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**FLEXIBILITY TOWARDS DIVERSITY.
NEW SKILLS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PSOs**

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1. Premise

The very demanding nature of Peace Support Operations has been definitely asserted and demonstrated. Far from being considered no risky at all, PSOs have been recognised to be missions with various and lower levels of risk (when compared to conventional combat operations), but with an anyway high level of stress as far as troops and leaders are concerned. Stress factors are of course different in these operations, even though some of them are similar for any kind of military missions. Using only one word to describe the stressors' mix, the word could be *diversity*.

Many kinds of diversity can be distinguished, and to each type and level of diversity, a specific kind of stress claims for attention.

For each type of diversity an adaptive behavior can be found accordingly, and lessons learned from diversity could be turned into the definition of specific and new skills required for PSOs.

As it will be demonstrated in this paper, the word better enlightening this outcome seems to be *flexibility*, and this is the reason why the title of this presentation is *flexibility towards diversity*.

Discussion here presented is based on various (diverse?) research pieces, but the majority of data comes from a specific sociological enquiry conducted in the year 2000 by a group of scholars belonging to the European Research Group On Military And Society (better known as ERGOMAS)¹.

The research has been a crossnational comparative research conducted as an expert survey among 371 officers serving in 9 different countries (Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, USA)², with wide experience in PSOs' deployments.

¹ G. Caforio (ed.), The Flexible Officer. Professional Education and Military Operations Other Than War: A Cross-national Analysis, Artistic & Publishing Co., Gaeta, Italy, 2002, CeMiSS publications serie.

² Sample characteristics are the following:

By country (absolute figures):								
Bulgaria	France	Hungary	Italy	Poland	Russia	S.Africa	Sweden	Usa
27	33	27	56	37	30	111	24	26
By service (%):								
Army		Navy		Air Force		Other		Total
85		3		7		4		100
By rank (%):								
Lieutenant		Captain		Major		Lt. Colonel		Colonel
13		28		27		22		9
By age (%):								
Under 25		25-29		30-35		36-45		Over 45
5		18		30		34		13
By term of service (%):								
Life			Short			Other		
79			12			6		

2. Many levels of diversity.

To give this paper a certain order, at least five types of diversity can be listed, at different levels of generalisation.

1. Diversity as for the military mission itself: PSOs are not combat operations, they are something different;
2. Diversity as for the PSOs: many different operations are included under this acronymous;
3. Diversity as for uncertainty and predictability: mission tempo, mission effectiveness, public opinion moods at every moment...;
4. Diversity as for the multinational forces deployed: different nationalities and military cultures must cooperate; different rules and resources are confronted;
5. Diversity as for the operation theatre: many various actors are present (civilians such as local population, refugees, fighting factions, local politicians, international and NGO officials and members, media representatives...).

2.1. Diversity as for the military mission itself.

The first type of diversity pertains to the most general level, where the definition of the military function is put under severe question. It is not here necessary to spend many words, since the topic about the nature of PSOs as a part of the “normal” military job or as a totally different and peculiar job has been discussed and considered many times by many sides. As far as the field of military sociology is concerned, the repeated and increasing experience of non conventional missions, for armed forces of many countries all around the world, has meant a true challenge for the definition itself of the profession of arms. As Reed and Segal note for the US military forces: “In 1993, for the first time, Army doctrine began to reflect the changing nature of military missions. Field manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, the Army basic field manual for doctrine, explicitly included a section on ‘Operations Other Than War’ (OOTW), which includes peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions – missions that Janowitz would regard as constabulary. At the same time, the Army began teaching the new doctrine to its junior and senior leaders in the officer basic courses and the senior-level staff schools and colleges.”³ One year later, in 1994, British military doctrine began to rely on what it was called “the Dobbie’s doctrine”, explained by C. Dobbie in an essay where an attempt was made to distinguish among different types of new missions (traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement), which because of this diversity would have need drastic differences in military personnel’s training systems⁴. A further discussion about the Dobbie’s doctrine has led C. Dandeker and J. Gow to define the type of *strategic peacekeeping* as an intermediate type of mission, thus giving further evidence to the complex and multifunctional nature of the new missions⁵.

In rather all essays and contributions dealing with the new missions performed by military organisations a recall is made to new training and education needs, even though not always this topic is adequately or extensively discussed. The need for something different in knowledge and ability is felt as far as officers’ education is concerned, for junior as well as for senior officers, for non-commissioned officers down to the lower levels of the command chain, emphasising the concept of bottom-up initiative and relative autonomy of lower hierarchical levels. When educational contents and behavioural guiding principles are in discussion, a reassessment of a

³ B.J. Reed & D.R. Segal, “The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers’ Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale, and Retention”, in *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 27, no. 1, Fall 2000, p. 60.

⁴ C. Dobbie, “A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping”, *Survival*, Vol. 36, Autumn 1994, pp. 121-148.

⁵ C. Dandeker & J. Gow, “The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success”, in *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 327-348.

professional field is working. When both ethics and competence are at stake, then something relevant is changing – or it has already changed - for a professional group.

Thus, this new paradigm under which to consider the military role, and the professional military role in particular, has given rise to a new type of soldier, whose nature is going to receive a definite assessment within military sociological theory: the military peacekeeper.

The new type is not “new”. As it happens many times, precursors can be found, and previous assessments of “new” problems are already at disposal. In 1976, Charles Moskos, in its *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force*, presented his findings of an inquiry over attitudes and behaviours of the various national contingents serving in the United National peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (the UNFICYP)⁶. In this pioneer research, Moskos explored attitudes toward change from soldiering to peacekeeping by means of interviews to officers and soldiers from Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, receiving from them the judgement that military professionalism was adequate also to the new tasks requested by peacekeeping missions. This is the frame where the statement “Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it” shifted from “oral tradition” to written form. To that, Moskos added that “middle powers” officers could better adjust to the constabulary ethic, which he had defined previously as based on two core principles: *absolute minimal force* and *impartiality*⁷.

