IFOR AFSOUTH Transcript Nov 21, 1996

In the interest of speed transcripts of IFOR press briefings are issued in unedited format Transcript of Mr. Carl Bildt's press conference held on 21 November 1996

Carl Bildt: good morning I've got a cold today. That is not the occasion for this thing. We all know the fact that one year ago some of us were not in Sarajevo, that's to state the obvious. But were in Dayton, Ohio. Look around and see who were there. But I was most certainly there and I spent three weeks honored by the day in the negotiations that on that day produced the agreement that was initialed and that was later signed in Paris on December the 14th. I took out of the computers the remarks I made at the ceremony, one year ago. And they are as valid today, perhaps even more than they were a year ago. I said it far too easy to start a war, and far too difficult to conclude a peace. It is far easier to start a war, it can be done in a day. But to build a peace is a task that lasts for months, years, and sometimes generations. I said it was important what had been achieved in Dayton. But it represented just the beginning that we should all be deeply aware of the challenges and the difficulties in the days, the weeks, the months, and the years ahead. But implementation was the key, not the agreement itself. To take us, Bosnia, to free and fair elections, to let the refugees have the possibility to return home, to disarm and demobilize, to start rebuilding a ruined economy, to understand that reconciliation is the road to future and harmony in Bosnia. I said that all this will be immensely difficult, but it will also require massive effort by the international community to both secure the immediate military implementation and to help to with the decisive political, humanitarian, and economic implementation. It is the civilian implementation which is the responsibilities of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves. Where it is the true key to the real possibilities of an enduring peace. Those were my remarks at the initialing ceremony at Dayton a year ago, and they are most certainly as valid today as they were a year ago. That was then of course the tendency to say that here is the agreement, accordingly there is the peace, and it might require a military effort for one year and that's enough. That was never released. There's no such thing as an instant peace. I said a war can be started in a day, but peace takes a long time to build if you want to have it lasting. Today is, for most of us, another working day, in Sarajevo. We are preparing the eighth session of the presidency to be held tomorrow, where I would hope that the three members of the presidency will be ... Will have the possibility to continue to move forward. They are moving very slowly. But still they are moving, and the direction is the right one. With the question very much about setting up the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Well this in my opinion the key to the future developments, political, economic, social, you name it. The common institutions, they are the key to what's going to happen in the years to come. It is only they who can start to bring Bosnia back together again. And only they can start to create the true conditions for economic development, that are so important, and that are also in my opinion the key to bringing to the gradual return of primarily refugees but also to certain extent displaced persons. And this is a question of achieving true power sharing. It is only a common state that is truly respected and accepted by all the peoples all across Bosnia and Herzegovina that would provide the guarantee that the peace is here to last. But to achieve that true power sharing, only a year after such a bitter conflict, is quite a challenge. And although the presidency is moving ahead, I think the pace has been too slow. I would today, one year after Dayton, call upon the three members of the presidency to urgently move forward in the setting up of a council of ministers. Details are less important than the setting up of the council of ministers itself. Because what we are seeing now is that delays are hampering our other efforts.

