Tajikistan, NATO’s relations with
NATO’s relations with Tajikistan NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and Tajik President Rahmon (NATO HQ, April 2013) NATO’s relations with Tajikistan should be viewed through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework which the country joined in 2002. NATO and Tajikistan actively cooperate in the fight against terrorism and have developed practical cooperation in many other areas. The Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) lays out the programme of cooperation between NATO and Tajikistan. Framework for cooperation Dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, James Appathurai, conducts high-level political dialogue with Tajik authorities through regular visits to the country. The NATO Liaison Officer in Central Asia also visits Dushanbe regularly and reviews cooperation with the government. NATO and Tajikistan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through the country’s Individual Partnership Programme (IPP), which is jointly agreed for a two-year period. Key areas include security and peacekeeping cooperation, especially counter-terrorism cooperation and border security, crisis management and civil emergency planning. Key areas of cooperation Security cooperation Tajikistan plays an important role in supporting Allied operations in Afghanistan through the hosting of French military aircraft at Dushanbe Airport. The Allies and Tajikistan also cooperate in the fight against international terrorism. NATO is supporting the country in its efforts to create an educational course on counter-terrorism for the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defence. Tajikistan also exchanges relevant expertise and information with the Allies. Tajikistan has listed a number of units as available for NATO/PfP operations and training exercises. Participation requires a government decision in each individual case. The units include an infantry platoon to support PfP activities within Tajikistan, a group of staff officers and a group of military medics. Tajikistan is also seeking to enhance cooperation with NATO Allies in mine-clearing activities. The country has participated in a number of PfP exercises with NATO Allies and other partner countries. Defence and security sector reform Tajikistan aims to develop sustained and effective democratic control of its armed forces. In consultation with the Allies, the country is developing coordination procedures between the government, parliament and the military. It is also in the process of reforming its armed forces. Cooperative processes with the PfP framework assist in achieving these goals and enhance the country’s ability to take part in peacekeeping or other operations alongside NATO forces. Tajikistan is also considering participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) mechanism. The Allies are available for consultations on Tajikistan’s efforts to consolidate its defence policies, strategies and relevant legislation. NATO is also ready to support the country’s efforts to modernise and mobilise relevant state resources. NATO and Tajikistan are working to further cooperate in strengthening the country’s border security and countering cross-border crime, especially drug trafficking. To that effect, Tajikistan has sent numerous personnel to attend counter-narcotics training sponsored by an initiative of the NATO-Russia Council. Military education is a key area of cooperation. Joint efforts are ongoing to develop courses in several areas, including border security and control, as well as language training. NATO and Tajikistan continue to work on preparing selected individuals from the country for NATO-related activities and the possible introduction of Alliance standards in the country’s military education programmes. Tajikistan has sent officers to take part in NATO familiarisation courses and in various other courses at the NATO School at Oberammergau. A PfP Trust Fund project to help eliminate stockpiles of large munitions, as well as assess the security of weapons’ storage facilities is currently under development. Civil emergency planning Tajikistan is working to further familiarise itself with Allied disaster-relief organisation and procedures in order to further develop its own capabilities. The country is considering the creation of its own disaster-relief operation centre and the creation of a small, NATO-compatible disaster-relief unit. The Allies are working with Tajikistan in developing early warning systems for natural disasters. Individuals from Tajikistan have participated in NATO-run tactical and operational civil-military-cooperation courses. A NATO introductory course on civil emergency planning took place in Dushanbe in July 2011. Science and environment Scientists from Tajikistan have received grant awards in a number of areas under NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) programme. In 2006, a networking infrastructure grant was issued to upgrade the cooperative area network in the Tajik technical university. In 2010, specialists from Tajikistan attended a NATO Science for Peace and Security sponsored programme designed to teach scientist and engineers the latest technology to secure the cyber networks of the educational and scientific communities in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Collaboration with NATO and other Partner countries is also ongoing on uranium extraction and environmental security, and new SPS projects are under preparation. Tajikistan also participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to increase internet access for academic and research communities in countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia through a satellite-based network. Public information Tajikistan and NATO are working together to increase public understanding of NATO and the benefits of cooperation. The country is also aiming to increase public awareness in support of defence and security reforms. Networks with universities, non-governmental organisations, and the press and media in order to increase awareness of the Alliance and Euro-Atlantic security issues continue to be enhanced through different activities. These include, among others, international conferences in Tajikistan and Tajik participation to yearly NATO-Afghan Student Forums. Work is ongoing on the potential establishment of a NATO Depository Library at the Tajik National University of Dushanbe. NATO supports educational activities relevant to security and defence issues in the country. Since 2005, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division has sponsored a summer academy in Tajikistan which brings together advanced students from around the country and beyond, to learn about and discuss international security issues. A group of parliamentarians and journalists from the country visited NATO Headquarters in July 2006, followed by a group of government officials from Tajikistan in September 2007. In 2009, President Emomali Rahmon paid another visit to NATO Headquarters. In 2011, Tajik parliamentarians and Tajik diplomatic officials visited NATO Headquarters. In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Tajikistan is the embassy of France. Evolution of relations NATO-Tajikistan relations date back to 1992, when the country joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997). Tajikistan joined the Partnership for Peace in 2002 to work alongside the Allies in areas where bilateral aims converge. Since joining PfP, Tajikistan has played an active role in hosting and participating in PfP exercises, with a special focus on command and control, civil-emergency planning and civil-military co-operation. There remains further scope for deepening cooperation. Key milestones 1992 Tajikistan joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997 2002 Tajikistan joins the Partnership for Peace. 2003 Tajikistan is connected to the Virtual Silk Highway. President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan makes his first visit to NATO HQ. 2004 NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visits Dushanbe The Allies sign a transit agreement with Tajikistan in support of the NATO-ISAF operations in Afghanistan Tajikistan completes destruction of over 1200 landmines under a PfP Trust Fund project. 2005 The annual NATO-sponsored Summer Academy in Tajikistan runs its first course. 2007 On 2 July 2007, Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister, Hamrokhon Zarifi, visits NATO Headquarters for discussions with the NATO Secretary General. A group of government officials from Tajikistan visit NATO Headquarters and the Allied Operational Command to explore possibilities to deepen cooperation with NATO in different areas. 2008 NATO expert team visits Dushanbe. Annual NATO-sponsored Summer Academy takes place in Tajikistan. 2009 President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, visits NATO Headquarters in February for discussions with the NATO Secretary General and opens a Tajik Painting Exhibition00. 2010 President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, meets with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen while in New York.
