

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
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EXEMPLAIRE N° 374
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SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(56)46

Summary Record of a restricted meeting of the Council
held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Tuesday,
14th August, 1956, at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Baron A. Bentinck

Mr. A. de Staercke	(Belgium)	Mr. N. Hommel	(Luxembourg)
Mr. L.D. Wilgress	(Canada)	Mr. M.F. Vigeveno	(Netherlands)
Mr. S. Sandager Jeppesen	(Denmark)	Mr. J.G. Raeder	(Norway)
Mr. J. Le Roy	(France)	Mr. A. Martins	(Portugal)
Mr. F. Krapf	(Germany)	Mr. Z. Kunalp	(Turkey)
Mr. D.M. Nicolareizis	(Greece)	Sir Christopher Steel	(United Kingdom)
Mr. M. Pinna-Caboni	(Italy)	Mr. E.M. Martin	(United States)

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. J. Murray Mitchell	(Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics)
Mr. J. Cahen Salvador	(Acting Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs)
Mr. J. Orme	(Acting Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance)
Mr. J.K. Starnes	(Acting Executive Secretary)

ALSO PRESENT

General G.M. de Chassey (Standing Group Representative)

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I. NATO MILITARY PLANNING

Documents: PO/56/791
STAND 1564

For the record of the discussion on this item, see Cosmic Top Secret Annex to this Record.

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II. UNITED NATIONS REFUGEES FUND

Document: C-M(56)94

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that it had been agreed to discuss this item at the present meeting at least in a preliminary manner before September, which promised to be a very busy month. The Council would note that document C-M(56)94 had also been referred to the Committee of Three Ministers.

2. The Council might first wish to consider whether it was appropriate for NATO to concern itself with a matter of which another international organization is seized. If the answer to this question was in the affirmative, the Council might then examine how best to tackle the problem further. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had pointed out that about 80% of the money to be made available to UNREF in 1956 would come from NATO countries. It seemed clear that, as the High Commissioner suggested, the continuation of the refugee problem was a threat to "the stability and wellbeing" referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty. Examination of this problem would give NATO an opportunity of eliminating a potentially dangerous situation in an important NATO area, of implementing Article 2 in a practical manner, and thereby of gaining some kudos at a time when the Organization needs it. He asked the members of the Council for their views.

3. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE saw no objection to discussing this matter in NATO, despite the fact that another international organization was seized of the problem. His Government took the greatest interest in refugee questions. They considered that it would be useful if the Council could urge governments to comply with the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner, and, if appropriate, to take some joint action to solve the question.

4. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE supported the Norwegian Representative, and said that he would welcome a discussion in the Council of the United Nations High Commissioner's memorandum.

5. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE, while agreeing that this was a problem to which a solution must be found, doubted whether it would be appropriate for NATO to take any action on a matter which was the direct concern of another international body. The Council might choose to discuss the problem, but he was not sure that any joint NATO action should be taken. As far as the United Kingdom was concerned, his Government had promised to contribute £100,000 to the United Nations Refugee Fund. Of this sum £80,000 had already been contributed, and the remaining £20,000 would be paid when the total contributions of United Nations member countries, including the United Kingdom, had reached \$3.25 million.

6. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE thought that it would be useful for the Council to discuss the problem. To date the United States Government has contributed \$1.2 million towards UNREF and for the 18 months period ending July 1957, the United States Congress has appropriated \$1.9 million on the basis that this does not exceed one third of total governmental contributions made to the Central Fund plus indirect contributions made by countries which accept aged and sick refugees in their territory for permanent care and maintenance. His Government was most anxious, therefore, that other governments should make their financial contributions so that the United States appropriation can be fully utilised.

7. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Council were in favour of discussing the problem. He pointed out that any practical solution, however, must depend upon the availability of funds. He suggested that the question should be placed on the Council's agenda for one of its meetings in September. Meanwhile, delegations might consult their governments on the possibility of making further funds available to UNREF.

8. The COUNCIL:

approved the proposal by the Chairman.

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III. WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE AREA OF NATO COMMAND TO WHICH THEY ARE ASSIGNED OR EARMARKED

Previous reference: C-R(56)44

9. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at their meeting on 3rd August the Council had invited the Standing Group Representative to request the military authorities to furnish, as soon as possible, the assessment called for in paragraph 8(c) of document C-M(55)82(Final). He asked the Standing Group Representative whether he would like to make a statement.

10. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE reported the Standing Group's views as follows:

"At the time of the United Kingdom Representative's report to the Council, the forces withdrawn from NATO consisted only of earmarked forces stationed in the United Kingdom. Certain ground units at that time in Germany, and assigned to SACEUR, were reported as being likely to be withdrawn. The units are of the support unit type. Certain ground units at that time in Germany were also reported as possibly being required. Although the withdrawal of all the above units would involve additional risks if NATO emergency defence plans had to be implemented, the numbers involved are not large but include certain units which play an important rôle. SACEUR has reported that he intends to adhere to his present plans unless the absence of these units should become prolonged.

"In view of the above, therefore, no immediate effect on the emergency defence plans of Allied Command Europe is caused by the reported United Kingdom redeployments, but if the plans have to be implemented this would involve acceptance of additional risks.

The naval forces involved in these United Kingdom redeployments represent a significant reduction in SACLANT's capability to implement his D-Day plans in support of the M.C.48 concept, as well as his anti-submarine campaign.

"Any further moves or prolonged absences of certain units may cause this report to be altered."

11. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that in view of the present situation in the Middle East, his Government had been forced to envisage the possibility of moving certain forces which would affect the situation in NATO Central European Command. SACEUR had been informed of this situation, which, he emphasised, was as yet only a possibility. Two categories of forces were concerned:

- (a) forces at present in Algeria;
- (b) forces at present stationed either in France or in Germany.

