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To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General
Subject: STUDY ON THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE:
TRANSMISSION OF RESUME OF RAPPORTEURS' REPORTS

The rapporteurs of Sub-Groups 1 to 4 have submitted to me their reports on the various subjects of their assignment. These have been sent to the delegations.

2. At the request of the Rapporteurs, I met with them several times, lastly at Ditchley on 11th October, 1967. The attached resumé of their reports was presented at that meeting and is transmitted herewith as a possible help to the members of the Special Group in their discussions. The rapporteurs, who take responsibility for the part of the resumé summarizing their own reports, consider this document as being no substitute for the reports themselves.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO

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DRAFT SUMMARY OF REPORTS

ON

FUTURE TASKS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

9th October, 1967

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SUMMARY OF REPORTS

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I. The General Context

In 1945 the universal hope was that the alliance with the USSR which had made victory possible could be maintained, and that the United Nations could take over responsibility for keeping the peace.

2. This line of approach, although theoretically sound, soon proved to be wide off the mark. The Soviet Union's refusal to participate in the economic rebuilding of Europe proposed by General Marshall in 1947, and the seizure of power in Prague in 1948, shattered any remaining illusions.

3. By 1949, responsible statesmen in the West, representing all shades of political thought, had become convinced of the need to unite in order to halt Communist expansionist policy in Europe. The Atlantic Alliance was born of this conviction.

4. It is sometimes difficult for a new generation to understand the state of mind of the preceding generation. Changes take place, elements of political problems alter. It is obvious that those who did not experience certain fears cannot react in the same way as those who were in their grip.

5. What is true is that the main objective of the authors of the Atlantic Treaty has been achieved. In Europe, since 1949, Communism has made no further progress. No country of the Atlantic Alliance has suffered the fate of those countries which, between 1945 and 1948, came under Communist control against the wishes of the majority of their inhabitants.

6. During the life of the Alliance, changing conditions have required the adaptation of its activities and machinery. The Report of the Wise Men in 1956 was a major stage in this process. That Report stressed that the challenge to the Atlantic nations was (a) political and economic as well as military; (b) much wider than the European arena. Since then, the Allies have substantially improved political co-operation within the Treaty area and to a certain extent beyond it; have strengthened the procedures for military planning; and have expanded economic co-operation through other agencies.

7. Adjusting the Alliance and its rôle to an evolving environment is a continuing process. The current exercise is a further stage in that process.

II. The Changing Environment

A. In East-West relations

1. The policy of "coexistence" reflects a significant shift in the Soviet challenge. Khrushchev and his successors seem to have accepted, especially since the Cuban missile crisis, that they cannot alter substantially the mutual deterrence on the European continent and globally. Their caution has been reinforced by the conflict with Peking, the nationalist upsurge in Eastern Europe, and serious internal problems. The Allies must, however, avoid illusions about the meaning of coexistence as the Soviets view it. If the USSR no longer expects to change the status quo in Europe by force and is making some moves toward détente with some allies, this is a tribute to the cohesion, determination, and effective military strength of NATO in the past and a lesson for the future.

2. Soviet objectives continue to differ from those of the West. The Soviet Government still hopes to weaken the cohesion of the Western Alliance, to isolate the FRG from its allies, and to open up differences between Western Europe and US. The Soviets see advantage in some relaxation of tensions but how far they are prepared to go towards co-operation is arguable. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe certain forces operate against a European settlement; while, others, notably new economic and technological requirements, work in its favour. The USSR and East European Governments have so far controlled these forces; this gives ground for hope that Eastern Governments can be persuaded of the advantages for them in co-operation and a stable settlement in Europe.

