NATO HQ 30 Sep . 2005

STOPWATCH 2 , Debate 1: NATO, the African Union, the United Nations and Darfur Special interactive video forum series with Jamie Shea Multimedia Audio file .MP3/14512Kb Video forum JAMIE SHEA (Director, Policy Planning, NATO): Hello everybody, and welcome to the latest Stopwatch, here from NATO Headquarters in Brussels. I very much hope that you enjoyed the first four Stopwatches that we broadcast before the summer break. Now after the summer break I'm happy to announce that there will be another series of four Stopwatch programs, looking at topical issues on NATO's agenda. I'm Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning here at NATO, and once again it's my pleasure to act as your moderator. Today we're going to talk about NATO's relations with the United Nations and other organizations outside Europe. A very topical subject at the moment when in New York the reform of the United Nations has been on the agenda, and Heads of State and Governments of many, many countries have been attending a summit to open the UN General Assembly. Here to discuss this issue with me I have three very special guests. First of all, Eirini Lemos, who is our resident UN expert here on the NATO international staff. Eirini has just been with the NATO Secretary General attending meetings on the margins of the UN General Assembly, so she really is the ideal person to have here representing NATO. At the same time, I've very pleased to welcome Dr. Klaus Becher, Associate Director of Wilton Park in the United Kingdom. And also Professor Mats Berdal, who is at the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London. So that's our panel for today and first of all I'm going to turn to Eirini. Eirini, our viewers may find it strange that NATO is talking about relations with the United Nations. People are familiar with the fact that NATO has a dialogue with the European Union and with other Europe-based organizations such as the OSCE, but the UN, that seems very far off NATO's agenda. So is this something that's only happened recently, for example, since September 11th? EIRINI LEMOS (Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO): Oh, certainly not. I think the NATO-UN relations has of course started its... the formal link has been enshrined in our fundamental documents, but of course for all those years up until 1992 no cooperation... the cooperation was extremely limited. However, I think it's only against the background of the conflicts in Western Balkans that led to a more intensified dialogue and cooperation between the two organizations. It's more, I think the Foreign Ministers, the NATO Foreign Ministers, they stated it very clear already in 1992 and 1994, that they're ready, they're prepared to assist the UN in all its crisis management efforts, and peacekeeping operations. Even include some kind of... provide assets and capabilities. So we have a commitment and the wish of the allies to assist. The... of course our experience in the Balkans, now in Afghanistan, and very recently in Darfur, have shown that we do cooperate and there is room for more improved cooperation, but I guess that will come later. SHEA: Yeah, but let me ask you a second question. I mean, how exactly do we cooperate? Do we sort of do joint peacekeeping operations together? Is that the idea? That NATO assist blue helmets, or do we assist the UN in other forms? For example, in nation-building, reconstruction or civil administration? Where exactly does the interface lie? LEMOS: No, I mean, we don't... NATO's role is not in... as you said, in judicial reforms or... it's really in the peacekeeping area. NATO is assisting the blue... we have provided strategic airlift. We provide... we have provided Over-the-Horizon-Force in the early nineties in Bosnia... in Eastern Slovenia at that time. It's very much in where NATO's added value, which is its military capacity and military capability, where so far it's provided assistance to the United Nations. SHEA: Klaus, why would the United Nations actually need NATO's assistance, or help. I mean, after all the UN is a long-standing organization. It's even older than NATO by four years or so. It's got a lot of experience of peacekeeping and nation-building, so why would it have any interest in cooperating with an organization like this one here, NATO? KLAUS BECHER (Associate Director of Wilton Park): Well, there's always two sides to being engaged in peacekeeping and protecting international peace and security. One is the legitimacy and the other side is the ability to act. Ideally those two would come together. The UN is really the source of legitimacy in the international system, but it has in the past had very little to actually do something about it and to out-contract to individual nation states or to regional organizations as in the Balkans. And I think it's good news that now the UN is trying to get its act together in a way, led by some of the member states, but carried by a broad consensus on the challenges and what needs to be done, in order to bring those two aspects back together. And what NATO can do for the UN is really help it to build its capacities and be able to be in the lead visually and factually in the future. SHEA: Well, Klaus, you make an interesting point here, and that makes me turn to Mats. I mean, Mats, NATO today is in Afghanistan, it's been in the Balkans, as Eirini was saying, for some time already. There's talk of NATO perhaps implementing eventual peace