We were planning, and are still planning, to have a donors' information conference in Brussels on December the 2nd and December the 3rd, to inform donors before the large donors conference that is scheduled for the beginning of next year. Bu t you can hardly have a donors' information conference if there are no common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be there and present their case. And of course these are plans that must be coordinated with the common institutions that are the result of the elections that were held in September. And the longer they are delayed to the setting up, the more do we risk delays in the vital economic and social problems. So I would call on the presidents to look more to the future than to the past. And to display the statesmanship and the vision that is called for on a day like this. There are immense problems that must be tackled. And we are now on the international side fairly well advanced in the planning for what is called the consolidation period. The guiding principles that were agreed in Paris last week, the discussion that is now under way in NATO concerning the details on the follow-on force, whatever name that is going to have, and the action plan that will be discussed at the Steering Board Meeting in Bonn next week to be decided upon and discussed at the london conference on the 3rd and the 4th. Also the preparations within the OSCE there is a Permanent Council Meeting in Vienna, as we speak, concerning the mandate for the OSCE in Bosnia during, for primarily 1997. The aim of the consolidation period 97-98. Ninety-six was a year when we tried lay the foundation for the peace. But it's not yet a self-sustaining peace process, in my opinion, not yet. The aim of the consolidation period is to create a peace process that is self-sustaining. And I believe that's possible, although immense problems ahead. That applies to a number of areas. It applies most certainly to the economy. As you might remember from previous press briefings, I belong to those that are very concerned with the economic and social situation. And I think people all across Bosnia will be less patient, six months, 12 months, 18 months from now, than they are today and that they've been last year. They demand that their political leaders should take action to relieve the economic and social situations. But that is not possible without economic reforms, sometimes radical economic reforms. Economic aid alone cannot lift Bosnia. No way. It is the combination of economic reforms, of open trade, and of economic aid, that after the end of the consolidation period can make Bosnia and Herzegovina a country with self-sustaining growth and with economic and social hope for the future. But absence of common institutions, absence o f economic reform, in the next say six months, will make it very difficult to achieve that result at the end of the consolidation period. One must understand I said this in Paris to the presidency, that while Bosnia was in the headlines of the world last year, and the years before and might well be to a certain extent today, the tension of governments and authorities in tax payers across the world will increasedly be called upon to deal with other areas. The great lakes region of Central Africa. I had an experience the other day when I called on a particular government that has been particularly generous when it comes to Bosnia to make a small contribution to something that we thought very important, short term, but had been somewhat neglected. And they said very honestly, "sorry, all of our immediate aid funds have been consumed by Rwanda." And there will be more events of this kind, which means that we can not count on endlessly having large sums of money. We would hope to be able to mobilize significant funds for 97, and significant funds for 98. But I would argue that we should aim at Bosnia be self-sustaining, in economic terms after that. And that puts quite a burden on political leadership today, because economic development is always somewhat long term. The common institutions is not only the council of ministers. It's also getting the machinery to work, and it is to conform the great challenge of next year which is going to be the local elections. Not only to hold the local elections but also to be certain that the result of the local elections can be implemented on the ground, and that I think will be very important not least for the issue of the possibilities of refugees and displaced persons who want to return to their places of orig in really to be able to do so. And then to move on, also during next year, with the preparations for the national and the entity elections in September of 98. I believe that those elections are the end of the consolidation period will be the first truly post-war elections, in Bosnia. I hope they will concentrate much more in the future and somewhat less than on the past. Immense tasks on democratization of society. The development of an independent media, for all of the difficulties that I think everyone is aware of in that area. For stronger support to the human rights institutions. There has been the emphasis this year quite a lot of monitoring by international NGOs and organizations running around -- that has been extremely useful. Next year I think we must concentrate on challenging the problems into the institutions set up by the Peace Agreement. The Human Rights Ombudsperson, the Human Rights Chamber -- make them take up the issues and then concentrate resources on implementing the findings of those institutions, less monitoring, in that sense, more implementations through the institutions. Create the different ways, networks across the IEBL. Can't forever rely on the black market as being the number one unifying force of the country -- there has to be some others working as well, and I think that will happen. Justice via the Tribunal. And strong support for its work, because that is important in several respects. First the obvious one, creates the possibilities for reconciliation. And I believe for a number of reasons that 97 is going to be the key year in this respect. That has to do with the fact that 98 is going to be the year of the elections, when I hope that the political system will be able to be