Web edition Vol. 38- No. 2 April 1990 p. 16 - 23

The public perception of NATO Luc Reychler Luc Reychler is Professor of International Relations, Strategy and Peace Research at the University of Leuven in Belgium and adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Political science is in for a thorough self-examination. The speed and impact of the reversed domino-effect in Eastern and Central Europe has taken most observers completely by surprise. Until 1987, it was relatively easy to teach international politics; there were many more constants than variables. The reverse is now true, practically all constants having become variables and diplomatic time is flying at an unnaturally fast pace. The basic assumptions which have underpinned the analysis of East-West relations have crumbled. Jeane Kirkpatrick's laws on the irreversibility of communist regimes have lost their validity. (1) In contrast to Jean-Francois Revel's alarming 'How democracies perish', the latter have proved to be well able to defend themselves against adversaries seeking their destruction, (2) while Helmut Schmidt's 'Grand strategy for the West' has become outdated.(3) If someone were to invite me to reassess NATO at this turning point in post-war history, I would define the Alliance as the best insurance on the way to a better security regime in Europe. I think this role would appeal to a great majority of people. Paradoxes in public opinion Today's revolutionary change is unlike past experiences of this kind. At times of fundamental change, people normally become apprehensive and fearful. Paradoxically, in the present situation, most people feel secure. The Euro-barometer, monitoring public opinion in the European Community countries, indicates that people have a very low expectation of international conflict. In 1980, more than half the Europeans (53 per cent) expected a troubled future with much international discord. Now, only one European in four (23 per cent) shows such pessimism. The number of respondents who see no danger of war has even tripled - from 15 per cent to 42 per cent (4) This rather calm revolutionary process results from a convergence of changes in both external and internal detente, i.e. by a correlation of detente efforts between East and West as well as within Eastern Europe itself. Internal detent is the result of the de-mocratization within the East European countries and the replacement of the Brezhnev doctrine by the Sinatra doctrine. Formerly, substantial progress on external detente between NATO and the Warsaw Pact proved impossible: such efforts would have raised internal demands in Eastern and Central Europe for freedom, which were invariably repressed and which, in turn, frustrated the external detente process. Today, internal and external detente policies are reinforcing each other, raising strong expectations about transcending bipolarity and the creation of a pan-European security community. While regression remains possible, it now seems much less likely. Equally paradoxical in the present period is the high level of popular support for NATO. In the Benelux countries, public appreciation of NATO is stronger now than in mid-1984, i.e. nine months before Gorbachev came to power. In 1988, 76 per cent of Belgians claimed that they supported NATO. (5) In my own university in Leuven in Belgium, I have noticed the creation of a NATO circle by students - previously an inconceivable event. One wonders, therefore, why public opinion should be a problem for the Alliance. One probable reason for such a concern is that it is a minimalist public opinion which supports the Alliance. Unlike the European Community, for example, NATO does not seem to command the emotional commitment of its citizens. For a great number of Europeans, being a European has become a significant part of their identity: they have become hyph-enated Dutch-Europeans, German-Europeans, and so on. In contrast, the Homo Atlanticus is still a rare species. For those younger Europeans who support NATO, the Alliance is less an object of sentiment than of practicality: it receives their support only to the extent that it reinforces national and European interests. Public opinion is not only minimalist but also post-revisionist: it tends to attribute responsibility for current developments to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is certainly a more critical public, not ready to tolerate allied muddling through, inertia and short-term thinking. It expects the allies to proact rather than to react. Criticism of NATO is not so much related to its goals as to its know-how, i.e. the Alliance has not always been successful in persuading public opinion that it knows how to achieve its objectives and it still needs to convince a majority of its publics that it has an accurate understanding of the changing international environment, and knows how to provide a more cost-effective security regime. A lingering feeling persists that NATO is adapting too slowly to far-reaching changes to the security environment. In other words, we have reached what the German philosopher Karl Jaspers termed an axial point - a major turning point in history where fundamental revisions are required. To predict the level of future support for NATO, it is not enough to concentrate on what is said and written in official circles, but rather to focus on what is not said, paying attention to the so-called sensitive issues. In other words, what need to be identified are those pervasive issues which tend to be regarded as taboo. There is certainly an underlying assumption that NATO will function ineffectively and lose support if these issues are not successfully and urgently addressed. What is the explanation for the existence of these taboo issues ? To begin with, Alliance planners may prefer to stick to the status-quo since existing arrangements have, for many years, proved successful in securing peace. Then there could be a fear that the discussion of certain sensitive problems, or an exploration of new concepts, may be taken as