



# RIGA SUMMIT READER'S GUIDE





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*Note: References made in this document to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are marked with an asterisk (\*) referring to the following footnote: "Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name."*

# I. SUMMING UP THE SUMMIT

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## Key achievements of the Riga Summit

**The Riga Summit that took place on 28 and 29 November 2006 was a significant event for NATO. Heads of State and Government of NATO's 26 member countries gathered for the eighth time since the end of the Cold War and the first time in a capital of one of the latest wave of new NATO members. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer put it, "nothing could demonstrate more clearly how much Europe has changed for the better, than the fact that this Summit is taking place here in a Latvia that is democratic and a Latvia that is free."**

The Riga Summit took place against the backdrop of continued intense activity for NATO. This Alliance agenda focuses on operations, capabilities, and partnerships, the three pillars the Summit was built on.

Allied leaders strengthened their commitment to NATO's Afghanistan mission and called for broader international engagement. They expressed their continuing commitment to other NATO operations, most notably in Kosovo. They took measures to further improve the Alliance's military capabilities, including declaring the NATO Response Force operational, and endorsed initiatives to deepen and extend relations with partners. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia were invited to join Partnership for Peace, and Allied leaders confirmed NATO's intention to extend further invitations to countries that meet NATO standards. With these initiatives, the Alliance showed its ability to adapt to meet the new security challenges of the 21st century.

At Riga, NATO leaders also endorsed the Comprehensive Political Guidance, a major policy document that sets out the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence for the next ten years and beyond. The Guidance, which supports the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept, recognises that for the foreseeable future, the principal threats to the Alliance are international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as instability caused by failed or failing states; regional crises; misuse of new technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources.

Against this background, the Guidance sets out the kinds of operations that the Alliance must be able to perform and the kinds of capabilities it will need: NATO's forces must

remain balanced, flexible and agile, able to conduct the full range of missions, from low to high intensity. The Guidance also emphasises the likelihood that NATO will need to carry out a greater number and range of smaller operations.

The Riga Summit Declaration stated Allies' commitment to continue to provide, individually and collectively, the resources necessary to allow NATO to perform the tasks demanded of it. It therefore called on member nations with declining defence spending to increase this spending in real terms.

In Latvia, NATO leaders reaffirmed the indispensable link between North America and Europe and underlined their commitment to continuing Alliance transformation. The Summit declaration concluded: "The decisions we have taken together, along with the work we have directed, demonstrate that the Alliance is adapting to the 21st century security environment, through its operations, transformed defence capabilities and deeper engagements with countries in and beyond the Euro-Atlantic Area, as well as continued internal reform. These efforts will strengthen our mission in Afghanistan and the Alliance's ability to meet further challenges. We will meet next in spring 2008 in order to assess progress, and give further direction to NATO's ongoing transformation, including our enlargement process."



## RIGA SUMMIT DECLARATION

**Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006**

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm today in Riga our resolve to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and defend our populations and common values, while maintaining a strong collective defence as the core purpose of our Alliance. Our 26 nations are united in democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and faithful to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
2. The principle of the indivisibility of Allied security is fundamental, and our solidarity gives us the strength to meet new challenges together. In today's evolving security environment, we confront complex, sometimes inter-related threats such as terrorism, increasingly global in scale and lethal in results, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery, as well as challenges from instability due to failed or failing states. This puts a premium on the vital role NATO plays as the essential forum for security consultation between North American and European Allies. It highlights the importance of common action against those threats, including in UN-mandated crisis response operations. It also underscores the importance of continuing transformation of NATO's capabilities and relationships, which includes our operations and missions, strong investment in enhanced capabilities, and closer engagement with our partners, other nations and organisations. We have today endorsed our Comprehensive Political Guidance which provides a framework and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10-15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence.
3. From Afghanistan to the Balkans and from the Mediterranean Sea to Darfur, in six challenging missions and operations in three geographic regions, we are advancing peace and security and standing shoulder-to-shoulder with those who defend our common values of democracy and freedom as embodied in the Washington Treaty. We are working closely with our partners and other nations in these endeavours. We pay tribute to the professionalism and dedication of the more than fifty thousand men and women from Allied and other nations dedicated to these tasks, and extend our deepest sympathies to the families and loved ones of the injured and the fallen.
4. We stand with the Government of President Karzai and the people of Afghanistan who seek to build a stable, democratic and prosperous society, free from terrorism, narcotics and fear, providing for its own security and at peace with its neighbours. Afghans have accomplished much in the last five years. Democratically elected institutions are in place, and the implementation of national reconstruction and development strategies is improving the lives of millions. We are committed to an enduring role to support the Afghan authorities, in cooperation with other international actors.

5. Contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan is NATO's key priority. In cooperation with Afghan National Security Forces and in coordination with other international actors, we will continue to support the Afghan authorities in meeting their responsibilities to provide security, stability and reconstruction across Afghanistan through the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), respecting international law and making every effort to avoid harm to the civilian population. We reaffirm the strong solidarity of our Alliance, and pledge to ensure that ISAF has the forces, resources, and flexibility needed to ensure the mission's continued success. Moreover, the Afghan Government and NATO are working together to develop democratically-controlled defence institutions. We have agreed today to increase our support to the training and further development of the Afghan National Army, and decided to make stronger national contributions to Afghan National Police training. We welcome the continued contribution of partners and other nations to the ISAF mission and encourage all members of the international community to contribute to this essential effort.
6. There can be no security in Afghanistan without development, and no development without security. The Afghan people have set out their security, governance, and development goals in the Afghanistan Compact, concluded with the international community at the beginning of the year. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are increasingly at the leading edge of NATO's effort, supported by military forces capable of providing the security and stability needed to foster civilian activity. Guided by the principle of local ownership, our nations will support the Afghan Government's National Development Strategy and its efforts to build civilian capacity and develop its institutions. We encourage other nations and international organisations, notably the UN and the World Bank, to do the same. NATO will play its full role, but cannot assume the entire burden. We welcome efforts by donor nations, the European Union (EU), and other international organisations to increase their support. We also welcome the steps already taken by the international community to improve the coordination of civilian and military activities, including dialogue between capitals and international organisations, and are convinced of the need to take this further. We encourage the UN to take a leading role in this regard in support of the Afghan Government.
7. We support the Government of Afghanistan's work to demonstrate decisive leadership, including reaching out to the provinces, strengthening the rule of law, tackling corruption and taking resolute measures against illegal narcotics. We further recognise the need to disrupt the networks that finance, supply and equip terrorists who threaten the government and people of Afghanistan. We recognise the linkage between narcotics and insurgents in Afghanistan and will continue to support the Afghan Government's counter-narcotics efforts, within ISAF's mandate.
8. We call on all Afghanistan's neighbours to act resolutely in support of the Afghan government's efforts to build a stable and democratic country within secure borders. We particularly encourage close cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan and NATO, including through the Tri-Partite Commission.



9. In Kosovo, a robust UN-mandated KFOR presence has been crucial in helping to maintain security and promoting the political process. NATO will remain ready to respond quickly to any threats to the safe and secure environment. We will play our part in the implementation of the security provisions of a settlement, and cooperate closely with the population of Kosovo, the EU and other international actors to promote stability and to assist in building a Kosovo security system that is democratically controlled and ethnically representative, and that enjoys legitimacy throughout Kosovo. We attach great importance to standards implementation especially regarding the safeguarding of minority and community rights and the protection of historical and religious sites, and to combating crime and corruption. We fully support UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari in his efforts to conclude the process and we call on all parties to work together with the UN Special Envoy in a constructive manner, show flexibility in the process, meet the internationally endorsed standards and participate in local civic institutions. This should result in a settlement that improves stability in Southeast Europe, enhances the entire region's prospects for integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions and is acceptable to the people of Kosovo. As in Afghanistan, success in Kosovo will depend on a concerted effort. Accordingly, NATO activity to provide a secure environment will continue to be coordinated with the activities of the UN, the EU and the OSCE to build governance and support reform.
10. Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today's challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors, and provides precedents for this approach. To that end, while recognising that NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, we have tasked today the Council in Permanent Session to develop pragmatic proposals in time for the meeting of Foreign Ministers in April 2007 and Defence Ministers in June 2007 to improve coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments as well as practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant international organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and local actors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations wherever appropriate. These proposals should take into account emerging lessons learned and consider flexible options for the adjustment of NATO military and political planning procedures with a view to enhancing civil-military interface.
11. NATO's policy of partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation is essential to the Alliance's purpose and its tasks. It has fostered strong relationships with countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), as well as with Contact Countries. NATO's partnerships have an enduring value, contributing to stability and security across the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. NATO's missions and operations have also demonstrated the political and operational value of these relationships: eighteen nations outside the Alliance contribute forces and provide support to our operations and missions, and others have expressed interest in working more closely with NATO.



