LONDON, 26 NOVEMBER 1993

Ladies and gentlemen,

          Just a few years ago, we entertained the vision of a
Europe "whole and free", in which relations between peoples would
be based not on ideology or military might but on tolerance and
common democratic values.  Now a gap has emerged between that
vision of a new peaceful order in Europe and our willingness to
pay the price to bring it about.  This gap produces instability
and undermines the credibility of Western institutions that have
helped to inspire change.  Today, four years after the fall of
the Berlin Wall, it is not euphoria but increasing disorder and
a crisis of confidence which dominate our European agenda.

          Let us be honest.  The international community has
failed to deal effectively with the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, and this failure has affected all international
institutions.  Moreover, Somalia reminds us of how difficult it
is to strike the right balance between the understandable impulse
to intervene and the difficulties of implementation.

          Does this mean that we should abandon our objective of
building a new international order?  Shall we just leave the
world to the forces of disorder and limit ourselves to
safeguarding our own national security, or at most, to containing
the crisis spots so as to prevent them from spreading?

          My answer is clearly no.  We cannot live in security
surrounded by chaos.  I do not believe that we should succumb to
pessimism.  We must come to grips with the changed security
environment.  We have to realise that the end of the Cold War has
spelled the end neither of history, nor of forward-looking
security policy.  Security still comes at a price, and we must
pay it.  

          We enjoy a tremendous advantage over previous
generations - namely, a structure of international institutions
and an ingrained pattern of international cooperation which can
enable us to build a better and more peaceful order in the era
to come - if we use this advantage properly.  That remains our
challenge - the main challenge of our times.  

          We cannot meet this challenge without NATO; to master
major security challenges you need NATO.  To provide stability
in a world that has become more unstable you need NATO.  To
prevent, manage and resolve major crises and conflicts in the
wider Europe you need NATO.  To prevent Europe from sliding back
into renationalisation and fragmentation you need NATO.  To keep
transatlantic relations working smoothly and effectively you need
NATO.  To face the new kinds of risks emerging from proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, from mass migration and from
extremism you need NATO.

          So this Alliance is not sustained merely by nostalgic
memories or by purely philosophical reflections on common values
and destinies.  It survives, indeed prospers, because it serves
the concrete requirements of its member nations in North America
and Europe.

          I am aware, however, that a different view has been
expressed by some, to whom the international community's failure
to prevent or reverse the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia is a
demonstration of NATO's irrelevance today.

          I reject this argument.  As much as I am personally
disappointed with the way this crisis has been handled, I think
we have to recognize that the international community was
unprepared for the different security environment with which we
would be confronted in the post-Cold War era, just as the West
was initially unprepared for the type of challenge Soviet power
would confront us with in the years immediately following World
War II.  The argument that we should disband NATO because of
Yugoslavia is masochistic in the extreme;  it is as if we were
to banish doctors for the persistence of illness, or abolish
police for the persistence of crime.  What we need to do,
obviously, is to draw the lessons of Yugoslavia so that there
will be no more Yugoslavias.

          It goes without saying that one lesson is that NATO
must be used differently, and indeed that NATO itself must
continue to adapt to a wholly different set of challenges from
those we faced during the Cold War.  That is why we are holding
the NATO Summit in January. So today I want to address two

     -    Why NATO?

     -    What kind of NATO do we need for this new era?

I.   Why NATO

          First, in a world full of crises and conflicts where
history moves fast and is full of surprises NATO still serves its
main strategic purpose:  to maintain the common defence and
security of its member countries.  Today it does so with fewer
troops and at lower cost. NATO serves as the insurance policy
against the remaining risks and new dangers.  Once dissolved an
effective Alliance could not be recreated overnight.

          Second, the transatlantic relationship is the most
stable and valuable geopolitical asset on the globe today,
bringing together the world's two largest trading zones, and the
two regions with the greatest global outreach and sense of global
responsibilities.  How could we seriously hope to achieve a more
stable world without a strategic alliance of these two major
power centres?   Where else but in NATO could they coordinate
their policies and pool their capabilities to deal with major
security challenges, as was done so successfully in the Gulf War? 
 Moreover, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe already
rely upon the stabilising influence which the Alliance exerts
around its periphery.  The disintegration of NATO would increase
the risk of conflict in Europe dramatically.

