the locations of lead or major agencies. They do not replace HQs as decision-making centres. If NATO forces enter the area after the arrival of IOs and NGOs, there may already exist an international or national centre providing many of the required services. The NATO force should then work with this centre.

3. **Key Functions.** Key functions of CIMIC Centres therefore are to:

   a. Provide initial points of contact.
   
   b. Provide a focal point for liaison.
   
   c. Facilitate information exchange.
   
   d. Provide advice on the availability and mechanics of military assistance to civilian organisations.
Figure 5-1: ILLUSTRATIVE CIMIC ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE IN A NON-ARTICLE 5 CRO
4. Co-ordination of CIMIC activities across the JOA. A key milestone within a CRO will always be transition to civilian authority for which arrangements must be achieved in as seamless a manner as possible. Just as the early deployment of CIMIC capabilities is designed to avoid vacuums being filled by democratically unaccountable elements, the same principle must apply to transition. In the same light no more CIMIC related responsibilities must be taken on than is necessary. Necessity will be determined by the military Commander on the basis of his staff's assessments and consultation with the appropriate civilian authorities and organisations. Commanders below the JFC level may see the need to authorise CIMIC activities which do not form part of the JFC’s CIMIC plan, and which will be undertaken either by general troops within their commands or by national CIMIC assets. This is acceptable provided that:

   a. These activities are fully transparent and are co-ordinated at the theatre level.

   b. They do not compromise the JFC’s mission.

Failure to follow these principles will not only embroil military forces in activities from which it will become increasingly difficult to extract but - by creating dependence upon military resources - could even create obstacles to the completion of the mission.

503. HQ Staff. The size and specific organisation of the CIMIC staff within HQs a function of the NATO mission. The CIMIC staffs are not necessarily themselves specialists with skills applicable in a civilian environment. However they must be trained operational staff officers who understand CIMIC principles and procedures and the environment in which they will operate and understand the workings of NGOs and IOs. They must be capable of explaining military requirements to civilian organisations and vice versa. They must be able to carry out accurate civil-military assessments and provide practical advice to the Commander. Above all, they must have the experience and credibility to work closely with all other staff to ensure that civil related factors are integrated into all plans.

504. STAFF AT HIGHER HQ

1. NATO Staffs. The staffs of Strategic Commands, Regional Commands, Joint Sub-Regional Commands, Component Commands and High Readiness HC should include CIMIC trained officers. Their main function in peacetime will be the planning and preparation of the CIMIC input for contingency plans for both Collective Defence Operations and CROs. They also contribute towards the
development of doctrine and education, training and exercises. They must ensure that allied commanders and staffs know what CIMIC capabilities are available and how to employ them. They may also be required to provide the CIMIC staff nucleus for a CJTFHQ or an ad-hoc established AJF.

2. National Staffs. Nations should also have a CIMIC staff focus in formations, including divisions and brigades, assigned to NATO.
CHAPTER 6
ORGANISATIONAL CIMIC RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPERATIONAL CIMIC TASKS

601. INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter outlines the organisational CIMIC responsibilities and, where appropriate, operational tasks to be carried out at all levels within NATO. The list is not exhaustive as other tasks may arise as a result of consultation between NATO and appropriate civilian authorities and organisations.

602. THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

1. The specific responsibilities of the Military Committee and Strategic Commands in relation to CIMIC are laid down in MC 411/1.

603. REGIONAL COMMAND AND BELOW

1. Regional Commanders. Regional commanders are to:

   a. Provide CIMIC staffs who are trained to assist in training, education and exercises. Regional Commanders should play a proactive role in standardising CIMIC skills within their areas.

   b. Promulgate appropriate directives and guidance, including planning guidelines.

   c. Provide CIMIC inputs to all regional plans and operation orders.

   d. Execute CIMIC assessments in support of operations.

   e. Train and support national and multinational CIMIC forces that have been assigned to support their operations.

   f. Develop training standards and supporting plans to cover CIMIC exercise input.

   g. Establish a HQ CIMIC staff to crisis establishment when appointed a JFC.

   h. Ensure appropriate liaison with the Regional Command /Combined Joint Task Force Multinational Joint Logistics Centre.
2. **Joint Sub-Regional Commanders**, the Commanders of Reaction Forces, the Commander of the Striking Fleet Atlantic (CSFL) and the Commander, Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)). The specific responsibilities of these Commanders are to:

   a. Provide dedicated CIMIC staffs who are trained appropriately.
   b. Ensure the appropriate use of CIMIC directives and guidelines and promulgate further ones as necessary.
   c. Provide CIMIC input to all plans and orders.
   d. On order, to execute CIMIC in support of operations.
   e. Support national or multi-national CIMIC forces that have been assigned to support their operations.
   f. Incorporate, as realistically as possible, CIMIC play into Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) exercises to the maximum extent possible.