But after that, the adequacy of military professionals to peacekeeping and other new missions has been submitted to many and highly diverse challenges, not last among them those coming from some side-effects of OOTW: peacekeeping multiple deployments’ consequences on officers’ and soldiers’ careers, and peacekeeping deployments’ training and duties effects on combat readiness. The question was not, and it is not right now, whether the new officer should become a peacekeeper, thus definitely abandoning the Heroic leader pattern, but whether the new officer could be able to include the peacekeeper role within the range of professional tasks requested by the international geo-political situation. Even though it has been taken for granted that only soldiers can do peacekeeping, time and experience have shown that peacekeeping is not simply one task among the many assigned to the professional soldier of today. The emphasis given to appropriate training and attitudes’ development by social scientists in more recent times is the demonstration that new missions have caused an unavoidable change in the ideal-type of the professional officer (and of the professional soldier in general as well!).

But this change does not mean at all to abandon the conventional feature of the soldier as warfighter. Notwithstanding the already rather long experience of PSOs, we can anyway say that professional military culture still exists in its “conventional” features, since everywhere the primary purpose of armed forces remains the preparation and conduct of war, and the idea of a warless society seems to be pertinent more to the “heaven of ideas” than to political reality. But it is evident, nevertheless, that also the “peacekeeping culture” has gained, or it is gaining, a definite status, not only in societies (western and westernised societies, I should say) but also within the military. Thus, the military has to front within itself latent or manifest strains and contradictions between the *culture of the warrior* and the *culture of the peacekeeper*. This basic diversity is unavoidable, in the sense that it cannot be overcome by means of the reduction to the one or the other side of the coin.

2.2. Diversity within the PSOs.

A second level of diversity is given by the wide range of operations covered by the Peace Support Operations definition, ranging from peace-enforcing to peacekeeping (or strategic peacekeeping), to peacemaking, to humanitarian aid and relief, to public order control. This

⁶ Charles C. Moskos Jr., *Peace Soldiers: the Sociology of a United Nations Military Force*, Chicago University press, Chicago, 1976.

⁷ Charles C. Moskos Jr., “UN Peacekeepers”, *Armed Forces & Society*, No. 1, 1975, pp. 388-401.

diversity affects military role and performance not simply because it means that soldiers can be asked to perform in different operative theatres (which means anyway a high level of adaptation to many and various types of tasks), but mainly that a single mission is not always sharply pertaining to the one or the other type (some ambiguity is always present) and it can often shift from the one to the other. This basic uncertainty is source of stress and difficulties for a military mind more at ease with clear and defined tasks such as those pertaining to conventional warfighting.

2.3. Diversity as for uncertainty and predictability.

A third level is given by the uncertainty about the sense to be given to the single mission: about its effectiveness, about its possible end, about its usefulness for one's military career and professional expertise. And, last but not least, the variety in the reactions in one's national public opinion about aims and reasons to engage and remain within a specific operation, with the frequent change of the mission exposure to media (too much at the beginning, rather low or absent during the mission, critical or benign according to different evaluation criteria).

2.4. Diversity within the multinational forces deployed.

This is one of the main distinguishing features of current PSOs' deployment: the fact that units are very often formed by several military contingents, variably differing in size and composition, coming from different nations all around the world. This requires, among many other things, for a high level of interculturalism within units, since we can assume that different cultures are linked to different nations, and that even diverse military cultures are involved (even though a certain *universal* military culture could be assumed to be existent, it is a matter of fact that this is not so plausible). But diversity means also different rules and organisational features for the various national contingents, different equipments and resources, not to mention different languages...! Since cooperation is requested, such a diversity has to be managed successfully for the sake of the mission itself.

2.5. Diversity within the operation theatre.

In operations other than war military forces are not alone: it is a common and "normal" situation to operate in a context where many actors are present, playing specific and definite roles. Such actors are not only other countries military forces, but more and more they are civilians: local population (inhabitants, refugees...), local political authorities (both formal and informal), local fighting factions, a variegated range of civil officials from various international agencies (UN, NATO, WEU...), members of NGOs, and media representatives. Military forces must cooperate with some of these actors, contrast some other maintaining a neutral position, trying to avoid strains and conflicts in the field. In a theatre as such, there is an evident cultural differentiation, with whom the military culture has to cope.

For each level of diversity, typical stress factors and difficulties can be distinguished, arising on the field and experienced by soldiers and officers as *push motives* for specific training improvement and new skills requirement.

3. Many kinds of stress factors and difficulties in peace support field situations.

Following the same scheme as above, different types of stress factors, and different kinds of difficulties can be defined.

3.1. Stressors and difficulties arising from diversity as for the military mission itself.

As it has been recalled very recently by Dandeker (1998), in those operations where the constabulary role is prevailing, many characters of the conventional military situation are lacking, and among them an easily definable “enemy” and a clear definition of end-states to be attained (“victory”) and according to which performance can be previously defined and then performed “efficiently”. Furthermore, the level of risk is not easily appreciable, it is more latent than visible, and it can suddenly manifest itself under scarcely predictable features.

3.2. Stressors and difficulties arising from diversity within the PSOs.

The very ambiguous nature of PSOs is a source of stress, since it helps to maintain a sense of precariousness: an experience in a specific type of mission cannot help in a different one, the proper way to confront civilians can vary according to the kind of mission, partners (both military and non military) change with mission, all that creating the feeling of an everlasting uncertain and indefinite set of tasks. The uneven and changing nature of ROE can also add a sense of personal insecurity and/or uncertainty as towards the right reaction.