          Third, one of the greatest achievements of the Atlantic
Alliance has been to put an end to the bad habits of European
power politics.  There was simply no longer any need for secret
pacts and cordial, or not so cordial, ententes.  The American
presence provided for a stable balance between former rivals and
enemies.  It even made possible the realisation of German
unification without a major crisis in West European politics. 
By contrast the dissolution of NATO or the disengagement of the
United States from Europe could and would undermine the European
integration process.  This would be damaging not only for Western
Europe and the United States, but would also gravely affect the
political and economic transition of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe which are urgently looking for links to the
political, economic and security institutions of the West.

          Fourth, NATO is the only organization that possesses
the right package of political-military tools for effective
crisis management.  It provides the bedrock of "hard" security
on which any new security order must be based.  Only NATO has the
means to turn political declarations into coherent action, a fact
which the United Nations, after decades of viewing us with
suspicion, has recognized in calling upon NATO to perform a range
of peacekeeping functions in the former Yugoslavia.  Which other
instrument could you turn to in a crisis situation, assuming the
political will was there to act?  Which other institution could
offer the integrated structure and the political/military
consultation mechanism?  

          The Yugoslav crisis demonstrates not NATO's irrelevance
but its vitality and its potential.  For the first time in our
history we are both acting out of area and ready, if it is judged
necessary to conduct air strikes, for actual combat operations. 
NATO has offered its support to the United Nations and it has
done everything the UN has asked; and the Alliance has done so
efficiently.  We are enforcing the embargo at sea and the no-fly
zone in the air.  We have supplied UNPROFOR with command and
control equipment and we have coordinated our military planning
with the United Nations.  We have also offered the United Nations
our protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR and
we are prepared to use air strikes, if necessary, to relieve
strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas.  All of these tasks
are being performed with the professionalism and dedication you
expect from this Alliance.

II.  The Way Ahead:  A New NATO for a New Era

          So what is the way ahead for NATO? Contrary to what
some have argued, NATO has not stood still since the end of the
Cold War.  This Alliance has changed more than any other
international institution in the last three years, and remains
a state-of-the-art model.  We have had to accept two new missions
to meet the demands of a vastly changed security environment: 
(a) projection of stability to the East and;  (b) crisis
management.  We have adopted a new strategy and force posture. 
We have started to strengthen our European pillar.  Most
importantly, we have established close relations with our former
adversaries by creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council,
and we have started participating in crisis management beyond our
borders.  So the slogan "out of area or out of business" is
obviously out of date.  We are acting out of area and we are very
much in business.

          Still, we need to continue to adapt the Alliance to
play its role in stabilising Europe.  Let me list five main areas
which will be at the top of the Summit's agenda.

          The first and most important area where change must
come is in further developing our ability to project stability
to the East.  Security is the oxygen of democracy;  if we want
our new democratic partners in the East to survive and to
flourish, then we must seek to give concrete meaning to our 1991
Declaration in Rome that "our own security is inseparably linked
to that of all the other States of Europe".

          I sense a growing consensus that, in principle, the
Alliance should open up to new members.  Even if there are no
immediate plans to enlarge NATO, giving such a perspective would
increase the stability of the whole of Europe, particularly if
we are also willing to enhance fundamentally our security
relationship with Russia.  The same holds true for Ukraine and
other cooperation partners.  Nobody will be isolated.  We intend
to build bridges and not barriers.

          But while incorporating new members is a long-term
process, we are also studying new ideas which can be implemented
already in the short term.  I would like to mention, in
particular, the proposal made by the United States for a 
"Partnership for Peace".  

          The "Partnership for Peace" is designed to intensify
the process of cooperation and give it a new dimension.  Let me
first clarify that I do not consider it to be an alternative to
eventual membership of Central and Eastern European Countries to
NATO.  The "Partnership for Peace" will be open to all
cooperation partners and other states in Europe.  The core idea
of this initiative is that interested States will sign bilateral
cooperation agreements with NATO.   The extent of cooperation
would be largely up to the partner countries themselves,
depending on their individual requirements.  This would lead to
a flexible network of cooperative links within Europe and across
the Atlantic.  The goal is to make our partners more capable of
interacting with NATO member states in a broad range of
multinational missions such as peacekeeping and crisis
management.  While "Partnership for Peace" is a proposal that is
still under discussion within our Alliance, the reactions so far
have been favourable and I have no doubt that it could lead the
way towards an ever closer relationship between NATO Allies and
our cooperation partners.