Terrorism, NATO and the fight against -
NATO and the fight against terrorism http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/76706.htm
Three, Report of the Committee of -
Report of the Committee of Three The Committee on Non-Military Cooperation, more frequently referred to as the “Committee of Three” or the “Three Wise Men”, was convened in 1956 and instructed to “advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community”. It produced a report entitled “The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO”, which was considered as a “major step forward in the development of NATO in the non-military field” and, more broadly, in the development of political consultation between members of the Alliance. It was published in December 1956 at a sensitive time in Alliance history: NATO’s unity and solidarity were jeopardized through a lack of consultation over the Suez affair. Effectively, the Suez crisis demonstrated that the continuous character of political consultation was not assured within the Alliance. The “Three Wise Men” were Lester B. Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada, Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, and Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway. They identified key areas where cooperation in dispute resolution was needed and suggested ways such cooperation could foment within the Atlantic Community. More generally, they examined and redefined the objectives and needs of the Alliance and made recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion and unity. Their work had a resounding impact on the Organization. It put forward several recommendations, including the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes, economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the information field. It also introduced a more cooperative approach to security issues and broadened the strategic framework within which the Alliance operated. It reinforced NATO’s political role at a time when the Organization was hardening its military and strategic stance, advocating massive retaliation as a key element of its new strategy. The adoption of political consulation as a key component of the Alliance permanently characterized NATO as a political and military organization. Aim and political context Methodology Main conclusions Impact of the report Aim and political context Cooperation and cohesion The aim of the report was two-fold: to broaden areas of cooperation beyond the military to include non-military cooperation and encourage regular political consultation among member countries so as to reinforce unity and cohesion. On 5 May 1956, the North Atlantic Council appointed Lester B. Pearson, Gaetano Martino and Halvard Lange to write a report by the end of the year that would offer ways and means of reaching these objectives. Encouraging regular political consultation and non-military cooperation Although Articles 2 and 4 of NATO’s founding Washington Treaty held the promise of more than a military Alliance, by 1956 members were not regularly using the Alliance’s framework to consult each other or to co-operate on non-military matters. In April 1954, a resolution on political consultation had nonetheless been put forward by Canada: “… all member governments should bear constantly in mind the desirability of bringing to the attention of the Council information on international political developments whenever they are of concern to other members of the Council or to the Organization as a whole ; and (…) the Council in permanent session should from time to time consider what specific subject might be suitable for political consultation at one of its subsequent meetings when its members should be in a position to express the views of their governments on the subject ”. Council Memorandum, C-M(54)38 However, even if this resolution was approved by Council, not all member countries were comfortable with the idea of consulting more systematically on international affairs. Reservations and resistance John Foster Dulles of the United States, although supportive of the resolution, expressed reservations in a Council meeting on 23 April 1954: “ Countries like his own with world-wide interests might find it difficult to consult other NATO governments in every case. For a sudden emergency, it was more important to take action than to discuss the emergency .” Council Record, C-R(54)18 Improving conditions for consultation within the Alliance meant that smaller Allies felt their voices could be heard, but that larger powers, such as the United States, were concerned that they would not have the freedom to act as they saw fit if they were forced to consult on foreign policy. Additionally, the United States argued that developing a political pillar within the Alliance could divert attention from the “straight defence arrangements” they wanted to put into place. This was an argument they had already put forward during the drafting of Article 2 of the Washington Treaty in 1949. A political and a military alliance Nonetheless, the Report of the Three Wise Men was to become a landmark in the evolution of NATO’s political consultation process as well as being instrumental in reinforcing NATO’s political pillar: “ A direct method of bringing home to public opinion the importance of the habit of political consultation within NATO may be summed up in the proposition “NATO is a political as well as a military alliance ”. The habitual use of this phraseology would be preferable to the current tendency to refer to NATO as a (purely) military alliance. It is also more accurate.” Council Memorandum, C-M(56)25 The Committee agreed that the two aspects of security – civil and military – were no longer separate, and that the needs and objectives of NATO had changed. It therefore set about consulting with members on how the Alliance could improve non-military co-operation. The Suez crisis – a case at hand Ironically, just six weeks after the Committee began consulting, France and the United Kingdom collaborated with Israel in the invasion of Egypt to secure the Suez Canal on 29 October 1956. This was the most serious dispute faced by the Allies since the establishment of NATO and it took place while “The Three Wise Men” were working on the report. France and the United Kingdom argued that Gamal Abdul Nasser’s nationalisation of the canal on 26 July 1956 was a threat to European industry and oil supplies. The French also accused Nasser of supporting the rebellion in Algeria and of threatening regional security. However, the United States maintained it would not support military action. When Israel launched the attack, supported by the British and French, no advanced warning was given to the United States or NATO. Although there had been tripartite discussions between the United Kingdom, United States and France regarding the crisis, they were not explicit. The danger of the Suez crisis was not a war between these powers but that the member countries would fail to act as a community. This could have endangered the Alliance. The North Atlantic Council first convened on the subject after the first London Conference in August 1956, which had brought together the signatories of the 1888 Constantinople Convention and states that shipped considerable cargo through the canal. The discussions at NATO were not been very fruitful. It was observed that neither France not the United Kingdom were interested in keeping the Allies informed of their actions. Eventually, debate in the United Nations Security Council turned from condemnation of the action to the idea of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). This force, the brainchild of Lester Pearson, moved into the Canal-zone in mid-November and by Christmas French and British troops were extracted from the region. The UNEF was the archetype for future peacekeeping missions run by the United Nations and Lester Pearson later received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in defusing the crisis and according to the Nobel selection committee, “sav[ing] the world.” Although the crisis was rapidly resolved, it shook the Alliance and clearly demonstrated the need for greater consultation and cooperation. Methodology The Committee looked at five areas: political co-operation; economic co-operation; cultural co-operation; co-operation in the information field; and organization and functions. At its first meetings on 20-22 June 1956 at NATO Headquarters, located at the time in Paris, the Committee established the procedures that would be followed. Each member country received a questionnaire from the Committee on 28 June, which touched on each topic area. In addition, a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist members with the questionnaires was issued. Member countries had to send their replies by 10 August, after which there was a period of two weeks for the Committee to consider the responses. Following this examination the Committee held consultations with each member country individually in order to clarify, where necessary, positions taken by governments in their replies and to discuss preliminary views of the Committee. NATO’s International Staff were tasked with producing a study on how other international organizations dealt with disputes between members and what NATO had done so far in the field of non-military cooperation. This included ways of improving the coordination of the foreign policies of member countries. A 15-page report was drafted with the help of Professor Lincoln Gordon (Harvard University), Professor Guido Carli (Rome) and Mr Robert Major (Oslo). It identified areas where increased co-operation could be implemented and how political consultation on matters of common concern could aid dispute resolution within the Alliance framework thereby promoting solidarity among members. The “Committee of Three” met again in New York on 14 November 1956 and re-examined the report in the light of the tensions surrounding the Suez crisis. It re-wrote the report in the last three weeks of November in response to the Suez crisis. Although many of the points remained the same, the language used was made stronger to reflect the deterioration in allied relations that had taken place. The final draft of the report was delivered to Council on 13 December 1956. Main conclusions Speaking at a Council meeting in Paris on 11 December 1956, Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the events of the Suez crisis had “shattered many illusions” within the NATO framework. “ The action taken by the United Kingdom and France risked setting up chain reactions which would have had the most serious consequences ,” he said. “ It was no excuse to say that these events were taking place south of a given parallel. To preserve the substance of the Alliance and its very existence, the concept of a geographical limit had to be discarded. The conclusions reached by the ‘Committee of Three Ministers’ were an imperative necessity, without acceptance of which there was no salvation for NATO .” Council Record, C-R(56)70, Item II. The Committee found that unless greater cohesion was achieved “ the very framework of cooperation in NATO, which has contributed so greatly to the cause of freedom, and which is so vital to its advancement in the future, will be endangered .” It acknowledged that the “first essential, then, of a healthy and developing NATO lies in the whole-hearted acceptance by all its members of the political commitment for collective defence”, stating further on that: “There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.” The core of the report focused on defining security in a broad sense, going well beyond military matters alone. “ From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognised that while defence cooperation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough. It has also become increasingly realised since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic cooperation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battle-ship or the equipping of an army .” Within the five areas examined – political, economic, cultural, cooperation in the field of information and organization and functions – the principal recommendations were the following: Political cooperation Members should inform the North Atlantic Council of any development significantly affecting the Alliance; they should do this not as a formality, but as a preliminary to effective political consultation; Both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise in the North Atlantic Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character; A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible; In developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the North Atlantic Council; Where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When, for national reasons, the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more important that, when an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the North Atlantic Council's discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national action or policies related to the subject of that recommendation. The “Three Wise Men” also recommended that the Council adopt a resolution on the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes and made some specific recommendations to strengthen the consultation procedure. These included initiatives such as submitting disputes between member countries to NATO before resorting to another international agency, except disputes of a legal or an economic character. Economic cooperation The report highlighted the importance of close economic relations between members, as well a good understanding of each other’s interests and concerns: “… there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests ”. However, even if the report did not recommend that NATO take on a lead role in this area, it suggested that there should be “… NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved; particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole. ” The report recommended that a Committee of Economic Advisers be established and also encouraged cooperation in the field of science and technology. Cultural cooperation The Three Wise Men underlined the importance of cultural cooperation between member countries. “ A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realization of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought .” To put this in practice, they proposed straight-forward initiatives such as preparing NATO courses and seminars for teachers; broadening support to other educational initiatives such as NATO fellowships; the use of NATO information materials in schools; and promoting closer relations between NATO and youth organizations; and financing cultural projects, with a common benefit. Cooperation in the information field The NATO Information Service was established in 1950, but to bolster its efforts, the “Three Wise Men” recommended that national information officers be designated to disseminate information material. Other initiatives were suggested, such as having this material translated into as many non-official NATO languages of the Alliance as possible and broadening NATO’s target audiences to include youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Organization and functions The proposals under this section were formulated with the full implementation of the report recommendations in mind. They included suggestions for improvement such as encouraging discussion rather than just declarations of policy at ministerial meetings, strengthening links between the Council and member countries and reinforcing the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff. Impact of the Report The Council approved the report on 13 December 1956 and in May 1957 inaugurated procedures based on the Committee’s recommendations. Immediate results were mixed. As a direct result the NATO Science Programme was launched that year. It sought to promote collaborative projects and to facilitate exchange and maximise return for resources spent on research. Another immediate impact was the creation of national information officers and targeted national information programmes, and the establishment of the Committee of Political Advisers (later to become the Political Committee) and the Committee of Economic Advisers in 1957. Paul-Henri Spaak, a proponent of non-military cooperation, became Secretary General of NATO the same year. However, even though a strong advocate of consultation was now at the head of the Organization, controversial issues continued to be largely ignored by members before the Council. Political consultation itself was a gradual process which took many years to come to fruition. In a NATO monograph on the issue in 1963 the International Staff noted: “ the creation of the NATO consultation system is, in itself, an achievement of the highest order. In fact, seen against the background of the centuries-old history of frustrated efforts in organizing and using political cooperation as an instrument to prevent armed aggression, NATO’s success in a) achieving continuity of consultation, and in b) creating the necessary permanent consultative organs is all the more impressive. ” NATO Historical Officer, NHO(63)1 While there have been occasions where timing, security and geographical responsibilities have made using the consultative NATO framework problematic for members, the number of these cases remain few said the monograph. “The criteria of the ‘Three Wise Men’ may have been in the nature of ideal objectives. If they have not been realised, this may have been due in certain cases to a lack of imagination among governments, unable at times to recognise ‘the common interest’ of certain problems.” In addition and similarly to the Harmel Report published in 1967, the Report of the Three Wise Men contributed to broadening the strategic framework within which the Alliance operated. Both reports could be perceived as NATO’s first steps toward a more cooperative approach to security issues. The Alliance continues to build upon the principles set out in the Committee’s report to this day.
Trafficking in human beings, NATO policy on combating -
NATO policy on combating trafficking in human beings © Van Parys Media The Alliance initiated a zero-tolerance policy on human trafficking, which was endorsed at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. The policy commits NATO member countries and other troop-contributing nations participating in NATO-led operations to reinforce efforts to prevent and combat such activity. The issue is kept under regular review by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The policy was also opened to the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries, as well as four partners across the globe (Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the New Zealand) and remaining operational partners (Colombia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Singapore, Tonga) in January 2011. NATO member countries are all signatories to the UN Protocol on Trafficking in Persons. The Allies are keenly aware that human trafficking fuels corruption and organized crime, and therefore runs counter to NATO’s stabilization efforts in its theatres of operation. These considerations led to the development of the NATO policy on combating trafficking in human beings. NATO does not see itself as the primary organization to combat trafficking in human beings, but is working to add value wherever it can. The policy was developed in consultation with EAPC countries and non-NATO troop contributors, as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations. The zero-tolerance policy calls for military and civilian personnel and contractors taking part in NATO-led operations to receive appropriate training on standards of their behavior during the operations. The Allies also agreed to review national legislation and report on national efforts in this regard. In theatre, NATO-led forces, operating within the limits of their mandate, support the responsible host-country authorities in their efforts to combat trafficking in human beings. Much of the responsibility for implementing the policy was assigned to NATO’s Military Committee given that it is troops from NATO and non-NATO nations participating in NATO-led operations who are the most likely to come into contact with trafficked individuals and trafficking rings. Guidance was then issued by the Strategic Commanders. The policy is kept under review to make sure that it’s effectively implemented by Allies and Partners as well as NATO as an organization. A regular comprehensive review is conducted to provide policy and practical recommendations. These include measures to strengthen policies and provisions in specific operations, to enhance training and awareness raising among NATO forces as well as the evaluation and reporting of all related activities. A Senior Coordinator on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (the NATO ASG for Defence Policy and Planning) coordinates all Alliance efforts in this field. Developing policies and provisions in specific operations The Alliance is working to ensure that the entire chain of command in every operation is aware of the NATO policy. Within existing operations the Allies are developing specific policy provisions, which do not exceed NATO’s mandate, for the role of NATO-led forces in supporting the authorities of the host country in combating the trafficking of human beings. Specific policy provisions have been developed and incorporated into the operational plans relating to Afghanistan and Balkans to reflect the NATO policy and relevant guidance, as well as to raise the awareness of personnel. The appropriate role for NATO forces in this area is to support activities to the local authorities and relevant international organizations. Maintaining close contact with the host country is vital. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is tasked to provide support to the Government of Afghanistan in countering human trafficking. ISAF works alongside and shares information with the Afghan security forces. ISAF holds weekly meetings with the International Organisation for Migration, which has been designated as the lead agency on the issue by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). ISAF also liaises regularly with the German police project, the UNAMA Human Rights Unit, the UNAMA Gender Advisor, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. In Kosovo, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has the lead on the issue. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) supports the UNMIK police (UNMIK-P) which has the executive responsibility. Training and raising awareness among Allied forces Training and raising awareness among NATO forces is essentially the responsibility of the individual troop-contributing nation. Yet the Alliance is addressing the issue in a number of courses for the military personnel of both NATO and Partner countries at the NATO Defense College in Rome and NATO School in Oberammergau ( NSO ), Germany. Options for enhancing training in this area are being considered. The NSO also provides two Advanced Distant Learning courses related to combating trafficking in human beings, which are available to all those that may want to use them. Moreover, since 2008, the Turkish PfP Training Center organizes a bi-annual course on “Fight Against Trafficking in Human Beings”, which is open to military and civilians from NATO, PfP, MD and ICI countries. Accountability under the zero-tolerance policy Nations contributing troops to NATO-led operations are required to ensure that members of their forces – as well as civilian elements –- who engage in human trafficking or facilitate it, are liable to appropriate prosecution and punishment under their national legislation. Senior NATO commanders could ask for the repatriation of any offenders.
