

Texts of Statements and Communiqués issued during 1999

NATO Office of Information and Press
1110 Brussels, Belgium
Fax: (32-2) 707.1252
E-Mail: DISTRIBUTION@HQ.NATO.INT

NATO Communiqués and other NATO Publications
are also available in English and French on
the World Wide Web at [HTTP://WWW.NATO.INT](http://WWW.NATO.INT)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PART I:

Statements, Communiqués, and Chairman's summaries issued at the conclusion of Meetings held at the level of Heads of State and Government and Foreign and Defence Ministers.

THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND KOSOVO

Statement issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Brussels, Belgium
12 April 1999

9

STATEMENT ON KOSOVO

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Washington, D.C.
23 April 1999

13

THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION

Signed and issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Washington, D.C.
23 April 1999

17

WASHINGTON SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Washington, D.C.
24 April 1999

19

THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Washington, D.C.
24 April 1999

35

MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP)

Washington, D.C.
24 April 1999

55

DECLARATION of the Heads of State and Government participating in the NATO-Ukraine Commission Summit Washington, D.C. 24 April 1999	65
DEFENCE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE Washington D.C. 25 April 1999	69
CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE EURO- ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL AT SUMMIT LEVEL Washington, D.C. 25 April 1999	71
CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government with Countries in the Region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Washington D.C. 25 April 1999	73
THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND KOSOVO Chairman's Statement issued at the Extraordinary Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Council Brussels 18 June 1999	75
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE AND THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP Final Communiqué Brussels 2 December 1999	79
MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN DEFENCE MINISTERS' SESSION Final Communiqué Brussels 2 December 1999	83
STATEMENT Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers' Session Brussels 3 December 1999	93

CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL IN DEFENCE MINISTERS' SESSION Brussels 3 December 1999	95
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL Final communiqué Brussels 15 December 1999	97
STATEMENT Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers Brussels 15 December 1999	113
CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF THE MEETING TO THE EURO- ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL Brussels 16 December 1999	115
THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (EAPC) ACTION PLAN 2000-2002 Brussels 16 December 1999	117

PART II: Other Statements and Declarations

NATO-RUSSIA	135
NATO-UKRAINE	142
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA	147
KOSOVO	157
FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA ⁽¹⁾	179
HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL	181

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID	182
NATO POLICY ON NON-LETHAL WEAPONS	184
WELCOMING STATEMENT TO THE THREE NEW ALLIES	187
PART III: Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence	191

PART I

Statements, Communiqués and
Chairman's summaries issued at
the conclusion of meetings held at
the level of Heads of State
and Government and Foreign
and Defence Ministers

THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND KOSOVO

Statement issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Brussels, Belgium 12 April 1999

1. The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, for which NATO has stood since its foundation. We are united in our determination to overcome this challenge.
2. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has repeatedly violated United Nations Security Council resolutions. The unrestrained assault by Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces, under the direction of President Milosevic, on Kosovar civilians has created a massive humanitarian catastrophe which also threatens to destabilise the surrounding region. Hundreds of thousands of people have been expelled ruthlessly from Kosovo by the FRY authorities. We condemn these appalling violations of human rights and the indiscriminate use of force by the Yugoslav government. These extreme and criminally irresponsible policies, which cannot be defended on any grounds, have made necessary and justify the military action by NATO.
3. NATO's military action against the FRY supports the political aims of the international community: a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo in which all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis. In this context, we welcome the statement of the UN Secretary-General of 9 April and the EU Council Conclusions of 8 April.
4. NATO's air strikes will be pursued until President Milosevic accedes to the demands of the international community. President Milosevic knows what he has to do. He must:
 - ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;
 - ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;
 - agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;

- agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;
- provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

5. Responsibility for the present crisis lies with President Milosevic. He has the power to bring a halt to NATO's military action by accepting and implementing irrevocably the legitimate demands of the international community.

6. We underline that NATO is not waging war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We have no quarrel with the people of the FRY who for too long have been isolated in Europe because of the policies of their government.

7. We are grateful for the strong and material support we have received from our Partners in the region and more widely in the international community in responding to the crisis.

8. The Alliance shares a common interest with Russia in reaching a political solution to the crisis in Kosovo and wants to work constructively with Russia, in the spirit of the Founding Act, to this end.

9. As a result of President Milosevic's sustained policy of ethnic cleansing, hundreds of thousands of Kosovar people are seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1). Others remain in Kosovo, destitute and beyond the reach of international relief. These people in Kosovo are struggling to survive under conditions of exhaustion, hunger and desperation. We will hold President Milosevic and the Belgrade leadership responsible for the well-being of all civilians in Kosovo.

10. NATO and its members have responded promptly to this emergency. We have activated with our Partners the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre. NATO forces in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have constructed emergency accommodation for refugees and have cared for them. NATO troops are also being deployed to Albania to support the humanitarian efforts there and to assist the Albanian authorities in providing a secure environment for them. We will sustain and intensify our refugee and humanitarian relief operations in cooperation with the UNHCR, the lead agency in this field. NATO-led refugee and humanitarian aid airlift operations for both Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) are

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

already under way and they will increase. The steps being taken by NATO and the efforts of other international organisations and agencies, including the European Union, are complementary and mutually reinforcing.

11. We pay tribute to NATO's servicemen and women whose commitment and skill are ensuring the success of NATO's military and humanitarian operations.

12. Atrocities against the people of Kosovo by FRY military, police and paramilitary forces violate international law. Those who are responsible for the systematic campaign of violence and destruction against innocent Kosovar civilians and for the forced deportation of hundreds of thousands of refugees will be held accountable for their actions. Those indicted must be brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague in accordance with international law and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Allies reaffirm there can be no lasting peace without justice.

13. NATO has repeatedly stated that it would be unacceptable if the FRY were to threaten the territorial integrity, political independence and security of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1). We have consulted closely and at a high level with both countries on their specific concerns. We will respond to any challenges by the FRY to the security of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) stemming from the presence of NATO forces and their activities on their territory.

14. We are concerned over the situation in the Republic of Montenegro. We reaffirm our support for the democratically elected government of President Milo Djukanovic which has accepted tens of thousands of displaced persons from Kosovo. President Milosevic should be in no doubt that any move against President Djukanovic and his government will have grave consequences.

15. The Kosovo crisis underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to the stabilisation of the crisis region in South-Eastern Europe and to the integration of the countries of the region into the Euro-Atlantic community. We welcome the EU initiative for a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe under the auspices of the OSCE, as well as other regional efforts including the South-Eastern Europe Cooperation initiative. We are strengthening the security dialogue between NATO and countries of the region with a view to building a dynamic partnership with them and have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to develop measures to this end. We look forward to a time when the people of Serbia can re-establish normal relations with all the peoples of the Balkans. We want all the countries of South-Eastern Europe to enjoy peace and security.

STATEMENT ON KOSOVO

**Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Washington, D.C., USA
23 April 1999**

1. The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence pursued by the Belgrade regime under the direction of President Milosevic. We will not allow this campaign of terror to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail.
2. NATO's military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) supports the political aims of the international community, which were re-affirmed in recent statements by the UN Secretary-General and the European Union: a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis.
3. Our military actions are directed not at the Serb people but at the policies of the regime in Belgrade, which has repeatedly rejected all efforts to solve the crisis peacefully. President Milosevic must:
 - ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo;
 - withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and para-military forces;
 - agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
 - agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations; and
 - provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework agreement based on the Rambouillet accords.
4. There can be no compromise on these conditions. As long as Belgrade fails to meet the legitimate demands of the international community and continues to inflict immense human suffering, Alliance air operations against the

Yugoslav war machine will continue. We hold President Milosevic and the Belgrade leadership responsible for the safety of all Kosovar citizens. We will fulfill our promise to the Kosovar people that they can return to their homes and live in peace and security.

5. We are intensifying NATO's military actions to increase the pressure on Belgrade. Allied governments are putting in place additional measures to tighten the constraints on the Belgrade regime. These include intensified implementation of economic sanctions, and an embargo on petroleum products on which we welcome the EU lead. We have directed our Defence Ministers to determine ways that NATO can contribute to halting the delivery of war material including by launching maritime operations, taking into account the possible consequences on Montenegro.

6. NATO is prepared to suspend its air strikes once Belgrade has unequivocally accepted the above-mentioned conditions and demonstrably begun to withdraw its forces from Kosovo according to a precise and rapid timetable. This could follow the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution, which we will seek, requiring the withdrawal of Serb forces and the demilitarisation of Kosovo and encompassing the deployment of an international military force to safeguard the swift return of all refugees and displaced persons as well as the establishment of an international provisional administration of Kosovo under which its people can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY. NATO remains ready to form the core of such an international military force. It would be multinational in character with contributions from non-NATO countries.

7. Russia has a particular responsibility in the United Nations and an important role to play in the search for a solution to the conflict in Kosovo. Such a solution must be based on the conditions of the international community as laid out above. President Milosevic's offers to date do not meet this test. We want to work constructively with Russia, in the spirit of the Founding Act.

8. The long-planned, unrestrained and continuing assault by Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces on Kosovars and the repression directed against other minorities of the FRY are aggravating the already massive humanitarian catastrophe. This threatens to destabilise the surrounding region.

9. NATO, its members and its Partners have responded to the humanitarian emergency and are intensifying their refugee and humanitarian relief operations in close cooperation with the UNHCR, the lead agency in this field, and with other relevant organisations. We will continue our assistance as long as necessary. NATO forces are making a major contribution to this task.

10. We pay tribute to the servicemen and women of NATO whose courage and dedication are ensuring the success of our military and humanitarian operations.

11. Atrocities against the people of Kosovo by FRY military, police and paramilitary forces represent a flagrant violation of international law. Our governments will cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to support investigation of all those, including at the highest levels, responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. NATO will support the ICTY in its efforts to secure relevant information. There can be no lasting peace without justice.

12. We acknowledge and welcome the courageous support that states in the region are providing to our efforts in Kosovo. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ and Albania have played a particularly important role, not least in accepting hundreds of thousands of refugees from Kosovo. The states in the region are bearing substantial economic and social burdens stemming from the current conflict.

13. We will not tolerate threats by the Belgrade regime to the security of its neighbours. We will respond to such challenges by Belgrade to its neighbours resulting from the presence of NATO forces or their activities on their territory during this crisis.

14. We reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries in the region.

15. We reaffirm our strong support for the democratically elected government of Montenegro. Any move by Belgrade to undermine the government of President Djukanovic will have grave consequences. FRY forces should leave the demilitarised zone of Prevlaka immediately.

16. The objective of a free, prosperous, open and economically integrated South-East Europe cannot be fully assured until the FRY embarks upon the transition to democracy. Accordingly, we express our support for the objective of a democratic FRY which protects the rights of all minorities, including those in Vojvodina and Sandjak, and promise to work for such change through and beyond the current conflict.

17. It is our aim to make stability in South-East Europe a priority of our transatlantic agenda. Our governments will cooperate urgently through NATO as well as through the OSCE, and for those of us which are members, the European Union, to support the nations of South-East Europe in forging a better future for their region - one based upon democracy, justice, economic integration, and security cooperation.

⁽¹⁾ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION

**Signed and issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Washington D.C., USA
23 April 1999**

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, declare for a new century our mutual commitment to defend our people, our territory and our liberty, founded on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The world has changed dramatically over the last half century, but our common values and security interests remain the same.
2. At this anniversary summit, we affirm our determination to continue advancing these goals, building on the habits of trust and cooperation we have developed over fifty years. Collective defence remains the core purpose of NATO. We affirm our commitment to promote peace, stability and freedom.
3. We pay tribute to the men and women who have served our Alliance and who have advanced the cause of freedom. To honour them and to build a better future, we will contribute to building a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies - a community where human rights and fundamental freedoms are upheld; where borders are increasingly open to people, ideas and commerce; where war becomes unthinkable.
4. We reaffirm our faith, as stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and reiterate our desire to live in peace with all nations, and to settle any international dispute by peaceful means.
5. We must be as effective in the future in dealing with new challenges as we were in the past. We are charting NATO's course as we enter the 21st century: an Alliance committed to collective defence, capable of addressing current and future risks to our security, strengthened by and open to new members, and working together with other institutions, Partners and Mediterranean Dialogue countries in a mutually reinforcing way to enhance Euro-Atlantic security and stability.
6. NATO embodies the vital partnership between Europe and North America. We welcome the further impetus that has been given to the strengthening of European defence capabilities to enable the European Allies to act more effectively together, thus reinforcing the transatlantic partnership.

7. We remain determined to stand firm against those who violate human rights, wage war and conquer territory. We will maintain both the political solidarity and the military forces necessary to protect our nations and to meet the security challenges of the next century. We pledge to improve our defence capabilities to fulfill the full range of the Alliance's 21st century missions. We will continue to build confidence and security through arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and our determination to protect ourselves against this scourge.

8. Our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe. NATO is an essential pillar of a wider community of shared values and shared responsibility. Working together, Allies and Partners, including Russia and Ukraine, are developing their cooperation and erasing the divisions imposed by the Cold War to help to build a Europe whole and free, where security and prosperity are shared and indivisible.

9. Fifty years after NATO's creation, the destinies of North America and Europe remain inseparable. When we act together, we safeguard our freedom and security and enhance stability more effectively than any of us could alone. Now, and for the century about to begin, we declare as the fundamental objectives of this Alliance enduring peace, security and liberty for all people of Europe and North America.

WASHINGTON SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE

**Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Washington, D.C., USA
24 April 1999**

An Alliance for the 21st Century

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO and to set forth our vision of the Alliance of the 21st century. The North Atlantic Alliance, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, remains the basis of our collective defence; it embodies the transatlantic link that binds North America and Europe in a unique defence and security partnership.
2. Fifty years ago, the North Atlantic Alliance was founded in troubled and uncertain times. It has withstood the test of five decades and allowed the citizens of Allied countries to enjoy an unprecedented period of peace, freedom and prosperity. Here in Washington, we have paid tribute to the achievements of the past and we have shaped a new Alliance to meet the challenges of the future. This new Alliance will be larger, more capable and more flexible, committed to collective defence and able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. The Alliance will work with other nations and organisations to advance security, prosperity and democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. The presence today of three new Allies - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - demonstrates that we have overcome the division of Europe.
3. The Alliance takes the opportunity of this 50th anniversary to recognise and express its heartfelt appreciation for the commitment, sacrifice, resolve and loyalty of the servicemen and women of all Allies to the cause of freedom. The Alliance salutes these active and reserve forces' essential contributions, which for 50 years have guaranteed freedom and safeguarded trans-Atlantic security. Our nations and our Alliance are in their debt and offer them profound thanks.

4. The NATO of the 21st century starts today - a NATO which retains the strengths of the past and has new missions, new members and new partnerships. To this end, we have:

- approved an updated Strategic Concept;
- reaffirmed our commitment to the enlargement process of the Alliance and approved a Membership Action Plan for countries wishing to join;
- completed the work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions on building the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness;
- launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative;
- intensified our relations with Partners through an enhanced and more operational Partnership for Peace and strengthened our consultations and cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
- enhanced the Mediterranean Dialogue; and
- decided to increase Alliance efforts against weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

5. As part of the Alliance's adaptation to the new security challenges, we have updated our Strategic Concept to make it fully consistent with the Alliance's new security environment. The updated Concept reaffirms our commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link; takes account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; presents an Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area; reaffirms our commitment to building the ESDI within the Alliance; highlights the enhanced role of partnership and dialogue; underlines the need to develop defence capabilities to their full potential to meet the spectrum of Alliance missions, including forces which are more deployable, sustainable, survivable and able to engage effectively; and provides guidance to the NATO Military Authorities to this end.

6. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.
- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

7. We warmly welcome the participation of the three new Allies - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - in their first Alliance Summit meeting. Their accession to the North Atlantic Treaty opens a new chapter in the history of the Atlantic Alliance.

We reaffirm today our commitment to the openness of the Alliance under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration. We pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. This is part of an evolutionary process that takes into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Our commitment to enlargement is part of a broader strategy of projecting stability and working together with our Partners to build a Europe whole and free. The ongoing enlargement process strengthens the Alliance and enhances the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. The three new members will not be the last.

At the Summit in Madrid we recognised the progress made by a number of countries aspiring to join the Alliance in meeting the responsibilities and obligations for possible membership.

Today we recognise and welcome the continuing efforts and progress in both Romania and Slovenia. We also recognise and welcome continuing efforts and progress in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since the Madrid Summit, we note and welcome positive developments in Bulgaria. We also

note and welcome recent positive developments in Slovakia. We are grateful for the cooperation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ with NATO in the present crisis and welcome its progress on reforms. We welcome Albania's cooperation with the Alliance in the present crisis and encourage its reform efforts.

We welcome the efforts and progress aspiring members have made, since we last met, to advance political, military and economic reforms. We appreciate the results achieved, and look forward to further progress by these countries in strengthening their democratic institutions and in restructuring their economies and militaries. We take account of the efforts of these aspiring members, together with a number of other Partner countries, to improve relations with neighbours and contribute to security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. We look forward to further deepening our cooperation with aspiring countries and to increasing their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance.

The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. To give substance to this commitment, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have expressed an interest in becoming NATO members will remain under active consideration for future membership. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on its own merits. All states have the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security. Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all Allies.

We welcome the aspirations of the nine countries currently interested in joining the Alliance. Accordingly, we are ready to provide advice, assistance and practical support. To this end, we approve today a Membership Action Plan which includes the following elements:

- the submission by aspiring members of individual annual national programmes on their preparations for possible future membership, covering political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects;

⁽¹⁾ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

- a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries' progress on their programmes that includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual 19+1 meetings at Council level to assess progress;
- a clearinghouse to help coordinate assistance by NATO and by member states to aspirant countries in the defence/military field;
- a defence planning approach for aspirants which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.

We direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep the enlargement process, including the implementation of the Membership Action Plan, under continual review and report to us. We will review the process at our next Summit meeting which will be held no later than 2002.

8. We reaffirm our commitment to preserve the transatlantic link, including our readiness to pursue common security objectives through the Alliance wherever possible. We are pleased with the progress achieved in implementing the Berlin decisions and reaffirm our strong commitment to pursue the process of reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance on the basis of our Brussels Declaration of 1994 and of the principles agreed at Berlin in 1996. We note with satisfaction that the key elements of the Berlin decisions are being put in place. These include flexible options for the selection of a European NATO Commander and NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations, as well as specific terms of reference for DSACEUR and an adapted CJTF concept. Close linkages between the two organisations have been established, including planning, exercises (in particular a joint crisis management exercise in 2000) and consultation, as well as a framework for the release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities.

9. We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in the WEU and - following the St. Malo Declaration - in the EU, including the Vienna European Council Conclusions. This is a process which has implications for all Allies. We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard:

- a. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;
- b. As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and trans-

parency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;

- c. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;
- d. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. We also note Canada's interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities;
- e. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.

10. On the basis of the above principles and building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address:

- a. assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
- b. the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
- c. identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
- d. the further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

We task the Council in Permanent Session to address these measures on an ongoing basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. The Council will make recommendations to the next Ministerial meeting for its consideration.

11. We have launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative to improve the defence capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present

and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces (and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces). Defence capabilities will be increased through improvements in the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and command and control and information systems. In this connection, we endorse the Council decision to begin implementing the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre concept by the end of 1999, and to develop the C3 system architecture by 2002 to form a basis for an integrated Alliance core capability allowing interoperability with national systems. We have established a temporary High-Level Steering Group to oversee the implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative and to meet the requirement of coordination and harmonisation among relevant planning disciplines, including for Allies concerned force planning, with the aim of achieving lasting effects on improvements in capabilities and interoperability. Improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO.

12. We reaffirm our commitment to the 1995 Peace Agreement, negotiated in Dayton and signed in Paris, which established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state, and to the full implementation of the Peace Agreement. We reiterate our readiness to work constructively with all Parties that support the Peace Agreement and seek to implement it.

13. The Madrid Peace Implementation Council meeting in December 1998 confirmed that the next two years would be vital in strengthening the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and recognised that SFOR's presence remains essential, both to keep the peace and to provide the secure environment and support for civilian implementation. Return of refugees to areas in which they are a minority will remain vital for political stability and reconciliation. We will support efforts to take this process forward.

14. SFOR will continue to work closely and effectively with the High Representative, whose role we support, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the OSCE and other major international organisations, the UN International Police Task Force and other agencies implementing the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. We commend the crucial contribution of men and women of both NATO and Partner countries serving in SFOR, who are helping to bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15. SFOR's presence cannot, however, be maintained indefinitely. SFOR is being streamlined through efficiency measures. We note that the Council in Permanent Session is examining options on the future size and structure of SFOR.

16. The continuing crisis in and around Kosovo threatens to further destabilise areas beyond the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The potential

for wider instability underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to the stabilisation of the crisis region in South-Eastern Europe. We recognise and endorse the crucial importance of making South-Eastern Europe a region free from violence and instability. A new level of international engagement is thus needed to build security, prosperity and democratic civil society, leading in time to full integration into the wider European family.

17. NATO is determined to play its full part in this process by contributing to the building of a more secure and cooperative relationship with and between the countries of the region. Given the differences in economic development and the diversity and complexity of the problems of each country in the region, international efforts to develop and stabilise the region must be comprehensive, coherent and well coordinated. To achieve these ends, NATO, the WEU, the EU, the OSCE and the UN must work closely together. The international financial institutions also have a crucial role to play. The Alliance's efforts to enhance regional security and stability in South-Eastern Europe and to help resolve humanitarian problems, and the efforts by other international organisations, as well as those by the countries of the region, should be mutually reinforcing.

18. We will be meeting with colleagues from the countries of South-Eastern Europe tomorrow. We intend to build on that meeting by maintaining NATO's consultations with the countries of the region. Accordingly, we will propose to them a consultative forum on security matters which brings together all NATO members and countries of the region at an appropriate level.

19. We direct the Council in Permanent Session, building on, as appropriate, the existing EAPC and PfP framework, to give substance to this proposal, *inter alia*, in the following areas:

- 19+1 consultations where appropriate;
- the promotion of regional cooperation in the framework of an EAPC cooperative mechanism, taking into account other regional initiatives;
- targeted NATO security cooperation programmes for the countries in the region, as appropriate;
- regionally focused PfP activities and exercises;
- better targeting and coordination of Allies' and Partners' bilateral assistance to the region.

20. The Alliance's efforts to enhance regional security in South-Eastern Europe complement those by other international organisations, as well as those by the countries of the region. We welcome the forthcoming European Union conference on a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe on

27 May 1999, and the South-Eastern Europe cooperation process, as well as other regional efforts. Coherence and coordination between the various initiatives will be of great importance.

21. The security of the Balkan region is essential to achieving lasting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Our goal is to see the integration of the countries of the region into the Euro-Atlantic community. We want all the countries and peoples of South-Eastern Europe to enjoy peace and security and establish normal relations with one another, based on respect of human rights, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

22. We reaffirm our commitment to consultation, partnership and practical cooperation through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace. We commit ourselves today to build an enhanced and more operational relationship with Partners for the 21st century that strengthens stability, mutual confidence, and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The EAPC and the PfP have transformed political-military relations across the continent and have become the instruments of choice when the Alliance and its Partners consult and act together in the pursuit of peace and security. We look forward to consulting with our Partners at tomorrow's EAPC Summit meeting.

23. The EAPC, founded in 1997, contributes substantially to stronger political consultation and practical cooperation between the Alliance and its Partners, for solutions to security issues. We applaud this expanded dimension of political consultations, which has enhanced transparency and confidence among all EAPC members. The Alliance and its Partners have consulted regularly on regional security issues, such as on Bosnia and Herzegovina and on Kosovo. We have also developed new areas of cooperation such as peace-keeping, humanitarian de-mining, control over transfer of small arms, and the coordination of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

24. We welcome the successful fulfilment by the Alliance and its Partners of five years of Partnership for Peace and the full implementation of PfP enhancements launched in 1997. Enhanced PfP has ensured that NATO-Partner cooperation contributes concretely to Euro-Atlantic stability and security. The participation of 15 PfP Partners in IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the real-life benefits of PfP's focus on interoperability and provides valuable lessons for future Alliance-Partner cooperation. The presence of Partner officers in an international capacity in NATO military headquarters enables Partners to participate in planning for NATO-PfP exercises and NATO-led PfP operations. Enhanced PfP has also permitted NATO to take action to assist Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ with their unique security concerns.

25. We welcome and take special note of the initiatives designed to make the Partnership more operational and ensure greater Partner involvement in appro-

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

appropriate decision-making and planning, as we had envisioned in our Madrid Declaration. These steps will ensure that the Partnership will be better able to address its objectives, and will provide a solid foundation for its continuing evolution as the core of a cooperative security network between NATO and its Partners for the 21st century. To further this goal, we have today approved the following comprehensive package. We have:

- approved a Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations, which will enhance Partners' roles in political guidance and oversight, planning, and command arrangements for such operations;
- endorsed the expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process, which will further enhance interoperability of Partner forces declared available for PfP activities, and will allow for more focused and increased Partner contributions of valuable forces and capabilities for future NATO-led PfP operations;
- endorsed the outline Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP operations, which will provide for deeper military cooperation between the Alliance and Partners with the goal of improving the ability of Partner forces and capabilities to operate with the Alliance in NATO-led PfP operations and directed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue its further development;
- endorsed the outline programme on enhancing PfP training and education to optimise and harmonise NATO and national PfP activities in order to meet the current and future demands of an enhanced and more operational PfP. The outline programme includes the role of three new PfP tools - a PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, a PfP Exercise Simulation Network and PfP Training Centres. We directed the Council in Permanent Session to develop a PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme.

26. We remain firmly committed to our partnership with Russia under the NATO-Russia Founding Act. NATO and Russia have a common objective in strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Throughout the Kosovo crisis, NATO and Russia have shared the common goals of the international community: to halt the violence, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, and to create the conditions for a political solution. These goals remain valid. Consultation and dialogue are even more important in times of crisis. NATO and its member countries are determined to build on the areas of common ground with Russia concerning the international response to the crisis in Kosovo and remain ready to resume consultations and cooperation in the framework of the Founding Act.

27. Close relations between NATO and Russia are of great importance to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Since the conclusion of the Founding Act in May 1997, considerable and encouraging progress has been made in intensifying consultation and cooperation with Russia. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council has developed into an important venue to consult, to promote transparency and confidence-building, and to foster cooperation. Russia's participation in the implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina was a significant step towards a new cooperative relationship. We have developed an extensive dialogue on such matters as disarmament and arms control, including the adaptation of the CFE Treaty; peace-keeping and nuclear weapons issues. Strategy, defence policy and doctrines, budgets and infrastructure development programmes, and non-proliferation, are further examples of this increasing cooperation.

28. We attach great importance to a strong, enduring and distinctive partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Ukraine has an important role to play in enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. We are pleased with the progress reached since the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter in Madrid, and will continue to strengthen our distinctive partnership. We continue to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and Ukraine's status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in Europe. We encourage Ukraine to carry forward its democratic and economic transformation, including its defence reform, and reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's efforts to this end. We applaud the progress made in the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform. We welcome the establishment of a NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv to further enhance Ukraine's role as a distinctive Partner. We also look forward to today's inaugural Summit meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

29. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the development of our Mediterranean Dialogue. The Dialogue is progressive in nature and we welcome the progress towards developing broader and deeper cooperation and dialogue with the countries in the Mediterranean region. We endorse the enhancements to the political and practical cooperation of the Mediterranean Dialogue agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and direct it to pursue their early implementation. We encourage Allied nations and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to organise events such as the Rome Conference in 1997 and the Valencia Conference in 1999 as positive steps to strengthen mutual regional understanding. We look forward to further opportunities to strengthen cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, particularly in the military field, and where Dialogue countries have expressed interest. The Dialogue and other international efforts, including the EU Barcelona

process, are complementary and mutually reinforcing and thus contribute to transparency and building confidence in the region.

30. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery can pose a direct military threat to Allies' populations, territory, and forces and therefore continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. We reiterate our full support for the international non-proliferation regimes and their strengthening. We recognise progress made in this regard. In order to respond to the risks to Alliance security posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, we have launched an Initiative that builds upon work since the Brussels Summit to improve overall Alliance political and military efforts in this area.

31. The WMD Initiative will: ensure a more vigorous, structured debate at NATO leading to strengthened common understanding among Allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them; improve the quality and quantity of intelligence and information-sharing among Allies on proliferation issues; support the development of a public information strategy by Allies to increase awareness of proliferation issues and Allies' efforts to support non-proliferation efforts; enhance existing Allied programmes which increase military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and to counter WMD threats; strengthen the process of information exchange about Allies' national programmes of bilateral WMD destruction and assistance; enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil populations against WMD risks; and create a WMD Centre within the International Staff at NATO to support these efforts. The WMD initiative will integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work in responding to proliferation.

32. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. NATO has a long-standing commitment in this area. Allied forces, both conventional and nuclear, have been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War as part of the changed security environment. All Allies are States Parties to the central treaties related to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and are committed to the full implementation of these treaties. NATO is a defensive Alliance seeking to enhance security and stability at the minimum level of forces consistent with the requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. As part of its broad approach to security, NATO actively supports arms control and disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, and pursues its approach against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery

means. In the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance will consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament. The Council in Permanent Session will propose a process to Ministers in December for considering such options. The responsible NATO bodies would accomplish this. We support deepening consultations with Russia in these and other areas in the Permanent Joint Council as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners in the EAPC.

33. The CFE Treaty is a cornerstone of European security. We reaffirm our commitment to the successful adaptation of the Treaty reflecting the new security environment and paving the way to greater conventional security and stability in Europe. In the course of the negotiations so far, members of the Alliance have already declared their intention to undertake reductions in their equipment entitlements or holdings, and we strongly encourage others to follow suit with similar substantial reductions. In this context, we are pleased that agreement has been reached by CFE States Parties in Vienna in March 1999 on the key outstanding issues, permitting drafting work to proceed without delay. Allies will do their utmost to complete an adapted Treaty for signature by the time of the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999. Until the adaptation process is completed, the continued full implementation of the existing Treaty and its associated documents will remain crucial.

34. We call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions. We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty in due course. We support the early commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

35. We are determined to achieve progress on a legally binding protocol including effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We re-emphasise the importance of universal adherence to, and effective implementation of, the Chemical Weapons Convention. We support de-mining efforts in Bosnia, the development of practical initiatives under the auspices of the EAPC, and - for signatories - activities to meet obligations under the Ottawa Convention.

36. We call on Belarus, Russia and Ukraine to ratify the Open Skies Treaty without delay.

37. We will seek to intensify on a mutually reinforcing basis the Alliance's contacts and cooperation with other international organisations with a role to

play in consolidating democracy and preserving peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.

38. As stated in the Washington Treaty, we recognise the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Alliance and the UN have worked together effectively in implementing the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We look forward to developing further contact and exchanges of information with the United Nations, in the context of cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management, crisis response operations, including peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. In the crisis in Kosovo, the Alliance is using its civil and military capabilities to work with the UNHCR, the lead agency in the field of refugee relief, and other relevant international organisations, in providing humanitarian assistance and refugee relief. The Alliance will consider on a case-by-case basis future cooperation of this kind.

39. Cooperation and coordination between the Alliance and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has expanded considerably in the light of the support we have provided to the OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Missions. We hope to make use of these important bridges between our two organisations to work together in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, in the spirit of the OSCE's Common Concept for the Development of Cooperation between Mutually Reinforcing Institutions. We continue to support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on European Security, worthy of adoption at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999.

40. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests. Our respective efforts in building peace in the former Yugoslavia are complementary. Both organisations make decisive contributions to peace and stability on the European continent. Cooperation between the two organisations on topics of common concern, to be decided on a case-by-case basis, could be developed when it enhances the effectiveness of action by NATO and the EU.

41. The Alliance, in order to adapt its structures to better prepare it to meet future challenges, launched a comprehensive programme including the continuing adaptation of NATO's command structure. Accordingly, Allies welcome the activation decision of the implementation phase of the Alliance's new command structure. This will ensure NATO's ability to carry out the whole range of its missions more effectively and flexibly; support an enlarged Alliance and our more operational relationship with Partners; and provide, as part of the development of the ESDI within NATO, for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations. After successful trials, we have embarked on the full implementation of the CJTF concept, giving us an important new tool for crisis management in the next century. Allies also welcome the full integration of Spain into NATO's

military structure from January this year, another significant milestone for the Alliance.

42. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation. The terrorist threat against deployed NATO forces and NATO installations requires the consideration and development of appropriate measures for their continued protection, taking full account of host nation responsibilities.

43. NATO Heads of State and Government believe that a key to the future success of the North Atlantic Alliance is the efficient production and availability of advanced weapons and technology in support of security for all its members. We also believe that viable defence industries on both sides of the Atlantic are critical to the efficient functioning of NATO military forces. To that end, we welcome continued transatlantic defence industrial cooperation to help ensure interoperability, economies of scale, competition and innovation. We will seek to ensure that NATO's armament activities meet the Alliance's evolving military needs.

44. We welcome the presence in Washington of the President and other representatives of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA). The NPA plays a significant role in complementing NATO's efforts to project stability throughout Europe. We therefore attach great importance to enhancing our relations with the NPA in areas of common concern. We also appreciate the contribution made by the Atlantic Treaty Association in promoting better understanding of the Alliance and its objectives among our publics.

45. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of the United States on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.

THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

**Approved by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Washington, D.C., USA,
24 April 1999**

Introduction

1. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance's new Strategic Concept.
2. NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and prevented war in Europe during the 40 years of the Cold War. By combining defence with dialogue, it played an indispensable role in bringing East-West confrontation to a peaceful end. The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War were reflected in the Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept. There have, however, been further profound political and security developments since then.
3. The dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new Europe of greater integration is emerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part. The Alliance has been at the heart of efforts to establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and has committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider stability. It has shown the depth of that commitment in its efforts to put an end to the immense human suffering created by conflict in the Balkans. The years since the end of the Cold War have also witnessed important developments in arms control, a process to which the Alliance is fully committed. The Alliance's role in these positive developments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation of its approach to security and of its procedures and structures. The last ten years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
4. The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It has, therefore, a demanding agenda. It must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpre-

dictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.

5. This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues this agenda. It expresses NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces.

Part I - The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance

6. NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.

7. The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

8. The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realise their essential national security objectives.

9. The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefits for its members alone, but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives.

10. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- **Crisis Management:** To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.
- **Partnership:** To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

11. In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country's adversary.

Part II - Strategic Perspectives

The Evolving Strategic Environment

12. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties

and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organisations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

13. In parallel, NATO has successfully adapted to enhance its ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Internal reform has included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the creation of arrangements to permit the rapid deployment of forces for the full range of the Alliance's missions, and the building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.

14. The United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) have made distinctive contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Mutually reinforcing organisations have become a central feature of the security environment.

15. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

16. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive security organisation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing cooperative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical cooperation, especially with regard to the international effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.

17. The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process will have implications for the entire Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU. The development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty. Important steps taken in this context include the incorpo-

ration of the WEU's Petersberg tasks into the Treaty on European Union and the development of closer institutional relations with the WEU.

18. As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. To this end, the Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put into place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defence enhances the security environment of the Alliance.

19. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements support NATO's political and military efforts to achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies have played a major part in the significant achievements in this field. These include the enhanced stability produced by the CFE Treaty, the deep reductions in nuclear weapons provided for in the START treaties; the signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the accession to it of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as non-nuclear weapons states, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines and similar agreements make an important contribution to alleviating human suffering. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional weapons and with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons.

Security challenges and risks

20. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts

could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.

21. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.

22. The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance recognises that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. Some states, including on NATO's periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

23. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance's growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO's superiority in traditional weaponry.

24. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.

Part III - The Approach to Security in the 21st Century

25. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance's contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organisations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

26. The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions; the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successfully; its continued openness to new members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other nations as part of its cooperative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The Transatlantic Link

27. NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible. Thus the Alliance's commitment to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defence of its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Maintenance of Alliance Military Capabilities

28. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, remains at the core of the Alliance's ability to prevent any attempt at coercion

or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success.

29. Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. These missions can be highly demanding and can place a premium on the same political and military qualities, such as cohesion, multinational training, and extensive prior planning, that would be essential in an Article 5 situation. Accordingly, while they may pose special requirements, they will be handled through a common set of Alliance structures and procedures.

The European Security and Defence Identity

30. The Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members and through which common security objectives will be pursued wherever possible, remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defence field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.

Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management

31. In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending

stability and often involves the participation of NATO's Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans. Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

32. NATO will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organisations to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage. A coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance, will require the Alliance's political authorities to choose and coordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages.

Partnership, Cooperation, and Dialogue

33. Through its active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive force in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Through outreach and openness, the Alliance seeks to preserve peace, support and promote democracy, contribute to prosperity and progress, and foster genuine partnership with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict.

34. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO's cooperation with its Partners. It offers an expanded political dimension for both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities, including in civil emergency planning, and scientific and environmental affairs.

35. The Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO. Through detailed programmes that reflect individual Partners' capacities and interests, Allies and Partners work towards transparency in national defence planning and budgeting; democratic control of defence forces; preparedness for civil disasters and other

emergencies; and the development of the ability to work together, including in NATO-led PfP operations. The Alliance is committed to increasing the role the Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and making PfP more operational. NATO has undertaken to consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

36. Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and cooperative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

37. Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values. NATO is committed to further strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues of common concern and a broad range of practical cooperation activities. The Alliance continues to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in central and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.

38. The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO's cooperative approach to security. It provides a framework for confidence building, promotes transparency and cooperation in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts. The Alliance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil, and military aspects of the Dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue.

Enlargement

39. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of

membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. To this end, NATO has established a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership in the context of its wider relationship with them. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

40. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance's ability to provide for collective defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions. The Alliance will continue to ensure that - as an important part of its broad approach to security - defence and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. The Alliance will continue to actively contribute to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as to confidence and security building measures. The Allies take seriously their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Alliance attaches great importance to the continuing validity and the full implementation by all parties of the CFE Treaty as an essential element in ensuring the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

Part IV - Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces

Principles of Alliance Strategy

41. The Alliance will maintain the necessary military capabilities to accomplish the full range of NATO's missions. The principles of Allied solidarity and strategic unity remain paramount for all Alliance missions. Alliance forces must safeguard NATO's military effectiveness and freedom of action. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. With respect to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the

combined military forces of the Alliance must be capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stopping an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur, and of ensuring the political independence and territorial integrity of its member states. They must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's forces have essential roles in fostering cooperation and understanding with NATO's Partners and other states, particularly in helping Partners to prepare for potential participation in NATO-led PfP operations. Thus they contribute to the preservation of peace, to the safeguarding of common security interests of Alliance members, and to the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use of NBC weapons, they contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means.

42. The achievement of the Alliance's aims depends critically on the equitable sharing of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. The North American Allies contribute to the Alliance through military forces available for Alliance missions, through their broader contribution to international peace and security, and through the provision of unique training facilities on the North American continent. The European Allies also make wide-ranging and substantial contributions. As the process of developing the ESDI within the Alliance progresses, the European Allies will further enhance their contribution to the common defence and to international peace and stability including through multinational formations.

43. The principle of collective effort in Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements also enable NATO's forces to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations and constitute a prerequisite for a coherent Alliance response to all possible contingencies. They are based on procedures for consultation, an integrated military structure, and on cooperation agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common funding; common operational planning; multinational formations, headquarters and command arrangements; an integrated air defence system; a balance of roles and responsibilities among the Allies; the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory when required; arrangements, including planning, for crisis management and reinforcement; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined doctrines and exercises when appropriate; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation. The inclusion of NATO's Partners in such arrangements or the development of sim-

ilar arrangements for them, in appropriate areas, is also instrumental in enhancing cooperation and common efforts in Euro-Atlantic security matters.

44. Multinational funding, including through the Military Budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme, will continue to play an important role in acquiring and maintaining necessary assets and capabilities. The management of resources should be guided by the military requirements of the Alliance as they evolve.

45. The Alliance supports the further development of the ESDI within the Alliance, including by being prepared to make available assets and capabilities for operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed.

46. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

The Alliance's Force Posture

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

47. The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance's forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and - in case of conflict - to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

48. The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardise Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting opera-

tions in support of other international organisations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security.

49. In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defence missions. Well-trained and well-equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed. The potential participation of Partners and other non-NATO nations in NATO-led operations as well as possible operations with Russia would be further valuable elements of NATO's contribution to managing crises that affect Euro-Atlantic security.

50. Alliance military forces also contribute to promoting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by their participation in military-to-military contacts and in other cooperation activities and exercises under the Partnership for Peace as well as those organised to deepen NATO's relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. They contribute to stability and understanding by participating in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements and in humanitarian de-mining. Key areas of consultation and cooperation could include inter alia: training and exercises, interoperability, civil-military relations, concept and doctrine development, defence planning, crisis management, proliferation issues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in operational planning and operations.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture

51. To implement the Alliance's fundamental security tasks and the principles of its strategy, the forces of the Alliance must continue to be adapted to meet the requirements of the full range of Alliance missions effectively and to respond to future challenges. The posture of Allies' forces, building on the strengths of different national defence structures, will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

52. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defence and to conduct crisis response operations, sometimes at short notice, distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies' territory. The characteristics of the

Alliance's forces will also reflect the provisions of relevant arms control agreements. Alliance forces must be adequate in strength and capabilities to deter and counter aggression against any Ally. They must be interoperable and have appropriate doctrines and technologies. They must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and be capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and combined operations, which may also include Partners and other non-NATO nations.

53. This means in particular:

- a. that the overall size of the Allies' forces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of collective defence and other Alliance missions; they will be held at appropriate and graduated readiness;
- b. that the peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory and waters and forward deployment of forces when and where necessary. Regional and, in particular, geostrategic considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as instabilities on NATO's periphery could lead to crises or conflicts requiring an Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times;
- c. that NATO's command structure will be able to undertake command and control of the full range of the Alliance's military missions including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and multiservice forces. It will also be able to support operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations in which Partners and other countries may participate;
- d. that overall, the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and for the full range of its missions, require essential operational capabilities such as an effective engagement capability; deployability and mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and sustainability, incorporating logistics and force rotation. To develop these capabilities to their full potential for multinational operations, interoperability, including human factors, the use of appropriate advanced technology, the maintenance of information superiority in military operations, and highly qualified personnel with a broad spectrum of skills will be important. Sufficient capabilities in the areas of command, control

and communications as well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as necessary force multipliers;

- e. that at any time a limited but militarily significant proportion of ground, air and sea forces will be able to react as rapidly as necessary to a wide range of eventualities, including a short-notice attack on any Ally. Greater numbers of force elements will be available at appropriate levels of readiness to sustain prolonged operations, whether within or beyond Alliance territory, including through rotation of deployed forces. Taken together, these forces must also be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to contribute to deterrence and to defend against limited attacks on the Alliance;
- f. that the Alliance must be able to build up larger forces, both in response to any fundamental changes in the security environment and for limited requirements, by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces when necessary. This ability must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including potential long-term developments. It must take into account the possibility of substantial improvements in the readiness and capabilities of military forces on the periphery of the Alliance. Capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within and from Europe and North America will remain of critical importance, with a resulting need for a high degree of deployability, mobility and flexibility;
- g. that appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and selectively, are necessary to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime;
- h. that the Alliance's defence posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, which also pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. A balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defences is needed;
- i. that the Alliance's forces and infrastructure must be protected against terrorist attacks.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

54. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions. This requirement has implications for force structures, force and equipment levels; readiness, availability, and sustainability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and

force build-up and mobilisation capabilities. The aim should be to achieve an optimum balance between high readiness forces capable of beginning rapidly, and immediately as necessary, collective defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations; forces at different levels of lower readiness to provide the bulk of those required for collective defence, for rotation of forces to sustain crisis response operations, or for further reinforcement of a particular region; and a longer-term build-up and augmentation capability for the worst case - but very remote - scenario of large scale operations for collective defence. A substantial proportion of Alliance forces will be capable of performing more than one of these roles.

55. Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational and joint nature of Alliance missions. Essential tasks will include controlling, protecting, and defending territory; ensuring the unimpeded use of sea, air, and land lines of communication; sea control and protecting the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based deterrent; conducting independent and combined air operations; ensuring a secure air environment and effective extended air defence; surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and electronic warfare; strategic lift; and providing effective and flexible command and control facilities, including deployable combined and joint headquarters.

56. The Alliance's defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences. As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO's borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning, and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.

57. Alliance strategy does not include a chemical or biological warfare capability. The Allies support universal adherence to the relevant disarmament regimes. But, even if further progress with respect to banning chemical and biological weapons can be achieved, defensive precautions will remain essential.

58. Given reduced overall force levels and constrained resources, the ability to work closely together will remain vital for achieving the Alliance's missions. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure plays the key role, are essential in this regard. The various strands of NATO's defence planning need to be effectively coordinated at all levels in order to ensure the preparedness of the forces and supporting structures to carry out the full spectrum of their roles. Exchanges of information among the Allies about their force plans contribute to securing

the availability of the capabilities needed for the execution of these roles. Consultations in case of important changes in national defence plans also remain of key importance. Cooperation in the development of new operational concepts will be essential for responding to evolving security challenges. The detailed practical arrangements that have been developed as part of the ESDI within the Alliance contribute to close allied cooperation without unnecessary duplication of assets and capabilities.

59. To be able to respond flexibly to possible contingencies and to permit the effective conduct of Alliance missions, the Alliance requires sufficient logistics capabilities, including transport capacities, medical support and stocks to deploy and sustain all types of forces effectively. Standardisation will foster cooperation and cost-effectiveness in providing logistic support to allied forces. Mounting and sustaining operations outside the Allies' territory, where there may be little or no host-nation support, will pose special logistical challenges. The ability to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level able to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Forces of various kinds and at various levels of readiness will be capable of flexible employment in both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. This will require control of lines of communication, and appropriate support and exercise arrangements.

60. The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between the Alliance's military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.

61. The Alliance's ability to accomplish the full range of its missions will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO for the Allies concerned. Such forces, which are applicable to the full range of Alliance missions, demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; and reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the ESDI within the Alliance. Multinational forces, particularly those capable of deploying rapidly for collective defence or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions, an approach which underlies

the implementation of the CJTF concept. For peace support operations, effective multinational formations and other arrangements involving Partners will be valuable. In order to exploit fully the potential offered by multinational formations, improving interoperability, inter alia through sufficient training and exercises, is of the highest importance.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

62. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

64. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including reduced conventional force levels in Europe and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote. Since 1991, therefore, the Allies have taken a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment. These include a dramatic reduction of the types and numbers of NATO's sub-strategic forces including the elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles; a significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-ruled forces; and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. NATO's nuclear forces no longer target any country. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe

which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link. These will consist of dual capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines.

Part V - Conclusion

65. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance's security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world the need for effective defence remains, but in reaffirming this commitment the Alliance will also continue making full use of every opportunity to help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free.

MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP)

Washington, D.C., USA

24 April 1999

1. The door to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains open. The Membership Action Plan (MAP), building on the Intensified, Individual Dialogue on membership questions, is designed to reinforce that firm commitment to further enlargement by putting into place a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership. It must be understood that decisions made by aspirants on the basis of advice received will remain national decisions undertaken and implemented at the sole responsibility of the country concerned.
2. The programme offers aspirants a list of activities from which they may select those they consider of most value to help them in their preparations. Active participation in PFP and EAPC mechanisms remains essential for aspiring countries who wish to further deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance.
3. Any decision to invite an aspirant to begin accession talks with the Alliance will be made on a case-by-case basis by Allies in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration, and the Washington Summit Declaration. Participation in the Membership Action Plan, which would be on the basis of self-differentiation, does not imply any timeframe for any such decision nor any guarantee of eventual membership. The programme cannot be considered as a list of criteria for membership.

Implementation

1. The Membership Action Plan, which is a practical manifestation of the Open Door, is divided into five chapters. These chapters are:
 - I. Political and Economic issues
 - II. Defence/Military issues
 - III. Resource issues
 - IV. Security issues
 - V. Legal issues

Within each, the MAP identifies issues that might be discussed (non-exhaustive) and highlights mechanisms through which preparation for possible eventual membership can best be carried forward.

The list of issues identified for discussion does not constitute criteria for membership and is intended to encompass those issues which the aspiring countries themselves have identified as matters which they wish to address.

2. Each aspiring country will be requested to draw up an annual national programme on preparations for possible future membership, setting objectives and targets for its preparations and containing specific information on steps being taken, the responsible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule of work on specific aspects of those preparations. It would be open to aspirants to update the programme when they chose. The programme would form a basis for the Alliance to keep track of aspirants' progress and to provide feedback.

3. Meetings will take place in a 19+1 format in the Council and other bodies and in NATO IS/NMA Team formats as appropriate.

4. Feedback and advice to aspirants on MAP issues will be provided through mechanisms based on those currently in use for Partners, 19+1 meetings and NATO Team workshops. These workshops will be held, when justified, to discuss particular issues drawn from the MAP.

5. The NATO Team will normally be headed by the appropriate Assistant Secretary General, Assistant Director of the International Military Staff, Head of Office or his representative. The NATO Team will liaise closely with the appropriate NATO bodies regarding advice to aspirants. Relevant procedures will be refined over time as experience is gained. Aspirants should make requests in writing for workshops to ASG/PA. He will be responsible for the implementation of the Membership Action Plan and the scheduling of meetings under the overall direction and coordination of the SPC(R).

6. Each year the Alliance will draw up for individual aspirants a report providing feedback focused on progress made in the areas covered in their annual national programmes. This document would form the basis of discussion at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council with the aspirant country. The report would help identify areas for further action, but it would remain at the aspirant's discretion to commit itself to taking further action.

I. Political and Economic Issues

1. Aspirants would be offered the opportunity to discuss and substantiate their willingness and ability to assume the obligations and commitments under the Washington Treaty and the relevant provisions of the Study on NATO

Enlargement. Future members must conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty such as democracy, individual liberty and other relevant provisions set out in its Preamble.

2. Aspirants would also be expected:
 - a. to settle their international disputes by peaceful means;
 - b. to demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights;
 - c. to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighbourly relations;
 - d. to establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces;
 - e. to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN;
 - f. to contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions and by promoting stability and well-being;
 - g. to continue fully to support and be engaged in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;
 - h. to show a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.
3. Moreover, aspirants would be expected upon accession:
 - a. to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security;
 - b. to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance through the sharing of responsibilities, costs and benefits;
 - c. to commit themselves to good faith efforts to build consensus on all issues;
 - d. to undertake to participate fully in the Alliance consultation and decision-making process on political and security issues of concern to the Alliance;
 - e. to commit themselves to the continued openness of the Alliance in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Madrid and Washington Summit Declarations.

Implementation

4. Aspirants will be expected to describe how their policies and practice are evolving to reflect the considerations set out above (in paragraphs 1-2 above), and to provide their views on, and substantiate their willingness and ability to comply with other parts of the NATO “acquis”, including the NATO Strategic Concept, the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter.
5. Aspirants would be expected to provide information on an annual basis on the state of their economy, including main macro-economic and budgetary data as well as pertinent economic policy developments.
6. Aspirants would be asked to provide a written contribution to the NATO Team, which would then be passed directly on to the Allies for their comments. After appropriate consultation in the Alliance, the NATO Team would then convene a meeting to discuss the contribution provided and relevant political issues. Such meetings would be held yearly; additional meetings could be convened upon mutual agreement.
7. An annual Senior Political Committee (Reinforced) meeting will be held to provide direct feedback from Allies to individual aspirants.

II. Defence/Military Issues

1. The ability of aspiring countries to contribute militarily to collective defence and to the Alliance’s new missions and their willingness to commit to gradual improvements in their military capabilities will be factors to be considered in determining their suitability for NATO membership. Full participation in operational PfP is an essential component, as it will further deepen aspirants’ political and military ties with the Alliance, helping them prepare for participation in the full range of new missions. New members of the Alliance must be prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits and burdens of common security and collective defence. They should be expected to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out in the Strategic Concept and as laid out in other Ministerial statements.
2. Aspirants would be expected upon accession:
 - a. to accept the approach to security outlined in the Strategic Concept;
 - b. to provide forces and capabilities for collective defence and other Alliance missions;
 - c. to participate, as appropriate, in the military structure;

- d. to participate, as appropriate, in the Alliance's collective defence planning;
- e. to participate, as appropriate, in NATO agencies;
- f. to continue fully to support PfP and the development of cooperative relations with non-NATO Partners;
- g. to pursue standardisation and/or interoperability.

Implementation

3. The following measures are designed to help aspirants develop the capabilities of their armed forces, including by enhancing interoperability, to be able to contribute to the effectiveness of the Alliance and thus demonstrate their suitability for future membership. The measures build where possible on extant initiatives.

- a. Aspirants will be able in accordance with existing PfP procedures to request tailored Individual Partnership Programmes to better focus their participation in PfP directly on the essential membership related issues. Within each IPP, certain generic areas would be marked as being essential for aspirants, and aspirants would be invited to give due priority to those areas of cooperation.
- b. Annual Clearinghouse meetings for aspirants in a 19+1 format would be developed to help coordinate bilateral and multilateral assistance and maximise their mutual effectiveness to better assist them in their preparations for membership.
- c. Within the general framework of the expanded and adapted PARP and in accordance with PARP procedures, planning targets specifically covering areas most directly relevant for nations preparing their force structures and capabilities for possible future Alliance membership will be elaborated with aspirants. Aspirants will undergo a review process on their progress in meeting these planning targets.
- d. These planning targets will be established on the basis of consultations between each aspiring country and NATO and may be applied to any component of their force structures, rather than solely to their PfP-declared forces.
- e. PARP Ministerial Guidance will include approaches and specific measures which aspirants might adopt, in the context of the MAP, to prepare their forces for possible future NATO membership.

- f. The PARP Survey will be used for aspirants to seek more information and data in a number of areas, for example, general defence policy, resources, and present and planned outlays for defence.
- g. As a sign of transparency, and in accordance with PARP procedures: aspirants will be encouraged to circulate individual PARP documents to other aspirants in addition to circulating them to NATO Allies; and aspirants will be encouraged to invite, in particular, other aspiring countries to participate in the review process on planning targets.
- h. Aspirants will be invited to observe and participate in selected, clearly defined phases of NATO-only exercises when Council decides to open these in accordance with current procedures. Priority consideration will be given to ensuring exercise effectiveness.
- i. Any future NATO facilities established for the assessment of Partner forces for NATO-led peace support operations and of Partner performance in NATO/PfP exercises and operations will be used to assess the degree of interoperability and the range of capabilities of aspirants' forces. If these assessment facilities are extended to encompass forces beyond those for peace support operations, they will be used to assist aspirants.
- j. Appropriate use may be made of simulation technology for training forces and procedures.