somewhat more forward looking. Then 97 might be the year to deal with the aspects of the war that needs to be dealt with. But also because it is so important to keep the issue of war crimes out of the national court system. One of the things that worries us is the tendency by local courts to bring war crimes charges to the one and other. It might be justified, in a number of those cases. In certain other cases, justification seems to be somewhat vague, to put it very mild. But this should be the responsibility of the International Tribunal. And to have it retained, as the responsibility of the tribunal is in the inte rest of both of the entities, because otherwise we might see a lot confidence in freedom of movement, a lot of confidence in the common institutions, a lot of confidence in a lot of other things that we are trying to build up. We have, as you know, a number of issues in that respect, right during these very days. Return of refugees, displaced persons, I already mentioned. Two hundred and fifty thousand, a quarter of a million this year, mainly displaced persons. We don't know really the numbers of refugees. My impression is that a lot of them have come back and taken a look to see how things are developing. But many of them are still too uncertain. It is still uncertain at that time whether there would be an international security presence in the country during the years to come. And I think that factor also have contributed to a lot of refugees deciding to remain -- be that in Germany, or be that in Austria, or be that in Sweden, or be that France, or be that Serbia, or be that in Croatia. There's also the political and economic condition, you know the political ones and the problems that are there with ethnic harassment going on more or less sanctioned by the local authorities throughout the territory of the country. But also the economic conditions: the lack of housing, the lack of employment, the lack of economic and social prospects for the country has also been something that is been holding things back. Also there I think that 97, will be a very important year, local elections come into the picture. Well I’m not here really to deliver speeches although it sounds like it. But just try to have some remarks on what has been achieved in one year, I said a very short period. Given any conflict within nations or between nations in modern or ancient history, and look at the state of that area or that nation, one year after the guns fell silent and then look at Bosnia today, in that perspective and I think you can see that yes, things have been done. Things are moving. But at the same time most of the agenda remains to be fulfilled, and that is really why we are here and why there will be another working day tomorrow. There can't be any questions after this can there be? Colum Murphy: Sabina Q: Mr. Bildt, I was going to ask you a general question about Dayton Peace Agreement but you already partly answered with last remarks. So I would like to pick up on the return of refugees. You have outlined a lot of problems connected to them. And you did outline also that mainly DPS are returning to the areas where they are majority. But some of the NATO officers on the ground that we have spoken to have told us unless NATO's policy has changed, and unless NATO is changed, and unless NATO provides security for return of refugees not only to ZOS but also beyond, that there will be no return of refugees, that Dayton will be a failure and that the country will be partitioned. What are your thoughts about that? Do you agree? You as a politician? What do you think you can do? C. Bildt: no, I profoundly disagree. Q: you disagree? C. Bildt: well, not even that. I profoundly disagree. Q: but there shouldn't be security provided for refugees? C. Bildt: well yeah, but that NATO can do... But I made that point several times I think it was a press conference here, that you can if you take an individual family that wants to go back. If you take family in to tank, you can drive that tank back to the house, you can help them into their house. We can have the tank staying there, as well. But not really for a very long time, or can you? I mean there's no way I think that in long term can secure conditions by outside force alone. This will have to be done through political changes, then we can go in, the way that is now done in the ZOS, try to help things along. But the solution to the question of security can never long term be the presence of tanks coming from foreign countries. It's simply not going to work. So with due respect to those NATO officers, I don't think they have the proper political perspective. In addition to that, let's be realistic, the force that's going to be here next year, is going to be, as I understand the debate of all the half or somewhat less than half. And in 98 it might go down to significantly below that. That means we can not expect the follow-on force to be able to do more than fairly limited missions. That means that there will be and increased burden on the political change and different ways in which those can be furthered. But by force alone, we can't do it. Q: so given the pace with which common institutions are being set up and given the pace with which the political will of the entities is moving the refugee issue forward, how many people do you expect to go back in the important year of 1997? C. Bildt: I don't know. A lot of people are working on that and working on different plans. And I would not venture a figure. It is dependent on a number of factors. It is dependent on local elections. Not only when they are held but how they are held and how they are implemented. I think that is a key factor. I think it also depends upon economic and social... Social developments. We should not forget the fact that even if it's not... (pause) how am I going to phrase this? Because I was going to talk about my own country. There are 130,000 people in Sweden. And I wouldn't say they always have an easy life, because they don't. It's not a bad country. They are far away and they want to be home. But in terms of social and economic conditions it's not that bad. And if there are choices really to back to an area where there's no sign of economic and social development whatsoever, that tends