Training and education
Education and training NATO conducts education and training to ensure that forces from member countries are effective and interoperable, and as part of its cooperation with non-member countries. The three main purposes are to increase the interoperability and effectiveness of NATO-led multinational forces, assist partner countries in their reform efforts, and help bring peace and stability to crisis-hit areas. Education and training are key agents for transformation. They are complementary activities which reinforce each other. Education focuses on the function of explaining concepts, doctrines and practices and teaching procedures, for instance English language classes and history. Training focuses on practicing and applying that knowledge, which helps to assimilate the subject matter completely. Exercises take training a step further by testing acquired knowledge during real-life or computer-assisted exercises with a scenario involving large numbers of participants from a broad range of countries. Historically, NATO education and training has been focused on ensuring that military forces from member countries can work together effectively in operations and missions. Today, NATO education and training functions have expanded significantly both geographically and institutionally. Geographically, NATO is working with a larger number of countries through its cooperation with partner countries and through the creation of NATO training missions as far away as Afghanistan and Africa. Institutionally, education and training have been reinforced through the creation, in 2002, of Allied Command Transformation, entirely dedicated to leading the ongoing transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. Subsequently, the introduction of new bodies and initiatives has also demonstrated the resolve to reinforce education and training activities for the Organization. At the Chicago Summit in 2012, NATO leaders stressed the importance of expanding education and training, especially within the context of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). CFI aims to ensure the ability of forces to communicate and work with each other. At the most basic level, this implies individuals understanding each other and, at a higher level, the use of common doctrines, concepts and procedures, as well as interoperable equipment. Forces also need to increasingly practice working together through joint and combined training and exercising, after which they need to standardize skills and make better use of technology. 1 CFI seeks to make greater use of education, training and exercises to reinforce links between the forces of NATO member countries and maintain the level of interoperability needed for future operations. 1 Joint training means forces from two or more military departments working under a single command and combined forces are forces from different countries working under a single command. Purpose and practical implementation As explained above, the three main purposes of NATO’s education and training programmes are to increase the interoperability and effectiveness of NATO-led multinational forces, assist partner countries in their reform efforts, and help bring peace and stability to crisis-hit areas. Enhancing interoperability Troops for NATO operations are drawn from many different countries: the forces of NATO member and partner countries, as well as from countries which are not NATO member or partner countries. Ensuring that these multinational forces can work together effectively despite differences in tactics, doctrine, training, structures, and language is a priority for NATO. This “interoperability” is built in a number of ways. Courses and seminars NATO’s network of educational institutions offers a broad range of courses on both strategic and operational issues. While courses differ, they tend to focus on knowledge and skills required by individuals who will occupy senior or specialised positions within the structure of the Alliance, or who hold NATO-related posts in their own countries. The NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, is NATO’s primary strategic-level educational facility and includes areas of study such as trends in the international security environment and their potential effects on NATO countries. It provides training for senior commanders. The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany is the primary operational-level training centre for students. Operational-level training focuses on joint planning of NATO operations, logistics, communications, civil emergency planning, or civil-military cooperation. Courses are being offered in an increasing number of locations to ensure all available expertise is being utilised, for instance, civil-military training at the Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Centre of Excellence, the Netherlands. Courses vary in duration (from a day to several months) and are open to personnel from NATO member countries and some to personnel from countries participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as selected “partners across the globe” (countries which are neither NATO members nor partner countries, also referred to as “global partners”). Some are also open to civilian participants. Experimentation and development NATO is constantly trying to improve the way its forces operate. In line with its transformation agenda, the Alliance is continuing to focus on the development of new concepts and capabilities to ensure future NATO forces are trained and equipped to the highest possible standard. NATO countries conduct their own experimentation. The Alliance provides a forum for members to engage in knowledge-sharing regarding concepts and capabilities. It does this through Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which leads the transformation of NATO’s military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. ACT enhances training, particularly of commanders and staff, conducts experiments to assess new concepts and promotes interoperability throughout the Alliance. Exercises Exercises provide opportunities to test and validate all aspects of NATO operations, including procedures, concepts, systems, and tactics. Exercises also build and reinforce interoperability by focusing on practical training for personnel from NATO countries and partners with which the Alliance cooperates. Working with NATO partners on defence reform NATO members have reduced levels of military personnel, equipment and bases from Cold War levels and transformed their forces to meet today’s needs. Many partner countries are still going through this process, often with scarce resources and limited expertise. In 2005, NATO started developing an “Education and Training for Defence Reform” (EfR) initiative that provides a framework for cooperation for both military and civilian personnel. EfR helps educators incorporate principles linked to defence institution building into their curricula. Since the courses are aimed at civil servants and other persons participating in defence institution building, they contribute indirectly to improving defence reform. Education is effectively a key agent of transformation and NATO is using it to support institutional reform in partner countries. The Alliance’s education and training programmes initially focused on increasing interoperability between NATO and partner forces. They have since been expanded to provide a means for members and partners to collaborate on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defence and military domain. Courses, seminars and workshops Partner countries which work with NATO are able to participate in an array of NATO education activities – courses, roundtables, seminars, and workshops. Tailor-made defence education Each partner country participating in defence reform agrees on an individualised programme with NATO that varies in depth and breadth, depending on its interests and level of commitment and cooperation. This can include tailor-made education programmes such as on-the-job training, language training, and resettlement and retraining of redundant military personnel. NATO is leading a series of tailored programmes called the Defence Education Enhancement Programmes (DEEPs), through which the Alliance advises partners on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defence and military domain. DEEPs focus on faculty building or so-called “educate the educators” programmes. They can cover areas such as how to teach leadership and critical thinking, and can be extended beyond the initial three-year period. This reflection on “what to teach” and “how to teach” has led to two initiatives. One resulted in the development of generic reference curricula on defence institution building, on professional military education for officers and on professional military education for non-commissioned officers. The latter gave birth to a Defence Educators’ Programme, which provides an opportunity for faculty members to exchange experiences and views with their peers on best practices on modern teaching methodologies. Both initiatives are the subject of regular workshops and conferences to continue strengthening defence institution building in countries of the former Soviet Union in particular. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany often hosts these events. This centre helps to forge deeper security cooperation and provide a variety of programmes for leaders from North America, Europe and Eurasia, while supporting US and German national security strategies. There are currently a total of 12 DEEPs in Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. They are run with the support of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (see “Additional training institutions and organisations” for explanations), the Partnership Training and Education Centres (idem) and Allied as well as partner defence institutions. NATO also manages an international professional network which brings together defence and military educators from Allied and partner countries to exchange experience in teaching methodologies and help those in need. A large part of this effort is focused on Afghanistan. Advice and expertise NATO countries are among the most advanced in the world in terms of defence capabilities. Countries cooperating with the Alliance on defence reform are able to take advantage of this expertise. For most countries, this is done through the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP), a mechanism that helps to identify partner forces and capabilities that could be available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations. Countries with special relationships with NATO can have additional mechanisms for exchanging advice and expertise. For instance, the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform provides a forum through which consultation can take place on initiatives as diverse as civil-military relations, democratic oversight and civilian management of the armed forces and other security sector agencies, defence planning, policy, strategy and national security concepts. Moreover, NATO-led multinational teams of experts can visit partner countries to address the education and training requirements listed in the individual action plans of the countries concerned. This has been the case, for instance, for the South Caucasus countries and Moldova, as well as Mauritania. An initiative for the Mediterranean and the Middle East A dedicated Middle East faculty has been established at the NATO Defense College in Rome as part of the NATO Regional Cooperation Course. Education and training in NATO-led operations NATO’s efforts to bring stability to crisis areas go beyond deploying troops. Through education and training programmes, NATO is helping countries such as Afghanistan develop its own security institutions and provide for its own security. Afghanistan An important aspect of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan is assisting the country in developing its security structures and forces. NATO’s Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established in November 2009, bringing together NATO and national efforts under one umbrella and working closely with Afghan authorities. Its key tasks include the training and mentoring of the Afghan National Security Forces, support to the Afghan National Army’s institutional training base, and the reform of the Afghan National Police at the district level and below. The Alliance also deployed Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams to Afghan National Army units at various levels of command. These gradually evolved into Military Advisory Teams and Police Advisory Teams, more generally known as Security Force Assistance Teams. In 2006, NATO signed a declaration with Afghanistan, establishing a substantial programme of long-term cooperation. This Afghan Cooperation Programme provides for further training assistance, including opening NATO courses and partnership activities to Afghan participation, providing advice and expertise on defence reform and the development of security institutions, as well as specific assistance such as language training. Subsequently, on 20 November 2010, NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed a Declaration on an Enduring Partnership at the NATO Summit in Lisbon. The Enduring Partnership is intended to provide long-term political and practical support to Afghanistan as it rebuilds its security institutions