

**NATO SECRET**

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**To: Secretary General****From: Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs****Subject: Reports on the Future Tasks of the Alliance**

The attached analytical summary of the four reports of the Rapporteurs was based on texts of the reports as submitted to recent meetings of the Sub-Groups, and without benefit of the final texts which Rapporteurs will present at the meeting at Ditchley Park. The first draft of the analysis was prepared by the Special Adviser for Policy Planning; most of the Political Division was drawn into the task of discussing and refining the attached paper.

2. While we can expect changes in the various reports -- in particular there may possibly emerge from Sub-Group 1 a recommendation for a continuing body to study and make recommendations on East-West relations -- the broad pattern of the reports and recommendations is likely to be substantively as represented in the texts on which this analysis is based.

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ANALYSIS OF THE REPORTS TO BE SUBMITTED BY  
THE REPORTERS OF THE SUB-GROUPS OF THE  
SPECIAL GROUP

I

Continuing Existence of the Alliance

Schultz/Watson affirm that the Alliance should continue; NATO and a policy of detente are not alternatives which exclude each other. They affirm that NATO will not have fulfilled its military tasks until its political tasks have also been received. Only the continued existence of the Alliance, its political weight, and readiness for defence will convince the Soviets that a policy of engendering crises brings no advantages.

Spaak's justification for the continuing existence of the Alliance lies rather in his scepticism of the ultimate effects of the detente. He takes a rather pessimistic view of peaceful coexistence. Not that the West should reject peaceful coexistence; but its results are likely to be modest. The Communist danger has by no means disappeared; the encirclement of Europe by hostile countries is still a possibility, and the fact that it may occur under the direction of China rather than that of the USSR makes no fundamental difference. It should be noted, moreover, that Spaak's report reflects his basic conviction that the Alliance should evolve into "une réunion de pays qui s'assemblent pour résoudre les problèmes importants qui se posent dans le monde."

If Spaak's justification for the continuing existence of the Alliance is mainly political, Kohl arrives at the same conclusion for security reasons. Direct aggression may be unlikely, but the Soviet Government continues to modernize and expand its already formidable military force. Kohl, like Schultz/Watson, terms Berlin a hostage. The threat of war resulting from miscalculation

is a real one. Furthermore, instability in the less developed countries is a continuing threat to peace and in today's world, conflict can spread rapidly. Consequently, military strength is necessary to deter aggression, and since no one nation, not even the United States, can successfully ensure its defense, an integrated defense effort continues to be necessary.

## II

### Soviet aims and detente

Schultz/Watson state that a certain relaxation of tensions has been seen by the Soviets in recent years as meeting their own national interests. But it is "arguable" how far their ultimate aims in Europe have changed; the Soviet Government hopes, by relaxing tensions selectively, to weaken the cohesion of the Alliance, to drive wedges between states of Western Europe and open up differences between Western Europe and the United States. In the reasoning of Schultz/Watson, therefore, detente is necessarily of a limited character.

As has been mentioned above, Brasch's view of the intrinsic importance of the detente is even less optimistic; and Kohlitz, as well as Edidin, point out that the Soviets are intent on increasing their military strength and influence in the less-developed areas, as recent events in the Mediterranean demonstrate.

## III

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance

Spaak speaks at some length of the rôle of Europe in the Atlantic Alliance. To play a significant rôle, the European countries have "to unite so that they can speak with authority". Europe, however, should be more than Europe of the Six; it means the inclusion of Great Britain and others. Were this to be achieved, Europe would become within the Atlantic Alliance a partner worthy of the United States and one of the great forces capable of influencing world politics. However, as long as some circles visualise a united Europe as a Third Force "no real progress can be made".

Spaak wants a strong continuing link between Europe and the United States. By rejecting a "third force" rôle for Europe, he stresses the continuing importance of the United States presence and influence.

In the view of Schultz/Weisger, European States are unable to defend themselves; a corresponding North-American presence is necessary; the United States contribution should not be limited to defence and deterrence.

## IV

Elements of a European settlement

Schultz/Weisger define these as follows:

- A European settlement must guarantee the NATO members that the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples are safeguarded.

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- Any European settlement would have to accept the differing political, economic and social systems of the states concerned.
- Renunciation of the use of force and other forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other states must be guaranteed.
- Relations between states are to be governed by the principles of the United Nations Charter.

NATO members should, moreover, try to ensure that the right of free movement of persons and of the free flow of information are as widely respected as possible in Europe.

## V

### The German Problem

Schuman/Adenauer consider that the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe must include a just and durable settlement of the German problem. This problem, they say, cannot be separated from the division of Europe. The Soviet thesis that there are two German states and that Berlin is a special political unit, cannot be accepted as a prerequisite for a detente. A solution of the German problem must be based on:

- the right of free decision for both parts of Germany;
- action of the four Powers with special responsibility for Germany;
- and the cooperation of all interested states of Europe.

Schmidt/Natson conclude that it is up to the Federal Republic of Germany to make life more liveable for the people of the Soviet Zone, inter alia, by means of a continuing increase of internal German trade and facilitating the participation of the population of the Soviet Zone in international life. It is up to the Allies to assist these efforts; the Alliance as such should be instrumental in harmonising and coordinating the policy of the Federal Government and that of the other Allies.

Finally, the Alliance is expected to ensure the freedom and viability of Berlin.

## VI

### Developments in Regions Outside the NATO Area

Spaak emphasises that we cannot afford to neglect the problem of political consultation in NATO on regions outside the Treaty area. Kohler points out that instability in the less developed countries is a continuing threat to peace.

