NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

to the

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

on

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENSE

OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

Reference: M.C. 3

The enclosed report by the Standing Group is a revision of M.C. 3, amended in the light of comments received from members of the Military Committee. It is circulated for consideration by the North Atlantic Military Committee.

C.H. DONNELLY

Colonel, USA,

Secretary, pro tem
ENCLOSURE “A”

REPORT FROM THE STANDING GROUP

TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

on

RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN THE OVER-ALL CONCEPT

1. A broad concept was prepared by the Standing Group in accordance with instructions and was transmitted to the members of the Military Committee for their consideration on or about 19 October 1949. Comments on the over-all concept have been received and have been analyzed in detail by the Standing Group with a view to reconciling differences. The recommendations of the Standing Group on the changes considered necessary to meet in so far as possible the views of all nations are indicated in the amended version of the concept (attached as Appendix).

2. The Standing Group recommends that the Military Committee agree to the revised version of the concept (Appendix) and transmit same to the Defense Committee for approval.
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE “A”

REVISED STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENSE
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

I
PREAMBLE

1. The attainment of the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty requires the integration by the parties to the Treaty of those political, economic, and psychological, as well as purely military means, which are essential to the defense of the North Atlantic area. Of particular significance is the requirement that the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty be accomplished in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The parties to the Atlantic Treaty have declared:

“They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”

“They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area.”

“They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security”.

2. For the purpose of, first, preventing war, and, second, insuring in the event of war the effective application of the military and industrial strength of the Treaty nations in a common defense, the military means available to the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty must be effectively coordinated. As a basis for such coordination a common strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic area must serve as the
keystone for the plans of the Military Committee and the Regional Planning Groups. It is the purpose of this document to outline a broad concept for the over-all defense of the North Atlantic area.

3. This broad concept is built on considerations of geographical position, industrial capacity, population, and the military capabilities of the Treaty nations. The objective is adequate military strength accompanied by economy of effort, resources and manpower. *It is desirable that each nation develop its military strength to the maximum extent consistent with over-all strategic plans in order to provide for its own defense and to participate in the common defense.*

4. This concept is the initial step in the initiation of realistic, vital and productive defense planning aimed at securing peace and lessening the possibility of aggression. It is aimed at providing the basic strategic guidance needed by the regional planning groups in order to assure coordinated planning in consonance with the principles set forth in Title II below. The measures required to implement this concept will require constant review.

II

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY DEFENSE PRINCIPLES**

5. Certain general principles are recognized as underlying the North Atlantic Treaty defensive organizations. These principles are accepted as fundamental to the successful functioning of the organization and the development of a common defense program. As such, those applicable to defense planning are set out in the following paragraphs as an integral part of the basic guidance for regional planning groups.
a. The main principle is common action in defense against armed attack through self-help and mutual aid. The immediate objective is the achievement of arrangements for collective self-defense among the Atlantic Treaty nations.

b. In accordance with the general objective of Articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, each nation will contribute, with the least possible delay and in the most effective form, consistent with its situation, responsibilities and resources, such aid as can reasonably be expected of it.

c. The military strength of the participating nations should be developed without endangering economic recovery and the attainment of economic stability, which constitute an essential element of their security.

d. The armed forces of those nations so located as to permit mutual support in the event of aggression should be developed on a coordinated basis in order that they can operate most economically and efficiently in accordance with a common strategic plan.

e. A successful defense of the North Atlantic Treaty nations through maximum efficiency of their armed forces, with the minimum necessary expenditures of manpower, money and materials, is the goal of defense planning.

f. A basic principle of North Atlantic Treaty planning should be that each nation should undertake the task, or tasks, for which it is best suited. Certain nations, because of their geographic location or because of their capabilities, will be prepared to undertake appropriate specific missions.

III

OBJECTIVES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY DEFENSIVE CONCEPT

6. The purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty defensive organization is to unite the strength of the North Atlantic
Treaty nations in order to promote the preservation of peace and to provide for the security of the North Atlantic area.