12. With this in mind, we task the Council in Permanent Session to further develop this policy, in particular to:
- fully develop the political and practical potential of NATO's existing cooperation programmes: EAPC/Partnership for Peace (PfP), MD and ICI, and its relations with Contact Countries, in accordance with the decisions of our Istanbul Summit;
  - increase the operational relevance of relations with non-NATO countries, including interested Contact Countries; and in particular to strengthen NATO's ability to work with those current and potential contributors to NATO operations and mission, who share our interests and values;
  - increase NATO's ability to provide practical advice on, and assistance in, the defence and security-related aspects of reform in countries and regions where NATO is engaged.
13. Together, we will pursue these objectives, subject to North Atlantic Council (NAC) decisions, by:
- making consultations with PfP Partners more focused and reflective of priorities, including by adapting the EAPC process and by making full use of the different formats of NATO's interaction with Partners, as provided for in the EAPC Basic Document and agreed at our Prague and Istanbul Summits;
  - enabling the Alliance to call ad-hoc meetings as events arise with those countries who contribute to or support our operations and missions politically, militarily and in other ways and those who are potential contributors, considering their interest in specific regions where NATO is engaged. This will be done using flexible formats for consultation meetings of Allies with one or more interested partners (members the EAPC, MD or the ICI) and/or interested Contact Countries, based on the principles of inclusiveness, transparency and self-differentiation;
  - strengthening NATO's ability to work effectively with individual countries by opening up for consideration those partnership tools currently available to EAPC countries to our partners in the MD and the ICI, as well as interested Contact Countries, on a case-by-case basis.
14. We will continue to follow closely how all Partners fulfil their commitments to the values and principles they have adhered to under the EAPC and the PfP. We reiterate the right of any Partner to seek consultations with the Alliance. We welcome the progress made by Individual Partnership Action Plan countries and encourage further reform efforts. We commend the initiatives to strengthen cooperation, security and stability in the Black Sea region and will continue to support the regional efforts to this end.
15. We welcome the progress achieved in implementing the more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) agreed at our Istanbul Summit, and we remain committed to it, including through the decisions we have taken today.



16. We also look forward to using the new pragmatic approach we have adopted to-day to enhance our relationship with MD and ICI countries as well as interested Contact Countries.
17. Since our Istanbul Summit, NATO's expertise in training has developed further while our partnership with the nations in the broader Middle East region has matured and grown in importance to NATO operations and missions. In this light, we have today launched the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative in the modernisation of defence structures and the training of security forces. The Alliance stands ready, in the spirit of joint ownership, and taking into account available resources, to share its training expertise with our MD and ICI partners from the broader region of the Middle East. Through an evolutionary and phased approach building on existing structures and programmes, we will set up to the benefit of our partners and NATO nations an expanding network of NATO training activities. An initial phase will include expanding the participation of these partners in relevant existing NATO training and education programmes, partnership activities, and Allied training facilities to meet Allies' and partners' needs, as well as the establishment of a Middle East faculty at the NATO Defense College. As a second phase, NATO could consider supporting the establishment of a Security Cooperation Centre in the region, to be owned by the MD and ICI countries, with regional funding and NATO assistance. A decision on contributing to the establishment of such a NATO supported centre would be based on overall political considerations, appropriate preparatory work by the Alliance and with partners, and experience gained in all aspects of the initial phase. Various sources of funding, including voluntary funding, for example trust funds, will be considered. We look forward to the timely implementation of this initiative, in close consultation with our partners.
18. All Allies continue to contribute to the NATO mission in Iraq, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, to support the Iraqi security forces through training, in or out of the country, equipping, or contributing to trust funds. Our training mission is a demonstration of our support for the Iraqi people and their government, and for the stability, democratic development, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq, in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. In response to a request from the Prime Minister of Iraq, we have asked the NATO Military Authorities to develop additional niche training options to support Iraqi security forces where military expertise is required, within the mandate of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq. This demonstrates our continued commitment to help Iraq build effective and sustainable multi-ethnic security forces.
19. We are deeply concerned by the continued fighting in Darfur as well as the worsening humanitarian situation and call on all parties to abide by the ceasefire. We are concerned about the regional implications of the conflict. We welcome the conclusions of the 16 November 2006 meeting in Addis Ababa for an African Union (AU) / UN hybrid peacekeeping mission and urge the Government of Sudan to implement them. NATO continues to support the ongoing AU mission and is ready, following consultation with and the agreement of the AU, to broaden that support. The Alliance

is committed to continued coordination with all actors involved, in particular the AU, the UN and the EU, including with respect to possible support for a follow-on mission with airlift and training.

20. We strongly condemn terrorism, whatever its motivations or manifestations, and will fight it together as long as necessary, in accordance with international law and UN principles. The Alliance continues to provide an essential transatlantic dimension to the response against terrorism. Operation Active Endeavour, our maritime operation in the Mediterranean, continues to make an important contribution to the fight against terrorism and we welcome the support of partner countries which has further enhanced its effectiveness. We remain committed to our dialogue and cooperation with our partners and other international organisations to fight terrorism, and reiterate our determination to protect our populations, territories, infrastructure and forces against the consequences of terrorist attacks. We commend NATO's Defence Against Terrorism initiatives, including development of cutting-edge technologies to counter terrorist threats, such as defending Allied forces in Afghanistan from Improvised Explosive Devices. We call upon Allies to continue to develop and fully implement their national capabilities in this important area, and to strengthen the Alliance's ability to share information and intelligence on terrorism, especially in support of NATO operations.
21. We support the promotion of common values, reform, and dialogue, among different peoples and cultures. In this regard, we acknowledge the initiative as an "Alliance of Civilisations" launched by the UN Secretary General, and the G8 "Forum for the Future" initiative.
22. Continuing defence transformation is essential to ensure that the Alliance remains able to perform its full range of missions, including collective defence and crisis response operations. Our operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans confirm that NATO needs modern, highly capable forces – forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed upon decision by the NAC. Building on our decisions at the Summits in Prague and Istanbul, much has already been done to make Alliance forces more capable and usable. We will strengthen capabilities further in accordance with the direction and priorities of the Comprehensive Political Guidance.
23. The establishment of the NATO Response Force (NRF) which today is at full operational capability has been a key development. It plays a vital part in the Alliance's response to a rapidly emerging crisis. It also serves as a catalyst for transformation and interoperability and will enhance the overall quality of our armed forces, not only for NATO, but also for EU, UN or national purposes. We support the improved implementation of the agreed NRF concept through mechanisms to enhance long term force generation, and steps to allow for a more sustainable and transparent approach to maintain the capability of the force in the future.
24. The adaptation of our forces must continue. We have endorsed a set of initiatives to increase the capacity of our forces to address contemporary threats and challenges.

These include:

- improving our ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them for extended periods. This requires forces that are fully deployable, sustainable and interoperable and the means to deploy them;
- commitments to increase strategic airlift, crucial to the rapid deployment of forces, to address identified persistent shortages. Multinational initiatives by NATO members and Partners include the already operational Strategic Airlift Interim Solution; the intent of a consortium to pool C-17 airlift assets, and offers to coordinate support structures for A-400M strategic airlift. Nationally, Allies have or plan to acquire a large number of C-17 and A-400M aircraft. There have also been significant developments in the collective provision of sealift since the Prague Summit;
- the launch of a special operations forces transformation initiative aimed at increasing their ability to train and operate together, including through improving equipment capabilities;
- ensuring the ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a crisis, as required and as set out in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, drawing on lessons learned and emerging from current operations on the added value of such military support;
- work to develop a NATO Network Enabled Capability to share information, data and intelligence reliably, securely and without delay in Alliance operations, while improving protection of our key information systems against cyber attack;
- the activation of an Intelligence Fusion Centre to improve information and intelligence sharing for Alliance operations;
- continuing progress in the Alliance Ground Surveillance programme, with a view to achieving real capabilities to support Alliance forces;
- continuing efforts to develop capabilities to counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats;
- transforming the Alliance's approach to logistics, in part through greater reliance on multinational solutions;
- efforts to ensure that the command structure is lean, efficient and more effective; and
- the signature of the first major contract for a NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system which is a major step towards improving the protection of deployed NATO forces.

25. At Prague we initiated a Missile Defence Feasibility Study in response to the increasing missile threat. We welcome its recent completion. It concludes that missile defence is technically feasible within the limitations and assumptions of the study. We tasked continued work on the political and military implications of missile defence for the Alliance including an update on missile threat developments.
26. We are committed to continuing to provide, individually and collectively, the resources that are necessary to allow our Alliance to perform the tasks that we demand from it. Therefore, we encourage nations whose defence spending is declining to halt that decline and to aim to increase defence spending in real terms. As set out in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, the development of capabilities will not be possible without the commitment of sufficient resources. Those resources should be used efficiently and focused on the priorities identified in the Comprehensive Political Guidance.
27. We endorse the drive for greater efficiency and effectiveness in NATO Headquarters and its funding practices.
28. In the Western Balkans, Euro-Atlantic integration, based on solidarity and democratic values, remains necessary for long-term stability. This requires cooperation in the region, good-neighbourly relations, and working towards mutually acceptable solutions to outstanding issues.
29. NATO's ongoing enlargement process has been an historic success in advancing stability, peace and cooperation in Europe and the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. In keeping with our pledge to maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future, we reaffirm that NATO remains open to new European members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a crucial stage in preparing countries for possible NATO membership. All European democratic countries may be considered for MAP or admission, subject to decisions by the NAC at each stage, based on the performance of these countries towards meeting the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty. We direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us.
30. We welcome the efforts of Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\* to prepare themselves for the responsibilities and obligations of membership. We commend their increasing contributions to international peacekeeping and security operations as well as their common efforts to advance regional cooperation. At our next summit in 2008, the Alliance intends to extend further invitations to those countries who meet NATO's performance based standards and are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability.
31. We welcome the improved conduct of Parliamentary elections in Albania in July 2005. Sustained efforts to combat corruption and organised crime are of critical importance. We encourage continued progress, particularly on the rule of law and defence reforms.