3.3. Stressors and difficulties arising from diversity as for uncertainty and unpredictability.

Here motivational factors are at stake. Uncertainty here is related to the meaning of the mission, to the perception of its effectiveness, to the perception of wasting time and professional expertise for something whose legitimation is unsure or questioned. As Dandeker says speaking about strategic peacekeeping⁸ –but it applies to every PSO- “strategic peacekeeping is a complex operation requiring legitimation”. Among the factors supporting legitimacy for PSO there is also its effectiveness, which is crucial also for military personnel performance. “...The military engaged in in such a mission contributes to the legitimation of the mission through an effective performance. (...) On the other hand, poor performance or lack of success can corrode the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of various audiences and, in so far as it affects morale of the participating troops, this will extend to the military itself”. Promoting and maintaining the sense of the mission even without clear signs of its effectiveness, without victories making adequate performances visible, after days and days of inactivity, and when after the overexposure to media of the first period a long silence follows, giving soldiers the impression to have been forgot and abandoned by national and international publics, this is among the main tasks for military commanders at every level, and at lower level in particular. Boredom and loss of a sense of the mission, a generalized uncertainty about its outcome, all these are stress factors affecting cohesion and military performance well recognized in PSOs analysis. Conventional military training relies on actions and action results to measure performance and to enhance troop motivation. But how to motivate when there is no action, or when actions are “opaque” to interpretation?

In the expert survey on officers with MOOTWs experience already cited, Vladimir Rukavishnikov has found five stress factors stemming from the factor analysis applied to the opinions of officers of the nine countries about stressors and related conditions, which are likely to be important and suggest leaders' actions to control them. It is valuable to quote directly from his chapter.⁹

“Most officers named several items as stressors. This result of survey was expected because it fits with a common sense consideration about correlation between various stress causes. Therefore actually the interesting research question is what kinds of latent stress factors, backing

⁸ Christopher Dandeker, *Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping*, paper presented at ISA Conference, July 27-August 2, 1998, Montreal, Canada.

⁹ Vladimir Rukavishnikov, *Stress Factors, Stress Management and Job Satisfaction in MOOTW*, in G. Caforio (ed.), *The Flexible Officer*, Latina, 2002, pp. 107-127.

various combinations of certain feelings, mission perceptions and objective life conditions, might influence inadequate soldier's behavior and other undesirable consequences.” (p.110).

In the following Table 1, figures are shown as far as stress factors have been chosen by officers in the expert survey.

Factor analysis permitted to single out some basic dimensions, where elements already put in evidence here above are expressed in aggregate form, thus giving empirical evidence to the kind of uncertainty and unpredictability which risks to erode motivation and cohesion in military units deployed in PSOs. Among the five dimensions depicted by Rukavishnikov, the first three are mostly relevant (and statistically meaningful), as shown in Tab. 2.

Table 1. Frequencies of stressors.*

Items.	Number of answers.	% to the total number of those respondents who faced some difficulties in managing psychological stress of soldiers and answered to the question about stressors.
Uncertainty	74	32
Unclear mission	60	27
Getting adapted	76	32
Risk to life	86	37
Ineffectiveness of mission	49	22
Movement and travel restrictions	83	35
Lack of family support	58	24
Lack of media recognition	37	16
Boredom	55	23
Relative deprivation (differences in wages, equipment, etc. Among contingents)	81	35
Length of deployment	64	27
Sexual deprivation	42	18
Other reasons	24	11

Note: The question sounds: “ If you had faced some difficulties in managing psychological stress of your soldiers due to deployment factors (either absolutely or sometimes), what kind of stressors did you find? You can tick more than one answer”.

*Source: V. Rukavishnikov, *cited, Tab. 1.2., p. 111.*

The first component has been called ‘nostalgia syndrome’, and “it might be interpreted as a hidden feeling of ‘home-sickness, loneliness and boredom’. The second component has been named as ‘a perception of inefficiency of a mission’ or ‘frustration’, and it is formed by “three variables related to the personal evaluation of the essence of mission and its goals and results, marked as

‘uncertainty’, ‘an unclear mission’, and ‘ineffectiveness of mission’”. The third component has been interpreted “as a feeling of ‘resentment’ or a ‘lack of respect from the government and public support’. Such understanding of this factor depends upon two variables: ‘a lack of media recognition’ and ‘relative deprivation (a sharp perception of unfair differences in wages, equipment, etc. among contingents)’”¹⁰.

Table 2. The factorial structure of stressors. The three main components**

Variables (labels)	Factor loadings after Varimax rotation*.
First principal component	
Boredom	0.704
Sex	0.688
Family	0.676
Deployment	0.445
% of Variance explained	13
Second principal component	
Unclear	0.764
Uncertainty	0.647
Ineffectiveness	0.501
% of Variance explained	12
Third principal component	
Media	0.815
Deprivation	0.770
% of Variance explained	11

**Source: adaptation from Rukavishnikov, *cited, Tab. 1.4*, p. 113

As J. W. Stokes has stated, ‘Those stressors come from being in an unfamiliar land far from home; sometimes with little to do but no freedom to go elsewhere; living in austere, uncomfortable facilities; among foreign and perhaps hostile people; and with rules of engagement that limit interaction with the local population and even self-defense. The mission may involve shifting or seemingly unattainable objectives, and receive criticism and questioning of its worth at home. Low

¹⁰ All quotations in brackets are from V. Rukavishnikov, *cited*, p. 112-13

moral can result, and lead to misconduct. There may also be ready access to and temptations for drugs, alcohol and unsafe or illicit sex”¹¹. And, furthermore, uncertainty arises also from media coverage and public opinion turbulence. Quoting again from Rukavishnikov, “ The fact of matter is that journalists are covering widely only first phases of OOTW... After the stabilization of the situation in the area of deployment the focus of media attention turns to another more important international and domestic events, and the military felt resentment that nobody paid attention to their efforts and requests, especially if the mission is prolonged for years. At this second phase of OOTW a lack of media coverage and public support may be a cause of a feeling of resentment toward the media and the international and domestic public, alienation, and frustration”.¹²

3.4. Stressors and difficulties arising from diversity within the multinational forces deployed.

Here a sort of “cultural shock” could be expected, even though not of the same relevance as in the following kind of diversity. But difficulties arising from relations with other units’ members of different nationality and language can affect performance, and give rise also to that “relative deprivation feeling” already mentioned above as “a sharp perception of unfair differences in wages, equipment, etc. among contingents”.