III. Resource Issues

1. New Alliance members would be expected to commit sufficient budget resources to allow themselves to meet the commitments entailed by possible membership. National programmes of aspirants must put in place the necessary structures to plan and implement defence budgets that meet established defence priorities and make provision for training schemes to familiarise staff with NATO practices and procedures in order to prepare for possible future participation in Alliance structures.
2. Aspirants would be expected upon accession:
 - a. to allocate sufficient budget resources for the implementation of Alliance commitments;
 - b. to have the national structures in place to deal with those budget resources;
 - c. to participate in the Alliance's common-funded activities at agreed cost shares;

- d. to participate in Alliance structures (permanent representation at the NATO HQ; military representation in the NATO command structure; participation, as appropriate, in NATO Agencies).

Implementation

3. Through existing mechanisms, including those within PfP, possible internships and training sessions, and NATO Team workshops, aspirants upon request will be:

- a. provided advice on their development of national structures, procedures and mechanisms to deal with the above issues and to ensure the most efficient use of their defence spending;
- b. assisted in training the staff needed to man those structures and work in and with NATO.

IV. Security Issues

1. Aspirants would be expected upon accession to have in place sufficient safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of the most sensitive information as laid down in NATO security policy.

Implementation

1. Appropriate courses may be made available, on request, to aspiring countries on Personnel, Physical, Document, Industrial Security and INFOSEC. Individual programmes for aspirants may be developed as warranted. The NATO Security and Special Committees may wish to meet with aspirants, whenever they judge it necessary or useful.

V. Legal issues

1. In order to be able to undertake the commitments of membership, aspirants should examine and become acquainted with the appropriate legal arrangements and agreements which govern cooperation within NATO. This should enable aspirants to scrutinise domestic law for compatibility with those NATO rules and regulations. In addition, aspirants should be properly informed about the formal legal process leading to membership.

- a. New members, upon completion of the relevant procedures, will accede to:

The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, 4 April 1949).

- b. Upon invitation, new members should accede to:
 - i. the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces (London SOFA) (London, 19 June 1951);
 - ii. the Protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty (Paris Protocol) (Paris, 28 August 1952).
- c. It is expected that new members accede to the following status agreements:
 - i. the Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National Representatives and International Staff (Ottawa Agreement) (Ottawa, 20 September 1951);
 - ii. the Agreement on the status of Missions and Representatives of third States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Brussels Agreement) (Brussels, 14 September 1994).
- d. It is expected that new members accede to the following technical agreements:
 - i. the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the Security of Information (Brussels, 6 March 1997);
 - ii. the Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relation to defence and for which applications for patents have been made (Paris, 21 September 1960);
 - iii. the NATO Agreement on the communication of technical information for defence purposes (Brussels, 19 October 1970).
- e. For possible eventual access to ATOMAL information, new members would be expected to accede to:
 - i. the “Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information” (C-M(64)39 - Basic Agreement);
 - ii. the “Administrative Arrangements to Implement the Agreement” (C-M(68)41, 5th Revise).
- f. Domestic legislation of aspirants should, as much as possible, be compatible with the other arrangements and implementation practices which govern NATO-wide cooperation.

Implementation

2. NATO Team workshops will provide for briefings on legal issues and discussions on the steps that would have to be taken. Aspirants could provide information on existing legal arrangements and the steps that would have to be taken to accede to the agreements, including whether or not there are any constitutional/legal barriers to doing so.
3. Aspirants might also provide information on whether and how domestic legislation might impede immediate and full integration into Alliance activities. Exchange of information and experience on this issue could take place with all aspirants as appropriate.

DECLARATION

of the Heads of State and Government participating in the NATO-Ukraine Commission Summit Washington, D.C., USA 24 April 1999

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the 19 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and of Ukraine, met today for our first Summit to review the implementation of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which was signed in Madrid in July 1997, and its role in Euro-Atlantic security.
2. NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their support for Ukraine's sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity, and the principle of inviolability of frontiers, as key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe and in the continent as a whole. In this context they reaffirmed the historic importance of Ukraine's decision to voluntarily remove nuclear weapons from its territory.
3. The President of Ukraine reaffirmed his country's determination to continue its efforts to implement democratic political, economic and defence reforms as well as to pursue its goal of integration in European and transatlantic structures. He affirmed that the recent accession to NATO of Poland and Hungary, two neighbours of Ukraine, together with the Czech Republic, is a significant contribution to stability in Europe.
4. We discussed the evolving challenges facing Euro-Atlantic security, the consequent adaptation of the Alliance and Ukraine's contribution to stability in Europe. NATO Allies reaffirmed their conviction that Ukraine should continue to play an increasingly important role toward improving security in Central and Eastern Europe and in the continent as a whole.
5. We exchanged views on the crisis in Kosovo and on the approaches followed by NATO and Ukraine aimed at reaching our common goal of a long-lasting and just peace in the region. We welcomed the statement by the United Nations Secretary General on 9 April on the crisis, and support the effort to achieve a political settlement in the form of a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo in which all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis. NATO Allies acknowledged Ukraine's important contribution to the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission.

6. We welcomed the progress achieved in the implementation of our Distinctive Partnership since the signing of the Charter in Madrid and look forward to the realisation of its full potential. We are satisfied with the development of a wide range of consultations and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine, at Summit, Ministerial, and Ambassadorial levels, as well as at the level of appropriate Committees and government bodies such as Ukraine's State Interagency Commission for Relations with NATO.

7. We reviewed Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace Programme and in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and expressed our common desire to see Ukraine progressively take full advantage of the opportunities offered therein. We noted the progress that has already been made towards the implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Work Plan for 1999. Ukraine's State Programme of Cooperation with NATO until 2001 outlines potential additional areas for cooperation, and we look forward to further discussions at Ministerial and Ambassadorial level on how to improve and prioritise future Work Plans.

8. We welcome the appointment of the two NATO Liaison Officers in Kyiv. We are confident they will contribute to facilitating Ukraine's work in PfP as well as strengthening contacts between NATO and Ukraine.

9. We are determined to ensure continued support for the NATO Information and Documentation Centre, established in Kyiv in May 1997, which plays an increasingly important role in providing the Ukrainian public with objective and complete information about NATO's role as a factor of stability and security in Europe.

10. We appreciate the meetings of the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, appropriately followed up at the expert level, as an effective instrument to catalyse the reform of the Ukrainian defense establishment, especially in the areas of civil-military relations, defence budgeting and training.

11. We are convinced that the designation of the Yavoriv Training Area as a PfP training centre provides a useful instrument for joint exercises and training opportunities and we encourage all Partners to take advantage of them. We underlined that multinational peacekeeping units will play an important role in meeting future challenges of European security and therefore welcome and support the creation of the Joint Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion, as well as other multinational units with Ukrainian participation.

12. We highly value the work of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Group on Emergency Situations. We also appreciate NATO-Ukraine consultations in the context of the Conference of National Armaments Directors and on-going consultation and cooperation in the fields of economic security, defence industrial restructuring, downsizing and conversion and retraining of retired military

officers, research and technology as well as scientific and environmental affairs.

13. We requested the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Ambassadorial session to oversee the implementation of the measures embodied in this declaration and the further development of the NATO-Ukraine distinctive partnership under the terms of the Charter.

DEFENCE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE

Washington D.C., USA

25 April 1999

Introduction

1. At Washington, NATO Heads of State and Government launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative. The objective of this initiative is to improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces.

The Challenge: Adapting Capabilities for a New Security Environment

2. In accordance with the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, NATO must continue to maintain capabilities to deal with large-scale aggression against one or more of the members, although the probability of this occurring in the foreseeable future is low. Warning times for the possible emergence of such a threat are likely to remain long. Potential threats to Alliance security are more likely to result from regional conflicts, ethnic strife or other crises beyond Alliance territory, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

3. Future Alliance military operations, including non-Article 5 crisis response operations, are likely to be smaller in scale than those which were the basis for Alliance planning during the Cold War. They may also be longer in duration, extend multinational cooperation to lower levels and take place concurrently with other Alliance operations. In many cases non-Article 5 operations will include force contributions from Partners and possibly other non-Allied nations. Operations outside Alliance territory may need to be undertaken with no, or only limited, access to existing NATO infrastructure. It may not be possible to invoke existing national emergency legislation to provide civilian transport assets for deployments or to mobilise reserves. These developments will make new demands on the capabilities required of Alliance forces, in particular in the field of interoperability. It is important that all nations are able to make a fair contribution to the full spectrum of Alliance missions regardless of differences in national defence structures.

4. Significant progress has been made in recent years in adapting Alliance forces to the requirements of this new security environment. However, many Allies have only relatively limited capabilities for the rapid deployment of significant forces outside national territory, or for extended sustainment of operations and protection of forces far from home bases. Command and control and information systems need to be better matched to the requirements of future Alliance military operations which will entail the exchange of a much greater volume of information and extending to lower levels than in the past. Maintaining the effectiveness of multinational operations will require particular attention to the challenges of interoperability. In this context, increased attention must be paid to human factors (such as common approaches to doctrine, training and operational procedures) and standardisation, as well as to the challenges posed by the accelerating pace of technological change and the different speeds at which Allies introduce advanced capabilities. Improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO.

The Way Ahead

5. Against this background, the Alliance has examined areas where improvements in capabilities would make a significant contribution towards meeting the challenges of the future. The aim has been to develop a common assessment of requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. In identifying the most important areas for improvement, and with a special focus on interoperability, the work has concentrated on the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, on their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and on command and control and information systems. In some cases it has been possible at this early stage to set out the steps to be taken to improve some capabilities. In others, further work is required to examine different options and make firm recommendations about improvements to be made. The initiative emphasises the importance of the resource dimension of this work as well as the requirement for better coordination between defence planning disciplines; takes into consideration the ability of European Allies to undertake WEU-led operations; addresses ways to improve capabilities of multinational formations; and considers issues such as training, doctrine, human factors, concept development and experimentation, and standardisation.

6. As part of this Defence Capabilities Initiative, Heads of State and Government have established a temporary High Level Steering Group (HLSG) to oversee the implementation of the DCI and to meet the requirement of coordination and harmonisation among relevant planning disciplines including for Allies concerned force planning, and with NATO standardisation, with the aim of achieving lasting effects on improvements in capabilities and interoperability.

CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL AT SUMMIT LEVEL

**Washington D.C., USA
25 April 1999**

1. Heads of State and Government, or their representatives, of the member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), met today in Washington. The Secretary-General of the Western European Union also attended the meeting. This was the second gathering of EAPC Heads of State and Government.
2. Discussion at the meeting focused on the theme of Euro-Atlantic Partnership in the twenty-first century. Heads of State and Government concentrated on the key security challenges that face the EAPC area today, in particular the situation in Kosovo; enhancements to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme to make it more operational and capable; and ways in which the EAPC can best help to deal with security challenges in the EAPC area.
3. The discussion underlined the importance of the EAPC as a forum for consultation on political and security-related issues and on practical cooperation measures to address those.
4. EAPC Heads of State and Government discussed the situation in Kosovo and expressed support for the demands of the international community. They underlined their sympathy for the refugees and their support for humanitarian relief efforts and for unhindered access by humanitarian aid organisations. They emphasised their abhorrence of the policies of violence, repression and ethnic cleansing being carried out by the FRY authorities in Kosovo.
5. EAPC Heads of State and Government welcomed the work that has been carried out on the further enhancement of the Partnership for Peace since the 1997 Madrid Summit. They noted that these initiatives will serve to increase EAPC capacity to contribute to crisis management endeavours. They endorsed the document on a "Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations" and emphasised its importance to the growing operational role of the Partnership. The Political-Military Framework sets out the principles, modalities and other necessary guidance for Partner involvement in political consultations and decision-making, in operational planning, and in command arrangements for future NATO-led operations in which they participate. It is a fundamental document for the future Partnership.

6. Heads of State and Government also welcomed and endorsed the report “Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century - The Enhanced and more Operational Partnership”. This report sets out the main elements of the more operational PfP, including the Political-Military Framework, the expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process, and enhanced defence-related and military cooperation. In endorsing the overall report, EAPC members also endorsed an Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations, which will be further developed to reinforce PfP’s operational capabilities, thereby improving the ability of the Alliance and Partner forces to operate together in the future. Furthermore, in recognition of the key role of training and education, EAPC members endorsed a strategy to develop a comprehensive enhancement programme in this area, with the aim of making best use of the human capital invested in PfP. Heads of State and Government agreed that this package of measures will considerably improve the effectiveness of the Partnership. They also took note of a compendium of views and experiences on humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping.

7. EAPC Heads of State and Government welcomed the contribution that both EAPC and PfP have made towards enhancing security for all, based on shared values. They discussed how the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council can further increase its effectiveness in enhancing transparency, confidence and cooperation throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. They took note of the various initiatives that have been undertaken by the EAPC in this field. They welcomed work already begun on global humanitarian mine action aimed at complementing and adding value to other international and national efforts in this field. They welcomed the creation of an open-ended ad hoc working group to examine how EAPC might contribute to controlling the transfer of small arms, recognising the high number of innocent civilian casualties caused by the use of mines and small arms. They also expressed their strong support for efforts to promote greater regional cooperation for security within the wider EAPC context, notably through seminars to this end held and planned in a number of Partner countries. They took note of the Alliance’s initiative to promote further regional cooperation in South-East Europe.

8. Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment to a vigorous and dynamic Euro-Atlantic Partnership into the 21st century and looked forward to continuing to strengthen multi-faceted cooperation within the EAPC and Partnership for Peace.

CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government with Countries in the Region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Washington D.C., USA 25 April 1999

1. NATO Heads of State and Government today met with their counterparts from Albania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾, Romania and Slovenia, and the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. They discussed the current situation in Kosovo, its impact on the countries in the region and longer term strategies for security, prosperity and stability in South-Eastern Europe.
2. There was general agreement that the Kosovo crisis represents a fundamental challenge to the entire Euro-Atlantic community and to the region in particular. NATO Heads of State and Government and leaders of the countries in the region condemned the ongoing violence and repression in Kosovo. They emphasised that the oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence must end and that all refugees and displaced persons must be allowed to return to their homes in safety and security, to allow for a credible, verifiable and durable political solution for Kosovo. They underscored the necessity for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to accept the international community's demands.
3. The meeting expressed support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the region.
4. NATO Heads of State and Government acknowledged that the neighbouring states are particularly affected by the humanitarian, political and economic implications of the crisis. Participants agreed to intensify their efforts to support refugee and humanitarian relief operations.
5. NATO Heads of State and Government expressed their gratitude for the efforts and solidarity shown by the neighbouring states in support of the Alliance's and the international community's objectives. In this context, they reaffirmed that the security of the neighbouring states was of direct and material concern to Alliance member states and that NATO would respond to any challenges by Belgrade to the neighbouring states resulting from the presence of NATO forces and their activities on their territory during this crisis.

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

6. The meeting also underscored the need for developing a longer term comprehensive strategy with the help of different institutions for securing stability and prosperity based on democratic principles and enhanced economic and political development. Participants emphasised their common aim of forging a better future for the region, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, based upon democracy, justice, economic integration and security cooperation. The full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement was considered an essential element of this process.

7. NATO and the countries in the region agreed to continue consultations both on the current crisis in Kosovo and on the development of a broader strategy for the region.

THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND KOSOVO

Chairman's Statement issued at the Extraordinary Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Council Brussels, Belgium 18 June 1999

1. In Kosovo the will of the international community has prevailed by achieving the withdrawal of FRY security forces, thus bringing to an end the brutal campaign of repression and ethnic cleansing. NATO has played a vital role in achieving this outcome. The Alliance pays tribute to the men and women of Operation Allied Force for the courage and commitment they have displayed.
2. NATO's objectives, which are those of the international community, are unchanged: the complete withdrawal of FRY military, police and para-military forces from Kosovo; an end to all violence; the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations; and the establishment of a political framework agreement based on the Rambouillet accords. NATO is determined to fulfil its promise that the people of Kosovo can return to their homes and live in security and without fear. Allies are appalled by the mounting evidence of atrocities committed in Kosovo. They are cooperating actively with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in order to bring to justice those responsible for atrocities and war crimes. A durable peace in Kosovo must be founded on justice and the rule of law.
3. To achieve these objectives, KFOR, with NATO at its core, is deploying rapidly into Kosovo, as authorised by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
4. The Alliance is determined to help create a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo within the FRY. KFOR will operate in an impartial and even-handed manner in carrying out its mandate. NATO will help the people of Kosovo build democratic institutions and a civil society based on respect for the human rights of all Kosovars on an equal basis, regardless of their ethnic or religious background. As the first, immediate steps in reaching this goal, NATO expects:

- the FRY authorities to complete the full withdrawal of their security forces in accordance with the timetable set out in the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and the FRY;
- the KLA and other armed groups in Kosovo to cooperate fully with KFOR, refrain from any violence and particularly any provocations against departing Serb forces, avoid any actions which would impede the establishment of the UN-led civil administration, fulfil their obligations for demilitarisation under UNSCR 1244, and respect the human rights of all peoples in Kosovo.

KFOR will not tolerate any challenges to its authority or intimidation of any of the people of Kosovo.

5. The Alliance welcomes the commitments made by its Partners and other interested nations to participate in KFOR.

6. NATO looks forward to the participation of the Russian Federation in KFOR within a unified chain of command. Allies are confident that arrangements will be found that will allow Russian and NATO forces to work together to bring peace and stability to all peoples in Kosovo. NATO and its member countries remain ready to resume consultations and full cooperation in the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

7. KFOR will work to create a secure environment in which the UN-led civil administration and international agencies can work unhindered. NATO welcomes the early establishment of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and intends to cooperate closely with it together with the OSCE and the EU. Allies call upon all peoples of Kosovo to recognise the authority of and cooperate fully with UNMIK. The Alliance is assisting the UNHCR and non-governmental organisations in the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. Allies will be cooperating closely with the UN Mine Action Service and other international organisations and NGOs on mine awareness and clearance activities, with the aim of ensuring a safe environment for the return of refugees and for the conduct of the civil mission. Allies look forward to cooperating closely with all these organisations in bringing lasting peace and security to Kosovo.

8. The Alliance reiterates the great importance attached by Heads of State and Government in Washington to the stability of Montenegro's democratically elected government.

9. Stability in South-Eastern Europe is a priority for member governments. The Alliance will not allow the Belgrade regime to destabilise the neighbouring states of the FRY. Belgrade's actions have inflicted enormous hardship on the countries of the region. NATO pays tribute in particular to the governments

of Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ for their handling of the massive influx of refugees. NATO also expresses its appreciation to the governments of Bulgaria and Romania for the support they have given to preserving stability in the region. The Alliance will work with all Partner countries to address the problems of the region. Allies are cooperating through NATO's initiative for South-Eastern Europe to support the nations of this region in forging a better future based on democracy, justice, security cooperation, economic development and integration. NATO supports the EU Stabilisation Pact for South-East Europe and the regional cooperation efforts of the countries in the region. The objective of a stable South-Eastern Europe cannot be assured until the FRY achieves democracy and respects the rights of all minorities, including those in Vojvodina and Sandjak.

10. In the Washington Declaration, Allied Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law on which the Alliance is founded and expressed their vision for the Alliance of the 21st century. NATO's actions in Kosovo are an expression of this commitment and vision.

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE AND THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

Final Communiqué Brussels, Belgium 2 December 1999

1. The Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 2 December 1999.
2. We reaffirmed the enduring importance of the transatlantic link. Developments during this year have emphasised the fundamental importance of collective defence planning as the framework within which national and Alliance requirements are harmonised. Our ongoing presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as Alliance operations to end the repression in Kosovo and to restore stability there could not have been undertaken without our integrated military structure and our well-established mechanisms for collective planning. In the light of the experiences of Kosovo operations and in accordance with the Defence Capabilities Initiative launched by our Heads of State and Government at the Washington Summit we shall ensure that collective defence planning continues to address the requirements needed for the full range of Alliance missions.
3. We reviewed the national defence plans of Allies for the period 2000-2004 and beyond and have adopted a five-year force plan which addresses the requirements of the future security environment. This review focused particularly on the extent to which Allies' fulfilment of requirements identified as part of the Defence Capabilities Initiative needed to be improved. Defence expenditure plans were also highlighted in our review. All Allies expect continued growth in GDP but, on the basis of current plans, only a few expect to increase defence expenditure. We shall need to keep this aspect under review. We remain determined to seek the resources necessary to ensure that our forces are properly manned, equipped, trained and sustained for the full spectrum of Alliance roles and missions, including through more effective use of available resources. We also recognise the importance of common efforts and multinational, joint and common funding, which contribute to enhanced Alliance cohesion and emphasise solidarity.
4. We also took stock of the work being done to ensure that the planning targets being developed by the NATO Military Authorities, and which we shall

be invited to approve as NATO Force Goals next Spring, take full account of the Defence Capabilities Initiative. It is important that, through our force planning mechanisms, Allied defence programmes are developed in full consonance with the work on the Defence Capabilities Initiative and reflect shared responsibilities of the Allies. We look forward to reviewing the draft Force Goals at our next meeting.

5. In accordance with the Washington Summit decisions, an initial exchange of thoughts has taken place within the Alliance on the further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the cohesion and integrity of the Alliance's defence planning process for the whole range of missions.

6. In this, our first meeting as the Nuclear Planning Group since the Washington Summit, we confirmed the principles underpinning the nuclear forces of the Allies as set out in the new Strategic Concept. These forces continue to have a fundamental political purpose: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They play an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression, and by providing an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe, at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability. Taking account of the present security situation, we affirmed that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by Allies are extremely remote.

7. We emphasised that since 1991, in the context of the improved security environment and in keeping with the Alliance's stated principle of keeping its forces at the minimum sufficient level, NATO has reduced the types and numbers of its sub-strategic nuclear forces by over 85 percent. These reductions included the complete elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched missiles. Furthermore, NATO has significantly relaxed the readiness criteria for nuclear-rolled forces.

8. We affirmed that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation - with the stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification they can provide - will continue to play a major role in the achievement of NATO's security objectives. Alliance work in these areas is ongoing as a contribution to the Washington Summit remit. We reviewed evolving threats from proliferant states. We reaffirmed our belief that Alliance forces deter the use of weapons of mass destruction, thus contributing to the Alliance goal of preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means. All Allies support the central treaties related to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and are committed to full implementa-

tion of these treaties. With a view to the upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in Spring 2000, we reaffirmed our full support of the Treaty and our continued commitment to efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons; we urged all countries which have not yet done so to accede to and fully implement the NPT. We continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify START II so that the benefits of this treaty can be reaped and negotiations on a START III treaty can be set in train. We continue to support the ratification, early entry into force, and full implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

9. Firmly committed to our partnership with Russia under the NATO-Russia Founding Act, we stand ready to resume reciprocal exchanges with Russia on nuclear weapons issues, and thus we reviewed possible next steps in such consultations. In this context, we note with concern that Russia appears to be moving towards a greater reliance on nuclear forces to ensure its security. We renew our call on Russia to review further its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile with a view toward making significant reductions. We look forward to further consultations on these issues. We welcomed plans by the United States to establish, in cooperation with Russia, a temporary joint Centre for Year 2000 Strategic Stability to deal with possible computer errors in either nation's missile attack warning systems. This is an important cooperative step towards ensuring overall nuclear safety and security.

10. We are pleased to note that Alliance nuclear forces, command and control systems and nuclear support infrastructure have been thoroughly reviewed and found to be fully compliant with the requirements of the changeover to the next millennium.

MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN DEFENCE MINISTERS' SESSION

Final Communiqué Brussels, Belgium 2 December 1999

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Defence Ministers Session in Brussels on 2 December, 1999.
2. As this was our first formal meeting following the Washington Summit and Operation ALLIED FORCE, our discussions centred on assessing progress on the continuing adaptation of the Alliance as directed by the Heads of State and Government in the Summit Communiqué and in the new Strategic Concept, and on reviewing the situation in the Balkans.
3. Against the background of political developments in the region, we reviewed the status of NATO's comprehensive approach and continuing commitment to the promotion of security, stability, democracy, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Balkans, including the NATO-led operations for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and the implementation of the South-East Europe Initiative. As Defence Ministers, we welcome the fact that the NATO military authorities continue to monitor the situation across the region closely.
4. The conclusion of the Kosovo air campaign marked the achievement of the key objectives of the NATO Allies and their partners. The humanitarian catastrophe has ended; an international peace force (KFOR) has been successfully deployed; and the international community has assumed responsibility for the civil administration through UNMIK. The key to success was the cohesion of the Alliance. NATO has remained united and resolute throughout.
5. Considerable progress has been made since the completion of the air campaign. We are determined to play our part in meeting in full the aims of the international community as set out in UNSCR 1244.
6. Ethnically motivated violence must stop. While the security situation in Kosovo is relatively stable, continued diligence is required in an environment which is still tense and uncertain. We will not tolerate harassment against minorities or the development of parallel structures that threaten UNMIK or KFOR objectives or the rule of law. We note with satisfaction that the ICTY prosecutor expressed appreciation for the support provided by KFOR. KFOR forces are now at full strength. We confirm that KFOR remains alert to, and capable of responding to, any external threat to the security of Kosovo, and

strongly endorse KFOR's commitment to monitoring and providing security at borders and internal boundaries. KFOR will continue to provide a secure environment for all the inhabitants of Kosovo. We commend KFOR in particular for their work in protecting all minorities, including through maintaining an effective military presence in Serb minority areas. We welcome the successful completion of the demilitarisation of the KLA, and KFOR's efforts to combat illegal arms and intimidation from whatever quarter. We support KFOR's contribution to the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps, as a multi-ethnic and civil organisation. This was a vital step in giving to former combatants a perspective for integration into civilian life after the demilitarisation of the KLA.

7. We are pleased with the excellent cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK. We reaffirm our full support to UNMIK in its efforts to establish a fully functioning civil administration in Kosovo. We commend the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for his outstanding efforts to this end. It will be vital that UNMIK is adequately resourced if it is to complete its mission successfully.

8. The robust practical and political support which neighbouring countries provided throughout the air campaign, and which they continue to provide, was and remains critical to success. We noted our deep appreciation for this support and in particular welcome the ongoing efforts of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ in supporting KFOR. NATO will continue to work closely with the countries of the region to build long-term and sustainable regional stability. In this context, we noted the Alliance's continuing work to develop the South-East Europe Initiative to promote regional security and cooperation in the region, including through Partnership for Peace tools, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Consultative Forum. The South-East Europe Initiative supports and complements the objectives of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. Implementation of activities under the initiative has already begun, including efforts both at NATO Headquarters and in the countries themselves to harmonise assistance programmes. We look forward in this regard to the establishment by the countries concerned, with the support of Allies, of a Security Assistance Cooperation Group and speedy implementation of other measures to increase the effectiveness of such assistance and to promote regional cooperation and transparency on security issues. We welcome the ideas already put forward by countries in the region in this respect, and the existing cooperation mechanisms they have established, and encourage them to make progress on activities such as the proposed exchange of representatives among national military headquarters and government ministries. We directed the Council in Permanent Session to report progress in all these areas at our next meeting.

