

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE N° 1
COPY

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
FIFTH SESSION
NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 1950

NATO
~~TOP SECRET~~
SUMMARY RECORD NO. 5/1
C5 - R/1
15th September, 1950
(including Corrigendum
15.9.52)

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
and
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Summary Record of the First Meeting
held in New York on 15th September, 1950, at 10:30 a.m.

Present

UNITED STATES

Dean Acheson (Chairman)
Charles M. Spofford (Deputy)

BELGIUM

Paul Van Zeeland
Fernand Van Langenhove (Deputy)

CANADA

Lester B. Pearson
L.D. Wilgress (Deputy)

DENMARK

Henrik de Kauffman
M.A. Vestbirk (Alternate
Deputy)

FRANCE

Robert Schuman
Herve Alphand (Deputy)

ICELAND

Bjarni Benediktsson
M. Gunnlaugur Petursson (Deputy)

ITALY

Count Carlo Sforza
Gastone Guidotti (Deputy)

LUXEMBOURG

Joseph Bech
M. Andre Clasen (Deputy)

NETHERLANDS

D.V. Stikker
Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van
Starkenborgh-Stachouwer (Deputy)

NORWAY

Halvard Lange
Dag Bryn (Deputy)

PORTUGAL

Paulo Cunha
Henrique Queiroz (Alternate
Deputy)

UNITED KINGDOM

Ernest Bevin
Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
(Deputy)

SECRETARIAT

Mr. T.A.G. Charlton (Secretary)
Mr. L.F. Morrissey (Assistant Secretary)

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1. The Council agreed that the United States Representative should continue as Chairman through the meetings of this session, after which the Chairmanship would be assumed by the Belgian Foreign Minister.

I. Introductory Remarks by the Chairman

2. The Chairman noted that, since the establishment of the Council a year ago, notable progress had been made in establishing effective machinery in the field of military and economic matters. In particular, the appointment of the Council Deputies had already borne fruit. Effective as these steps had been, however, they did not go far enough, and the Council would be felt in the course of this Session wish to discuss ways and means of securing the transition from the planning stage to the provision of active forces for the defence of freedom in Europe. The aggression in Korea had produced a salutary effect, both in demonstrating the unity of purpose among the free nations and by emphasizing the danger of immediate deficiencies in the defences of the NATO countries. He was certain that the Council would be encouraged by the news of counter-attack in Korea and he had confidence in its success.

II. Adoption of the Agenda

3. The Council unanimously adopted the proposed agenda (Doc. C5 - D/1).

III. Report of the Council Deputies

4. The Council had before them a Report by the Council Deputies (Document No. C5 - D/2).

5. At the request of the Council the United States Deputy gave an oral summary of the Report. He emphasised two general points which had characterized, in his view, the work of the Deputies during their two sessions in London, namely, (a) the feeling of urgency which had accompanied their deliberations and (b) a gratifying atmosphere of real solidarity and team work.

6. The Deputies had based their approach to the manifold problems involved on Resolution No. 4/7 of the North Atlantic Council, which presented them with five principal tasks (see paragraph 4 of the Report). In the first instance, however, the Deputies had felt themselves compelled to concentrate on the tasks summarized in sub-paragraph 4(a) and 4(b) of the Report, which related immediately to the strengthening of the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty. They had not, however, overlooked the three remaining tasks and proposed to concentrate on them as soon as possible.

7. The action which they had taken to strengthen the defences of the North Atlantic area had been restricted to

immediate measures which had been undertaken without prejudice to the long-term considerations.

8. In the purely military field member Governments had been asked to submit as a matter of urgency statements showing what steps they contemplated to increase the total effective combat forces readily available on the 1st July, 1951. These reports had been subjected to a preliminary analysis by the Deputies and had subsequently been remitted to the Chairman of the Defence Committee with the request that the latter should analyse the replies, as a matter of urgency, for presentation to the Council, together with such recommendations as might be appropriate in the light thereof.

9. In the field of production the Deputies had been able to take steps for the immediate implementation of a high priority production programme. This programme, which aimed at the maximum use of existing production capacity in the European NAT countries for categories of equipment which were of vital importance, had been based on studies which had been rapidly prepared by the Permanent Working Staffs of the Military Production and Supply Board and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee. He emphasised that, in order to facilitate the implementation of this programme, Deputies had agreed on interim financial arrangements under which the initial cost of the additional production would fall on the producing country and the machinery of the European Payments Union would be used in cases where equipment was transferred from one country to another. Provision was also made for financial assistance from the United States, in accordance with measures which had been authorised by the United States Congress. Deputies had also held a preliminary exchange of views on possible changes which might be necessary in the existing structure of the NAT agencies and had set up a Working Group to study the detailed problems involved as a matter of urgency. He hoped that the discussions at this session of the Council would provide some valuable guidance to the Working Group in submitting their detailed recommendations.

10. Deputies had also turned their attention to the need for ensuring the dissemination of factual information regarding the aims and objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty, and as a result had approved the appointment of a Director of Information Services who would be assisted by a small staff of experts and would work under the general guidance of the Council Deputies.

