

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE

N° 361

COPY

index
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
22nd January, 1963

NATO SECRET
SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(63)2

Summary record of a meeting of the Council,
held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe,
on Wednesday, 16th January, 1963 at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. D.U. Stikker

BELGIUM

Mr. A. de Staercke

CANADA

Mr. G. Ignatieff

DENMARK

Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen

FRANCE

Mr. François Seydoux

GERMANY

Mr. U. Sahn

GREECE

Mr. Christian X. Palamas

ICELAND

Mr. P. Thorsteinsson

ITALY

Mr. A. Alessandrini

LUXEMBOURG

Mr. P. Reuter

NETHERLANDS

Mr. H. Scheltema

NORWAY

Mr. J. Boyesen

PORTUGAL

Mr. V. da Cunha

TURKEY

Mr. Pertev Subaşı

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

UNITED STATES

Mr. E. Durbrow

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General -
Assistant Secretary General
for Economics and Finance:

Mr. F.D. Gregh

Assistant Secretary General
for Political Affairs:

Mr. R.W.J. Hooper

Assistant Secretary General
for Production, Logistics
and Infrastructure:

Mr. Johnson Garrett

Executive Secretary:

The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative: Général de Corps d'Armée J.M. Guérin

NATO SECRET

CONTENTS

<u>Item</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Paragraph Nos.</u>
I.	Financing of activities of the Industrial Security Section for NATO Production and Logistics Organizations (NFLOs)	1 - 8
II.	Report by the Armaments Committee on V/STOL Medium Range Transport Aircraft (NBMR-4)	9 - 10
III.	"Cabal" - Draft revised security arrangements for handling certain nuclear information	11 - 14
IV.	Eighth World Youth Festival, Helsinki, 1962	15 - 18
V.	Statement by the French Representative on the zone of application of the North Atlantic Treaty following on the independence of Algeria	19 - 35
VI.	Recent East-West contacts	36 - 42
VII.	United States proposal to meet with Mr. E. Martin, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs	43 - 44
VIII.	Possible participation of CENTO officials in SHAPEX 63	45 - 60
IX.	Discussion of Nassau proposals	61 - 64

6
[It was agreed, as suggested in RDC/63/18, to postpone until the next meeting discussion on the first three items of the Agenda, i.e. the 20th, 21st and 22nd Reports of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts.]

NATO RESTRICTED

I. FINANCING OF ACTIVITIES OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY SECTION FOR NATO PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS ORGANIZATIONS (NPLOs)

Reference: C-R(62)65, Item IV
Document : C-M(62)147 ✓

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he understood that, when a month earlier the Council had discussed the question of financing the activities of the Industrial Security Section of the Security Bureau, three delegations (Canada, France and the United Kingdom) had not felt able to accept the view of the majority, i.e. support for the financing of the posts concerned under the normal Civil Budget formula. These delegations had undertaken to reconsider this matter. He asked if they were now prepared to accept the majority view that the necessary funds for the Industrial Security Section of the Security Bureau should be provided on the basis of the normal Civil Budget formula.

2. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE was instructed to say that after reconsideration his authorities were still of the opinion that, as a matter of principle, since the activities of this Section of the Security Bureau were related to the work of the NPLOs, their expenses should be reimbursed by the NPLOs.

3. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that his instructions were the same. His authorities considered that this formula was more appropriate in that it respected the autonomous nature of the Agencies.

4. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE also reaffirmed this view.

5. The CHAIRMAN noted that the problem accordingly arose of the action to be taken on this question. He reminded the Council that, nine months before, they had agreed, on the basis of a recommendation by the Security Committee, that the Industrial Security Section should be established. This decision had not been implemented due to lack of agreement on the formula for financing. He doubted if it would be fruitful to invite the other nations to change their opinions, and he therefore suggested that this matter might be deferred for, say, six months. This would only be possible, of course, if the United States Government would be good enough to continue to provide and pay the two existing United States officers presently carrying out the required tasks. These they had been undertaking on the basis of the fact that the weapons being produced by the NPLOs were, at least for the present, all of United States origin. During these six months, the Budget Committee should find a generally acceptable formula.

6. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities felt very strongly that this expenditure should be borne on the NATO Civil Budget, and that the question should at long last be settled. However, as this was a matter of importance to the Alliance, his authorities could continue the present procedure for a maximum period of six months. When other countries came to participate in the production of weapons by the NPLOs the required tasks should be carried out by officers of other nationalities or at least all member countries should contribute financially through the Civil Budget.