32. We welcome Croatia's full cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and its significant progress in furthering political, economic, rule of law and defence reform, which must be sustained, and encourage further efforts to ensure that its membership aspirations are backed by stronger popular support.
33. We welcome the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's\* successful conduct of Parliamentary elections in 2006, and the strong efforts to deepen political, economic, defence, rule of law and judicial reform, which must be sustained.
34. We firmly believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia can offer valuable contributions to regional stability and security. We strongly support the ongoing reform processes and want to encourage further positive developments in the region on its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration.
35. NATO will further enhance cooperation on defence reform with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, and will offer advice and assistance as Montenegro builds its defence capabilities.
36. Taking into account the importance of long term stability in the Western Balkans and acknowledging the progress made so far by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, we have today invited these three countries to join Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. In taking this step, we reaffirm the importance we attach to the values and principles set out in the EAPC and PfP basic documents, and notably expect Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with the ICTY. We will closely monitor their respective efforts in this regard.
37. We reaffirm that the Alliance will continue with Georgia and Ukraine its Intensified Dialogues which cover the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to those countries' aspirations to membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision.
38. We reaffirm the importance of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership, which has its 10th anniversary next year and welcome the progress that has been made in the framework of our Intensified Dialogue. We appreciate Ukraine's substantial contributions to our common security, including through participation in NATO-led operations and efforts to promote regional cooperation. We encourage Ukraine to continue to contribute to regional security. We are determined to continue to assist, through practical cooperation, in the implementation of far-reaching reform efforts, notably in the fields of national security, defence, reform of the defence-industrial sector and fighting corruption.
39. We welcome the commencement of an Intensified Dialogue with Georgia as well as Georgia's contribution to international peacekeeping and security operations. We will continue to engage actively with Georgia in support of its reform process. We encourage Georgia to continue progress on political, economic and military reforms, includ-

ing strengthening judicial reform, as well as the peaceful resolution of outstanding conflicts on its territory. We reaffirm that it is of great importance that all parties in the region should engage constructively to promote regional peace and stability.

40. The NATO-Russia partnership remains a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area. As we look towards the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Founding Act and the 5th anniversary of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2007, we welcome progress made in intensifying political dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia, and believe that the cooperative agenda set forth in the May 2002 Rome Declaration has not yet achieved its full potential. Much work remains to be done to this end, and we call on Russia to join us in enhancing our cooperation on key security issues, including the fight against terrorism. We look forward to Russia's early ratification of the PfP Status of Forces Agreement, which would facilitate the further intensification of our practical cooperation, in particular military-to-military projects. We value Russia's contribution to Operation Active Endeavour, and our practical cooperation in countering narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan and Central Asia. We are prepared to strengthen and deepen cooperation within the NRC by making its existing structures more effective, and to continue working together as equal partners in areas of common concern and interest where our cooperation can provide added value, as envisaged by the Rome Declaration.
41. NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. NATO-EU relations cover a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and civil emergency planning. Our successful cooperation in the Western Balkans, including through the Berlin Plus arrangements regarding EU operation Althea, is contributing to peace and security. We will strive for improvements in the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organisations, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and avoid unnecessary duplication, in a spirit of transparency and respecting the autonomy of the two organisations. A stronger EU will further contribute to our common security.
42. We reaffirm our commitment to the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and to the early entry into force of the Adapted Treaty, which would permit accession by new States Parties. The 3rd Review Conference underscored the vital importance we attach to the CFE Treaty and we are determined to maintain our constructive approach to conventional arms control. Fulfilment of the remaining Istanbul commitments on the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova will create the conditions for Allies and other States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. We welcome the important agreement signed by Russia and Georgia on 31 March 2006 on the withdrawal of Russian forces, and the progress made since then. We note with regret the continued lack of progress on withdrawal of Russian military forces from the Republic of Moldova and we call upon Russia to resume and complete its withdrawal as soon as possible.



43. We regret the persistence of regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova. Our nations support the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova. We support continued efforts to achieve peaceful settlements to the conflicts involving these countries.
44. We fully support the United Nations Security Council's determination that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear test constitutes a clear threat to international peace and security and the Council's demand that the Iranian government suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities including research and development to be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. We expect that both governments comply fully with the demands of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We express our support to ongoing diplomatic efforts in this respect. We reiterate that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of non-proliferation and disarmament, and call for the full compliance with it by all States Parties to the Treaty. We reaffirm that arms control and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in preventing the spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. Current proliferation challenges underline the importance of strengthening national measures, implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and existing multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international arms control and disarmament accords, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles.
45. As underscored in NATO's Strategic Concept, Alliance security interests can also be affected by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. We support a coordinated, international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure security. With this in mind, we direct the Council in Permanent Session to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security, in order to define those areas where NATO may add value to safeguard the security interests of the Allies and, upon request, assist national and international efforts.
46. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by our Latvian hosts. Here in Latvia, a nation whose accession to NATO has strengthened security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area and brought us closer to our common goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace and by common values, we have reaffirmed the indispensable link between North America and Europe, and underlined our commitment to the continuing transformation of our Alliance. The decisions we have taken together, along with the work we have directed, demonstrate that the Alliance is adapting to the 21st century security environment, through its operations, transformed defence capabilities and deeper engagements with countries in and beyond the Euro-Atlantic Area, as well as continued internal reform. These efforts will strengthen our mission in Afghanistan and the Alliance's ability to meet further challenges. We will meet next in Spring 2008 in order to assess progress, and give further direction to NATO's ongoing transformation, including our enlargement process.



# COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL GUIDANCE

**Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006**

## Introduction

1. This Comprehensive Political Guidance provides a framework and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10 to 15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence. This guidance, to be reviewed periodically, also aims to increase their coherence through an effective management mechanism.

## Part 1 - The Strategic Context

2. NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept described the evolving security environment in terms that remain valid. This environment continues to change; it is and will be complex and global, and subject to unforeseeable developments. International security developments have an increasing impact on the lives of the citizens of Allied and other countries. Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years. Instability due to failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts, and their causes and effects; the growing availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry; the misuse of emerging technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources are likely to be the main risks or challenges for the Alliance in that period. All of these factors can be inter-related or combined, most dangerously in the case of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.
3. Peace, security and development are more interconnected than ever. This places a premium on close cooperation and coordination among international organisations playing their respective, interconnected roles in crisis prevention and management. Of particular importance because of their wide range of means and responsibilities are the United Nations and the European Union. The United Nations Security Council will continue to have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The European Union, which is able to mobilise a wide range of military and civilian instruments, is assuming a growing role in support of international stability. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe also continues to have important responsibilities in this field.

## Part 2 - Implications for the Alliance

4. The Alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999 Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management, and partnership.

5. Collective defence will remain the core purpose of the Alliance. The character of potential Article 5 challenges is continuing to evolve. Large scale conventional aggression against the Alliance will continue to be highly unlikely; however, as shown by the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 following which NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time, future attacks may originate from outside the Euro-Atlantic area and involve unconventional forms of armed assault. Future attacks could also entail an increased risk of the use of asymmetric means, and could involve the use of weapons of mass destruction. Defence against terrorism and the ability to respond to challenges from wherever they may come have assumed and will retain an increased importance.
6. The Alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including through non-Article 5 crisis response operations, as set out in the Strategic Concept. The Alliance has undertaken a range of operations of this kind since the end of the Cold War. Experience has shown the increasing significance of stabilisation operations and of military support to post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The role of the UN and EU, and other organisations, including as appropriate non-governmental organisations, in ongoing operations and future crises will put a premium on practical close cooperation and coordination among all elements of the international response.
7. Against this background, NATO must retain the ability to conduct the full range of its missions, from high to low intensity, placing special focus on the most likely operations, being responsive to current and future operational requirements, and still able to conduct the most demanding operations. There will continue to be a requirement for a mix of conventional and nuclear forces in accordance with extant guidance. In particular, the Alliance needs to focus on:
  - a. strengthening its ability to meet the challenges, from wherever they may come, to the security of its populations, territory and forces;
  - b. enhancing its ability to anticipate and assess the threats, risks, and challenges it faces, with special attention to the threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
  - c. providing forces able to conduct the full range of military operations and missions;
  - d. being able to respond quickly to unforeseen circumstances;
  - e. ensuring that NATO's own crisis management instruments are effectively drawn together. While NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking into account existing arrangements, with partners, relevant international organisations and, as appropriate, non-governmental organisations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations;
  - f. continuing to adapt planning processes to meet the new demands.
8. The evolving security environment requires that commitments from nations, recognising the primacy of national political decisions, to NATO operations be translated into concrete terms by the development and fielding of flexible and sustainable contributions, and

also by a fair sharing of the burden. It is also important to have an early indication of the likely military demands and potential availability of forces and resources when making an Alliance decision to launch an operation.

9. All of this requires Allies to continue the process of transformation, including conceptual and organisational agility and the development of robust capabilities that are deployable, sustainable, interoperable, and usable.

### Part 3 - Guidelines for Alliance Capability Requirements

10. Given the likely nature of the future security environment and the demands it will impose, the Alliance will require the agility and flexibility to respond to complex and unpredictable challenges, which may emanate far from member states' borders and arise at short notice. The Alliance will also require effective arrangements for intelligence and information sharing. As in the past, intelligence and lessons learned from operations will also inform capability development.
11. In order to undertake the full range of missions, the Alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance; it is likely that NATO will need to carry out a greater number of smaller demanding and different operations, and the Alliance must retain the capability to conduct large-scale high-intensity operations.
12. Regardless of its overall size, each operation is likely to require a command and control structure able to plan and execute a campaign to accomplish a strategic or operational objective, employing the appropriate mix of air, land and maritime components. It also requires forces that are structured, equipped, manned and trained for expeditionary operations in order to respond rapidly to emerging crises, for which the NATO Response Force would be a key element, effectively reinforce initial entry forces, and sustain the Alliance's commitment for the duration of the operation.
13. On this basis, the Alliance requires sufficient fully deployable and sustainable land forces, and appropriate air and maritime components. This requirement is supported by political targets as set out by Defence Ministers for the proportion of their nation's land forces which are structured, prepared and equipped for deployed operations (40%) as well as the proportion undertaking or planned for sustained operations at any one time (8%), and by the Allies undertaking to intensify their efforts, taking into account national priorities and obligations, to this end.
14. NATO and the EU and their respective members states have already agreed procedures to ensure coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to both organisations. NATO's planning disciplines should continue to take full account of these principles, objectives and procedures.