3. Soviet military capabilities continue to grow. While the policies by which the Soviets seek to realise their ends show signs of evolving, and on present assessment, direct aggression in Europe is unlikely, the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact constitute a formidable element in the threat, and the Pact countries continue to spend large sums on improving them. Soviet leadership still hopes to derive political influence in Western Europe from this military power. As recent events show, the Soviets, despite some evidence of caution, are intent on increasing their military strength and extending their influence in the Mediterranean which is a fact that poses a threat to NATO's southern flank. Military planning must take account of the risk of deliberate attack, and the possibility of hostilities arising by accident or miscalculation, which could escalate to greater intensity, cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, instability in the less developed countries is a continuing threat to peace, and in to-day's world, conflict is difficult to isolate.

4. The fundamental issues underlying the tensions between East and West are far from resolved. The USSR has not modified its attitudes toward the basic political and security problems of Central Europe, and specifically on the German problem. To persuade the USSR and its allies that its more ambitious objectives are unattainable will be a slow process. The core of the problem is to convince these states that there are greater advantages for them in a stable Europe where states co-operate despite differing social systems.

5. Consequently, "coexistence" offers the Atlantic nations opportunities as well as risks. The chance for commercial and cultural exchanges has improved with the better atmosphere. Such contacts, even if selective and whatever the Soviet motives, offer chances for fostering a favourable evolution of policy opinion in Eastern Europe and the USSR which can exercise restraint on their leaders. It may also open new possibilities for finding arrangements in the field of arms control which would favour emergence of a new political environment without jeopardising Western security. The policy of China, however, is quite different. It seems at least as dangerous as that of the USSR twenty years ago; and conferences like that in Havana shows how active the subversive forces still are.

6. Thus, Allied policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must rest on two basic pillars.

First, to provide effective protection for our own territorial integrity, political independence, and security by adequate deterrence and defence.

Second, without jeopardising these, to work towards eliminating the barriers which divide Europe and Germany and to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe guaranteed by a balanced and viable system of European security.

B. Outside the Treaty area

1. Threats to the security of the member-nations now seem to rise more often from outside the Treaty area. Communist expansion has shifted to other parts of the world and political instability is on the increase everywhere. The prevention of conflicts in the Third World may in some cases be a precondition for "détente" in Europe, since a viable European settlement implies a general understanding with the Soviet Union extending to all areas of the world. The weakness and lack of cohesion of the new states of Asia and Africa engenders conflicts which tend to draw in outsiders. Such events outside NATO may therefore affect the security of the Alliance and require co-ordination of the policies of the members.

2. NATO is not the instrument for operational activities outside the area, but the members are forced to seek to co-ordinate their policies in their own interest. It is an illusion for members of NATO to hope to obtain a certificate of "United Nations' virginity" by refraining from taking sides in conflicts elsewhere. A failure to harmonise their policies will in the end alienate the allies one from another. NATO's task beyond the Treaty area is to serve as a clearing house for the identification and formulation of the common interest.

3. The impact of events on the Alliance and the concern of the allies will vary in kind and degree.

(a) Some events may directly affect NATO security, as when they occur on the NATO perimeter (like the Middle East or North Africa) or are likely to provoke a confrontation of the great powers; or shift the nuclear balance, or the power structure (as possibly China).

In such cases the Council should know what developments would not be acceptable in view of the security of the members. Remedial action will have to be taken in an environment and under a responsibility different from those of the NATO Council (e.g. the United Nations). But for a harmonisation of policies, both in NATO and elsewhere, the members should develop a long-term political strategy, policy planning and a system of crisis-management.

(b) Other events outside the NATO area may involve allies in varying ways, but not directly affect NATO security. Many are too minor to concern the Alliance or require a co-ordinated approach, but a complete freedom of action, without prior consultation, would undermine the belief in the Alliance.

(c) Finally, some problems - like racial issues and development - are global but require a response from the Atlantic nations. The needs for development assistance are especially urgent and have major long-term implications for the Atlantic nations.