and assumes full responsibility for its own security through the transition process. It includes a series of agreed programmes and activities undertaken as part of the ongoing cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan. This includes the Professional Military Education Programme for Afghanistan, which aims to further develop Afghan institutions. NATO and Russia also are collaborating through the NATO-Russia Council on a counter-narcotics training pilot project tailored to Afghan and Central Asian personnel. The African Union At the request of the African Union (AU), NATO assisted the AU (June 2005-end December 2007) in strengthening its peacekeeping force in Darfur in a bid to halt the continuing violence. Initially, NATO’s support consisted in training AU troops in strategic-level planning and operational procedures. It provided support to a UN-led map exercise and later, in summer 2006, provided training assistance in the fields of pre-deployment certification and “lessons learned”, as well as information management. Additionally, NATO has been providing subject matter experts to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007, offering expertise in areas such as maritime planning, air movement coordination and logistics. NATO also provides expert and training support to the African Standby Force (ASF), at the AU’s request. The ASF is part of the AU’s efforts to develop long-term peacekeeping capabilities. Iraq From 2004 to end 2011, NATO helped Iraq provide for its own security by training Iraqi personnel and supporting the development of the country’s security institutions. NATO trained and mentored middle- and senior-level personnel from the Iraqi security forces in Iraq and outside of Iraq, at NATO schools and training centres. The Alliance also played a role in coordinating offers of equipment and training from individual NATO member and partner countries. The training bodies and institutions There are a number of main bodies through which education and training is organised and run. Some operate under the direction of the Alliance and others are external, but complementary to Alliance structures. Allied Command Transformation Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was created as part of the reorganisation of NATO’s Command Structure in 2002. It holds lead responsibility for NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) joint education, individual training, and associated policy and doctrine development as well as for directing NATO schools. Since July 2012, ACT has also been given the responsibility of managing collective training and exercises based on Allied Command Operations’ requirements. All of the entities attached to ACT fulfil an education and training function. For detailed information, please refer to the “Allied Command Transformation” A to Z page. Additional training institutions and organisations These are entities that have a relationship with NATO, but are typically administered by sponsor countries, national authorities or civil organisations. They are open to participation by personnel from NATO member and partner countries. Centres of Excellence These are centres that have been accredited by NATO. One of their roles is to provide high-quality education and training to the Euro-Atlantic community. They are funded nationally or multi-nationally and their relationship with NATO is formalised through memoranda of understanding. The first Centres of Excellence to be fully accredited by NATO were the Joint Air Power Competence Centre in Germany and the Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence in Turkey. Many more have been established since then. Partnerships Training and Education Centres Partnerships Training and Education Centresfocus on the operational and tactical levels of a military operation. Each one has a different area of expertise and provides enhanced training and facilities for personnel from all partner countries. There are currently 24 Partnerships Training and Education Centres, which now go beyond the original Euro-Atlantic borders to include Egypt and Jordan. Education and training activities conducted within these centres are related to NATO partnership programmes and policies. The NATO School in Oberammergau and ACT co-chair the annual conference of the Commandants of the Partnerships Training and Education Centres. This commmunity has been opened to the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). In April 2011, NATO adopted a concept for Partnerships Training and Education Centres. It is based on the “Policy for a More Efficient and Flexible Partnership”, which states that “all partners will be offered deeper political and practical engagement with the Alliance, including through support for defence education, training and capacity building, within existing resources.” With this initiative, NATO has committed itself to supporting interested partners in developing their defence education and training capacities even further. Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes The PfP Consortium was established in 1999 to help promote education in security-related topics. It does this by facilitating cooperation between both civilian and military institutions in NATO and PfP countries in support of NATO priorities such as defence institution building and defence reform. In 2008 for instance, the PfP Consortium produced what is called a reference curriculum on the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB). This document aims to provide partner countries with in-depth learning objectives and curriculum support for academic courses focused on reforming or building defence institutions. In 2011, a similar reference curriculum was produced on professional military education for officers and, more recently, one has been developed for non-commissioned officers. The PfP Consortium is also running an Educators’ Programme to familiarise partners with modern teaching methodologies and is supporting Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in education-related aspects of their Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs). The PfP Consortium establishes working groups where experts, policy-makers, and defence and security practitioners pool information and develop products such as educational tools or scholarly publications. Participating organisations include universities, research institutions and training centres. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany, forms the Secretariat. Education and training: a key activity since 1949 Collective education and training has been ongoing since the inception of the Alliance in 1949. Over time, it has expanded dramatically and has become an integral aspect of the Alliance’s ability to provide security. Interoperability In the early years of the Alliance, NATO forces conducted joint training to strengthen their ability to practice collective defence. In other words, education and training was conducted to ensure that forces were prepared in the case of an attack. An integrated force under centralised command An integrated force under centralised command was called for as early as September 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was appointed in December 1950. Following this appointment, national forces were put under centralised command. The Alliance’s first exercises The Alliance’s first exercises were held in the autumn of 1951. During 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO. From this point on, NATO forces began to gain cohesion. Education for individuals Individual education soon followed. The need for a specialised setting to explore issues unique to the Alliance was first recognised by General Eisenhower in April 1951. The NATO Defense College was inaugurated later that year, on 19 November and was transferred from Paris to Rome, Italy in 1966, where it is still located. The NATO Communications and Information Systems School in Latina, Italy was established in 1959, when a civil contractor began to train a small number of NATO personnel on what would become NATO's ‘ACE HIGH Communications System.’ On 2 May of the same year, the NATO Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, Italy was commissioned. During the 2002 reform process, this Undersea Research Centre was moved to the agency structure of the Alliance as an organisational element linked to research. In 1971, the Military Committee established the NATO Training Group. The NATO Training Group met for many years in joint session with the Euro-training sub-group, which was set up to improve multinational training arrangements between European countries (its responsibilities were passed on to NATO in 1993). The NATO Training Group was formally transferred from the Military Committee to Allied Command Transformation in 2004. Its principal aim is to improve interoperability among Allies and, additionally, between the forces of partner countries. In 1975, the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, received its charter and present name. For almost 25 years, its principal focus was on issues relating to collective defence. More recently in 2003, the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center was established at Souda Bay, Greece to conduct training for NATO forces in surface, sub-surface, aerial surveillance and special operations activities. It does this through theoretical and practical training programmes, as well as through simulations. NATO training opens to partners Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has increased its political engagement with non-member countries and opened its education and training to these countries. Partnership for Peace countries When NATO invited former Warsaw Pact countries, former Soviet Republics and non-member western European countries to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994, participating countries committed to increase interoperability with NATO forces. This opened the way for joint training and marked the beginning of NATO’s support for defence reform. NATO training institutions soon followed suit. The first officers’ course for partner countries was conducted in October 1994 at the NATO Communications and Information Systems School. Similarly, the NATO Defense College integrated PfP issues into its Senior Course. Mediterranean Dialogue countries The Mediterranean Dialogue was likewise created in 1994, initially as a forum for political dialogue. In 1997, at a meeting in Sintra, Portugal, the Alliance decided to open selected military training activities to countries participating in this initiative (currently seven countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). Increasing cooperation with all partners In 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council approved the creation of the Partnership for Peace Consortium and at the 1999 Washington Summit NATO leaders approved plans for an “Enhanced and More Operational Partnership”. In addition, with the revision of the NATO Strategic Concept in 1999, the role of the NATO School was fundamentally altered to include cooperation and dialogue with civilian personnel from non-NATO countries. In May 2002, the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal was established. This facility’s mission is to perform joint analysis and experimentation of operations, training and exercises, also with partners. In February 2005, the North Atlantic Council noted the Education and Training for Defence Reform (EfR). EfR helps EAPC educators incorporate principles linked to defence institution building into their curricula. Since the courses are aimed at civil servants and other persons participating in defence institution building, they contribute indirectly to improving defence reform. Transformation through training With the creation of the two new strategic commands in 2002, the coordination and coherence of NATO education and training activities was greatly increased. This led to the creation of additional training institutions and initiatives. New training centres A Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway was inaugurated on 23 October 2003. The Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland, inaugurated on 31 March 2004, supports training for both NATO and partner forces to improve joint and combined tactical interoperability. Stepping up training and partnerships At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, Alliance leaders elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative to a genuine partnership, to include increased participation in exercises and individual training at NATO institutions. Provision was also made for cooperation on defence reform. At the same time, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was introduced, which paved the way for cooperation between NATO and countries from the broader Middle East (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) in areas such as education and training. This Summit also made provision for partners to engage in joint training to combat terrorism and to train jointly with the NATO Response Force. NATO’s efforts on defence reform gained added momentum with the creation of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building, which outlines what NATO and partners want to achieve in this area. The Chicago Summit in 2012 reiterated the importance of education and training for the future of the Alliance, a statement which was reinforced by the introduction of the Connected Forces Initiative.
