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VERBATIM RECORD NO. 6

C5 - VR/6

18 September 1950

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Attached is the verbatim text of the fifth meeting of
the Council held at 3:17 p.m., 18th September, 1950.

T. A. G. CHARLTON
SECRETARY

20th September, 1950

New York

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September 18, 1950

(The meeting was opened at 3:17 p.m., Mr. Acheson presiding.)

MR. ACHESON (United States): When we recessed for lunch Dr. Lange was putting forward some questions. Would you be willing to resume, Dr. Lange?

DR. LANGE (Norway): Mr. Chairman, I have been greatly impressed by the arguments you have put forward and those proposed by others in favor of creating this integrated force for the defense of Western Europe, and I certainly fully realize the very large consequences of the decision taken by the United States Government to allocate larger United States units to such an integrated force than those at present in Europe. This decision is one of the factors that gave us all the more reason to believe that the setting up an integrated force will make for greatly increased defense strength and for greater efficiency in our common defense efforts.

Norway would never wish to obstruct the realization of an idea on which the three great powers in this alliance are agreed and which has such strong support as has now been voiced from most of our allies. When it comes to Norway's position in relation to such an integrated force, however, I have for a number of reasons found myself in a difficult situation during the last few days.

Firstly, owing, I take it, to the fact that decisions on this issue have been arrived at so recently by other member Governments, there has not been any possibility of informing, either through the Council of Deputies or through any of the Regional Planning Groups of which we are members, or even through regular diplomatic channels, that the proposal of such a truly revolutionary nature would be put before this Council for decision at its present session.

On the contrary, questions of a similar nature raised by the French memorandum of August 17 had been referred by our Deputies to the appropriate organ of our Pact Organization with a view to being reported back to the Council by October 18, and there have been no adequate discussions among our Deputies on the substance of those proposals. The proposals raised both by the French memorandum and by the proposals put before us by our Chairman Friday night are of a nature that in my country

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are essentially within the competence and under the constitutional responsibility of the Defense Minister. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, essential for the smooth functioning and the efficiency of this Council that, in the future, notice should as far as it is at all possible be given in beforehand to the Council Deputies of proposals to come before us for decision, so as to allow all Governments time for proper discussion and necessary consultation with the parliamentary bodies.

For the reasons just stated, the problems are, to say the least, somewhat muddled, and I therefore regret that I found myself these last few days without proper authority at this stage to commit my country to major decisions of policy, on which it has not been possible to inform my Government adequately, and the concurrence at this stage on my part in these circumstances would be of little value and might cause serious reactions at a later stage.

A further difficulty, at least as important as the one just mentioned, is that in the short time given it has been impossible to get any really clear idea of the consequences for my own country of setting up such an integrated force as is now contemplated. Geographically, Norway is in quite a different position from the central continental area of Western Europe. Furthermore, the setting up of the unified command in peacetime involves for us special constitutional problems, and there has been no time to investigate either the military or the legal and constitutional aspects of an eventual allocation of Norwegian troops to the integrated force.

I do not, Mr. Chairman, mention these difficulties in any obstructionist spirit. I trust that answers will be found to our queries, those of them that are at present unanswered, and that we will be able to get within a short time a clearer view of the consequences involved. I trust also that the legal and constitutional obstacles that I have mentioned can and will be overcome. But parliamentary action will be necessary to take effect as far as my country is concerned.

I am not quite clear in my mind either as to how intimately the decision to set up an integrated force under unified command is linked with the problem of German participation in the defense effort. I am thinking here of the expression you used yourself, I believe, of presenting this as a "single package proposal". In view of the great importance of the problems involved in this proposal, the submission by the Council to the Deputies for the report of the Council of Deputies, that is October 18, would in my point of view have been preferable in this case. I realize, however, the very cogent reasons for speeding up the decision, and I am happy that there seems now to be agreement that you should leave decision on the principle of the matter until early next week. I trust that will give me the minimum of time, not quite four days, for consultation with my Government and with our competent parliamentary bodies.

I repeat, Mr. Chairman, that all my colleagues may be confident that Norway does not wish to put difficulties in the way of the realization of this idea of an integrated force. We on our side are confident that the peculiarities of our position-- a geographical situation at long distance from the central defense area and the fact of our being the only member nation having common borders with Soviet Russia--will be taken into account. Similar peculiarities as to geographic location of other member nations, I believe, will no doubt necessitate a certain flexibility in the application to different areas of the principle of the unified army.

