WEB EDITION No. 5 - Oct. 1994 Vol. 42 - pp. 26-30	EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST: AT THE CROSSROADS Carlos Gaspar Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon
	The end of the Cold War brought on a dual crisis in Europe and in the Middle East - two regional security complexes whose external borders and internal dynamics are in the process of rapid change, following the end of the rivalry between the two great powers, the failure of Soviet Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Beyond the asymmetry of the two regions, there are common points to be found in the evolution of Europe and the Middle East since the end of the Cold War. Firstly, both regions experienced a restoration of relative independence from the influence or control of outside powers that have more or less determined their development for over 40 years; secondly, both regions have experienced various attempts at territorial expansion in search of earlier historic borders - one of the causes of today's regional conflicts, particularly in the Balkans and in the Caucasus. The parallel paths of the transition processes of the two regions in turn determine the relations between Europe and the Middle East. On the one hand, there are signs of a resumption of the strategic interactions between the two contiguous areas, which had been interrupted with the British and French withdrawals from the Middle East. On the other hand, a return to a more normal level of relations between the two regions can only be achieved by confronting the growing trend towards mutual isolation, which manifests itself through the rise in radical movements seeking to assert their identity. These factors of regional convergence and divergence can, in turn, complicate the evolution of the respective internal dynamic processes of the two regions. What happens on the northern borders of the Middle East or on the southern borders of Europe - that is, either side of the line that separates these two major civilizations - has become more important for both regions. The southern frontier In the case of the Middle East - from Rabat to Tehran and from Damascus to Mogadishu - the turning point of the post-Cold War era was marked both by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and its subsequent disintegration, and by the Gulf War. The Soviet withdrawal upset the strategic balance in the region. First, it left a certain number of Arab states and parties - especially Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) - without their main external ally. Then, the United States, no longer constrained by the Soviet counterweight, decided to consolidate its status as the major external power while adapting its policy in the region; its aims are no longer focused on containing its former adversary but are now centred on preserving the status quo - as demonstrated by United States opposition to Iraq's attempt to impose its hegemony and the US intervention in Somalia - and on the Arab-Israeli peace process. But the revised US policy also contains a determination to pull back, limiting intervention only to the case of a resurgent threat to Israel or the emergence of a hegemonic power, and otherwise leaving the countries of the Middle East to assume their own responsibilities for providing stability in the region, a situation without precedent since the end of the colonial period. This situation is made all the more difficult following the independence of the six republics of the former Soviet Union whose populations are mainly Muslim - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - and which constitute part of the historic Middle East. Of course, the definitive status of these states vis-a-vis Russia is not yet clear. The possibility exists, however, of a recomposition of the security complex in the Middle East - from Marrakesh to Bukhara - with the addition of one or two sub-regional complexes on Russia's doorstep. In any event, the orientation of these post-communist regimes - be it in the direction of secularization along the lines of Turkey, or in the opposite direction of anti-Western, radical fundamentalism in the Iranian mould, or along the lines of the Islamic pretorian model of Pakistan - is becoming a crucial issue. The outcome of those processes of political transition cannot fail to change the strategic map of the region. The enduring influence of the Gulf War The effects of the Gulf War on the Middle East equation are no less significant than the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Firstly, Iraq's annexation of Kuwait put an end to pan-Arab nationalism, which had been the principal factor for unity among the Arab states since their independence, as well as a key instrument for the legitimization of the post-colonial autocratic regimes. Of course, pan-Arabism never succeeded either in unifying or in stabilizing an Arab bloc, or in controlling the dynamics of state autonomy. This force of transnational cohesion did, however, play a role in mobilizing society and allowed inter-Arab tensions to be kept in check, until the Gulf War debacle. Without the moderating influence of pan-Arabism, the dynamics of regional fragmentation could be expected to be the dominant force in the region for a long time. Secondly, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait interrupted a trend towards political and economic liberalization, which was making headway in certain Arab countries, as well as the sub-regional cooperation efforts that were beginning to take shape with the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Cooperation Council and the Maghreb Arab Union. Paralysed by the divisions among their members, these councils have become no more than "empty shells". The break in the reform process risks encouraging authoritarian regimes in their repressive excesses - and possibly precipitating their own violent overthrow; while the ineffectiveness of the sub-regional multilateral structures can lead to an escalation in interstate conflicts, even in the case of sub-regional complexes - the Maghreb, for example - where such tensions have been under greater control. Thirdly, the Gulf War, as a war among Arab states, and the decisive riposte by the United States, acted as a catalyst to the rise of radical Islamic movements whose opposition to authoritarian secular regimes was strengthened with the end of the myth of Arab unity, as well as by the circumstances of international