criticism of present policies. I believe that these inhibitions could be overcome if there was a clear agreement to support the present security regime until an alternative system has been shown to provide peace on a more cost-effective basis. What then are these sensitive issues, treated as taboo but the management of which will determine future support for the Alliance? Europeanization of NATO First of all, there is a growing appreciation of the need for a European level of security, i.e. the development of a European security pillar. To many analysts, Europeanization is no longer a mere aspiration but a sheer necessity, not only because of US expectations (burdensharing), but also for economic and politico-psychological reasons. European defence integration is necessary for the development of a more cost-effective defence policy, a more effective articulation of its interests, and for greater public support for the respective defence efforts. A clear majority of Europeans (72 per cent) favours the creation of a common defence organization between the 12 countries of the European Community. (6) A strongly integrated Europe could be a more effective vehicle for reinforcing the East-West relationship. This implies speeding up European integration in order to achieve a United States of Europe with a common foreign and security policy. However, there are still several obstacles hindering this pursuit of incremental integration. There are the old-fashioned nationalists whose policies are based on irrational and backward looking perceptions; there are some Americans who fear that the Europeans will go their own way, that the European Community will thus become a fortress, denying an equal status to outsiders; there is the divide and rule preference of those who are nervous of the power which would be wielded by a more effective Europe. Then there are certain left-wing circles which seem to be based on what could be called a cold war complex. As previous generations were guided by the Munich complex, with everything smacking of appeasement being refuted, many left-wingers detect pervasive dangers of a renewal of confrontation. Several left-wing analysts traditionally refer to the European Community as a cold war product and fear that further integration will inhibit the detente process. Freed from this cold war complex, we could easily imagine a United States of Europe which, together with the United States of America, could pursue a common foreign policy characterized by solidarity with the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and by a more cost-effective security policy. Defensive defence A second sensitive issue concerns conventional armaments, in particular, the question of how far we can go after a successful conclusion of the CFE agreement. CFE-I will, of course, be a major breakthrough in terms of conventional stability and verification, but it should be conceded that both sides will still retain major offensive capabilities, and that no significant cuts in the NATO defence budgets can be expected. Strong demands for more cost-effective and reassuring defence will put considerable pressure on NATO to propose more significant cuts, and to envisage further changes in deployments and force structures in a mutually more defensive defence mode. Resistance to such a post-CFE debate is, however, still widespread. A good many of the objections are based on misunderstandings about the very concept of'mutual defensive defence'. This concept was initiated by Gorbachev, and is therefore resisted by some people: others do not like the term because it tends to imply that, until now, NATO has not had defensive intentions, an invalid objection, since the term does not refer to intentions but to capabilities. Then there is an association of the term 'defensive defence' with 'unilateralism', an unconvincing concept to most security analysts. Another explanation for the reluctance to consider defensive defence is the assumption that the concept implies the removal of all nuclear weapons. This is not the case because nuclear deterrence will remain necessary in the future, but the achievement of a mutually more defensive defence could make a minimum nuclear deterrence more attractive. Furthermore, there is a misunderstanding that proponents of the concept believe in absolute defensive defence. Yet security does not stop at NATO's borders and, as not all countries in the world are willing to pursue a mutually defensive defence regime, it will still be necessary to maintain sufficient forces to secure interests outside Europe. Defensive defence agreements are part of an overall defensive strategy and are context-specific. Finally, it is said that a discussion of post-CFE matters should await an agreement, that one should proceed step-by-step. This argument is unacceptable because modern security requires proactive thinking. Mutual reductions and a restructuring of military power will allow us to overcome the security dilemma and release resources which could be invested in the transformation of Eastern Europe. There is a need for a post-CFE security vision and for concrete arms control proposals for the mid-1990s. It is also of crucial importance to offer the public a prudent and credible set of expectations in order to build confidence and maintain support. Such confidence and support are necessary both to sustain the current negotiating efforts and for the maintenance of armed forces whose size and posture are suited to our security requirements at each stage of the evolving East-West relationship. Minimum nuclear deterrence A third sensitive issue concerns nuclear deterrence. Although most people have learned to live with nuclear weapons, the credibility of the US nuclear force and the validity of the flexible response doctrine are still widely debated. Some maintain that flexible response is the worst form of deterrence, with the exception of all the others. Others voice doubts as to the credibility of this extended deterrence system and consider a future minimal European deterrence