4. The Atlantic nations have a variety of instruments and agencies for concerted action on the wide range of issues of concern to some or all of them. They can and should use them flexibly according to the nature of the problem. NATO is, of course, only one of these instruments, although an important one. In the development and economic field, for example, OECD normally offers the best framework for harmonising policy through DAC. Even here NAC consultation could sometimes underline the urgency and priority of issues, such as the serious need for much more adequate development financing.

C. In Inter-Allied Relations

1. From the start, the Alliance has faced an internal problem of balance among the allies. This imbalance arises both from (a) the great disparity in military and economic power between the US and the other allies; and (b) the differing size and concerns of the various allies in an Alliance of de jure equals. In the earlier years, when Europe had not yet revived and the fear of the Soviet danger was acute, these differences did not occasion serious friction or tensions among the allies.

2. As Europe has recovered and fear has receded, the situation has changed. The existing disparity in power and influence causes frustration on both sides of the Atlantic. Many Europeans are dissatisfied with the US predominance in the Alliance. They feel that it impairs unduly the freedom of action and political influence of the European allies. Others question the validity of the objection within the NATO area, though conceding its relevance elsewhere. Conversely, the US feels that its NATO partners should take a greater share in maintaining international order. The European and Canadian members, although receptive to UN tasks or to providing LDC aid, are often reluctant to accept for themselves or the Alliance a larger political (or military) rôle in world affairs. Among the European allies themselves, changing conditions have also enhanced differences in outlook and interest. These various disparities create obstacles to co-operation both within and beyond the NATO area.

III. The Rôle and Future Tasks of the Alliance

A. Security

1. All members of the Alliance are convinced that it must continue. Given Soviet military capability, no member of the Alliance could assure its security by its own strength. Security for the members of NATO rests on two pillars: first, the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of the NATO countries if aggression should occur. Second, realistic measures to reduce tensions and the risk of conflict, including arms control and disarmament measures.

2. The Alliance requires a full spectrum of military capabilities, including strategic nuclear forces, tactical nuclear forces, and conventional forces. NATO military strength serves to deter aggression, to counter it if necessary, and to neutralise the political influence which can be exercised by Soviet military power. It also provides the political climate, based on security, in which the allies can proceed with confidence to develop expanded relations with the East. In

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doing so, the allies must keep in mind that their unity, strength and determination are the main cause of the present Soviet posture and the essential foundation for further progress towards genuine détente. A sound NATO defence policy and military structure, combined with close political consultation, can prevent the USSR from (a) utilising its military power in Europe as a basis for Soviet pressure for Western political concessions; or (b) playing one NATO member off against another, dividing and weakening the Alliance.

3. To ensure stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area, the members of NATO must continue to unite their efforts for the preservation of peace and security. The fourteen members of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) have reaffirmed their belief that an integrated military effort is essential to their security. The continuation of the Alliance not only is insurance against external threats, it also represents a means by which small and medium-sized states, which want to exercise a responsible rôle in assuring their own security, may do so by making their limited capabilities relevant to deterring the Soviet Union and by giving them a voice in the military policies and actions for the common defence. Moreover, the risk of national rivalries can be reduced if defence measures are co-ordinated in a spirit of mutual confidence through an alliance such as NATO

4. In the period ahead, the allies should make full and effective use of their improved defence machinery to plan, organize, and manage NATO forces and strategy. Despite some setbacks, the fourteen allies, which maintain an integrated defence system, have updated their procedures and structures to changing conditions and new problems.

For the period ahead, they should:

- (a) sustain and modernise their military strength in order to maintain deterrence and create the political climate indispensable to security and progress toward a permanent political settlement in Europe. The aim should be to continue using and improving the force planning process to relate strategy, forces, and resource capabilities;
- (b) use effectively the machinery recently created for nuclear planning (Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee and Nuclear Planning Group) and strengthen national nuclear planning staffs so that the non-nuclear members can participate more effectively in this planning;
- (c) carry through the steps already initiated to improve military consultation through the regular exchange of intelligence and related information in the Situation Centre. This can provide the desired basis for more effective crisis consultation particularly if the Centre provides early warning of worldwide events that may affect NATO security.