3. **NATO Nations**. NATO nations undertake to:

   a. Consider CIMIC during the planning process and implement it into directives and planning documents.
   b. Develop plans and programs in support of NATO CIMIC policy and doctrine.
   c. Ensure, within their capabilities and overall priorities, that information, research, and analysis are provided in support of NATO CIMIC.
   d. Ensure interoperability is taken into consideration during development and procurement of CIMIC capabilities.
   e. Include CIMIC in education, training and exercises as appropriate.
   f. Provide resources and trained personnel to support NATO CIMIC in operations and exercises.

604. **STRATEGIC LEVEL TASKS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS**
1. The theatre level commander or JFC will normally require considerable CIMIC support from the strategic level to conduct operations. Depending on circumstances and designated command status, this support may be provided at SC or Regional HQ level. Principal tasks will be to:

a. Plan CIMIC activities to support the various stages of planning in accordance with the NATO CIMIC Bi-SC Functional Planning Guide.

b. Advise the commander and staff of the civil conditions in the area of operations and how military operations and civil population and institution will affect each other. Advice should cover topics such as the nature and organisational imperatives of the civil environment.

c. Assist subordinate HQs in the conduct of CIMIC training, the most important aspect of which is pre-deployment training.

d. Ensure effective communication through, inter alia:
   (1) Dissemination of regular reports, the frequency of which will be determined by the Commander.
   (2) Collection and dissemination of civil organisations reports.
   (3) Attendance at key organisational meetings.
   (4) Exchange of liaison officers with the key civil organisations.
   (5) Establishment of a site on the world wide web to communicate with the agencies present in the theatre.

e. Provide expertise on the composition of agreements with civilian organisations.

f. Co-ordinate with information operations staff in the development of an information campaign designed to inform audiences about civil-military co-operation and to release information to aid the population.
CHAPTER 7

CIMIC IN NATO DECISION MAKING

701. GENERAL

1. NATO’s decision-making cycle requires a close interaction between the political and military staffs. Limitations and imperatives in one area may affect decisions in the other. It is critical that the CIMIC staff are represented on the commander’s planning group. Indeed, factors relating to the civil environment are likely to impact upon all aspects of operations and related staff work. Therefore, the CIMIC staff should work in close co-operation with all military staff branches to ensure that civil-related factors are fully integrated into all operational plans. To be effective in influencing the planning process, CIMIC staff must be included on ground reconnaissance missions and should maintain close contact with relevant civil organisations and government officials in the run-up to an operation.

702. THE NATO OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

1. General. NATO’s Operational Planning Process (OPP) is described in MC 133/2 and the Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). The NATO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide describes the CIMIC planning process and how it provides input to the main OPP. This includes the production of the Civil Assessment and the CIMIC Estimate as well as CIMIC input to an Operation Plan (OPLAN).
CHAPTER 8

CIVILIAN ORGANISATIONS

801. INTRODUCTION

1. General. Civilian organisations are responsible for a wide range of activities encompassing humanitarian aid, human rights, protection of minorities, refugees, displaced persons, legal assistance, medical care, reconstruction, agriculture, education, arts, sciences and general project funding. It is critical that CIMIC personnel fully understand the mandate, role, structure, methods and principles of these organisations to establish an effective relationship with them. Collectively, civilian organisations, together with local populations and their representatives, represent the other half of the CIMIC equation.

802. TYPES, ROLES AND MANDATES

1. Types. There are three principal types of civilian organisations:

   a. International Organisations (IOs).

      (1) IOs are established by intergovernmental agreements and operate at the international level such as the various UN organisations and the OSCE. The major UN organisations that are most likely to be involved in humanitarian relief are the UN High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). This group also includes organisations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

      (2) Separate mention should be made of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which, unlike those IOs mentioned above, was established by intergovernmental agreement. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in situations of conflict and
their aftermath. The ICRC has a unique status as it fulfils a role conferred upon it by international treaties the Geneva Conventions 1949, to which virtually all countries in the world are party, and their Additional Protocols of 1977) and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted by the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions in 1986.

b. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). NGOs are voluntary organisations that are not usually funded by governments. The term used in Article 71 of the UN Charter. They are primarily non-profit organisations that are independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. They are legally different from UN agencies and other IOs in that they write their own charter and mission. They may fall into one of two categories:

(1) Mandated. A mandated NGO has been officially recognised by the lead international organisation in a crisis and authorise work in the affected area.