Treaty, The Washington -
Washington Treaty The foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were officially laid down on 4th April 1949 with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, more popularly known as the Washington Treaty. It is a model of brevity and provides for in-built flexibility on all fronts. Without the original text being modified at any stage, the Alliance has been able to adapt to a changing security environment through time and each Ally can implement the text in accordance with its capabilities and circumstances. The Treaty derives its authority from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent right of independent states to individual or collective defence. Collective defence is at the heart of the Washington Treaty and is enshrined in Article 5. It commits members to protect each other and sets a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance. Only 14 articles long, the Treaty is one of the shortest documents of its kind. The carefully crafted articles were the subject of several months of discussion and negotiations before the Treaty could actually be signed by the 12 founding members in the Departmental Auditorium in Washington D.C. There were several areas of contention on fundamental issues such as the duration of the Treaty, its geographical scope, membership and the rights and obligations implied by Article 5. Once signed, the Treaty gave birth to the Alliance and only later did a fully-fledged organization develop. Strictly speaking, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides the structure which enables the goals of the Alliance to be implemented. To date, those goals have not fundamentally changed nor the Treaty been rewritten. The only so-called “amendments” made so far stem from the series of accession protocols which have been added as new members join, illustrating the foresight of its drafters and their ability to marry international concerns and objectives with national interests. Political context of the Alliance’s birth The hostilities that had characterized relations between soviet and western powers since 1917 gradually re-emerged at the end of the Second World War. This “East-West” divide was fuelled by conflicting interests and political ideologies. There were clashes over peace agreements and reparations, and tensions were exacerbated by events such as the Berlin blockade in April 1948, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and direct threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece and Turkey. As the power of the Soviet Union spread to several Eastern European countries, there was concern among Western European countries that the USSR would impose its ideology and authority across Europe. From 1945, Western governments started reducing their defence establishments and demobilizing their forces. But in January 1948, Bristish Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin spoke of the need for a “treaty of alliance and mutual assistance”, a defensive alliance and a regional grouping within the framework of the UN Charter. The United States would only agree to provide military support for Europe if it were united. In response, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, signed the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, creating the Western Union. Designed to strengthen ties between the signatories while providing for a common defence system, the Brussels Treaty ultimately became the basis for the Washington Treaty. In the meantime, the US Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution – a resolution that would change the course of American foreign policy since it allowed the United States to constitutionally participate in a mutual defence system in times of peace. The ground was set for negotiations to start on a transatlantic treaty. Negotiating and drafting the Treaty The talks on what would become the Washington Treaty took place between the powers of the Brussels Treaty (except Luxembourg, which was represented by Belgium) plus the United States and Canada. Representatives from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States constituted the core drafting team, but participants from other countries also contributed to the initial discussions, with the assistance of a working group. What has been coined as the “six-power talks” gave birth to the Washington Paper, issued 9 September 1948, which contained an outline of possible future articles for the Treaty. Formal public treaty negotiations began 10 December 1948 with the Ambassadors Committee in Washington, D.C. For these talks, Luxembourg sent its own representative. Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy were later invited to the final sessions of negotiations, which began 8 March 1949. Although the participating countries agreed that collective defence would be at the heart of the new Alliance, several other issues were still not resolved and needed to be worked out before the formation of the Alliance could become a reality. Collective defence Views on the implementation of Article 5 differed. The United States had previously taken a stance of officially avoiding foreign entanglements. Because of this, it was concerned that Article 5 would draw the country into a conflict through treaty obligations. Something had to be put in place to allow for the US to send aid to attacked countries without having to declare war. The European countries, on the other hand, wanted to ensure that the United States would come to their aid if one of the signatories came under attack. The United States refused to make this pledge and believed US public opinion would not follow so they proposed an option that would allow each country to assist other signatories “as it deems necessary.” In other words, there would be no automatic declaration of war or obligation to commit militarily on the part of member countries; the action to be taken would be up to each individual member country. Ultimately, the American viewpoint on collective defence won out. Political and military cooperation Some drafters wanted more than just military cooperation between signatories. They wanted to expand cooperation to social and economic cooperation, but there were differing views on how to treat non-military issues. Ultimately, Article 2 went through, and now forms the basis of the Alliance’s political and non-military work. Article 2 is reinforced by Article 4, which encourages the Allies to “consult together” whenever they consider it necessary, therefore facilitating consensus-building. The practice of regularly exchanging information and consulting together strengthens the links between governments and knowledge of their respective preoccupations so that they can agree on common policies or take action more easily. Geographical scope of the Alliance The geographical scope of the Alliance, both in terms of membership and area of responsibility, was yet another topic on which the negotiators had a difference of opinion. The United States and the United Kingdom saw NATO as more of a regional organization while other countries, such as France, felt it should take on a more global role. Ultimately Article 6 of the Washington Treaty details specific countries in the North Atlantic area, along with the caveat that in certain conditions the Alliance’s responsibility could be extended as far south as the Tropic of Cancer to encompass any islands, vessels or aircrafts attacked in that area. However, according to one of the original drafters, Theodore C. Achilles, there was no doubt in anybody’s minds that NATO operations could also be conducted south of the Tropic of Cancer and basically, worldwide. This interpretation of the Treaty was reaffirmed by foreign ministers in Reyjavik in May 2002 in the context of the fight against terrorism: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.” Membership of the Alliance In terms of whom to invite to join the Alliance, again the drafters held diverging views. The United Kingdom wanted to keep the Alliance small and strong, avoiding commitments to peripheral countries, while the United States advocated inviting weaker countries or countries that were more likely to fall to Soviet aggression. France, on the other hand, was mainly concerned with protecting its colonial territories. Of concern to all three countries was Germany, whose membership was not immediately considered due to the complexity of its situation. The drafters also discussed inviting Italy, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Iceland and the Scandinavian countries, essentially for their strategic value. Italy, Portugal and Iceland were among the founding members and ultimately, Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952. Iceland linked its membership to that of Denmark and Norway, which also joined in 1949; Sweden, on the other hand, categorically refused to have any links with NATO. Consideration was also given to offering membership to Ireland, Iran, Austria and Spain, but the idea was dropped largely due to internal conditions in each country. Colonial territories The status of colonial territories was one of the biggest bones of contention in the drafting of the Washington Treaty. France insisted on including Algeria, while Belgium requested the Congo’s inclusion. However, the United States and Canada wanted to exclude all colonial territory, the main concern being that NATO would end up having to resolve problems stemming from the native population of overseas territories. Ultimately, the drafters granted France’s request to include Algeria¹, which had been fully integrated into the French political and administrative organization as a French department, but rejected Belgium’s request regarding the Congo. Duration of the Treaty The negotiating countries disagreed on how long the treaty should last. Some countries favoured a long-term agreement that would set the initial duration at 20 years, while others feared that anything beyond 10 years would be seen as an unnecessary extension of the war effort. Finally, at the insistence of Portugal, the Treaty was made valid for a 10-year period, after which the Treaty could be reviewed (Article 12); and only after the Treaty had been in force for 20 years could a member withdraw from the Organization (Article 13). To date, these two provisions have never been used, i.e., the Treaty has never been reviewed nor a member withdrawn from the Organization. 1. The Article dealing with French Algeria no longer became applicable from 3 July 1962, following the independence of Algeria. The Treaty and its fundamental values and principles Once Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States came to an agreement on the various areas of contention, they drafted a new document that would establish the North Atlantic Alliance. On 4 April 1949, the 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty in the city which lends the Treaty its nickname: Washington D.C. The treaty committed each member to share the risk, responsibilities and benefits of collective security and required them not to enter into any international commitments that conflicted with the Treaty. It also committed them to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and stated that NATO members formed a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In addition to collective defence and key values, the principle of consensus decision-making and the importance of consultation define the spirit of the Organization, together with its defensive nature and its flexibility.