7. The CHAIRMAN expressed appreciation of the attitude adopted by the United States.

8. The COUNCIL accordingly:

- (1) noted that the United States Government was prepared to continue for a maximum period of six months to provide and pay the two United States officers presently carrying out the tasks required of the Industrial Security Section of the Security Bureau;
- (2) requested the Civil Budget Committee during these six months to find a generally acceptable formula for the financing of these activities.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

II. REPORT BY THE ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE ON V/STOL MEDIUM RANGE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (NBMR-4)

References: C-R(62)20
C-M(62)54

Document : C-M(62)157

9. The CHAIRMAN noted that document C-M(62)157 contained a report submitted by the Armaments Committee in response to the invitation given to it by Defence Ministers in Athens in May 1962, to submit by the end of 1962 proposals for a co-ordinated development programme for V/STOL Medium Range Transport Aircraft (NBMR-4). The Council would observe from this report that despite long and arduous efforts by the Ad Hoc Mixed Working Group set up by the Armaments Committee to handle this project, it had not been found possible to reach sufficient agreement to enable a proposal for a programme, as requested by the Defence Ministers, to be submitted. This was disappointing, but in order to ensure as far as possible that the useful work that had been undertaken was not wasted, the Committee had urged national authorities and the NATO Military Authorities to continue studies on the problem of V/STOL Medium Range Transport Aircraft, and would itself periodically examine the prospects of future co-operative action in this field. The Council was asked to take note of the report by the Armaments Committee.

10. The COUNCIL:

took note of the report by the Armaments Committee on V/STOL Medium Range Transport Aircraft (NBMR-4) (C-M(62)157).

III. "CABAL" - DRAFT REVISED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR HANDLING CERTAIN NUCLEAR INFORMATION

Document: C-M(62)50(Revised) and Corrigendum

11. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at its meeting in April 1962, the Council approved a set of interim procedures for affording special security protection to certain nuclear and related information. Recently, the United States Delegation had suggested certain amendments to these procedures. These amendments had been considered by the Working Group on CABAL Procedures, who had now submitted revised security arrangements in C-M(62)50(Revised) and Corrigendum, to which the approval of the Council was sought.

12. In answer to a question by the Turkish Representative, the Chairman confirmed that the last sentence of paragraph 6 of C-M(62)50(Revised) should be interpreted not as limiting the dissemination of documents containing CABAL information to certain countries, but as limiting dissemination to a restricted number of persons in each country.

13. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he could approve the revised arrangements, though the formal procedure for the approval of his Government had not yet been implemented.

14. The COUNCIL:

approved the revised security arrangements contained in C-M(62)50(Revised) and Corrigendum.

IV. EIGHTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL, HELSINKI, 1962

Document: C-M(62)156

15. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Council had before it a report by the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (C-M(62)156) which assessed the Communist Eighth World Youth Festival held in Helsinki in August 1962, and which pointed out some of the implications for the future of these festivals. In general, the report showed that, while the Festival undoubtedly fulfilled a useful purpose for its Communist organizers, it was less successful than its predecessors in many ways. The report

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

DOWNGRADED TO N.A.T.O. UNCLASSIFIED

SEE : DNC (84) 23

N.A.T.O. NATO CONFIDENTIAL

commented that there was a large measure of agreement that Western countermeasures taken from outside the framework of the festival were effective, and it detailed some suggestions for additional Western countermeasures in the future which had been made by some Western observers. The Chairman invited comments on the report.

16. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE, supporting the comments by the Chairman, thought that NATO should continue to follow such meetings with the same interest as in the past. Obviously much depended on the location of the meeting; while it was difficult to imagine that Western countries could influence the participants in such festivals when held, say, in Moscow, it was easier to have an influence when they were held, as in 1962, in Helsinki. The present report should be used as a guideline for the future.

17. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE associated himself fully with these remarks.

18. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the Report by the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations on the Eighth World Youth Festival, Helsinki 1962 (C-M(62)156);
- (2) noted the comments by the French and United Kingdom Representatives.

NATO SECRET

V. STATEMENT BY THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ZONE OF APPLICATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY FOLLOWING ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF ALGERIA

19. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that by the vote on self-determination on 1st July, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on 3rd July, 1962, formally recognised the independence of Algeria.

