Web edition Vol. 47 - No. 5 Oct. 1993 p. 3-7

UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND COOPERATION WITH NATO Kofi A. Annan United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Last June marked the forty-fifth anniversary of the first deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force. Today, 29 peacekeeping undertakings later, we still have 15 operations in force, with two more in the wings. We are in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. We are, in a sense, a growth industry, though most certainly we are a non-profit enterprise. Perhaps it is time to reflect upon the path which we have trodden and the directions in which it might yet lead us. When faced with situations as compelling as Somalia, Cambodia and Bosnia, this exercise becomes not merely appropriate but essential. At no time since its inception has the nature or the concept of peacekeeping been as open to redefinition as it is at this juncture. Within the last two years alone, we have mounted 11 new peacekeeping operations. As the number of operations proliferates, the view we had held during the first four decades of the United Nations existence on the essence of peacekeeping has begun to change. The rapid growth of peacekeeping has also obliged the UN to seek new avenues of cooperation with groups of member states already organized for joint military action, such as NATO. What factors have brought about this expansion of peacekeeping? The end of the Cold War has had a substantial impact on the scale of operations, a development which, along with the inherent evolution of the United Nations and of peacekeeping itself, made this action possible. To understand this trend, we should examine, if only briefly, peackeeping s sources, situation and prospects. Principles and Precedents: It is almost impossible to define a technique that has differed nearly every time that it has been practised. Through improvisation over time, peacekeeping has been used to investigate and report on volatile situations, to monitor truces and ceasefires, to verify compliance with agreements, to establish buffer zones between hostile armies, to help create the conditions necessary for the implementation of complex settlements, and to provide humanitarian support to local populations caught up in war. Furthermore, peacekeeping as we have come to know it is not defined or prescribed in the Charter itself; the only reference there to United Nations activities involving military force is in Chapter VII,(1) which has very rarely been invoked in peacekeeping. Instead, it is a tool that has largely been used in situations where application of Chapter VI of the Charter(2) was inadequate and utilization of Chapter VII was impossible. Hence peackeeping became, in the memorable phrase of former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, Chapter six and a half. The only way to define peacekeeping as it has been practised is to take a cross-section of characteristics of the operations pursued to date. In this context, peacekeeping appears as the use of multinational military personnel, armed or unarmed, under international command and with the consent of the parties, to help control and resolve conflict between hostile states and between hostile communities within a state. Clear as that definition seems, events are now making parts of it contentious. Historically, peacekeeping acquired the characteristics just quoted becausethey reflected the tasks which member states were prepared to let the United Nations assume. The lack of unanimity among the members of the Security Council throughout the Cold War required much careful navigation. It was a fine line that had been left us, and a certain amount of finesse and flexibility was needed to follow it. Only with the end of the Cold War did the proliferation in peacekeeping really begin. There are two reasons for this: a new accord within the Security Council, which made broader action possible; and the new political landscape, in which wars came to an end for lack of Superpower support, and states began to dissolve in the absence of the pressure that had long held them together. Present Parameters: In these changed circumstances, the principles and practices which had evolved in the Cold War period suddenly seemed needlessly self-limiting. Within and outside the UN, there is now increasing support for peacekeeping with teeth. When lightly-armed peacekeepers were made to look helpless in Somalia and Bosnia, member states and public opinion supported more muscular action; an increasing number of situations seem to require it, and the Charter of the United Nations provides the legal authority for it. So how should these teeth best be bared? The temptation to bite into various problems more firmly is compounded by the disintegration of different elements of the definition cited earlier. Formerly, a tradition had developed by which operations required the consent of the parties involved. In the current conflicts, how should we define a party? Does each faction in the former Yugoslavia qualify? Or every tribe in Somalia? Article 2 of the Charter warns against intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ; but it becomes difficult to apply this principle in situations where there is no recognized or recognizable governing authority. Formerly, peacekeeping limited the use of force to self-defence, even though self-defence could be construed to mean the defence of the ability to carry out one's mandate. However, the idea of peacekeeping was always subject to the principle of a minimum use of force and was represented by contingents and equipment that made more extensive measures impractical. Peacekeepers were deployed to keep the peace, not to make war; their major weapon was moral authority, not military strength. Today s conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia have fundamentally redrawn the parameters. It is no longer enough to implement agreements or separate antagonists; the international community now wants the United Nations to demarcate boundaries, control and eliminate heavy weapons, quell anarchy, and guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in war zones. These are clearly tasks that call for teeth and muscle , in addition to the less tangible qualities that we have sought in the past. In other words, there are increasing demands that the United Nations now enforce the peace, as originally envisaged in the Charter. Prospects for Cooperation with NATO: Anticipating the future form of United Nations action demands foresight of two kinds: to extrapolate from lines now being pursued and reactions to them, and to foresee possibilities which are currently unattainable. From whichever perspective one starts, the first and most formidable obstacle has been, and most probably will continue to be, translating commitment into action. In light of the new possibilities that peacekeeping presents, member states are now encouraging commitment of a breadth and depth previously unimagined in the international community. In recent months, a new battalion has been added to the Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM); the Somalian Operation (UNOSOM) has been reconstituted on a more ambitious scale; the Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) has overtaken the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as the largest peacekeeping operation in history; and operations in Mozambique, Georgia and on the Uganda-Rwanda border have commenced. Missions to Haiti and Liberia are under consideration in the Security Council. This breadth of action is matched by the depth of activity envisaged. In