intervention against Iraq, and the crisis of legitimacy of certain nationalist regimes. In this context, the fundamentalist movements, which are mobilizing transnational solidarity and regional unification ideologies against Western hegemony and are polarizing internal opposition factions, represent a real threat to the political status quo. For now, however, the dynamics of national and regional fragmentation remain stronger than the pan-Islamic unification movements which are threatening nationalistic regimes and Westernized elites. In Egypt, fundamentalist forces are following a strategy of gradual Islamization "from below". In Algeria, the same forces have paralysed the government through the ballot box and through terrorism. In Sudan, these forces have imposed their power indirectly, and in Tajikistan, they have brought about civil war. They are equally capable of provoking a break in the Arab-Israeli peace process, should the succeed in neutralizing their PLO rivals or in radicalizing Israeli opinion. Finally, the effects of the Islamic movement against the power elites are making themselves increasingly felt in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan and, even beyond the borders of the Middle East, in Turkey. The force of the dynamics of fragmentation seems to be gaining the upper hand and is opening the way to the proliferation of conflicts in the entire region. Europe's southern frontier is thus in the process of becoming an arc of crisis, whose effects are making themselves felt, especially in Southern Europe. Southern European perceptions Post-Cold War Europe, which is also in a crisis of transition, faces two areas of instability on its periphery - to the east and to the south. In both cases, the resurgence of anti-Western forces - radical nationalist and religious movements, pan-Slavic and pan-Islamic movements - within a framework of political instability and of economic and social crisis, is at the origin of conflicts that cannot be isolated. Moreover, in the event of escalation, these conflicts run the risk of creating divisions among the European powers, as well as within the Atlantic community, and even of resurrecting historic enmities - the rivalry between Germany and Russia or a confrontation between the West and Islam, for example. Of course, the two crisis areas do not constitute "twin arcs", since the stakes in the two peripheries are not of the same order. At stake in Central and Eastern Europe are, on the one hand, the possibility of European reunification of East and West by extending the frontiers of democracy and through enlargement of the European Union and, on the other, the definition of the balance of power among the states which belong to the European security complex from the Atlantic to the Urals - the key to European stability. In the Middle East, democratization does not seem to be on the agenda and there is no question of expanding the European security complex into this area or integrating it into European or Western institutions. While there is no regional power or coalition that constitutes a threat to Europe's security, the security problems on its southern frontier have grown following the withdrawal of the Red Army from Central Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a parallel crisis in the Middle East. The destabilizing effects were immediately felt with the invasion of Kuwait, which could have sparked off an economic crisis, had the US-led coalition not intervened to oppose Iraq's strategy of regional hegemony. At the same time, certain Southern European countries are not only more sensitive to the effects of the crisis in the Middle East but are also very concerned over an Eastward shift of the centre of gravity of European politics. For these countries, the growing instability in the Middle East, especially in the Mediterranean, gives rise to their fears of the political and social fallout from the flow of refugees and immigrants. They also perceive an anti-Western threat coming from this neighbouring region, just across the Straits of Gibraltar - according to some, "Europe's Rio Grande".(1) The implication of this analogy is that the importance of the southern frontier should counterbalance the importance of the eastern frontier; the dangers would then become opportunities to bring European priorities back into balance in the face of the two areas of crisis and to contain the tendencies that might otherwise lead Spain or Portugal back to a semi-peripheral status, confuse the position of Italy, placed at the crossroads of the two crisis areas, or the position of France, the only member of the European Union that really has a Middle Eastern policy. In this connection, a certain number of initiatives have been launched since 1990, such as the Italian and Spanish initiative for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, whose scope would go far beyond the Mediterranean basin to encompass the entire Middle East and - following the example of the CSCE - the United States and Russia; at an early stage, both France and Portugal joined in supporting this proposal. Other later initiatives, such as a proposal to link the states of the Maghreb Arab Union with the WEU or with NATO in a framework comparable to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), also seek a comparable commitment in the two regions. However, these types of initiatives have little chance of success. It is unrealistic to try to place the two crisis areas on an equal footing or to try to integrate into a single institutional framework the European and Middle Eastern regional security complexes. Moreover, there is a lack of unity in the perceptions of the countries of Southern Europe as to what constitutes their interests. Greece looks primarily to the Balkans and to the Eastern Mediterranean. Italy is unable to bring together a southern coalition to implement a Mediterranean "unitary strategic area" concept. France wants to retain its exclusive ability to formulate policies that differentiate between the various sub-regional complexes in the Middle East. Spain is primarily concerned over the crisis in the Maghreb, and Portugal wants simply not to be left out of joint initiatives in the Western Mediterranean. The countries of Southern Europe are not ready, and do not possess the means, to confront the Middle East crisis as a whole - to go beyond sub-regional divisions that separate the instability of the Maghreb