The general objectives of the defensive concept are:

a. To coordinate, in time of peace, our military and economic strength with a view to creating a powerful deterrent to any nation or group of nations threatening the peace, independence and stability of the North Atlantic family of nations.

b. To develop plans, for use in the event of war, which will provide for the combined employment of military forces available to the North Atlantic nations to counter enemy threats, to defend and maintain the peoples and home territories of the North Atlantic Treaty nations and the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

IV

MILITARY MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT DEFENSE CONCEPT

Basic Undertakings

7. Over-all defense plans must provide in advance of war emergency, specifically for the following basic undertakings in furtherance of the common objective to defend the North Atlantic area. The successful conduct of these undertakings should be assured by close coordination of military action as set forth in over-all plans.

a. Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing including the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb. This is primarily a U.S. responsibility assisted as practicable by other nations.

b. Arrest and counter as soon as practicable the enemy offensives against North Atlantic Treaty powers by all means available, including air, naval, land and psychological operations. Initially, the hard core of ground forces will come from the European nations. Other nations will give aid with the least possible delay and in accordance with over-all plans.
c. Neutralize as soon as practicable enemy air operations against North Atlantic Treaty powers. In this undertaking the European nations should initially provide the bulk of the tactical air support and air defense, other nations aiding with the least possible delay in accordance with over-all plans.

d. Secure and control sea and air lines of communication, and ports and harbors, essential to the implementation of common defense plans. The defense and control of sea and air LOC’s will be performed through common cooperation in accordance with each nation’s capabilities and agreed responsibilities. In this regard it is recognized that the United States and United Kingdom will be primarily responsible for the organization and control of ocean lines of communication. Other nations will secure and maintain their own harbor defenses and coastal LOC’s and participate in the organization and control of vital LOC’s to their territories as may be indicated in over-all plans.

e. Secure, maintain and defend such main support areas, air bases, naval bases and other facilities as are essential to the successful accomplishment of the basic undertaking. These undertakings will be a responsibility of the nations having sovereignty over these essential bases, areas and facilities, aided as necessary and to the extent set forth in collective defense plans.

f. Mobilize and expand the over-all power of the Treaty nations in accordance with their planned contribution to later offensive operations designed to maintain security of the North Atlantic Treaty area.
it is recognized that certain cooperative measures must be undertaken in advance. These measures are:

a. Standardization, insofar as practicable, of military doctrines and procedures.

b. Conduct of combined training exercises, when deemed desirable.

c. Compilation and exchange of intelligence information and data peculiar to the conduct of contemplated Atlantic Treaty Organization defense planning and operations resulting therefrom.

d. Cooperation in the construction, maintenance, and operation of military installations of mutual concern.

e. Standardization of maintenance, repair, and service facilities which will be of mutual concern in the event contemplated defense plans have to be implemented.

f. Standardization, insofar as practicable, of military material and equipment for use in operations as developed by common defense plans.

g. Collective cooperation in arranging for military operating rights, in peacetime, in furtherance of common defense requirements.

h. Cooperation, # within the legal limitations and administrative restrictions of each country, in research and development of new weapons and in the development of new methods of warfare.

i. Cooperation, insofar as is practicable, in the conduct of psychological and “cold” war operations.

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* changes recommended but, after consideration, not accepted by the Standing Group.

# Note change through deletion of a phrase
ENCLOSURE “B”

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE OVER-ALL CONCEPT

The following specific changes, by paragraph, were received from the nation indicated in each instance:

1. Paragraph 1: None

2. Paragraph 2: None

3. Paragraph 3, last sentence:
   France: Change to read: “It is desirable that each nation be capable of participating in the common defense, of developing its military effort to the maximum effort possible, consistent with an over-all strategic plan designed to implement an efficient common defense.”

4. Paragraph 4: None.

5. Paragraph 5b:
   Belgium and Norway: A general comment indicating in essence that paragraph 5a set up both the principles of self-help and mutual aid, and, subsequently, the principle of self-help was emphasized in paragraphs 5c and 5d, whereas no further attention was given to the mutual aid consideration.

6. Paragraph 5f:
   a. France: Change to read: “A basic principle of North Atlantic Treaty planning should be that each nation shall participate in the common defense by undertaking the tasks for which it is best suited. Certain nations, because of their geographic location or because of their capabilities, will emphasize appropriate specific missions.”
   b. Denmark: Change to read: “A basic principle of North Atlantic Treaty planning should be that each nation should undertake the tasks, or tasks, for which it is best suited. Certain nations, because of their geographic location or because of their capabilities, will be prepared to emphasize appropriate specific missions.”
7. Paragraph 6: None

8. Paragraph 7a, first sentence:
   Denmark: Change to read: “Insure our ability to carry out strategic bombing.”

9. Paragraph 7b, last sentence:
   France: Change to read: “The hard core of initial ground forces in being will come from the European nations aided with the least possible delay by other nations in view of an efficient common defense.”

10. Paragraph 7c, last sentence:
    France: Change to read: “In this undertaking the European nations should provide the bulk of initial tactical air support and air defense in being, other nations aiding with the least possible delay in view of an efficient common defense.”