11. To sum up, the Deputies, although they had been much encouraged by steps which had already been announced concerning increased defence efforts by the NAT countries, were fully aware how much remained to be done. The preliminary study of the replies submitted by Governments to the United States on the proposed levels of defence effort in the respective

countries showed only too clearly the continued existence of a substantial gap between planned resources and the full defence requirements.

12. Members expressed their general appreciation of the work which had been carried out by the Deputies during the short period since their formation. The following points were mentioned in discussion:

(1) Attention was drawn to the desirability of the Council Deputies carrying out exchanges of views on political matters, in accordance with the terms of Council Resolution No. 4/7. These exchanges of views might prove most useful to the smaller countries who did not enjoy the same facilities as the larger countries for obtaining information from widely differing sources. In pointing out the desirability of these exchanges of views it was emphasised that steps should be taken to ensure that matters of greater urgency were not thereby delayed.

(2) It was unanimously agreed that the Director of Information Services should proceed warily in his very delicate task of presenting the aims and objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty to the public. A large staff would not be required but it must be of high quality. It was also agreed that, as recommended by the Deputies, information should be disseminated to the public through the National Information Services, so as to take account of the varying conditions in each country.

(3) It was confirmed that there was no reason why appropriate additions should not be made to the list of items contained in the high priority production programme as the need for them arose.

(4) It was also confirmed that the interim financial arrangements for the implementation of the high priority production programme did not exclude the conclusion of separate bilateral agreements governing the purchase and sale of military equipment.

(5) Mr. Schuman emphasised the view of his Government that it was essential to introduce permanent financial arrangements as soon as possible as in the absence of such arrangements it would be difficult, if not impossible, for countries to meet the full requirements under the Medium Term Defence Plan.

13. The Council received the Report of the Council Deputies (Document C5 - D/2) on the understanding that they would be free to discuss at a later stage points arising from the report which affected subsequent items on the Agenda.

IV. Item 4: Questions Affecting the Defence of Western Europe

14. D. Stikker drew attention to a report of August 18, 1950, which had been forwarded by the Western European Regional Planning Group to the Standing Group of the Military Committee recommending withdrawal to Rhine-Yssel defence line in the event of aggression in Western Europe. A decision to defend this line would necessitate the evacuation of two and a half million inhabitants from the northern provinces of the Netherlands and of a further million residing east of this line. This withdrawal would also involve evacuations from Germany. In his view a plan to defend this small area, swollen with refugees, was completely unrealistic. The effect on the morale in the Netherlands would be disastrous if such a plan were adopted and when high morale was indispensable for a successful defence. In his view it was essential to establish a defence line as far to the east as possible. This would necessitate more divisions and more equipment than were now available. To provide these there appeared to be two alternatives: (1) the transfer to Western Europe of divisions from the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada or (2) German participation in the defence of the West. He felt that, inasmuch as the Defence Ministers would discuss this report when they meet next month, they should have guidance from the Council on the major political issues involved.

15. Mr. Bevin recalled that the plan in question had been based on estimates of the military and financial resources available at the time it was drawn up. Recent changes, such as the lengthening of military service in Great Britain and the decision of the President of the United States to increase the size of the United States forces in Germany, would doubtless lead to a reconsideration of strategic plans. He emphasized that it was far better to use the maximum strength of the West to avoid being overrun, rather than be faced with the problem of liberating conquered territory.

16. M. Schuman supported the views expressed by D. Stikker. From the time of signing the North Atlantic Treaty, France had been in favour of an effective defence of the West, which would prevent the catastrophe of occupation. The NAT countries were fully conscious of the gap in their combined defences and it was this knowledge which had led to the adoption of the recent measures to increase their efficiency. These measures, however, were still in the planning stage and until the defence programmes were implemented the West would continue to face a serious threat. He expressed his pleasure at the decision of the President of the United States to send increased forces to Germany, but he had reservations regarding the arming of Germany. Other considerations apart he doubted whether the rearming of Germany would, in effect, result in increasing the total resources available for defence. This equipment would have to be drawn from existing resources available to

the NAT countries. To raise and equip German forces at the expense of the forces of the NAT countries would be unacceptable.

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17. The Chairman said that in his view it was not a question of a choice between the two alternatives mentioned by the Representative of the Netherlands. In order to defend the West effectively both solutions would have to be adopted: Troops would have to be sent to Germany from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and steps must be taken simultaneously to rearm Germany. He felt that there were two ways of going about the drawing up of strategic plans: either the Council could inform the Defence Committee that a certain quantity of manpower and equipment was available, leaving the military experts to decide how large an area could be defended; or it could inform the Defence Committee that, for political reasons, a given area must be defended. In the latter case it would be up to the Council to obtain the necessary men and equipment to meet the requirements for such defence as calculated by the military experts.

18. It was agreed that the Council would reconvene at 3.00 p.m.

New York

15th September, 1950