          The second major Summit issue, is how to re-balance the
Alliance so that Europe assumes a greater share of responsibility
for security in Europe and beyond.  Let me state very clearly
from the outset that I regard a greater European role not as a
threat but as a precondition of NATO's longer-term vitality.  The
WEU has an essential role to play in this regard, and I regard
it as one of NATO's accomplishments that we have established a
very close working relationship between our organisations.  For
example, we are now running an efficient joint naval operation
in the Adriatic.  Our objective is to coordinate our planning so
that forces assigned to NATO can operate under WEU authority in
those crises that affect first and foremost European interests. 

          We now have to move to practical, operationally sound
arrangements in this respect.  For example, we are currently
looking at the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces for
peacekeeping and other contingency operations.  Such a concept
would earmark resources within the integrated military structure
for non-Article V missions in addition to their role in defence. 
In a crisis these resources could be used in conjunction with
non-NATO contributions.  This could provide the basis for
"separable but not separate" forces which could accommodate both
the needs of NATO and of an emerging European Security and
Defence Identity.

          The third issue the Summit must address, is the further
development of the Alliance's capabilities for crisis management,
peacekeeping and peacemaking. I would maintain -- notwithstanding
the frustration about Yugoslavia -- that NATO's track record in
this area has been as good, as I set out earlier, and that we
have established a good cooperation with the UN. But I believe
that we can and must achieve more.  We should not succumb to
false modesty.  The UN is overextended and underfunded.  If it
wants our support, it must accept that we will push for clearer
mandates and that we will insist that the chain of command and
the rules of engagement must be agreed in a satisfactory manner
as a precondition to any major Alliance involvement.  I have
repeatedly stated that if NATO acts on behalf of another
organisation it does so as a partner and not as a sub-contractor. 
The closer our interface with the UN, the better the chance of
obtaining a mandate suitable for effective implementation.

          And this is not all.  As we all agree that prevention
is better than cure, we must find ways of making Allied assets
more relevant not only to peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but
to crisis prevention as well.  In this respect I believe that we
should look for ways of enhancing the Alliance's contribution to
the CSCE.  

          The fourth issue concerns the need to address the
question of what "defence fundamentals" will be required in
future.  Otherwise, there is a risk of free-fall, structural
disarmament which would rapidly deprive our member nations of
meaningful military capabilities for many years to come.  This
would affect our traditional collective defence mission as well
as our new tasks in peacekeeping.  So the stabilisation of
defence budgets agreed by NATO Defence Ministers in May is of
major significance.  In handling any crisis, what you have
available very much determines what options you have:  the fewer
deployable forces, the fewer options for decision-makers, and the
less credibility accorded subsequent actions.

          The fifth issue is counter-proliferation.  Already in
1991 the Alliance's Strategic Concept stated that the
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction should be given special consideration.  A viable
solution to this increasingly serious problem requires a
complementary approach of various elements, focusing first and
foremost on traditional prevention mechanisms, such as export
controls, but also including political disincentives and missile
defence.  We are currently examining ways to deal with this issue
within the framework of the Alliance.  I look to the Summit to
draw up a road map for further action.

          In closing, I want to underline that we need to make
it clearer to our publics that NATO has been transformed, that
it continues to change, and that it plays the leading role in
Euro-Atlantic security.  In particular, we must make it clear
that security still comes at a price, whether the issues at stake
are collective defence, peacekeeping or crisis prevention.  We
also have to make it clearer than before that the political
strength of our Alliance as a cornerstone for European security
derives directly from its perceived military value, and that to
allow military atrophy means to deprive the Alliance of its
political weight as an instrument to shape the peace.  

          The Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom has an
important role to play in these efforts.  NATO has been the most
successful Alliance in history not only because its policies were
the right ones, but also because they were consistently supported
by the great majority of our public opinion.  Indeed, if there
is one lesson that we have learned from difficult times in the
past, it is that the more we have explained those policies
directly to the public, the more support we have gained.

          The need to explain NATO's roles and missions has
become even more important now that we have adopted the new task
of projecting stability into Central and Eastern Europe.  Despite
the NACC and numerous other contacts, there are still many
misconceptions about our Alliance in some of our Cooperation
Partner countries.  So the Atlantic Council also has a vital role
in building bridges between public opinion in our countries and
in Central and Eastern Europe. Our aim must be to bring together
the successor generations of future political leaders.  We must
foster among them a sense of common values, outlook and culture
as well as the personal ties that make our vision of a Euro-
Atlantic community a reality. These are our tasks. Let's start
tackling them today.