Troop contributions When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO member and partner countries volunteer personnel, equipment, and resources for the mission. These national contributions operate under the aegis of the Alliance. NATO is an alliance of 28 sovereign countries, which does not possess military forces of its own. While personnel serving in a NATO operation are often referred to collectively as “NATO forces”, they are actually multinational forces composed of individuals, formations and equipment drawn from NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries or other troop-contributing countries. The procedure for staffing an operation or mission is often referred to as “force generation”. This procedure ensures that Alliance operations or missions have the manpower and materials required to achieve set objectives. Obtaining troop contributions for operations and missions The final decision on whether to contribute troops and equipment to a NATO-led operation or mission is taken by national capitals, which communicate continuously with NATO through their permanent diplomatic missions, national military representation, or partnership liaison teams. Force generation When a NATO operation or mission is deemed necessary, NATO’s military authorities draft a concept of operations – referred to as a CONOPS – which outlines the troop and equipment requirements necessary to meet the operations’ or mission’s objectives. Upon approval of the concept of operations and the release of a “Force Activation Directive” by the North Atlantic Council, Allied Command Operations (ACO), led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, initiates the force generation and activation process. In general, the force generation process follows a standard procedure. For a given operation or mission, a list of personnel and equipment requirements (the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements), is produced by ACO and sent to NATO member countries and, in some cases, partner countries. National offers to provide personnel are addressed during conferences attended by representatives from NATO and partner countries. These conferences take place on an ad hoc basis as required. For example, a force generation conference will take place prior to the start of a new operation or mission, or if there are significant changes in an ongoing operation. In addition to these conferences, an annual conference is held for all operations and missions, the Global Force Generation Conference. Contributions by individual countries, both NATO members and partners, are subject to their overall national capacity, taking into account prior commitments, force size, structure, and activity level. Every contribution, whether big or small, is valuable and contributes to the success of the operation or mission. In many cases, NATO or partner countries will commit complete or formed units to operations or missions. A country may volunteer to send a complete battle group, which – in the case of ground forces – could include infantry personnel, an armoured reconnaissance element, an artillery battery to provide fire support, and service support personnel. Countries that provide leadership for an entire operation or mission, or take responsibility for central elements, are identified as “lead.” For example, the lead country for a given operation or mission might provide the command element and a significant part of the forces, and will also be responsible for filling the remainder of the force required. Although NATO as an Alliance does own and maintain some specialised equipment, such as the AWACS aircraft and strategic communications equipment, troop-contributing countries generally commit the equipment necessary to support their personnel in pursuit of operational objectives. Caveats It is during the force generation process that caveats are stated. While national contributions to NATO operations are expected to operate under the Alliance’s chain of command, the provision of forces by NATO and partner countries is sometimes conditional on factors such as geography, logistics, time, rules of engagement, or command status. Known as “caveats,” these conditions can restrict NATO commanders by limiting their flexibility to respond to situations on the ground. For this reason, the Alliance seeks national contributions with as few caveats as possible. Provincial Reconstruction Teams Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), such as those established in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), constitute an exception to the normal force generation process. In contrast to traditional military operations, PRTs are interdisciplinary. That is, they are comprised of development workers, military forces, diplomats and civilian police, who work to extend the authority of the central Afghan government in remote areas, and to facilitate development and reconstruction. Because of the unique combination of personnel, NATO is involved in generating forces for the military component of a PRT, while it is the responsibility of the contributing country to staff the civilian components. As a result, PRTs are a hybrid of personnel who fall under either NATO or national chains of command. Coordinating troop contributions for non-NATO operations Over the years, the Alliance has developed significant expertise in coordinating troop contributions for multinational operations. In the past, it has offered this expertise in support of non-NATO operations. Under the Berlin Plus agreement, the Alliance cooperates closely with the European Union (EU) in the resourcing of selected operations. When requested by the EU, NATO’s Deputy SACEUR and his staff provide support in coordinating member countries’ troop contributions. For example, the Deputy SACEUR was identified as operational commander for Operation Althea, the EU-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was responsible for force generation. NATO also provided force generation support to Germany and the Netherlands, during their leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in 2003 in Afghanistan, prior to its conversion into a NATO-led operation. Who decides? In determining troop contributions, ACO engages with the Military Committee, the North Atlantic Council, and individual countries, all of which have critical roles to play in bringing Alliance operations and missions to reality. ACO, commanded by SACEUR, is responsible for executing all Alliance operations and missions. The Deputy SACEUR and his staff coordinate troop contributions. Force generation through time For much of NATO’s history, the Alliance’s primary operational commitment was focused on the former border between East and West Germany. For over 40 years, NATO strategists spoke of medium and long-term “force plans” rather than “force generation” for specific operations. This was because during that time, the Alliance maintained static, “conventional” forces in former West Germany, poised for an attack from the former Soviet Union. Beginning 1986, conventional forces were reduced and, following the end of the Cold War, bases of individual NATO countries in Germany were largely dismantled or converted to other use, although some remain functional to this day. NATO’s first major land expeditionary operation took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. The NATO force generation process, which is still in use today, was developed during the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo. Transforming to meet operational needs While the core procedures for contributing troops and equipment remain valid, the process has been refined in tandem with NATO’s transformation. At their May 2002 meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, NATO foreign ministers decided that: "To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives." NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan in 2003 posed a number of new problems for force generation. It soon became apparent that the nature of the mission was different from previous tasks. Greater flexibility was needed in types and numbers of forces, from rotation to rotation, and from area to area. In addition, with many countries moving to smaller, more highly trained and highly equipped forces, it became unrealistic to expect large standing commitments from individual countries. The procedure for staffing an operation or mission was made more responsive to operational requirements. Communication between NATO commanders and member/partner countries was improved, allowing potential troop-contributing countries to be better informed about evolving operational requirements. The first Global Force Generation Conference was held in November 2003; Prior to this, force generation meetings had been called on an ad hoc basis as required. During this annual conference, troop and resource requirements for all NATO-led operations and missions are addressed at the same time. While ad hoc meetings are still necessary to address immediate needs, rolling numerous meetings into one facilitates improved coordination between and within troop-contributing countries and NATO military authorities. Lastly, NATO military planners are taking a longer view of force generation. While developments in operations, as well as political developments within troop-contributing countries, prohibit definitive troop and material commitments far into the future, NATO military planners are looking beyond immediate needs, which allows both the Alliance and troop-contributing countries to plan their resources better.