January 1992, the United Nations deployed 11,500 peacekeepers to cover all the operations then extant. Today, UNOSOM II alone constitutes a force of over 28,000 in Somalia. Yet at the same moment when the world has galvanized itself behind collective action in principle, it has failed to take commensurate steps in practice. In 1992, the report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly showed US$ 723 million unpaid in obligatory assessments, the equivalent of 62 per cent of the 1993 general budget of the Organization. Of US$ 1.1 billion that has thus far been assessed for 1993, US$ 695 million was still outstanding as of the end of August. An additional assessment of US$ 800 million has recently been authorized, and will soon be assessed to member states. Beyond this critical situation lies an even more daunting scenario. Peacekeeping as we know it has no capital fund, no reserve stock of equipment and no reserve force. If we are to surmount the frustrations of delay, structure and scale, if we are to rise to the challenge which renewed interest and widened mandates present us, we will need the means to do so. The teeth of peacekeeping are of necessity two-edged: they must have both mandate and means. The sheer size and complexity of peacekeeping operations makes it imperative to explore new avenues of cooperation with regional organizations such as NATO. With its existing military structure, resources and political weight, NATO has a lot to contribute to the concept of peacekeeping, particularly in its more muscular form. The larger and more pro-active operations will require more sophisticated command and control structures and equipment. As the Security Council makes increasing use of its enforcement powers under the Charter, United Nations operations have to be equipped with military and protective means that go far beyond the traditional white-painted soft-skinned vehicles and small arms. In this context, NATO s willingness to participate in United Nations operations, as reflected at the North Atlantic Council s ministerial meetings in December 1992 and June this year,(3) holds the promise of a vast qualitative as well as quantitative expansion of the means for collective action that are at the disposal of the United Nations. Already, particularly in the context of operations in the former Yugoslavia, NATO has made available several of the means at its disposal.(4) NATO airborne warning and control planes are monitoring the no-fly zone established by the Security Council over Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1992, and since April 1993, fighter and reconnaissance planes of NATO member states, now numbering some 100, are providing the teeth to enforce the Council's interdiction on military flights. And, since July 1993, as a further precedent, member states operating in the NATO framework have been providing protective air cover for UNPROFOR troops operating on the ground to deter attacks against the safe areas established by the Security Council. The planning process for the implementation of the now defunct Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina was a useful learning experience for both NATO and the United Nations. The United Nations made it clear from the outset that such an operation, which would have required some 70,000 to 85,000 troops, was beyond its planning and implementation capacity. Both organizations in the planning process have had an opportunity to familiarize each other with their respective ways of doing business and it is hoped that close collaboration will occur should a new peace agreement be reached in Bosnia in the last quarter of the year. Of course, command and control becomes an issue when two organizations with their own established lines of political and military decision-making are to cooperate. There can be no doubt that the Security Council is the ultimate legal and political authority in deciding on a United Nations operation. The Council uses this authority guardedly and generally insists on retaining control over the operations to maintain international peace and security which it has mandated. In most cases, the Council entrusts the Secretary-General with the responsibility of overseeing the faithful implementation of its resolutions. However, it has also, in some cases, passed resolutions authorizing member states or regional organizations to take actions relating to international peace and security, as with Desert Storm or the UNITAF operation in Somalia. It is conceivable that the Council could, in the Bosnian case, ask the Secretary-General to exercise his responsibility by providing overall political and strategic guidance through his Special Representative, leaving the tactical and operational decisions to a Theatre Commander who would use NATO command structures and assets in leading a force which, in the main, would be composed of NATO troops. Understandably, for NATO, it is critical to determine at what level of its own political and military hierarchy command and control should be submitted to the authority of the Security Council through the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Obviously, member states of NATO have an interest in retaining control over their troops; that may not be difficult to reconcile with the interest of the United Nations in staying on top of an operation mandated by the Security Council. While this institutional issue will need further discussion and clarification, there is already much room for cooperation on a smaller scale. Most members of NATO are among the most technologically advanced countries in the world, and many of the sophisticated technologies developed for NATO could usefully be employed in peacekeeping operations. For example, technical means for surveillance ranging from relatively simple drones to advanced satellite remote sensing technologies could help to make some of the routine tasks in peacekeeping, such as observing and monitoring, more cost-effective and reduce the number of peacekeepers exposed to a dangerous environment on the ground. Moreover, NATO member states have logistics and airlift capabilities which would greatly help peacekeeping operations to reduce reaction time between a mandate given by the Security Council and the actual deployment of peacekeepers on the ground. And the provision of close air support to UN troops in danger is always of incalculable value. As with the concept of peacekeeping itself, cooperation between the executing organizations will have to be developed further on a case by case basis. No two conflicts which may merit the involvement of international peacekeeping forces are alike. While the United Nations has global responsibility for peace and security, NATO s area of operations is in essence confined to Europe. The members of NATO, therefore, will have to determine in each case whether they want to contribute individually or collectively in the resolution of a particular conflict. What has always to be borne in mind is the overall political objective, the peaceful settlement of a dispute. Notes: (1) Chapter VII concerns 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'. (2) Pacific Settlement of Disputes. (3) For text of communique of the ministerial meetings, see NATO Reviews, No.6, December 1992, pp.28-31, and No.3, June 1993, pp.31-33. NATODATA File nac106.92 and nac38.93 (4) For a more detailed discussion of NATO's contribution to the UN in former Yugoslavia, see John Kriendler, "NATO's changing role - opportunities and constraints for peacekeeping", NATO Review, No.3, June 1993, pp.16-22. © Copyright by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1993.