15. The development of capabilities will not be possible without the commitment of sufficient resources. Furthermore, it will remain critically important that resources that Allies make available for defence, whether nationally, through multi-national projects, or through NATO mechanisms, are used as effectively as possible and are focused on priority areas for investment. Increased investment in key capabilities will require nations to consider re-prioritisation, and the more effective use of resources, including through pooling and other forms of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. NATO's defence planning should support these activities.
16. Over the next 10 to 15 years, the evolving security environment and the need to deal with conventional and especially asymmetric threats and risks, wherever they arise, will put a premium on improvements in meeting the following capability requirements:
- a. the ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them for extended periods. This requires forces that are fully deployable, sustainable and interoperable and the means to deploy them. It also requires a fully coordinated and, where appropriate, multinational approach to logistic support;
  - b. the ability to adapt force postures and military responses rapidly and effectively to unforeseen circumstances. This requires, inter alia, an effective capability to analyse the environment and anticipate potential requirements, a high level of readiness for our forces, and the necessary flexibility to respond to any sudden shifts in requirements;
  - c. the ability to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against terrorism, and more particularly to contribute to the protection of the Alliance's populations, territory, critical infrastructure and forces, and to support consequence management;
  - d. the ability to protect information systems of critical importance to the Alliance against cyber attacks;
  - e. the ability to conduct operations taking account of the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards, including the ability to defend deployed NATO forces against theatre missile threats;
  - f. the ability to conduct operations in demanding geographical and climatic environments;
  - g. the ability, through appropriate equipment and procedures, to identify hostile elements, including in urban areas, in order to conduct operations in a way that minimises unintended damage as well as the risk to our own forces;
  - h. the ability and flexibility to conduct operations in circumstances where the various efforts of several authorities, institutions and nations need to be coordinated in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired results, and where these various actors may be undertaking combat, stabilisation, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian activities simultaneously;
  - i. the ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts across all phases of a crisis, including to establish a safe and secure environment, within the full range of missions; military support to reconstruction efforts will be provided to the extent to which conditions in the theatre of operations prevent other

- actors with primary responsibilities in this field from carrying out their tasks. This should embrace the ability to support security sector reform, including demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, and to bring military support, within available means and capabilities, to humanitarian relief operations;
- j. the ability to field forces with the greatest practicable interoperability and standardisation amongst Allies, and the flexibility also to cooperate with the forces of partners, including, to the extent possible, through the release of appropriate standards.
17. Delivering these capabilities requires an openness to new technologies, concepts, doctrines and procedures supporting, in particular, an approach to operations which, bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 7e above, aims at the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance to create overall effects that will achieve the desired outcome. Such an effects based approach should be developed further and might include enhancing situational awareness, timely operational planning and decision-making, improving links between commanders, sensors and weapons, and deploying and employing joint expeditionary forces coherently and to greatest effect.
  18. Among these qualitative requirements, the following constitute NATO's top priorities: joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them; high-readiness forces; the ability to deal with asymmetric threats; information superiority; and the ability to draw together the various instruments of the Alliance brought to bear in a crisis and its resolution to the best effect, as well as the ability to coordinate with other actors. The NATO Response Force is a fundamental military tool in support of the Alliance and a catalyst for further transformation and has top priority together with operational requirements.

## Part 4 - Principles for a Management Mechanism

19. The NATO committees and bodies responsible for the relevant planning disciplines, including operational planning and intelligence, are to implement the Comprehensive Political Guidance in their work through the development, as necessary, of detailed policies, directives and guidance which they in turn provide for their respective disciplines.
20. An effective Management Mechanism is an integral part of the implementation of the Comprehensive Political Guidance. The Management Mechanism will be established by the NATO Council in Permanent Session to provide for the development of further detailed guidance, and for monitoring and ensuring compliance of these planning disciplines with the provisions of the Comprehensive Political Guidance and ensuring coherence and harmonisation among them<sup>(1)</sup>. The Management Mechanism will comprise a system of effective arrangements, including, as required,

<sup>(1)</sup> The Management Mechanism was established in February 2006.



formal direction, with the aim of achieving aligned planning processes, consistent guidance and harmonised requirements and supporting structures.

21. Implementation of this Comprehensive Political Guidance should lead to the development of more usable capabilities for future operations and missions.

## OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Electronic version of the reader's guide:

[www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-riga/](http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-riga/)

Riga Summit Declaration:

[www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm)

Comprehensive Political Guidance:

[www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b061129e.htm)

## II. THREE PILLARS

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### 1. OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

**At the time of the Riga Summit, the Alliance was involved in six operations and missions on three continents: the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan; the Kosovo Force (KFOR); Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean; NATO Headquarters – Sarajevo; the NATO Training Mission in Iraq; and support to the African Union Mission in Sudan.**

During their meeting, Allied leaders paid tribute to soldiers who have served in these missions, including the more than 50 000 men and women involved at the time of the Summit. They also observed a minute of silence in recognition of the injured and the fallen.

Building upon the experience in operations, and most notably in Afghanistan and Kosovo, the Riga Summit also underscored the importance of a comprehensive approach in planning and conducting current and future operations, often involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. To this end, while recognising that NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, Allied leaders at Riga called for NATO to develop pragmatic proposals aimed at improving coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instruments as well as practical cooperation at all levels, including with partners, other international organisations, non-governmental organisations or local actors.

#### 1.1. Prevailing in Afghanistan

The Riga Summit began with a working dinner on 28 November which was mainly devoted to NATO's key priority: contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan. Allied leaders reaffirmed their solidarity and long-term commitment to this objective and agreed to remove national caveats on how, when and where forces can be used to further strengthen the effectiveness of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. NATO leaders also reaffirmed that, regardless of the remaining caveats, in an emergency situation every Ally will come to the aid of the forces that require assistance. A number of countries also pledged additional assets, including fighter aircraft, helicopters, infantry companies and training teams to mentor the Afghan National Army.

Recognising the importance of reconstruction and development to Afghanistan's long-term stability, NATO leaders called for broader international engagement and a comprehensive approach including political, military and economic elements. "There can be no security in Afghanistan without development, and no development without security," they stated in the Summit Declaration.

### ***NATO's role in Afghanistan***

NATO is a key component of the international community's engagement in Afghanistan, assisting the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. The Alliance's aim is to help establish the conditions in which Afghanistan can enjoy – after decades of conflict, destruction and poverty – a representative government and self-sustaining peace and security.

NATO's role is a key part of the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan between the government of Afghanistan and the international community which sets goals relating to the security, governance and economic development of the country.

NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is three-fold:

- through leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an international force of over 30 000 troops that assists the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilisation and reconstruction;
- a Senior Civilian Representative, responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of the Alliance's commitment to the country, who works closely with ISAF, liaises with the Afghan government and other international organisations, and maintains contacts with neighbouring countries.
- a substantial programme of cooperation with Afghanistan, concentrating on defence reform, defence institution-building and the military aspects of security sector reform.

### ***International Security Assistance Force***

Through the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO is assisting the Afghan Government in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilisation and reconstruction.

The Alliance's mission now covers the whole of Afghanistan. By end 2006, NATO is leading some 32 000 troops from 37 countries and 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams. ISAF is NATO's first ground operation outside Europe, and currently also its largest.

On 5 October 2006, NATO-ISAF took command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led coalition, placing it in control of the entire country. Now, over 30 000 NATO-led forces are providing support to the Afghan authorities throughout the country, creating the conditions for reconstruction and development.



ISAF's key military tasks include assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country, conducting stability and security operations in co-ordination with the Afghan national security forces; mentoring and supporting the Afghan National Army; and supporting Afghan government programmes to disarm illegally armed groups.

Upon the request of the Afghan government, ISAF also supports government and internationally-sanctioned counter-narcotics efforts within limits. It also contributes to humanitarian assistance operations co-ordinated by Afghan government organisations, and supports the Afghan National Police, within means and capabilities.

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Final Communiqué from the meeting of NATO defence ministers, confirms ISAF's imminent expansion into the south and states that recently agreed command arrangements would shortly ensure closer coordination between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (paragraph 3), 8 June 2006:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-064e.htm>

Final Communiqué from the meeting of NATO foreign ministers on the endorsement of a revised operational plan for expansion to the south and the development of an Afghan cooperation programme (paragraphs 3 and 4), 8 December 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-158e.htm>

Final Communiqué from meeting of NATO defence ministers on providing additional support for elections and on the future expansion of ISAF to the south (paragraph 4), 9 June 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-076e.htm>

Statement by the NATO Secretary General on expansion of ISAF to the west, 10 February 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-014e.htm>

Istanbul Summit Communiqué on the expansion of ISAF with four more PRTs (paragraphs 4-6), 28 June 2004:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>

Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Afghanistan, 28 June 2004:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-106e.htm>

Final Communiqué of NATO defence ministers, announcing the decision to expand ISAF beyond Kabul (paragraph 5), Brussels, 1 December 2003:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-148e.htm>



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<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-059e.htm>

NATO's ISAF mission online:

<http://www.nato.int/isaf/>

Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan:

<http://www.cfc-a.centcom.mil>

NATO in Afghanistan:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html>

Revised operational plan for NATO's expanding mission in Afghanistan:

[http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan\\_stage3/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan_stage3/index.html)

NATO's security assistance for Afghan elections:

[http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan\\_2005elections/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan_2005elections/index.html)

Fact sheet on ISAF:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheet.htm>

Frequently Asked Questions on ISAF:

[http://www.nato.int/ISAF/Update/media\\_faq.htm](http://www.nato.int/ISAF/Update/media_faq.htm)

NATO Review issue dedicated to NATO operations, Spring 2006:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/contents.html>

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Transcript of a video interview with Afghan Anti-Narcotics Minister, Dr. Qaderi, "Fighting drugs in Afghanistan", January 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050120b.htm>

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[http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art3\\_pr.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art3_pr.html)

## 1.2. Continued presence in Kosovo

Allied leaders also discussed the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and confirmed the Alliance's preparedness to play its part in implementing the security provisions of a settlement on the status of Kosovo. NATO leaders made clear that, as in Afghanistan, success in Kosovo will depend on a concerted effort. Accordingly, NATO activity to provide a secure environment will continue to be coordinated with the activities of the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to build governance and support reform.