to have a negative impact on their willingness to go back. Apart from the politics. So it is very much dependent upon what we can do in terms of economic and social development throughout the territory. Here we face the dilemma of that, most of the refugees that are in Western Europe are from Republika Srpska territory, where the economic and social situation is the worst. Politics apart. That is increasingly going to be a dilemma in our development... Development policies. So politics and the economic factors are going top determine that. I think increasingly that we will see people starting to come back to what we today refer, somewhat wrongly to minorities areas. But of course it will be difficult. It will be slow. But I think it will happen. C. Murphy: Phillip and then Julian. Q: Mr. Bildt a lot of people I think in this room suspected there was something of a divide in the international community's approach to using NATO and the force here on the ground to go after war criminals. A couple... Three weeks ago we learned that in fact there had been... You had taken the initiative ... You've been writing letters to very important politicians that have great influence within NATO to try and get some kind of change in the mandate. The Germans have come on board but it appears that those countries which are most crucial to the effort including the United States, en gland, and France have not moved in the direction of your initiative. What can we expect in the new year? How much are you going to stress this point? I noticed that war criminals came up towards the end of your speech today. How important is it for the implementation of Dayton to get these people to The Hague? C. Bildt: it's one of the most important factors, needless to say. What I have to say on that particular aspect concerning what can be done and what can't be done, I said in the speech in London in public, whenever that was, a couple of weeks, months ago, two months ago, something like that, and you can of course make the assumption that if I’ve said that in public in those terms, I might have said something or seemed somewhat different terms in the internal debates. But internal debates are for internal consumption and then we'll see the policy that evolves out of that. I’ve also made it very clear that if something is going to happen on that, or when something is going to happen, the last thing I will do is to announce it at a press conference. For reasons that are fairly obvious. That being said if I remember it right, we have 78 persons indicted now. There will be in my opinion, or it's not for me to talk about these things really, but there should be more. And I’m quite convinced there will be more. This means that numbers will be fairly large. This issue is going to be with us for quite some time to come. And the prime responsibility must be with the part ies. And in a formal sort of way all of them are lacking. If you look at where are the 78, well the largest number is in the Republika Srpska. If I remember the figure right, correct me if someone has it, it's around 45, 50. Some 40, 50, I would say, without ... I’m looking at ... You are dealing with these issues...(interruption from reporter). Q: 52. C. Bildt: 52. Then we have a couple on Yugoslav territory. Then we have well the Republika Croatia, that different information concerning how many. And then we have on the territory of the federation, which is also of course a problem for the federation authorities, to be able to exercise their full authority, throughout the federation to deal with also this particular issue. So we'll have to work with this particular issue with all the authorities in the entire region, for quite some time to come. But if there are those that are deliberately, massively disregarding obligations, I think that will cause action. C. Murphy: Julian then Chris. Q: the question of whether it being imperative or not, because I don't get the sense, and I know you want to keep it a secret because you think you might spook the war criminals because they might go running to their mothers in Serbia, or something, but frankly can you just say how imperative you feel it is for the peace process to have these people arrested? C. Bildt: all of these things are imperative. I wouldn't say this is the thing. The combination of what... There's nothing that I mentioned here that we can disregard -- economic development, war criminals, common institutions, return of the refugees, all of it must be done. The peace package is a package. We must do all of it. If you neglect one bit, you risk the entire construction. C. Murphy: Julian. Q: is it a problem for you going around the world raising money to try and invest in Bosnia if there are so many war criminals in positions of influence. I mean wouldn't that have been better trying to remove these people before you raise money? Is it an obstacle? C. Bildt: I wish it was an obstacle but sorry to say it's not. No realistically I’m involved in a major debate back home in Sweden where there is a major political crisis because the prime minister said that there's such an excellent political stability in China, and that's a good investment climate. Which unfortunately says quite a lot about the peace joint between respectful and rights investment climate. I mean those are sorry to say two different things. So I think the problem with the indicted war criminals is of another ... It's a moral dimension. It has implications for the future reconciliation. It has implications for the possibility of having the atmosphere that we want, for the elections. It also has I think important implications for the region and for deterring further conflicts in the future. I belong to those, as you know, that don't think all the problems of this part of Europe are over. I can point at a number of places where we have to be extremely careful for the next 5, 10, 15 years to prevent the outbreak of war. Then I think it is immensely important to make clear to those that might be contemplating things that we saw here in Bosnia, that that is not going to be tolerated. If those that are indicted are allowed to run around forever more less freely here, that has a negative impact not only on Bosnia but has a negative impact on a region where there