WEB EDITION No. 5 - Oct. 1991 Vol. 39 p. 7-10

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY: REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, Head of the US Delegation to the negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arm During the nearly fifty years since the first nuclear weapon was developed, the world has witnessed the creation and development of ever-increasing numbers and kinds of strategic nuclear weapons. It watched with great uneasiness as such weapons became the foundation of a bipolar relationship based on confrontation and mistrust. At the same time, the United States and its allies have relied on strategic nuclear weapons as a means of deterring war and ensuring Western safety and security. As part of the sweeping changes that have been witnessed in Europe and the Soviet Union which date back ten years or so, the United States and the Soviet Union have been working to change their strategic relationship. In June 1982 these two countries began the START process to better manage this relationship and the weapons that shaped it, a process that culminated on 31 July this year when President Bush and President Gorbachev signed the START Treaty. More recently, President Bush, after consultation with NATO allies, announced on 27 September far-reaching initiatives on nuclear arms including the decision to stand down from alert all heavy bombers as well as all US intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) scheduled for deactivation under START. Further, after START has been ratified, their elimination will be accelerated. The USSR was called upon to adopt similar measures. In the past two years, NATO Review has kept track of the progress of the START negotiations. (1) Now, I would like to describe the results of these many years of effort. The START Treaty comprises the Treaty itself and ten Protocols and Annexes - totalling over 700 pages. Together, these historic documents contain the rules by which the strategic offensive forces of both countries will be reduced and limited. The START Treaty not only sets equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed by either side but also establishes an equal ceiling on ballistic missile throw- weight (a measure of the lift capability for ballistic missiles). In addition, each side is limited to no more than: 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers), a limit that is 36 per cent below the current Soviet level and 29 per cent below the current US level; 6,000 total accountable warheads - 41 per cent below the current Soviet level and 43 per cent below the current US level; 4,900 accountable warheads deployed on ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) - 48 per cent below the current Soviet level and 40 per cent below the current US level; 1,540 accountable warheads deployed on 154 heavy ICBMs, a 50 per cent reduction in current Soviet forces (the US has no heavy ICBMs); 1,100 accountable warheads deployed on mobile ICBMs; and, Aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs equal to about 54 per cent of the current Soviet aggregate throw-weight. Unlike previous strategic nuclear arms agreements, the effect of these limits is real reductions, including reductions in the near term. By the end of the first three years of the reduction period called for in the Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union will be at equal levels through the removal of nuclear weapons from the deployed forces of both sides. Overall, the deepest reductions will be in the weapons categories which pose the greatest threat to the United States and its allies - ballistic missiles such as the Soviet Union's SS-18 heavy ICBMs. The Treaty's central limits are designed to strengthen strategic stability by encouraging the restructuring of the Soviet strategic arsenal away from its historic emphasis on first strike weapons and toward less threatening, more survivable systems, such as bombers. The reductions and limitations of the Treaty will be conducted under the terms of highly intrusive verification procedures. The START Treaty builds on the three years of experience from the INF Treaty with inspections by each side of virtually every significant strategic installation of the other side. All told, the START Treaty includes 12 different types of inspections plus continuous monitoring at the facilities in each country that produce mobile ICBMs or their first stages. The Treaty also creates an extensive system of over 80 separate notifications - each side being required to tell the other about new missile systems as well as about movements, operations, and eliminations of the forces subject to the Treaty - to increase the understanding each side has of the others' intentions an actions. Significant elements A striking example of the intrusiveness of this verification regime is found in one of the most significant elements of the regime - the exchange of magnetic tapes of missile flight test data, telemetry, following such tests by either side. The agreement to exchange copies of tapes as well as any data necessary to understand them, would not have been possible during any other time in the history of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, this agreement was one of the last elements to be hammered out during the final month of negotiations in Geneva. The Soviet side had been reluctant to sign up to such a significant step but the movement to a new era of cooperation made it possible.Other significant elements of the Treaty concluded in the final stages of the negotiations in July were the agreements on downloading and the definition of a new type of ICBM or SLBM. Each of these, though completed near the end, is crucial to the underlying objectives of the Treaty - the creation of incentives to move to less threatening forces. Downloading allows each side to remove a limited number of warheads from existing missiles and count those missiles as having a reduced number of warheads. There are some significant benefits to such a practice. Reducing the concentration of warheads on missiles promotes stability by reducing the value of the missile as a target. Downloading also saves money by not forcing a country to build new missiles with fewer warheads. However, large-scale downloading could be reversed and could lead to a breakout or a quick build-up of weapons. The Treaty balances these competing interests by allowing strictly limited downloading on existing systems only. The provision on new type is another aspect of the same concept. Strict definitions have been established to distinguish between a newly developed ballistic missile and a modification of an existing missile. Without such differences, one side could make cosmetic changes to an existing design and claim that the result was a new missile with a different number of warheads. Once again, allowing such a result could increase the risk of breakout. It is also important to note what is not included in the START Treaty. There are no restrictions on conventional capabilities, nor on the development of stabilizing defences, nor on the ability of the United States to continue support of NATO. Also, consistent with the bilateral nature of the negotiations, there is no compensation in the Treaty for the independent nuclear forces of France and Great Britain. Increasing stability While the timing of the completion of the negotiations on the START Treaty fits nicely with the sweeping changes that the world has recently witnessed in the Soviet Union, critics will ask whether the START Treaty continues to be relevant. The same question will also be asked of future negotiations on strategic offensive arms. It is important to note that the START Treaty is not about eliminating deterrence; it is about eliminating the risk of war. In his address at the START signing ceremony in Moscow, President Bush said, 'by reducing arms, we reverse a half-century of steadily growing strategic arsenals. But more than that we take a significant step forward in dispelling a half-century of mistrust. By building trust, we pave a path to peace. We sign the START Treaty as testamentto the new relationship emerging between our two countries - in the promise of further progress toward lasting peace'. These words perhaps have more meaning now after an attempted coup in the Soviet Union, than they had at any time before. The military transparency and structured approach to reductions of strategic offensive arms increase the stability that is needed during this period in which many different republics are vying for a position in a new union. With the START Treaty, we will be able to further dispel mistrust and enhance this emerging relationship. This becomes especially significant given the possibility that the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan may remove nuclear weapons and transfer them to the Russian Republic. Such a radical and rapid shift in the Soviet nuclear arsenal, if not carried out in a structured approach, could threaten the stability we have enjoyed for the past few decades. Therefore, the provisions in the START Treaty have more meaning than they have ever had before. These provisions will be one of the pillars of our continued strategic relationship. At the conclusion of the Washington Summit in 1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev agreed that consultations on future steps should be held at the earliest practical opportunity following the signature of START. While the contents of such discussions are still being studied, it is unlikely that there will ever be another 700 page treaty on strategic offensive arms, since the START Treaty provides a very good framework for future negotiations if the US and USSR so choose.While some may seek to judge START in terms of who won or who lost, the answer is that both of our nations, NATO, and indeed all the nations of the world, have won in terms of greater security and stability that will be brought by this treaty's implementation. Note: (1) See Richard Burt, NATO Review, No. 4, 1989, p. 6 and NATO Review No. 4, 1990, p. 24 © Copyright by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1991.