New age, new threats, new responses

Same concept, different angles: video 3

How will the timing of this new Strategic Concept affect the outcome? Will it be able to deal with threats for decades to come? How will it change the way international organizations work together? And what will its changes mean for the men and women in uniform? All of these questions come under scrutiny in this section.

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Same concept, different angles

How will the timing of this new Strategic Concept affect the outcome? Will it be able to deal with threats for decades to come? How will it change the way international organizations work together? And what will its changes mean for the men and women in uniform? All of these questions come under scrutiny in this section.

The many threats of a new,

emerging and globalised world

will have to be factored in

to NATO’s new Strategic Concept.

Well, the threats are

much more diverse than they were

when we wrote this Treaty in 1949.

They come from a wide variety

of different places

and we need institutions

and processes to deal with those.

It’s a new area.

Defining the new threats.

What do we accept as new threats?

What are the relevant threats?

Although a multitude

of new types of threats exist,

this does not mean

they are all for NATO to deal with.

There is little desire and appetite

for offering a laundry-list

of possible forms of attacks.

I think the allies will leave it at:

An attack on one is an attack on all.

The Strategic Concept

must not be a shopping-list.

It doesn’t make sense to pile up

everybody's ideas and requirements,

since the funding is not there.

But there are examples

of new threats

that have the effect

of an armed attack,

but without the use

of conventional arms.

If computers are used

to deny or to wreak havoc

with infrastructure which has

impact on lives of patients in hospital,

then computers become a weapon.

It’s an armed attack by other means.

Take energy security.

How can NATO look into such a

complex area of providing security?

Should it even consider doing so?

If you look at the map,

many countries,

which are basically adjacent

or very close to NATO countries,

are probably the fossil fuel exporters.

The provider of energy

likes to make money,

and the consumer of the energy,

likes to have energy for his country.

I think the best is

to think in a systematic way

what security aspects are there.

The question is whether NATO should

act in case of energy deprivation,

or whether that’s a responsibility

of the EU or other institutions.

Even with the best of will,

this question of energy efficiency,

energy security,

energy demand, supply

and everything else,

transit through the countries

of not easy political regimes,

all of this is enormous...

enormously difficult questions.

But, both Russians

and the EU are ready to tackle that.

The same question could be asked

about climate change.

The danger is that everything is

climate change in this world.

I think it is more for the expert group

to think: If there's climate change,

are there coming

security aspects out of it,

and, very much so, security aspects

which we can link back

to the kind of mission

we see for NATO.

Cyber attacks have already been

witnessed, in Estonia for example.

How much should NATO focus on this

in its new Strategic Concept?

It has to have a fair share,

as it has in a number of Concepts

adopted so far in different countries.

But clearly, cyber threats

cannot be addressed solely on...

from the defence point of view.

We need a comprehensive approach.

The most important thing

is awareness

and defensive measures

by all participants,

including regular civil users,

not to turn their computers

into cyber warriors.

So what should NATO’s

overall approach be

to the new and emerging threats?

Because NATO finds it

difficult to act against threats

that don’t come with a clear

return address, we can do two things.

Either we decide in the future

that there is no good way to retaliate

because there’s no actor we can

really hold responsible for the attack.

Or we decide to go after

the state, the society, the system

that has protected and sheltered

those who have attacked a NATO ally.

As we’ve done in Afghanistan.

The many threats of a new,

emerging and globalised world

will have to be factored in

to NATO’s new Strategic Concept.

Well, the threats are

much more diverse than they were

when we wrote this Treaty in 1949.

They come from a wide variety

of different places

and we need institutions

and processes to deal with those.

It’s a new area.

Defining the new threats.

What do we accept as new threats?

What are the relevant threats?

Although a multitude

of new types of threats exist,

this does not mean

they are all for NATO to deal with.

There is little desire and appetite

for offering a laundry-list

of possible forms of attacks.

I think the allies will leave it at:

An attack on one is an attack on all.

The Strategic Concept

must not be a shopping-list.

It doesn’t make sense to pile up

everybody's ideas and requirements,

since the funding is not there.

But there are examples

of new threats

that have the effect

of an armed attack,

but without the use

of conventional arms.

If computers are used

to deny or to wreak havoc

with infrastructure which has

impact on lives of patients in hospital,

then computers become a weapon.

It’s an armed attack by other means.

Take energy security.

How can NATO look into such a

complex area of providing security?

Should it even consider doing so?

If you look at the map,

many countries,

which are basically adjacent

or very close to NATO countries,

are probably the fossil fuel exporters.

The provider of energy

likes to make money,

and the consumer of the energy,

likes to have energy for his country.

I think the best is

to think in a systematic way

what security aspects are there.

The question is whether NATO should

act in case of energy deprivation,

or whether that’s a responsibility

of the EU or other institutions.

Even with the best of will,

this question of energy efficiency,

energy security,

energy demand, supply

and everything else,

transit through the countries

of not easy political regimes,

all of this is enormous...

enormously difficult questions.

But, both Russians

and the EU are ready to tackle that.

The same question could be asked

about climate change.

The danger is that everything is

climate change in this world.

I think it is more for the expert group

to think: If there's climate change,

are there coming

security aspects out of it,

and, very much so, security aspects

which we can link back

to the kind of mission

we see for NATO.

Cyber attacks have already been

witnessed, in Estonia for example.

How much should NATO focus on this

in its new Strategic Concept?

It has to have a fair share,

as it has in a number of Concepts

adopted so far in different countries.

But clearly, cyber threats

cannot be addressed solely on...

from the defence point of view.

We need a comprehensive approach.

The most important thing

is awareness

and defensive measures

by all participants,

including regular civil users,

not to turn their computers

into cyber warriors.

So what should NATO’s

overall approach be

to the new and emerging threats?

Because NATO finds it

difficult to act against threats

that don’t come with a clear

return address, we can do two things.

Either we decide in the future

that there is no good way to retaliate

because there’s no actor we can

really hold responsible for the attack.

Or we decide to go after

the state, the society, the system

that has protected and sheltered

those who have attacked a NATO ally.

As we’ve done in Afghanistan.

Videos in Same concept, different angles:

1. A battle of minds

2. Timing is Everything?

3. New age, new threats, new responses

4. What does it mean for the military?

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