To this respect, data coming from the expert survey already quoted does not seem to be so much supportive of this kind of difficulties. Bernard Boene, treating this topic openly says that there is “interesting evidence which, though it is limited in scope and details, is enough to invalidate the most pessimistic hypotheses on the incidence of problems posed by intercultural relations and the deficiencies in professional education and training that might cause them. Indeed, the simple findings expounded below unmistakably point to fewer difficulties than could reasonably be expected”¹³. Only 38% of the total officers sample declares difficulties and problems in interpersonal relations with colleagues from other national contingents, and of those, less than 3% declares these difficulties as frequent (remaining 35% declares these difficulties to be intermittent). When difficulties are considered, lower rank officers “mention problematic cross-national relations less often (below 30%) than do senior officers (between 40 and 55%)”, and the same is registered for younger officers (25-35 years old). With relation to the source of problematic intercultural relations, these are registered as in the Table 3 below.

As it can be seen, the main difficulties arise rightly from general cultural diversity (language, culture) and from diversity in military culture (divided loyalties, mission interpretation, professional preparation, ethical codes of conduct). The fact that such difficulties are less frequent than expected does not mean at all that they are not so relevant for units performance.

3.5. Stressors and difficulties arising from diversity within the operation theatre

This is the very place where a true cultural shock can have place. It seems that different military orientations toward PSOs can affect the perception of difficulties arising from the variety of actors, most of them civilians, active in the operation theatre and bearers of diverse cultures in terms of values, norms, goals, needs and behaviors in general. One of the main findings of the expert survey is the fact that military culture (better, the conception of military professional beared on by officers) in the various national units involved in OOTWs has an influence, among other aspects, on the ability of officers (in this specific case) to cope with commitments and expectations coming

¹¹ Stokes, J. W. (1994) *The Stress Threat in Operations Other Than War. Combat Stress Manual: Combat Stress Control in Operations Other Than War*. HSHS-MB, AMEDDC&S, FSH TX 78234-6133 (210) 221-6905/DSN 471. Last Revision Date: March 1994; may see on site : <http://www.vnh.org/CombatStress/CSCOOTW/html>.

¹² V. Rukavishnikov, *Idem*.

¹³ B. Boene, Relations with Officers from Other Nations in Military Operations Other Than War and in the Impact of Comparisons on Professional Self-perceptions, in G. Caforio (ed.), *The Flexible Officer*, cited, pp. 89-105.

Table. 3 – Source of intercultural problematic relations*. Absolute percentages** over those respondents answering “Yes, absolutely” and “Yes, sometimes” to the question “Did you face some difficulties in relationship with officers by contingents from other countries?”.

Source of difficulty	%
Language	46,1
Divided Loyalties (NATO, UN, Country...)	32,6
Cultural differences	31,2
Mission diverging interpretations	31,2
Interoperability problems	28,4
Professional preparation	28,4
Different ethical codes	24,8
Communication	22
Rivalries	17
RoE	16,3
Other	4,2

*Adaptation from B.Boene, cited, p. 93

** Percentages exceed 100 because more than one item could be chosen by respondents.

from a complex and often uncertain role set, composed by the many and various non military actors present on the operation theatre¹⁴. The verified hypothesis is that officers showing a professional orientation more inclined toward the type of the “warrior”, or more inclined toward the type of the “peacekeeper”, have different reactions to the variety of expectations coming from their role set in MOOTWs theatres; in particular, “warriors” could find more difficulties in managing with diversity and environment turbulency (many different actors, uncertainty of end-states, mandate ambiguities and the like...), while “peacekeepers” could feel more at ease with flexibility and cooperative unhyerarchical relationships. The two basic types have been formed as shown in Table 4 here below.

The research has furthermore demonstrated the existence of a third type, defined provisionally as the “In-Between” officer, which is not simply a mid-way pattern, and it should not be considered as a transitional figure: it is on the contrary the empirical evidence of that “flexible” type of soldier who has to cope with a job that “it is not a soldiers’ job, but only a soldier can do it”. Under another point of view, the experience acquired in OOTWs can have an impact over the military culture itself: that is, warriors and peacekeepers can be the outcome of officers’ type and time of deployment.

As far as difficulties stemming from cultural diversity of the many and different actors in the field, Table 5 gives evidence that difficulties with civilians actors have been faced everywhere, but we can anyway note some peculiarities. Problems have been strongly evidenced by officers from Russia, South Africa (90%), but also from Sweden and Hungary (79 and 74%). All these are over the sample average of 73%. Officers facing less difficulties are those from Italy (54%), France and Bulgaria (58%). In a sort of mid-position are officers from Poland and USA (both with difficulties in the 63% of cases)¹⁵.

¹⁴ For this part see Marina Nuciari, *Officers Education for MOOTW. A Comparative Research on Military and Civilian Agencies Problematic Relationships*, in G. Caforio (ed.), *The Flexible Officer*, cited, pp. 61-88.

¹⁵ Notwithstanding the fact that the discriminatory power of the country variable is rather good (squared ki value 40,224 with a significance of ,000), it seems highly improbable that the simple nationality could be the reason for this distribution. A possible explanation could be the mission mix, since Russian and Southafrican officers have been deployed mainly (or in large majorities) in constabulary type operations, what it often means to deal with public order problems, and in humanitarian missions; on the other side, officers from Italy, France and Bulgaria have experienced mainly, if not only, Peace Support Operations, where contacts with civilians, though existing, can be of different nature

Tab. 4 - TYPOLOGY WARRIOR vs. PEACEKEEPER¹⁶

(from question Q3_2, List of characteristics chosen as applying to the “good” officer. From Q2_7 “Do you feel that OOTWs are a natural part of the military’s role”, YES, NO, Do not know).