20. The result was that the "Algerian departments of France" no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing.

21. It was therefore the view of the French Government that it should be noted that, as regards Algeria, the guarantees provided by Article 6 of the Treaty, as revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey, had become void. This was also the case for the guarantee concerning the territory of the former Algerian

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

DOWNGRADED TO N.A.T.O. SECRET
SEE : DNC 79/18

departments of France, set out in sub-paragraph (1) of Article 6 as revised by the above Protocol; and it was also the case for the guarantee accorded, in relation to the above territory, to the forces of member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty (sub-paragraph (2) of Article 6).

22. The CHAIRMAN said that the Council would no doubt wish to consider the French Representative's statement further. He was advised, and he understood that this was also the opinion of the French legal experts, that if the Council were to take note of this statement, and go formally on record as endorsing the views expressed on behalf of the French government, no further formal action would be necessary to take account of the changed status of Algeria. In particular, it would not be necessary to modify Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, or to add a protocol to it, both of which might involve procedural or political difficulties. In due course, appropriate publicity would have to be given to the Council's decision: and he would suggest that in future editions of the Treaty, a footnote should be appended to Article 6 recalling the French statement and the Council's decision. He thought that this procedure was probably the easiest and simplest way of dealing with the problem. He understood that the Algerian Government had been consulted and agreed. However, the problem was one to which the Council had not yet given consideration. The Council might think it best to revert to it at an early meeting.

23. The changed status of Algeria of course also raised a number of complex technical and financial problems. These arose mainly in the sphere of infrastructure, though there were also certain matters of concern to the military authorities, for instance, the modification of military documents which still referred to the "Algerian departments of France". He suggested that the Council should invite the Infrastructure Committee and the military authorities to examine the problems involved in Algerian independence and to report to the Council. It was of course understood that any decision the Council might arrive at in regard to Article 6 would be without prejudice to any arrangements subsequently to be made in regard to the technical, financial and military problems to which he had referred.

24. He assumed that the French Representative and the Council generally would prefer that no publicity should be given to their discussion on this matter at the present stage.

25. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE, thanking the Chairman for his comments, with which he concurred, said that he would have preferred the Council to settle this question today, and thus put an end to a long-drawn-out affair. He had no objection to the proposal that the French and allied military authorities should study the questions of concern to the military. As regards the problems of infrastructure, it might be preferable to have the views of the military authorities before referring the question to the Infrastructure Committee.

26. All necessary steps had been taken to inform the Algerian Government of the situation. He agreed with the Chairman that it was unnecessary for the Council to take formal action other than that proposed by the Chairman. Finally, he said that his authorities saw no objection to making public the fact that he had made the statement recorded above.

27. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he could approve the proposal by the Chairman.

28. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that at present he must reserve his Government's position. He thought it probable that his Government would agree to the proposal by the Chairman, but further reflection was required on a number of problems, including that of publicity, which he thought it preferable to handle in the lowest key.

29. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE also reserved his position.

30. In answer to a question by the Belgian Representative on the nature of the public statement envisaged after Council endorsement of the French statement, the CHAIRMAN repeated his suggestion that there should be no publicity at this stage. He proposed to study with the French Representative how the final Council decision should be made public. He hoped that the Council might be in a position to endorse the French statement at its next meeting, without prejudice to the military and infrastructure studies to be undertaken. He agreed with the French Representative that the Infrastructure Committee should obtain the advice of the military authorities, but he thought that the Committee should first begin its study of the infrastructure problems involved, and then ask for military advice.

31. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE was strongly of the opinion that the Infrastructure Committee should not begin its study until it had received the views of the military authorities.

32. The CHAIRMAN suggested that he should look into this matter further. He thought it would be desirable for the Infrastructure Committee to indicate the nature and extent of the infrastructure problem.

33. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE agreed that it was essential that the Council be informed of the implications in the field of infrastructure.

34. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities felt strongly that NATO should not incur any more expenditure on infrastructure in Algeria.

35. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the statement by the French Representative and of the statements made in discussion;
- (2) agreed that it would be desirable to aim at a final Council decision on this question at the next meeting;
- (3) noted that the Chairman would circulate his suggestions as to the action to be taken by the Council at their next meeting (vide PO/63/27).

~~NATO SECRET~~
N.A.T.O. UNCLASSIFIED

VI. RECENT EAST-WEST CONTACTS

36. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE commented on the talks which had taken place in Washington on 9th and 10th January between President Kennedy, Mr. Rusk and Mr. Kuznetsov. No new ground had been covered, and the issues raised had been discussed only in general terms. Mr. Kuznetsov, speaking on instructions, had emphasised the necessity to improve United States-USSR relations, and said that now that the Cuban question was settled one could move on to the questions of a German peace treaty and disarmament. There was mention of a nuclear test ban treaty. Mr. Kuznetsov had invited the United States to make new proposals on the German problem.

