"The End of the Post-Cold War Era"
By Javier Solana
NATO Secretary General
I am very pleased to participate in this year's Wehrkunde Conference,
all the more so as this is the last Wehrkunde chaired by its founder,
Ewald von Kleist. He has made this conference into what it is today: a
unique forum on transatlantic security relations. The Wehrkunde meetings
have always been more than ritualistic gatherings. They are occasions
which offer - no, which demand p that we use them to refresh our thinking
about security issues.
In masterminding the Wehrkunde, Ewald von Kleist has created much more
than a widely acclaimed international conference: he has created a transatlantic
family, held together not only by shared interests but also by personal
friendship is undergoing profound change, this achievement cannot be over-estimated.
Ar many previous Wehrkunde-meetings we have talked about the Euro-Atlantic
area being in a transition phase. This term captured the notions that
while the Cold War was over, we were not yet sure where we were going
to.
I would argue that this transition is now coming to an end. Today, we
are witnessing the end of a Post-Cold War era. What we have put in its
place is a new strategic consensus - a strategic consensus on the main
pillars of our security in the next century.
What are the elements of this consensus? First and foremost, a new transatlantic
bargain between Europe and North America.
Bosnia taught us a lesson of unity which is essential for maintaining
a healthy transatlantic relationship. But it is not sufficient. The end
of the Soviet threat and the dynamics of European integration are going
to affect the transatlantic relationship in ways far deeper than many
of us may be ready to admit. If the transatlantic relationship is to remain
healthy in the longer term, a new bargain must include a Europe willing
and able to shoulder more responsibility.
I would argue that NATO has indeed begun to implement this new bargain.
It is after all, in NATO where the real, operational future of a European
Security and Defence Identity is now taking shape. With a new command
structure, Combined Joint Task Forces, and stronger relations between
NATO and WEU, the stage is set foe Europe to play a security role more
in line with its economic strength. Such a stronger Europe will not only
make a more coherent contribution to security in Europe; it will also
be a more attractive partner of North America in managing global contingencies.
A stronger Europe also implies a less fragmented defence industrial
base. That is why I believe that within NATO a transatlantic dialogue
on technology-sharing could help us forestall a growing technology gap
and, thus keep the transatlantic relationship healthy.
These decisions and initiatives constitute elements of a new bargain
between North America and Europe. Together, they constitute the new parameters
of burden-sharing for the next century. Together, they demonstrate that
this Alliance remains responsive to the security needs on both sides of
the Atlantic.
Clearly, Europe is not yet the strategic actor it wants to be, nor the
global partner the US seeks. But these shortcomings do not result from
"too much United States", as some still claim, but from "too little Europe".
That is why the European integration process is not only relevant foe
Europe's own identity, but for a new transatlantic relationship as well.
The second element of a new strategic consensus is the need foe a strong
Russian involvement. No one today would be seriously consider building
security without, let alone against, Russia. Indeed, how Russia settles
herself within the new Europe is perhaps the most important single factor
that will determine the quality of European security in the years ahead.
That is why the NATO-Russia relationship we seek is not simply one of
mutually acknowledging each other's importance, but one of active cooperation,
leading to mutual trust. And I believe that with the Founding Act and
the Permanent Joint Council we have created the right mechanisms to achieve
this close cooperation.
The Permanent Joint Council is barely half a year old, yet it is already
working at a high pace. We have monthly meetings of Ambassadors, we had
several meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers, and we have agreed
an ambitious work programme. To put it bluntly: The PJC works. It works,
because both, NATO and Russia want it to work. Its works, because both
NATO and Russia know that they are destined to cooperate.
This new political relationship between NATO and Russia cleared the
way for a closer military relationship. This means that the superb cooperation
we have achieved in IFOR and SFOR must now be extended across the full
spectrum of security-related issues.
We are setting up military liaison missions between NATO and Russia,
starting at the highest level first - NATO Headquarters, SHAPE, SACLANT
and equivalent locations in Russia. We already have meeting of the Military
Committee and the new Russian military representative at NATO. We are
developing cooperation between NATO and Russia on defence-related environmental
issues. We have opened the new NATO Science for Peace Programme to some
1,5000 Russian scientists. And we have already exploratory meetings on
armaments-related cooperation.
There are just a few examples of the work we hope to undertake with
Russian in the future. So if we say that Russia needs to be in the architecture,
and not outside of it, we mean what we say.
The third major element of the new consensus is the need for a wider
architecture - an architecture based on different institutions acting
towards shared strategic objectives.