MR. ACHESON (United States): Dr. Lange has raised some questions regarding our suggestions the other day, which I think probably it would be wise to answer as far as I can at this point. I would like to make very clear that the points which Dr. Lange has raised seem to be wholly proper, wholly reasonable, not in the slightest bit obstructive, and I am very glad indeed that he has raised these points at this time.

First of all, in regard to procedure, it would be highly desirable if we could proceed in a completely orderly way so that every matter could be thoroughly thrashed out by the Deputies before it came to this Council, but I am a little bit at a loss to know how always to do that. This matter of the integrated force was raised--it has been in everybody's mind, I am sure, for a long time--but it was raised by the French memorandum of August 17. We went to work on that memorandum right away. We thought that the suggestions raised by the French memorandum were very penetrating and should be a matter of urgent study. In that view our natural sluggishness was overcome by the able representations of the very able French representative in Washington, who assured us that the French Government attached the deepest importance to these principles. We completed our examination of that in the United States Government and obtained the President's approval on the course we recommended to him on Saturday preceding my departure from Washington. There has been no time to present our views to anybody except this body. I could have suppressed them during our meeting and sent them on to the Deputies afterwards, but I should not have thought that that was a good thing to do. I am merely explaining this to indicate that procedure sometimes is a matter of necessity.

Now, as to the questions which Dr. Lange asked me, his first question related to the third paragraph of the United States memorandum, where we spoke of a force "adequate to insure the successful defense of Western Europe," "Western Europe", I think it said, "including Western Germany", and Dr. Lange asked what specific area we meant by Western Europe. What we meant by Western Europe is the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. We have no intention or desire to change the provisions of the Treaty in any way whatever, and how that area can be defended

is not anything about which I can speak. In fact, there is no living man who can speak of it at this time. It depends upon what we are willing to provide for the soldier, whose duty it is to defend it. As we said so often in this debate, with forces of sufficient power and number, a soldier can do all sorts of things; with paltry forces he can produce something different. But the purpose of this would be to defend the area comprising the North Atlantic Treaty and in that area we consider western Germany to be included for the purpose of this force.

The second question Dr. Lange asked was what was meant by "the necessary authority for directing the organization and training of the forces into a unified force and of prescribing the specifications for and the training of units in process of being formed." Dr. Lange inquired whether this meant that the Supreme Command would have authority over the organization and period of time of training of national forces which were not committed to his command. Now, in answering that question, may I separate the answer into two parts. First, let us consider the relations of the Supreme Commander and his staff to forces not yet committed to his command but intended to be committed to his command, and, secondly, let us consider what he would do with forces committed to his command.

In the first instance, it is not contemplated that he would have any authority whatever over the decisions of any Government as to its period of service or any other matter within its sovereign control. It is contemplated that he would have a very important voice in talking with representatives of Governments who intended to commit troops to his command, pointing out that there were certain standards which he thought should be met before he received troops. In other words, he could not intelligently receive troops whose period of service would end a few weeks after he received them. That would be a waste of time, of everybody's time and effort and would be a paper transaction to put them in his army and then take them out. Similarly he would want to say, "I believe you ought to give these men training along this general line before you turn them over to me, because I will expect them to come up to certain standards, which will be met by other troops, and I don't want them lagging behind and not knowing certain things." But whether the Governments do that or not is up to the Governments. He has no authority, except that I suppose he would be permitted to refuse to receive troops which were incompetent from his point of view.

Secondly, what would be his authority over troops committed to his command? There I think his authority should be very great, and he and his staff should be entitled to prescribe in detail how the troops should be trained, with whom they should train, where they should train, and that sort of thing, but, again, what I am now answering is not what you gentlemen will

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decide but what was in our mind when we made the proposal that we made so that you will understand it clearly.

Now, the third question that Dr. Lange asked was, how does the United States proposal work in relation to the existing Regional Planning Groups, particularly the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group. I should think that in regard to the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group the United States proposal has very little if anything to do. We are talking about the creation of a force on the continent of Europe, and the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group deals with sea operations and it would certainly not be absorbed in any staff which was dealing with the organization and operation of a force on land. It would doubtless have a close relationship because ocean supply would come in very closely, but we could not contemplate that that Group would be absorbed into any staff.