are other problems that might be as difficult as Bosnia's was, 5 10, 15 years from now. So it has great significance for not sorry to say in that particular aspect. C. Murphy: Chris then Karen. Chris. Q: Mr. Bildt. I have two unrelated questions. I’ll ask them both. The most notorious war criminal, indicted war criminal or suspected war criminal, is presumably arcan(?). He's certainly the most infamous, and yet he hasn't been indicted. And I would like to know if that is because of the pressure from your office or from the Americans or anybody else? The second question has to do with conditionality. It seems to be a widening rift between yourself and the World Bank, over whether aid should be conditional or not on the Serbs, particularly observing various parts of the Dayton Peace Agreement. They seem to not want conditionality and you do want it. And this dispute seems to be getting worse rather than better. I’m just wondering how you think this would be resolved in time for December 2nd? Thanks. C. Bildt: I find it a strange idea that my office should be exercising pressure on the tribunal not to indict arcan(?). I can say though, that we are not pressuring the tribunal into either indicting or not indicting persons, because that would be inappropriate. I am the product of a political culture of where we keep the executive arm --- if we are that -- and the legal arm of government are very separate. The legal people should do their thing. We support it and we implement it, but we do not interfere in any sort of way in their particular judgements. Then I might have my own views on that, but those are certainly not the ones that you. . .that communicate. . .I don't think to anyone else. Frankly speaking, if you look at the way the Tribunal has been working, they have been dealing with episodes. . .campaigns, whatever. . .periods in the world. . .and then they have been indicted all of those associated with that particular period. . .of what happened during the war. .and there are important aspects of the entire war that they have not dealt with in any sort of way. And that is why it's fairly easy to say, I think, that further indictments will come. Because, everyone knows that there are aspects of the conflict that they are looking very actively into. And I think everyone in this room are aware of the fact that on this particular aspects of war, there are those very likely indeed to be, to be indicted by the tribunal. On the conditionality, that's more, I would say, a legal thing. That has to do with the statutes of the World Bank. And conditionality does not exist in the word of the World Bank, formally speaking. Going back to China, for awhile, because that's a good illustration of human rights. When that was the fourth of June 1989, the Tiannamen. Massacre. One of the reactions was that. . .I thought it at least, ceased to be the military contacts or numbers of things, at least temporarily, stop economic aid. That presented enormous problems for the World Bank. . .because the World Bank, by the nature of the organization, does not take political factors into account. In. . .so that, that's the formalities and legalities of the situation. In practical terms, we are working very closely together, so I don't see this as an issue. Question: could I just follow up on that one then? In December, obviously it's going to be fairly, fairly relaxed. But, February, you're going to have to ring people's bells and get all this money flying in. Are you going to say to them, "I want this money, but on the other hand, it will be held up unless the Serbs meet all the conditions of Dayton." Or are you going to say, "OK, the aid's going through anyway and we hope that somehow by doing this, the Serbs will come around and see sense?" Which is it going to be? C. Bildt: well, it's going to be that ... I am concerned by the fact that we must have. . .a distribution of aid across the country, which is somewhat more equal than it's been. And, so far, I mean conditionality has not been working very well for two reasons. I mean. . .on this side money has been flown without any real danger in that respect, whatever has been done. On the other side, where roughly 2 percent of the money has been spent. . .it's 2 percent of construction money going to the Republika Srpska side. Conditionality hasn't worked either. Because they tend to say, "well, we know that money is not, never going to come here." So they're just talking and we'll just disregard. It's only by having, or achieving, somewhat more of a balance that we can have some sort of possibility to having an impact with conditionality. It also has. . .I mean. . .going back to that is sue I mentioned. . .return of the refugees. . .most of those that are in Western Europe. . .are coming from territory which is today Republika Srpska. And. . .as things are developing now, if they want to come back to Bosnia, they can choose at this time, to new housing which we are building with European and American, Japanese, and whatever taxpayers' money. . .in the federation side. . .and ruins from the Republika Srpska side. And that is also going to be an increasing problem when we see the distribution of the aid money. But the distribution is mainly going to be, of course, according to. . .the things that need to be done. I’m concerned by the fact that some of the key infrastructure problems have been under-funded. Let me mention the power thing which is under-funded. . .the transportation, which is under-funded, telecommunications is under-funded, but that's not, sorry to say, been a problem, because even the money that is there has been refused by the parties, all of them. Because they have been playing too much games. . .with telephones. Housing has been over-funded this year. But housing will accelerate next year. And there, we might have a funding shortage. So those are the key problems, as I see it. And, why our power and transportation, telecommunications am so important? Well they are important in two respects. They are important, first in this answer, this is the basic infrastructure without the economy, without which the economy is not going to take off. If I don't want economic reforms and things like that, that's a responsibility of the national authorities. But it will not be possible to mobilize domestic savings, through the next two or three years, to repair the basic infrastructure of their country. So if they do the economic reforms, our part of the bargain is really to get the key infrastructure in place. Second aspect. . .that which unites the country. Infrastructure is common. There is no way in which you can have a separate power system, a separate transportation system, for the federation or for the Republika Srpksa. Those are Bosnia-Herzegovina systems, and will be rebuilt, as such, throughout the country. C. Murphy: Karen, and then we have a time problem. We'll take two more questions after that. Question: Mr. Bildt, you've painted a very gloomy picture in terms of how the Dayton Agreement has gone over the last year (interruption). . . C. Bildt: have I? Question: well, I think so. (interruption, inaudible by C. Bildt)...but anyway, that was just. . .just before my question which was you mentioned that the formation of the joint institutions was the most problematic thing at the moment. Do you feel that these joint institutions will actually be formed properly? Because after all, we don't even have the Serbs signing their declaration yet for the house of representatives. Are they, is the joint, are the joint institutions really going to be assembled? Are you getting those indications? And, also, what are the possibilities of the country sliding back into war, if these institutions are not going to actually come up and you can't get these people to cooperate? C. Bildt: first, the declaration not being signed is not a political problem. They have declared their readiness to sign it. So I think we are well past that particular problem. So, that, that will happen. . .yes, it takes time to set up the common institutions. That is hardly surprising. I’ ve been in my own country forming governments a couple of times and ... After elections ... And it is never less than a month, and that is after spanish election, I think it took recently, that took two or three months. Anyone who expects progress here to be extremely rapid. . .for the setting up of the common institutions. . .I think it is naive. It's extremely difficult. And if you look at other similar situations around the world and throughout history ... While attempts have been made, to set up common institutions less than a year after the end of the conflict. . .some of them have failed. And it never really happened, and the country has remained partitioned. Some of it has been a very, very cumbersome process. . .and that's why when we say it's a bleak picture. . .well, I mean, Dayton has not been realized in one year. If there was anyone who thought that everything in Dayton would be realized in one year, that person was rather naive. But, a foundation has been laid, and in comparison with what was the situation a year ago, and how our peace process of this kind normally developing ... I mean, it's not that bad. The common institutions, what would happen if they don't. . .materialize, over time? Well, then the country will remain partitioned. That's the tragedy of it. The military implementation, that was happening in the earlier part of this year, was the easy part of it because that was really to verify the partition. It closed down the war. Political implementation is to start to overcome the partition, and if that fails, then partition remains. The partition was of course, the result of the war itself. With that result in war coming back ... That's of course the ultimate question. I believe that if there are set up common institutions, that over time, develops into a state that is truly respected by each and every one, or nearly each and everyone, throughout the territory of the country. That is by, the leaders of the three constituent peoples, then peace will last and Bosnia will remain a United Country. If that fails, two years from now, or five years from now, then peace and the unity of the country will be at risk. I don't see this in the short perspective, I see the risk of the longer perspective. The common institutions and the true power sharing -- is really the key to the long-term possibilities of Bosnia and of peace. Question: you've spoken quite a bit about what your goals are, at this point, and what you'd like to do, what needs to be done at this point. But, we've heard very little about your ability actually to coerce the parties to actually, to actually fulfill their obligations under Dayton, at this point. I’m wondering. . .you've spoken in the past about your wish to be able to be the center, basically, of coordinating the civilian implementation ... Coordinating funds. . .basically, the carrots and sticks for the parties. Will you ask for this power, a greater power of coordination. . .this in london. . .because otherwise, really, these problems which you've referred to, will continue for the next year, and it's difficult to see where your ability to influence this actually lies at this point. C. Bildt: well, true. . .I mean, why. . .what I can do and my office can do, is to coordinate the international efforts, period. But it's not our country, neither should it be. It's not our peace, it's not our future. It is the primary responsibility of all the elected leaders of all parts of Bosnia to implement the Peace Agreement, they signed it. We witness it, and we are here to help. And that's rather fundamental. I mean, it's even more fundamentally the situation, after you've had elections. They're now elected by their people, or by their peoples, however they like to phrase that. . .and, all of them have committed themselves to Dayton. And, Dayton needs to be implemented over time. There will be massive international efforts here to help and assist them, but not forever. That's also an important message. There's a lot during this year. And it's somewhat less, but still significant during the next two years. . But it is going to gradually be reduced and increasingly a larger part of the responsibility must rest on the elected politicians of the country themselves. We can coordinate the international efforts, most certainly, but we're not running the country. It is not, neither should it be, the protector. On that note, if there are no further questions. . .thank you very much.