11. Paragraph 7d, last two sentences:
    a. France: Change to read: “It is recognized that this task will be performed through a common cooperation on all oceans and seas, it being understood that the organization and control of transocean LOC’s will be primarily a responsibility of the United States and United Kingdom. Moreover, because of the urgency and importance of the participation of all her means to the European continental battle, France shall assume a predominant share of responsibility along the LOC’s by linking her African and metropolitan territories.”
    b. Netherlands: Change to read: “It is recognized that this will be primarily a responsibility of the United States and United Kingdom. Other nations will secure and maintain their own harbor defense and coastal sea lines and will assist in the maintenance of other lines of communications in accordance with their capabilities and agreed responsibilities.”
c. Denmark: Change to read: “It is recognized that the defense and control of sea and air LOC’s will be primarily a responsibility of the United States and United Kingdom. Other nations will secure and maintain their own harbor defense and coastal sea lines and will assist in the maintenance of other lines of communications as their means permit.”

12. Paragraph 7f, line 2, first word:
   Denmark: Change to read: “Treaty”.

13. Paragraph 7g (suggested addition):
   France: Add: “Insure the successful conduct of operations over-all by close coordination of military actions implementing the above objectives; these operations to support and complement each other, particularly by adapting strategic action to tactical action.”

14. Paragraph 8d:
   Denmark: Change to read: “Coordination in matters concerning construction, maintenance, and operation of military installations of mutual concern.”

15. Paragraph 8h:
   Netherlands: Change to read: “Cooperation within the legal limitations of each country, in research and development of new weapons and in the development of new methods of warfare.”

16. Paragraph 8i:
   France: Add: “Cooperation, insofar as practicable, in the conduct of psychological and cold war operations.”
"ENCLOSURE "C"

COMMENTS RECEIVED BY THE STANDING GROUP ON

THE OVERALL CONCEPT

(in Alphabetical Order)

I BELGIUM

TRANSLATION

BRUSSELS 10 November 1949
No. 145 TAF 11

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

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PERMANENT SECRETARIAT OF THE
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

to the President of the Standing
Group of the North Atlantic Treaty

I have the honor of communicating to you the general agreement of the Belgian Delegation to the Military Committee of the "broad strategic concept relative to the defense of the North Atlantic region" received as an annex to M.C. 3 of 19 October 1949.

Belgium, however, would wish that the following suggestions be examined, and, should these suggestions be adopted, that they might appear in the above mentioned documents as well as in the general directives which will subsequently be given to the regional groups as guidance for the planning purposes.

Happily, it is affirmed (5a) that common action against an armed attack will result simultaneously from the self help of each power and from mutual assistance.

Although the "self help" aspect is well brought out in Article 7(b & c), it would appear that the form under which mutual assistance will take place is not sufficiently accurate ("... aided by other nations as they can mobilize").

Does this mean, for example, in case Europe were to be initially the object of a serious attack, that she would only benefit by the help of her partners across the Atlantic in a manner which would recall that of their intervention during the last two World Wars, i.e., after a relatively long period of time, corresponding to the mobilization of their immense resources?

Is it not to be feared that this method would be too slow and should one not rather recommend the use of rapid methods? Might one not put forward the principle that for the essential objective or objectives contained within the North Atlantic region and the loss of which would lead to a long drawn-out conflict, if not a conflict of temporary issue, there should be foreseen a mechanism of quick mutual assistance?

The Air Forces are evidently the best adapted to this role. But it would be necessary that their intervention in various points of the immense North Atlantic zone be prepared by those who will put them into action as well as by those who will benefit by this assistance.

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Enclosure "C"
There is, of course, the atomic bomb. But is it absolutely certain that its employment, even its immediate employment, would render all other manner of mutual assistance useless at the beginning of the conflict? In spite of the fact that Belgium possesses very little information on this powerful weapon, she does not think that it would eliminate all other forms of immediate mutual assistance.

/s/ Lt. General Baele
Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee

(Initialled)
Philip St.G. Cocke
Maj., CAV.
Chief, E.A.A. Section
Rm 2d540 Ext. 74182
In reply please quote
No. CJS 105-2

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
Canadian Joint Staff
1700 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

14 November 1949

COMMANDER J.R. MADISON,
Secretary,
North Atlantic Military Committee,
Standing Group,

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE
North Atlantic Area
Document M.C. 3 dated 19th October, 1949

1. I have been requested to advise you as follows:

"The Canadian Chiefs of Staff consider that the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area as prepared by the Standing Group is acceptable as a paper outlining in broad terms the various political and strategic considerations.