(2) Non-Mandated. A non-mandated NGO has had no official recognition or authorisation and therefore works as a private concern. These organisations could be contracted or subcontracted by an IO or a mandated NGO. In other cases they obtain funds from private enterprises and donors.

NGOs are increasingly numerous and sophisticated and in any potential AO could be numbered in their hundreds. They generally remain strongly independent from political control in order to preserve their independence and effectiveness. In many cases their impartiality has been of great benefit, forming the only available means of rebuilding relations when political dialogue has broken down. They often highly professional in their field, extremely well motivated and prepared to take physical risks in appalling conditions. NGOs will usually be accredited by the host nation or the lead agency before being authorised to operate within the country. However, some NGOs may not be accredited and this can create local tensions.

c. International and National Government Donor Agencies, such as: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM, US State Department)
Department for International Development (DfID, UK), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Agencia Española de Cooperacion Internacional (AECI) and European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). International and National Government Donor Agencies have responsibilities for the funding, monitoring and evaluation of development programmes, which should ideally be coordinated by lead IOs.

2. Other groupings. Within the above generic types the following groupings are also important to note:

a. Civilian Development Agencies. Some civilian organisations are concerned mainly with reconstruction. Their mandates are to provide technical assistance to developing countries. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) administers and co-ordinates most development technical assistance provided through the UN system. These agencies normally spend a longer time in the affected area than the military. In these cases the CIMIC task is to identify the requirement for reconstruction together with the local government, and when possible lead agencies, to enable the organisations to begin work continue under the most favourable conditions. The reconstruction agencies will usually have allocated resources to plan and develop projects throughout the affected area on the basis of need.

b. Human Rights and Democratisation Agencies. The primary agencies in this area are the United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), although the latter only operates within Europe. These agencies seek to protect human rights in states where abuses may be rampant. They seek to instill democratic values and the rule of law at all levels of governments. Additionally, the OSCE has the ability to arrange for and monitor elections, and co-ordinate programs instilling democratic institutional values.

803. **LEAD AGENCIES**

1. **Lead agency concept.** A lead agency is one that has been mandated by the international community to initiate the coordination of the activities of civilian organisations, which volunteer to participate in an operation. It is normally a major...
UN agency such as UNHCR or UNICEF or - increasingly likely - the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), part of the UN Secretariat. Specific responsibilities of a lead agency are to:

a. Act as a point of contact for other agencies, particularly in the areas of planning and information sharing.

b. Co-ordinate field activities to avoid duplication of effort and wasting resources.

c. Act as an interface with the military at the theatre level.

The ICRC coordinates all activities of the Red Crescent Movement in situations of conflict and their aftermath.

2. **Lead agency concept in practice**. Often the lead agencies will coordinate field activities through another agency’s or organisation’s field offices. Although the latter will usually be from UNHCR or the World Food Programme (WFP), NGOs such as Save the Children have in the past filled this role. Lead agencies have also contracted other IOs and NGOs to implement health, food or transportation programmes or to operate refugee camps. The IOM has assisted in these areas. The ICRC has conducted its activities with the other agencies in this field. In such situations NGOs will operate under legal agreements involving them as partners with the host nation government and a UN agency. The relationship between NATO and the lead agency is critical. MOUs between the NATO force and the lead agency provide a useful tool in making the relationship work.

804. **PRINCIPLES**

1. **General**. Quite apart from the requirement to understand the different roles and mandates of the various civilian organisations, it is also critical to the civil-military relationship to understand the three humanitarian principles adopted by the international community and under which most civil aid organisations operate and upon which humanitarian action is based:

a. **Humanity**. Human suffering is to be relieved wherever it is found. The dignity and other human rights of individuals and groups must be respected.

b. **Impartiality**. Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination. Relief is given without regard to nationality, political
ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex or ethnicity, but only on the basis of the urgency of the need.

c. Neutrality. Humanitarian actors may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

805. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CIVIL ORGANISATIONS, GOVERNMENTS AND MILITARY

1. General. Governments have the primary responsibility for handling humanitarian needs within their own countries. Civil organisations will establish contacts with governmental and local authorities to develop their activities. The role of CIMIC is to work closely with the civil organisations and national governments and/or local authorities. In some cases, the military will only play a supporting role or other situations, CIMIC participation and co-ordination will be the main focal point for the establishment and development of the necessary initial contacts. This type of situation can occur when no civil authority is in place, which is a common occurrence in CROs.