5. In addition, the Alliance should seek to develop more effective arms production. A two-fold approach is required:

- (a) There is an urgent need to increase intra-European co-operation, if the European members of the Alliance are to cope with the problems of maintaining high-technology industries on the scale necessitated by their complexity and cost.
- (b) The need is to continue and develop the inter-allied co-operation already in existence in such forms as the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the bilateral and multilateral production programmes, the SHAPE Technical Centre, AGARD, the SACLANC ASW Centre, and the activities of the NATO Science Committee.

6. While maintaining effective means of deterrence, the Alliance should formulate concrete disarmament propositions which will afford renewed evidence of the political will of the Alliance to realise an effective détente with the countries of the East. In particular, in preparation for the time when balanced force reductions may become feasible, possibilities in this field should be studied now. Other measures which might constitute elements of a future European security arrangement are:

- (a) establishment of special military liaison missions on both sides with maximum freedom of movement, or mobile observation posts;
- (b) agreements between parties on both sides renouncing the use of force;
- (c) reduction of Soviet MRBM/IRBMs targeted on Western Europe, which may be possible only in the framework of limitations on US-Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles;
- (d) East-West non-aggression pacts, undertaken in the context of concrete progress towards a European settlement, might result from progress on some of the above measures.

B. East-West Relations

1. The long-term aim of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. Such an order must (a) end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe which manifest themselves most clearly in the division of Germany; and (b) provide adequate and reliable security to all of Europe. Easier movement and intercourse between the countries of Europe and peaceful co-operation among them can contribute to this outcome. Yet relaxing of tensions is not the final goal but a step on the way towards a European settlement which in itself no longer gives rise to renewed tension.

2. The difficult problem is to assure that détente serves this long-term aim. The USSR and some East European states seek through détente some objectives in Europe which directly conflict with this long-term Western aim. But the hopes of these Governments are probably tempered by what they think they can attain.

A just and peaceful order in Europe can be achieved only if the other side is willing to contribute to it. Thus, the task is to induce the USSR and Eastern European states to modify their aims and to recognise the advantages for them in a European order acceptable to all concerned and therefore genuinely stable. This process will take a long time to produce significant results. It will require a patient, undramatic, and co-ordinated Western policy.

3. The Alliance and a policy of détente are not contradictory as experience has shown. Until a lasting settlement in Europe has been realised, the Alliance remains an irreplaceable guarantor of security in Western Europe. Indeed, a European security system may be more effective and involve less risks if it is based on an equilibrium between two groupings. The participation of the US and of Canada is of vital importance both in working toward a new peaceful order and in maintaining it afterward. Similarly no substantial progress can be made toward a European settlement without Soviet agreement. Many East European regimes regard Soviet support as necessary.

4. It is not possible now to draw a blueprint for a peaceful order in Europe or for a solution of the German problem.

- (a) What is clear is that both problems are and must be indissolubly linked. There is no magic formula for overcoming the division of Germany. The solution of this question, as it seems today, will be a long process, closely connected with the progress in overcoming the present division of Europe. Any solution of the German problem which contributes to and is part of a just and lasting European settlement must start from the principle that the German people in both parts of Germany have the right of free decision. It

requires action not only of the four powers with special responsibility for Germany and the other allies but of other states of Europe which also have a vital interest in establishing a lasting and peaceful order in Europe;

- (b) détente and ultimate settlement can be kept in step only by close co-operation of the allies.

