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WEB EDITION No. 3 - June 1994 Vol. 42 - pp. 21-25
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THE CSCE AND THE CHANGING
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This article reflects the results of a Belgian
research project involving academics from the
University Of Leuven (KUL), Brussels (ULB and VUB),
Antwerp (UIA) and Namur (FUNDP) and coordinated
by Werner Bauwens of NATO's Office of Information
and Press.
Since the notion of security has many dimensions, security risks and threats can vary considerably. Thus we see that NATO's January 1994 Brussels Summit Declaration, (1) while noting the end of the period of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War, refers to the new causes of instability, tension and conflict that have emerged. These new security risks in Europe are multifaceted, with political, military, socio-economic, developmental and environmental dimensions. At the present time, it hardly seems conceivable that such a broad range of risks could be dealt with by any one organization acting alone. Coherent interaction and increased cooperation between the existing security structures is therefore required, but as the dividing lines between their mandates has become less clear, this will not be easy to achieve. The Alliance's Strategic Concept, (2) underlining a broad approach to stability and security, reflects new thinking in this regard, but it is difficult to distinguish NATO's enlarged mandate from the overall approach of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Furthermore, the expansion of NATO's zone of influence to the Central and East European states through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and to other CSCE member states through Partnership for Peace (PFP), influences NATO's specific profile within the CSCE. Nevertheless, the question remains how the complementarity between the mandates of these respective organizations can be properly arrived at, particularly bearing in mind that, while respecting the need for close interaction, it could be argued that the specificity of each of these so-called interlocking institutions should be preserved. Developments within the CSCEThrough its scope (addressing and linking all dimensions of security), its geographical size (covering an area from Vancouver to Vladivostok), its comprehensive membership of 53 states, and its decision-making structure which is based above all on consensus, the CSCE is by far the organization best suited to address overall European security.While sovereign equality of the individual states was firmly enshrined in the CSCE's Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and duly reflectedin the consensus procedure, the first principle of the Final Act equally recognized the right to choose whether or not to be a party to alliance treaties. The bloc behaviour and confrontation typical of the Cold War era became manifest in many practical aspects of the CSCE's activities. Time-consuming caucus meetings were held to prepare the plenary sessions. The classical internal consultation approach followed by NATO member states led to a highly visible and prominent posture of the Alliance in the CSCE, through co-sponsored proposals, well orchestrated tactics and agreed positions. In most instances, the NATO caucus maintained a monopoly on the preparation of military-security decisions. When it came to the drafting stage at CSCE meetings, informal negotiating structures were set up on a tripartite basis: East, West and the neutral and non-aligned countries, the latter playing a coordinating role. Within the Western group of countries, a distinction was made between the NATO and European Community subgroups, although pragmatic formulas allowed both forces to unite when needed. The present evolution from confrontation to cooperative security in Europe is having a profound effect on the CSCE, including on its level of institutionalization and crisis management capabilities, as well as on its relationships with other security structures. This development is taking place within a wider context of discussions among NATO member states on the future of their Alliance, and among Central and Eastern European states on the question of security guarantees. Whereas previously it would have been out of the question to include an explicit reference to NATO in a CSCE document, these days there are regular cross references to NATO and the CSCE in their respective communiqués. This phenomenon illustrates the major conceptual change in the NATO-CSCE relationship: NATO today is not only acting within the CSCE as a core group, but is also interacting with the CSCE as a partner. It is interesting to note the gradual evolution of this interaction. The first timid reference to NATO as such appeared in the summary of conclusions of the CSCE Berlin Council Meeting in June 1991, where the exchange of information and relevant documents between the CSCE and the major European and transatlantic institutions, such as NATO, was encouraged. The Prague Council Meeting in January 1992 decided that NATO and other European and transatlantic organizations could be invited to make contributions to specialized CSCE meetings whenever they have relevant expertise. At the Helsinki CSCE Summit in July 1992, it was decided to improve contacts and practical cooperation with appropriate international organizations by inviting them to attend CSCE meetings and seminars as guests of honour, with appropriate nameplates indicating their organization ('NATO', 'EU', 'WEU' and so on), and to give presentations. It also stated that the CSCE was prepared to seek, on a case-by-case basis, the support of such international institutions and organizations, as well as other mechanisms, including the peacekeeping mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), for CSCE operations. It should be noted, however, that since the Helsinki Summit, the NATO-CSCE institutional linkage has not been significantly carried forward in more practical terms. Both the 1992 Stockholm and 1993 Rome Council Meetings of the CSCE remained vague on the issue. In his address to the Rome Council meeting, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner stated that the two organizations do not compete but complement each other. He added that 'the fruitful, effective and growing cooperation between the United Nations and NATO has revealed the necessity to have early coordination between institutions if they are preparing to support one another in undertaking peacekeeping and conflict prevention actions'. It remains to be seen how this early coordination will materialize. NATO's Brussels Summit Declaration committed the member states to further strengthening the CSCE, being the only organization comprising all European and North American countries, as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, cooperative security, and the advancement of democracy and human rights. It also stated that NATO will actively support efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. Thus the main responsibility for addressing the broad field of conflict prevention lies with the CSCE. As the Secretary General of CSCE, Dr. Wilhelm Hynck, recently stated: 'The activities of the CSCE range in principle from early warning to crisis management and post-conflict measures, but in reality it is early warning and conflict prevention which have been given the greater emphasis since prevention is preferable to cure.'