37. A telegram just received from Washington stated that it appeared that the Soviets were spreading a story that agreement had been reached on the problem of nuclear tests and the proposed presence of Western troops in Berlin under a United Nations flag. This was a Soviet fabrication intended to cause difficulties between the United States and the allies. There had been no discussion during these talks of the German problem, and Berlin had only been referred to briefly by Mr. Kuznetsov along standard Soviet lines. The last significant United States-USSR talks on Germany and Berlin had taken place on 18th October, 1962, between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko.

38. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE made a statement commenting on (a) the letter from Mr. Khrushchev to Dr. Adenauer of 24th December, 1962; and (b) the present status of talks between the Head of the Federal Republic's "Trenhandstelle für den Interzonenhandel" Trusteeship Office for Interzonal Trade in West Berlin and representatives of the Soviet zone régime on certain problems of interzonal trade.

39. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, welcoming the statements by the United States and German Representatives, suggested that in view of the recent speeches made by Communist leaders in East Germany it might be useful for the Council to have a general discussion on East-West relations at its next meeting.

N.A.T.O. UNCLASSIFIED

NATO SECRET

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

DOWNGRADED TO N.A.T.O. UNCLASSIFIED

SEE : DMC 79/18

40. In answer to a question by the Belgian Representative as to what was Mr. Rusk's reply to Mr. Kuznetsov's request for new United States proposals on Berlin, the United States Representative said that he did not know of any new proposals having been made to the Soviets. It was most unlikely that any new proposals had been made, since the last substantive discussions had taken place on 18th October.

41. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported the proposal by the Belgian Representative for a general discussion at the next meeting.

42. The COUNCIL:

agreed to have a general discussion on East-West relations at its meeting on Wednesday, 23rd January, 1963.

N.A.T.O. CONFIDENTIAL

VII. UNITED STATES PROPOSAL TO MEET WITH MR. E. MARTIN, UNITED STATES ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR LATIN-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

43. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, referring to Mr. Rusk's statements at the recent Ministerial Meeting on the importance of widening and deepening political consultation, invited the members of the Council, and governments, to make known their views on methods for improving techniques of political consultation in NATO; and said that the United States would later have some proposals to make. Mr. E. Martin, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs, would be in Europe in February, and would be available to meet the Council for a discussion on either Saturday, 23rd, or the morning of Monday, 25th February. The United States hoped that other countries would send similar high-ranking officials concerned with Latin-American questions. Such a meeting might serve as a trial run for the type of informal political consultation envisaged by his government. He invited comments for the next meeting of the Council.

44. The COUNCIL:

agreed that Permanent Representatives should obtain instructions for the next meeting.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

VIII. POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION OF CENTO OFFICIALS IN SHAPEX 63

45. The CHAIRMAN said that the Council would recall its endorsement of the general principle that there should be closer political and military liaison with the other regional defence organizations, and of the various agreements concluded with those organizations on this subject. In 1962 the suggestion had been

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

DOWNGRAD TO M.A.I.C. UNCLASSIFIED

SEE : DNC 79/18

made that CENTO representatives - who would probably be the Secretary General, his Deputy and the five Military Deputies - the senior national military representatives of the five CENTO Powers - should be invited by SACEUR to attend SHAPEX 63 as observers. This suggestion had been favourably received by General Norstad and subsequently by General Lemnitzer. In the course of informal contacts between SHAPE and CENTO the latter had made it clear that they would welcome such an invitation if it were issued.

46. SHAPEX was of course a SHAPE project, and it was for the Supreme Commander to conduct it, within limits, as he thought best. However, as there were political implications to this proposal, he, the Chairman, had discussed the matter with General Lemnitzer. He had said that while he did not himself object to the proposal, he thought that the Council ought to be consulted in view of the political considerations involved and also because the presence of CENTO representatives at SHAPEX would almost certainly become known. He had also pointed out that if CENTO representatives were present, he would not be able to give the same sort of speech as at past exercises. It would therefore be necessary either for him to cut down what he said very considerably - in particular, he would not be able to discuss nuclear intelligence or anything higher than Confidential information - or to exclude the CENTO observers from that part of the proceedings. He understood SACEUR proposed the latter solution, i.e. to invite the CENTO observers for the two middle days only.