He understood that the military authorities would provide the Council with a military appraisal of the repercussions of these possible withdrawals. Should circumstances change at a later date, the French Government would do everything in its power to restore the situation. In conclusion, he said that he was reporting this information to the Council in accordance with the requirements laid down in document C-M(55)82(Final).

12. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that as in the case of the United Kingdom redeployments, the Standing Group would provide an appraisal of these possible French redeployments.

13. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the statement by the French Representative;
- (2) noted that the Standing Group would provide the Council with the assessment called for in paragraph 8(c) of document C-M(55)82(Final).

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IV. FUTURE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMMES

Previous reference: C-R(56)43

(a) Consideration of a note by the German Delegation

14. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the Council to a note by the German Delegation concerning infrastructure, which he had received the night before and which had been circulated to members of the Council at the beginning of the meeting. The note, he said, made clear that the German Government accepts the proposals outlined in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) of document C-R(56)43. It contained certain observations which lent precision to the proposals and which, when taken together, did not change the German Government's acceptance of them. The text of the note was as follows:

"The Government of the Federal Republic is prepared to provide, as proposed by the United Kingdom Representative /document C-R(56)41, paragraphs 17 1(a), (b) and (c)/, 50% of the costs of the 1956 German infrastructure programme, i.e. £19,125 million as the German contribution to the Seventh Slice, provided:

- (a) the ceiling for the future infrastructure programme is £225 million, including the balance of the 1956 German infrastructure programme, i.e. £19,125 million, and a 10% contingency fund;
- (b) the German contribution to this future infrastructure programme is assessed concurrently with the contributions of the other members by cost-sharing negotiations;
- (c) the overall contribution of the Federal Republic to the 1956 German programme and the future infrastructure programme does not exceed under any circumstances, the maximum figure of £50 million, and is reduced accordingly if the future infrastructure programme does not reach the £225 million figure."

15. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Council take note of the statement of the German Delegation. He added that as no objections had been raised by any delegation to the proposals contained in paragraph 1 of document C-R(56)43, he assumed they were now approved, and that this phase of the discussions on infrastructure was closed.

16. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE invited the Council not only to take note, but to approve the text circulated by his Delegation.

17. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could now approve the ceiling of £225 million on the understanding that this would be without prejudice to the stand which his Government might wish to take in the cost-sharing negotiations.

18. The COUNCIL:

- (1) approved the note by the German Delegation contained in paragraph 14 above; and
- (2) gave final approval to paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) of C-R(56)43.

(b) Timetable for the presentation of Slice Eight

19. In answer to a question by the United Kingdom Representative, the STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that he thought there would be less delay in the elaboration of the final programme this year since the preliminary work had been carried out in greater detail than usual by the Commands.

20. The CONTROLLER for INFRASTRUCTURE said that the Infrastructure Committee did not normally make final recommendations until the proposals of the Standing Group and the Military Committee were available. He said that according to the present timetable, the Standing Group and the different countries should have the major Military Commands' recommendations of the programme in their hands by September.

V. MARCINELLE MINE DISASTER

21. The CHAIRMAN said that he was sure that the members of the Council were as distressed as he was to hear of the mine disaster at Marcinelle in Belgium. He had sent the following telegram to Mr. Spaak in the name of the Council:

"Deeply moved by the tragedy which has taken place at Marcinelle, the North Atlantic Council requests me to convey to you and to your Government their profound sympathy on the occasion of the grievous loss which has befallen the people of Belgium".

22. He thought that the Council would likewise wish to convey their sympathy to the people of Italy, who had also suffered in this tragedy.

23. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed the thanks of his Government to the Council for their sympathy. He joined with the Chairman in conveying his sympathy to the people of Italy.

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VI. RECTO-VERSO PRINTING

24. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Management Survey Team had drawn attention in their Report to the economies which would be realised by the Organization if documents were printed on both sides of the page (recto-verso). These economies were estimated roughly at 20 tons of paper per year representing about 2 million francs. Furthermore, if certain additional equipment were purchased, printing on both sides could be carried out in one simple operation, thus producing substantial economies in man-hours. As members of the Council would have noted, the Summary Record of the last meeting of the Council (C-R(56)45) had been printed in this manner. He asked whether the Council wished this experiment to be continued.

25. After a brief discussion, the COUNCIL:

agreed that Summary Records of the Council's meetings should be printed on both sides, the desirability of continuing the practice and of printing other documents on both sides to be considered in two or three months time after further experience of using papers cast in this form.

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VII. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR ALL-EUROPEAN AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

26. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE referred to a Russian proposal which had been made recently in ECE for an all-European agreement on economic co-operation, first mooted at the 11th Plenary Session of the Economic Commission for Europe in April this year. In their statement, the Soviet Government advocated the convening of a conference of European countries to discuss setting up an all-European regional organization for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The United Kingdom Representative said that his authorities considered that this matter should be discussed in NATO as well as in OEEC, as clearly the proposal had been put forward by the Soviet Government as much for political as for economic reasons.

27. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his instructions made it possible for him warmly to support the United Kingdom proposal.

28. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE suggested that when the actual document containing the Soviet proposal had been received, it might be circulated to delegations and the item placed on the agenda for discussion at a private session early in September.

29. The COUNCIL:

approved the proposal by the United Kingdom Representative.

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VIII. QUESTIONNAIRE SENT OUT BY THE COMMITTEE OF THREE MINISTERS

30. The COUNCIL:

noted a request by the Chairman that replies to the Questionnaire sent out by the Committee of Three Ministers be submitted, in 35 copies, by 20th August.

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IX. FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL

31. It was agreed that the next meeting would take place on Wednesday, 5th September, 1956, at 10.15 a.m.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.