agreements in the Middle East. We'll talk in a moment about NATO's role in Africa. If you were the Secretary General of the United Nations, which you may well be one day, would you not think that the best idea, as Klaus would say, would be to subcontract all of these peacekeeping operations out to NATO, to get out of the peacekeeping business and give that job to NATO, because obviously we have the troops and we're rather good at it? MATS BERDAL (Department of War Studies, Kings College, London): Well, I think there is certainly a recognition within the UN now, and certainly this current Secretary General Kofi Annan, that the UN is fundamentally overburdened. And we tend to forget about the... we tend to talk about the current UN crisis. We tend to forget that over the past three years the UN has taken on five new peacekeeping operations. In 2004 alone 120,000 troops rotated out of UN missions. So there is a huge issue of overstretch. There is another important development that has happened. Ten years ago most UN peacekeepers, the majority of them, tended to come from traditional troop contributor countries; developed countries. Now the overwhelming majority of UN peacekeepers come from the developing countries; Indian, Pakistan, and Bangladesh making the top. And this, although they are very often excellent and competent troops, they lack key enabling qualities, and this is where I think the Secretary General, rightly, identifies NATO as a principal organization to provide those enabling capabilities: force multipliers, logistic support and so on and so forth. But there's a real issue of growth there. I think if I could just add one things on the history of the organization... It is true, as Eirini said, it goes quite a long back in time, back in 1993. Initially, of course, it was a very rocky relationship. Many of the... those watching the program will remember the dual-key discussions during Bosnia and the Secretariat itself, I think, felt slightly burnt about the relationship in '95 and '96. That has changed, I think, quite radically. Especially as UN began to realize that these operations are much, much more difficult. They require competent forces and they require often, as you mentioned, over-horizon capability. And I think that sank in really in Iraq and the attack on the UN compound. Since then there's a much more relaxed and flexible approach on the part of the Secretariat, which is slightly different from member states. SHEA: Eirini, you've just been in New York. I mean, what Mats said about the UN having a more positive image of NATO, is that the sort of thing that you were picking up in the UN last week? LEMOS: Oh yeah, absolutely. I think the qualitative difference... what made a qualitative difference, I think is the fact that NATO has gone to assist the African Union in Darfur, a UN-mandated operation. It is very important to see, I think, that NATO has been able to move into a continent that so far as not been at all in the spectrum of NATO, and that we moved into assisting an organization to mount an operation, a very daunting operation, but we did not see it as taking over that operation. It was really assisting, based, of course, on a request. And I think that has made a big difference. And it has also opened up a perspective for further cooperation with both the UN and other regional organizations which may have the need for such assistance. SHEA: Could you maybe just tell our viewers exactly what NATO is doing today to help the African Union in Darfur, so that they understand it precisely. LEMOS: I mean, we provide... we provide the logistic support, strategic airlift to the African Union, but also we provide technical and capacity-building assistance to African Union headquarters in mounting the operation. I think it is... I think it's very important to highlight the fact that NATO now has moved into a new field, which is... BERDAL: I would just second that. I think Darfur has had an important impact. And certainly within the UN itself people think this is a welcome development. I think ten years ago they would have been much more sceptical. And it is true, in this document the UN delegates managed to produce last week there is a commitment to a ten-year work plan to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities within the AU context. And it seems to me NATO's a natural candidate (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) SHEA: But really, the question (inaudible)... If the African Union now accepts therefore NATO as a valid partner, why would NATO not have had troops on the ground in Darfur, for example, operating bases, or running supply lines, working alongside the African Union. What we're doing, of course, in transport is very significant, but could we not go further? LEMOS: Well, I mean, first of all, the reason why we wanted to go into the African Union... into Darfur, was really to assist the African Union. It was not for NATO to move into Africa. It was, I think, what Mats said before, is that to assist regional organizations to man their operations. Here, I don't think that NATO had an interest, a specific interest in going in and sending troops on the ground. It was... it's much, much more within the line of NATO's thinking to assist the country organization to meet its challenge, rather than having NATO troops on the ground at this stage. SHEA: Klaus, do you think that this aspect of NATO sort of helping the UN and other regional organizations to sort of beef up their