to be preferable. Yet others still opt for a partially nuclear-free Europe. A major indication of the lack of a solid consensus on such questions is the chronic debate on short-range nuclear weapons. Certainly, current developments in Europe make the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons less attractive. Architecture of Europe A fourth area where discussions have not made much headway and a consensus is still lacking, concerns the development of a policy vis-a-vis Eastern and Central Europe. The discussions are dragging on partly because of the difficulties in forecasting these developments, but, above all, because of the emergence of differing views on the architecture of a future Europe. A salient example concerns the problem of German unification. Some still fear that this will lead to the domination of Central Europe, while most visualize unification in the context of a vaguely described new European order. More concrete blueprints for the future order have been presented by Michael Mertes and Norbert Pril 1,(7) as well as by Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission. The former envisage a Europe consisting of four concentric circles, while the latter proposes a Europe with three such circles. Recently, the concept of a European Confederation, which would be made up of all democratic states, has been considered. This concept was introduced by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mark Eyskens,(8) subsequently applied by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in his ten-point proposal for German unification, and finally presented to a wider audience by French President Francois Mitterrand. In order to be able to prevent crises and explore fully the new opportunities, there should be more scope for considering different scenarios. Cooperation that was both too little and too late could jeopardize the chances of a successful political and economic transformation of Eastern and Central Europe and could lead to fragmentation, even conflict. If Mr. Gorbachev's efforts to keep order lead to repressive measures, the West will face the difficult task of deciding how to react. On the one hand, no one wants a return to the old order while, on the other, a policy of reprisals could deny millions within the Soviet Union the prospect of achieving democracy and freedom. According to Mr. Eyskens, there is a need for a neo- or post-Harmel doctrine, in which security is not only based on a good defence and an active detente policy, but also on effective support for the transformation movement. Wider security issues Finally, a fifth group of sensitive problems concerns the so-called out-of-area issue, i.e. security problems in the Third World. Assessing these security threats should not be dismissed as simply looking for new enemies. The security of the members of the Alliance is a global problem. Negative developments, such as the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons, missile technology and militarization, will determine how far East and West can disarm. The real new enemies, however, are not Third World countries as such but the tremendous poverty which is to be found there. If this problem is not addressed, the resulting economic decline will lead to more frustration, resentment, domestic unrest or even civil war. Human suffering and turmoil make countries ripe for authoritarian regimes or external subversion; the triple combination of authoritarian governmental structures, immature political societies and massive destructive capability, endangers stability in the entire world. East-West detente has the potential for improving the situation in the South by enhancing the possibilities for conflict management and economic cooperation. There is at present a greater awareness that development is not solely a question of aid but also of physical security, respect for human rights, population control and ecology. It is necessary to analyse these threats, and specify how and at what level - i.e. at national, European, Atlantic, regional, superpower-condominium or United Nations level - defence should be organized. NATO countries may need to operate in much closer conjunction with the United Nations, the effectiveness of which is increasing and should be supported with more vigour. The Gorbachev effect How does Gorbachev fit into the picture? What influence does he have on the credibility of NATO? First, it should be stressed that the issues described above are not new but part and parcel of trends in European security thinking which predates Gorbachev (9). But Gorbachev seems to have reinforced these trends, challenging the Alliance to respond to them more urgently. Gorbachev's impact on NATO has been of an essentially ambivalent nature. He has at the same time credited and to some degree discredited the Alliance. He has given credit to the Alliance by explicitly recognizing the validity of its earlier claims and demands with respect to conventional a-symmetry, the level of Soviet defence expenditures, the Krasnoyarsk radar station, and so on. In addition, the USSR has now declared its interest in preserving the NATO Alliance, including its nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future. This reassessment seems to reflect a Soviet recognition that Western solidarity could help to prevent unmanageable chaos in Europe. Of course, Gorbachev is also challenging the credibility of the Alliance. In the fashion of an iconoclast, he has shattered one assumption after another. I have already mentioned the demise of the Brezhnev doctrine: Gorbachev's initiatives in the areas of politics, economics and arms control have created an unprecedented opportunity to end the cold war but have also triggered very high expectations. To the public at large, Gorbachev certainly comes across as a mover, while the Alliance has been perceived as responding in a reactive rather than in a proactive manner, as sticking for too long to a wait and see approach instead of engaging in a cooperative let's try it attitude, and as