WARRIOR *	PEACEKEEPER **
Discipline	Determination
To be fit for action	Empathy
Decisiveness	Expertise
Leadership	Ability to easily make friends
Obedience	Cooperativeness
Ability to undergo physical stress	Mental strenght
Patriotism	General education
Readiness to make sacrifices	Open-mindedness
Loyalty to the civil power	Taking responsibility
OOTWs are NOT a natural part of the military’s role***	OOTWs are a natural part of the military’s role****

* Selected items were recoded 1
 ** Selected items were recoded 2
 *** Answers “NO” and “Do not know” to Q2_7
 **** Answers “YES”

Table 5 – Difficulties with civilians. Percentages by country.*

COUNTRY	DIFFICULTIES WITH CIVILIAN ACTORS		% ROW TOTAL
	% YES	% NO	
BULGARIA	59	41	100
FRANCE	58	42	100
HUNGARY	74	26	100
ITALY	54	46	100
POLAND	63	37	100
RUSSIA	93	7	100
SOUTH AFRICA	89	11	100
SWEDEN	79	21	100
USA	63	37	100
TOTAL SAMPLE	73	27	100

* Pearson’s Square X 40,214 Sig. Asint. (two-sided) ,000.

and they not necessarily include reciprocal conflictual positions. This explanation does not fit for Sweden and Hungary, where the high intensity of difficulties claimed comes from officers mainly deployed in PSO as well, and the same could be said for Poland and the USA. As we shall see further on, for these last cases Length of Deployment and Variety of Mission Experience could be a better explanation.

¹⁶ Note: in the three-types typology, warriors are those selecting 4 or 5 items from the “warrior list” and “NO” in the last cell; peacekeepers are those selecting 4 or 5 items from the “peacekeeper list” and “YES” in the last cell. The third type, “in-between”, is formed by those selecting 3 items in the one and 2 items in the other list (and the opposite) and Yes or No in the last cell.

It is anyway a fact that where Constabulary operations (and also Humanitarian missions) are present in a large number, therein a wider claim about difficulties with civilians appears, probably ought to the fact that these two last types of missions implicate inevitable and wide-range relationships with civilians.

Measured on a military-civilian scale, some missions defined as PSOs are much nearer the conventional military mission than Constabulary or Humanitarian missions could be. For these missions, the term "*strategic peacekeeping*" has been proposed (Dandeker, 1998), intending something in-between from classic peacekeeping to peace enforcement; in strategic peacekeeping, as well as in peace enforcing, a certain use of force is envisaged, and a more "muscular" attitude is requested than in classic peacekeeping missions. In a few words, this kind of peacekeeping is not as distant from conventional "military culture" as it is the peacekeeping of the first generation. Thus, for officers in our sample difficulties can become more evident as far as the distance between the war-like context and the other-than-war contexts becomes wider.

Looking at ranks, as expected, difficulties increase with rank: lieutenants declare difficulties in their relationships with civilians in 60 percent of cases, and this figure grows constantly up to 87 percent of colonels. This is a positive sign: in a bottom-up organisation such as a military force deployed in OOTWs should be, the fact that personnel at the lower levels, positioned at direct contact with the real situation, seems to cope better than the top with his direct environment is a matter of effectiveness. Of course, officers in different rank positions perform different tasks and are asked to play in different role-sets: as a consequence, the different level of difficult relationships with the various actors can also be linked to the higher variety of role expectations facing senior officers in their middle and top level responsibilities.

And about what kind of civilian actors were perceived as source of problems and stress, in Table 6 we see that the main sources of problems are the civilian population and local authorities (40%), followed by, where existing, local fighting factions (34%). Less problematic are relationships with civil officials from international agencies and with journalists (17%), and practically without problems are the eventual relationships with local churches¹⁷. Different difficulties with different actors are shown also by country in Table 7.

**Table 6 – Difficulties with various types of civilian actors.
Percentages over total sample.**

DIFFICULTIES WITH CIVILIANS...			
	YES	NO	TOT.
Civil officials (NATO, UN,...)	17	83	100
Local authorities	40	60	100
Civilian population	41	59	100
NGOs' personnel	13	87	100
Local church	4	96	100
Local fighting factions	34	66	100
Media	17	83	100
Others	3	97	100

¹⁷ Of course the recurrency of these actors is highly dependent on the type of mission performed and the place of deployment, and this topic is linked to what it has been said before about the distribution of difficulties according to country.

Tab. 7 - Difficulties with civilian actors. Percentages by country.*

Difficulties with:	Bulg.	Fran.	Hung.	Italy	Pol.	Russia	South Africa	Swed.	USA	Total samp.
Civil officials (NATO, UN...)	22	12	33	14	19	17	12	42	0	17
Local authorities	22	36	48	22	43	57	45	50	35	40
Civil population	7	21	44	23	35	60	63	46	31	41
NGO's personnel	15	18	11	15	11	17	9	25	12	13
Local Church	0	9	4	0	5	10	5	4	0	4
Local fighting factions	26	27	19	23	22	47	47	63	19	34
Media	4	12	0	9	8	27	23	13	8	17

*Squared K values: **officials** **25,524** **Sig. asint. .002**
 authorities **19,766** **.019**
 population **56,096** **.000**
 NGOs 6,628 .676
 Churches 9,953 .354
 Factions **32,720** **.000**
 Media **21,651** **.010**

As it was expected, rank makes some difference: officials coming from international agencies usually have relations with senior officers, and in fact difficulties with them are declared more by colonels (30% of them, against 8% of lieutenants); captains and majors, dealing with the "terrain", encounter more difficulties than other ranks with the civil population, local authorities and fighting factions (when existing). On their side, colonels seem to find themselves not at ease with media and NGO (16% of colonels have problems with NGOs against 10% of lieutenants, and 23% of colonels declare difficulties with the media against the 8% of junior officers. Both variables grow constantly with rank.

4. Some comments and evaluation of new skills required.

Diversity has been chosen as the key element to define the kind of situation facing military personnel in PSOs. At an overall consideration of the various diversities, it seems evident that the main problem for soldiers and officers is to face a high variety of expectations, coming from many differentiated "others" (being they military or civilians) arising from the many and different situations with whom military personnel has to cope. This variety is felt more or less problematic at

the extent to which every actor in each situation is the bearer of a specific culture, that is with values and norms, and also interests, more or less in contrast with each other.