2. Realizing that more detailed strategic guidance of a purely military nature will be issued at a later date, the Chiefs of Staff feel that considerable detail as to forms and scales of attack will have to be delineated in order to ensure that the regional plans of the various groups are based on an agreed intelligence appreciation.

3. Would you please convey the above information to the Standing Group.

/s/
(Hugh Campbell)
Air Vice Marshal
Chairman,
Canadian Joint Staff

Enclosure "C"
Major General C. Forslev
Liaison Officer for Denmark
to the Standing Group of
the Military Committee

Ref.: H2/A3e
Washington, D.C., Nov. 15, 1949

TO
THE STANDING GROUP OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

Dear Sirs:

The Danish member of the Military Committee proposes the following modifications to the strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic area (MC-3):

1) to section II, 5, f :
   It is proposed to insert the words “be prepared to” after the word “will” in the last line. The last period after this insertion will then run as follows: “Certain nations, because of their geographic location or because of their capabilities, will be prepared to emphasize appropriate specific missions”.

2) to section IV, 7, a :
   It is proposed to replace the words “deliver the atomic bomb promptly” by the words “carry out strategic bombing”. The modified period will then run as follows: “Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing”.

3) to section IV, 7, d :
   It does not seem clearly defined which “ports and harbors” are intended to be the primary responsibility of the United States and the United Kingdom. It is therefore proposed to make the following modification: delete the word “this” in the third line, and replace it by “the defense and control of sea and air lines of communication”. The second period in the paragraph concerned will then run as follows: “It is recognized that the defense and control of sea and air lines

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Enclosure “C”
of communication will be primarily a responsibility of the United States and United Kingdom’.

4) to section IV, 7, f:
   If the designation “Allied nations” is not intended to include other nations than the nations united in the North Atlantic Treaty, it is proposed to alter the designation to “Treaty nations”.

5) to section IV, 8, d:
   It is proposed to replace the expression “Cooperation in” by the expression “Coordination in matters concerning”. The modified period will then run as follows: “Coordination in matters concerning the construction, maintenance, and operation of military installations of mutual concern”.

/s/ C. Forslev
Major General
IV FRANCE

ANNEXE

Proposed Amendments to MC 3 - October 19th 1949

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**Preambula**

- Paragraph 3 - Replace last phrase by:

“It is desirable that each nation be capable, in view of its own defense and of its participation to common defense, of developing its military effort to the maximum extent possible, consistent with an over-all strategic plan designed to implement an efficient common Defense.”

**Paragraph 5 - Sub para f**

- Replace first phrase by:

“A basic principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Planning should be that each nation shall take part in the common defense in undertaking the tasks for which it is best suited.”

**Paragraph 7 - Sub para b**

- Replace final phrase by:

“The hard core of initial ground forces will come from the European Nations aided, with the least possible delay, by other nations in view of an efficient common defense”.

**Paragraph 7 - Sub para c**

- Replace last phrase by:

“In this undertaking the European nations should provide the bulk of the initial tactical air support and air defense, other nations aiding with the least possible delay, in view of an efficient common defense”.

**Paragraph 7 - Sub para D**

- Replace 2d and 3d phrases by:

“It is recognized that this task will be performed through a common cooperation on all Oceans and Seas, being understood that the organization and control of trans-ocean lines will be primarily a responsibility of the United States and the United Kingdom.

“Other nations will secure and maintain their own harbor defense and coastal sea lines and will assist in the maintenance of other lines of communications as their means permit.

Moreover, because of the urgency and importance of the participation of all her means to the European continental battle, France shall assume a predominant share of responsibility along the lines of communication linking her African and Metropolitan territories.”
Paragraph 7 - Sub para G (to be added)

Ensure the successful conduct of the general battle by a close coordination of military actions, implementing the above defined objectives; these military actions supporting and completing each other particularly by adapting strategic action to tactical action."

Paragraph 8 - Add Sub para i

“Cooperation (insofar as practicable) in the conduct of psychological and cold war operations.”

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V ITALY

AMBASCIATA D’ITALIA
Washington, D.C.
Office of the Air Attache

1946

November 16, 1949

Col. Charles H. Donnelly,
National Defense Building, Rm 2D-883,
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Col. Donnelly:

I have been informed by Rome that, generally speaking, our military representatives have no objections to interpose to the contents of the memorandum of the Standing Group relative to the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area. Details of minor importance can be discussed later by the Military Committee.