Trust Funds, Partnership -
Partnership Trust Funds Individual Allies and partners support practical demilitarization projects and defence transformation projects in non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, through individual Trust Funds. Trust Fund projects assist with the safe destruction of stockpiles of surplus and obsolete landmines, weapons and munitions. Another priority is to help manage the consequences of defence transformation through initiatives such as the retraining of former military personnel and converting military bases to civilian use. The Trust Fund policy is an integral part of NATO’s policy of developing practical security cooperation with partners. Any partner country having an individual programme of partnership and cooperation with NATO may request assistance. A specific Trust Fund is then established to allow individual NATO and partner countries to provide financial support on a voluntary basis. Originally, Trust Funds were developed in the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme – NATO’s programme of practical bilateral cooperation with non-member countries in Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. However, over the years, use of Trust Funds has been extended to countries of the Mediterranean and broader Middle East region, which participate in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as to Afghanistan. More recently, with the launch of NATO’s new partnership policy at the April 2011 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin, the Trust Fund mechanism was also opened to NATO’s other partners across the globe. By August 2013, Trust Fund projects across 12 countries have helped to destroy: 140 million rounds of small arms ammunition; 4.4 million landmines; 2 million hand grenades; 621,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO); 557,000 small arms and light weapons; 28,000 tonnes of various munitions, including 8,300 tonnes of cluster sub-munitions (15 million sub-munitions); 9,300 rockets and missiles; 2,620 tonnes of chemicals, including rocket fuel oxidiser (melange); more than 1,100 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). In addition, some 11,800 former military personnel in three countries have received retraining assistance through Trust Fund defence transformation projects. The destruction of surplus stockpiles of arms and munitions reduces the threat to individual partner countries as well as the wider region. It also ensures that such materials are put beyond the reach of terrorists and criminals. Highlights Promoting the safe destruction of surplus and obsolete landmines, weapons and munitions Building capacity in areas such as demining and munitions stockpile management Supporting the retraining and transition to civilian life of former military personnel Specific Trust Funds established for each project to allow individual NATO and partner countries to provide financial support on a voluntary basis Projects open to all NATO partner countries Project development Projects may be initiated by either NATO member states or partner countries. Each project is led on a voluntary basis by a lead nation, which is responsible for gathering political and financial support for the project as well as selecting the executing agent for the project. There can be several lead nations, and a partner country can also take that role. The beneficiary host nation is expected to provide maximum support to the project within its means. Informal discussions with the NATO International Staff help determine the scope of the project. Project proposals set out in detail the work to be undertaken, the costs involved and the implementation schedule. The formal launch of a project is the trigger to start raising funds. Subject to completion of formal legal agreements, work can start once sufficient funds have been received. Trust Fund projects seek to ensure adherence to the highest environmental, health and safety standards, and recycling of materials is an integral part of many projects. Local facilities and resources are used to implement projects, where possible, so as to build local capacity in the Partner countries concerned, ensuring sustainability. NATO cooperates actively with other international organizations and other relevant actors on Trust Fund projects to ensure coherence and effectiveness, as well as to avoid duplication of efforts. For example, NATO has to date cooperated closely with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which acts as the executing agent for the retraining Trust Fund projects in the Balkans; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the European Commission (EC); and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Project oversight and implementation The NATO Support Agency (NSPA) – formerly the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) –plays an essential role in the development and implementation of Trust Fund projects. It offers technical advice and a range of management services and has often been appointed to act as the executing agent for demilitarization projects by lead nations. This involves overseeing the development of project proposals as well as the competitive bidding process to ensure transparency and value for money in the execution of projects. Once the project proposal is agreed by the lead nation and the host nation, it is presented to the Political and Partnerships Committee in EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) format. This body serves as a formal forum to discuss the project and attract potential support and resources. ( More info on the NSPA website ) Evolution of Trust Fund policy The Trust Fund policy was established in September 2000 to assist Euro-Atlantic partner countries in the safe destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines. It provided the Alliance with a practical mechanism to assist Partners to meet their obligations under the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction. Initial success in the safe destruction of anti-personnel landmines led to an extension of the policy to include conventional munitions, as well as small arms and light weapons. In recent years, the scope of the Trust Fund policy has been further expanded to support wider defence transformation initiatives. It has also been extended geographically and is now open to all partner countries participating in NATO’s structured partnership frameworks – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative –as well as partners across the globe.
Turkmenistan, NATO’s relations with -
NATO’s relations with Turkmenistan Major General Yaylym Berdiyev, Minister of Defence of Turkmenistan, meets the Secretary General at NATO Headquarters NATO’s relations with Turkmenistan should be viewed through the Partnership for Peace framework, which Turkmenistan joined in 1994. Turkmenistan adheres to a policy of permanent neutrality and does not offer any armed forces units or infrastructure for use in the context of NATO-led operations. NATO and Turkmenistan actively cooperate in security-related, science and environmental issues and other areas. An Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP) lays out the programme of cooperation between NATO and Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan is expected to attend the meeting on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which is taking place in expanded format at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012. Framework for cooperation Regular political dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In addition, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, James Appathurai, conducts high-level political dialogue with Turkmen authorities. The NATO Liaison Officer in Central Asia also visits Ashgabat regularly and reviews cooperation with the government. NATO and Turkmenistan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through the country’s Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP). Turkmenistan’s cooperation with NATO aims at introducing and familiarizing Turkmen personnel with NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) issues, as well as enhancing deepening cooperation in areas such as border control and security, civil emergency planning, and defence planning. Turkmenistan is also participating actively in the NATO-Russia Council pilot project on counter-narcotics training for Afghan and Central Asian personnel. Key areas of cooperation Security cooperation Based on its policy of permanent neutrality, Turkmenistan does not offer any armed forces units or infrastructure in the context of NATO-led operations. However, Turkmenistan is prepared to contribute, on a case-by-case basis, to disaster relief, humanitarian and search and rescue operations. Every year, officials from Turkmenistan’s armed forces participate in a range of courses provided by NATO and NATO member states. Topics covered include arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, the law of armed conflicts, courses aimed at familiarizing officers with combating terrorism techniques and illegal trafficking issues, border security and control, defence planning and budgeting, language training, medical services and other areas. In the case of trafficking, in particular, Turkmenistan has worked with NATO to address several of these issues. Since 2006, Turkmenistan has sent numerous personnel to attend counter narcotics training sponsored by an initiative of the NATO-Russia Council. Civil emergency planning Civil emergency planning and disaster-relief coordination are key areas of cooperation. Turkmenistan is developing its civil response capacity for natural and man-made emergency situations in consultation with the Allies. It is also working to prepare Turkmenistan’s units to contribute to international disaster relief operations. This includes updating planning procedures and organization methods for rescue operations. To assist Turkmenistan with its intention of establishing a Ministry of Emergency Situations, NATO held a seminar on civilian emergency planning in Ashgabat in 2009. Personnel from the Civil Defence Department of the Turkmen Ministry of Defence and national civil emergency planning experts attended the seminar, which covered basic principles of disaster management and civil emergency planning. Science and environment Since its involvement with NATO’s science activities began in 1996, Turkmenistan scientists and experts have participated in over 30 activities. Additionally, under the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, Turkmenistan has received grant awards for over 8 cooperative projects for scientific, environmental and educational collaboration. These collaborative projects include studies into radiological risks and the safe handling of radioactive waste in Central Asia, oil spill risk prevention and pollution in the South Caspian Sea and strategic management of sensitive natural resources. Turkmenistan’s main priorities under the SPS Programme are defence against terrorism and countering security threats. To address these concerns, officials from Turkmenistan have previously participated in NATO funded projects, including an Advanced Training Course designed to teach the latest counter-terrorism methods and strategies in May 2010. As part of a networking project, teachers from European institutes trained Turkmen from different institutions, via internet-based distance-learning technologies. A grant awarded in 2008 supported the expansion of the academic and educational internet communication system in Turkmenistan, including the connection of additional academic centres in Ashgabat and medical colleges in other regions of the country, as well as training Turkmen researchers in how to use the network. Turkmenistan also participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to improve internet access for academics and research communities in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia through a satellite-based network. Public information NATO continues its information and outreach activities with Turkmenistan. In 2011, Turkmen parliamentarian and diplomatic officials visited NATO Headquarters for a series of information and discussion sessions on the current NATO's priorities, including its partnerships with Central Asian Republics. In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance. The current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Turkmenistan is the embassy of the United States. Evolution of relations NATO-Turkmenistan relations began in 1992, when the country joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC, in 1997). Relations further developed in 1994, when Turkmenistan joined the Partnership for Peace programme. Through this framework, cooperative initiatives have expanded to include a range of activities in which the aims of NATO and Turkmenistan coincide. Milestones 1992 Turkmenistan joins the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. 1994 Turkmenistan joins the Partnership for Peace (PfP). 1995 Turkmenistan and NATO agree on the country's first Individual Partnership Programme (IPP). 2002 Turkmenistan hosts regional PfP civil emergency planning courses. 2003 Turkmenistan is connected to the Virtual Silk Highway. 2007 The NATO Secretary General meets with the new Turkmen President at NATO Headquarters. Turkmenistan hosts a mobile training team of the NATO-Russia Council pilot project on counter-narcotics training for Afghan and Central Asian personnel. 2008 Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov participates in the NATO Summit meeting in Bucharest. 2009 Turkmenistan hosts a NATO seminar on civilian emergency planning in Ashgabat. 2010 Major General Yaylym Berdiyev, Minister of Defence of Turkmenistan, meets the Secretary General at NATO Headquarters.