5. The German Question

- (a) As long as a part of the German people is denied the right of self-determination and has to live in a separated state-like entity, ruled by a regime imposed upon them by a foreign power and kept by force, that regime must be denied international recognition. There are not two German states nor a special entity Berlin.
- (b) The Federal Republic of Germany in its efforts to overcome the division of the German people should strive for a relaxation of tension in its relations with the Soviet Union as well as the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
- (c) The Federal Republic of Germany should include the other part of Germany in its policy of détente by retaining and strengthening the ties between the Germans in East and West. At the same time the Federal Government should make it clear that the more freedom is granted to the Germans in East Germany, the more the division of Germany will be overcome.
- (d) A continuing increase of internal German trade which is a significant link between the two parts of Germany, and economic co-operation, would be an important instrument in this respect.
- (e) It is up to the Federal Republic of Germany, as significant results in inner German relations are achieved, progressively to facilitate the participation of the population of the Soviet zone in international life, in scientific, cultural and sporting exchanges without thereby furthering the political objectives of the East Berlin regime.
- (f) It is necessary that each member of the Alliance should, as part of its endeavour to overcome the division of Europe and achieve a relaxation of tension between East and West, strive for a just solution to the problems of Germany and Berlin.

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(g) The allies should assist the Federal Government's efforts for a relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany and for improving the conditions of life of the individuals in East Germany. They should in co-operation with the Federal Government open up and facilitate private contacts with the Germans of the other part of Germany, particularly in the sphere of science, culture and sports. The link with progress in internal German relations should be kept in mind.

(h) The Alliance as such should be instrumental in harmonising and co-ordinating the policies of the Federal Government and those of the other allies in this context. It is also the task of the Alliance to help to ensure the freedom and viability of Berlin and to remain aware of the constant threat to Berlin even in times when the East is hoping for Western interests to wane and resistance gradually to flag.

6. The appropriate forms and channels of East-West contacts will be various.

- (a) Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are both necessary. Bilateral East-West discussions can be of great value if carried out within the framework of common objectives formulated by allied consultation. Co-operation with individual Eastern governments is valuable for its own sake and as a means of influencing the Soviet Union. Multilateral negotiations with Eastern governments will become increasingly desirable as relations develop. They too have their limits and undue or premature insistence on them should be avoided.
- (b) Economic, technical and cultural co-operation offer important opportunities for breaking down Communist rigidity and forging mutually beneficial links between Eastern and Western Europe.
- (c) Other forms of co-operation may also prove valuable; including co-operation in existing multilateral institutions and national organizations, regional co-operation in special ventures; semi-official and non-governmental activities; and special East-West forums to develop the dialogue.
- (d) Political and security arrangements will be needed to establish a durable settlement guaranteed by an adequate security system. An East-West security conference seems premature now, but it may be necessary when we have advanced a considerable distance towards a settlement.

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7. The allies should now give further detailed study to the various measures proposed to extend the détente and to achieve a European settlement and security system..

- (a) The machinery of NATO offers an excellent means for carrying out detailed consultations and for maintaining the necessary co-ordination in allied dealings with the East. The Alliance should be the forum where general guides regarding relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe are worked out. In applying them each member must have some latitude, while keeping its allies informed. Thus, the Atlantic Council should be a sort of "clearing house" where analysis and discussion of new proposals might always be possible.
- (b) The Alliance should constitute a special body, under the North Atlantic Council, to study on a continuing basis the substantive issues related to a general settlement in Europe, a European security system and procedural approaches to East-West negotiations.

8. Strengthening NATO's Arms Control Machinery

- (a) The Alliance should give increasing concern to arms control issues. These have often been discussed within the Council and by experts, but efforts in this respect, although valuable, have not proven adequate. The Alliance should establish regular and continuing machinery to examine and evaluate all aspects of proposals or suggestions in this field.
- (b) This could be accomplished by establishing, under the authority of the Council, a separate, permanent Arms Control and Disarmament Committee. This Committee would be supported by an expert staff section established within the International Staff under the Secretary-General and would have the advice of NATO military planners in formulating its recommendations.