I hope you will excuse the late reply. I realize it was to have been sent in by November 15.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/
Colonel Carlo Unia
Italian Air Attache

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VI NETHERLANDS

Executive 8 November 1949
110/39/1

Reference: Suggested Changes in M.C. 3

Upon the instructions of my Government - and with reference to the informal conference which I had with Captain Beecher, U.S.N., Colonels Storke, U.S.A., Richardson, U.S.A.F., and Dougher, U.S.A., on October 31st - I have the honor to submit herewith the following proposed amendments to the Memorandum by the Standing Group to the North Atlantic Military Committee transmitting the strategic concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area (M.C. 3):

1. page 6, par. 7d, end last sentence:
   to replace the words "as their means permit" by "in accordance with their capabilities and agreed responsibilities".

2. page 7, par. 8 h:
   to omit the words: "insofar as practicable".

Yours sincerely,

/s/
Jonkheer Hendrik A. van Foreest
Rear Admiral, Royal Neth. Navy
Chairman Netherlands Joint Staff Mission
Netherlands Permanent Representative to the Standing Group

The Secretariat of
The Standing Group

Attention: Col. C.H. Donnelly

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Enclosure "C"
From: Lt.-General Bjarne Oen  
Norwegian Member of  
North Atlantic Military Committee  
NATO M.C. I  
Date: 12th November 1949

Comments on the Strategic Concept  
for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area

With reference to Memorandum by the Standing Group, M.C. 3 dated 19th October 1949, the comments by the Norwegian Member of North Atlantic Military Committee are submitted herewith.

/s/ Bjarne Oen  
(Bjarne Oen)

To: The Standing Group

Comments by the Norwegian Member of  
the Military Committee on the Strategic Concept  
for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area

A study has been made of the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area, which was prepared by the Standing Group of the Military Committee, and which was promulgated for comment under M.C. 3 dated 19th October 1949.

2. It is found that the broad principles upon which the Concept is based are acceptable, as also are the general objectives which it is designed to attain. However, while the Defence Committee and the Military Committee have directed that the "Concept shall be formulated in the light of probable threats to each region", no mention has been made of such probable threats in the prepared Concept. It is realized that an appreciation on the matter is difficult and must, perhaps, take some time. On the other hand, it is felt that the Defence Committee and the Military Committee can not avoid providing, in due time, some guidance in this respect to the regional planning groups.

3. With regard to the Military measures required to implement the Concept, it is recognized that each nation must in the first place be prepared to defend itself, and that the hard core of the ground power in being as well as the bulk of Tactical Air Support and Air Defence must evidently come from the European nations. No mention, however, has been made of the necessity for making a study of the overall forces, and resources, which will be required for the successful defence of each area.
4. This point is considered to be of great importance, since it is only upon the results of such a study that it would be possible to plan the extent of the aid which would be required by existing national forces when joint allied defence of the area were to be undertaken. It is suggested, therefore, that a clause should be added to the Concept calling attention to the need for such a study to be made.

5. Furthermore, a few points are mentioned for clarification purposes:

6. Para 5 (d). It is assumed that Norwegian Forces at present located in Germany will come within the Northern European Group for planning purposes.

7. Para 8 (a). It is assumed that practical steps to standardize military doctrines and procedures will include joint staff courses etc.

8. Para 8 (g). The necessity for operating rights in peacetime, is recognized. It should be recalled, however, that establishment of bases in Norwegian territory, manned by non-Norwegian forces, is not envisaged as long as Norway is not subject to attack or threat of attack.
M.C. 3/1
23 November 1949

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

HOLDERS OF M.C. 3/1

CORRIGENDUM

Holders of M.C. 3/1 are requested to:

a. Incorporate the attached Enclosure “C”.

b. Insert the word “specific” in the first line of the text in Enclosure “B”, between “following” and “changes”, and

c. Insert “and Norway:” after “Belgium:” in the first line of the text of paragraph 5 of Enclosure “B”.

J.R. MADISON
Commander, USN
Secretary

Corrig. to M.C. 3/1
6 February 1950

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the

HOLDERS OF M.C. 3/1

CORRIGENDUM

1. M.C. 3/1 was published and circulated on 19 November 49 and was followed by a Corrigendum, dated 23 Nov 49, which contained an Enclosure “C” giving the comments on the Strategic Concept made by the various governments. Page 19, containing comments by the Belgian government, was inadvertently omitted from this Enclosure. This oversight was corrected in Paris on 30 November by the circulation of a memorandum by the Secretary, enclosing the Belgian comments.

2. For the convenience of holders of M.C. 3/1 in completing the record, the enclosed page 19 is transmitted. This page, together with the pages 20 to 29 inclusive which were transmitted on 23 November, should be attached to M.C. 3/1. This paper will then be complete, with pages 8 to 29, inclusive.

C.H. DONNELLY
Colonel, USA
Secretary

Corrig. to M.C. 3/1