capacity for peacekeeping, do you think that's going to be a sort of major role of NATO in the future, a growth industry? BECHER: I think NATO has a lot to offer and that's why I assume there'll be demand for that as we're seeing now in Darfur, in addition to what has been mentioned, there's also a training aspect there in just offering peacekeepers, even police forces, whatever, from other countries that do not have the resources that NATO countries can bring together, to assist them to improve their skills in such missions. And there's also now efforts to bring together these countries with NATO countries in new facilities, jointly operated, drawing on the experience of NATO countries. That's one thing that I believe will play a big role, as it has already in NATO's relationship with partner countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, around the Mediterranean and so on. This is just widening the offer that NATO has been made before to other countries. SHEA: Eirini. LEMOS: I'll just add one more thing here. Before it was mentioned that UN is understanding its shortfalls at this stage because of the amount of peacekeeping operations that it undertakes, but it also, at the same time, wants to strengthen other regional organizations to mount their operation. And I think that's the example we have with the African Union, because at this stage UN is also assisting the operation to meet the challenge. And I think it's important, and we've seen it also in the reform program, in the reform process of United Nations, that there is a specific need for structured relationship with regional organizations, and that has been agreed with the Heads of State and Governments, because they see the added value that each regional international organization can bring in the maintenance of peace and security. SHEA: Mats, do you think that this means to have that structured relationship that Eirini was talking about, that we should sort of have a UN presence at NATO Headquarters, or a UN sort of military staff permanently based here in the way that we have the cells of the partner countries that have been for a long time now already established at NATO? BERDAL: I think in order to ensure that operations run as smoothly as possible, you know, the maximum amount of cooperation, the more structured it is the better. But I think there is a wide ratio raised here by Darfur, which we in a way have ducked. We've spoken about NATO here as a military contract for the first resort, and of course it is very good to do that. The fact is that the AU mission is fundamentally a peacekeeping mission. It is not an enforcement operation, so it doesn't pose a huge legal problem in terms of enforcement. It is also the argument that the solution hasn't really been... the fundamental problem in Darfur hasn't really been addressed yet. Does it require an enforcement operation? Now, if that issue were to come up that's a different ballgame altogether because member states and the Security Council might oppose it, we might have a divided Council, in which case, what role does NATO then assume. The final point to make on this: There was some quibbling between NATO and the EU on this issue on who should be providing logistic support and so on and so forth, so it wasn't so much EU and NATO resolving differences about the desirability of going there, but really key member states, French, (inaudible) and Belgium opposing a too high-profile NATO mission when EU could do the job. So there are political issues there we shouldn't duck about out-of-area missions in the future. SHEA: But Eirini, I think the NATO and EU did manage to find a modus operandi finally, in terms of moving forward in Darfur. LEMOS: Yes, and I think the... particularly the strategic airlift support is really seen as a blend of joint endeavour to meet the requirements for the African Union's needs. But I think what you mentioned before, also I want to make reference to the new responsibility to protect. We know that now there is this... the problems have not been solved in Darfur, but now with this new element within the international law, I would say, even the fact that we have a responsibility to protect, gives a new dimension to ongoing difficult situations, humanitarian situations, where nations need to protect people on the ground. SHEA: But Klaus, this brings me, I think, to a fundamental point. Eirini has mentioned that there's now a broadening acceptance for the notion of interventions can be justified to cope with genocide or ethnic cleansing. We saw that in Kosovo and Bosnia. We've also established that the UN and African Union, perhaps other organizations, are now more receptive to being helped by NATO. We see, thirdly, that NATO, as I said, is in Afghanistan, but is NATO really capable, in your opinion, of being able now to be engaged in 30, 40, 50 missions? I mean, the sky's the limit if we sort of see that the calls on NATO to act are going to go up and up and up and up. Do you think this organization is going to be able to respond? Will it want to respond? Will it want to be in Latin America, Africa, Asia, all these places, simultaneously? What are your thoughts on this? BECHER: Well, clearly NATO has to get its priorities right. Its main mission is to protect its member states from attack from the outside. That hasn't gone away. And resources are limited. But then we have to clearly distinguish. There are challenges far away that are so important--I speak of genocide more