### **KFOR**

NATO continues to lead a force of approximately 16 000 troops in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment. The Alliance will maintain its current operational capabilities in Kosovo at present levels throughout the status talks and in the immediate post-settlement period.

KFOR has been deployed in Kosovo since June 1999, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, and works in close cooperation with the UN Mission in Kosovo and other international and non-governmental agencies. It also aims to monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the agreements that ended the conflict.

KFOR's presence remains crucial to guarantee security and stability in Kosovo, as the diplomatic process led by the United Nations to define its future status moves forward.

UNSCR 1244, adopted in June 1999, established Kosovo as an entity under interim international administration, until a solution is sought for the future status of the province. This resolution called for an effective international civil and security presence in Kosovo. The UN Secretary-General therefore appointed a Special Representative to oversee the implementation of the international civil presence and authorised member states and relevant international organisations to establish the international security presence which was led by NATO from the beginning.

Initially, KFOR consisted of five multinational brigades (MNBs): MNB North, MNB Centre, MNB East, MNB West and MNB South. MNB South and MNB West were later combined to form MNB Southwest. KFOR's latest restructuring, which started in mid-2005 and was completed in June 2006, led to the transformation of the four remaining MNBs



into five multinational task forces (MNTFs), which have further improved its effectiveness and allow troops to operate flexibly across the province without restriction:

- MNTF Centre based in Lipljan;
- MNTF North based in Novo Selo;
- MNTF South based in Prizren;
- MNTF West based in Pec;
- MNTF East based in Urosevac.

The MNTFs come under a single chain of command under the authority of Commander KFOR.

There is also a Multinational Specialized Unit in Pristina and a KFOR Tactical Reserve Manoeuvre Battalion.

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<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-064e.htm>

Final Communiqué of the NAC in defence ministers session on the commitment to Kosovo and the Western Balkans in general (paragraphs 5 and 6), Brussels, 9 June 2005:  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-076e.htm>

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<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-089e.htm>

KFOR web site:

<http://www.nato.int/kfor/>

SFOR web site:

<http://www.nato.int/sfor/>

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<http://www.nato.int/ifor/>

NATO HQ Skopje web site:

<http://www.nhqs.nato.int>

Crisis management:

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NATO in the Balkans:

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Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-1996):

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NATO's role in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\*:

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Background information on NATO's role in peace-keeping:

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### 1.3. Operation Active Endeavour

In Riga, Allied leaders stated the continuing importance of Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's maritime operation in the Mediterranean, in the fight against terrorism and welcomed the support of partner countries in further enhancing its effectiveness.

Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO and partner vessels are patrolling the Mediterranean, monitoring shipping and providing escorts to non-military vessels through the Straits of Gibraltar to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity.

The operation has evolved out of NATO's immediate response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States.

As the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role in the intervening years, the operation's mandate has been regularly reviewed and its remit extended.

The operation aims to demonstrate NATO's solidarity and resolve in the fight against terrorism and to help detect and deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.

Over the past five years, NATO forces have monitored over 83 000 vessels, boarding some 100 suspect ships.

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[www.nato.int/docu/home.htm#theme](http://www.nato.int/docu/home.htm#theme)

### 1.4 NATO Training Mission in Iraq

In the Riga Summit Declaration, Allied leaders stated that the NATO Training Mission in Iraq “is a demonstration of our support for the Iraqi people and their government, and for the stability, democratic development, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq, in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.” In response to a request from the Iraqi Prime Minister, they tasked the NATO military authorities to develop additional niche training options. These will support Iraqi security forces where military expertise is required, within the mandate of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, as a demonstration of continued Allied commitment to help Iraq build effective and sustainable multi-ethnic security forces.

In response to a request by the Iraqi interim government, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 to involve the Alliance in Iraq. This decision was taken in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1546, which requests international and regional organisations to contribute assistance to the Multinational Force (MNF). NATO Partner countries were also invited to participate in the mission.

After an initial assessment period, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) was fully staffed and funded by February 2005. As of December 2006, it had trained over 4 000 officers in country, as well as 934 in NATO and national facilities.

All NATO training missions are coordinated with the Iraqi authorities and the MNF. The MNF commander is dual-hatted as he is also the commander of the NATO effort in the country, reporting to Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The latter then reports, via the Chairman of the Military Committee, to the North Atlantic Council.

In addition, the Alliance is helping to coordinate training, equipment and technical assistance provided by NATO nations on a bilateral basis, both inside and outside of Iraq, to ensure that the Allies complement each other. This work is carried out by the NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group, established at NATO Headquarters on 8 October 2004. Since the beginning of the mission, NATO has delivered military equipment worth some €110 million, including ammunition, helmets and body armour, light vehicles, 36 BMP-1 armoured infantry fighting vehicles and 77 Hungarian T-72 main battle tanks, to Iraq.

### ***National Defence University***

NATO has set up the National Defence University (NDU) in the Cultural Centre Building in the International Zone in Baghdad. The NDU focuses on the training of middle and senior level personnel to help develop an officer corps trained in modern military leadership skills. It also aims to introduce values that are in keeping with democratically controlled armed forces.

The North Atlantic Council agreed to support the establishment of this centre on 22 September 2004 and it was officially opened by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jafaari on 27 September 2005.

### ***NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group***

This group was established at NATO Headquarters on 8 October 2004. It works with a similar centre based in Baghdad to coordinate the requirements of the Iraqi government for training and equipment that is offered by NATO as a whole or by individual NATO member countries.

### ***NATO training outside Iraq***

Training is also conducted outside Iraq in NATO schools and training centres throughout NATO member countries. In order to allow an increasing number of Iraqi personnel to take part in specialised training outside of Iraq, a language institute was opened in February 2006, with the support of NATO.

This Defence Language Institute in Baghdad teaches civilian and military officials English. It is attached to the NDU. NATO played a key role in its establishment by advising on the course curriculum and assisting in the acquisition of its facilities, computers and furniture.



**OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

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Press release giving details on NATO support to Poland, 3 September 2003:

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## 1.5 Supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan

In Riga, Allied leaders expressed their deep concern about the continued fighting in Darfur, the worsening humanitarian situation and the regional implications of the conflict and called on all parties to abide by the ceasefire. They welcomed the conclusions of the 16 November 2006 meeting in Addis Ababa for an African Union (AU)/UN hybrid peace-keeping mission and urged the Sudanese government to implement them.

NATO continues to support the ongoing AU mission and is ready, following consultation with and the agreement of the AU, to broaden that support. The Alliance is committed to continued coordination with all actors involved, in particular the AU, the UN and the EU, including with respect to possible support for a follow-on mission with airlift and training.

Since July 2005, NATO has been assisting the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to help stop the continuing violence and improve the humanitarian situation in Sudan's Darfur province. This assistance has taken various forms, while NATO has played its role, within means and capabilities, in helping the AU to effectively expand its presence in Darfur.

### ***Airlifting AU peacekeepers and civilian police***

Since July 2005, NATO has helped to provide air transport for some 24 000 peacekeepers, as well as over 500 civilian police from African troop contributing countries into and out of Darfur<sup>(2)</sup>. From July to October 2005, NATO helped to provide airlift into Darfur for almost 5 000 African Union peacekeepers, significantly boosting the force on the ground. Prior to 2005, the AU force numbered less than 3 000 troops.

NATO's airlift assistance is coordinated from Europe. A special AU air movement cell at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, is coordinating the movement of incoming troops on the ground in Africa.

Both NATO and the European Union - which is also providing airlift assistance - are providing staff to support the AU cell, but the AU has the lead.

### ***Training assistance***

In addition to airlift, some 184 AU officers have taken part in training provided by NATO at the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and at the AMIS force headquarters in El Fashir, Sudan.

The training was based on strategic-level planning and operational planning. It focuses on technologies and techniques to create an overall analysis and understanding of Darfur and to identify the areas where the application of AU assets can influence and shape the operating environment to deter crises.

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<sup>(2)</sup> Figures reflect situation as of spring 2007.

Separately, NATO helped organise a UN-led mapping exercise on 18-27 August 2005. The aim of the exercise was to help AU personnel understand and operate effectively in the theatre of operations, as well as build their capacity to manage strategic operations. NATO provided 14 officers who acted as exercise writers and tactical-level controllers.

Presently, NATO is providing training and mentoring on managing information to AU officers in the DITF in Addis Ababa, as well as support of an AMIS lessons learned exercise, together with the EU.

NATO has also agreed to the AU's request for additional training, to support the establishment of an AMIS Joint Operations Centre (now known as the Joint Forward Mission Headquarters) in El Fashir, and in the field of unit pre-deployment certification.

NATO is also considering, in close coordination with all its partners, an AU request for a possible NATO contribution to training assistance in the field of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

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## 2. CAPABILITIES

### 2.1. Fully operational NATO Response Force

Allied leaders announced at Riga that the NATO Response Force (NRF) had reached its full operational capability. The technologically-advanced force is made up of land, air, sea and special forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed. It is capable of performing missions worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations, including evacuations, disaster management, counterterrorism, and acting as an initial entry force for larger, follow-on forces. It can number up to 25 000 troops and start to deploy after five days' notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days or longer if re-supplied.

