WEBEDITION Vol. 46 - No. 4 Winter 1998 pp. 20-23

Taking another look at NATO's role in European security Michael Rhle Senior Planning Officer, Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section of NATO's Political Affairs Division

(25Kb) Many observers still fail to understand why NATO remains in business long after the Soviet threat has disappeared. Their puzzlement stems from an analytical yardstick that ties NATO to the single purpose of providing for collective defence, argues Mr. Rhle. In the post-Cold War world, however, institutions have become multiple-purpose instruments, working together to create a more benign strategic environment. By supporting a European Security and Defence Identity, the evolution of a democratic Russia, sound transatlantic relations and common approaches to crisis management, NATO has become an instrument for shaping the security environment in the broadest sense. Asking the wrong questions What is NATO's purpose after the end of the Soviet threat?" Ten years after the Cold War this question is still being asked. It is a legitimate question. After all, doesn't theory tell us that alliances dissolve once their common enemy has been defeated? If so, why is NATO still around? And why is it still dominating the European security debate - from Bosnia to enlargement? Puzzled by NATO's continued existence, some critics have suggested that the Alliance's endurance is simply the result of bureaucratic inertia. Others believe that NATO's busy agenda is fabricated, aimed at concealing that the Alliance has lost its rationale. Yet such explanations completely miss the mark, for they all rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of institutions in today's security environment. During the East-West conflict, each institution had a clear and definable task; each was a "single issue" institution. Then, NATO's purpose was defence and deterrence against a specific threat. In the post-Cold War world, however, institutions have become multiple purpose instruments working together to shape a more benign strategic environment. Accordingly, if one wants to understand why NATO is still around today, and why it is in fact busier than ever before, the analytical yardstick must change: rather than looking vainly for a singular purpose to replace the "Soviet threat" one must ask a broader question: "What is NATO's contribution to the emerging Euro-Atlantic security architecture?" Security architecture: the right context From left, Jorge Domecq (Director of the Private Office), Secretary General Javier Solana, General Klaus Naumann (Chairman of the Military Committee) and Anthony Cragg (Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations), preparing to begin the 27 October meeting of the NATO Council on the Kosovo crisis. (NATO photo 51Kb) Of course, to rephrase the question in such a way is to beg yet another question, namely that of the definition of a security architecture. Many definitions have been advanced, often focusing on the concept of "interlocking institutions". This concept remains a useful intellectual framework, yet it does not fully capture the dynamics of post-Cold War European developments. Instead of looking at institutions, it may be more useful to understand an architecture as a series of key political processes that shape the strategic environment: the European integration process, the evolution of Russia, the development of transatlantic relations, and the evolution of crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area. If these processes evolve in a positive direction, they will generate a set of relationships within which crises and conflicts could be prevented or at least successfully managed, i.e., an "architecture". Clearly, the successful management of these processes requires participation by far more players than NATO alone. Indeed, in recent years all major organisations have ceased to be "single issue" institutions and are engaged in managing these wider political processes. The European Union's enlargement process, its special programmes for Russia or its growing Mediterranean dimension testify to this tendency as does the role of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in defusing minority problems across Europe, organising free elections in Bosnia or, most recently, verifying an agreement in Kosovo. NATO remains unique, however, for only it can offer the instruments to bring these processes together in a coherent way. The Alliance's combination of political consultation, military competence and transatlantic vocation make it a unique contributor to the management of the security dimension of the European integration process, the evolution of Russia into a responsible security actor, the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship, and the evolution of crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area. European unity: deepening and widening An advance team in Pristina preparing the ground on 18 October for the phased arrival of 2,000 OSCE observers who will verify compliance with UN resolutions intended to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. A NATO force has been planned for the emergency extraction of OSCE observers if necessary. (AP photo 51Kb) NATO and the European integration process have always been closely interrelated. However, throughout the Cold War NATO's relationship to the European integration process remained a passive one: the Atlantic Alliance provided security for a Europe focusing largely on economic and political cooperation. This passive role of NATO has meanwhile been overtaken. Since the decision was made to develop a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, and not outside of it, NATO's role in deepening European integration has become an active one. By strengthening the WEU's capability to act in cases where a European military response may be preferable, NATO provides a framework for gradually overcoming Europe's limits as a strategic actor. The development of an ESDI within NATO not only reflects an awareness that for the foreseeable future European military clout will remain dependent on material support by the United States. It also ensures that other strategic partners like Canada, Norway and Turkey remain involved in the process. In sum, a more flexible NATO should allow Europe to make progress in deepening its integration without being caught in a painful split between political ambitions and limited military means. NATO's contribution to the widening of European integration is even more direct: it consists of widening NATO itself. Europe's division can only be overcome for good if the new democracies in the East are also able to exercise their right to determine their foreign policy and security orientation. Given the historically unique integration achieved in NATO and EU it should not come as a surprise that many of these states see their future as members of these two organisations. Both enlargement processes have already demonstrated their value as effective instruments of managed change. The mere prospect of membership in NATO and the EU has spurred many nations in Central and Eastern Europe to tackle domestic reforms and contentious bilateral issues. NATO's credible commitment to keep the door open for further accessions is thus probably one of the strongest levers to influence the strategic environment in a positive way for years to come. NATO and Russia: Towards a mature partnership The evolution of Russia, Europe's largest security variable, constitutes the second major political process affecting the future of a new security architecture. If Russia remains on the path of democracy and market economy, most problems of European security could be solved in a cooperative fashion, whether regional conflicts, nuclear safety or non-proliferation issues. NATO thus has a vested interest in constructively engaging Russia in the emerging security architecture. But what can NATO do to help Russia participate in European developments? Is NATO not the very organisation that excludes Russia most visibly - and that is thus most limited in its cooperation options? It would be arrogant indeed if the Alliance were to claim a leading role for itself in bringing Russia into the democratic mainstream. Nevertheless the Alliance's cooperative efforts vis--vis Russia remain of crucial importance. They signal that NATO is taking Russia seriously as a major security actor. The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 cleared the path to a new cooperative relationship. It opened new venues of cooperation, ranging from preventing proliferation to joint approaches to crisis management. Moreover, through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, political consultation between the Alliance and the Eurasian great power has been institutionalised. The PJC thus closes a gap in the European security architecture. Even if consultations in the PJC will not always lead to common positions, they serve to minimise misunderstandings or conflicting signals in a crisis. Most of all, these consultations demonstrate that NATO and Russia have not succumbed to the fatalistic logic of designating each other as permanent adversaries. Transatlantic relations: The core of the Alliance US Defence Secretary William Cohen (left) standing with Portuguese Defence Minister Veiga Simao at the informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Vilamoura, Portugal on 24 September. A healthy transatlantic relationship is at the core of the Alliance. (NATO photo 48Kb) Neither the process of European integration nor the constructive engagement of Russia would be possible without strong transatlantic relations. The security link that ties North America to Europe still contributes to healthy intra-European relations. It also ensures that Russia does not fall victim to the temptation of again pursuing its security interests at the expense of its neighbours. Last but not least, the United States remains a unique crisis manager - from its role in facilitating German unification to resolving the conflict in Bosnia. These are the reasons why a new European security architecture must always be a Euro-Atlantic architecture as well. However, if the transatlantic link is to function smoothly in the future, business as usual will no longer suffice. On both sides of the Atlantic a new generation is taking over which no longer views NATO through the prism of personal experience or emotional attachment. This suggests that if NATO wants to remain the central forum for transatlantic security cooperation in a new security environment, it must be able to tackle new challenges. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is such a challenge. To prevent it politically, yet also to protect against its consequences militarily, is only possible through transatlantic cooperation. It is thus only logical that NATO has put this issue on its agenda. Maintaining healthy transatlantic relations also requires addressing the issue of fair burden sharing within the Alliance. As has been pointed out with reference to European integration, NATO is currently trying to establish a new formula for transatlantic burden sharing through a strengthening of Europe's ability to act. This policy will only be successful, however, if the United States overcomes its latent scepticism of a distinct security role for Europe. By the same token, Europe must seek to establish an ESDI not just as an expression of European self-assertion, but as a genuine contribution to a new, more mature transatlantic partnership. Towards a Euro-Atlantic security space European integration, Russia's evolution, transatlantic relations - all three processes have one thing in common: they are vital for the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. By contrast, regional conflicts do not fall into this category. In a territorial sense, at least, they are not "vital". Still, the Bosnian conflict left deep scars across the entire Euro-Atlantic area. Discord in transatlantic relations, in the NATO-Russia relationship and in intra-European relations tended to undermine the very trust that is required for building a new security architecture. Such an architecture, therefore, requires yet another building block: a capacity for crisis management across the entire Euro-Atlantic area. In managing this task, NATO again remains the sine qua non institution. The Alliance's unique military competence has allowed it to forge ties to many non-NATO nations. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) has attracted 27 nations, from Sweden to Kazakhstan, to enter into a cooperative military relationship with NATO. No other institution could have generated such a strong momentum. This cooperation has already played a significant role in setting up the joint operation in Bosnia and providing assistance for states neighbouring Kosovo. It will also facilitate the creation of future military coalitions. Together with PfP's political complement, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), NATO thus has created a security framework which bridges different memberships, fosters common approaches in crisis management and regional cooperation, and offers the former neutrals a means of coming closer to Euro-Atlantic security structures. Asking the right questions NATO has become an invaluable instrument of change for shaping Euro-Atlantic security - a catalyst for a broader security order. Thus, any attempt to analyse the Alliance with the outmoded yardsticks of the Cold War will inevitably fall short of understanding NATO's continued vitality. Therefore, the question that should be posed is not "What is NATO's one single purpose in the post-Cold War era?"; rather, the question that goes to the heart of the matter is "What is NATO's contribution to the emerging Euro-Atlantic security architecture?" Admittedly, this is an ambitious yardstick against which to measure NATO's performance, as it goes far beyond deterrence and defence and into managing long-term political change. Yet it is the only useful yardstick to apply. As Secretary General Solana once put it, NATO has moved from preventing the "worst case" to achieving the "best case" - a new security architecture for the Euro-Atlantic area.