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

9. We welcomed the progress that has been achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina including the development of civil institutions; increases in the level of refugee returns, including to minority areas; progress in civil reconstruction; reductions in arms holdings; and the development of the role of the Standing Committee on Military Matters. We commended SFOR's role in this process, which has permitted a substantial restructuring of the force, including a reduction by about a third of the current strength which should be complete early next year. We are confident that it will result in a more flexible force capable of contributing fully to the maintenance of a secure environment in support of the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. We endorsed SFOR's close working relationship with the High Representative and other civil agencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in particular SFOR's continuing strong support for the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, including through the continuing successful detention of persons indicted for war crimes. At the same time we realise that more needs to be done and we are committed to ensuring that progress continues, including through further detentions, and attach priority to the campaign against corruption, to continuing refugee returns, and to further reductions in arms, force levels and military budgets. We commend the High Representative's efforts and fully support his initiative gradually to shift responsibility to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina for their own internal affairs. We support his recent decision to remove from office various public officials who have obstructed the implementation of the Dayton accords.

10. We are concerned about the lack of progress towards a democratic and peaceful FRY taking its place in the international community, which remains our goal. We are also concerned about the tensions between Serbia and Montenegro and urge all concerned to refrain from any destabilising measures.

11. We are grateful for the very substantial contribution that NATO's Partners, including Russia and Ukraine, and other nations are making to efforts to bring peace and stability to the Balkans. We expressed our deepest appreciation for the outstanding skill, courage and determination with which the service men and women of all nations are undertaking their duties in both SFOR and KFOR, as well as during the air campaign.

12. We are determined to draw on our experience during the Kosovo conflict to prepare ourselves better for any such contingencies in the future, and to continue building a more effective Alliance. The campaign underlined the importance of planning for a wide range of possible contingencies and the need for determination in the conduct of operations. It demonstrated the need to enhance the capabilities of Allies' military forces - and particularly the forces of European Allies - to engage more effectively in the most complex aspects of modern peace support operations, and to improve their readiness and availability to deploy forces at short notice.

13. We remain deeply concerned about the situation in the North Caucasus. Recognising Russia's territorial integrity and Russia's right to protect itself against terrorism, we urge Russia to exercise the fullest restraint, cease the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force which has given rise to severe hardship for the civilian population, and take urgent steps towards a political solution building on the commitments of Istanbul and the role of the OSCE. We call upon Russia to facilitate the provision of humanitarian relief to those in need and to work cooperatively with international organisations. Finally, we urge Russia to ensure that the conflict does not spread to other states, bearing in mind the importance of regional stability and security.

14. Responding to the new demands of the approach to Alliance security set out in the new Strategic Concept, the Defence Capabilities Initiative agreed in Washington will ensure that the Alliance's forces can deploy quickly, can be supplied, reinforced and sustained for an extended period away from their home bases, and can operate more effectively, be better protected, and be supported by effective command and control arrangements. Drawing on the lessons learned from Alliance operations in the Balkans, the Defence Capabilities Initiative will promote greater interoperability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, also between Alliance and Partner forces. The Initiative will also strengthen European capabilities and the European pillar of NATO. Implementing the Defence Capabilities Initiative will require a sustained effort by Allies as well as by NATO bodies to focus their efforts on the important capability areas identified by the Initiative, to ensure force structures are properly balanced to meet anticipated requirements, to pursue creative approaches to overcoming shortfalls in capabilities, and to provide sufficient resources to meet the challenges of the future. Implementation of DCI is first and foremost a national responsibility. However, cooperative and collective arrangements and mechanisms, including multi-national, joint and common funding, will also have to make an important contribution.

15. We have reviewed the state of implementation of DCI. We are encouraged by the useful initial results achieved to date, both within NATO and in national programmes. We are pleased with the progress in implementing the Multi-national Joint Logistic Centre Concept including in the staffing of the MJLC positions and the refinement of its new operational doctrine. We also noted ongoing work to develop clearinghouse mechanisms on multi-national formations on which a first conference will take place later this month, and the acceleration of work to develop a system architecture for NATO Consultation, Command and Control. In order to continue this initial progress, we directed that further vigorous efforts to implement DCI be undertaken and have asked for a progress report at our next meeting.

16. Work on the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance continues as set out in the Washington Summit

Communiqué and the Strategic Concept. In this context, an initial exchange of views has taken place on the question of relations with the European Union, on the practical arrangements for supporting EU-led operations, and on the participation issue.

17. We applaud the determination of all European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen European military capabilities. These improvements will both strengthen the ability of Allies to contribute to Alliance missions, and will also contribute to strengthening the capability for EU-led operations. We are following closely ongoing work in the EU and are looking forward to EU initiatives which may emerge from the Helsinki Summit, notably in relation to the development of defence capabilities avoiding unnecessary duplication, expecting that these initiatives and those arising from NATO's DCI will be mutually reinforcing, and in the confidence that a stronger Europe means a stronger Alliance. On this basis, we look forward to building a close relationship between NATO and the European Union.

18. Meanwhile, the Alliance continues to work with the WEU to complete and implement arrangements to facilitate cooperation between the two organisations in the event of a WEU-led military operation using NATO assets and capabilities. We look forward to exercising these arrangements in a crisis management exercise between NATO and the WEU scheduled for February 2000. We appreciate the information we have received on the outcome of the WEU Audit of assets and capabilities available for Petersberg tasks as approved by WEU Ministers at their Luxembourg meeting.

19. We underline the risk to international and regional stability posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. We urge all countries to accede to and fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. We are determined to achieve progress on a legally binding protocol including effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We emphasise the importance of universal accession and adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

20. The Alliance is making progress in implementing the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative (WMDI). The new Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre will improve coordination of all WMD-related activities at NATO Headquarters, as well as strengthen non-proliferation related political consultations and defence efforts to improve the preparedness of the Alliance. We look forward to establishing the WMD Centre in early 2000. Significant progress has been made in defining the tasks of the WMD Centre. The specifications of a WMD intelligence and information database are under active

consideration, with the aim of improving the quality and increasing the quantity of intelligence and information-sharing among Allies. Finally, we are continuing to prepare for renewed consultations with Russia under the Permanent Joint Council on these matters, and we welcome the initiation of proliferation-related discussions with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission. We are determined to improve our capabilities to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, which also pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory and forces.

21. Work also continued on other aspects of NATO's internal adaptation. The activation of the headquarters of the new command structure began on 1 September. The new command structure will provide the Alliance with the capacity to command and control the full range of the Alliance's military missions, including through the use of deployable combined and joint headquarters, in particular CJTF headquarters. The final phase of the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force Concept, which has begun, will provide the Alliance with an important new tool for crisis management in the next century. In addition, NATO's military authorities are preparing guidance on the military implementation of the Strategic Concept. It will be followed by a review of the force structure which will lead to a more effective response to future risks and threats. In parallel, NATO's military authorities are updating NATO's operational planning procedures, adapting them in order to take into account the lessons learned from the recent operations and more generally to respond to operational requirements.

22. We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. We welcome the considerable interest and active participation by aspirant countries in the Membership Action Plan, including its defence and military aspects. They have submitted Annual National Programmes, which establish a basis for taking the MAP process forward, including through Alliance assessment and feedback on their progress towards strengthening their ability to meet the requirements and obligations of membership. Preparation for possible future membership is supported by Partnership for Peace activities. Tailored Individual Partnership Programmes and Partnership Goals for aspirants will be of key importance in support of improving the effectiveness and interoperability of their armed forces. We will consider progress by each aspirant in the defence and military field at our next Ministerial meeting.

23. We welcomed the decision of Ireland to become, as of 1 December 1999, the newest member of the Partnership for Peace. This testifies to the central role PfP has come to play in Euro-Atlantic security and stability.

24. We appreciate the progress being made in implementing the Enhanced and more Operational Partnership, which was launched at the Washington Summit to reinforce the operational capability of Partnership for Peace. We look forward to the approval tomorrow of the first Ministerial Guidance of the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the development of Partnership Goals as a substantial step forward in bringing the force planning process for Partners closer to that of the Alliance and achieving enhanced capabilities.

25. We welcome the progress that has been made in involving Partners as troop contributing nations in consultations, planning, conduct and political oversight of the present operations in the Balkans, in accordance with the Political-Military Framework (PMF) for NATO-led PfP operations. We endorse the Operational Capabilities Concept which will reinforce PfP's operational capabilities and improve the capability and interoperability of Partner forces, as well as enhance the Alliance's overall ability to put together tailored force packages to mount and sustain future NATO-led PfP operations along the lines of SFOR and KFOR. The Operational Capabilities Concept will evolve to reflect further development and implementation of the concept in light of new challenges to multinational operations involving both Allies and Partners. We appreciate the substantial progress achieved so far on the Training and Education Enhancement Programme and look forward to the submission of the fully developed programme at our next meeting in Spring 2000. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to report progress on these important initiatives at our Spring 2000 meeting.

26. We continue to attach great importance to a close relationship with Russia as envisaged in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In addition to our joint efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there has been excellent cooperation between NATO and Russian forces in Kosovo, and we have continued to consult regarding Kosovo in the Permanent Joint Council. We regret that Russia has not yet been willing to resume the full spectrum of cooperation agreed in the Founding Act. We urge Russia to reconsider her policy in this respect and look forward to expanding our consultations and cooperation in the future, including in the framework of the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace.

27. We attach great importance to the further development of our distinctive partnership with Ukraine. We pledge our continued support for the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform and note the valuable work of the NATO Liaison Office and of the Documentation and Information Centre in Kyiv. We look forward to the meeting tomorrow of the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

28. The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. We are pleased with the progress achieved in enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue as part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security. We welcome the fact that the 2000 Work Programme will include a substantial number of military activities. We also emphasise the importance of tailored defence-related activities, and, in this context, of military contacts through visits to Mediterranean Dialogue countries. To this end we direct the Council in Permanent Session to submit a progress report to us on these issues at our next meeting.

29. The Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on 19 November, will ensure the continuing viability of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and stability. The Allies made comprehensive proposals which served as an important basis for the negotiations, in particular for the introduction of a system of nationally based equipment limits and improvements to the Treaty provisions concerning stability, transparency and predictability. The Adapted Treaty will enhance security throughout Europe, not least as it introduces a more constraining structure of National and Territorial Ceilings, while permitting sufficient deployment flexibility for routine training purposes and effective crisis management, thereby ensuring NATO's ability to fulfil its responsibilities. We are pleased that the Adapted Treaty will permit accession by new States Parties and strengthen Treaty requirements concerning host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces.

30. We welcome the important political commitments contained in the CFE Final Act, in particular the bilateral agreements reached by Russia and Georgia, and Russia and Moldova, on withdrawal of Russian Forces. But it is essential that the CFE Treaty remains effective and credible. NATO countries are concerned about continued Russian non-compliance with the Treaty's Article V ("flank") limits. We note Russia's commitment to comply with all the Treaty's provisions and limitations. We also note Russia's assurances that its exceeding of CFE limits will be of a temporary nature. NATO Allies expect Russia to honour its pledge to comply with CFE limits as soon as possible and, in the meantime, to provide maximum transparency regarding its forces and weapons deployed in the North Caucasus, in accordance with the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document. Entry into force of the Adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's limitations. It is on this basis that we will work towards bringing the Adapted Treaty into force. Pending the completion of this process, the continued implementation of the existing Treaty and its associated documents remains crucial.

31. The Alliance attaches importance to preserving strategic stability. In this respect, we call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reduc-

tions on nuclear weapons stockpiles. We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty as soon as possible. We support the early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

32. We welcomed the completion of the NATO Armaments Review conducted under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). The Review sets out new arrangements for the harmonisation of armaments-related requirements to meet Alliance defence capability needs, the standardisation of materiel in pursuit of broad-based interoperability, cooperative equipment procurement and a more effective use of defence research and technology resources. A key result of the Review will be to enhance coordination particularly through the NATO Committee for Armaments Coordination of materiel-oriented matters among all NATO bodies concerned and thereby contribute directly to the implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative. A NATO Research and Technology Strategy has been developed to guide the work of the Alliance in this field. Both the Review and the Strategy will help sustain NATO's distinct role in the field of armaments in the years ahead. We welcome the developments within the European defence industry and their contribution to the strengthening of the European capabilities. Viable defence industries on both sides of the Atlantic are critical to the efficient functioning of NATO military forces. To that end, we welcome continued transatlantic defence industrial cooperation to help ensure interoperability, economies of scale, competition and innovation. In this context, we look forward to an increase in transatlantic cooperation in the field of research, development and production of armaments in a spirit of balance and partnership as an important factor of the cohesion of the Alliance.

33. In order to enhance the effectiveness of Civil-Military Cooperation, confirmed in the Strategic Concept as essential to the Alliance's operational capability, a fundamental review of civil emergency planning in NATO is nearing completion. This review will result in a closer working relationship between the civil and military communities and will permit a more effective use of civil resources in such Alliance activities as peace support operations. The important contribution of Partners to joint operations will also benefit from the outcome of the review as they become more and more involved in civil-military planning activity. In this regard, Partners' growing involvement in CEP activities which, in addition to their interoperability in disaster response through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre, now also includes arrangements for civil support to the military, is proving highly useful.

34. NATO common funding plays a significant role in support of the NATO command structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. As part of the continued adaptation of the common funded programmes to Alliance security requirements as set out in the new Strategic Concept, steps have been taken to

improve their transparency and the focusing of the common-funded resource allocation process. We welcome the initiatives set out to further improve this process.

35. Terrorism in all its forms constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of states. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation. The terrorist threat against deployed NATO forces and NATO installations requires the consideration and development of appropriate measures for their continued protection, taking full account of host nation responsibilities.

STATEMENT

Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers' Session Brussels, Belgium 3 December 1999

1. The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) met on 3 December 1999 in Defence Ministerial Session, the first such meeting since the Washington Summit.
2. Ministers reviewed the situation in the Balkans. They welcomed the continuing progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and noted the restructuring of SFOR. On Kosovo they noted the achievements of KFOR. They discussed future challenges to KFOR and called upon all communities to work together with the international community in reconstruction efforts. Ministers expressed their determination to playing their part in meeting in full the aims of the International Community as set out in UNSCR 1244.
3. NATO Ministers expressed their appreciation for the Ukrainian military contribution to IFOR and SFOR and noted that Ukraine will focus its future troop contributions in the Balkans on KFOR.
4. Ministers reviewed the status of defence reform in Ukraine. Minister Kuzmuk reported on progress and future plans to restructure Ukraine's Armed Forces. NATO Ministers commended Ukraine's commitment to defence reform, and emphasised their continued willingness to assist through the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform.
5. Ministers reviewed defence-related cooperation under the NATO-Ukraine Charter. They noted proposals to hold expert meetings on defence resource management, force planning and legal issues in the work plan for 2000. They stressed the need to keep the work under review and to follow-up on past meetings in the area of civil-military relations and on education and training.
6. Ministers also reviewed cooperation under Partnership for Peace. They welcomed steps undertaken in Ukraine to make the Yavoriv PfP Training Centre fully operational and noted the need to ratify the Status of Forces Agreement. NATO Ministers welcomed Ukraine's Individual Partnership Programme proposals for 2000-2001. Ministers noted the wider opportunities in the new Operational Capabilities Concept and Training and Education

Enhancement Programme and underlined the important role of the NATO Liaison Office in the effective management and implementation of the Ukrainian IPP.

CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL IN DEFENCE MINISTERS' SESSION

**Brussels, Belgium
3 December 1999**

1. This was the first meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at Defence Ministers' level since the Washington Summit. The meeting focused on cooperation in the Balkans and progress in developing the enhanced and more operational Partnership as foreseen at Washington. In addition, the Secretary General reported on the outcome of NATO ministerial meetings and Ministers received a briefing on the status of implementation of the Alliance's Defence Capabilities Initiative.
2. Ministers welcomed the continuing progress towards full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and noted that, in the light of the improved security situation, SFOR restructuring had begun. They confirmed that support for law and order, the return of refugees and displaced persons, and the strengthening of common institutions should remain high on SFOR's agenda.
3. Ministers noted with satisfaction KFOR's achievements in building stability and security, as well as the continuing humanitarian improvements which its deployment had made possible. They also took stock of the major challenges which confront KFOR. Ministers called upon all communities in Kosovo to work together, and to support the international community's efforts in the reconstruction of Kosovo, for which the necessary resources need to be made urgently available. They confirmed their support for KFOR's even-handed approach to establishing a secure environment and providing support for key civil implementation tasks in accordance with UNSCR 1244.
4. Ministers noted a progress report on the Alliance's South-East Europe Initiative, welcoming work underway in the framework of the EAPC and the PfP on proposals to contribute to security and stability in the Balkan region.
5. Ministers welcomed the increasingly important role which Partnership plays in strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, in particular its political and military contribution in support of NATO-led operations in the Balkans. They also welcomed the progress which had been made in implementing steps to enhance PfP and make it more operational.

6. In this context, Ministers noted the agreement of the first Ministerial Guidance by Alliance Ministers and Ministers from Partner nations participating in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). This guidance will be taken into account in developing Partnership Goals, which seek to enhance interoperability between Partner forces declared for PfP and provide planning targets for the development of Partner forces and capabilities for NATO-led PfP operations. They welcomed steps taken to implement the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations and stressed the importance of information exchanges and consultations with Partners contributing to the NATO-led SFOR and KFOR operations in the Balkans.

7. Ministers also endorsed the new Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations which seeks to reinforce PfP's operational capabilities. This concept will introduce new mechanisms to improve the interoperability of Partner forces and the Alliance's ability to mount and sustain peace support operations with Partners in the future.

8. Finally, Ministers endorsed a progress report on the PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme, which aims to place increased emphasis on training and education to meet the current and future needs of the Partnership.

9. The Ministers welcomed the intention to meet again in June 2000 in Brussels.

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Final communiqué Brussels, Belgium 15 December 1999

1. At our meeting today, we recalled NATO's major achievements in 1999:
 - We set forth NATO's vision for the 21st century and approved an updated Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit, where we also celebrated the Alliance's 50th Anniversary;
 - We admitted as new members the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; and
 - We contributed decisively, in particular through the conduct of our air campaign and the subsequent deployment of KFOR, to the international community's objective of creating the basis for long-term peace and stability in Kosovo.

We reviewed progress in implementing the Washington Summit decisions and took steps to further adapt the Alliance to the new security environment. We reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to its fundamental security tasks, as set out in the Strategic Concept, and the importance of our individual and collective efforts to achieve our guiding objective of enhancing the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

2. Against the background of political developments in the Balkans, we reviewed the status of NATO's comprehensive approach and continuing commitment to the promotion of security, stability, peace and democracy, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region, including through the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the implementation of NATO's South-East Europe Initiative. Through the Council in Permanent Session and the NATO Military Authorities, we continue to monitor closely the situation across the region.

3. We pay tribute to the service-men and women of all nations who are serving in the Balkans for their professionalism and dedication to the cause of peace and stability. We express deep sympathy to the families of those who have lost their lives and to those who have been injured in the cause of peace.

4. The Kosovo air campaign, which demonstrated the cohesion and unity of the Alliance and its determination to act, reinforced the diplomatic efforts of the international community and achieved the key objectives of the NATO Allies and their Partners. The humanitarian catastrophe has ended; some 850,000 refugees have returned; a NATO-led international peace force (KFOR) has been successfully deployed; and the international community has assumed responsibility for the civil administration through the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

5. We are determined to play our part in meeting in full the aims of the international community as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. We remain committed to a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all peoples can live in peace and security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis, including through participation in democratic institutions.

We noted the progress made in restoring peace and stability since the deployment of KFOR in Kosovo in accordance with UNSCR 1244, in particular the reduction in violence and the re-establishment of civil institutions. We commend the work undertaken by UNMIK and are pleased with the excellent level of coordination and cooperation established between KFOR and UNMIK. Close civil-military relations are essential for the success of our common goals and of our peace-building efforts in the region. In this respect, we have invited the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Dr. Kouchner, to tomorrow's meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

6. While progress has been achieved, much remains to be done, in particular the continued protection of all ethnic groups and minorities. We condemn all acts of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter. We underline KFOR's determination to put an end to ethnically motivated violence and to act swiftly and decisively against all perpetrators, including through maintaining an effective military presence in Serb minority areas. We strongly commend KFOR's determination to combat arms trafficking, illegal possession of weapons, the development of parallel structures that threaten KFOR or UNMIK objectives or the rule of law, to monitor and provide security at the borders and boundaries of Kosovo and to work with UNMIK to avoid cantonisation.

The achievement of the de-militarisation and the dissolution of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) under the supervision of KFOR was an important step in establishing an environment for post-conflict reconciliation. We welcome the establishment of a civilian, multi-ethnic Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) as another important step in the development of a civil society for the benefit of all communities. Close control of the KPC by UNMIK and KFOR is essential. We underscore KFOR's determination to continue to pro-

vide day-to-day operational direction and tasking, under the overall authority of the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative.

KFOR will continue to cooperate closely with UNMIK, providing support to its efforts towards establishing a fully functioning administration and democratic institutions, promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights, and assuring the safe return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes. It will be vital that UNMIK is adequately funded and staffed to fulfil its mission, particularly in the area of local administration and civilian international police. We will continue to do our utmost to provide a secure environment and we will give appropriate support for the conduct of free and fair elections under the auspices of the OSCE, which are to be held next year. We will also continue to provide strong support for the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

7. We urge all community leaders in Kosovo, irrespective of their ethnic background, to work together and with the international community in the reconstruction of Kosovo and the establishment of a democratic society founded on the rule of law, tolerance and respect for human rights. We call in particular on the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to renounce violence, to demonstrate its commitment to a tolerant, democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo, and to cooperate with UNMIK and KFOR against those who advocate and practice violence. In this context we welcome the creation by UNMIK of a Joint Interim Administrative Structure, and in particular the establishment of an Interim Administrative Council. We are encouraged by Kosovar Albanian agreement to participate in these structures, and underline the importance of early participation by representatives of all Kosovar peoples, including the Serb community. We expect all parties to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including by facilitating the conduct of its investigations. The continuing support of the international community will depend upon an adequate response to these requirements.

8. Our common efforts in Kosovo demonstrate the value of the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions, a concept long championed by the Alliance. In this respect, our individual bilateral efforts, the substantial role of the EU and that of other international bodies, are making a decisive contribution to the economic reconstruction of Kosovo. We also commend the UNHCR for organising relief efforts and resettlement, the UN Mine Action Centre for its role in coordinating the removal of mines, and the OSCE for its institution-building, human rights work and training of Kosovar police. We also express our appreciation for the significant role played by the many non-governmental organisations.

9. We express our deep appreciation for the robust practical and political support provided by Partner countries of the region throughout the air cam-

paign and thereafter. This support was and remains critical to success. In particular, we reiterate our appreciation for the ongoing efforts of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ in supporting KFOR.

We are grateful to NATO's Partners and other nations for the substantial contributions they are making to efforts to bring peace and stability to the Balkans, which are the practical expressions of these countries' commitment to our shared values.

10. The crisis in Kosovo demonstrated the resilience of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement. The Alliance remains committed to supporting a peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single democratic state composed of two multi-ethnic Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. We are encouraged by the continuing progress in the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement. We welcome the appointment of Ambassador Petritsch as High Representative, whose vigorous approach to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement we strongly support. We note in particular the progress made in:

- the development of functioning civil institutions;
- increases in the level of refugee returns, especially to areas in which returnees are in the minority;
- civil reconstruction;
- reduction in arms holdings; and
- the development of the role of the Standing Committee on Military Matters.

We also welcome the progress made in the ongoing arms control and confidence building negotiations in the framework of the Dayton Agreement with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia. We urge all parties to demonstrate fully their commitment to the Dayton process and their cooperation with the High Representative, as the basis for further progress in transferring administrative responsibility to local authorities.

11. SFOR has helped to secure a more stable and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result, it has been able to undertake significant restructuring. Early next year a smaller, more flexible force will be in place and will remain fully capable of carrying out its mandate. SFOR will continue to contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment and to give targeted and focused support to civilian implementation. In this respect, we fully

⁽¹⁾ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

endorse SFOR's close working relationship with the High Representative and other civil agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular SFOR's continuing strong support for the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in bringing indicted war criminals to justice.

12. Despite this encouraging progress, important challenges remain, such as:

- the return of displaced persons to minority areas;
- further reduction of both Entities' armed forces;
- further progress in humanitarian de-mining;
- improving the effectiveness of all common institutions, notably the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and cooperation between Entities;
- transferring to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes;
- the fight against corruption, organised crime and illegal secret services;
- judicial and police reform; and
- the establishment of a state border service.

Accordingly, we expect the Entities to work together fully in coordination with the Presidency, the Council of Ministers and on all other levels. We applaud the spirit of cooperation exhibited among the common institutions and between authorities of both Entities during preparations for hosting the Stability Pact Summit. We call upon the Presidency to implement in full the commitments made in the New York Declaration of 15 November, and to support the work of the Standing Committee on Military Matters. We also demand that all parties fully cooperate with the ICTY, in particular by surrendering indictees within their territory. Only on the basis of justice can a lasting peace be established. We emphasise the fundamental significance of implementing market oriented economic reforms.

Taken together, these steps will reinforce the efforts of the High Representative to make the leaders and authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina the "owners" of the process of peace implementation and open the way to the integration of their country into Euro-Atlantic institutions. As Co-chair of the Stability Pact Working Table on Security Issues, Bosnia and Herzegovina can play an important role in promoting stability in the region.

13. We remain concerned about continued tensions between Belgrade and the democratically elected government of Montenegro. We are therefore paying close attention to developments there. We call on both sides to resolve their

differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way and refrain from any destabilising measures. We express our support for the objective of a peaceful and democratic FRY, which protects the rights of all minorities, including those in Vojvodina and Sandjak. This would open the way for the eventual return of the FRY to the Euro-Atlantic family of nations.

14. The forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia will be crucial for its future. We hope that the entire Croatian leadership will seize the chance to re-vitalise implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, and demonstrate their commitment to democratic elections and due constitutional process. There is an opportunity for the next Croatian government to move towards a closer relationship with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

15. Our goal remains the integration of all the countries of South-East Europe into the Euro-Atlantic Community. To this end, we are building on the Alliance's already extensive cooperation in the region as evidenced by NATO's leadership of the SFOR and KFOR operations. The South-East Europe Initiative, launched at our Washington Summit, is also working to achieve this goal, including through PfP tools, the EAPC and the Consultative Forum, which all play valuable roles in our post-conflict efforts to win permanent peace in the region. Today we received a consolidated progress report on the South-East Europe Initiative and we note with satisfaction the range of activities already undertaken, by the countries in the region and by Allies, with the aim of harmonising assistance programmes for the states of the region, as appropriate.

NATO's South-East Europe Initiative promotes regional security and cooperation; it supports and complements the objectives of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, adopted by Ministers in Cologne in June and endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Sarajevo Summit in July. NATO is participating fully in the work of the Regional Table and the Working Tables established to implement the Stability Pact. The Alliance will continue to contribute to the success of the Stability Pact by making available its wealth of experience and expertise in practical military and defence-related cooperation and by ensuring that our efforts complement and contribute to the goals of the Pact.

We welcome the constructive contribution of Partners and other nations of South-East Europe to the stabilisation of that region. We applaud the engagement of Montenegro in the Stability Pact and look forward to the time when the FRY will be able to play its rightful part in this endeavour.

We direct the Council in Permanent session to pursue vigorously the various efforts under the South-East Europe Initiative and the Alliance's contribution to the objectives of the Stability Pact, and to report on progress by the time of our next meeting.