The Secretary General described achieving full operational capability for the NRF as "a major accomplishment because it gives the Euro-Atlantic community unprecedented capability." NATO leaders agreed at Riga on common funding of short-notice deployments of the NRF, an agreement that should act as an incentive for countries to participate in future rotations of the force. The agreement specifically covers airlift, "the most expensive part," according to the Secretary General.

#### ***NATO Response Force***

The NRF can deploy worldwide, as and when decided by the North Atlantic Council. It is held at very high readiness, capable of all Alliance missions, from disaster relief or peacekeeping, to high-intensity war fighting.

The NRF consists of a brigade-size land component with a forced-entry capability, a naval task force composed of one carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface action group, an air component capable of 200 combat sorties a day, and a special forces component.

The NRF, which is driven by the underlying principle: "first force in, first force out", has different missions:

- As a stand-alone force for Article 5 collective defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as evacuation operations, disaster consequence management (including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear events), and support in a humanitarian crisis situation and counterterrorism operations;
- An initial entry force facilitating the arrival of larger follow-on forces;
- To show NATO determination and solidarity to deter crises (quick response operations to support diplomacy as required).

Combat support and combat service support capabilities are integral parts of the NRF. These include nuclear, biological and chemical defence and medical units, as well as supporting air and naval units, logistics, communications, intelligence and whatever else is required to make it a credible and capable fighting force.

The NRF prototype numbering 9 500 troops was officially inaugurated on 15 October 2003 at the headquarters of Joint Force Command Brunssum in the Netherlands. The NRF achieved an initial operational capability in October 2004, with some 17 000 troops.

Elements of the NRF helped protect the Athens Summer Olympics and supported the elections in Afghanistan in 2004 and provided humanitarian relief in Pakistan in 2005-2006. The NRF held its first full-scale exercise, Steadfast Jaguar 06, in Cape Verde in June 2006.

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Improving NATO's operational capabilities:

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The Prague Capabilities Commitment:

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Improving NATO's air- and sealift capabilities (with links to more detailed information on strategic airlift and strategic sealift):

<http://www.nato.int/issues/strategic-lift/index.html>

The NATO Response Force:

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Allied Ground Surveillance:

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NATO's Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion:

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## 2.2. Military transformation

At Riga, NATO leaders stressed that “adaptation of our forces must continue”. They endorsed a set of initiatives to increase the capacity of Allied forces to address contemporary threats and challenges. They welcomed progress in key areas, including strategic airlift, missile defence, air-to-ground surveillance and defence against terrorism (detailed below). They also launched a special operations forces transformation initiative to increase joint training and doctrine development, improve equipment, and enhance interoperability. The Allies also directed further work in a number of other areas that are vital to modern operations, including logistics and intelligence-sharing. These and a broad range of other activities illustrating NATO’s transformation in action were displayed at a Transformation Exhibition during the Summit.

### ***Strategic airlift***

A Boeing C-17 was displayed at Riga airport during the Summit. Fourteen NATO nations plus Sweden intend to jointly purchase and operate three or four of the C-17s under the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability.

This will complement the already operational Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), a multinational consortium of 16 nations led by Germany, using Russian and Ukrainian Antonov An-124-100 airlifters. Under a three-year, renewable contract, two Antonov An-124-100s are on full-time charter, two more on six days notice and another two on nine days notice.

Another initiative is to coordinate support of the future A400M airlifter.

### ***Missile defence***

The NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system engineering and integration contract, worth €75 million, was signed in Riga by NATO and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), leader of the industrial team working on the programme. This keeps NATO theatre missile defence on track for an initial operational capability in 2010.

The Alliance is developing a deployable theatre missile defence (TMD) system to protect NATO troops on the ground or a threatened territory or region against shorter and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, and against aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other unexpected threats. It will consist of a multi-layered system of low and high-altitude defences, including battle management command and control, early warning radar, and various interceptors.

In addition to and building on ongoing work on TMD, at the 2002 Prague Summit, Allied leaders initiated a new NATO missile defence feasibility study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats. The 18-month feasibility study conducted by a consortium led by SAIC addressed critical issues such as the command and control architecture and the optimum

mix of planned and existing systems and capabilities. It concluded that missile defence is technically feasible within the limitations and assumptions of the study. At Riga, Allied leaders tasked work to continue on the political and military implications of missile defence for NATO, including an update on the development of the missile threat.

### ***Alliance Ground Surveillance***

The year 2007 will see the launch of the design and development phase of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that is being developed for NATO by an international consortium. AGS will give Alliance commanders a picture of the situation on the ground in mission areas using data relayed from a mix of manned and unmanned radar platforms that can look down on the ground.

AGS will be produced by the Transatlantic Industrial Partnership for Surveillance (TIPS) led by AGS International, a joint venture between the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), Galileo Avionica, General Dynamics Canada, Indra, Northrop Grumman and Thales, which includes partnerships in every participating NATO member. The system is scheduled to achieve an initial operational capability in 2013. It will be owned and operated by NATO.

Just as NATO's AWACS radar aircraft oversees airspace, AGS will be able to look at what is happening on the ground with radars especially designed to do so. AGS will provide situational awareness before and during NATO operations. This is an essential capability for modern military operations and will be a key tool for the NATO Response Force (NRF).

AGS will consist of manned and unmanned platforms, as well as ground control stations in different configurations. The manned platform will be based on the Airbus A321 commercial airliner and the unmanned platform on the Global Hawk high altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The manned platform will carry the Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR).

### ***Defence against terrorism***

At Riga, Allied leaders commended NATO's Defence Against Terrorism initiatives, including development of cutting-edge technologies to counter terrorist threats, such as defending the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from improvised explosive devices. They called for work to continue on developing and fully implementing national capabilities in this area, and to strengthen the Alliance's ability to share information and intelligence on terrorism, especially in support of NATO operations.

The enhanced package of anti-terrorist measures agreed at NATO's June 2004 Istanbul Summit includes a research and technology programme to combat terrorism developed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors. This programme is focusing on the following areas:

- Countering improvised explosive devices, such as car and roadside bombs, through threat detection;

- Reducing the vulnerability of wide-body civilian and military aircraft from man-portable air defence missiles;
- Reducing the vulnerability of helicopters to rocket-propelled grenades;
- Protecting harbours and ships from explosive-packed speedboats and underwater divers;
- Detection, protection and defeat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons;
- Explosive ordnance disposal;
- Precision airdrop technology for special operations forces and their equipment;
- Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition of terrorists;
- Technologies to counter mortar attacks; and
- Protection of critical infrastructure.

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Military Command Structure:

[http://www.nato.int/issues/military\\_structure/command/index-e.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/military_structure/command/index-e.html)

Strategic airlift:

[www.nato.int/issues/strategic-lift/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/strategic-lift/index.html)

Improving NATO's operation capabilities:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/capabilities/index.html>

Missile defence:

[http://www.nato.int/issues/missile\\_defence/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/missile_defence/index.html)

Alliance Ground Surveillance:

[www.nato.int/issues/ags/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/issues/ags/index.htm)

NATO's role in defence against terrorism:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/index.html>

### 3. PARTNERSHIPS

At Riga, Allied leaders reiterated the essential importance of NATO's policy of partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, with Contact Countries, as well as with Russia and Ukraine. They tasked the North Atlantic Council to further develop this policy with the aim of making consultations with Partnership for Peace members more focused, allowing ad hoc meetings using flexible formats for consultation, and opening the possibility of making Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council partnership tools available to Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Contact Countries, on a case-by-case basis. The Secretary General gave as an example meetings in a 26-plus-N format in which the N stands for a group of nations with common interests to discuss with NATO, such as meetings between the 26 Alliance members and troop contributors to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and donors.

#### 3.1. Welcoming new Partners

At Riga, NATO leaders agreed to invite three more countries to join Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said PfP membership would help bring these countries "more fully into the Euro-Atlantic family", while emphasising the continued importance of full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia signed the PfP Framework Document at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 14 December 2006, marking "a beginning of much wider cooperation," in the words of the NATO Secretary General.

On 18 December 2006, the NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo opened a military liaison office in Belgrade in the presence of Serbian Defence Minister Zoran Stanković. Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo said that its opening "will greatly facilitate the increased cooperation that will undoubtedly flow from the new stage in our relationship."

The NATO Military Liaison Office will be located in the Serbian Ministry of Defence and will have a military staff of nine personnel from NATO member countries, headed by French Army Brigadier General Yannick Asset, as well as locally employed civilians. The office will facilitate Serbian cooperation with NATO under the PfP programme.

The Military Liaison Office will support the Serbia/NATO Defence Reform Group, which since February 2006 has been advising and assisting in the reform and modernisation of Serbia's armed forces and in creating a modern, affordable and democratically controlled

defence structure for the country. The Military Liaison Office will also liaise with the Serbian military authorities on the practical aspects of the implementation of the 18 July 2005 transit agreement, to improve the logistical flow for NATO operations in the Western Balkans.

### ***Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council***

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a multilateral forum in which NATO and Partner countries meet on a regular basis to discuss a multitude of political and security-related issues including arms control, terrorism, peacekeeping, defence economic issues and nuclear safety. They also consult in areas such as science and the environment, as well as civil emergency planning. In 1998, on the initiative of Russia, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre was created to serve as the focal point for the coordination of disaster relief efforts among EAPC countries.

In addition to short term consultations in the EAPC on current political and security-related issues, a two-year EAPC Action Plan provides for longer-term consultation and cooperation in a wide range of areas.

The EAPC can convene at different levels - heads of state and government, ministerial, ambassadorial and at the expert and working levels - and can play a key role in times of crisis. For instance, during the Kosovo crisis, a series of extraordinary meetings was held to keep Partners informed of the status of NATO planning and preparations for possible military options in Kosovo and to exchange views during and after the conflict.