In Bosnia, we see most clearly how much such an architecture can work.
NATO, OSCE, the UN and the EU are all involved in creating the conditions
for a long-term stability in this region. But for our institutions to
cooperate is not enough. They must also be open to new members.
That is why getting NATO's enlargement right is so crucial. What is
at stake is not only the credibility of NATO as a cohesive Alliance. The
successful accession of the first three invitees will also be an incentive
for future aspirants to continue on the course of freedom.
Even as our Alliance is growing, it will not loss sight of a wider Euro-Atlantic
security ship for Peace and the EAPC both have created a powerful momentum
for continent-wide cooperation. Through these mechanisms we have been
able to tie virtually all countries of the Euro-Atlantic region into a
network of close military cooperation. Even countries with a neutral security
tradition have involved themselves in these endeavours. This demonstrates
that NATO's commitment to a wider Europe is not mere rhetoric, but has
become an uncontested reality of a new strategic consensus. In this new
Europe, the old notion of dividing lines no longer makes sense.
The decisions of last year's Madrid Summit have put key elements of
this new strategic consensus in place. We are now in a consolidation phase.
But this should not make us complacent. If we want this strategic consensus
to be more than a fleeting moment of the late 1990s, then we must continue
to perfect the instruments we have at our disposal. There is still unfinished
business.
Our most pressing immediate task is to decide on the future of our operation
in Bosnia. We have to create the conditions for a self-sustaining peace
that does not require a continued international military presence. That
point will be reached when all parties realise that their stakes in peace
are higher than their possible gains in war.
1998 is a decisive year for the political future of Bosnia. This is
the year when the politics of war must finally be replaced by the politics
of peace. This is also the year in which the return of refugees and displaced
persons should take place on a large scale.
We are moving in the right direction in building peace in Bosnia. Successful
action against war criminals has been undertaken; a new government has
taken office in Republica Srpska, with its capital far from the Pale hard-liners;
refugees continue to return from overseas; a common currency is in circulation;
common licence plates have come into effect; and fresh concepts are in
the air - Sarajevo has to become an Open City; a weapons amnesty programme
to curb the number of illegal weapons in private hands - to name but two.
These are encouraging signs. They demonstrate that our perseverance
is paying off. And we will stay the course. There is already agreement
in NATO and among other troop-contributing nations and international organisations
that a follow-on force is needed in Bosnia. The precise options of such
a force are now under discussion. But whatever the exact option we settle
on, one thing is particularly clear for the Alliance. Our operation in
Bosnia has shown that we make most progress if we act as a unit, not as
a coalition of the willing. To act in solidarity should, thus, remain
the rule, not the exception - for such solidarity will provide the cornerstone
of our success in managing the challenge of the 21st century.
The new strategic consensus I outlined here owes a lot to NATO. Much
of the positive developments of the last years have been inspired by the
decisions and initiatives of this Alliance.
Our cohesion - whether at 16 today, or at 19 tomorrow - is what enables
us to successfully manage NATO's broader agenda. It is our cohesion that
makes our collective defence commitment credible; it is our cohesion that
ensures that SFOR command such tremendous respect; and its our cohesion
which gives NATO's cooperative initiatives their direction and momentum.
If we retain this cohesion we can confidently cope with an ever more
complex agenda. But this requires more than a common vision of the future,
or a political commitment to common course of action. It also requires
the commitment of adequate resources to get the job done. Security still
carries a price tag. This, too, should be part of our wider strategic
consensus.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In April next year, we will celebrate NATO's 50th anniversary at our
Washington Summit. This Summit should be more than a celebration of NATO's
past achievements. It should first and foremost look ahead.
We will look ahead. At next year's Washington Summit:
- we will complete the accession of our first new members;
- we will adopt a new Strategic Concept, defining a new balance between
NATO's traditional and new missions;
- we will have our new command structure in place, with more flexibility
and a stronger European element in it;
- we will have turned the NATO-Russia relationship into a major element
of a new security architecture;
- we will have firmly anchored Ukraine in a distinct relationship with
NATO; - we will have made the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace permanent
fixtures of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation; and
- we will have moved closer towards a re-balanced transatlantic relationship,
in which Europe and North America are sharing the burdens more equally.
This is an ambitious agenda. But in defining NATO's role for the 21st
century we have every reason to be bold. For we now know that we can do
far more than prevent the worst case. If we maintain the strategic consensus
I outlined, we can achieve the best case: a stable Europe within a vibrant
Atlantic community.
Thank You.
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