In regard to the other three Regional Planning Groups, I cannot give you the answer because I don't know what the answer is. I don't know what to suggest, but we can suggest how we approach the answer. If such a force as we have been talking about was created and such a staff was created, the staff of the Supreme Commander would perform many other functions than purely planning. It would have all the functions of a staff of a great army. One of those is planning. Planning is the only function of these three Regional Planning Groups. Now, I am not talking about the North Atlantic Ocean but the three area groups. Their only function is planning. They have no other function. That function must in some way be brought into and incorporated in the new working of this staff. I don't know how that would be done. Clearly it cannot be done until professional advice has been taken, a plan has been worked out, that plan has been considered by Governments, and that plan has been considered by this Council, because the Council has set up the Regional Planning Groups and the Council is the only body which can alter their powers and functions. Therefore, my answer must be vague.

Also, that touches on the questions which Dr. Lange and others have raised of the relationship, the liaison between the military authorities of nations not on the Standing Group and the Standing Group. Again, that is something which obviously requires professional advice and thought and obviously requires the action of the Council. Some way must be worked out to solve the problem. Again I don't know how, but I recognize it as a problem. You are quite right in mentioning it, and I think it has got to be worked out.

One last word. Dr. Lange also said he was not clear about the relation of this integrated force and the German question,

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so far as the American proposal was concerned. The American proposal is a most earnest effort to reply to the French memorandum. We have studied everything which seems to us highly pertinent to the quick creation of a force adequate to defend Western Europe, and the points that we made seem to us essential points in the creation of that kind of a force within the time that is probably open to us. We have laid it before this Council and we would like to have the views of the Council on this proposal.

Now, what happens if the Council turns it down, I am not able to say. We have made a proposal which seems to us to be a reasonable one. We think it makes no sense, for instance, to say, "Let's have a commander but have no troops." Similarly, it makes no sense to say, "Let's have the troops but no commander." All of these things, in our view, work together. However, we want your views on all of it. We want to talk the whole thing over with you, and if your views were that this proposal is no good, why, then we will go to work and try to find something else that will work, but we would feel that we were not quite fairly treated if you said, "We are willing to talk about certain aspects of your proposal but others we cannot talk about now." We will say that that doesn't meet the proposal. Now, that is the connection.

Do you wish to follow Norway, Mr. Ambassador?

MR. DE KAUFFMANN (Denmark): Mr. Chairman, I had intended to be very brief. What you said just now makes it possible for me to be even briefer than I had planned. I would like to start out by thanking you for the very clear expose we have just heard. From what you said we got enlightenment, and also you made it clear that there were certain counsels we could not expect today. All of this will be a great help. All of this will be studied by the Danish Government. Dr. Lange started out by assuring all of us how Norway appreciates, as we appreciate, the plan that is before us. I can assure you we in Denmark appreciate it, and appreciate it very much.

Dr. Lange mentioned the various difficulties and the problems that we were going to be faced with. Some of these problems are of a constitutional and political nature, others are going to be of a practical nature. The problems will be very similar in Denmark in that respect. For me, personally, these last days have been somewhat difficult, as difficult as for Dr. Lange in one respect perhaps a little more, that while he can speak as a member of the Norwegian Government, I can speak as a civil servant representing our Foreign Minister, who was not able to come here, because as you know after our elections we have had no instructions from our Government and he has not been able to be with us.

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One thing Dr. Lange mentioned was the geographic position of Norway which is somewhat different from other countries. Denmark's position in that respect is not quite the same as Norway's. As you all know, we are on the continent of Europe, we are in the immediate proximity of Germany, due north of the dividing line between the Russian zone of occupation. This makes our problems arising in connection with the integrated force of a somewhat different nature perhaps than the problem perceived in Norway, but it does not make the problem less vital, nor perhaps less difficult.

For these reasons I can associate myself completely with what Dr. Lange has said, that it would be necessary to inform my Government, and I can also associate myself with what he said about the hope that in the course of the allowed time it would be possible for us to give an answer to the questions before us. I can assure you that we in Denmark want to be cooperative and I can assure you that we will do everything in our power to be cooperative. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. ACHESON (United States): Thank you, Mr. Cunha.