47. He would be grateful for the Council's views on this proposal.

48. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he was instructed to give strong support to the proposal which, his authorities noted, was supported by SACEUR. It would be most valuable if in this way the sense of common interest between the alliances could be increased. In the view of his authorities there should be no question of trying to keep secret the presence of CENTO officials at SHAPEX 63 in the event of their attending. He thought personally that the suggestion that CENTO officials should attend the two middle days only was a good compromise.

49. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he was without instructions. He thought that there might be two objects behind the proposed invitation, of which the first was to educate CENTO officials through certain briefings. He thought that this object could be achieved by a visit of CENTO officials before or after SHAPEX, and not necessarily during it. The second object might be a prestige one, i.e. in the interests of CENTO. If this latter reason were the decisive one, he asked whether this was also the view of SACEUR; he also asked whether there were any other reasons in favour of the proposed invitation.

50. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE was in full agreement with the comments by the Chairman. Obviously the problem was not the same for those countries who were members of CENTO and those who were not. The nature of SHAPEX would be influenced if there was CENTO participation; the Council should therefore reflect on this proposal.

51. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that SHAPEX was not an official NATO exercise, and that the attendance of Permanent Representatives was entirely at their own choice. He thought that the great value of SHAPEX was that it should be kept unofficial. It was organized by SACEUR, and SACEUR might surely choose whom he invited to attend, provided of course he respected security requirements.

52. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE, speaking personally, warmly supported the proposed invitation to CENTO, and thought that his Government would also support it. If certain conditions were to be attached to the invitation, for example, attendance on certain days only, he hoped that care would be taken in not offending CENTO susceptibilities.

53. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that CENTO participation would be particularly useful, but pointed out that in view of the political implications he must consult his Government.

54. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that he must also reserve his position on this question because of the political implications. Such an invitation might suggest that there were close organizational links between NATO and CENTO and the problem of publicity would be a delicate one.

55. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked how this proposed invitation would fit in with the Council's decisions regarding very cautious exchanges of information with CENTO and SEATO. Given the very sensitive nature of the political problems discussed in SHAPEX, he thought the proposal called for further reflection. He noted that the problem was now a delicate one since it had already been discussed with CENTO.

56. The CHAIRMAN thought that it was generally agreed that the closest possible contacts should be maintained with CENTO; in certain fields, for example, civil defence, NATO could give considerable help to CENTO. As regards the security aspect, he recalled that in PO/59/510 it was clearly understood that any exchange of documents with CENTO should not go beyond Confidential information. He thought that the proposal that the CENTO Representatives should attend for only two days, i.e. that they would not be present either for his opening statement or for the discussion of nuclear matters on the fourth day, would meet the security requirements. He personally was strongly in favour of the maximum possible contacts with CENTO. He suggested that the Council resume discussion at the next meeting.

57. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE repeated that he personally welcomed the "two-days' attendance" compromise, which would provide a method of associating CENTO with SHAPEX without running into difficulties. The United Kingdom believed it was politically desirable to show the links between NATO and CENTO, but the over-riding reason in favour of the invitation was to educate CENTO as far as possible in the concept that the defence of the Western world was indivisible.

58. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he thought his authorities would give sympathetic consideration to the compromise proposed by the Chairman.

59. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE thought that from the military point of view such contacts would be useful.

60. The COUNCIL:

agreed to obtain instructions for the meeting on Wednesday, 23rd January, 1963.

NATO SECRET

IX. DISCUSSION OF NASSAU PROPOSALS

Reference: PO/63/25

61. The CHAIRMAN said that he had been informed that one delegation wished to postpone the meeting arranged for Friday, 18th January, 1963. He accordingly suggested that this meeting should be held on Wednesday, 23rd January; in addition to discussing procedural questions, the Council might also have a general discussion on future NATO policy regarding East-West relations, as already suggested by the Belgian Representative under Item VI above.

62. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, regretting this postponement, emphasised that his Government was anxious that the Council should begin its deliberations on the Nassau proposals as soon as possible. As previously indicated, his authorities were preparing a list of questions for discussion by the Council.

63. The CHAIRMAN hoped that this list of questions would be available very shortly.

64. The COUNCIL:

agreed to discuss the Nassau proposals as suggested by the Chairman at the meeting on Wednesday, 23rd January, 1963.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIIe.

NATO SECRET

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE