WEBEDITION
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Towards an Alliance framework for extended air defence/theatre missile defenceDavid Martin(*)
The end of the Cold War brought with it new security challenges and risks that were different in nature from those which NATO faced in the past. In taking stock of the new strategic environment it became increasingly apparent to the Alliance that one of the new risks that required attention was the proliferation and use of shorter-range ballistic missiles. Indeed, during the 1980s, some 350 Scud ballistic missiles had been employed by Iran and Iraq in their 'war of the cities'; at least 2,000 Scud missiles were used in Afghanistan from 1988 to 1991; some 90 Scuds were fired by Iraq during the Gulf War; and Scuds were used during the 1994 civil war in Yemen. It was no surprise then, that the Alliance noted in its 1991 Rome Declaration that "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery undermines international security".(1) Proliferation of ballistic missiles also figured heavily in the formulation of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept of November 1991. In discussing security challenges, the new Strategic Concept noted the risks posed by the "buildup of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies... including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance", and stated that "in light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special consideration".(2)
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The proliferation problem was important because it was potentially detrimental to the Alliance's new strategy. To take into account the global context of NATO's new strategy, NATO forces would have to be more mobile, able to react to a wider range of contingencies, and be flexible enough to respond quickly to crisis situations. Implicit in this new strategy is the requirement for NATO forces to operate outside traditional NATO boundaries in support of crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions.
The growing proliferation of countries with ballistic missiles, however, could seriously complicate NATO operations in out-of-area contingencies, and could even deter NATO intervention at the outset should NATO territory and the population itself come within range of a potential aggressor's missiles. To carry out its new strategy, NATO thus needed to examine carefully the requirement for extended air defence/theatre missile defence (EAD/TMD). In June 1992, the North Atlantic Council noted that the NATO Air Defence Committee (NADC) would investigate approaches to satisfy the requirement for tactical ballistic missile defences. After conducting an extensive risk assessment, the NADC developed a conceptual framework for the provision of extended air defence for the Alliance and its forces, with specific regard to the risks stemming from ballistic missiles. This framework, approved by the Council in August 1993, proposed developing an extended air defence capability as a logical addition to NATO's existing integrated air defence system. This would include an integrated, multinational structure for the surveillance and early warning of tactical ballistic missile threats, and for active and passive countermeasures. The NADC also produced a report on Tactical Ballistic Missile Countermeasures, and presented its Air Defence Programme for 1995-2010, which provided significant Alliance guidance for all bodies working on aspects of extended air defence. Also, by this time, NATO military authorities began work at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) on a formal military operational requirement for theatre missile defence in Allied Command Europe. |
The counter-proliferation frameworkA significant step toward an Alliance EAD/TMD framework was taken when NATO Heads of State formally acknowledged the security threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles at their January 1994 Summit in Brussels and decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation.(3) The North Atlantic Council subsequently established the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) to carry out this work.(4)The first major product of these ad hoc groups was an Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, issued at the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9 June 1994.(5) The Alliance observed, inter alia, that: a number of states on the periphery of the Alliance continue in their attempts to develop or acquire the capability to produce WMD and their delivery means or to acquire illegally such systems; WMD and their delivery means can pose a direct military risk to the member states of the Alliance and to their forces; and WMD proliferation can occur despite international non-proliferation norms and agreements. In responding to these risks, the Policy Framework stressed that NATO's approach must incorporate both political and military capabilities to "discourage WMD proliferation and use, and if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations and forces". The SGP addressed the political aspects of NATO's approach to the proliferation problem. In responding to the risks of proliferation, the principal objective of Alliance policy is to prevent proliferation or, if it occurs, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The SGP has considered a range of factors that influence proliferation and has identified political and economic instruments available to prevent or respond to proliferation, such as the strengthening of international arms control and non-proliferation regimes. The Alliance recognized, however, that political efforts to prevent proliferation may not always be successful. For this reason, the DGP was tasked to address the military capabilities needed to discourage nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons proliferation, deter threats or use of NBC weapons, and to protect NATO populations, territory and forces.(6) The work of the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation was broken down into three phases. In the first phase, completed in December 1994, the DGP conducted an assessment of the risks posed to the Alliance by the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means. Drawing upon NATO intelligence assessments, the DGP's Risk Assessment validated the June 1994 Summit Declaration which noted that proliferation of WMD and their delivery means poses a real security challenge to NATO; spelled out in detail the growing proliferation risks on NATO's periphery due to indigenous production or illicit transfer; concluded that these weapons could pose new threats to NATO's civilian populations and territory and could make military operations more difficult for NATO forces to prosecute; and suggested that the challenge of ballistic missiles needs to be studied further.(7) Building on its Risk Assessment, the DGP Phase II effort, completed in November 1995, considered the implications of proliferation for allied planning and identified a range of capabilities needed to support NATO's defence posture for dealing with proliferation. To assess the implications of proliferation risks, the Alliance examined threats or attacks both on NATO territory and population, and risks posed to NATO forces in out-of-area operations (to include peacekeeping and humanitarian missions). Noting that military capabilities complement political efforts to prevent proliferation, the DGP found that a mixture of capabilities is necessary to provide a firm basis for deterring or protecting against the risks from proliferation.
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Additionally, wide area defences would be required to protect major portions of NATO territory and population against longer-range tactical ballistic missiles and sophisticated tactical aerodynamic missiles should the threat evolve. The third phase of the DGP's work, now under way, focuses on identifying areas in NATO's current military posture, to include extended air defence, where progress should be made to better counter the risks posed by proliferation. This effort should be reported to the North Atlantic Council in the summer of 1996. Additional concern for the risks posed by proliferation was also noted by the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and NATO Military Authorities at SHAPE. In its communiqus of December 1994 and June 1995, the DPC noted the growing proliferation risks with regard to states on NATO's periphery, and the continuing risks of illicit transfers of WMD and related materials, and recommended that the Alliance be prepared, if necessary, to counter this risk and thereby protect NATO's population, territory, and forces. Acknowledging the deterrent role of missile defence, the DPC and Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) noted in their joint communiqué of November 1995 that an appropriate mix of conventional response capabilities, to include active defences, would complement Alliance nuclear forces and would reinforce the Alliance's overall deterrence posture against threats posed by proliferation. In October 1994, SHAPE completed a draft of its Military Operational Requirement (MOR) for Theatre Missile Defence for Allied Command Europe, which is now undergoing revision. The SHAPE MOR calls for the protection of NATO forces, territory, and population against ballistic missiles and suggests an evolutionary defence capability that includes multiple defensive tiers or layers. SHAPE is currently developing a concept of operations, in conjunction with the NADC and the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), for implementing an offer by the United States to share ballistic missile early warning information with NATO allies. In parallel with the activities of NATO's political and military arms, the CNAD, NATO's matériel developers, established in October 1993 an Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG) on EAD/TMD to define future opportunities and methods of collaboration in this specific area. The eight-nation AHWG presented the results of its study to the CNAD in April 1995, urging nations and Alliance bodies to proceed with a number of specific cooperative technical projects while identifying additional areas of cooperation. A follow-on effort, the Missile Defence Ad Hoc Group (MDAHG), was subsequently established to identify several EAD/TMD concepts and to develop technical configurations and associated costs for EAD/TMD interceptors, sensors, and battle management, command, control, and communications (BMC3). This cost and configuration data will assist the DGP in its Phase III efforts. |
Conclusion: Defence policy guidance and TMD cooperationNATO's EAD/TMD policy is steadily developing. It began with an appreciation of the risks posed to the Alliance by the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery means, and a recognition that NATO's new Strategic Concept necessitated the protection of NATO forces, territory and population against ballistic missiles. A concept for extended air defence that integrates ballistic and cruise missile defence into existing air defence missions has since been adopted by the Alliance and a military operational requirement for EAD/TMD is being drafted by NATO's military authorities.NATO defence ministers have endorsed the DGP Phase II report, which found that extended air defence - to include tactical ballistic missile defence - for deployed NATO forces is an essential component of NATO's response to the proliferation threat, and will shortly make recommendations concerning NATO's military posture in this respect. An Alliance framework for EAD/TMD endorsed by the Council could then serve as an important guideline for Alliance members as they continue to develop their respective national approaches to the proliferation problem. In developing a framework for missile defence, the Alliance will also have to consider resource constraints. Lower defence budgets mean that armaments cooperation becomes an important consideration in finding solutions to the proliferation problem. Cooperation in development, production and fielding of EAD/TMD systems can provide a budgetary way ahead for allies working together to provide solutions where individual nations could not proceed alone. Cooperation also adds to the essential political fabric of the Alliance as nations work together to address common concerns. Finally, cooperation is essential militarily because by starting with a common system design, forces are better able to effectively interoperate with one another - whether they are deployed together in out-of-area operations in defence of Alliance interests or operating within NATO boundaries to defend Alliance territory and population. In evaluating EAD/TMD requirements, the United States has found that multi-tiered defence systems (capable of intercepting enemy missiles at high and low altitudes) provide the most robust capability against all ranges of theatre ballistic missiles and is necessary for defending successfully against ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. The US has also seen value in pursuing both sea and land-based missile defence options. Likewise, it is important for the Alliance also to consider the benefits of a layered missile defence system for deployed forces that could incorporate both ground and sea-based assets; and as the delivery range of ballistic missiles grows longer, NATO will also have to consider multi-tiered, wide area defences for the protection of NATO territory and population.
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Notes:(*) The author is Deputy for Strategic Relations in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of the US Department of Defense. He is also Chairman of the Missile Defense Ad Hoc Group of NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the DoD, the US Government or the CNAD.(1) Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, November 1991, paragraph 18. Text in NATO Review, No. 6, December, 1991, p. 22. (2) Ibid. pp. 25-32. (3) Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, para. 17. Text in NATO Review, No. 1, February 1994, p. 32. (4) For more on NATO's proliferation initiatives, see Gregory L. Schulte, "Responding to proliferation - NATO's role", In NATO Review, No. 4, July, 1995, pp. 15-19. (5) Text in NATO Review, No. 3, June 1994, pp. 28-29. (6) "NATO's Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Facts and Way Ahead", NATO Press Release, (96)124, 29, 29 November 1995. (7) While the NATO Risk Assessment is classified, open US government sources indicate there are currently 25 countries that possess or are developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and more than 15 nations that have ballistic missiles. (8) Op. Cit., NATO Press Release (95)124, 29 November 1995.
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