DR. CUNHA (Portugal): (Translated). Mr. Chairman, I realize and understand very well the importance of the position taken by the United States in the proposal, in the memorandum which was submitted to us, and I understand also the extremely laudable effort which was made. My Government also understands clearly the danger with which we are faced. As a matter of fact, I may say that Portugal was the first country to clearly see, to realize this danger and to attract the attention of the world's opinion to it.

Now in regard to the question of German participation in the common defense, I wish to say that my Government does not see anything against, does not oppose in any way such a participation defined in the terms which were used in the United States memorandum.

As for the remainder of this memorandum, this proposal, that is to say, the question of the creation of an integrated force, the question of a unique combined supreme command, the question of the increased powers of the Standing Group and the need for a more centralized direction by an international organism of the international economic problems involved, on all these I have certain questions to ask.

I would have asked the questions which were asked earlier, by Mr. Pearson or Mr. Stikker and by Mr. Lange, but I also have some other questions which I would like to ask myself. On these questions I would ask for some precision, but not precision on the details. I do not believe they bear on details because they bear on questions on which may depend the entire attitude of my Government. I wish here to apologize. Maybe

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I, have not understood certain questions for reasons of language. We are at a disadvantage here since neither French nor English is our native tongue.

The first question I will ask is the following one. Which countries are to contribute forces to the creation of this integrated force? Are they to be all the countries members of our organization, or are certain ones to be excused? Who is going to decide that? How are we going, in what manner are the national forces of each country to be placed at the disposal of the combined forces? I believe that the final decision will belong in each case to the Government interested. However, I believe that certain clarifications ought to be brought on that point.

The second question I would like to ask will have reference to the powers of the Supreme Commander in peace time. We understand that these powers are to be extremely wide in regard to the forces placed at his disposal, forces belonging to the integrated force, and that he is to have no powers over the other forces, over the national forces. However, there is another question here: How far can he use the integrated force? Mainly from the geographical point of view, does he have the authority to place units of that force in any territory of the countries members of our organization?

Another point which I would wish to raise is the following one. In the United States memorandum centralized authority on the economic questions is referred to. In particular, the Military Production and Supply Board is mentioned, and the powers of this body on the utilization of all the economic forces for common defense is stressed. However, different terms are used in the memorandum. In certain places we speak of "guidance", in certain other places of "assistance" and of "help" and finally we say that this to be an action body. All this creates a certain problem, certain questions in our mind. Is this body to be an executive or a consultative body, or in other words, what freedom is to be left to the different governments in economic matters?

Another question is that of the North Atlantic Regional Planning Group, or more exactly, that of planning groups and in particular that of the North Atlantic Ocean Planning Group. The functions of that body are not only that of an admiralty body, they do not only refer to the question of the war on sea. The defense of Portugal against attacks on land is also put under this body, or more exactly, this body has certain consultative authority on the questions referring to the defense of Portugal on the ground, and therefore, we believe that a certain relationship between the Supreme Command and his Staff and a North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group must be defined.

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The final question is that of the fact that we have right now two documents before us: We had first the introductory speech of our Chairman and then the memorandum of the United States. Certain points are raised in one of these two documents only and not in the other. Certain other points are described in a slightly different manner in both these documents, and a question of interpretation might arise. Which of these two documents shall be considered as the authoritative one? I personally believe that both of them should be considered in this light. However, how are we going to act, what will be our procedure in the cases where a certain divergence exists between these two documents? Which are we going to base our views on?

There is finally one more question, that of the lapse of time which will pass before our next meeting. In about a week or ten days we are going to meet again, and certain questions were raised here already and certain other questions may occur to us during the interval. We may think upon studying more deeply the problems involved of some new questions to ask. I believe that it might be useful if such questions could be asked by the governments of the Government of the United States, and if any of the answers could be given they might be communicated to our body.

Now I would like to show the position of my country at the present moment, the position of my Government in regard to these questions. Naturally we all have to face many of the difficulties which were mentioned and described previously. As Dr. Lange has said, we were taken a little bit by surprise. Of course, we did see the French memorandum of August. However, we had expected that preliminary answers to that memorandum would be arrived at at the October meetings of the Defense Ministers, and before taking a firm position on many of these questions, my Government awaited the preliminary opinions of this Council. We believe that in order to facilitate the work of this Council those questions should be asked beforehand.

There is also another question, and that is the question of the sensitivity of nations in regard to the problems of sovereignty, and such touchiness of the psychology, as it is called, cannot be ignored.