2. Organisational Cultures. NATO forces, IOs and NGOs, government donors and the UN each contain their own organisational cultures characterised by their national, professional and institutional differences. The degree of involvement, influence and impact of each of these organisations may vary greatly depending on the situation. Co-operation and consensus between the various organisations may be difficult to achieve due to the requirement for each to maintain relationships on three levels. The levels at which relationships must be maintained are in the field at the tactical level; with the national parties (host government or authorised governmental body) at the operational level; and the international community and supporting donors at the strategic level.

3. Stable and fragile states. In those situations where a host nation government is still functioning, NGOs usually enter into legal agreements with those governments prior to conducting operations in that country. Agreements often take the form of official registration with and accountability to a particular government ministry. Many NGOs operate in association with and through funding from UN agencies.

4. Failed or collapsed states. Where a state ceases to function as a political entity, there exists no government with which to register. Therefore NGOs can operate on the legal basis of their contracts and agreements with UN agencies or
even as independent agencies operating their own programs. This situation may cause difficulties for the NATO Commander, as many of these organisations may abide by established security agreements and procedures or in accordance with established UN co-ordination structures in theatre. Furthermore, very often, IOs, NGOs and UN agencies rely on military protection against paramilitaries and bar in the area and such protection may be critical to the achievement of their tasks.

5. Training and Education. The most effective way for military forces to understand the skills, knowledge and capabilities of IOs and NGOs is to maintain relationships with them prior to entering an area of operations, and to educate themselves through military schools and courses which incorporate integrated training. This can provide much insight into these organisations and can establish good working relationships based on trust and understanding.
POTENTIAL TASKS OF A CIMIC GROUP

1. **General Tasks:**
   a. Provision of CIMIC support elements to subordinate commands of the land component.
   b. Provision of functional specialist support.
   c. Establishment of CIMIC centres.
   d. Execution of the Commanders CIMIC plan through the conduct of CIMIC activities.

2. **Potential Specific Tasks:**
   a. **Pre Operational Stage.**
      (1) Assist in the assessment and planning of contingency planning and exercises.
      (2) Provide advice on the civil conditions and the effect of military operations on the civilian population and organisations and vice versa.
      (3) Prepare educational material for the force on the anticipated civil conditions and brief staff augmentation.
      (4) Reconnaissance
   b. **Operational Stage.**
      (1) Continue the pre-operational tasks.
      (2) Facilitate the exchange of unclassified information.
(3) Support the staff in the facilitation of initial contracts and agreements through the appropriate J4 organisation.

(4) Provide assessments on civilian needs.

(5) Conduct CIMIC activities.

(6) Set up and run CIMIC Centres.

c. **Transition Stage.**

(1) Continue the operational stage tasks.

(2) Co-ordinate plans for the transition of responsibilities and functions to civil authorities and agencies.

(3) Co-ordinate military activities for termination.

(4) Support the staff in the termination of civil-military agreements.

(5) Analyse and assess remaining unfulfilled civilian needs.

(6) Close CIMIC Centres.

(7) Hand over tasks to civilian authorities and organisations.
The Glossary contains terms and their definitions used within AJP-9. Unless otherwise stated, they are drawn from AAP-6(V) ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’. Those marked (1) are to be submitted to the NATO Terminology Programme for consideration on behalf of the AJODWP.

**allied joint publication**
A publication of joint interest containing doctrine applicable to NATO-led multinational operations involving more than one Service. It is used by Commanders of Allied joint forces, their subordinate commanders and staffs. (AJODWG 98)

**alliance**
The result of formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long objectives which further the common interests of its members. When the word ‘a’ written with a capital ‘A’ (‘Alliance’), it refers specifically to NATO. (AJODWP 97)

**assign**
1. To place units or personnel in an organisation where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organisation controls and administers personnel for the primary function, or greater proportion of the function of the unit or personnel.
2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. See also attach. 1/7/80

**attach**
1. To place units or personnel in an organisation where such placement is relatively temporary. Subject to limitations imposed in the attachment order, commander of the formation, unit, or organisation receiving the attachment will exercise the same degree of command and control thereover as he does over the units and persons organic to his command. However, the responsibility for transfer and promotion of personnel will normally be retained by the formation, unit, or organisation.
2. To detail individuals to specific functions where such functions are relatively temporary, i.e., attach for quarters and rations, attach for flying duty. See also assign. 1/3/81
civil-military cooperation (1)
The resources and arrangements which support the relationship between commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements include cooperation with non-governmental agencies, organizations and authorities. 25/9/98.

cimic group
See chapter 5.

command

1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit, or units, an organisation, or an area under the command of one individual.
4. To dominate by a field of weapon fire or by observation from a superior position.
5. To exercise a command. See also administrative control; base command; functional command; national command; operational control.

control

1. The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.
2. In mapping, charting and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations, or both, have been or will be determined. See also administrative control; control; tactical control. 1/9/81

co-ordinating authority
The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.
**doctrine**
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

**end state**
The stated political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (4/10/2000)

**full command**
The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Note: the term “command” as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control. See also administrative control; operational command; operational control. (4/10/2000)

**functional command**
A command organisation based on military functions rather than geographic areas.

**host-nation support**
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to other forces and organizations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation’s territory. See also host nation. (4/10/2000)

**humanitarian operations**
Operations conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian operations may accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations.

