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To: Permanent Representatives

From: Secretary General

SPECIAL GROUP ON THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

LIST OF ISSUES

In accordance with the request of the Permanent Representatives at their meeting on 25th October, 1967, I enclose a list of the issues which have arisen in the Study on the Future Tasks of the Alliance.

(Signed) Manlio BROGIO

OTAN/NATO
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NATO SECRET

FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

List of issues to be discussed by
the high level meeting of the Special Group

- I. Historical Introduction
- II. The Present Setting in East-West Relations and Future Prospects
(Policy of Co-Existence; Soviet foreign policy objectives and military power; Outstanding issues between East and West; Policy of détente; Allied objectives towards the East in Europe).
- III. Balance and Co-operation within the Alliance
(European unity and co-operation and the Alliance; Relations between the European and North American members).
- IV. Rôle and Future Tasks of the Alliance
(Continuation of the Alliance)

In security and related problems
(Requirements of defence; Possible improvements in NATO defence and planning machinery; Disarmament issues).

In the political field
(Conduct of the Alliance in a period of détente; the German problem; European security; the nature of a European settlement).

In Regions outside the NATO area
(Impact of events upon the interests of the Allies and possible improvements in consultation).

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Some of the issues which may be examined under the above headings may be outlined as follows:

- I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION: No particular issue.
- II. THE PRESENT SETTING IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

1. First of all, the Allies should determine the degree to which "co-existence" reflects a significant shift in the Soviet challenge. They should weigh the extent to which such factors as mutual deterrence, the conflict with Peking, internal problems, Eastern European nationalism and NATO's cohesion and military strength have reinforced Soviet caution. They should consider the actual meaning of "co-existence" as the Soviets practice it.

2. The Allies should then ascertain how and to what extent Soviet objectives continue to differ from those of the West, particularly as regards the USSR's attitudes towards Alliance cohesion, the solidarity of the Federal Republic of Germany with its Allies, the relationship of Western Europe with the United States and the extent to which the USSR and Eastern Europe are prepared to "co-operate" with the West.

3. A key issue is that of the continued growth of Soviet military capabilities. The allies should consider its consequences particularly as regards future Soviet political influence in Europe and elsewhere.

4. Another issue Alliance members should consider is the extent to which fundamental issues underlying tensions between East and West have moved towards resolution. At the same time they should consider how best the Eastern states and the Soviet Union might be persuaded to modify their attitudes on these issues.

5. Alliance members consequently should determine the extent to which East-West exchanges, contacts and "atmospherics" actually foster the favourable evolution of policy opinion in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The question of how best to exploit the opportunities "co-existence" offers the West should be taken into consideration.

6. They then should proceed to examine the fundamental purposes underlying the policies of the members of the Alliance toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Should these purposes be considered in terms of the traditional twin concepts of (1) effective protection through deterrence and defence and (2) progress toward a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe guaranteed by a balanced and viable system of European security? Or are other formulations and concepts more acceptable?

III. BALANCE AND CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

7. Are relations among the members within the Alliance satisfactory? There has always been an imbalance of power between the United States and the other Allies. Furthermore, different members have differing interests, particularly outside the Treaty area. The Allies should consider whether the lessening fear of the Soviet threat and European recovery have created new difficulties in the functioning of the Alliance. If so, they should examine the nature of these difficulties.

8. In considering the problems of imbalance, the Allies should consider the relevance of European unity and its importance for the future of the Alliance. Suggestions which might be examined relate to joint European arms production, improved machinery in the defence field and the granting of a greater joint responsibility to the European members, especially in the nuclear field.

IV. THE ROLE AND FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

IN SECURITY AND RELATED PROBLEMS

9. Members of the Alliance should determine whether it should continue in the light of Soviet military capabilities and of the relative weight of each Alliance member's own strength. In this context, they should also define the basis of their security.

