

Allemagne  
GREWE

Last week my authorities have examined the <sup>status</sup> ~~present~~ of <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ studies and the prospects for a practical <sup>outcome</sup> ~~result~~ of the exercise on the future tasks of the Alliance.

They have <sup>instructed</sup> ~~asked~~ me to express the appreciation of the German Government with respect to all the efforts undertaken so far.

This applies to the Belgian Foreign Minister, the author of the initiative, to the 5 rapporteurs, Messrs. Watson,

~~Smith, G. Smith, H. Smith and others~~ to the Secretary General and his staff, <sup>order</sup> ~~to all the members of the Ditchley Park meeting~~

in short, to all who have contributed to provide the ministers with highly valuable material, which <sup>will help</sup> ~~will help~~ them, as we ~~confidently hope~~ to formulate and adopt a <sup>statement</sup> ~~declaration~~ on the future tasks of the Alliance.

Let me begin by making a few observations on how my government <sup>sees</sup> ~~interprets~~ the meaning and the function of such a re-definition of the future tasks of the Alliance.

We do not believe that the tasks and functions of our Alliance have basically changed. It has never been a purely military defence organization but - like any alliance - at the same time a political association of states with common interests. The political tasks of this Alliance have been clearly described already in 1956 in the Report of the Three Wise Men. Therefore, it cannot be the object of this exercise to allocate new tasks to the Alliance. What we must rather do is to remind the <sup>public</sup> ~~public~~ ~~relations~~ of the member <sup>nations</sup> ~~countries~~ of the dual function of the Alliance in a situation which is very much different from that in 1949 and <sup>even</sup> 1956. By doing this we are, at the same time, <sup>answering</sup> ~~replying to~~ the question why the Alliance is indispensable also in a period of détente. (Danish public relations aspect.)

This also defines the limits of our to-day's efforts and of what the Ministers <sup>can expect</sup> ~~will be able to do~~ at their meeting in December: no basic reform of the Alliance, <sup>advice</sup> ~~no~~ adoption of new objectives, no far-reaching institutional and organisational innovations, but a <sup>appraisal</sup> ~~reappraisal~~ of the <sup>permanent</sup> ~~existing~~ objectives and tasks <sup>of the Alliance</sup> and <sup>this</sup> ~~an~~ explanation and interpretation in the light of recent political developments so as to make them understandable to the public.

- 3 -

may be as a section of  
the Communiqué - as an  
annex to it or as a separate  
document.

Such purpose would best be served by a short, concise  
statement, not longer than 4 or 5 pages. In such a state-  
ment we need not reiterate the history of NATO or the  
cold war or the development of the present world situation,  
*at least not at length (not against de Gaulle's statement.)*  
It would not be necessary or even possible to outline a  
solution for the problems we are facing. All we need is  
a clear definition of the tasks which lie ahead of us, *and perhaps*  
*and an* indication how to deal with them.

*a certain*  
Such definition will, we hope, emerge from *our* *today* discussion  
the material which the rapporteurs have prepared. This  
~~means~~ *need not* means that the reports ~~should~~ be adopted, amended  
or rejected. Neither the special group nor the Ministers  
need express their approval or disapproval of a single  
report or of all of them. ~~As a matter of fact, we would~~  
~~probably waste plenty of time, if we were going to discuss~~  
the 4 reports paragraph by paragraph. I do not recommend  
such a procedure.

Rather, I would think that all the valuable reports worked  
out by our rapporteurs should be presented to the Ministers  
at the December meeting as background material. They should  
remain as they are now with the continuing understanding  
that they are presented under the responsibility of the  
rapporteurs.]

- 4 -

In conformity with the general trend of this morning's discussion I would like to comment the substantive issues, which in our view, have to be covered by the final report to ministers.

In general, there is no item, which my Government would like to add to those, which have been mentioned this morning.