(3) The CSCE has therefore agreed on a set of operational tools giving it special, unequivocal capabilities in the field of preventive diplomacy, enabling it to tackle at their roots situations and developments with a destabilizing potential. The most impressive progress has been made in what could be called the 'lower end' of conflict management. So-called 'soft' measures, such as sending fact finding, rapporteur and long-term missions, are combined with a close political consultative follow-up. Although some attempts have been made to introduce specific procedures, such as the Moscow mechanism on the human dimension or the Berlin mechanism regarding crisis situations, flexibility remains one of the main characteristics of the CSCE political consultative system. Another core element of the CSCE is the direct linkage between the review of implementation and normative action, as addressed at the traditional review conferences and at the Forum for Security Cooperation. Moreover, the prospect of an implementation review has in itself a conflict prevention effect. In the Cold War era, this link was particularly effective in promoting compliance withhuman rights commitments, for example. The functional significance and authority of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office, (4) the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the newly-established Permanent Committee illustrate the development of a pragmatic and rapid reaction approach in line with these CSCE characteristics. With regard to peacekeeping and other measures at the 'higher end' of conflict management, the CSCE would appear to be following a more restrained course. In accordance with the 1992 Helsinki Summit decisions, CSCE peacekeeping operations will not include enforcement action under the CSCE's responsibility and are subject to a wide range of conditions. Having defined itself as a regional arrangement, the CSCE could be entrusted with peacekeeping within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, although it would have to obtain authorization from the UN Security Council to conduct military enforcement actions (Article 53 of the UN Charter). Even if the CSCE obtained such authorization, a purely CSCE enforcement operation would seem unlikely under the present circumstances because of its complete lack of military capabilities. The CSCE is preparing its first peacekeeping project in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which may involve sending a very small contingent to observe the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. The difficulties which the CSCE has been having in defining the modalities concerning command, control and financing, as well in obtaining troops from member states for this operation, especially from the Western participants, seem to indicate that only small-sized peacekeeping operations, and thus with narrow objectives, can be organized directly by the CSCE. Currently, there are no clear provisions on how NATO could interact with the CSCE in these matters. In principle, however, it should be acceptable to both organizations that their cooperation range from statements of support to full-range synergy, depending on the circumstances and the subject matter. In any case, this functional approach requires the expression of political will on the part of all the states involved. With regard to ethnic conflicts - an area in which the CSCE has come up with significant initiatives and proved its capability in defusing tensions - the CSCE's instruments are self-sufficient, NATO's role being limited to declarations of support. In the case of the Forum for Security Cooperation, NATO member states continue their practice of introducing common proposals on a variety of military-oriented subjects, some of which have also been included in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council's Work Plan. This is thus the first manifestation of the NACC coming within the framework of the CSCE. In this connection, the Helsinki Summit Declaration recognized that NATO, through the creation of the NACC, has established patterns of cooperation with new partners in harmony with the goals of the CSCE. However, apart from the participation of a representative of the Chairman of the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping and on Early Warning, as well as the presence of representatives of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office at several meetings of the Ad Hoc Group, there is no other evidence of NACC-CSCE interaction. The NACC, mainly due to the wishes of some Central and Eastern European countries, tends to favour and preserve its intimate and privileged relationship with NATO. Partnership for Peace introduces new and important elements into the discussion. PFP is not only open to NACC participating states but also to other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to the programme. NATO's commitment to consult with the Partnership participants if a partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security, has to be harmonized with the existing mandates of the CSCE in the field of political consultations. The PFP Framework Document, which is signed by all participating states, also refers to the maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE. Together with the Alliance's offer made at the Oslo Ministerial meeting in June 1992, to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, and with the NACC making a similar offer, this element of Partnership for Peace will have to be considered more fully if and when NATO-CSCE interaction in peacekeeping moves from the conceptual to the operational stage. NATO's experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina, acting under a United Nations mandate, proves this point. In the field of peace enforcement and 'hard' forms of peacekeeping, such as sending large military forces with an extended mandate which could include a broader use of force than purely for self-defence purposes, NATO undoubtedly has the necessary experience and infrastructure to play an operational role under the mandate of the CSCE. Obviously, the pre-requisites for any such operations would be the existence of the necessary political will on the part of the Western allies and the acceptance of NATO involvement on the part of the non-NATO states of the CSCE. The consultation process within the CSCE has been significantly affected by the new security tasks of the post-Cold War era. The NATO caucus, which previously acted as the main unifying force for the West during a time of bloc-to-bloc negotiations, can no longer claim that role. With more emphasis being put on the political dimension of security, it is only logical that other organizations also come into play. The European Union has begun to develop its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) according to the relevant Maastricht Treaty provisions. Its objectives are not only to strengthen the security