It would also be necessary for us to consult our Parliament, and our Parliament has adjourned at the present moment, and according to the constitution it will meet only in November. There are also difficulties of a constitutional nature, and there are questions of a geographical nature which place us in a position not too dissimilar from that of Norway or Denmark in spite of certain differences.

There is also the regret that in the present situation the global defense of the Iberian Peninsula is not insured.

This question, for instance, raises a considerable difficulty for my Government, which is responsible for such a defense of the Iberian Peninsula in addition to being responsible for a defense of its overseas territories.

This being stated, however, we do not oppose at all the principle of the creation of an integrated force. We must, however make certain reservations regarding the participation of national forces within it. As far as the question of the Supreme Command in peace time is concerned, in this case also there are certain points which must be clarified, and for us it would be premature to take a firm commitment at the moment. We must also make a few reservations regarding the need for a centralized body having authority in economic matters.

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I wish to assure you that it is not our intention to create obstacles. However, there are certain obstacles, which have prevented certain other countries from accepting the remilitarization of Germany or of Spanish participation: there are such obstacles and we have our share of them.

Thank you.

MR. ACHESON (United States): Dr. Cunha has raised three or four questions here which I assume that I am supposed to throw some light on. Others are ones obviously beyond my power.

The first one was, what countries are to be expected to contribute forces. It is hoped that the countries parties to the North Atlantic Treaty will do so, and no country can be forced to do that without--but if enough do not join in, then there obviously won't be any forces.

Two, what are the powers in peace time of the Supreme Commander to place any part of the unified force in any country? Obviously, he can only do that with the consent of the country involved.

Third, the words "guidance", "assistance", "help", and "action body" have been used in regard to the economic affairs. Dr. Cunha asked which of these words are dominant. It seems to me that all are. It is an action body for the purpose of giving guidance, assistance and help.

Fourth, he asked whether there should not be a relationship between the North Atlantic Ocean Planning body and the proposed Staff. I think the answer is, yes, there should be.

And, fifth, he asks which of my statements are authoritative, what I said or what I wrote. The answer is, you have to do your best with both of them. If I try again, you will be in a worse fix.

I think those are the principal points that you raised, Dr. Cunha, that I can help you on now.

Mr. Bevin.

MR. BEVIN: I won't keep the Council but a couple moments. My position is the same as that taken last week. Perhaps I might just in a few words recapitulate for the sake of the record and it is as follows: We agree on the necessity for an integrated force for the defense of the West. Second, we agree that this integrated force should be under the supreme commander with an integrated staff. I do not think it is proper to the function of the Council to elaborate the manner in which the integrated force should be constituted or the central command system organized. These, in my view are questions, the details of which should be worked out by the Defense Committee.

In regard to the German participation, my government is agreed to accept the principle of German participation in western defense, subject to agreed conditions, some of which have already been indicated by you, sir. We agree with you, however, that this would inevitably take time and implies a period of planning and it does not imply that we go immediately to the constitution of German armed units. We agree, as you stated last Friday, the next stage should be the examination of the details by the Defense Committee and other appropriate NAT bodies and exploration of the matter with the German Government in order to ascertain what part Germany can play in this effort.

Those are the words I am authorized by the Cabinet in England to say. I have made it short because I think the time has come to express our views and on that basis we are ready to work. We think that not as a part of this decision but as a suggestion of procedure dealing with the Germans very largely, I think is what was expressed in another way by M. Schuman earlier. We think we ought to reply to what you stated the other day-- What reply do we give to Adenauer? What should we say? We think in order to keep the things in the right perspective, the right method of dealing with the Germans, we should reply to the communication of the Chancellor, that the High Commissioners have been authorized to ascertain from him in what way they feel Germany could best contribute to the defense of the free world against aggression. We don't think we ought to be pinned down to one thing, just limited, fait accompli, to production and all sorts of things the High Commissioners think it best. Knowing the situation they could

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discuss with him and report to us so we would have a clear view of the German mind, as well as our own governments' mind, when they come back and probably produce better results. In the meantime, our own governments will give very careful thought to it.

I would repeat what I said yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that there are a lot of aspects bearing on it. It isn't easy. As I stated briefly today, I don't want the difficulties underestimated by anybody but the political and the psychological point of view of having to face bringing the Germans back into the family of nations, there will be a good deal to get over-- in my own country and my government has faced that and we have come to this conclusion which I have read out.