**international organisation**
See Chapter 8

**joint**
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. Also called “multiservice”. See also combined. 1

**joint force commander**
A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise command authority or operational control over a joint force.

**joint operations area**
A temporary area defined by a NATO strategic or regional commander, in which joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level. It is defined in coordination with nations and approved by the North Atlantic Council Committee as appropriate, in accordance with the NATO's Operational Planning Architecture. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the geographical area, are contingency- or mission-specific and may overlap areas of responsibility. See also area of responsibility; operational level of war. (4/10/2000)

**line of operation**
In a campaign or operation; a line linking decisive points in time and space on the centre of gravity. See also campaign; centre of gravity; decisive point; operation.

**mission**
1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.
2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task.

**multinational**
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which elements of more than one nation participate. See combined. 16/7/99

**national command**
A command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of, a specific nation or may not be placed under a NATO commander. See also command.

**national component/contingent**
Any national forces of one or more services under the command of a single national commander, assigned to any NATO commander.

**NATO assigned forces**
Forces in being which nations agree to place under the operational command or control of a NATO commander at the declaration of a specific stage, state or measure in the NATO Precautionary System or as prescribed in special agreements. See also force(s).

**non governmental organisation**
See Chapter 8.
**objective**
The physical object of the action taken, e.g., a definite tactical feature; the seizure holding of which is essential to the commander's plan. See also target. 1/3/73

**operation**
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

**operation order**
A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders of effecting the co-ordinated execution of an operation. See also operation order.

**operation plan**
A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plan. The designation ‘plan’ is usually used instead of ‘order’ in preparing for operation advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, becomes the operation order. See also coordinated draft plan; draft plan; final plan; operation order. 1/3/73

**operational command**
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note: it does not include responsibility for administration. See also administrative control; command; operational control; tactical control. 1/10/2001

**operational control**
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. See also administrative or logistic control. See also administrative control; command.

**operational level of war**
The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operation.
readiness
Note: in English "readiness" is a generic term covering "readiness state" and "readiness time". See readiness state; readiness time. 4/10/2000

strategic level of war
The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve its objectives.

support
The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force. See also close support; mutual support. 1/11/68

The term ‘support’ has the following sub-sets:

- **associated support** - In naval usage, operations in which a designated unit operates independently of a specified force or group, but is tasked to provide contact information to, receive intelligence from and, if authorised, to co-operate and co-ordinate operations with the supported force. Tactical control of the unit remains with the assigning authority who co-ordinates tasking and movement of the unit in response to the requirements of the supported force commander.

- **in support of** - Assisting or protecting another formation, unit or organisation while remaining under original control. (AJP-01(B))

sustainability
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.

tactical command
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

tactical control
The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. See also operational command.

tactical level of war
The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. See also tactical intelligence.
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

The Glossary contains abbreviations and acronyms used in AJP-9.

A

ACE    Allied Command Europe
ACLANT  Allied Command Atlantic
AJF    Allied Joint Force
AJP    Allied Joint Publication
AO    Area of Operations
AOR    Area of Responsibility

C

CEP    Civil Emergency Planning
CIDA    Canadian International Development Agency
CJTF    Combined Joint Task Force
CMRC    Civil-Military Resource Co-ordination
CRO    Crisis Response Operation

D

DfID    Department for International Development (UK)

E

ECHO    European Community Humanitarian Office

G

GOP    Guidelines for Operational Planning

H

HQ    Headquarters
HNS    Host Nation Support

I

IC    International Community
ICRC    International Committee of the Red Cross
IO    International Organisation
IOM    International Office for Migration

J

C-1
JOA  Joint Operations Area
JFC  Joint Force Commander
JSRC  Joint Sub-Regional Command

LO  Liaison Officer

MC  Military Committee
MJLC  Multinational Joint Logistic Centre
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding

NAC  North Atlantic Council
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation

ODIHR  Office for the Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OPCON  Operational Control
OPLAN  Operation Plan
OPORDERS  Operational Orders
OPP  Operational Planning Process
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

RC  Regional Command

SC  Strategic Command
SUPLAN  Supporting Plan

TTPs  Tactics, techniques, and procedures
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioners Office for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>