### ***Partnership for Peace***

Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries. Its emphasis is on tailor-made programmes that respond to the specific needs of the country in question. These are called Individual Partnership Programmes, which are two-year programmes drawn up from an extensive menu of activities selected from the Partnership Work Programme. The Partnership Work Programme offers activities in over 20 areas, ranging from defence policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, to air defence, communications and information systems, crisis management, and civil emergency planning. In 1999, the Individual Partnership Programme was complemented by the Individual Partnership Action Plan, which seeks to encompass activities under the EAPC and the PfP, and bring Partners even closer to NATO.

The formal basis of PfP - the PfP Framework Document - lists the specific undertakings to be made by each participant: transparency in defence planning, democratic control of armed forces and interoperability. NATO in turn commits itself to consult with any Partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The Framework Document also commits NATO to develop with Partner countries a Planning and Review Process (PARP) designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating

forces and capabilities which might be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations with NATO forces. PARP is modelled on NATO's own force planning system and is offered to Partners on an optional basis. It has contributed to the cooperation of Partner countries in NATO-led operations such as those in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan, and has helped lay the basis for greater Partner involvement in PfP decision-making and planning.

PfP Staff Elements, manned by officers from Allied and Partner countries, have been established at several NATO headquarters to work on planning for exercises and conducting other cooperative functions. Moreover, at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, a Partnership Coordination Cell helps coordinate PfP training and exercises. There is also an International Coordination Centre that provides briefing and planning facilities for all non-NATO countries contributing troops to NATO-led peace-keeping operations.

PfP is reviewed on a regular basis to adjust it to changes in the international environment and to the needs of Partners. Over the past years the programme has been enhanced consistently, including the launching of Partnership Action Plans against Terrorism and on defence institution building.

In addition to these periodical enhancements of PfP, the programme has been complemented by an important initiative: the establishment of PfP Trust Funds in September 2000 to assist Partners in the safe destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines and other munitions. Several projects have been initiated, for instance in Albania, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. They are led by a NATO Member and Partner country and funded by countries that wish to join the projects.

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Key document entitled: "Towards a Partnership for the 21st century - The enhanced and more operational partnership" covering PMF, PARP, OCC, IPAP and TEEP, 15 June 1999:

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Module including legal and political texts, and official statements on the EAPC and PfP, including the PfP Invitation Document, the PfP Framework Document, the Basic Document of the EAPC, Action Plans and Work Plans:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/eapc-off-text.htm#political>

Legal texts related to PfP, as well as ministerial communiqués and Partnership Work Programmes:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/off-text.html>

EAPC member countries, with national links:

<http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc-cnt.htm>

PfP members listed in chronological order of the signing of the Framework Document:

<http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-date.htm>

EADRCC web site:

<http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/home.htm>

NATO's Military Liaison Office in Belgrade:

<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/mlo/>

NATO's Partner countries:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/partners/index.html>

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/index.html>

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<http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html>

Partnership for Peace Trust Fund:

<http://www.nato.int/pfp/trust-fund.htm>

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<http://www.nato.int/issues/eadrcc/index.html>

NATO-EU: A strategic partnership:

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Meeting with the North Atlantic Council: speech by Boris Tadić, President of Serbia:

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NATO Update: NATO opens Military Liaison Office in Belgrade:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/12-december/e1219a.htm>

Keynote speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, at opening of NATO Military Liaison Office in Belgrade:

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Celebrating ten years of Partnership for Peace, 10 January 2004:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/01-january/e0110b.htm>

Fifth anniversary of the EADRCC, 3 June 2003:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/06-june/e0603b.htm>

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### 3.2. Clear signal on enlargement

Over the past decade, ten former Partners have become members of the Alliance. At Riga, Allied leaders underlined that NATO's door remains open. They gave what the Secretary General called a "clear signal" to Membership Action Plan countries Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\* that "the Alliance intends to extend further invitations to those countries who meet NATO's performance-based standards and are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability" at the next NATO Summit in 2008.

Riga was also an opportunity to welcome the launch of an Intensified Dialogue with Georgia on issues related to its membership aspirations. Allied leaders also reaffirmed the importance of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership and welcomed progress made under its Intensified Dialogue.

Georgia was granted an "Intensified Dialogue on Membership Aspirations" by the North Atlantic Council in September 2006. The first round of the dialogue took place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 14 December 2006. The talks covered a broad range of issues, from the main outcomes of the Riga Summit to the expectations NATO member countries have of potential members in the political, military, financial, legal and security fields.

The two sides also discussed the work plan for the Intensified Dialogue for 2007, which will consist of a series of focused discussions between Georgia, the NATO International Staff and NATO member countries.

### ***Road to membership***

In accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the door to NATO membership remains open to other European countries that are ready and willing to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership and who are potential security providers. Aspirant countries are expected to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to prepare for membership and demonstrate their ability to meet the obligations and commitments of membership. The MAP is a programme designed to help aspiring Partner countries meet NATO standards and prepare for possible future membership. Participation in the MAP does not prejudice any decision by the Alliance on future membership but it greatly facilitates the process.

After successfully completing the MAP process, aspirants must be officially invited by NATO to begin accession talks with the Alliance. Once this invitation is issued, the major steps in the process are:

- accession talks with a NATO team;
- invitees send letters of intent to NATO, along with timetables for completion of reforms undertaken as part of the MAP process;
- accession protocols are signed by NATO countries;
- accession protocols are ratified by NATO countries;
- the Secretary General invites the potential new members to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty;
- invitees accede to the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with their national procedures;
- upon depositing their instruments of accession with the US State Department - the depository of the treaty - invitees become NATO members.

## **OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP):

[www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html)

### 3.3. NATO-Russia relations

While welcoming progress made in intensifying political dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia, Allied leaders meeting in Riga called on Russia to join them in enhancing cooperation on key security issues, including the fight against terrorism. They looked forward to Russia's early ratification of the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement, which would facilitate further intensification of practical cooperation, particularly military-to-military projects. They expressed appreciation for the Russian contribution to Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean, and practical cooperation in countering narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan and Central Asia. They also expressed their readiness to strengthen and deepen cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) by making its structures more effective.

#### ***NATO-Russia Council***

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is the principal mechanism for NATO-Russia cooperation. In the framework of the NRC, NATO Allies and Russia participate as equal members and develop cooperation in different areas of common interest. Since its establishment at the Rome Summit in May 2002, the NRC has developed into a mature and effective forum for political dialogue and cooperation.

Key areas of cooperation under the NRC include the fight against terrorism, crisis management, theatre missile defence, non-proliferation, military-to-military cooperation and defence reform. Russia also cooperates with NATO in airspace management, civil emergency planning, scientific cooperation and environmental security.

A stocktaking of the NRC's activities was undertaken in spring 2006. On the basis of the progress achieved and challenges identified in the course of implementing the NRC agenda, Allied and Russian foreign ministers meeting in Sofia in April 2006 agreed a set of priorities and recommendations to guide the NRC's work in the medium term. These overarching priorities include:

- reinforcing the NRC's political dialogue;
- intensifying efforts to develop interoperability and to deepen cooperation on defence reform;
- intensifying cooperation in the struggle against terrorism;
- further developing mutual trust, confidence and transparency with regard to NATO and Russian armed forces;
- further developing interoperability and cooperation on crisis management;
- identifying areas for result-oriented cooperation on non-proliferation;

- heightening public awareness of the NRC's goals, principles and achievements; and
- seeking adequate resources to support NATO-Russia initiatives.

In December 2004, NRC foreign ministers approved a comprehensive NRC Action Plan on Terrorism, aimed at improving overall coordination and strategic direction of NRC cooperation. Joint pre-deployment training to prepare Russian ships to support Operation Active Endeavour began in December 2004. The deployment of the first Russian ship, the frigate RFS Pitlyvi, was announced in September 2006.

## OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p051208e.htm>

Statement from the meeting of the NRC Defence Ministers, 9 June 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p050609-nrce.htm>

Statement from the meeting of the NRC Foreign Ministers, 9 December 2004:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p041209e.htm>

NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism, 9 December 2004:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b041209a-e.htm>

Chairman's statement from the meeting of NRC Foreign Ministers in Istanbul, 28 June 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p040628e.htm>

Chairman's statement from the informal meeting of NRC Foreign Ministers, 2 April 2004:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p040402-nrc-e.htm>

Statement from the meeting of NRC Foreign Ministers, 4 December 2003:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p031204e.htm>

Statement by ministers of defence at the NRC meeting, on areas of cooperation  
1 December 2003:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p031201e.htm>

NATO-Russia Council statement on defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23 July 2003:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p030723be.htm>

The NATO-Russia Summit in Rome - basic texts and other related documents, 28 May 2002:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/0205-rome.htm>

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The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre:

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Transcript of the news conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the informal meeting of the NRC, 28 April 2006:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060428c.htm>

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<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040405a.htm>

Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson on "A New Russian Revolution: Partnership with NATO", giving a short history of NATO-Russia relations, 13 December 2003:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021213a.htm>

Speech by General Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, on "Peacekeeping: Achievements and next steps", 3 July 2003:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030703a.htm>

### 3.4. NATO-Ukraine relations

In Riga, Allied leaders reaffirmed the importance of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership and welcomed progress made in their Intensified Dialogue. They expressed appreciation for Ukraine's substantial contributions to common security, including through participation in NATO-led operations and efforts to promote regional cooperation, and called on Ukraine to continue to contribute to regional security. They expressed their determination to continue practical cooperation to help Ukraine implement far-reaching reform efforts, notably in the fields of national security, defence, reform of the defence-industrial sector and fighting corruption.

#### ***Distinctive partnership***

The NATO-Ukraine relationship has developed progressively since the signature of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership in 1997. The Charter identified areas for consultation and cooperation and established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) to take work forward. Over the years, a pattern of dialogue and cooperation has become well-established in a wide range of areas, including defence and security sector reform, the fight against terrorism, peacekeeping, civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness, political co-operation on regional security issues, military cooperation and science and technology cooperation.