than anything else--that we cannot just sit back and watch it happen. And NATO needs to be prepared to do that, basically anywhere on the globe, if it happens there. And there I would agree with you NATO is not necessarily well-prepared to do that, when it is really necessary to do that kind of intervention based on a UN mandate. And here local knowledge, building up networks of cooperation with regional organization, with countries in the region, various social and political groups in regions where NATO countries don't have sufficient knowledge and understanding of what is actually going on, can often be a good preparation for such eventualities in the future, and I think that is also one of the important elements. A learning process. NATO is learning about Africa at the moment. SHEA: Eirini, you want to come in here? LEMOS: I just want to say that an element here, which is very important, and I agree, is the fact that the cooperation is not just a good idea. It's an imperative at this stage. We're talking about transnational threats which have no borders. We're all facing them. And it's not just cooperating because it's good to cooperate. It's cooperating because we have need to build these multilateral effective cooperation to meeting challenges, and the fact that we have scarce resources. It's not just that everybody can go in and duplicate. It's a matter of really streamlining our cooperation through an effective, multilateral framework. SHEA: Mats, in this respect, again, the UN now has been engaged in this very fundamental process of reform, the high level commission, the recommendations of the Secretary General. What do you think is very particular about this from a NATO perspective? For instance, this new idea of a peacebuilding commission. Is that something where NATO could be involved? BERDAL: Well, I think one of the positive things to come out of the period of introspection within the UN over the past few years, is that there is a major institutional gap in the international response to conflicts emerging from civil war. And the peacebuilding commission is an idea, or an effort to try to fill that gap by bringing different institutional actors together. And I think it's important to stress here, in response to your earlier question, that we aren't really looking at NATO taking over, I think, missions lock, stock and barrel. We're looking at combinations of working alongside other actors. It seems to me, if I can be quite specific where NATO could be useful, let's look now at the whole range of very, very complex missions the UN is undertaking in Africa. What is needed there? Very often an over-the-horizon, an extraction force that give that force greater mobility. This is a real problem in the Congo. And there is a little cause for concern here. You remember Operation Artemis run by the French? Well it was a very successful operation as far as it went. Afterwards the Africans asked, do you want to stay on for longer? No, actually I think we've got to move on. And likewise, American marines were involved in Liberia, they were asked to stay over-the-horizon, they pulled out afterwards. There is a question of long-term commitment which is very important. I think that's why it's welcome that we're actually beginning to talk about the modalities of engagement in a much more structured way than we've done. We've really paid lip service for about ten years now to the idea of regional organization as a good idea. SHEA: In sort of that long-term commitment are you thinking in terms of NATO being involved in security sector reform, training the local army, training the local police forces to be able to handle security themselves without international involvement. Do you see a role there for us? BERDAL: I do very much. It depends very much on individual circumstances. In the case of Congo the UN mission has been asked to do a number of very difficult tasks: disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of troops. What they lack is a proper rapid reaction force effectively, if problems develop on the ground. And that is a very tough thing to ask for. Not least because the mission in some respects is shaky. That is where NATO forces can, I think, make a qualitative difference. Whether member states are prepared to do that is a different proposition altogether. SHEA: Are you think of NATO's Response Force... BERDAL: NATO Response Force... SHEA: ...being made available to the United Nations under particular circumstances. BERDAL: Yeah. Arrangements have to be worked in terms of operational responsibility, command and control and so on and so forth, but some kind of over-the-horizon force to help particular forces. Now in the case of Congo, in Eastern Congo, should things deteriorate dramatically. That's always been the problem. The UN goes in and offers protection, quote/unquote, but when things go tough they're not able to offer much protection. That's when we have to look to an outside force. And with the current predominance, if you like, of developing countries providing troops there is a real issue of limited capability, and some of these issues which are close to operational overstretch I would say. LEMOS: But I think there, NATO's commitment to assist United Nations doesn't go contrary to any of these aspects you've referred to, and I think we need to be open that NATO has... it is committed to assist United Nations, and I think it makes sense at this stage to really look into all these difficult areas that exist. And if there is a need, if there is a request, then, I'm sure allies are ready to look into the requests and... BERDAL: Absolutely...