I would like to sum them up as follows:

- 1) - the interrelated problem of détente and deterrence, of relaxing political tensions while maintaining military strength;
- 2) - the problem of a European settlement and a solution for the German question;
- 3) - the problem of disarmament and arms control;
- 4) - the problem of consultation in conflicts and crises outside the treaty area - and as special sub-problem the Mediterranean question, which seems to lie in a gray area between the treaty area in the juridical sense of the world and the outside area.

- 5 -

In dealing with these 4 or 5 items I do not want to try to give you a comprehensive portrait of my Government's views.

From ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> the discussion/went on this morning, I see no major point of controversy, as far as we are concerned.

It is clearly our view that under present circumstances, détente is bound to be the policy of all Allied Governments, including the German Government. Such a policy is only realistic if it does not <sup>mean</sup> a unilateral dismantling of our defence system. In this respect we find ourselves in agreement with the very constructive study by Mr. Kohler on Future Defence Policy.

The assertion made in this report that the security of the alliance rests on two pillars, namely the military strength and the political solidarity on the one hand and realistic measures towards détente, disarmament and arms control on the other is in our opinion a valuable contribution and might be considered as a basic formulation of the future tasks of the Alliance.

As far as the problem of a European settlement and German reunification is concerned, my Government ~~will be~~ <sup>is</sup> in agreement with the views which are expressed in the Schütz-Watson report. I think it is not necessary to repeat them here. Our agreement also includes the suggestion to constitute a special body responsible to the North Atlantic Council to study on a continuing basis all the substantive issues listed in the report. As a matter of fact, we attach considerable importance to ~~these~~ <sup>these</sup> recommendations. This is one of the very complex problems

- 6 -

which cannot exclusively be dealt with in bilateral contacts and approaches.

Up to now the problem has normally been dealt with in conferences and diplomatic exchanges between the Three Western Powers having a special responsibility in this field, and the Soviet Union. In preparing such conferences, the Federal Republic normally joined the Three Western Powers in order to reach a common position. This general pattern is well known and has been recognized by all the members of the Alliance during many NATO Conferences throughout the years. But the other members of the Alliance, who always lent their support to the initiatives of the Four, rightly claim a share in hammering out the general lines of policy. This claim could and should be taken into account, without impairing the special responsibilities which I mentioned before.

This could be achieved by setting up a group which rely on the initiatives and suggestions of the Four, but in which every member government would be invited to participate in discussing the problem.

- 14 -

3)

Coming to disarmament and arms control, we think it would be very useful to have some kind of a standing committee of the North Atlantic Council for questions of disarmament and arms control (as suggested by the rapporteurs).

In a way, we have already a committee of this sort within the framework of POLADS. It is perhaps only a matter of secondary importance how to modify this arrangement in order to satisfy our practical needs.

4)

Conflicts and crises outside the treaty area have always been <sup>a</sup> particularly difficult subject for our Alliance. As far as I can see, nobody wants to back down from the principle that there is no geographical limitation to consult on conflicts and crises wherever they arise and whoever has caused them. On the other hand, nobody favors intervention or any kind of <sup>common</sup> action with respect to these areas. I am afraid we cannot go very far beyond these limits at the present time. Perhaps this is a range of problems where our studies could one day, after the December Conference be continued.

-----

All the substantive items which I have mentioned are related to the form, intensity and fruitfulness of our consultations. I do not have to offer a magic definition which would have a chance to satisfy everybody. I can only say that for my country this Alliance would lose its impact and interest if it did not protect us against threats and aggressions but also against political isolation. Détente is desirable to all of us, but it must be indivisible.

Only close consultation can protect us in this respect.

As far as the presentation is concerned, I could imagine that public opinion is not very much interested in a statement of general principles. A concrete action program might have a stronger impact on the public.

I also can visualize a presentation of our final result under the heading "NATO in the 70th". (or 5 y. r.)

But these are secondary matters of style and format. They may be resolved at the very end.

Outline of today's meeting:  
draft report written by Sec. Gen. on the  
basis of this discussion.

To be reviewed by 2. meeting  
of spec group.