10. Alliance members concerned should determine what spectrum of military capabilities the Alliance will require to serve NATO's purposes, both military and political.

11. They should determine to what degree they should unite their efforts for the preservation of peace and security.

12. They should determine how and to what extent they should use their improved defence machinery to plan, organize, and manage NATO forces and strategy, particularly in the field of modernisation, full utilization of nuclear planning machinery and the further implementation of military consultation, including crisis consultation.

13. A further problem to be determined is whether development of effective arms production is required, with particular regard to increasing intra-European co-operation and existing and possibly future forms of inter-Allied co-operation.

14. Alliance members should consider whether new concrete disarmament propositions should be formulated. This problem should be explored also in the light of political considerations and in the preparation for a future time when balanced force reductions may become feasible. In this context, they should consider other appropriate measures which, at the same time, may be part of a future European security arrangement.

II. THE POLITICAL FIELD

15. How, in the opinion of Alliance members should their long-term aims in Europe be defined? And how do they think détente should be made to serve such long-term objectives?

16. The first problem here is to determine whether the Alliance and a policy of détente are, or are not, contradictory. An important consideration in this regard is whether a European security system may, or may not, be more effective and less risky if based on an equilibrium of two groupings. Finally, in this context, there is the problem of determining the rôles of the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union in respect to the creation and maintenance of a stable and peaceful order in Europe.

17. The problem should be examined whether, at the present stage, it is possible to draw up plans either for a peaceful order in Europe or for a solution of the German problem. Are both problems indissolubly linked? Which powers, apart from the Four with special responsibility for Germany, have a vital interest in establishing such order in Europe? Finally, the Allies should examine the degree of co-operation that is required to keep détente and ultimate settlement in step.

18. On the German question, the Allies should study the various aspects related to the consequences of the division of Germany, not only in respect to the Pankow régime but also to the status of Berlin. The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the East and the other part of Germany should be examined in this context. Finally, should a just solution to the problems of Germany and Berlin be part of Allied endeavours to relax tension between East and West and, in a wider perspective, to do away with the division of Europe? The Allies should determine how they could be instrumental in the harmonisation and co-ordination of their policies with those of the Federal Government in this field; they should also try to define their rôle and task vis-à-vis the freedom and viability of Berlin.

19. While there may be many forms and channels of East-West contacts, the Allies should consider which forms of co-operation offer the most promising opportunities. They should determine the relative advantages between the bilateral and multilateral approaches to East-West relations and contacts. The necessity of a formal security conference between East and West, either now or in the future, should be examined.

20. The Allies should determine whether they should now give further detailed study to the problems of détente, including a European settlement and security system. In this context, they must consider whether the machinery of NATO, in its present form, is sufficient for whatever consultation and co-ordination may be necessary, or whether special bodies should be instituted. under the North Atlantic Council, for continuing studies in these fields.

21. Likewise, the Allies should consider the problem of whether NATO arms control machinery, under the authority of the Council, should be strengthened, and if so, how?

IN REGIONS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA

22. The security of the Allies in the Treaty area has been preserved. However, there is a rising tide of violence and instability in regions outside the area. Accordingly, the Allies may wish to consider whether this situation has consequences for the policy of "détente" in Europe and for an eventual European settlement. They may also wish to consider what impact this has on the interests and security of the members of the Alliance and how this impact varies among the members. Finally, they may examine its implications for the functioning of NATO, and particularly for the need of consultation and possibly of planning. The members should also consider the variety of instruments at their disposal to deal with these problems.

23. In studying these questions, the Allies should determine to what extent consultation on events outside the Treaty area may be improved and how. For example, the Allies may consider the possibility of creating specialised groups working on specific regions and issues. They may consider also whether these groups may possibly be composed, in the first instance, by those members who feel they have special knowledge or concern for these regions or issues. Furthermore, consideration might be given to methods of improving consultation between the members' missions to the United Nations. Finally, the machinery for possible long-term planning may also be examined.