from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The centre and its periphery A comparison of the security situations of the Middle East and of Europe discloses their asymmetry on many levels. Europe is a community of states engaged in a process of integration, while the Middle East remains an area where the dynamics of fragmentation can lead to conflicts among states; the common boundary between the two areas separates democracy from autocracy, market economies from under-developed economies, modern societies from archaic social structures torn asunder by the phenomena of modernization. These differences are further sharpened by the contrast in demographics, by the economic dependence of the countries of the Middle East on their European neighbours, and by the military superiority of the West. Relations between Europe and the Middle East are thus typical of relations between a centre and its periphery, especially since the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War. Previously, Middle Eastern countries were in a position to play upon East-West divisions to bolster their position in the region. In addition, their control of oil reserves conferred on the Arab states an effective tool for exerting political pressure, as was demonstrated on two occasions in the 1970s. Now, the centre is no longer divided, its military forces are no longer concentrated on its eastern borders, and the oil threat seems to have lost its credibility, especially after the Iraqi adventure. Thus, the perception of some Southern European countries of an increased threat to their security from beyond their southern boundaries seems to be exaggerated. Militarily, the countries of the Middle East - especially those on the Mediterranean - are at most capable of defending themselves against external interventions, and the increased proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons in the region does not alter the strategic imbalance between the centre and the periphery. The only exceptions are Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, which do not enjoy the protection of the Atlantic Alliance. Economically, the importance of the energy resources of the Gulf and of North Africa can create a less asymmetrical interdependence between the Middle East and Europe, the latter remaining the major export market of the countries of the south and their major source of investment, technology transfer and development aid. Politically, the instability of the secular autocracies and the emergence of Islamic regimes can cause the process of democratization in the Middle East to falter and give rise to an anti-Western radicalization, which may result in a consolidation of regional security autonomy, but not necessarily entailing a direct threat to Europe. Lastly, social interpenetration is the area where the effects of the crisis on the southern borders can be felt the most in Europe. This is less through the flow of refugees, which can be controlled, than through the racist and exclusionary tendencies toward immigrant communities in Europe. This in turn can open the field to extremist forces in Europe whose growth - in France and Italy, for example - could undermine the stability of democratic regimes as well as increase tensions between Europe and the Middle East. If the crises in Europe and the Middle East were to become aggravated - through increasing social insecurity - the probability of a "cold war" between Islam and the West could increase. Such a development is not inevitable, however, and it is possible to limit the negative effects of the crisis processes in the two regions. The key to positively influencing relations between Europe and the Middle East is through economic programmes, investments in particular, in such high priority sectors as energy, transport and telecommunications - programmes that are essential to the credibility of the new Mediterranean policy. Such a policy must be pursued without losing sight of the European Union's crucial support of the Arab-Israeli peace process. These measures should make it possible to coordinate the development of bilateral relations within the framework of a Community effort to contain political instability in the Middle East and to reduce the flow of emigrants. Militarily, the principal guarantor of security in the Middle East and the Mediterranean remains the United States, as demonstrated by the US intervention in the Gulf, the US role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the deployment of a standing NATO naval force in the Mediterranean. The United States - both within the Atlantic Alliance and through bilateral relations - is also the only solid link between its allies in Southern Europe as well as between those allies and Turkey - itself caught in a vice between the two arcs of crisis. Since there is no other federating power that can replace the United States, its role must be bolstered; at the same time, however, the European military presence in the southern border area must be reinforced, and integration of the Southern European countries in the NATO military structure must be enhanced - or, in the case of France, the way should be opened to reintegration. The Combined Joint Task Forces concept could be used to create intervention forces as well as a naval force composed of French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese units with responsibility for security in the western Mediterranean. Such an initiative could reduce the insecurity of the Southern Europeans and mobilize their military resources without having to place them under US command. The risk of division between European and Western states remains so long as there is no common Middle East security policy, formulated within the European Union in liaison with the United States. Achieving such a policy presupposes a revision of the relations between the European Union and Israel, which could be initiated by those member states of the European Union and NATO most threatened by regional instability. Thus, in the end, the post-Cold War crisis in the Middle East could serve as a catalyst to the consolidation of the European and Atlantic communities through their efforts to coordinate a coherent Middle East policy and to play a stabilizing role in the region, which in turn would also contribute to the settlement of the post-Cold War crisis in Europe. Note: (1) The river on the US-Mexican border. © Copyright by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1994.