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C. Problems outside the Treaty Area

1. When it comes to political actions outside the NATO area, the responsibilities for the members of NATO will differ widely. There are advantages in a multifirmity of international conduct on the condition that the members of the NATO will be guided by the same views on the merits of the case and its solution. For this purpose the members of the Alliance should improve the procedures for consultation with regard to developments outside the NATO area.

2. It is not advisable for NATO as such to intervene in conflict situations outside its own area. The Treaty contains no provision for operational activities of the Alliance in other regions. The same degree of co-operation cannot be expected in regard to problems arising outside the NATO area as for those affecting directly the members of the Alliance.

3. Therefore, gradations in the consultative process, both as to the participants and the issues singled out for study, seem desirable.

(a) --Groups performing a narrow function and restricted to closely defined subjects would meet this need. Not all members are equally interested in the study of specific areas or specific issues outside the NATO area. Special responsibility rests on those members who are directly involved or have a special experience of the problem or the regions concerned, or have global concerns. Those who are ready and capable to engage in contingency planning for action outside the NATO area should be able to do so within NATO without involving those who do not want to take part. While there are clearly no military obligations for members outside the NATO defence perimeter, the Treaty nowhere implies that there are subjects which fall outside the consultation processes of the Alliance.

(b) In short, the NATO Council should create a number of specialised groups working on specific regions or subjects outside the Atlantic area. The groups should preferably be limited to member countries possessing special knowledge of the subject, or acknowledging a genuine stake and interest in it. Their main task would be contingency planning for the prevention of conflict: the study of situations before they present acute danger, and advice about the political measures to be applied in order to prevent a deterioration of the situation. In particular, such groups should be established promptly on the (a) the Mediterranean and Middle East, and (b) on China.

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4. To improve the NATO capacity for long-term policy planning, the NATO Council should consider

- (a) how to make better use of APAG whose task would be to turn latent common interests into active common policy. The same applies to the Committee of Political Advisers (POLADS);
- (b) arranging for independent advisers or working parties of experienced politicians and scholars from time to time to present to the NATO Council confidential proposals for policy and diplomatic action. A similar task of study and advice could be entrusted to one or more international institutes.

5. NATO consultation between the members' Permanent Missions to the United Nations should be strengthened. NATO also could contribute to world stability by encouraging members to participate in United Nations peacekeeping activities and, in support for them, harmonising NATO responsibilities with members' commitments to the United Nations.

D. Inter-Allied Relations

1. The ultimate remedy to the problems arising from the disparity in power and influence between the United States and its European partners, is for the Europeans to develop the unity for acting and speaking with one voice. In the long-run effective Atlantic co-operation depends on progress toward a European unity which could play a larger rôle and command an influence in world affairs comparable to the US and USSR. The experience of the EEC in the Kennedy Round and IMF have demonstrated this point. Hence, how Europe develops will profoundly affect the future functioning of the Alliance. But a Europe with capacities in political and defence matters will emerge slowly at best.

2. Hence, for the next stage, interim methods will have to be found to cope with the existing disparity. No procedures can provide an adequate cure for the problem, but they can overcome some of the obstacles to co-operation. Indeed, recognition of the difficulty and greater clarity as to its ultimate solution can mitigate some of the inevitable frustration and resentments.

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- (a) Joint European arms production (as proposed in III, A above) could overcome some of the existing imbalance in that and other fields of technology.
- (b) Effective use of the improved machinery in the defence field (see III, A above) will allow greater influence by the European members.
- (c) The use of smaller groups of specially interested members for consultation can also enhance their contribution to policy making (see III, C).
- (d) It might be possible to take into account the "European fact" to some extent by giving to the European members of the Alliance a greater joint responsibility in matters concerning defence, especially in the field of nuclear defence. This could serve to moderate the existing sense of inferiority or lack of influence in the fields covered.
- (e) As and when the European Community develops and expands its fields of competence, the machinery and procedures of the Alliance will have to be adapted to reflect the change.

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