MR. ACHESON (United States): Thank you very much, Mr. Bevin.

Now, we have had a question from each of the Ministers on this point and unless there is more to be said about it, I suggest we now turn to the communique. Is there any further discussion before turning to the communique?

M. SCHUMAN (France): (Translated): Mr. Chairman, this morning I raised a question, a question on which action could possibly be taken by the three occupying powers in Germany through their high commissioners in Germany, and that is the question of possible German participation in the defense through the building of fortifications on its own territory. I suggest that it would be very useful to have a first opinion on that matter before our next meeting. This opinion should be that of the three high commissioners of the Allied High Commission in Germany and could be obtained in the following manner if the Council will agree:

The Council asks the three powers which occupy Western Germany to direct their High Commissioner to examine under what conditions the Federal German Government could associate itself and contribute to the defense of the West and consequently to the defense of the German Federal Republic through the carrying out of defense works, through the preparation of fortifications and airfields on German territory. The three occupying powers are invited to communicate the result of that study during the next meeting of the Council.

MR. ACHESON (United States): Are you putting that forward as a proposal now, M. Schuman? Would you like to have that acted on by the Council or is that something you wish to take up with the three powers in regard to Germany?

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M. SCHUMAN (France): I think it would be useful to have the communication of this advice for our meeting of the Council next week.

MR. ACHESON (United States): I should think that if the Council wishes information on that they might ask the three powers to give it to them. I do not see that the High Commissioners are in any position to do that. What I am suggesting is that I should be very strongly opposed to asking the High Commissioners to take any action whatever in regard to this matter but if your proposal is that the three governments which are responsible should consider it and then talk with the Council, I should be entirely agreeable but the resolution does not say that. The resolution asks that the Council ask the three powers to ask the High Commissioners. Now that gets this debate going on in Germany where I think it does not belong at the present time.

M. SCHUMAN (France) (Translation): Mr. Chairman, I am strongly opposed to asking the question of the High Commissioners. I am in full agreement that all reference to the three High Commissioners be stricken out of the resolution.

MR. BEVIN (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask M. Schuman if we are going to have a military appreciation from the Defense Committee on the whole question of defense of the West. Do you think it is wise to pick out one part and deal with it in this way? Shall not we get in the Maginot Line complex in the one part and I got rather in my mind the point put up by Mr. Stikker as to the present lines and as to the whole thing must in the light of what we are doing here be reviewed; at least, that is my feeling. The whole thing has to be reviewed. I should like to see a military appreciation of how they are really going to handle this western problem when we give them this integrated force. I am a little nervous about putting it to them on one point alone and I should have thought-- I don't mind the provocation of Russia very much--but I should have thought dealing with this one phase of it in Eastern Germany would--after all we have our forces there--be so provocative it might lead to an attack and prevent us defending it because we haven't much there to defend it. Anything that happens, we shall demoralize the place.

I think myself it is quite proper that the Council sit at an early date and have a proper appreciation; in fact, I don't know how we will give them the right number of men in the end or anything else until we get this appreciation.

The last word I would say is that I have heard, M. Schuman, so much disputation by military people on the efficacy of using these vast fortifications as against the mobility of maneuver in battle that I don't feel quite competent to make up my mind as to whether this is the best method or not. I am not against it in the sense of opposing you. I am trying to find the best method of dealing with it.

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MR. ACHESON (United States): Does anybody wish to speak on this suggestion?

(Silence)

M. Schuman, I agree very strongly with Mr. Bevin on this. I think all of these matters should be examined quietly. I think it is a great mistake for the Council to be passing resolutions about this sort of thing. It gets about. I am very much disturbed by it. I had hoped that we could discuss this sort of matter quietly. It has to do with the whole program, as Mr. Bevin has pointed out. If you get the idea around that we are asking the Germans to come in and do sort of day labor on the thing, it is not a good idea and I am bothered by it.

M. SCHUMAN (France) (Translation): Mr. Chairman, I did not have in mind any negotiations or even consultations with the Germans. What I had in mind was simply a short preliminary study of one of the many defense possibilities but it is precisely because this is only one of the many possibilities that I believe immediate attention should be given to it. In about ten days we will be asked to take a decision of principle on the question of German manpower. I believe that this will be more difficult unless a proposal such as this one is considered beforehand. It will be, in any case, much more difficult for my government to take a favorable position. Saturday I have indicated that here was a possibility which was offered to Germany of making itself useful to common defense immediately. I also believe that we neglect a little bit too much the question of the various sorts of installations and seem to be hypnotized by the question of manpower.