16. In its Strategic Concept, NATO has committed itself to contribute to effective conflict prevention. Our common efforts to build peace and security in Kosovo, to support a peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina and to enhance cooperation, including security cooperation, in South-Eastern Europe, are examples of such contributions by the Alliance, as are the recent initiatives to promote practical regional cooperation in the EAPC/PFP framework. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to consider means to ensure an effective and coherent Alliance contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and defuse conflicts, and to make recommendations where and if appropriate.

17. Our experience in Kosovo has confirmed that NATO must continue to adapt and improve its defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of Alliance missions. Implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), agreed in Washington, will ensure that NATO's forces can meet the challenges of mobility, deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability and interoperable and effective command, control and communications systems. The DCI will also promote greater interoperability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between Allied and Partner forces. The DCI is essential to strengthening European defence capabilities and the European pillar of NATO, so that European Allies will be able to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO. It will also improve their capability to undertake EU-led operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We are encouraged by the useful initial results achieved to date in implementing the DCI and look forward to further essential improvements in Alliance defence capabilities. Though the implementation of DCI is first and foremost a national responsibility, the provision of adequate resources, including multinational, joint and common funding arrangements, will be a critical factor.

18. The development of an effective ESDI will strengthen the Alliance, through which we remain ready to pursue common security objectives wherever possible. We are committed to reinforcing the Alliance's European pillar. Building on existing arrangements between NATO and the WEU as agreed in Berlin, and reaffirmed at our Washington Summit, we support the development within NATO of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. These developments will also result in a stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship.

19. We have set in train work on the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance as set out in the Washington Summit Communiqué and the Strategic Concept. In this context, we have initiated discussions in the Alliance to address means to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on the mech-

anisms existing between NATO and the WEU; participation of non-EU European Allies; as well as practical arrangements for assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities and for ready EU access to NATO collective assets and capabilities on a case-by-case basis and by consensus as set out at Washington.

20. Alliance work will proceed on the Washington Summit agenda, on an ongoing basis, taking into account the evolution of relevant arrangements in the EU. In this regard, we note the results of the European Council meeting in Helsinki on the strengthening of the common European policy on security and defence and on the development of modalities for EU/NATO relations, which represent a major contribution to the process of reinforcing our Alliance and its European pillar. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that this process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army. In this regard:

- a. We note the European Union's decision to set a common European headline goal and to develop collective capability goals to improve European military capabilities. The contribution of the non-EU European Allies to this process is and will be important. We applaud the determination of all European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities. The EU's headline and capability goals and the objectives arising from NATO's DCI will be mutually reinforcing, using - subject to the necessary decisions - existing defence planning procedures including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and the Planning and Review Process of the PfP, noting that in addition EU Ministers will develop a method of consultation and a regular review of progress made.
- b. We reiterate our readiness to define and adopt, in accordance with our decisions taken in Washington, the necessary arrangements for European Union ready access to separable but not separate NATO collective assets and capabilities, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance, respecting the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure.
- c. We note the decision of the EU to set up, in future, appropriate structures to ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with European NATO members which are not members of the EU on issues related to European security and defence policy and crisis management. In this respect, we underline, as we did at the Washington Summit, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies,

for the necessary involvement of non-EU European Allies in these structures.

We note that the non-EU European NATO members will participate, if they so wish, in the event of an operation involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities, and that they will be invited, upon decision by the EU, to take part in other EU-led operations. We see these EU decisions as important steps to achieve the goals envisaged by our Heads of State and Government at the Washington Summit. Participation of non-EU European Allies will enhance the effectiveness of EU-led military operations and will contribute directly to the effectiveness and vitality of the European pillar of NATO.

- d. We recognise the European Union's decision to establish permanent political and military structures and interim bodies, and its commitment to develop, under the Portuguese Presidency, modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU. We note that this, as with all the tasks entrusted to the Portuguese Presidency, is to be carried forward as a matter of priority. We reciprocate the EU's intention to develop appropriate modalities for a close and confident relationship between the two organisations. We welcome as a first step the informal contacts between the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.

21. We welcome the participation in our discussions of Dr. Javier Solana. As Secretary General of the Western European Union, his presence symbolises the close relationship that has developed between NATO and the WEU. The Alliance continues to work with the WEU to complete and implement arrangements to facilitate cooperation between the two organisations in the event of a WEU-led military operation using NATO assets and capabilities. We look forward to exercising these arrangements in a crisis management exercise between NATO and the WEU scheduled for February 2000.

22. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to proceed with its work as set out at the Washington Summit, taking into account the developments described above, and report to us at our next meeting.

23. The Alliance reaffirms its commitment to remain open to new members. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. The three new members will not be the last.

At the Washington Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to reinforce NATO's commitment to the openness of the Alliance. We have received today a report on the implementation of the MAP to date. We are pleased that the MAP process has made an effective start and met with a positive response of the nine aspiring countries. Aspirants have submitted annual national programmes which enable the Alliance to provide them with direct advice, feedback and assistance on their preparations for possible future membership.

24. We encourage all aspirants to set themselves realistic, prioritised goals and timelines and to allocate the necessary resources to them. We stand ready to assist the aspirants in their efforts to meet the goals they have set. To this end, we will develop with them Planning Targets in the defence/military field and tailored PfP Individual Partnership Programmes. Meetings of the Council will take place next Spring with each aspirant to examine progress made. We will keep the enlargement process, including implementation of the MAP, under continual review. We expect the annual consolidated progress report on activities under the MAP at our next Ministerial.

25. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council remains the key forum for regular consultation on security and defence related issues between the Alliance and its Partners. We welcome the expansion of activities within the EAPC/PfP framework to promote practical cooperation, including regional cooperation notably in South-East Europe, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Enhanced cooperation in support of, inter alia, peacekeeping, global humanitarian mine action and addressing the challenges of small arms and light weapons underline the role of the EAPC as a vital and dynamic institution in enhancing security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

26. We are pleased with the progress made in implementing the Washington Summit decision to further enhance the Partnership for Peace and make it more operational. We welcome the approval of the first Ministerial Guidance of the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the development of Partnership goals as a substantial step forward in bringing the force planning processes of Partners closer to those of Allies. We also welcome the progress that has been made in involving Partners as troop contributing nations in consultations, planning, conduct and political oversight of the present operations in the Balkans, in accordance with the Political-Military Framework (PMF) for NATO-led PfP operations. We endorse the Operational Capabilities Concept which will reinforce PfP's operational capabilities and improve the capability and interoperability of Partner forces, as well as enhance the Alliance's overall ability to put together tailored force packages to mount and sustain future NATO-led PfP operations along the lines of SFOR and KFOR. The Concept will continue to evolve. We appreciate the substantial progress achieved so far on the Training and Education Enhancement Programme. We

look forward to a report by the Council in Permanent Session on progress made on these important initiatives at our Spring 2000 meeting.

27. We welcome the recent signing by Ireland of the PfP Framework Document and we look forward to close cooperation with Ireland in the PfP and EAPC.

28. We continue to attach importance to consultations and practical cooperation with Russia. Our aim remains to establish a strong, stable and enduring partnership within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

29. We note the progress made in recent consultations in the PJC framework on issues relating to the operation in Kosovo. We note with satisfaction the valuable experience of practical cooperation between NATO and Russian forces both in SFOR and KFOR.

30. We encourage Russia to resume cooperation on the broad range of issues foreseen in the Founding Act and to engage actively in the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace. At the same time, we emphasise that the further development of our cooperation depends on Russia's respect for international norms and obligations.

31. We are deeply concerned about the conflict in Chechnya, continuing reports of civilian casualties there and the plight of displaced persons. We condemn, in particular, Russian threats against unarmed civilians, such as those in Grozny. We acknowledge the right of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and to protect its citizens against terrorism and lawlessness. We condemn terrorism in all its manifestations but believe that Russia's pursuit of a purely military solution to the conflict is undermining its legitimate objectives. The continuing disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population is incompatible with the commitments Russia has undertaken within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. In this context, we also recall the principles enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. We therefore urge Russia to exercise the fullest restraint, to refrain from the use of force against civilians and protect their human rights, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, and to cooperate fully with international relief agencies and to ensure security for their operations. Bearing in mind the importance of regional stability and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states, we are deeply concerned about the impact of the crisis of the entire Caucasus region and stress the need to avoid steps that would further undermine regional security.

We urge Russia to open all avenues for a political solution to the conflict. To this end, it is essential that the Russian government and Chechen representatives take meaningful steps toward a renewed dialogue. We also urge the

Chechen authorities to condemn terrorism and to take action against it. We expect Russia to respect the commitments made in Istanbul and to make good use of today's visit by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to the region in order to facilitate a political process to end the conflict.

32. We welcome the progressive development of the NATO-Ukraine distinctive partnership in accordance with the Charter signed in Madrid in 1997. We are pleased that this partnership is providing a framework for cooperative initiatives such as the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, which is actively engaged with Ukrainian media, universities and think-tanks. We also note that a NATO Liaison Office has been operational in Kyiv since April, and is providing a valuable contribution to facilitating Ukraine's full participation in the Partnership for Peace programme and more generally, to enhancing cooperation between NATO and Ukrainian authorities.

33. We continue to support the efforts of the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform and remain prepared to provide advice, as appropriate, to assist Ukraine with the transformation of its defence establishment. In the economic area, we welcome the initiation of a programme for the retraining of retired military officers. Cooperation is also developing in the fields of civil emergency planning, air-traffic management, armaments-related partnership activities, defence research and technology, and science. We reiterate our view that a speedy ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement by Ukraine will further the goals of our cooperation.

34. We encourage Ukraine to move forward with its democratic and economic reforms, and reaffirm NATO's support for Ukraine's efforts to this end. In this context, we welcome Ukraine's commitment to exploit the full potential of the NATO-Ukraine Charter and express our appreciation for Ukraine's concrete contribution to peace and stability in the Balkans, in particular through its participation in KFOR. We look forward to today's meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Foreign Ministers' session.

35. The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. We are pleased with the progress achieved in strengthening the Mediterranean Dialogue as agreed at the Washington Summit. The last round of political consultations with the six Mediterranean Dialogue countries held in October and November, offered an opportunity for sharing views on the implementation and future development of the Dialogue, including the Work Programme for 2000. We recognise the interest of our Mediterranean partners in developing the Dialogue, including through a strengthened cooperation in areas where NATO can bring added value.

36. We acknowledge the role played by the recently-designated Contact Point Embassies and we encourage the Mediterranean Cooperation Group to continue its efforts to progressively develop the Dialogue. Visits by NATO representatives have improved the prospects for closer contacts and cooperation. We welcome and encourage Allied nations and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to organise events such as the Rome Conference in 1997 and the Valencia Conference in 1999, as positive steps to strengthen mutual regional understanding. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to report at our next meeting on the political and practical cooperation in the Dialogue agreed in Washington.

37. We welcome the adoption of the OSCE Istanbul Charter on European Security, in particular the emphasis in the Charter on closer cooperation among international organisations. We also welcome the adoption of the Platform for Cooperative Security. The adoption of the Vienna Document 1999 on Confidence and Security Building Measures constitutes an important step towards increased transparency in military matters among OSCE participating states. We look forward to further intensifying cooperation between NATO and OSCE, notably in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

38. We reaffirm that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play an important role in the achievement of NATO's security objectives.

39. The Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on 19 November, will ensure the continuing viability of the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and stability. The Allies made comprehensive proposals which served as an important basis for the negotiations, in particular for the introduction of a system of nationally based equipment limits and improvements to the Treaty provisions concerning stability, transparency and predictability. The Adapted Treaty will enhance security throughout Europe, not least as it introduces a more constraining structure of National and Territorial Ceilings, while permitting sufficient deployment flexibility for routine training purposes and effective crisis management, thereby ensuring NATO's ability to fulfil its responsibilities. We are pleased that the Adapted Treaty will permit accession by new States Parties and strengthen Treaty requirements concerning host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces.

40. We welcome the important political commitments contained in the CFE Final Act, in particular the bilateral agreements reached by Russia and Georgia, and Russia and Moldova, on withdrawal of Russian Forces. But it is essential that the CFE Treaty remains effective and credible. NATO countries are concerned about continued Russian non-compliance with the Treaty's Article V ("flank") limits. We note Russia's commitment to comply with all

the Treaty's provisions and limitations. We also note Russia's assurances that its exceeding of CFE limits will be of a temporary nature. NATO Allies expect Russia to honour its pledge to comply with CFE limits as soon as possible and, in the meantime, to provide maximum transparency regarding its forces and weapons deployed in the North Caucasus, in accordance with the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document. Entry into force of the Adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of compliance by all States Parties with the Treaty's limitations. It is on this basis that we will work towards bringing the Adapted Treaty into force. Pending the completion of this process, the continued implementation of the existing Treaty and its associated documents remains crucial.

41. The Alliance attaches importance to preserving strategic stability. In this respect, we call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions on nuclear weapons stockpiles. We underscore the importance of achieving a successful conclusion to the upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Spring 2000. In this context, we reiterate our full support of all efforts towards universal adherence, full implementation and further strengthening the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We reaffirm our commitment to efforts aimed at reducing nuclear weapons.

We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty as soon as possible. We call for the early start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

42. The prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery remains our primary aim. We remain committed to preventing proliferation and reversing it where it has occurred through diplomatic means. We recognise that proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery, which pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory and forces, can continue to occur despite our preventive efforts and can pose a direct military threat to those populations, territories and forces.

We continue to attach the utmost importance to full implementation and rigorous verification of international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. We note with satisfaction that the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is proceeding well and welcome the progress made in the negotiations in Geneva on a legally binding Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by ensuring effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency. We urge that additional efforts be made to complete the remaining work as soon as possible before the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC in 2001.

43. We welcome the progress made by the Alliance in implementing the Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction. NATO's new WMD Centre, which we expect to be operational in early 2000, will provide an effective additional means to address both the political and defence challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, and will promote more active and regular intra-Alliance consultations and cooperation on this important issue. Significant progress has been made in setting in place an enhanced WMD intelligence database and information repository, which will aim at improving the quality and increasing the quantity of intelligence and information sharing among Allies to support efforts by NATO members to address proliferation issues. We support deepening consultations with Russia in these areas within the Permanent Joint Council, as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners in the EAPC, as well as with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

44. At the Washington Summit, our leaders committed the Alliance to consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament, in the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons. We have decided to set in train this process and have instructed the Council in Permanent Session to task the Senior Political Committee, reinforced by political and defence experts as appropriate, to review Alliance policy options in support of confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, and arms control and disarmament, so that a comprehensive and integrated approach to the accomplishment of the remit agreed at the Washington Summit is ensured. The responsible NATO bodies will contribute to this review. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session to submit a report to Ministers for their consideration in December 2000. We believe that this process will reinforce the Allies' contribution in advancing confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament.

45. In order to enhance the effectiveness of Civil-Military Cooperation, confirmed in the Strategic Concept as essential to the Alliance's operational capability, a fundamental review of civil emergency planning in NATO is nearing completion. We welcome the progress made. A close working relationship between the civil and military communities will contribute to a more effective use of Allied and Partner civilian resources in Alliance activities such as peace support operations. We look forward to the completion of this review at an early date. We will continue and consolidate the excellent cooperation with Partners in this field, including through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which played an important role in contributing to the relief of the humanitarian crisis in and around Kosovo, and in supporting Allied national authorities following recent natural disasters.

46. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation. The terrorist threat against deployed NATO forces and NATO installations requires the consideration and development of appropriate measures for their continued protection taking full account of host nation responsibilities.

47. At the Washington Summit our leaders took the steps to ensure that our Alliance will remain the bedrock of our collective defence, and continue to play a key role in the development of a secure and stable peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, as we enter the 21st century, we can state with confidence that NATO is ready to face the challenges of the future.

STATEMENT

Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers Brussels, Belgium 15 December 1999

The NATO-Ukraine Commission met in Foreign Ministers session at NATO Headquarters on 15 December 1999.

The Commission welcomed the reaffirmation of Ukraine's policy of Euro-Atlantic integration after the re-election of President Kuchma. The Ministers stressed their mutual commitment to making further progress in enhancing the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership. In this context, they also noted Ukraine's aspiration for closer involvement in the process of developing the European security and defence identity.

The Commission discussed the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic area and welcomed the approval by the OSCE Summit of the Charter for European Security, the adapted CFE Treaty and the updated Vienna Document. The Ministers expressed their confidence that the EAPC, the PfP program, the NATO-Ukraine Charter as well as the NATO-Russia partnership all have a major role to play in further strengthening European security and stability. The members of the Commission appreciated the achievements of NATO and Ukraine in strengthening regional security, in particular through their close cooperation within KFOR and SFOR. They also took positive note of Ukraine's commitment to further promote regional security in Europe through her membership in the UN Security Council in 2000-2001.

The Commission reviewed the situation in the Balkans. The Ministers welcomed the continuing progress in implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and noted the restructuring of SFOR. The members of the Commission discussed further prospects for NATO-Ukraine cooperation in the consolidation of peace and security in Kosovo and noted the achievements of KFOR in this regard. They also discussed present and future challenges to KFOR and called upon all ethnic communities to demonstrate tolerance and work together with the international community in the reconstruction efforts. The members of the Commission condemned the ongoing acts of ethnic violence in Kosovo and stressed their determination to meet the full aims of the international community as set out in UNSCR 1244, reaffirming their commitment to a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Commission exchanged views on the results of cooperation under the NATO-Ukraine Charter in 1999 and endorsed a substantial range of cooperative activities for 2000, with a particular emphasis on such fields as military-technical cooperation, armaments and standardisation, economic and environmental aspects of defence-related activities, science and technology, and civil emergency planning. The members of the Commission noted significant progress reached in NATO-Ukraine cooperation under the Charter and within the Partnership for Peace. Ministers welcomed steps undertaken in Ukraine to ensure the effective implementation of Ukraine's National Program for cooperation with NATO to the year 2001, as well as efforts to make the Yavoriv PfP Training Centre fully operational.

The Commission took positive note of the more focused and prioritised approach taken by Ukraine towards her cooperation with the Alliance. Ministers also discussed the prospects of further strengthening the institutional basis of the NATO-Ukraine relationship, in particular the NATO Liaison Office to Ukraine, the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, as well as the Joint Working Groups on Defence Reform, Civil Emergency Planning, and the Open Ended Working Groups on Economic Security and Retraining of Retired Military Personnel.

The next meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission will be held in Ambassadorial session in Kyiv in March 2000.

CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL

**Brussels, Belgium
16 December 1999**

1. The Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) met in Brussels today. The Secretary General of the Western European Union also attended the meeting. Ministers welcomed Ireland as the newest member of the EAPC.
2. The Secretary General of NATO informed the EAPC about the main results of the North Atlantic Council meeting on 15 December.
3. Dr. Bernard Kouchner, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo, briefed Ministers on UNMIK activities in Kosovo.
4. Ministers exchanged views on the situation in Kosovo and commended the successful operations being carried out by KFOR in close cooperation with UNMIK. Ministers underscored the importance of nations contributing sufficient resources, financial and personnel, to support the reconstruction effort in Kosovo. They reiterated their commitment to the full implementation of UNSCR 1244 and recognised that the task of building a peaceful and multi-ethnic society in Kosovo would demand long-term attention. In that context, they voiced concern about the continuing ethnic violence on the ground despite KFOR's determined efforts to stop it.
5. Ministers underlined the importance of the consultations that had taken place within the EAPC framework on operations in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and welcomed the intensification of these in accordance with the Political Military Framework for NATO-led Operations put in place at the Washington Summit earlier this year.
6. Ministers expressed profound concern about the conflict in Chechnya and the continuing violence, particularly the use of force against the civilian population. They also condemned terrorism in all its forms. They called for the utmost restraint, the fullest protection and humanitarian assistance for the civilian population and refugees and urged the immediate renewal of dialogue to achieve a political solution. Ministers were also deeply concerned about the impact of the crisis on the countries in the region and the risks of the conflict undermining stability and security throughout the region.

7. Ministers highlighted the fundamental importance of the EAPC/PfP framework in efforts to prevent conflict, manage crises and deal effectively with security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic area. They discussed the activities of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council during the last year and exchanged views on how political and security related cooperation might be further enhanced throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. They took note of the various initiatives that have been undertaken by the EAPC in this regard: they welcomed the work undertaken to complement and support international action in the fields of dealing with the Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons and promoting Global Humanitarian Mine Action; and they supported work in the EAPC to foster practical regional cooperation in the Caucasus.

8. Ministers welcomed the work underway in the EAPC and PfP to promote further practical regional cooperation in South-East Europe, directed at contributing to the building of lasting peace and stability in the region, and complementing the work of the Alliance and the Stability Pact.

9. Ministers welcomed progress made since the Washington Summit on the implementation of the enhanced and more operational Partnership, including implementation of the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led Operations, an expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process and enhanced defence-related and military cooperation. EAPC members also endorsed the Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations, intended to offer means and mechanisms to reinforce PfP's operational capabilities through closer military cooperation. They welcomed the further development of the PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme, aimed at increasing the scope, level and efficiency of training and education efforts to meet future demands of the Partnership.

10. Ministers endorsed and agreed to make public the EAPC Action Plan for 2000-2002, which is the main document guiding the cooperative work of the Alliance and its Partners for the next two years.

11. Ministers will meet again in May 2000.

EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (EAPC) ACTION PLAN 2000-2002

**Brussels, Belgium
16 December 1999**

Section I: Short-Term Planning

Organisation of EAPC work (Inter-Ministerial work schedule, including political and security-related consultations and practical cooperation)

1. The EAPC Action Plan covers a two-year period. The Action Plan for the period 2000 until 2002 will be updated in the fall of 2000 and then reviewed in the fall of 2001 to be replaced by an EAPC Action Plan for a new two-year period. After submission to Ambassadors the Action Plan will be endorsed by Ministers at their December meeting.
2. As a follow-up to each regular meeting of EAPC Foreign Ministers, EAPC Ambassadors will establish a work schedule for consultations on political and security-related issues as well as on practical cooperation activities under the EAPC Action Plan, leading up to the following Ministerial meeting. Topics to be discussed in that period will be dictated by political and security-related developments and take into account the Ministerial meetings just completed, including the EAPC Defence Ministers' meeting (Summits). The schedule may be adjusted as necessary. Other meetings such as in Alliance+ and other formats will be scheduled on a case-by-case basis. The EAPC will be kept informed by its Chairman on relevant developments within the Alliance.
3. According to the EAPC Basic Document, specific subject areas on which Allies and Partners would consult in the framework of the EAPC, may "include but not be limited to: political and security related matters; crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) proliferation and defence issues; international terrorism; defence planning and budgets and defence policy and strategy; security impacts of economic developments. There will also be scope for consultations and cooperation on issues such as: civil emergency and disaster preparedness; armaments cooperation under the aegis of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); nuclear safety; defence related environmental issues; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control; scientific cooperation; and issues related to peace support operations."

4. As a working method, open-ended groups of EAPC members may prepare, on an ad-hoc basis, discussion papers on specific issues or regional security cooperation matters to stimulate focused and result-oriented discussions in the plenary session of the EAPC. The EAPC plenary would pass on ideas and suggestions for practical cooperation developed in this framework to relevant committees for any appropriate follow-up. In 1999 four open-ended Ad Hoc Working Groups were convened, joining the ongoing work of the EAPC/PMSC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, exploring possible EAPC contribution to the following: Global Humanitarian Mine Action, the challenge of small arms and light weapons, prospects for regional cooperation in South-Eastern Europe, and in the Caucasus. The EAPC will consider, based on evolving practical experience, whether these working methods would need improvement, adaptation or extension.

5. A major part of the work schedule for the short and the long term will be the development and implementation of the Partnership related initiatives launched at the Washington Summit; namely the Enhanced and more Operational Partnership, including the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations (PMF), the Expanded and Adapted Planning and Review Process (PARP), the Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations (OCC) and the PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme (T&EEP).

Section II: Long-Term Programme for Consultation and Cooperation

Political and Security-related Issues

Topics

1. Regional matters, including South-Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.
2. Cooperation on Stability Pact issues (Working Table 3).
3. Cooperation with the OSCE and other international institutions on security issues.
4. Kosovo Lessons Learned.
5. Follow-up on the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations.

6. Practical cooperation issues.
7. Other topics to be defined.

Activities

1. Seminars, workshops, open-ended Ad Hoc Working Groups' meetings, expert meetings, briefings and exchange of information on Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo.

Events planned for 2000

1. Two seminars/workshops on regional security cooperation.
2. Meetings of NATO Regional Experts with experts from Partner countries (dates t.b.d.).
3. Workshop on the implementation of the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations (t.b.d.).

Committee support

EAPC in Political Committee session, PMSC in EAPC/PfP format, Policy Coordination Group with EAPC Partners.

Staff support

International Staff/Political Affairs Division, Political Directorate, Defence Planning and Operations Division.

Policy Planning

Topic

1. Mid- and long-term foreign and security policy issues.

Activities

1. Meetings of NATO's Atlantic Policy Advisory Group in EAPC format.

Events planned for 2000

1. One meeting of APAG in EAPC format to be held in Switzerland.

Committee support

EAPC in Political Committee session.

Staff support

International Staff/Political Affairs Division, Political Directorate.

Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues

Topics

1. Arms control.
2. Political and defence efforts against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missiles.
3. The Challenge of small arms and light weapons.
4. Global Humanitarian Mine Action.

Activities

1. Consultations and expert meetings, open ended Ad Hoc Working Groups' meetings.

Events planned for 2000

1. One meeting of EAPC/PC with disarmament experts (date t.b.d.).

Committee support

EAPC in Political Committee session, PMSC in EAPC/PfP format.

Staff Support

International Staff/Political Affairs Division, Political Directorate;
Defence Planning and Operations Division.

Implementation of Arms Control Agreements

Topic

1. Conventional arms control, implementation and verification.

Activities

1. Consultations, expert meetings, seminars, workshops.
2. Training and courses on support of arms control implementation.

Events planned for 2000

1. Courses on general arms control orientation at NATO School, Oberammergau.
2. Continuation and adaptation of programme of Joint Multilateral Inspection Teams for CFE Cooperation Partners.
3. Continuation of operation and development of the VERITY database.
4. Seminar(s) on implementation of conventional arms control agreements (including CFE), with a regional focus, as appropriate.

Committee Support

Verification and Coordination Committee.

Staff support

International Staff/Political Affairs Division, Political Directorate.

International Terrorism

Topic

1. Identifying threats from and responses to international terrorism.

Activities

1. Meetings with the NATO Special Committee.

Events planned for 2000

1. Meeting(s) of the EAPC/PC with the Special Committee (t.b.d.).

Committee support

Special Committee in EAPC format (t.b.d.).

Staff support

International Staff/NATO Office of Security.

Peacekeeping

Topics

1. Common understanding of concepts and principles related to peacekeeping, including:
 - humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping and civil-military relations;
 - lessons learned from peacekeeping;
 - early warning and conflict prevention.

2. Knowledge and application of International Humanitarian Law.

Activities

1. Meetings of the EAPC/PMSC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, inviting where appropriate international organisations and other concerned groups (dates t.b.d.). Expanded contacts and dialogue with the United Nations and OSCE on conceptual approaches to peacekeeping.
2. Specialised courses in the field of peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

Events planned for 2000

1. Briefing of the ICRC President and of the Prosecutor of the ICTY at an EAPC Ambassadorial meeting.
2. Workshop/seminar on International Humanitarian Law and Multinational Forces.