At a general level, they can be distinguished according to their specific status and roles in the theatre where the military is deployed. They can be the civil population, local administrative and political authorities, and even fighting factions, who can be defined as *actors within the context*: they are in fact part of the situation for which the mission has been decided. Under certain circumstances, it is normal that problematic relations can arise from these actors, since here the wider cultural gap can be found among each of them and the military force. Of course, they are also differing among themselves: civil population plays often, if not always, the role of the "victim" who must be "saved, helped and protected" by the peacekeepers; it maintains anyway ambiguous relationships with factions in arms (if any), and this ambiguity is also present in its relationships with local authorities; on their side, political authorities and fighting factions have specific goals and interests, and tend to make opportunistic use of the peacekeeping force presence. If a different language and more general cultural differences are added to this picture, it is evident that the largest part of problematic relationships came from these actors.

A second type of actor is made by those whose actions are bound *toward the context*, that is those who are directly playing the role of the peacekeeper: international agencies representatives and officials, members of NGOs, and the military itself in its diversity as far as national contingents are concerned; they are all acting in order to settle the conflictual or dramatic situation for which they have been deployed. They should have mainly common goals, and their interaction should give place to some kind of problem solution. Notwithstanding this positive premise, cultural distance is even here a matter of fact, together with at least some goals and interests. International agencies, such as United Nations, WEU, or other mid-level regional agencies, are usually bureaucratic organisations whose representatives act as members of an organisation, following norms and practices according to a well-established and peculiar "organisational culture". If they do not differ from the military as far as bureaucratic patterns of thinking and acting are concerned, they differ anyway as far as goals and inner values are concerned. A certain amount of problems in their relationships with these civilian bureaucracies are mentioned by officers in our sample, even though at a lower extent when compared with the within-the-context actors. Another source of problems is the relationships with NGOs¹⁸. The military is an "institution", while an NGO is a "movement", authority and hierarchical responsibility are featuring the military while normative commitment under an individual and voluntary basis are the cement of an NGO. Rules and procedural correctness, division of labour, discipline and obedience form the bulk of military organisation, while individual initiative, diffuse and despecialised roles, critical mind and an antiauthoritarian habit are usually common features of any NGO. Following a well-known conceptual dichotomy in organisational literature, the military is a mechanic system, while an NGO is an organic system (Burns and Stalker, 1961). NGOs, furthermore, are very often antimilitaristic, and they are not so well inclined toward armed forces, notwithstanding their need for security and protection. Problematic relationships, thus, are the results of a shared responsibility, stemming both from NGOs themselves and from the military.

Another type of actor has been left alone since it is really different: the media are really the new actor in the MOOTWs' theatre, and their role and goals are sharply divergent with those of every other kind of actor on the peace or humanitarian missions' scene. Where soldiers, NGOs, international agencies bureaucrats must *do something*, the media must "simply" *report everything*. But in the mediatic society, only what is reported, or "covered", by the media, has a real existence.

¹⁸ As noted by many observers, and by Moskos in particular, "...it is customary to view NGOs and the military as somehow at odds one another in terms of staff recruitment and organisational styles... The rigidly hierarchical approach to decision making that is the hallmark of the military may not be possible or desirable in humanitarian crises where their help is needed. This contrast is sharpened by the strong national loyalty of military personnel as opposed to the more typical international orientation of NGO staff. And, of course, military efforts may be at odds with NGO objectives and vice versa" (Moskos, 2000, p. 33; Benthall, 1994; Minear, Larry & Weiss, 1995).

In this new Military-Media paradigm, as Charles Moskos thinks, in military operations other than war, the story begins when the media arrive, which in most cases will be in advance of major military forces arriving; and the story ends when the media go home. In OOTWs, the attitude of the military toward the press is *apprehensive* (since the greatest fear of every military commander is "to say the wrong thing to the media", Dec. 10, 1995, CBS Evening News, from an US Army commander in Bosnia), the press attitude is *distant*, military control over media is *low*, and media feel to be *courted* by the military (as Major General William L. Nash, the NATO commander in the American-controlled sector of Bosnia, said:"The art of good reporting is to seduce the subject. The art of the military commander is to seduce the reporter", Moskos, 2000, p. 27).

In the research very often recalled here, difficulties with the media are reported by the 17 percent, the same percentage as for international organisations' officials, and the main types of difficulties are imputed to a different mind and to a certain "disloyalty and bad faith". The problematic relationship is not only a trait of officers in our sample: it is a rather recurrent pattern characterising the relationship between the military and the media, and it relates also to the acceptance by military institutions of this specific instrument by means of which public control is exerted over armed forces. As more as armed forces and society relationships are democratised, and as far as typical democratic instruments are accepted and "taken for granted" by the military, then military-media relationships become less problematic; this happens not simply and not necessarily because of a growing convergence of interests, values and objectives between these two actors (who maintain, on the contrary, many and radical differences), but because the reciprocal ability to deal with each other is rationally pursued and cultivated, thus becoming one among the many qualities requested to soldiers in MOOTWs.

We have seen that officers with a peacekeeper or a "flexible" orientation feel more at ease with diversity. But a question remains: is there a chance that the Warrior or Peacekeeper or Flexible outlook be influenced by the very experience of these unconventional missions? Can we speak of an adaptive process, or better of a learning process, so that mission exposure affects the shift from a warfighter mind to that of a true peacekeeper? From Table 8 there is evidence that Length of deployment is able to influence at least the cultural framework of officers: a shifting from the Warrior outlook to the Flexible to the Peacekeeper type seems to go along the same direction of an increased and prolonged experience of Operations other than war, indicating to a certain extent the adjustment of officers to a new definition of their professional role¹⁹.

Tab. 8 – Length of OOTWs deployment by Warrior or peacekeeper typology. Percentages over total sample. *

Warrior or Peacekeeper?	Low Length	High Length	Total sample
WARRIOR	25	23	24
FLEXIBLE	40	37	38
PEACE-KEEPER	35	40	38
TOTAL	100	100	100

* Squared X 11,947 Sig. asint. (2-tails) ,289

The relationship between time of deployment and cultural pattern of officers in our sample seems to go in the expected direction, while in a rather tortuous way: experience acquired in

¹⁹ The rather low values of significance for squared X induces anyway some caution in keeping this result as totally satisfying.

MOOTWs is able to affect the military idealtype, giving room to more flexible and adaptive patterns in the definition of the "good" officer.