(inaudible)... LEMOS: Because that was the case with Darfur. I mean, who would expect Darfur a couple of years ago, that we had a specific request and that request was met in a positive way. SHEA: But then that also suggests that we need different types of institutional arrangements. I mean, Eirini can you imagine that the Secretary General would go to brief the Security Council frequently; should we have a permanent staff in New York? I mean, how can we handle things in such a way that we have this closer cooperation so that we can identify these opportunities? LEMOS: I'd say it's... I mean, it's exactly what you said. I think we need to structure the relationship. That was what we discussed before and that was as a call-back from Kofi Annan's own cooperation with... structured cooperation with the international organizations. It's very important that we do have more structure in the way that the Secretary General is briefing the Security Council on its... on the missions that we are... there is a UN mandate. We anyway provide reports to the Security Council on a quarterly basis, if I'm not mistaken... I'm not sure for all operations, but most of our operations. And I see no difficulty in the Secretary General going and presenting these specifics. If I'm not mistaken the UN Security Council resolution the last one on ISAF, there was a specific reference that the organization should continue reporting back to the Security Council. Then moving into permanent structures, already we have a liaison office. Probably it is not known, but we do have a liaison office in DPKO. We have one military liaison office... SHEA: DPKO being the Department of Peacekeeping Operations... LEMOS: Department of Peacekeeping Operations at United Nations. We do have a liaison office. Now whether there is room for improve... for looking into or amend the terms of reference, this is something that the nations will have to look into it. You know, along the process of improving and intensifying and strengthening the relationship of the UN (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) SHEA: I'd like to bring in Klaus here for a comment. BECHER: I agree with everything Eirini said, but wanted to add one point, because you mentioned the request that was put to NATO by the African Union. It's interesting to see, in the case of Darfur, as well as in Afghanistan, actually, that before NATO was formally involved as an institution, already individual member states had done similar work bilaterally, also based on diplomatic contacts and bilateral requests. For example, in Darfur the German air force had provided airlift already at the end of last year for troops from Gambia. And there is one important element I think is important to understand, that the member states of NATO often begin things by laterally, but then because of their strong interest in fostering multilateralism as the principle of international security, try to bring in NATO as an institution. We very much saw that in Afghanistan. And that is how it usually will evolve, I would assume. So one shouldn't always wait for a formal request from whoever, be it the UN or a country, for NATO, but the work in NATO begins already before that when member states begin to get involved. SHEA: I'd like to just, in the time that's left, just take a slightly different tack here because we've spent a lot of time talking about the peacekeeping, nation-building part of the UN, but looking at the spectrum of security challenges today we have terrorism, we have the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The UN obviously is involved here. NATO as a security organization is also focusing on these problems. Do you think, Mats, that there's also room for greater interaction in areas such as combating terrorism, or trying to reform the global non-proliferation regime? BERDAL: Well, I think the operative word is interaction and not be too ambitious here. These two areas you mentioned, the issues of proliferation in particular, we've seen major disappointments over the past year. And at the UN summit recently there were... member states weren't able to agree on any form of words to address the issue. I think NATO itself has had difficulties coming up with, if I put it this way, a broad anti-terrorism strategy for again, very good political reasons. I think it's important, though, your general point, that we shouldn't just simply look at UN support... NATO support for UN operations. There is a range of other activities where they can cooperate, not least, since you mentioned the DPKO, the experience that NATO has, particularly in planning operations, in thinking about issues. And I'm reminded of the Brahimi report on UN peacekeeping operations. His key lesson was, you have to be able to say no sometimes, and maybe NATO is the right organization to say this is this is not a good idea, to go in this and that area. There NATO has a long institution experience of planning, which I think is very, very valuable. But I'm fairly sceptical about these, if you like, these areas that are considered particularly important and (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) SHEA: Eirini, you've just come from New York. I mean, did you get a flavour that there's scope for NATO and the UN to cooperate more in combating terrorism or dealing with weapons of mass destruction