Committee support

EAPC/PMSC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.

Staff Support

International Staff/Political Affairs Division, Political Directorate;
Defence Planning and Operations Division.

Defence Economic Issues

Topics

1. Defence related issues:
 1. Resource management in defence spending;
 2. Transparency in defence planning and budgeting;

3. Transition from conscript to professional army;
 4. Military base closures;
 5. Restructuring of defence industries (including privatisation);
 6. Regional matters.
2. Security aspects of economic developments - selected issues (e.g. regional cooperation, shadow economy, investment climate).

Activities

1. Seminars, Workshops, Expert meetings, Annual Colloquium.

Events planned for 2000

1. A seminar in Georgia on “Economic Aspects of Defence Budgeting in Transition Economies” (proposed date: April/May 2000).
2. A seminar in Romania on “Economic Aspects of Resource Management of Defence Spending, taking into account NATO Country Methodologies” (proposed date: 1st half of 2000).
3. A seminar in Austria on “The Role of the Private Sector in Defence” (proposed date: October 2000).
4. A seminar in Bulgaria on “The Financing of Infrastructure Projects with Dual Use Potential” (dated to be determined).
5. A conference in Ukraine on “The Retraining of Military Personnel” (date to be determined).
6. Annual NATO Economics Colloquium (proposed date: June 2000 and June 2001).
7. Exchanges on “Real Cost of Defence as Measured in Purchasing Power Parities” (format to be determined).
8. Seminar in Armenia on “The Impact of Economic Difficulties on the Development of Democratic Societies in Transition” (date to be determined).

Committee support

EAPC in Economic Committee Session.

Staff support

International Staff/Political Affairs Division, Economics Directorate, to be coordinated with other Divisions where necessary.

Science

Topic

1. Participation in the activities of the NATO Civil Science Programme, which focuses on linking Partner and NATO nation scientists. The four Sub-Programmes are:
 - Science Fellowships;
 - Cooperative Science and Technology;
 - Research Infrastructure Support;
 - Science for Peace.

Activities

1. Supporting applied science and technology projects that relate to industrial, environmental or security-related problems under the Science for Peace Programme.
2. Meeting of Science Committee in EAPC format at least once a year.
3. Participation of scientists from Partner countries in Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) and Advanced Research Workshops (ARW), as well as the holding of such meetings in Partner countries.
4. Participation of scientists from Partner countries in Collaborative Linkage Grants, Science Fellowships and Expert Visit Grants.
5. Sending proceedings of NATO's scientific meetings to a central library in each eligible Partner country and disseminating other literature on the Science Programme to scientists in Partner countries.
6. Sponsoring visits of experts from Partner countries when invited by project directors in NATO member countries.

7. Assisting Partners through the use of NATO's network of referees and experts.
8. Assisting Partner nations to develop computer networks connected to the Internet to facilitate contacts and promote more effective cooperation among scientists. This is accomplished through Networking Infrastructure Grants and Networking Supplements to Collaborative Linkage Grants.

Committee support

Science Committee in EAPC format.

Staff support

International Staff/Scientific and Environmental Affairs Division.

Challenges of Modern Societies

Topics

1. Defence-related environmental issues.
2. Additional pilot study topics of interest to Partners.

Activities

1. Meeting of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) in EAPC format at least once a year.
2. Participation of Partners' experts in pilot study meetings, workshops, conferences, seminars, and holding pilot study meetings in Partner countries.
3. Dissemination of information on CCMS pilot studies, workshops, conferences and seminars, as well as approved reports to Partners.
4. The following current or recent pilot study topics will be subject to annual revision in consultation with Partners:
 - Clean products and processes;

- Ecosystem modelling of coastal lagoons for sustainable management;
 - Modelling nutrient loads and response in river and estuary systems;
 - Development of an integrated coastal zone management programme (INCOM) through coastal and shelf monitoring and modelling in the Black Sea;
 - Evaluation of demonstrated and emerging remedial action technologies for the treatment of contaminated land and groundwater;
 - Methodology, focalisation, evaluation and scope of the environmental impact assessment;
 - Environmental management systems in the military sector.
5. Active consideration of new pilot study proposals made by either NATO or Partner countries.

Committee support

Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society in EAPC format.

Staff support

International Staff/Scientific and Environmental Affairs Division.

Information

Topics

1. Contribution to increased understanding of NATO and EAPC/PfP issues and to a more informed debate on security matters.
2. Exploration of expectations including public expectations of the information programme.

Activities

1. Information about NATO and its policies as well as on EAPC/PfP issues will be made available to target audiences in Partner countries, including selected institutions and organisations, inter alia through embassies of NATO member countries serving as contact points, and other channels.

2. Continue and further intensify information-related cooperation with relevant institutions in Partner countries able to provide the necessary facilities, support personnel and services.
3. Visits to NATO by target groups.
4. Sponsorship of experts from Partner countries to attend security-related seminars in Allied countries.
5. Co-sponsorship of seminars/workshops and educational activities relevant to Euro-Atlantic security and defence issues.
6. Presentations by speakers from NATO and Partner countries at selected events.
7. Fellowships for academics (individual and institutional support).
8. Increased dissemination of NATO documentation and information materials in Partner countries, and dissemination of information by electronic means.
9. Distribution of NATO video footage and photos.
10. Press tours to NATO and Partner countries.

Events planned for 2000

1. One meeting of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) with EAPC Partners (date t.b.d.).

Committee support

Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) in EAPC format.

Staff support

International Staff/Office of Information and Press.

Section III: Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness

Topic

1. Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness.

Activities

1. Further development of a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response capability (this effort will include cooperation with UN bodies responsible for disaster relief).
2. Progressive implementation of the opening up of the technical committees, which depend on SCEPC, to Partner participation.
3. Discussion on civilian-military interoperability in civil emergency planning and disaster response (t.b.d.).

Committee support

Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee in EAPC format.

Staff support

The EADRCC, International Staff/Infrastructure, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning Division, NMA's as appropriate.

Section IV: PfP Areas of Cooperation

1. As stipulated by the EAPC Basic Document, Partnership for Peace in its enhanced form will be a clearly identifiable element within the flexible framework created by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. PfP will maintain the Alliance+1 character reflected in the Individual Partnership Programmes, as well as the principle of self-differentiation. In that context, PfP will provide increased scope for regional cooperation activities.

2. Topics and activities undertaken in the PfP are included in the PfP Partnership Work Programme, which is a separate document. Below are listed the generic agreed areas of cooperation that will be updated every two years.
 1. Air Defence related matters (ADF).
 2. Airspace Management/Control (ASM).
 3. Consultation, Command and Control, including Communications and Information Systems, Navigation and Identification Systems, Interoperability Aspects, Procedures and Terminology (C3).
 4. Civil Emergency Planning (CEP).
 5. Crisis Management (CRM).
 6. Democratic Control of Forces and Defence Structures (DCF).
 7. Defence Planning, Budgeting and Resource Management (DPB).
 8. Planning, Organisation and Management of National Defence Procurement Programmes and International Cooperation in the Armaments Field (DPM).
 9. Defence Policy and Strategy (DPS).
 10. Planning, Organisation and Management of National Defence Research and Technology (DRT).
 11. Military Geography (GEO).
 12. Global Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA).
 13. Language Training (LNG).
 14. Consumer Logistics (LOG).
 15. Medical Services (MED).
 16. Meteorological Support for NATO/Partner Forces (MET).
 17. Military Infrastructure (MIF).
 18. Political and Defence Efforts against NBC Proliferation (NBC).
 19. Conceptual, Planning and Operational Aspects of Peacekeeping (PKG).

20. Operational, Materiel and Administrative Aspects of Standardisation (STD).

21. Military Exercises and Related Training Activities (TEX).

22. Military Education, Training and Doctrine (TRD).

As reflected in the “Short-Term Planning” section of this document, a significant effort will be devoted to the further development and implementation of the Partnership related initiatives launched at the Washington Summit.

PART II

Other Statements and Declarations

NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL MEETING AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

**Brussels, Belgium
20 January 1999**

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at Ambassadorial level met on Wednesday, 20 January 1999 at NATO Headquarters.

Ambassadors reviewed the rapidly deteriorating situation in Kosovo. They condemned the recent cycle of violence, including the massacre in the Racak area.

They called for a full investigation by the FRY authorities with the participation of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. Involvement of other international experts should be welcome.

NATO and Russia reaffirmed their full support for the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo, and its Head of Mission, Ambassador Walker, underscoring that the OSCE presence in Kosovo was essential in helping achieve a political solution to the crisis. The NATO side also informed Russia about the January 19 talks of senior NATO military officials in Belgrade. NATO and Russia underscored that all parties to the conflict should immediately cease all acts of violence and open the path for a negotiated settlement.

Ambassadors received a briefing on the meeting of military representatives under the auspices of the PJC held on 14 January 1999.

Following up on the adoption of the 1999 PJC Work Programme by the Foreign Ministers of NATO and Russia on 9 December 1998, both sides agreed on steps to ensure its implementation, including a tentative list of issues to be addressed by PJC Ambassadorial meetings during the first half of 1999.

NATO and Russia continued the exchange of information and consultations on infrastructure-related issues initiated in the PJC on 20 May and 21 October 1998, with a briefing provided by the Russian Federation.

The next meeting of the PJC is scheduled for 17 February 1999.

NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL MEETING AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

**Brussels, Belgium
17 February 1999**

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at Ambassadorial level met on Wednesday, 17 February 1999 at NATO Headquarters.

Ambassadors discussed the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. They stressed the importance of and expressed their full support for the ongoing peace talks at Rambouillet, and urged the parties to work responsibly and intensively in order to achieve an interim political agreement by Saturday 20 February.

NATO and Russia agreed to continue their close consultations in light of the ongoing negotiation process.

Ambassadors received a briefing on the meeting of military representatives under the auspices of the PJC held on 4 February 1999.

Following presentations by NATO and Russia, Ambassadors discussed strategy as part of their ongoing exchanges on strategy and defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes.

The next meeting of the PJC is scheduled for 17 March 1999.

NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL MEETING AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

**Brussels, Belgium
17 March 1999**

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at Ambassadorial level met on Wednesday, 17 March 1999 at NATO Headquarters.

NATO and Russia continued their regular consultations on the crisis in Kosovo. They will continue their efforts aimed at peace and stability in the region. They underscored the urgency and importance of the ongoing talks in Paris.

Ambassadors received a briefing on the meeting of Chiefs of Staff under the auspices of the PJC held on 10 March 1999.

NATO and Russia reviewed Russia's participation in Partnership for Peace. They discussed ongoing activities and exchanged views and information on further activities later this year.

NATO briefed on ongoing work with regard to the Defence Capabilities Initiatives to be adopted at the Washington Summit with the aim to support the ability of the Alliance to undertake the full range of its missions.

The next meeting of the PJC is scheduled for 15 April 1999. (1)

(1) The PJC did not meet in April, May and June 1999.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT
JOINT COUNCIL ON THE SECURITY SITUATION
IN KOSOVO**

**Brussels, Belgium
23 July 1999**

NATO and Russia affirm their commitment to full implementation of the provisions and goals of the UNSCR 1244.

NATO and Russia are determined to do their utmost to ensure equal security for all inhabitants of Kosovo regardless of their ethnic, political or religious affiliations. To this end most intensive patrolling will continuously be undertaken in all parts of Kosovo, especially in areas of high risks. NATO and Russia will continue to consider in the PIC ways of further improving security in Kosovo. They condemn all acts of violence against the Kosovo population. Those responsible should be brought to justice through the mechanisms referred to in UNSCR 1244. They express their growing concern at the continuing departure of significant numbers of Serbs and members of other ethnic groups from Kosovo. They urge all Serbs and members of other ethnic groups to stay in Kosovo and those who have left to return to their homes.

NATO and Russia call upon all the people of Kosovo to support and cooperate with the international security and civil presences in carrying out their mandates established by UNSCR 1244.

MEETING OF THE NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

**Brussels, Belgium
15 September 1999**

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at Ambassadorial level met on Wednesday, 15 September 1999 at NATO Headquarters.

Following a briefing on the meeting of Military Representatives under the auspices of the PJC held on 6 September 1999, Ambassadors discussed the situation in and around Kosovo and exchanged views on NATO-Russia cooperation in the international security presence (KFOR).

Stressing their commitment to full implementation of the provisions and goals of UNSCR 1244, NATO and Russia commended the cooperative and professional relationship among NATO participating states and Russia within KFOR and discussed ways to further improve the security situation in Kosovo. They condemned all acts of violence and called upon all the people of Kosovo to support and cooperate with the international security and civil presences.

NATO and Russia also stressed the importance of the September 19 deadline regarding the UCK Undertaking on Demilitarisation and Transformation as an additional milestone in consolidating peace and security in Kosovo. They urged the UCK leadership and all Kosovar armed elements to take all necessary measures in order to fulfill all their obligations in this regard. NATO and Russia agreed that the international community should keep this process under close scrutiny and ensure its proper completion.

The next meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is scheduled for 27 October 1999.

MEETING OF THE NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

**Brussels, Belgium
27 October 1999**

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at Ambassadorial level met on Wednesday, 27 October 1999 at NATO Headquarters.

Following a briefing on the meeting of Military Representatives under the auspices of the PJC held on 7 October 1999, Ambassadors discussed the situation in and around Kosovo, and discussed in detail NATO-Russia cooperation in the international security presence (KFOR).

Stressing their commitment to full implementation of the provisions and goals of UNSCR 1244, NATO and Russia commended the cooperative and professional relationship among NATO and Russian military contingents within KFOR, reflected, inter alia, in joint patrolling.

Discussions reflected a common understanding on a number of issues and a joint determination by NATO and Russia to cooperate closely in ensuring the continued protection and well-being of Kosovo's minorities and the establishment of a multi-ethnic, democratic society. They condemned all acts of violence and called upon all the people of Kosovo to support and cooperate with the international security and civil presences.

Both sides noted that KFOR will attach high priority to monitoring cross-border movements into Kosovo. KFOR shall, under the authority of UNMIK, provide day-to-day operational direction to the recently established Kosovo Protection Corps with a view to ensuring its civilian and multi-ethnic character.

The next meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is scheduled for 17 November 1999.

MEETING OF THE NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

**Brussels, Belgium
17 November 1999**

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at Ambassadorial level met on Wednesday, 17 November 1999 at NATO Headquarters.

Ambassadors discussed the situation in and around Kosovo and exchanged views on NATO-Russia cooperation in the international security presence (KFOR).

Stressing their commitment to full implementation of the provisions and goals of UNSCR 1244, Ambassadors reiterated the determination by NATO and Russia to cooperate closely in ensuring the protection of Kosovo's minorities and the establishment of a multi-ethnic, democratic society.

NATO-UKRAINE COMMISSION AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

**Brussels, Belgium
22 March 1999**

The NATO-Ukraine Commission met today at the Ambassadorial level at NATO HQ in Brussels. Members held a wide-ranging discussion and shared their concern about the deteriorating security situation in Kosovo. They underscored the urgent need for the FRY to accept the Interim Agreement which provides for an enhanced status of autonomy for Kosovo within the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO Allies expressed their appreciation for Ukraine's participation in the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, Ukraine's offer to contribute to the Kosovo air verification mission, a possible NATO-led peace implementation force, as well as for its ongoing contribution to SFOR.

Members of the Commission also had a fruitful exchange of information on strategy and military doctrines.

Members of the NUC discussed the implementation of activities under the NATO-Ukraine Charter in 1999, including the visit by the Political Committee to Kyiv in February, the meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff in March in Brussels, the on-going work of the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, the ad-hoc expert group on arms control which met in February in Brussels, the continuing implementation of the information programme and the recent workshops on retraining military officers and defence industry conversion.

They welcomed the fact that the Yavoriv training area has been officially designated as a PfP Training Centre.

They looked forward to the appointment of the two NATO Liaison Officers, as well as the new Director for the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv.

Members also discussed preparations for the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting to be held at Summit level in Washington, D.C. in April.

NATO-UKRAINE COMMISSION AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TARASYUK

**Brussels, Belgium
19 May 1999**

The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) met today at NATO HQ in Brussels. The Ukrainian side was represented by Foreign Minister Tarasyuk. Members reviewed the first Summit level meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission held in Washington on 24 April 1999, and discussed ways to ensure the implementation of the NUC Declaration issued on that occasion.

They appreciated in particular that the NATO liaison office based with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence in Kyiv is now fully operational, and has begun their work in support of Ukraine's participation in PfP as well as the development of NATO-Ukraine cooperation in general. Members of the Commission were pleased to also note the recent appointment of a new Director for the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine. They agreed that the provision of objective and complete information to the Ukrainian public about NATO's role as a factor of stability and security in Europe is a common goal of outstanding importance.

Foreign Minister Tarasyuk stressed Ukraine's commitment to strengthen the NATO-Ukraine partnership and to pursue its strategic goal of integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. He reiterated the determination of his country to pursue its efforts to implement political, economic and defence reforms.

Members of the Commission also discussed the situation in Kosovo and its implications for the stability in the region and in Europe. They shared their concern about the ongoing conflict and strongly supported a political solution based on the demands of the international community as recently formulated at the meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers on 6 May 1999. NATO Ambassadors highly appreciated Ukraine's contribution to the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They welcomed Ukraine's untiring efforts in the search for a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo crisis and looked forward to a Ukrainian participation in an international civil and security presence in Kosovo.

NATO-UKRAINE COMMISSION AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

**Brussels, Belgium
9 September 1999**

The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) met today at NATO HQ in Brussels. The Commission held a wide-ranging discussion on the situation in and around Kosovo. NATO and Ukraine welcomed KFOR's accomplishments and looked forward to full Ukrainian participation in the international security presence. They reaffirmed their commitment to full implementation of the principles and goals of UNSCR 1244. Stressing the importance of peace and stability in and around Kosovo for long-term stability in the region, they condemned all acts of violence and called upon all the people of Kosovo to support and cooperate with the international security presence in carrying out its mandates.

Members of the NUC reviewed the implementation of the measures embodied in the NUC Washington Summit Declaration. They positively assessed the implementation of activities under the NATO-Ukraine Charter in 1999, including the ongoing work of the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, activities of the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv as well as continuing cooperation within PFP and PARP, in the fields of retraining of retired military personnel, scientific and environmental affairs and civil emergency planning. Ambassadors highlighted the continuing NATO-Ukraine cooperation in the area of information, with the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv playing an important role.

NATO-UKRAINE COMMISSION IN AMBASSADORIAL SESSION

**Brussels, Belgium
29 November 1999**

The NATO-Ukraine Commission met in Ambassadorial session at NATO Headquarters on 29 November 1999.

The Commission was briefed on the outcome of the presidential campaign in Ukraine resulting in the re-election of President Leonid Kuchma and the reaffirmation of Ukraine's efforts to integrate in European and Trans-Atlantic structures. In this regard the members of the Commission emphasised a mutual commitment to further develop and enhance their distinctive partnership.

The Members of the Commission positively assessed the achievements of NATO-Ukraine cooperation since their last meeting in September. They expressed their particular appreciation of the cooperation between Ukraine and NATO within KFOR and SFOR, stressing their commitment to a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo within the FRY.

Among recent examples of successful cooperative activities the Commission noted the PfP naval computer exercise "Cooperative Support 99" held in Odessa on 13-19 October 1999, the workshop on the defence-related environmental issues in the Black Sea and Azov Sea held on 25-28 October in Sevastopol, the first meeting of the open-ended working group on economic security held in Kyiv on 22-23 November 1999, and the seminar on issues related to regional security held in Brussels on 26 November 1999. The NATO-Ukraine Agreement on Retraining Discharged Military Personnel in Ukraine signed in October was a signal of the practical efficiency of the distinctive partnership. The Commission also discussed the prospects of cooperation related to the Yavoriv PfP Training Center, the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, the NATO Information and Documentation Center in Kyiv and the NATO Liaison Office to Ukraine.

In the context of preparations for the upcoming NUC ministerial meetings in December, the Commission noted with satisfaction that the activities planned for 1999 were being implemented satisfactorily, and discussed proposals from both sides for the year 2000.

Members of the Commission held an in-depth discussion concerning Ukraine and NATO contributions in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and prospects for future cooperation in the context of the Alliance's WMD Initiative.

The next meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission will be held in Defence Ministerial session on 3 December 1999.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON SFOR'S ACTION AGAINST AN INDICTED
WAR CRIMINAL**

**Brussels, Belgium
9 January 1999**

This morning, SFOR elements in Bosnia Herzegovina, acting within the SFOR mandate, attempted to detain Dragan Gagovic, a person indicted for war crimes. During the detention operation, Gagovic drove his car directly at SFOR soldiers, threatening their lives. In self-defence, SFOR soldiers opened fire and shot Gagovic. Following the incident, Gagovic was taken to a medical facility and pronounced dead upon arrival. There were no other casualties. This action was taken within the SFOR mandate, and the response was appropriate under the applicable rules of engagement.

Dragan Gagovic had been openly indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for crimes against Humanity and, among others, Violations of the Laws or Customs of War.

This action was undertaken in accordance with SFOR's mandate that authorises detention operations for such persons. It was within the mandate given to SFOR by the North Atlantic Council under authority contained in the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

The International Community has made it clear that bringing indicted war criminals to justice is an essential part of building peace and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to maintain a secure environment conducive to peace. I call upon the parties in Bosnia Herzegovina to fulfil their responsibilities under the Dayton Peace Accords.

Other persons indicted for war crimes who are still at large will also be brought to justice. Once again I call on these indictees to surrender immediately to the ICTY.

SACEUR, as overall commander for SFOR, has kept me fully informed of this operation.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON THE BRCKO ARBITRATION**

**Brussels, Belgium
5 March 1999**

The Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana welcomes the decision of the Independent Arbitrator, Mr. Roberts Owen on the future status of Brcko.

He recalls that both sides involved have accepted that the arbitration would be final and binding. The Secretary General calls on them to honour this undertaking and to respect the Arbitrator's decision which has been taken after a thorough examination of all the factors and extensive and careful consultations with all sides.

SFOR has made all necessary preparations to ensure the maintenance of a secure environment in and around Brcko and expects the full cooperation of all involved.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE'S DECISION TO
REMOVE MR. POPLASEN FROM THE OFFICE OF
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA**

**Brussels, Belgium
5 March 1999**

The Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana, has expressed his full support for the decision of the High Representative, Mr. Carlos Westendorp, in accordance with the powers vested in him by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to remove Mr. Nikola Poplasen from the Office of President of Republika Srpska.

As the High Representative has made clear, this decision was taken in the light of Mr. Poplasen's consistent abuse of his authority and his obstruction of the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which hindered efforts to create lasting peace and security in Republika Srpska and throughout the country.

The Secretary General calls on the leaders and the people of the Republika Srpska to respect fully the High Representative's decision consistent with their obligation under the Dayton Peace Agreement and the decisions of the Peace Implementation Council. SFOR remains vigilant at this time and will take whatever steps are required to ensure calm and stability.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON THE REMOVAL OF MR. POPLASEN AND
ON THE BRCKO ARBITRATION DECISION**

**Brussels, Belgium
10 March 1999**

I reiterate my full support for the decision of the High Representative to remove Mr Poplasen from the Office of President of Republika Srpska.

The responsibility for this outcome rests with nobody other than Mr Poplasen himself. His abuse of authority and attempts to obstruct implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords created political and social instability and harmed the interests of Republika Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I therefore urge responsible RS authorities to accept the dismissal of Mr Poplasen in the wider interests of the people of Republika Srpska and in accordance with the High Representative's decision.

SFOR will continue to ensure a secure environment throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and support the full implementation of the Peace Accords, the decisions of the Peace Implementation Council and of the High Representative.

I would also like to reaffirm my full support for the arbitration Award on the status of Brcko, announced by the High Representative on 5 March. The decision to create a neutral Brcko District is the best solution for the country, its two entities and its citizens.

The new arrangement guarantees freedom of movement for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Brcko area. SFOR will ensure full respect for this provision.

The Award also improves prospects for the return of displaced persons to and from Brcko and offers the best chance for revitalising the economy of the Brcko area.

SFOR will continue to ensure a secure environment in and around Brcko and is committed to the full implementation of the Brcko arbitration Award.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON SFOR'S ACTION AGAINST AN INDICTED
WAR CRIMINAL**

**Brussels, Belgium
7 June 1999**

On 7 June SFOR detained Dragan Kulundzija, who is indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is now being processed for transfer to The Hague. Details will be provided in due course by the operational commanders.

This action was undertaken in accordance with SFOR's mandate, which authorises SFOR to detain indicted war criminals when encountered in the course of its duties. This mandate was given to SFOR by the North Atlantic Council under authority contained in the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

The parties to the Dayton Peace Accords remain responsible for apprehending and transferring indicted war criminals to The Hague. SFOR will continue to do its part by carrying out its mandate in a firm and even-handed manner.

Other persons indicted for war crimes who are still at large will also be brought to justice. Once again I call on these indictees to surrender immediately to the ICTY.

SACEUR, as overall commander for SFOR, has kept me fully informed of this operation. I should like to commend the SFOR troops and their commanders for their courage, professionalism and dedication in carrying out this action, which will contribute to the continued consolidation of the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON SFOR'S ACTION AGAINST AN INDICTED
WAR CRIMINAL**

**Brussels, Belgium
6 July 1999**

Today, 6 July 1999, SFOR detained Radislav Brdanin, who is indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is now being processed for transfer to The Hague. Details will be provided in due course by the operational commanders.

This action was undertaken in accordance with SFOR's mandate, which authorises SFOR to detain indicted war criminals when encountered in the course of its duties. This mandate was given to SFOR by the North Atlantic Council under authority contained in the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

The parties to the Dayton Peace Accords remain responsible for apprehending and transferring indicted war criminals to The Hague. SFOR will continue to do its part by carrying out its mandate in a firm and even-handed manner.

Other persons indicted for war crimes who are still at large will also be brought to justice. Once again I call on these indictees to surrender immediately to the ICTY.

SACEUR, as overall commander for SFOR, has kept me fully informed of this operation. I should like to commend the SFOR troops and their commanders for their courage, professionalism and dedication in carrying out this action, which will contribute to the continued consolidation of the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON SFOR'S ACTION AGAINST AN INDICTED
WAR CRIMINAL**

**Brussels, Belgium
2 August 1999**

On 2 August SFOR detained Radomir Kovac, who is indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is now being processed for transfer to The Hague. Details will be provided in due course by the operational commanders.

This action was undertaken in accordance with SFOR's mandate, which authorises SFOR to detain indicted war criminals when encountered in the course of its duties. This mandate was given to SFOR by the North Atlantic Council under authority contained in the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

The parties to the Dayton Peace Accords remain responsible for apprehending and transferring indicted war criminals to The Hague. SFOR will continue to do its part by carrying out its mandate in a firm and even-handed manner.

SFOR's action reaffirms our determination to ensure that all persons indicted for war crimes are brought to justice. I strongly urge those indictees still at large to surrender immediately to the ICTY.

SACEUR, as overall commander for SFOR, has kept me fully informed of this operation. I should like to commend the SFOR troops and their commanders for their courage, professionalism and dedication in carrying out this action, which will contribute to the continued consolidation of the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**STATEMENT BY NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
SFOR DETAINS PERSON INDICTED FOR
WAR CRIMES**

**Brussels, Belgium
25 October 1999**

On 25 October 1999, SFOR detained Damir Dosen, who is indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is now being processed for transfer to The Hague. Details will be provided in due course by the operational commanders.

