

**NATO'S MILITARY TRANSFORMATION:  
AN OUTSIDER'S ASSESSMENT**

**Anthony H. Cordesman  
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy  
Center for Strategic and International Studies**

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## **Introduction**

- **The devil is in the details: What countries actually fund in terms of mission capabilities: Not declarations, plans, intentions and strategies.**
  - **No outsider can really know and evaluate the capabilities of country orders of battle and unit element.**
  - **Nations remain sovereign, and “force plans” are not necessarily “force actions.”**
  - **Long history of nations being unable to execute their force plans.**
  - **Transparency of mission capabilities and measures of effectiveness are major issues.**
  - **Nations have found it difficult to transform forces and simultaneously contribute to current missions.**
- **Not attempt in 15 minutes to say what should be done.**
- **Will instead raise a series of seven challenges that NATO must meet to have effective transformation.**

## **Challenge One: What is the Real Mission for Force Transformation?**

- **“Keeping up the façade: ”Maintain the image of Transatlantic unity.”**
- **Transatlantic specialization: Europe concentrates on unity and stability, the US on out of area strategic concerns.**
- **Focus on full spectrum capabilities for regional use or niche capabilities for global use.**
- **Cohesive alliance deployments: Large mixes of conventional forces for extended periods of time.**
- **Modular ad hoc deployments: Limited mixes of forces tailored to a given contingency.**
- **Anti-terrorism defense and response in the NATO area.**
- **Asymmetric and irregular warfare out of area.**
- **Peacemaking, stability operations, and nation building.**
- **All of the Above?**

## **Challenge Two: Cohesive or “A la Carte Alliance?”**

- **Is Transatlantic cohesion militarily credible at the NATO level?**
- **Should transformation be for an alliance in which force elements are allocated by “Coalitions of the Willing” on an ad hoc basis?**
- **Coordinated transformation to avoid duplicative capabilities?**
- **NATO force, NATO flag, or simply from NATO countries?**
- **De facto ala carte with ability to become cohesive?**
- **Do either the EU or NATO goals for European power projection forces make sense under these conditions?**
- **Should NATO revisit its Strategic Concept and should the EU go beyond the European Security Strategy?**

### **Challenge Three: In What Contingencies is NATO Credible?**

- **Capabilities are contingency dependent, and nature of contingencies is evolving radically in era of asymmetric and irregular warfare, terrorism, and proliferation.**
- **What specific contingencies is there a high credibility that NATO could act upon cohesively?**
- **Past Cases:**
  - **Red flagging and No Shows in the Balkans.**
  - **No shows in Afghanistan**
  - **Iraq as a Warning.**
- **Future cases:**
  - **Iranian proliferation?**
  - **Peacemaking force for Arab-Israeli conflict?**
  - **Counter mass immigration from North Africa?**
  - **Korean and Taiwan Straits?**
  - **Central Asian or Sub-Saharan stability operations and nation building?**

## **Challenge Four: What to Become?**

- **“General purpose forces are no purpose forces.”**
- **Expeditionary goals or modular forces?**
- **Is the high tech, RMA-like, transformational equipment mix no longer valid?**
  - **If is unaffordable for the US is unaffordable for everyone.**
  - **Value of legacy forces in Iraq.**
    - **Existing or near-term netcentric capabilities, cheap precision weapons. Old platforms**
  - **Cost Containment a Nightmare for all US Services: Army defers FCS. A Navy of 230-260 ships. Marine Corps mortgaged to Osprey; Air Force crisis over F-22, F-35. Force enablers.**
- **What does mobility and sustainability really mean?**
  - **Airlift is what gets you into trouble: 95% of US lift is still sealift.**
  - **Sustainability and logistic needs in Iraq.**
- **Irregular and asymmetric warfare; stability operations, and nation building: Potential value of special forces, area expertise and languages, civil military and MP units.**
- **What does counterproliferation really mean?**

### **Challenge Five: What is the Future of Interoperability?**

- **What kind of hierarchical command, control, communications, and computer (C<sup>4</sup>) system is really practical and affordable?**
  - **NATO standard vs. hi-low vs. minimum standards?**
- **What kind of hierarchical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) system is really practical and affordable?**
- **What does “netcentric” really mean for NATO?**
  - **Force tracking and red-blue netcentric warfare?**
  - **“Effects-based”: targeting-precision-battle damage assessment?**
- **How is the overall decision-making cycle structure to create compatible reaction times, decision-making cycles?**
- **What kind of shared metrics and standards can be developed to determine overall capability?**
- **Integrated or compartmented overall battle management?**
- **Dependence on US? Independence but compatible? NATO**
- **Cost containment vs. the mire of infinite “bandwidth.”**
- **How to train and organize for so many options, national systems, and types of war?**

### **Challenge Six: What to Get Rid Of?**

- **How fast and how well is transformation downsizing what is no longer needed?**
- **Earmarked, Assigned, and Reported to NATO versus total effort:**
  - **\$650 billion for NATO; \$220 billion for NATO Europe.**
  - **3.6 million actives for NATO; 2.2 million actives for NATO Europe.**
  - **3.9 million reserves for NATO; 2.6 million reserves for NATO Europe.**
  - **740,000 million paramilitary for NATO; 680,000 paramilitary for NATO Europe.**
  - **Are non-deployable conventional forces large useless forces?**
- **Are there forces that may not be “modern” or suited for the revolution in military affairs that should be preserved for asymmetric and irregular war, stability operations, and nation building?**
  - **Homeland defense?**
  - **Counterterrorism?**

## **Challenge Seven: How Can NATO Establish Credibility and Transparency**

- **Is a new force planning and reporting system needed?**
- **Expeditionary force goal is not the answer.**
- **Size is not the issue; mission capability is.**
  - **Need to rethink orders of battle to define specific unit elements in terms of specific mission capabilities; not service totals.**
  - **New “toys” need to be tied to specific mission capabilities.**
- **Need for credible mission capability plans and reporting.**
  - **At national level.**
  - **In terms of NATO review and reporting.**
- **What are meaningful measures of effectiveness?**
  - **Classified?**
  - **Public?**
- **Need to overcome mistrust between NATO and the EU.**