It is only in the interests of the common cause that I suggest that resolution. The occupying powers might deal with that question by any means they would wish to utilize and report next week. There is no question of any consultations with the Germans and there is no question of any publicity on that matter.

MR. BEVIN (United Kingdom): One of my colleagues was disturbed about publicity in the war. When he met the head of another state he went to him and said: "That talk you had last night was off the record, wasn't it"? The head of the state said: "I thought it was so I shot the interpreter."

Of course I don't believe for a moment that interpreters ever say anything. I apologize to them. What I was conveying was that anything mentioned in this room, I didn't see how it could be kept out of the newspapers.

M. SCHUMAN (France) (Translation): In other words, sir, you would like to have all the newspapermen shot?

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MR. BEVIN (United Kingdom): Oh, no. No, I am just losing my faith in secrecy.

DR. CUNHA (Portugal) (Translation): Let us hope that this will not happen one of these days.

MR. ACHESON (United States): Well, I should much prefer to discuss this matter quietly with M. Schuman and Mr. Bevin, but if M. Schuman wishes this resolution put, I shall of course put it.

M. SCHUMAN (France) (Translation): If the effect of presenting this question as a resolution shocks my colleagues, and since we still have a tripartite meeting, I can present it then and without including it in a resolution if this could facilitate matters.

MR. ACHESON (United States): I think that would be better.

Can we then proceed to the draft communique? The paper which brings this up is marked C5-N/6 (Second Revision).

MR. de KAUFFMANN (Denmark): Mr. Chairman, may I just make a little observation.

MR. ACHESON: Yes.

MR. de KAUFFMAN (Denmark): We were given a copy of the French draft but may I suggest to the Chairman perhaps that you ask us to return this draft as we pass out of the door instead of having any copies of that action?

MR. ACHESON (United States): I think that is an excellent suggestion.

Now, might we turn our attention to the draft communique. Are there any changes suggested in it? Does it meet with your approval? What is the wish of it?

MR. PEARSON (Canada): Mr. Chairman, this is probably the only document that will not appear in the press so we cannot spend very much time on it. I was wondering if in the second sentence, aren't we emphasizing too much possibly the reaction by putting the word "strongly" in front of "determined"? Wouldn't it be better to read: "...The Council was determined to proceed with the necessary measures."

MR. ACHESON (United States): I wonder if it would be useful to get all the suggestions of all the Ministers and then tell the Deputies to go out and fix it up and put it out. Let us get all the suggestions and maybe it won't be very difficult.

Mr. Ambassador?

MR. de KAUFFMAN (Denmark): No suggestions.

MR. ACHESON: M. Schuman, how does this strike you?

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M. SCHUMAN: I believe there is a mistake in the French translation. In the last sentence it is said in the French text that many military considerations, etc. The word "military" does not appear in the English draft.

MR. ACHESON: That is correct. I think the word "military" was stricken out but perhaps it remained in the French translation. Otherwise, is it agreeable to you?

M. SCHUMAN (France): Yes.

MR. ACHESON (United States): Any other suggestions or changes?

(Silence)

Mr. Bevin, did you have any suggestions?

MR. BEVIN (United Kingdom): No, you adopted the one I sent up.

MR. ACHESON (United States): (to Mr. Bevin): I think yours is contained in this paper. Mr. Bevin suggests we send this to the Deputies.

MR. BEVIN (United Kingdom): For the improvement of the English--putting it up to the standards of the French.

MR. ACHESON (United States): Are there any other suggestions?

(Silence)

So far these are of an editing nature and don't change the sense of the text in any way and instead of our spending too much time on it, if it is agreeable and there are no other changes, I suggest the Deputies just make a clean copy, adopt these changes, and then put out the text.

Mr. Spofford, will you take account of Mr. Pearson's suggestions.

If the Deputies will remain after the meeting a few moments we will have this in good shape.

If there is no further business today, shall we recess subject to call of the chairman?

(Silence)

Without objection we will do that.

(Meeting adjourned at 5:15 pm).