In treating this problem, Fatijn prefaces his conclusions and recommendations by stating that public opinion is today even less convinced than in 1956 that NATO as an international organization has a function outside the Treaty area.

He maintains that the most fundamental reason for the European reluctance to face new responsibilities outside the NATO area lies in the fact that the Europeans have no common view and, even more, no clear conception of a role for Europe outside the Atlantic area.



On the other hand, détente is indivisible and even to reach a European settlement, there will be a need for global negotiations with the Soviet Union. NATO's task is not to operate outside the Treaty area but to devise common policies for its members with respect to these areas (cf. Spach's original point that it is within the Atlantic Alliance that the guidelines for common policy towards the emergent countries should be laid down. However, it is assumed that in the final version of his report this particular point will be dropped.)

Kohler says that we should use NATO machinery to work out a common view and approach on threats to peace, outside the NATO area, which could directly affect the security interests of all NATO members. We should also improve our machinery for identifying developing situations and measures for dealing with them.

Enlila separates the events outside the NATO area which could affect the security or cohesion of the Alliance, and for which the coordination of the policies of the members is necessary, into three different categories. He then arrives at certain proposals (see below) for improving political consultation. These are based on two premises:

- NATO is in need of a greater variety of forms of consultation in order to mobilize its potential capabilities for studies in depth.
- On the basis of its wealth of information and political analyses, NATO should make a more deliberate effort to present to the Council policy implications for the members of the Alliance.

## VII

Future Tasks and Objectives of the Alliance

According to Spahn/Watson, the political objective of the Alliance is a "just and lasting peaceful order which provides adequate and durable stability for all States of Europe, the members of the Alliance, and of the Warsaw Pact and other States in neither grouping." This must include a just and durable settlement of the German problem.

Spahn, having explained why the Alliance must continue, then lists objectives, both short and long term, as follows:

- The continued existence of the Alliance depends on a "common and not merely concerted policy on the problems of Germany and the status of Berlin." Divergence of views on German policy would, in his view, speedily bring the Atlantic Alliance to an end.
- NATO countries must work out a common policy for disarmament, security and defence problems.
- Within the Alliance, general rules should be laid down for relations with the USSR and the European communist countries.
- It is only within the Atlantic Alliance that the countries of Europe can hope to influence the policy of the United States. The long term future of the Atlantic Alliance depends on progress towards unification of Europe.



In the field of security, Kohl thinks NATO should

- sustain and modernise its military strength in order to maintain deterrence;
- create the climate of security indispensable to progress towards a permanent political settlement in Europe;
- explore the possibilities for maintaining effective deterrence at lower force levels through balanced mutual force reduction;
- strengthen the machinery of the Alliance for dealing with arms control.

### VIII

#### Policy Recommendations

Schultz/Kohl recommend a purposeful, patient and undramatic policy to convince the East European states and the Soviet Union of the greater advantages to both sides inherent in East/West collaboration.

- Specifically, they recommend both bilateral and multilateral contacts in East/West relations. They stress that the fields of cultural and personal contacts and of economics and technology offer good prospects for significant advances towards mutually beneficial links between the two parts of the divided European continent.
- In political arrangements and security, we should seek wider and deeper forms of East-West cooperation, thus hoping to increase the readiness of Eastern

- They recommend close and urgent study of these possibilities, as well as of the sort of European settlement towards which the Alliance should work. These studies should also include various questions relating to a Soviet sponsored "European Security Conference". The composition and terms of reference of the Groups to which these studies should be entrusted will be proposed by the Rapporteurs later.

Rehms/Reism point out the limitations of both the bilateral and multilateral approaches in East/West relations.

In this context, Spash's thesis, as formulated in the following quotation, should be noted:

"Il faut insister sur le fait que les relations coordonnées entre deux groupes de puissance sont beaucoup plus efficaces que celles que pourraient avoir entre eux une vingtaine de pays agissant en ordre dispersé. L'ordre européen ne se créera pas par une addition de relations bilatérales. Il sera beaucoup mieux assuré par une politique faite par des groupes de pays agissant ensemble. C'est par cette voie qu'un équilibre réel pourra être établi au bénéfice de tous. Le temps de l'action individuelle est aujourd'hui dépassé. C'est l'action collective qui doit être appliquée." (x)

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(x) As one of several possible interpretations of this passage, it may be argued that Spash's thesis could lead to a situation where actual negotiations between the two groups of powers are requested.

Kohler recommends that:

- There be created a Permanent Arms Control and Disarmament Committee of NATO and a unit of the International Staff to support this Committee.
- The machinery recently created for nuclear planning be maintained and national nuclear planning staffs strengthened so that the non-nuclear members can participate more effectively in this planning.
- Military consultation through the regular exchange of intelligence and related information in the Situation Centre to continue to be improved, thus providing the basis for more effective crisis management.
- Intra-European cooperation in defence, research, development and production be increased and the inter-allied cooperation already in existence be extended.

As to the recommendations of Fatin, he proposes that:

- The Council should create a number of groups -- (Restricted? Open-ended? This point is still at issue) -- working on specific regions or subjects outside the NATO area. These groups should meet without publicity or press releases, with the minimum of paper work, and should be served by a small secretariat. Their task would be contingency planning for the prevention of conflict: studying situations before they present acute danger, and advising on the political measures to be applied in order to prevent a deterioration of the situation.

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The NATO Council should also consider how to make better use of the results of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, as well as of the Committee of Political Advisors.

If new policies are to come out of these bodies, the level of representation should be very high.

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