clinging to a worst-case analysis. Last year's NATO Summit, held at the end of May, constituted a real signal of hope and a new point of departure, in that the Alliance showed it intended to be more than a caretaker. Although the Summit was certainly a great relief to many observers of the Alliance, the new credit will be quickly dissipated if NATO is not perceived as responding more effectively to the sensitive issues which have been outlined. Without any doubt, Gorbachev has reinforced the demand for Europeanization but he has, at the same time, fuelled discussion and reduced the consensus about the arrangements for common European defence cooperation. Some still envisage foreign policy and defence as a future task of the European Community and look to the Western European Union (WEU) as a first step in this direction. Others see such a development as an obstacle to the integration of emancipated Eastern European countries into a larger free Europe. Gorbachev has certainly not eased the construction of the European pillar. The new thinking in Soviet defence policy has also raised expectations for further reductions and a restructuring of the conventional forces into a mutually more defensive defence mode, leading to a more cost-effective defence. Gorbachev's proposals for increased denuclearization of Europe, especially after a CFE agreement, will challenge the Alliance to review its flexible response doctrine - especially the role of short-range nuclear weapons -and raise the question of European nuclear deterrence. Another major challenge is Gorbachev's invitation to respond positively to the political and economic changes in Eastern Europe. More support for these developments would be a major investment in the security of the West, and underscore the strength of the Alliance's commitment to the Helsinki process. The greatest challenge for the Alliance in the next decade will be to build the European home without destroying the Atlantic home. Finally, the pressing need to develop a global out-of-area policy will gradually be exacerbated by the present East-West detente. Developments in the Third World and the advent of international glasnost resulting from the Soviet reassessment of its activities will compel Alliance members to develop a new strategy towards the South, not only in terms of coping with military and non-military threats, but also in terms of supporting a more constructive conflict-management. A suggestion in this direction was recently made by Mr. Genscher, the Federal German Foreign Minister. He proposed banning either side from reducing its arsenal by selling weapon systems at discount rates to Third World states. In any event, it is clear that the development of a new Third World strategy is urgently needed. Cassandra's versus devil's advocate These are some of the challenges which will face the Alliance in the coming years. The operational support of public opinion will depend on how the Alliance handles these pervasive issues. I would suggest that NATO, like the European Community, publish, on a regular basis, its own NA TO barometer in order to better monitor changes in public opinion, thereby pre-empting misperceptions but, above all, in order to allow the respondents to express their opinion in a more nuanced way. I would also recommend that the sensitive issues which I have described should be taken out of the taboo sphere, and an institutional framework for discussing them set up. NATO should tackle these issues and develop a new consensus. I would recommend that the Alliance set up a think tank which could develop a security vision going beyond the Harmel doctrine and the latest comprehensive security concept. A pressing need exists to present to the public a prudent and credible set of concrete arms control proposals which go further than the ones currently on the table. Furthermore, it is necessary to reinforce a better-case analysis of the present situation. Not unlike other large organizations, the Alliance seems to have a sub-climate where Cassandra's advocates feel more at ease than devil's advocates. The former tend to draw attention to alarming interpretations of the evidence at hand. Their call for extra prudence is based on the claim that the next six months will be as unpredictable as the six months that have just passed. The Cassandras among us seem to feel more comfortable in the role of caretaker than of mover. Such thinking, while remaining very useful for many security problems, should be able to coexist with an increased presence of devil's advocates, those who challenge these reigning Cassandras, presenting better-case scenarios, and suggesting policies that could reinforce and institutionalize further steps to increase confidence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Even in the present buoyant atmosphere, there are still some variables we can and must control. (1) Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorship and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics, 1982, Simon and Schuster. (2) Jean Francois Revel, How Democracies Perish, 1985, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. (3) Helmut Schmidt, A Grand Strategy for the West, 1985, Yale University Press, New Haven and London. (4) Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Community, No 30, December 1988. Directorate-General Information, Communication, Culture. Surveys, Research, Analyses. Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brussels. (5) Belgian security survey, July 1988, West European Branch Office of Research, US Information Agency. (6) Eurobarometer. See footnote 4. (7) Michael Mertes and Norbert Prill, 'Der Verhangnisvolle Irrtum eines Entweder - Oder', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 July 1989. (8) Minister Mark Eyskens, From Detente to Entente, the Impact of the Implosion of Communism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, January 1990. (9) Robert Rudney and Luc Reychler, European Security beyond the Year 2000, 1988, Praeger Publishers, New York, pp. 283-305.