Looking at the total sample, the distinctiveness given by the typology is rather sharp, and according to country we can see cases where a Flexible (Bulgaria, Russia, South Africa and Hungary) or a Peacekeeper outlook (Italy) seems to be more adequate in reducing, if not difficulties as such, at least their perception as problems. In the other four countries, anyway, the winning strategy seems to be that of the warrior (France, Poland, Sweden and USA). To a certain extent, it seems that the best pattern be the "Flexible" type of officer, who is not someone in the middle, unable to decide what to do or what to be, but a professional able to combine different qualities, some of them pertaining to the warrior model, some other to the peacekeeper model, in order to adapt his/her performance to the uncertain and variable requests coming from a turbulent environment as the OOTW theatre often it happens to be

How useful, and to what extent, are the above findings for the very pragmatic question of education and training of officers for operations other than war? What kind of new skills can we draw from the above findings?

We can try to answer following the same diversity scheme adopted above.

5. New skills to cope with diversity.

1. ***Diversity as for the military mission itself: PSOs are not combat operations, they are something different.*** To cope with this basic difference, many observers and experts agree with the necessity for military personnel, and for officers in particular, to acquire a political education and sensitivity. Reed and Segal, in one of their last researches published in the 2000, make explicit reference to it, underlining the fact that, according to Janowitz, "...with transforming the military profession into a constabulary force...the modern professional soldier must be able to maintain an effective balance among a number of different roles, and to do this, must develop more of the skills and orientations common to civilian managers"²⁰. The problem of preparing military personnel was depicted by Janowitz as the necessity to include in the career pattern "more extensive general competence from its military managers and more intensive scientific specialisation from its military technologists". And Reed and Segal add that "the prescribed career of the future should be one that sensitizes the professional soldier to the political and social consequences of military action and provides the military professional with a broad, strategic perspective of the entire range of the military spectrum. Under the constabulary model, the requirement for the military professional to be well-versed in political-military affairs is critical". And a socio-cultural approach to anthropological diversity could give officers that special awareness of the relativistic character of human culture, able to induce openmindedness and cosmopolitan values and to overcome ingroup/outgroup (friend/enemy) oppositions.
2. ***Diversity as for the PSOs: many different operations are included under this acronymous.*** Skills required here pertain to the capability to adjust to change and to accept a variable range of uncertainty. Dutch sociologist Geert Hofstede put the degree of Uncertainty Avoidance existent in a specific culture as one among his four basic dimensions by means of which to aggregate different cultures into rather homogeneous sub-groups²¹. This low or high ability to cope with the uncertain and the unknown is, generally speaking, culturally determined. Military culture has in general a strong uncertainty avoidance, being much more inclined to well-defined rules

^{20 20} B. J. Reed & D. R. Segal, "The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers' Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale, and Retention", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 27, no. 1, Fall 2000, p. 60.

²¹ See G. Hofstede, *Cultures and Organisations. Software of the Mind. Intercultural Cooperation and its Importance for Survival*, Mc Graw-Hill Companies, Inc., New York, 1997.

and structured predictable action chains. The new skill means to turn this cultural orientation from a rigid to a flexible system.

3. ***Diversity as for uncertainty and predictability.*** Alongside with the ability to cope with uncertainty, a special ability to assure motivation and sense of mission is requested from commanders at lower as well as higher levels. The understanding of the general reasons and legitimacy of each mission is crucial. The flexible officer (and the flexible soldier as well) is an aware and well-acquainted actor within the context of her/his action.
4. ***Diversity as for the multinational forces deployed:*** different nationalities and military cultures must cooperate; different rules and resources are confronted. In this framework, the new ability is group thinking and cooperative orientation. To a certain extent, this is the easiest diversity to be overcome, since military cultures, while different, are much more similar one another than the opposite.
5. ***Diversity as for the operation theatre:*** many various actors are present (civilians such as local population, refugees, fighting factions, local politicians, international and NGO officials and members, media representatives...). We can say that military culture affects the ability to cope with an uncertain and differentiated theatre where many different actors are present, especially when they are civilians; we can say also that military culture is affected by the mix of experience acquired by officers, and it is pushed to go in a direction where a mixed, flexible, or definitely "peacekeeper" pattern is prevailing. An educational path adequate to the non conventional operative theatres should then be oriented to reinforce these attitudes, reducing without eliminating the warrior-like attitudes: the outcome should be a kind of officer able to refer to more than one pattern, to use more than one code system, so that he or she could understand and behave in an adequate way within the highly uncertain and somewhat ambiguous environments where MOOTW are "usually" performed. Crosscultural management techniques, cultural diversity awareness and ability to analyse and solve role conflicts, all these are new skills required to deal with culturally complex and diverse environments.

6. Educational fields to be improved.

According to the above considerations, some educational fields should be improved, mainly in the rather long period of basic professional education (within the Academies for officers). A simple list could be enough: politology, international relations, general sociology, cultural anthropology, contemporary history, all these subjects permits to cope better with the first and the second level of diversity; communication techniques, massmedia culture, public opinion understanding, international law, crosscultural knowledge, crosscultural management techniques, problem solving and decision-making, work and social psychology, all these can help in coping with diversities of the third, fourth and fifth level.

The list appears to be rather long, but it is by no means a mere inventory of "humanities". Looking again at findings of the crossnational expert survey on the Flexible Officer, respondents give specific indications about educational needs required by PSOs on the basis of their direct and empirical experience, as it is shown in Table 9, and in the following Table 10 where subdivision by country is in evidence.

Table 9 – Topics on which Officers Feel Insufficiently Prepared*

Topics	Chosen	Not chosen	Total
Foreign languages	36.2	63.8	100
International law	29.2	70.8	100
International relations	21.7	78.3	100
Logistics	20.6	79.4	100
Religions	19.6	80.4	100
Intercultural management techniques	19.0	81.0	100
History	18.0	82.0	100
Administration	15,7	84.3	100

* Source: G. Caforio, *How Officers Judge Their Professional Preparation for the Issues Posed by MOOTW*, in G. Caforio (ed.), *The Flexible Officer*, cited, p. 46.