of the Union and its member states, but also to preserve peace and international security. (5) It should be noted that the CSCE has, from the very beginning, been a core element for European political cooperation and that over the years the European Community (now the European Union) has succeeded in securing for itself formal recognition within the CSCE, though sometimes not without difficulties encountered in the larger Western group of nations. Based on the European Union's CFSP mandate and following the evolution of the US reaction to the changing European security environment, European political cooperation is becoming more and more visible within the CSCE. Developments at the Forum for Security Cooperation illustrate this trend: as far as Western coordination is concerned, the emphasis is shifting towards the European caucus, which today meets more frequently and with greater impact than in the past. One of the most substantive initiatives tabled by EU member states was the proposal for a politico-military Code of Conduct. This Code includes the non-recognition of any territorial acquisition through violence; the interdiction of the stationing of foreign forces without the consent of the host state; the characterization of any non-respect of obligations stemming from arms control agreements as a 'source of concern'; the inviolability of borders; and finally, norms governing intra-state relations, including the protection of rights of persons belonging to national minorities. The EU member states succeeded in channelling their proposal through the negotiations without losing the initiative or weakening the common identity of the original sponsors. Apparently, however, although almost all NATO members co-sponsored the EU proposal, this process did not go as smoothly as the EU members had anticipated. In the delicate area of ethnic conflict, the European Union has indicated its eagerness to play an operational role by proposing a Pact on Stability in Europe, which includes specific measures to prevent such conflicts. NATO's Brussels Summit Declaration welcomed this EU initiative and mentioned the willingness of the Allies to contribute to its elaboration. In addition to the above approach, which primarily covers measures at the lower end of the conflict management scale, the EU has also declared its readiness to develop measures at the higher end. In the Maastricht Treaty's provisions relating to the framing of a common defence policy, the Western European Union is requested to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union with defence implications. The EU can thus become an organization capable of handling all security tasks by deepening its own integration process, although it has clearly stated that it does not seek to be an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. NATO, in turn, wholly encourages the development of a European security and defence pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. In this connection, the EU-NATO relationship has much to gain from the recent adjustment to the WEU's membership which is brought closer to that of both NATO and the EU through the establishment of an observer and associate status. Moreover, the capabilities of NATO and WEU in future will be 'separable but not separate'. As part of this process, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), announced at NATO's Brussels Summit, is not only of high political significance in the re-balancing process in which the transatlantic partners are presently engaged. It also reflects an operational necessity as it provides a means to facilitate operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. This initiative needs to be urgently translated into practical arrangements. Looking aheadMore limited groupings than the 53-nation CSCE still have a role to play within the overall European security environment. At the same time, the mutually reinforcing character of the relationship between the CSCE and other European security organizations needs to be further emphasized. The arrangement between NATO and the CSCE concerning official contacts and exchanges should be more vigorously pursued and implemented, though without leading to overly rigid procedures, all the more so in view of the continuing transformation of the Alliance and the prospect of enlargement. NATO's partners for peace have everything to gain from a straightforward NATO-CSCE interaction and synergy, if only because NATO expansion and reform are clearly conditioned by the political and security developments 'in the whole of Europe'. The understanding and support for the expansion of NATO on the part of the CSCE family of nations will depend on the nature, scope and quality of the NATO-CSCE relationship.The interoperability between NATO and the CSCE in the field of peacekeeping should be actively studied and tested. Surely, NATO as such, but also with its NACC and Partnership for Peace dimensions, can contribute to the CSCE by providing monitoring and observer missions with support in such areas as transport, logistics and intelligence. In the case of more coercive actions, the UN-NATO experience gained in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina could be repeated and even expanded in a CSCE context. Further political reflection on such developments is undoubtedly required. Within the CSCE itself, the NATO and EU caucuses continue to make sense. Both are indispensable as driving forces, and other CSCE participants expect that these groups will continue to put forward increasing numbers of initiatives. A balanced and open relationship between the EU and NATO caucuses, in particular with regard to timely exchanges of information, would benefit the entire CSCE community. However, the division of labour between the EU and NATO caucuses is changing, and thus their format may also need to be adapted in specific cases. A more flexible response capability regarding the various demands in the security field is needed. New pre-negotiation procedures and arrangements as well as new textures and patterns of relations between CSCE participating states will have to be explored in the light of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union, the recently agreed association status within the WEU, and the developments in NACC and Partnership for Peace. The present security challenges in Europe call for a 'post-Ost-Politik' based on an updated two-track approach in the spirit of the Harmel doctrine, with a mix of 'soft' and 'hard' security measures. This approach implies that NATO and EU inputs are necessary, both within and outside the CSCE. The challenge is to harmonize these inputs and make them work together for peace and stability throughout Europe. Notes: (1) For text, see NATO Review, No.1, February 1994, pp.30-33. (2) For text, see NATO Review, No.6, December 1991, pp.25-32. (3) 'CSCE works to develop its conflict prevention potential', Dr Wilhelm Höynck, NATO Review, No.2, April 1994, pp.16-22. (4) The Foreign Minister of the last country to host the meeting of the Council of Ministers. (5) Treaty on European Union, Title V. © Copyright by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1994. |
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