NATO and Ukraine are currently engaged in an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's aspirations to join the Alliance and related reforms. Launched in April 2005, this Dialogue reflects a renewed momentum in the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

In parallel with the Intensified Dialogue, a package of short-term actions was approved to focus practical cooperation on five priority areas:

- strengthening democratic institutions;
- enhancing political dialogue;
- intensifying defence and security sector reform;
- improving public information;
- managing the social and economic consequences of reform.

An important aspect of NATO-Ukraine relations is the support given by NATO and individual Allies for Ukraine's ongoing reform efforts, particularly in the defence and security sectors. These reforms are vital for the country's democratic development and the realisation of its goal to become more integrated with Euro-Atlantic structures. An important tool for guiding cooperation in this process is the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, adopted by the NUC in November 2002.

The Action Plan identifies a set of long-term strategic objectives designed to bring Ukraine closer to its Euro-Atlantic integration goals and provides a framework for current and future NATO-Ukraine cooperation. It sets out jointly agreed principles and objectives covering political and economic issues, information issues, security, defence and military issues, information protection and security, and legal issues.

Annual Target Plans outlining specific Ukrainian measures and joint NATO-Ukraine actions in support of the objectives set out in the Action Plan are developed each year. Assessment meetings take place twice a year and a progress report is prepared annually to enable the NUC to review progress in achieving the objectives of the Action Plan.

Both the Intensified Dialogue and the short-term actions, launched in April 2005, are intended to complement and reinforce existing cooperation under the Action Plan.

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Chairman's statement at the NUC meeting in Defence Ministers session, 8 June 2006:

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<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-159e.htm>

Joint Press Statement, NUC meeting in Kyiv, 19 October 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-132e.htm>

Meeting of NUC Defence Ministers, 9 June 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-077e.htm>

Press release on "Enhancing NATO-Ukraine Cooperation - Short-term Actions", issued at meeting of NUC Foreign Ministers in Vilnius in parallel with the decision to launch an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's membership aspirations, 21 April 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p050421e.htm>

NATO-Ukraine 2006 Target Plan in the Framework of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b060407e.pdf>

NATO-Ukraine 2005 Target Plan in the Framework of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan:

[http://www.nato.int/docu/other/ukr/target\\_plan\\_e.pdf](http://www.nato.int/docu/other/ukr/target_plan_e.pdf)

Chairman's statement, meeting of the NUC at summit level in Istanbul, 29 June 2004:

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NATO-Ukraine 2003 Target Plan in the Framework of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b030324e.pdf>

First NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, November 2002, containing detailed information on Ukraine's strategic objectives and areas of cooperation with NATO:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm>

NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, 9 July 1997, Madrid:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm>

NATO-Ukraine relations:

<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/nato-ukraine.htm>

Transcript of an interview with John Colston, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, explaining NATO-Ukraine defence cooperation, 11 January 2006:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060111a.htm>

Transcript of the interactive video debate "Stopwatch" on NATO and Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, November 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051122a.htm>

Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to the Diplomatic Academy in Kiev, Ukraine, 20 October 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051020b.htm>

Transcript of an interview with Ambassador Erdmann, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, explaining the Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine, 27 September 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050727a.htm>

### 3.5. Relations with Contact Countries

At the Summit, Allied leaders directed work to fully develop the political and practical potential of NATO's partnership frameworks and its relations with Contact Countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan. This will include measures to make consultations more focused, meeting formats more flexible, and established partnership tools more widely available to newer partners, such as those in the Mediterranean Dialogue process and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as to Contact Countries.



### 3.6. NATO Training Initiative

At Riga, Allied leaders launched the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative offering to share NATO training expertise with its Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners. The initiative, launched in the spirit of joint ownership, will take into account available resources and aims to build an expanding network of NATO training activities that will modernise defence structures and train security forces. This will be done through an evolutionary and phased approach, first by increasing participation in existing NATO training and education programmes and partnership tools, and by establishing a Middle East faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome. In a second phase, NATO could support the establishment of a dedicated training facility in the Middle East.

#### ***Mediterranean Dialogue***

NATO initiated a political dialogue with Mediterranean countries in 1994, which it offered to elevate to a genuine partnership ten years later. Currently, there are seven participants: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

The Mediterranean Dialogue aims to contribute to regional security and stability, achieve a better mutual understanding, dispel any misconceptions between NATO and its Mediterranean partners and promote good and friendly relations across the region. It is based on several principles, in a spirit of joint ownership:

- Non-discrimination: all partners are offered the same basis for cooperation and discussion with NATO;
- Self-differentiation: the Dialogue allows for a tailored approach to the specific needs of each partner;
- Mutual interests: the Alliance seeks contributions from partners for the success of the Dialogue, and partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with NATO;
- Complementarity: NATO's initiative complements those of other international organisations in the region – the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Five plus Five.

While cooperation and dialogue essentially take place at a bilateral level (26+1), the Mediterranean Dialogue also allows for multilateral political consultation (26+7). Since the 2002 Prague Summit, regional cooperation involving at least two Dialogue partners is also possible.

Since its inception, the Dialogue has been characterised by a progressive approach in terms of participation and substance, allowing the number of participants to grow from the five initial members in 1994 to the inclusion of Jordan in 1995 and Algeria in 2000, and allowing forms of cooperation to evolve.

The Mediterranean Cooperation Group was established in July 1997 under the authority and supervision of the North Atlantic Council. It has overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue and is the forum within which political discussions take place either bilaterally or multilaterally on a regular basis and at different levels.

An Annual Work Programme has existed since 1997. It lays out the different areas of cooperation, which include public diplomacy, science and the environment, crisis management, civil emergency planning, defence policy and strategy, small arms and light weapons, airspace management, and global humanitarian mine action.

There is also a military dimension to the annual Work Programme, which enables Mediterranean Dialogue representatives to participate in courses at NATO schools and observe and/or participate in NATO military exercises. Meetings take place at the level of Chiefs of Defence Staff. In the past, three of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries - Egypt, Jordan and Morocco - have contributed troops to NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Morocco still contributes troops to NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and together with Algeria and Israel has announced it wants to participate in Operation Active Endeavour.

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Istanbul Summit Communiqué on taking the Mediterranean Dialogue to the level of a genuine partnership (paragraph 36), 28 June 2004:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>

Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programmes (from 2002 to 2005) can be accessed via the topic page on the Mediterranean Dialogue:

<http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm>

NATO Foreign Ministers urge for an upgrade of the Mediterranean Dialogue (paragraph 17), 4-5 December 2003:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-152e.htm>

Upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue including an inventory of possible areas of cooperation, May 2003:

<http://www.nato.int/med-dial/upgrading.htm>

NATO Foreign Ministers announce their decision to upgrade the political and practical dimensions of the Mediterranean Dialogue (paragraph 15), 14 May 2002:

<http://www.nato.int/med-dial/comm.htm#020514>

Decision to enhance the political and practical dimensions of the Mediterranean Dialogue (paragraphs 5, 29, 38), April 1999:

<http://www.nato.int/med-dial/comm.htm#990424>

Extract from the Madrid Declaration by NATO Heads of State and Government, announcing the creation of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (paragraph 13), July 1997:

<http://www.nato.int/med-dial/comm.htm#970708>

Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council announcing the creation of a Mediterranean Dialogue (paragraph 19), 1 December 1994:

<http://www.nato.int/med-dial/comm.htm#941201>

Brussels Summit Declaration, laying the basis for the creation of a dialogue in the region (paragraph 22), January 1994:

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<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060213b.htm>

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<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050428b.htm>

Transcript of the interactive video forum series "Stopwatch" on bridging the Mediterranean, 11 March 2005:

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Transcript of the video interview with Nicola de Santis, Head of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Section, Public Diplomacy Division, January 2005:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041210b.htm>

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Speech by Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo, NATO Deputy Secretary General, at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, 29 November 2004, on "The Mediterranean and the Middle East: the successor generation":

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041129a.htm>

Speech by Lord Robertson at RUSI, London, 30 June 2003, on "NATO and Mediterranean Security: Practical steps towards partnership", where he outlines five priority areas for the Mediterranean Dialogue:

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030630a.htm>

### ***Istanbul Cooperation Initiative***

At the NATO Summit in June 2004, the Alliance launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The programme offers countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO so as to contribute to global and regional security. To date, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have joined.

Based on the principle of inclusiveness, ICI is open to all interested countries in the region who subscribe to the aim and content of this initiative, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Each interested country is considered by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on a case-by-case basis and on its own merit. Initially, the Initiative was offered to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, all of which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The ICI is also open to other countries, and does not exclude the participation of the Palestinian Authority.

The Alliance proposes to cooperate in a number of areas that are set out in the ICI official policy document made public at the Istanbul Summit. It includes:

- contributing to NATO-led operations and the fight against terrorism;
- stemming the flow of WMD materials and illegal trafficking in arms;
- improving the capability of countries to address common challenges and threats, in cooperation with NATO.

Six practical areas of cooperation have been identified from which participants can choose:

1. Providing tailored advice on defence reform, defence budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations;
2. Military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities that could

improve the ability of participating countries' forces to operate with those of the Alliance in contributing to NATO-led operations;

3. Cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing and maritime cooperation;
4. Contributing to the Alliance's work on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
5. Cooperation in the field of border security in connection with terrorism, small arms and light weapons and the fight against illegal trafficking;
6. Civil emergency planning, including participating in training courses and exercises on disaster assistance.

Since an underlying requirement of success for ICI is the development of ownership by countries of the region, both NATO and participating countries agreed that it is necessary to update the understanding of governments and opinion-formers on NATO and the Initiative, and are currently engaged in a joint public diplomacy effort in the region.

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