Damir Dosen is under an open indictment for war crimes committed between 24 May and 30 August 1992. He was a shift-commander of the Keraterm camp just outside Prijedor, in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina. Detainees at Keraterm camp were killed, sexually assaulted, tortured, beaten, and otherwise subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment. Dosen is accused of crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or customs of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

This action was undertaken in accordance with SFOR's mandate that authorises detention operations for such persons. It was within the mandate given to SFOR by the North Atlantic Council under authority contained in the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

The parties to the Dayton Peace Agreement remain responsible for cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international/humanitarian law. SFOR will continue to do its part by carrying out its mandate in a firm and even-handed manner.

Persons indicted for war crimes or otherwise involved in war crimes, who are still at large, should realise that they too will be brought to justice. Once again I call on these people to surrender immediately to the ICTY.

SACEUR, as overall commander for SFOR, has kept me fully informed of this action. I should like to commend the SFOR troops and their commanders for their courage, professionalism and dedication in carrying out this action, which will contribute to the continued consolidation of the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON SFOR'S ACTION AGAINST INDICTED
WAR CRIMINAL**

**Brussels, Belgium
20 December 1999**

On 20 December 1999, SFOR detained Stanislav Galic, who is indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is now being processed for transfer to The Hague. Details will be provided in due course by the operational commanders.

Stanislav Galic is under sealed indictment for war crimes committed between 10 September 1992 and 10 August 1994. Galic was commander of all Bosnian Serb forces comprising or attached to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. While under his command, the Romanija Corps conducted a protracted campaign of sniper and shelling attacks against the civilian population of Sarajevo. Galic is accused of crimes against humanity, including murder and inhumane acts; and violations of the laws and customs of war, including attacks on civilians and inflicting terror on civilians.

This action was undertaken in accordance with SFOR's mandate that authorises detention operations for such persons. It was within the mandate given to SFOR by the North Atlantic Council under authority contained in the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

The parties to the Dayton Peace Agreement remain responsible for cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international/humanitarian law. SFOR will continue to do its part by carrying out its mandate in a firm and even-handed manner.

Persons indicted for war crimes or otherwise involved in war crimes, who are still at large, should realise that they too, will be brought to justice. Once again I call on these people to surrender immediately to the ICTY.

SACEUR, as overall commander for SFOR, has kept me fully informed of this action. I should like to commend the SFOR troops and their commanders for their courage, professionalism and dedication in carrying out this action which will contribute to the continued consolidation of the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON ACTIONS BY SFOR TO DETAIN A PERSON
INDICTED FOR WAR CRIMES**

**Brussels, Belgium
24 December 1999**

Yesterday, 23 December 1999, SFOR detained an individual suspected of being Zoran Vukovic. Vukovic is indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for war crimes. These crimes were committed while serving as a sub-commander of the Bosnian Serb Military Police and as a paramilitary leader between April 1992 and February 1993 in the Southern BiH city of Foca.

Vukovic is charged with violations of the Laws or Customs of War, and crimes against humanity for his part in the rape and torture of Moslem women between 3 July 1992 and 23 July 1992. These crimes and violations are punishable under Articles of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

The individual suspected of being Zoran Vukovic is now being processed for transfer to The Hague.

There were no casualties sustained during the operation. Yesterday's action was undertaken in accordance with SFOR's mandate that authorises it to detain such persons when encountered in the course of SFOR's duties. This mandate was given to SFOR by the North Atlantic Council under authority contained in the relevant United Nation Security Council Resolution.

There can be no peace without justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO is determined to play its role in helping to bring indicted war criminals to justice. Indeed yesterday's detention is the second by SFOR this week. Those indicted war criminals that remain at large have no permanent hiding place. NATO will continue to detain them, as well as those that the Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY may indict in the future. I therefore advise all indicted war criminals to surrender immediately to the Tribunal.

SACEUR as overall commander for SFOR has kept me fully informed of this action. I would like to praise the SFOR troops and their commanders for the courage, professionalism, and dedication in carrying out this action which will contribute to the continued consolidation of the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL ON BEHALF OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

**Brussels, Belgium
17 January 1999**

- The Council condemns the massacre of Kosovar Albanians that was carried out in the village of Racak last Friday. This represents a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law.
- The Council calls on the Yugoslav Authorities to cooperate fully with the ICTY in accordance with UN resolutions, including by granting immediate and unrestricted access to Chief Prosecutor Arbour, and international investigators including Finnish forensic experts. We also call on the FRY Authorities to ensure the security of the ICTY personnel.
- The Council demands that the Government of the FRY take immediate steps to ensure that those responsible for this massacre are brought to justice. The names of those who participated in the killing and those who gave the orders must be divulged and they must be handed over to the ICTY for prosecution if requested.
- Milosevic must comply with all his commitments to NATO and to the OSCE which are based on UNSC Resolution 1199.
- The FRY must bring VJ and MUP force levels and posture into compliance with its commitments to the Alliance last October. As the signatory of this agreement, President Milosevic is responsible for ensuring that these force levels are respected. He is also personally responsible for the behaviour of his security forces.
- The North Atlantic Council received briefings from the Chairman of the Military Committee and SACEUR on the military situation and on the status of NATO planning. It reaffirmed that the ACTORDS for air operations remain in effect.
- The NAC has decided to send the Chairman of the Military Committee and SACEUR to Belgrade to impress upon the Yugoslav Authorities the gravity of the situation and their obligation to respect all their commitments to NATO, and to report back to the NAC. The Chairman of the Military Committee and SACEUR will also reaffirm NATO's support to international efforts to bring peace to the region, including by the United Nations, OSCE and the European Union.

- The Council fully supports the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission and its Head, Ambassador Walker. It expresses its strong condemnation of the attack against two members of this mission last Friday and calls for those responsible to be brought to justice.
 - The Council insists that the FRY authorities respect their obligations to ensure the security of the verifiers. Both sides must refrain from actions that put OSCE verifiers in danger.
 - Finally, NATO condemns all acts of violence. It calls on both sides to cease hostilities immediately and to begin negotiations towards a lasting political solution which provides greater autonomy for Kosovo and which preserves the territorial integrity of the FRY.
-

STATEMENT BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON KOSOVO

**Brussels, Belgium
30 January 1999**

1. NATO reaffirms the demands set out in its statement of 28 January 1999. It stands ready to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by both sides in Kosovo for the requirements of the international community, and observance of all relevant Security Council Resolutions, in particular the provisions of Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203.
2. NATO gives full support to the Contact Group strategy of negotiations on an interim political settlement which are to be completed within the specified timeframe. It welcomes the Presidential Statement of the United Nations Security Council of 29 January 1999.
3. NATO recalls that those responsible for the massacre at Racak must be brought to justice and that the FRY authorities must cooperate fully with ICTY. They must also cooperate fully with the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission and ensure the security of its personnel.
4. The crisis in Kosovo remains a threat to peace and security in the region. NATO's strategy is to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political settlement for Kosovo, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe. Steps to this end must include acceptance by both parties of the summons to begin negotiations at Rambouillet by 6 February 1999 and the completion of the negotiations on an interim political settlement within the specified timeframe; full and immediate observance by both parties of the cease-fire and by the FRY authorities of their commitments to NATO, including by bringing VJ and Police/Special Police force levels, force posture and activities into strict compliance with the NATO/FRY agreement of 25 October 1998; and the ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force in accordance with these commitments.
5. If these steps are not taken, NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements, including in particular assessment by the Contact Group of the response to its demands, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community and the achievement of a political settlement. The Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on FRY territory. The NATO Secretary General will take full account of

the position and actions of the Kosovar leadership and all Kosovar armed elements in and around Kosovo in reaching his decision on military action. NATO will take all appropriate measures in case of a failure by the Kosovar Albanian side to comply with the demands of the international community.

6. NATO is also studying how to support measures to curb arms smuggling into Kosovo.

7. NATO's decisions today contribute to creating the conditions for a rapid and successful negotiation on an interim political settlement which provides for an enhanced status for Kosovo, preserves the territorial integrity of the FRY and protects the rights of all ethnic groups. NATO is resolved to persevere until the violence in Kosovo has ended, and a political solution has been reached.

STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL ON BEHALF OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

**Brussels, Belgium
19 February 1999**

The Alliance today recalls the demands set out in its statement of 30 January 1999, including the necessity of compliance by all parties involved with the appropriate UN Security Council Resolutions.

It expresses its full support to the efforts of the Contact Group to secure an interim political settlement for Kosovo at Rambouillet which provides for a substantially greater degree of autonomy for Kosovo, reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, protects the rights of all national communities, and contains effective measures for its implementation including an international military presence.

The deadline set by the Contact Group for the parties to come to an agreement is approaching fast, underlining the urgency of finding a peaceful solution. They must therefore accept their responsibilities and show the maximum flexibility and political will to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

The crisis in Kosovo remains a threat to peace and security in the region. NATO's strategy is to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political settlement for Kosovo, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe.

A viable political settlement must be guaranteed by an international military presence. Accordingly, the Alliance is prepared, following acceptance by the parties, to lead a multinational peacekeeping force with broad participation, to implement and enforce the military aspects of an interim agreement, which include specific commitments by both parties, and to contribute to an environment which supports the OSCE and other organisations in the implementation of the civil aspects.

As clearly spelled out in the statement by the North Atlantic Council of 30 January and if no agreement is reached by the deadline set by the Contact Group, NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary - in the light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements, including in particular assessment by the Contact Group of the response to its demands - to avert a humanitarian catastrophe by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community and the achievement of a politi-

cal settlement. These include the use of air strikes as well as other appropriate measures.

NATO has taken appropriate steps to prepare its forces to ensure that they are ready in the event that military action is necessary.

**STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL
OF NATO ON THE OUTCOME
OF THE RAMBOUILLET TALKS**

**Brussels, Belgium
23 February 1999**

NATO welcomes the substantial progress made in the Kosovo Peace Talks in Rambouillet towards a political settlement which will give Kosovo a significant degree of autonomy and help bring stability to the region. However, a final agreement has not yet been reached. I appeal to the parties to accept rapidly the Contact Group Peace Plan in its entirety, including its military aspects, and at the very latest by the time of the implementation conference in France on 15 March.

During the period until the 15 March, NATO expects the parties to work constructively to bring about a peace settlement. In particular they must respect the cease fire, refrain from all provocations and carry out all of the provisions of the UNSC Resolutions on Kosovo. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must comply fully with all of its commitments under its agreement of 25 October 1998 with NATO. The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission must be allowed to carry out its work and both parties must ensure the safety of its personnel.

NATO will continue to watch the situation on the ground very closely. We are very concerned by the violence in Kosovo in recent days. We remain ready to use whatever means are necessary to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo and to prevent further human suffering. Those who prevent the achievement of an interim agreement, provoke violent incidents or threaten the security of the Kosovo Verification Mission personnel will be held fully responsible for their actions.

Since the beginning of the crisis, NATO has fully supported the efforts of the international community to bring peace to Kosovo and to help achieve a negotiated political solution. Our stance in putting the threat of force at the service of diplomacy has helped to create the conditions for the Rambouillet talks to make progress. The Alliance remains ready to lead an international military force in Kosovo which would guarantee the implementation of an interim political settlement. I call on both parties to build on the considerable progress that has been achieved at Rambouillet and to seize this opportunity to achieve a lasting settlement for the benefit of all the peoples of the region. NATO stands ready to help them in this endeavour.

**STATEMENT BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ON THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO**

**Brussels, Belgium
22 March 1999**

In response to Belgrade's continued intransigence and repression, the Secretary General of NATO, to whom the North Atlantic Council had delegated on 30 January the authority to decide on air operations, is completing his consultations with the Allies to this end.

In view of the evolution of the situation on the ground in Kosovo, the North Atlantic Council has also authorised today the Secretary General to decide, subject to further consultations, on a broader range of air operations if necessary.

**PRESS STATEMENT
BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL**

**Brussels, Belgium
23 March 1999**

I have just directed SACEUR, General Clark, to initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I have taken this decision after extensive consultations in recent days with all the Allies, and after it became clear that the final diplomatic effort of Ambassador Holbrooke in Belgrade has not met with success.

All efforts to achieve a negotiated, political solution to the Kosovo crisis having failed, no alternative is open but to take military action.

We are taking action following the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Government's refusal of the International Community's demands:

- Acceptance of the interim political settlement which has been negotiated at Rambouillet;
- Full observance of limits on the Serb Army and Special Police Forces agreed on 25 October;
- Ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force in Kosovo.

As we warned on the 30 January, failure to meet these demands would lead NATO to take whatever measures were necessary to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.

NATO has fully supported all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the efforts of the OSCE, and those of the Contact Group.

We deeply regret that these efforts did not succeed, due entirely to the intransigence of the FRY Government.

This military action is intended to support the political aims of the international community.

It will be directed towards disrupting the violent attacks being committed by the Serb Army and Special Police Forces and weakening their ability to cause further humanitarian catastrophe.

We wish thereby to support international efforts to secure Yugoslav agreement to an interim political settlement.

As we have stated, a viable political settlement must be guaranteed by an international military presence.

It remains open to the Yugoslav Government to show at any time that it is ready to meet the demands of the international community.

I hope it will have the wisdom to do so.

At the same time, we are appealing to the Kosovar Albanians to remain firmly committed to the road to peace which they have chosen in Paris. We urge in particular Kosovar armed elements to refrain from provocative military action.

Let me be clear: NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia.

We have no quarrel with the people of Yugoslavia who for too long have been isolated in Europe because of the policies of their government.

Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo.

We must also act to prevent instability spreading in the region.

NATO is united behind this course of action.

We must halt the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo.

We know the risks of action but we have all agreed that inaction brings even greater dangers.

We will do what is necessary to bring stability to the region.

We must stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people in Europe at the end of the 20th century.

We have a moral duty to do so.

The responsibility is on our shoulders and we will fulfil it.

**PRESS STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY
GENERAL FOLLOWING THE COMMENCEMENT
OF AIR OPERATIONS**

**Brussels, Belgium
24 March 1999**

I have been informed by SACEUR, General Clark, that at this moment NATO Air Operations against targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have commenced.

In the last months the international community has spared no efforts to achieve a negotiated solution in Kosovo. But it has not been possible.

Clear responsibility for the air strikes lies with President Milosevic who has refused to stop his violent action in Kosovo and has refused to negotiate in good faith.

The time has now come for action.

Let me reiterate: NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia.

We have no quarrel with the people of Yugoslavia who for too long have been isolated in Europe because of the policies of their government.

Our actions are directed against the repressive policy of the Yugoslav leadership.

We must stop the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo. We have a moral duty to do so.

NATO's men and women in uniform, who are carrying out this important mission, are among the best in the world. I am confident that they will be successful.

**PRESS STATEMENT
BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL**

**Brussels, Belgium
25 March 1999**

Yesterday evening around 8 p.m., Operation Allied Force began.

Last night's operation was carried out with a broad participation by Allies.

This demonstrates NATO solidarity, unity and resolve in carrying out this action.

Let me stress that strikes were conducted against carefully chosen military targets focused on the air defence network of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Our initial reports indicate that these first strikes were successful.

All NATO aircraft returned safely to their bases.

I express on behalf of the North Atlantic Council our gratitude to the men and women in our Allied armed services who were involved.

In a few moments, I will ask SACEUR to give you an interim update on activities.

Let me reiterate we are determined to continue until we have achieved our objectives: to halt the violence and to stop further humanitarian catastrophe.

Let me emphasise once again that we have no quarrel with the people of Yugoslavia.

Our actions are directed against the repressive policies of the Yugoslav government, which is refusing to respect civilized norms of behaviour in this Europe at the end of the 20th century.

The responsibility for the current crisis rests with President Milosevic.

It is up to him to comply with the demands of the international community.

I strongly urge him to do so.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF NATO ACTION WITH REGARD TO THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO

**Brussels, Belgium
23 March 1999**

NATO's overall political objectives remain to help achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo by contributing to the response of the international community. More particularly, the Alliance made it clear in its statement of 30 January 1999 that its strategy was to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political solution.

Alliance military action is intended to support its political aims. To do so, NATO's military action will be directed towards halting the violent attacks being committed by the VJ and MUP and disrupting their ability to conduct future attacks against the population of Kosovo, thereby supporting international efforts to secure FRY agreement to an interim political settlement.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON THE INITIATION OF A BROADER RANGE
OF AIR OPERATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF YUGOSLAVIA**

**Brussels, Belgium
27 March 1999**

A few moments ago, I directed SACEUR to initiate a broader range of air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I have taken this decision with the support of all Allied governments, which are determined to bring a halt to violence in Kosovo and to prevent further humanitarian catastrophe.

With this aim in mind, the broader range of operations will allow NATO Commanders to intensify their action against Yugoslav forces.

Let me reiterate once again: NATO is not at war with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The responsibility for the current crisis rests with President Milosevic who has refused to stop his violent action in Kosovo and has refused to negotiate in good faith.

NATO's ultimate objective remains to contribute to the achievement of a political solution to the crisis in Kosovo.

**STATEMENT
BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL**

**Brussels, Belgium
6 April 1999**

The unilateral ceasefire proposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the government of Serbia is clearly insufficient. Before a ceasefire can be considered President Milosevic must meet the demands established by the international community.

NATO's current military action against the FRY is in support of the political aims of the international community: a peaceful multi-ethnic democratic Kosovo in which all its people live in security.

These aims can be achieved by the return of all refugees and therefore the deployment of an international security presence, the withdrawal of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces, and putting into place a political framework for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL STATEMENT

Brussels, Belgium
8 May 1999

Following its meeting this afternoon the North Atlantic Council wishes to express its deep regret for the tragic mistake of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

The sincere sympathy and condolences of all members of the Alliance go to the victims, their families and the Chinese government.

NATO never has, and never will, intentionally target civilians. Extraordinary care is taken to avoid damage to other than legitimate military and military-related targets. The bombing of the Chinese Embassy was a deeply regrettable mistake. We continue to review the circumstances surrounding the incident and we will make available any further information as soon as possible.

NATO will continue to pursue its goals: to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and ensure the Kosovars can return to their homes in peace and security.

NATO is prepared to suspend its air strikes once Belgrade has unequivocally accepted the five key conditions set down by the North Atlantic Council for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

NATO will continue to support all attempts at a diplomatic solution which respect these conditions. Our mistaken attack against the Chinese Embassy should not diminish or derail these efforts building on the results of the recent G8 meeting.

STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL ON SUSPENSION OF AIR OPERATIONS

**Brussels, Belgium
10 June 1999**

A few moments ago I instructed General Wesley Clark to suspend NATO's air operations against Yugoslavia.

I have taken this decision following consultations with the North Atlantic Council and confirmation from SACEUR that the full withdrawal of the Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo has begun.

The withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo is taking place in accordance with the Military-Technical Agreement that was concluded between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia yesterday evening. It is also consistent with the agreement between the FRY and EU and Russian special envoys of 3 June.

I have just written to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the United Nations Security Council to inform them of these developments.

I urge all parties to the conflict to seize this opportunity for peace. I call on them to comply with their obligations under the agreements that have been concluded these past days and with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The violence must cease immediately. The Yugoslav security forces must withdraw, and all armed Kosovar groups must demilitarise. Violence or non-compliance by any party will not be tolerated.

I would like to take this opportunity to salute General Clark, his commanders and all the men and women of Operation Allied Force who have bravely contributed so much to the cause of peace and security for all the people of Kosovo.

Ensemble avec le reste de la communauté internationale, l'OTAN aidera tous les réfugiés et toutes les personnes déplacées à rentrer dans leurs foyers. Nous aiderons tous les habitants du Kosovo - quelque soit leur origine ethnique - à reconstruire une société libre, débarrassée de la répression violente qu'elle a connue pendant si longtemps. Depuis le début de l'opération Force Alliée, j'ai insisté sur le fait que l'OTAN n'a aucun grief contre le peuple de Yougoslavie. J'espère que les Serbes du Kosovo resteront chez eux. Les forces de l'OTAN

défendront leurs droits tout autant que les droits des autres communautés ethniques du Kosovo.

L'OTAN avance à grands pas dans ses préparatifs pour la KFOR. Dans quelques heures, le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord se réunira pour approuver formellement le déploiement de forces de l'OTAN au Kosovo. Ces forces créeront un environnement sûr permettant le retour des réfugiés et le processus de reconstruction. Aujourd'hui, une réunion importante se tient à Cologne pour développer un Pacte de Stabilité pour l'Europe du Sud-Est. L'OTAN est prête à contribuer pleinement à cette initiative.

All this would not have been possible without the cohesion and the determination of all Allies. As our air operations against Yugoslavia are now suspended, NATO is ready for its new mission; a mission to bring people back to their homes and to build a lasting and just peace in Kosovo.

STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL

Brussels, Belgium
20 June 1999

I have been informed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe that all FRY military and police forces (VJ/MUP) have now departed Kosovo in compliance with the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) signed by the Commander of KFOR and representatives of the FRY Government on 9 June 1999.

Acting under the authority granted to me by the North Atlantic Council, I have accordingly decided to terminate with immediate effect the air campaign, which I suspended on 10 June 1999.

In making this statement I wish once more to express my thanks to all those who have contributed to Operation Allied Force and to underline the need for all parties to comply fully with the MTA and UNSCR 1244. KFOR will continue to work towards the establishment of a secure environment for all the people of Kosovo, regardless of ethnic origin.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON THE DEMILITARISATION OF THE UCK**

**Brussels, Belgium
21 September 1999**

I warmly welcome the statement by KFOR, that the Kosovo Liberation Army has complied with its commitment to demilitarise.

This is a milestone for the ongoing peace implementation efforts by the international community in Kosovo. As of today, the KLA has ceased to exist as a structured para-military organisation. Moreover, all weapons as required under the Undertaking on Demilitarisation have been handed over and are now in specially designated storage sites under KFOR control. Any individuals who are found to be violating these undertakings will be dealt with severely by KFOR. Any non-authorized weapons found will be confiscated.

The successful demilitarisation process is only the beginning of a larger effort by the international community, and in particular KFOR, to promote reconciliation in Kosovo and to integrate former combatants into civilian life. I welcome the establishment by the UN Mission in Kosovo of a new, multi-ethnic civilian emergency force, the Kosovo Protection Corps, which will play an important role in civil emergency planning and reconstruction tasks in Kosovo. I hope the new Corps will be formed in the very near future.

I call on all members of Kosovar society, especially former KLA fighters, to seize this unique opportunity to build a peaceful and stable Kosovo of the future.

**STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL**

**Brussels, Belgium
13 October 1999**

At the Ambassadorial meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on 13 October, Ambassadors condemned the recent killing in Kosovo of a Bulgarian member of UNMIK's staff. Ambassadors called for full cooperation of all concerned parties to bring those responsible for the recent killing to justice. They rejected as unacceptable any violence directed against UNMIK or KFOR personnel in carrying out their mission under the authority of UNSCR 1244.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON THE OSCE REPORT ON KOSOVO**

**Brussels, Belgium
6 December 1999**

The latest OSCE Report on Kosovo provides convincing evidence of a pre-planned and systematic campaign of persecution carried out by the Serb security forces against the ethnic Albanian population earlier this year. The OSCE Report makes clear that this was done as a matter of organised policy. It lists many individual instances of murder, cruelty and suffering, deliberately inflicted by the Serb forces against innocent civilians, many of them women and children. It is because of these crimes against humanity which Milosevic refused to curtail that NATO launched its operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia last March. The success of this action put a stop to this systematic persecution and allowed over 800,000 deportees to return to their homes.

I remain preoccupied by the individual acts of hatred and vengeance in Kosovo today. The United Nations and NATO are working closely together to reduce the level of violence and to create a stable and secure situation in Kosovo. I will be discussing this cooperation and future arrangements when I meet UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan later today.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON BEHALF OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ON THE 19+1 MEETING WITH THE FORMER
YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (1)**

**Brussels, Belgium
9 April 1999**

Today, the North Atlantic Council met with Foreign Minister Aleksandar Dimitrov and Defence Minister Nikola Kljusev of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1). On this occasion, NATO Allies reiterated their gratitude for the generous support the country has provided to the efforts of the international community to bring peace to Kosovo and in particular to address the grave humanitarian crisis brought on by the actions of FRY forces in Kosovo. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) has played, and continues to play, a vital role in this regard.

The Alliance is, of course, aware of the immense hardship that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) is undergoing because of the massive influx of refugees into its territory. In response to this latest crisis, the Alliance's military forces have been engaged in refugee relief in cooperation with the relevant humanitarian organisations, in particular the UNHCR, which is the lead international agency in this field. Our forces have been providing and transporting supplies, providing logistical support, assisting in setting up refugee centres and in building infrastructure for these centres. At its meeting of 3 April, Council authorised the Commander of the NATO forces in the country, General Sir Michael Jackson, to take responsibility for coordinating NATO's humanitarian efforts in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1), making use of all available NATO forces in the area. The NATO Commanders will continue to initiate action at every opportunity to assist the international humanitarian effort, with the intention of handing over such initiatives to the UNHCR or other agencies when appropriate. In addition, NATO member States are actively engaged in humanitarian relief efforts by providing humanitarian and financial assistance. NATO and its Partners will continue their efforts, including through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre to assist the coordination of the international humanitarian effort.

The cooperation on the ground between NATO and the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) is proceeding very well. Following the Council decision of 31 March, a NATO liaison team was sent to Skopje to

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

further strengthen our liaison with the authorities, for as long as circumstances require. We have been also looking at practical ways of helping. For example, Council has decided, on an exceptional basis, to waive the host country's usual share of 25 per cent of any damages caused by NATO forces deployed under the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement and under the command of COMARRC. As the Alliance has repeatedly made clear, NATO forces stationed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are not offensive forces. They are enabling forces for what, we hope, will become the NATO-led Peace Implementation Force that will be able to deploy swiftly to Kosovo to assist with the implementation of a political settlement accepted by both sides. We reiterate that any attack on the NATO forces stationed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would be met by an appropriate response by the Alliance.

The security of all NATO member States is inseparably linked to that of all Partner countries, especially those hosting NATO troops, and the security of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is of a direct and material concern to the Alliance. In that connection, NATO has repeatedly stated that it would be unacceptable if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were to threaten the territorial integrity, political independence and security of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO will respond to any such challenges to the security of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stemming from the presence of NATO forces and their activities in its territory.

The Alliance continues to broaden and deepen its cooperation with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in matters beyond the current crisis. The Partnership for Peace cooperation programme with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is developing into a very productive relationship which will also assist the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to prepare for possible future membership in the Alliance. It proceeds on the basis of a revised Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) for 1998-2000 which, in accordance with Spring 1998 Ministerial decisions, have enhanced and supplemented PFP cooperation with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Cooperation in this framework includes border security, civil emergency planning, crisis management and logistics, exercises, as well as direct material/technical assistance mainly from Nations.

NATO looks forward to its continued cooperation with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

**STATEMENT BY THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
ON RESULTS OF HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL**

**Brussels, Belgium
13 December 1999**

I welcome the results of the European Council meeting in Helsinki. As I have said on numerous occasions, a stronger Europe means a stronger Alliance. A stronger European role will reinforce the Alliance for the 21st century. The Helsinki Summit is a very important step in the right direction. We look forward to cooperating with the EU in a manner that is both transparent to, and inclusive of, all NATO allies.

STATEMENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Following the Meeting between Representatives of the NATO Member States, the EU Member States, the OSCE CIO, the UNHCR, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union

**Brussels, Belgium
4 April 1999**

At the initiative of the EU Presidency and with the agreement of the North Atlantic Council, a timely and constructive meeting was held today at NATO Headquarters in Brussels of representatives of the NATO member states, of the EU member states, the European Commission and ECHO, of the OSCE CIO, of the UNHCR, of the Council of Europe and of the Western European Union. The objective of the meeting was to contribute to the coordination of efforts and to identify concrete measures to address the grave humanitarian crisis brought on by the actions of President Milosevic's forces in Kosovo.

This humanitarian tragedy requires an immediate response. We are ready to work as constructively and efficiently as possible and in coordination with other international organisations and agencies. We welcome and support the statement of the EU Presidency following today's meeting.

The situation in Kosovo and in the region continues to deteriorate further, as a consequence of the continued Yugoslav campaign of ethnic cleansing which has already resulted, according to the UNHCR, in 125,000 refugees in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾, 226,000 in Albania and 33,000 in Montenegro. What we have been witnessing over the last few weeks is the climax of a campaign of violence and destruction carried out by Yugoslav Army and Serb police forces.

We have already taken steps to address this humanitarian catastrophe. On 3 April, we took a series of important decisions which will allow NATO to step in quickly and help with humanitarian efforts both in Albania and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. ⁽¹⁾

The Alliance's military forces will engage more actively in refugee relief in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ and Albania, in cooperation and

⁽¹⁾ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

coordination with the relevant humanitarian organisations which are already responding to the crisis, in particular the UNHCR which is the lead international agency in this field.

NATO and its member states are providing shelter, food and logistical support, and are working closely with other international organisations in the provision of humanitarian assistance to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ and Albania. The NATO Commander in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ (representing the Secretary General and the SACEUR) has full authority to coordinate NATO's assistance to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ⁽¹⁾ and has been authorised to use all available NATO forces to assist in humanitarian relief. SACEUR has been authorised to establish a forward headquarters in Albania, in coordination with the Albanian authorities and the UNHCR, in order to assess the humanitarian situation and provide support thereto. The NATO Military Authorities have been tasked to undertake further planning to this end.

The NATO Commanders will continue to initiate action at every opportunity to assist the international humanitarian effort, with the intention of handing over to the UNHCR or other agencies when appropriate. The NATO Commanders will exercise, as necessary, coordination and control of movement on land, sea and in the air.

NATO and its Partners will continue to use the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre to assist the coordination of the international humanitarian effort.

The Alliance has informed the member States of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on the outcome of today's meeting.

NATO has agreed to meet on 5 April 1999 at the European Union to continue efforts to coordinate with all relevant agencies.

NATO POLICY ON NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

**Brussels, Belgium
13 October 1999**

I. Purpose

1. The purpose of this document is to establish NATO Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons.
2. This policy applies to all NATO Non-Lethal Weapon research, development and acquisition programmes, employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, and related activities. It does not apply to information operations or any other military capability not designed specifically for the purpose of minimising fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment, even though they may have these effects to some extent.

II. Definition

3. The following definition is applied as far as this policy is concerned:

Non-Lethal Weapons are weapons which are explicitly designed and developed to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment, with minimal undesired damage or impact on the environment.

III. NATO policy

4. It is NATO policy that Non-Lethal Weapons, relevant concepts of operations, doctrine and operational requirements shall be designed to expand the range of options available to NATO Military Authorities. NLW are meant to complement the conventional weapons systems at NATO's disposal.
5. Non-Lethal Weapons should enhance the capability of NATO forces to achieve objectives such as (not necessarily in order of priority) to:
 1. accomplish military missions and tasks in situations and conditions where the use of lethal force, although not prohibited, may not be necessary or desired;
 2. discourage, delay, prevent or respond to hostile activities ;

3. limit or control escalation;
 4. improve force protection;
 5. repel or temporarily incapacitate personnel;
 6. disable equipment or facilities;
 7. help decrease the post-conflict costs of reconstruction.
6. The availability of Non-Lethal Weapons shall in no way limit a commander's or individual's inherent right and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defence.
7. Neither the existence, the presence nor the potential effect of Non-Lethal Weapons shall constitute an obligation to use Non-Lethal Weapons, or impose a higher standard for, or additional restrictions on, the use of lethal force. In all cases NATO forces shall retain the option for immediate use of lethal weapons consistent with applicable national and international law and approved Rules of Engagement.
8. Non-Lethal Weapons shall not be required to have zero probability of causing fatalities or permanent injuries. However, while complete avoidance of these effects is not guaranteed or expected, Non-Lethal Weapons should significantly reduce such effects when compared with the employment of conventional lethal weapons under the same circumstances.
9. Non-Lethal Weapons may be used in conjunction with lethal weapon systems to enhance the latter's effectiveness and efficiency across the full spectrum of military operations.
10. NATO planners shall ensure that the potential contribution of Non-Lethal Weapons is taken fully into account in the development of their plans.
11. Non-Lethal Weapons shall conform to the definition contained in Section II above and have, as a minimum, the following characteristics:
1. they must achieve an appropriate balance between the competing goals of having a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, with minimal undesired damage, and a high probability of having the desired effects;
 2. they must not be easily defeated or degraded by hostile counter-measures once known or, if they could be so defeated, the benefits of a single opportunity to use such a weapon in a given context would, nevertheless, be so great as to outweigh that disadvantage or any risk of consequent escalation.

12. The research and development, procurement and employment of Non-Lethal Weapons shall always remain consistent with applicable treaties, conventions and international law, particularly the Law of Armed Conflict as well as national law and approved Rules of Engagement.

IV. Additional Policy Guidance

13. Any future request for additional policy guidance shall be referred to the North Atlantic Council.

WELCOMING STATEMENT BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL TO THE THREE NEW ALLIES

**Brussels, Belgium
12 March 1999**

Today a new chapter opens in the history of the Atlantic Alliance and of Europe. The North Atlantic Council warmly welcomes three new Allies - the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary - who today will formally accede to the Washington Treaty. Next week, on Tuesday 16 March we will receive the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary here in Brussels. Their flags will be raised alongside those of the other 16 member countries at a ceremony of welcome. They will then take their seats at the table of the North Atlantic Council as full and equal Allies.

The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO's door will remain open to all those willing and able to contribute to our common vision of a lasting order of peace based on human rights, freedom and democracy.

The process of opening the Alliance to new countries is part of the Alliance's policy to improve the security and stability environment for nations in the Euro-Atlantic area. The contours of a new security order in Europe become clearly discernible. It is based on integration and cooperation, not confrontation. It raises the security of all and it excludes nobody. The countries of Europe are moving closer together to finally overcome the division of Europe.

We, the members of the North Atlantic Council, look forward to work with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in our common quest to make the 21st Century a time of peace and progress for all our peoples.

PART III

Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO defence

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC DATA RELATING TO NATO DEFENCE

DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES 1975-1999

The figures given in table 1 represent payments actually made or to be made during the course of the fiscal year. They are based on the NATO definition of defence expenditures. In view of the differences between this and national definitions, the figures shown may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by national authorities or given in national budgets. For countries providing military assistance, this is included in the expenditures figures. For countries receiving assistance, figures do not include the value of items received. Expenditures for research and development are included in equipment expenditures and pensions paid to retirees in personnel expenditures.

France is a member of the Alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure and does not participate in collective force planning. The defence data relating to France are indicative only.

Iceland has no armed forces.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the Alliance in 1999.

SUMMARY

Table 1: total defence expenditures

Table 2: gross domestic product (GDP) and defence expenditure annual volume change

Table 3: defence expenditures as % of GDP

Table 4: GDP and defence expenditures per capita

Table 5: distribution of defence expenditures by category

Table 6: armed forces

READER'S GUIDE

To avoid any ambiguity the fiscal year has been designated by the year which includes the highest number of months: e.g. 1997 represents the fiscal year 1997/1998 for Canada and U.K. and the fiscal year 1996/1997 for U.S.

Because of rounding, the total figures may differ from the sum of their components.

Conventional signs: e estimate - nil
.. not available // not applicable
| break in continuity of series

Table 1: Defence expenditures of NATO countries

Country	Currency unit (million)	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999e
(0)	(-)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Current prices and exchange rates										
Belgium	francs	70899	115754	144183	155205	131156	131334	131796	133007	136393
Czech republic	koruny	//	9117	//	//	17468	17896	18521	//	41484
Denmark	Danish kroner	5355	110514	13344	16399	17468	17896	18521	19079	19577
France	French francs	55872	110514	186715	231911	238432	237375	241103	236226	244029
Germany	Deutschmarks	375869	48518	58650	68376	58986	58671	57602	58977	59730
Greece	Drachmas	45936	96975	321981	612344	1171377	1343276	1510684	1724621	1853189
Hungary	Forint	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	182106
Italy	1 000 Italian lire	3104	7643	17767	28007	31561	36170	38701	40763	41888
Luxembourg	Luxembourg francs	836	1534	2265	3233	4194	4380	4797	5197	5460
Netherlands	Neth. guilders	7119	10476	12901	13513	12864	13199	13345	13676	14079
Norway	Norwegian kroner	4771	8242	15446	21251	22224	22813	23010	25087	25074
Poland	Zlotys	19898	43440	111375	267299	403478	401165	418772	420654	448690
Portugal	Pesetas	350423	674883	922808	1078751	1091432	1091432	1123046	1185942	1185942
Spain	1 000 Turkish liras	33	203	1235	13866	302864	611521	1183327	2289430	4367663
Turkey	Pounds sterling	5571	11593	18301	22287	21439	22330	21612	22551	22283
United Kingdom	<i>US dollars</i>	//	111981	92218	186189	184352	186821	172732	175306	180798
<i>Nato Europe</i>	Canadian dollars	3360	5788	10332	13473	12457	12457	10831	11168	11048
Canada	US dollars	88400	138191	258165	306170	278856	271417	276324	274278	283096
United States	<i>US dollars</i>	91704	143141	265731	317717	287933	279860	284146	281806	290532
<i>North America</i>	<i>US dollars</i>	//	255122	357949	503906	472284	466681	456879	457112	471330
1990 prices and exchange rates										
Belgium	francs	132418	158789	157465	155205	115966	114228	113002	112522	113805
Czech republic	koruny	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	12626
Denmark	Danish kroner	14095	15622	15759	16399	15524	15562	15652	15653	15610
France	French francs	171903	198895	220437	231911	214675	210675	210939	204751	210279
Germany	Deutschmarks	60568	64021	66139	68376	49024	48256	47077	47233	47950
Greece	Drachmas	510756	524576	689616	612344	610416	647663	681584	740737	772385
Hungary	Forint	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	37737
Italy	1 000 Italian lire	22048	23289	26608	28007	24702	24882	24622	25207	25090
Luxembourg	Luxembourg francs	1645	2232	2488	3630	3758	3758	4025	4315	4510
Netherlands	Neth. guilders	10996	11769	13037	13513	11650	11469	11560	11427	11254
Norway	Norwegian kroner	14153	16135	19712	21251	19809	20014	19713	21010	20230
Poland	Zlotys	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	1697
Portugal	Escudos	259215	217934	208150	267299	274531	264795	269183	259663	270742
Spain	Pesetas	8601	862375	963323	922808	828568	812567	819486	798016	828902
Turkey	1 000 Turkish liras	6801	8567	9336	13866	15344	16402	17263	17913	18956
United Kingdom	Pounds sterling	21848	22092	24576	22287	17060	17138	16107	16397	15807
<i>Nato Europe</i>	<i>US dollars</i>	8527	167799	183765	186189	156026	155611	153413	153850	157940
Canada	Canadian dollars	213125	9442	12537	11410	10378	10378	9686	10047	9842
United States	US dollars	224685	301661	301661	306170	240529	227867	227867	221927	225112
<i>North America</i>	<i>US dollars</i>	220433	232777	312406	250308	237989	236169	236169	230538	233547
<i>Nato total</i>	<i>US dollars</i>	//	400576	496170	503906	406334	393599	389581	384378	391488

**Table 2: Gross domestic product
and defence expenditures annual variation (%)
(based on constant prices)**

Country	Average 1975-1979	Average 1980-1984	Average 1985-1989	Average 1990-1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999e
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Gross domestic product									
Belgium	3.2	0.2	2.6	1.0	2.3	1.3	3.0	2.9	1.9
Canada	4.4	1.4	3.5	0.4	2.8	1.7	4.0	3.1	2.9
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Denmark	3.7	1.5	1.8	1.7	3.0	3.3	3.1	2.9	1.6
France	3.7	1.6	2.8	0.9	1.7	1.1	2.0	3.2	2.3
Germany	4.0	0.4	2.5	5.4	1.2	1.3	2.2	2.8	1.7
Greece	5.3	0.5	1.8	1.3	2.1	2.4	3.2	3.7	3.5
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	4.2
Italy	4.8	0.8	3.1	0.6	2.9	0.7	1.5	1.4	1.4
Luxembourg	2.5	1.3	6.9	6.0	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.3	3.3
Netherlands	3.4	0.1	2.5	2.0	2.3	3.1	3.6	3.7	2.2
Norway	5.1	1.7	2.1	3.3	3.8	4.9	4.3	2.1	0.6
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	3.5
Portugal	5.5	1.1	5.6	1.7	2.9	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.5
Spain	2.5	1.0	4.5	1.1	2.7	2.4	3.2	3.2	4.3
Turkey	5.3	4.7	6.0	3.2	7.2	7.0	7.5	2.8	-1.5
United Kingdom	2.5	1.0	4.3	0.3	2.8	2.6	3.5	2.2	0.7
United States	4.5	1.8	3.2	1.3	2.3	3.4	3.9	3.9	3.6
Defence expenditures									
Belgium	4.4	0.1	1.4	-7.3	-2.4	-1.5	-1.1	-0.4	1.1
Canada	2.0	6.2	2.0	-3.1	-6.4	-9.0	-6.7	3.7	-2.0
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	8.3
Denmark	2.6	0.2	1.0	-0.5	-1.3	0.2	0.6	-	-0.3
France	3.8	3.3	1.3	-0.7	-4.9	-1.9	0.1	-2.9	1.7
Germany	0.5	1.2	-0.4	-7.6	-2.1	-1.6	-2.4	0.3	2.5
Greece	4.6	8.0	-3.9	-1.1	1.5	6.1	5.2	8.7	6.7
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	4.3
Italy	-0.2	2.4	3.1	-0.5	-9.7	0.7	-1.0	2.4	-0.5
Luxembourg	3.9	3.8	7.5	4.1	-2.1	3.5	7.1	7.2	4.5
Netherlands	2.3	2.7	2.0	-2.9	-3.4	1.6	-0.8	-1.1	-1.5
Norway	2.4	2.6	1.6	0.3	-9.1	1.0	-1.5	6.6	-3.7
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	2.1
Portugal	-9.5	0.1	5.2	0.2	6.5	-3.5	1.7	-3.5	4.3
Spain	..	1.9	0.5	-3.5	3.5	-1.9	0.9	-2.6	3.9
Turkey	7.6	1.0	6.5	3.4	1.1	6.9	5.3	3.8	5.8
United Kingdom	-1.4	2.6	-3.1	-8.1	-6.0	0.5	-6.0	1.8	-3.6
United States	-0.8	6.0	2.0	-5.3	-5.0	-4.8	-0.5	-2.6	1.4

Table 3: Defence expenditures as % of gross domestic product

Country	Average 1975-1979	Average 1980-1984	Average 1985-1989	Average 1990-1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999e
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Based on current prices									
Belgium	3.2	3.3	2.8	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Denmark	2.3	2.4	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6
France	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.8
Germany	3.4	3.4	3.0	2.2	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.5
Greece	5.6	5.4	5.1	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.9
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Italy	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0
Luxembourg	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9
Netherlands	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.4	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8
Norway	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.2
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Portugal	3.4	3.0	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2
Spain	//	2.3	2.2	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4
Turkey	4.4	4.0	3.3	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.4	5.7
United Kingdom	4.9	5.2	4.5	3.8	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.6
<i>NATO-Europe</i>	//	3.5	3.2	2.7	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Canada	1.9	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2
United States	5.0	5.6	6.0	4.7	3.8	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.2
<i>North America</i>	4.7	5.3	5.6	4.5	3.7	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.0
<i>NATO-Total</i>	//	4.5	4.5	3.6	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.6
Based on constant prices									
Belgium	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Denmark	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5
France	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.8
Germany	3.4	3.4	3.0	2.2	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.5
Greece	5.6	5.4	5.1	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.9
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Italy	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.7
Luxembourg	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9
Netherlands	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.4	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7
Norway	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Portugal	3.4	3.0	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2
Spain	//	2.3	2.2	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4
Turkey	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.5
United Kingdom	5.2	5.4	4.5	3.7	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.5	2.4
<i>NATO-Europe</i>	//	3.5	3.2	2.6	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0
Canada	1.9	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2
United States	5.2	5.6	5.9	4.7	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.1	3.1
<i>North America</i>	4.9	5.3	5.5	4.4	3.6	3.3	3.2	3.0	2.9
<i>NATO-Total</i>	//	4.4	4.3	3.5	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.5

**Table 4: Gross domestic product
and defence expenditures per capita in US \$
(1990 prices and exchange rates)**

Country	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999e
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Gross domestic product									
Belgium	14232	16551	17098	19690	20636	20861	21437	21991	22334
Czech Republic	19147	21405	24436	25944	28782	29540	30316	31115	31510
Denmark	15738	17949	18840	21431	22048	22202	22549	23170	23617
France	16559	19527	20853	23746	21687	21902	22341	22841	23124
Germany	6311	7332	7600	8160	8419	8578	8809	9089	9360
Greece	12725	15545	16676	19281	20187	20292	20548	20793	21034
Italy	18383	20639	21083	27083	32896	33408	34151	35678	36349
Luxembourg	16662	18383	16802	20363	20913	20913	21557	22218	22570
Netherlands	14692	16157	16802	18979	20363	20913	21557	22218	22570
Norway	17954	22296	25590	27223	31743	33120	34452	35001	35037
Poland	4340	5183	5285	6984	7606	7840	8097	8364	8640
Portugal	9434	9844	10279	12663	13410	13716	14181	14610	15214
Spain	2016	2237	2286	2681	2863	3012	3185	3213	3107
Turkey	12237	13404	14765	17112	18187	18590	19175	19546	19618
United Kingdom	12118	13724	14471	16488	16894	17115	17485	17840	18228
NATO-Europe	15632	17922	19449	20913	21393	21501	22115	22509	22858
Canada	17000	18969	20896	22983	24050	24655	25506	26259	26952
United States	16867	18867	20754	22776	23781	24335	25160	25876	26531
North America	14036	15831	17079	19126	19752	20118	20678	21190	21545
NATO-Total	405	483	477	466	342	337	332	330	333
Belgium	450	493	498	516	480	478	479	477	474
Czech Republic	599	678	732	751	678	663	661	639	654
Denmark	606	644	671	669	372	365	355	355	358
France	356	343	438	380	368	388	406	439	456
Germany	332	344	392	412	360	362	357	365	362
Greece	137	184	203	253	270	285	285	302	312
Italy	442	457	494	496	412	412	407	400	391
Luxembourg	564	631	758	800	726	730	717	760	728
Netherlands	200	157	146	189	194	187	190	183	190
Norway	226	246	246	233	207	203	204	206	206
Poland	65	74	71	95	95	100	104	106	110
Portugal	690	697	770	688	517	518	485	473	492
Spain	462	493	484	484	378	375	368	367	328
Turkey	315	329	414	415	330	297	274	281	271
United Kingdom	987	987	1265	1225	914	863	854	824	824
NATO-Europe	922	923	1182	1144	855	805	795	769	772
Canada	..	651	779	761	576	554	546	534	499
United States	..	651	779	761	576	554	546	534	499
North America	..	651	779	761	576	554	546	534	499
NATO-Total	..	651	779	761	576	554	546	534	499

Table 5: Distribution of total defence expenditures by category

Country	Average 1975-1979	Average 1980-1984	Average 1985-1989	Average 1990-1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999e
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	% devoted to personnel expenditures								
Belgium	62.9	61.8	68.3	68.3	69.0	69.3	69.3	68.5	67.3
Canada	60.8	50.7	46.2	49.7	47.8	45.9	42.5	43.2	46.1
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	46.6
Denmark	58.0	54.6	56.6	57.5	60.5	59.7	58.8	60.0	59.9
Germany	49.8	46.6	48.9	57.4	61.6	62.1	62.7	61.2	60.1
Greece	57.6	54.6	60.5	63.0	63.3	61.2	62.2	60.4	61.4
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	47.3
Italy	61.9	59.1	57.8	63.6	67.4	69.2	75.4	73.3	72.9
Luxembourg	85.5	77.5	76.9	76.2	80.9	82.5	78.8	77.1	76.5
Netherlands	61.2	55.3	52.8	56.9	60.0	55.8	56.0	52.3	51.1
Norway	52.9	48.8	43.9	40.6	37.3	37.5	38.5	37.7	40.7
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	62.2
Portugal	68.8	66.6	67.7	77.3	77.8	80.7	80.0	82.8	78.8
Spain	//	//	//	64.9	65.7	67.3	66.1	67.5	66.6
Turkey	47.6	45.3	37.1	50.1	50.9	46.2	48.4	48.5	43.0
United Kingdom	44.6	37.4	38.6	42.2	41.8	40.3	39.4	38.0	39.2
United States	42.0	41.9	37.0	39.3	39.8	38.8	39.1	39.0	38.6
	% devoted to equipment expenditures								
Belgium	11.7	13.8	12.1	7.8	5.4	5.3	6.2	5.9	5.6
Canada	9.0	17.8	19.7	18.1	18.5	15.6	12.9	11.0	14.7
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	15.9
Denmark	18.4	16.9	14.0	15.8	12.5	12.5	13.7	13.8	13.9
Germany	16.8	20.0	19.6	13.5	11.4	11.1	10.8	12.7	13.6
Greece	19.3	17.4	18.2	22.8	19.8	21.1	19.4	20.6	19.4
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	19.0
Italy	14.7	17.4	19.7	16.3	15.0	14.3	11.3	12.4	12.2
Luxembourg	1.9	1.8	3.5	3.4	2.4	4.1	3.5	6.5	3.4
Netherlands	18.0	20.5	19.8	15.6	15.6	18.7	15.7	15.3	16.0
Norway	16.0	19.4	21.7	24.9	25.4	25.2	24.6	25.0	23.5
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	9.7
Portugal	2.2	5.5	7.6	5.7	5.9	6.3	8.2	3.8	9.4
Spain	//	//	//	12.4	13.6	13.4	13.6	12.0	12.0
Turkey	19.2	9.1	18.2	23.7	29.7	30.8	27.0	20.6	27.5
United Kingdom	21.6	26.2	24.8	21.0	22.0	23.9	24.9	26.5	24.5
United States	17.6	21.9	25.6	25.1	27.7	26.9	26.0	25.6	24.4

Country	Average 1975-1979	Average 1980-1984	Average 1985-1989	Average 1990-1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999e
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	% devoted to infrastructure expenditures								
Belgium	6.5	5.5	4.0	3.4	3.9	4.5	4.0	3.4	3.4
Canada	2.5	2.3	2.8	3.2	2.4	4.1	3.4	5.1	4.1
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Denmark	2.4	2.8	3.4	3.2	2.6	2.4	2.1	1.8	2.5
Germany	6.3	5.4	5.9	4.9	4.6	5.0	4.8	4.6	4.7
Greece	5.3	2.8	2.2	1.7	1.9	1.5	2.1	2.1	2.1
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Italy	1.8	2.3	2.6	2.4	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0
Luxembourg	3.2	10.3	7.3	10.4	5.5	1.7	4.7	4.5	8.0
Netherlands	3.2	3.7	5.2	3.7	4.4	4.5	3.7	4.4	4.4
Norway	4.3	5.0	8.2	9.2	6.7	6.9	5.9	6.9	5.2
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Portugal	3.4	5.9	3.7	2.3	1.6	1.3	1.2	0.6	0.9
Spain	//	//	//	1.2	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.8
Turkey	7.3	13.2	5.4	3.0	2.5	3.0	4.2	6.1	4.7
United Kingdom	1.7	2.7	3.9	5.2	5.5	5.8	5.2	4.6	5.0
United States	1.9	1.6	1.8	1.5	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.2	1.9
	% devoted to other expenditures								
Belgium	18.8	18.8	20.4	20.4	19.6	21.2	20.4	22.2	23.7
Canada	27.3	29.0	31.2	29.0	31.4	34.4	41.2	40.7	35.1
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Denmark	21.0	25.7	25.8	23.3	24.4	25.4	25.4	24.3	23.7
Germany	27.0	27.9	25.5	23.9	22.3	21.8	21.7	21.5	21.6
Greece	17.0	24.9	18.4	12.2	14.9	16.2	16.2	16.8	17.2
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Italy	21.5	21.0	19.8	17.7	16.6	15.6	12.5	13.5	13.9
Luxembourg	9.1	10.2	11.9	9.4	11.2	11.7	13.1	11.9	12.1
Netherlands	17.3	20.3	22.1	22.1	21.4	21.2	23.8	28.7	28.4
Norway	26.6	26.7	26.0	24.8	30.6	30.4	31.0	30.4	30.6
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	26.8
Portugal	25.1	21.9	19.8	13.8	14.7	11.8	10.7	12.8	10.9
Spain	//	//	//	21.2	20.0	18.6	19.6	19.7	19.6
Turkey	23.7	30.1	38.4	22.5	16.9	19.9	20.4	24.8	24.8
United Kingdom	31.9	33.5	32.5	30.5	30.6	30.1	30.6	31.0	28.4
United States	36.8	34.5	35.5	33.6	30.0	31.9	32.7	33.2	35.1

Table 6: Armed forces - Annual average strength

Country	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999e
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Military (thousand)								
Belgium	103	108	107	106	47	46	45	43	43
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
Denmark	34	33	29	31	27	28	25	25	53
France	585	575	563	550	504	501	475	449	421
Germany	491	490	495	354	339	335	335	334	334
Greece	185	186	201	201	213	212	206	202	205
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	61
Italy	459	474	504	493	435	431	419	402	391
Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Netherlands	107	107	103	104	67	64	57	55	55
Norway	38	40	36	51	38	38	33	33	33
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	187
Portugal	104	88	102	87	78	73	72	71	72
Spain	//	356	314	263	210	203	197	189	155
Turkey	584	717	814	769	805	818	828	797	788
United Kingdom	348	330	334	308	221	221	218	218	218
NAITO Europe	//	3504	3603	3510	3010	2976	2912	2809	3050
Canada	78	82	83	87	70	66	61	60	59
United States	2146	2050	2244	2181	1620	1575	1539	1505	1489
North America	2224	2132	2327	2268	1690	1641	1600	1565	1548
NAITO-Total	//	5636	5930	5778	4700	4617	4512	4375	4598
	Military and civilian personnel as % of labour force								
Belgium	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1
Czech Republic	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.4
Denmark	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
France	3.2	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0
Germany	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.6	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2
Greece	6.5	6.1	6.1	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.1	5.1
Hungary	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.9
Italy	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9
Luxembourg	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
Netherlands	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.1	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1
Norway	2.8	2.6	2.3	2.9	2.3	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.8
Poland	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//	1.4
Portugal	2.8	2.3	2.6	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7
Spain	//	3.0	2.5	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.2
Turkey	3.8	4.5	4.8	4.1	3.9	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9
United Kingdom	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
NAITO Europe	//	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8
Canada	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5
United States	3.4	2.8	2.9	2.6	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6
North America	3.2	2.7	2.7	2.4	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5
NAITO-Total	//	2.7	2.7	2.5	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7