Table 9 – Unsatisfactory Topics by Country*

Topics %	Bul.	Fr.	Hun.	Italy	Pol.	Rus.	S.Af	Swe.	USA
Language	18.5	21.2	25.9	51.8	48.6	36.7	32.4	29.2	30.8
Int. Law	37	36.4	33.3	32.1	43.2	33.3	16.2	20.8	23.1
Int. Rel.	22.2	30.3	14.8	25	21.6	26.7	15.3	20.8	15.8
Logistic	37	9.1	11.1	16.1	27	36.7	18	8.3	15.4
Religions	18.5	9.1	18.5	17.9	32.4	30	10.8	25	26.9
Intercult. techniq.	11.1	12.1	22.2	12.5	2.7	16.7	27	No ans.	42.3
History	11.1	15.2	29.6	10.7	13.5	16.7	16.2	37.5	19.2

* Source: G. Caforio, *How Officers Judge Their Professional Preparation for the Issues Posed by MOOTW*, in G. Caforio (ed.), *The Flexible Officer*, cited, p. 46.

7. To conclude, are new skills for PSO relevant to any extent as far as servicewomen are concerned?

This last point does not intend to analyse in details limitations posed anyway to a full integration of servicewomen in the military organisation, since situations greatly vary from country to country and the integration process is subject to progressive changes.

Women's entry in the armed forces goes along the transition from conscripts-based and large armies to the smaller and technologically advanced All-Volunteer Force. This process goes also along two other dynamic phenomena of high relevance: force downsizing, at least in the armed forces of western societies, and frequent deployment in non conventional missions. In PSOs the use of force is reduced, and soldier's orientation is undergoing a change, becoming less centred on the "warrior" ideal-type, and more on a protective disposition which has been called, among many other definition, the "miles protector" model.

Each one of these processes can have specific influence on women's future within armed forces. The transition to a professional and voluntary military makes the entry easier to women

because their exclusion from a public sector employment is no more acceptable, and also because of the necessity to heighten and enlarge the recruitment basis (both in quality and in quantity). On the other side, downsizing can have an opposite effect, and reducing posts for women.

But the process deserving more attention is the increased frequency of non conventional deployment. Here the military role of women can receive its appropriate evaluation and prominence. The new type of soldier is considered to be at the same time an “egoist defender” of his/her country and the altruistic protector of “others”, in many cases formed by weak and oppressed people, mainly civilian populations of women, children, aged people, refugees and the like. This soldier is also asked to be cold and enduring against possible offences coming from the conflictual situation in which he/she has to operate: the use of the organised force, its degree and also the choice and the extent to which to use it, this is his/her peculiarity, the true “soldier’s job”. But the use of force must be legitimated, as it happens in any case for conventional armed forces in conventional warfare. In military operations other than war, legitimacy comes from many sources (Dandeker and Gow, 1997), but one of the most important is the maintainance of a neutral position when needed, and the defence of the reasons of the “other”, the reasons of the weak; this impartiality combines thus with pro-active actions done “according to the interest of the weak”. It is not only an altruistic help given to someone in difficulty, it is the application, possible or real, of a legitimated violence for “other’s” interests and goals. For this peculiar attitude requested to the peace soldier, the word *flexibility*, often abused, has been proposed as the new quality of the non conventional soldier; *flexible*, then, and not *tough*, should the new soldier be for the military missions of today. This flexibility does not contradict the eventual aggressive attitude and toughness requested in case of true warfare, since it means rightly the soldier’s ability to cope with all the spectrum of situations where his/her performance is asked.

In a picture as such, many have expressed opinions such as women soldiers could find an easier adjustment in a field condition where aggressive attitudes do not function or are even disruptive, and where on the contrary a large part of the task is made of care and service to people in many different states of deprivation. More adequate cognitive dispositions have been actually found in non-homogeneous (that is, gender mixed) units in one of the first studies conducted on soldiers deployed in operations other than war, the Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and co-authored by Laura Miller and Charles Moskos²² (Miller and Moskos, 1997).

In their study, Miller and Moskos found a distinction among U.S. soldiers deployed in Somalia, so that two ascribed conditions, race and gender, seemed to cooperate in the definition of two different and somewhat contrasting orientations toward the situation. These two orientations were able to define two differene strategies of adjustment to the continuous ambiguity and precariousness present in the situation. Thus, a *warrior’s strategy* and a *humanitarian strategy* have been defined. The first is adopted by soldiers who define the (Somali) population as anyway “hostile and unfriendly”, ununderstandable in its behaviour or superficially classified on the basis of cultural stereotypes and ethnocentric principles, and it is typically adopted by soldiers in combat units, exclusively formed by males, and white males in large majority; the humanitarian strategy is, on the contrary, typical of black soldiers and of black as well as white women soldiers; it refuses negative stereotypes about Somali people, showing an empathetic orientation bound to understand the situation, the culture *and the reasons of Somalian people* (italics mine), and it refuses also the resort to force even though it would be a justified reaction to violence and damages committed by the “protected”: Miller and Moskos, in their comments of american military performance in Somalia, arrive to say that: “American troops exerted far less excessive force during Operation Restore Hope than did other national contingents”, and in their opinion all that was to be imputed to the mixed composition of military units by race and by gender, in that servicewomen and black

²² Miller L. and Moskos C.C., “Humanitarian or Warriors? Race, Gender and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope”, *Armed Forces & Society*, 21, 4, p. 614-637.

soldiers were able to act as bad behaviour controllers more than other soldiers in one-race and one-gender units.

This empathetic orientation has been explained by means of a better ability of people in condition of minority to consider differences between self and others in a more positive as well as respectful way. Women as minorities and black (men and women) as minorities in gender and race mixed groups were thus able to reduce the resort to the more aggressive and harsh culture of all-male (and white) soldiers' units.

Variety, then, and diversity within military units, allow to accept and to adjust more easily to diversity in situations such as those frequently found in Peace Support Operations. This could be another aspect under which to consider the quest for flexibility needed by peace soldiers, adding one more reason, if necessary, to promote and reward women's presence in the armed forces.