or long-term strategy on nation-building, for example, in places like Afghanistan? Beyond the immediate stabilization missions? LEMOS: I think indeed when we were in New York there was a feeling that there is much more to be done. And I want to make a point here that NATO and UN, it's not only the cooperation in the areas of crisis management peacekeeping operations. There is a room and there has been some kind of cooperation, some sort of cooperation with the Department of Counterterrorism Committee, with regard to the area of counterterrorism; to the Department of Disarmament Affairs with United Nations. Of course we have not come with concrete results at this stage, because I mean let's face it, these are very daunting issues. It would be extremely interesting to have very good results in the context of the fight against terrorists. But I think there is room and there is scope for cooperation. Now with regard to Afghanistan, certainly there is room for more structured cooperation and now I think the focus is really how to make it work in the post-Bonn process. It's not the... I mean, we all focused our acts with regard to the elections, but there is a real challenge ahead of us, there's a big challenge with regard to the post-Bonn process and how all the international actors will be engaged and remain engaged in order to meet the challenge and maintain the peace, and not relapse in any kind of violence that we've had in the history of Afghanistan. SHEA: This is obviously, Klaus, a key point, isn't it? I mean, if you look at the Balkans what you've seen is a relatively successful model, for example, in Kosovo, you know, NATO doing what it does best, which his the military stability and then the UN doing what it seems to do best, which is civilian reconstruction, elections, building up democratic institutions. Do you think that's really the sort of the model. Mats, you may want to come in on this as well for the NATO-UN relationship, that you know, they do the civilian part, we do the military part and we sort of fit together that way? BECHER: Each case is different. Of course, there is a potential for friction if you have two big institutions, or even more than two, on the ground doing work in parallel. And there's always room for improving the way they work together. It's not an idea way of doing business, to have more than one institution in the lead and trying to solve a local or regional problem. That's why I would be hesitant to call it a model. It works, in some cases, in some cases in the past it hasn't worked. But what's really underpinning it is a community of values and you mentioned the historical roots that NATO, as well as the UN, go back to 1945. They contain both institutionally a commitment to a set of values providing security and providing opportunities to the individual world-wide. And as long as that common basis is there and is evolving I'm very optimistic about the potential to work together, and that can involve this kind of sharing the roles as to what each of them can do better under this overarching roof of common values. And it's good news. If you think back 15 years, some of the member countries would have been reluctant to use the UN, because the history of the east-west conflict and so on, UN wasn't seen as a valuable tool really. It has come quite a way since then, and there were reservations using NATO, even among some NATO countries. And we've come quite a long way there. So things are converging. SHEA: This really brings me, Mats, to the final question, and I'd like to put it to you. I suppose ultimately NATO's ability to interact with the UN depends upon the UN's own ability to play a greater role in international security in the 21st Century, and we've all been looking with interest at Kofi Annan's reform program. Based on what we've seen in New York in recent days, where do you think the UN stands in this ambitious reform program? What's been achieved and what hasn't been achieved yet that NATO should look out for? BERDAL: Well, I think the key thing to the merger, I think, from this summit, from the reform process, is a recognition--this is important relative to NATO--that the UN is essentially a central service agency for its member states. If states wants to make use of it it can use it. The other important lesson, I think, of the past ten years or so, is that UN will never take on enforcement responsibilities. Apart from that I think the distinction between military and civilian tasks shouldn't be taken too far. But I think there is a realization at the end of the day that the summit wasn't(?) successful, that the UN is going to be around for a long time. It still plays a very important role, surprising some might say, in conferring legitimacy on the actions of state. And I think there is real scope for a much more structured and productive relationship over the years to come. SHEA: Well Mats thank you very much for that, and Eirini, thank you. Klaus, thank you. That's all we have time for, ladies and gentlemen, for this edition of Stopwatch. I very much hope that you enjoyed looking at it and you will tune in to the next Stopwatch in about four weeks from now, when we will be looking at the evolution of the security situation in the Balkans, particularly with the spotlight currently on Kosovo and the possible definition of this final status. So for now from me, Jamie Shea, goodbye from Brussels, and just a reminder, please continue to send in your e-mails with your questions.