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SUGGESTED OUTLINE DRAFT FOR A PERSONAL REPORT BY THE
RAPPORTEUR OF SUB-GROUP NO. 2

I. Ideological foundations and the unity of the Alliance

- (a) In 1949, the Washington Treaty was signed by the Western European countries primarily because of their fears that the USSR would pursue its imperialist policy (subjugation of the Baltic countries, annexation of parts of Finland, Poland, Rumania and Germany, establishment of minority Communist governments in the Balkans and in Central and Eastern Europe using the method of internal subversion backed by external pressure).

All the countries of Western and Southern Europe felt threatened to a greater or lesser degree. The United States and Canada had cogent reasons for opposing this policy.

The Atlantic Alliance offered what proved to be an adequate means of containment.

- (b) However, although it has been an effective remedy for a specific problem, the true importance of the Alliance can obviously only be gauged against a wider background.

It is the tool devised by the democratic leaders of the Free World to counteract the world threat represented in 1949 by Communist ideology and policy for which the USSR, under the direction of Stalin, undeniably provided the motive force. In addition to the collective defence of Europe and North America against a Soviet attack, the authors of the Washington Treaty visualised the creation and development of a common policy which would permit opposition to Communism not only in the geographical area covered by the Treaty but throughout the world, and not only in the military but also in the political and economic fields.

The Alliance was meant to be the instrument of a world policy. This is clear, to my mind, from certain phrases in the Preamble and in Article 2 of the Treaty.

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- (c) This conception of the Alliance which was simply mentioned in the Treaty was amplified and confirmed in the Report of the Committee of Three.

By 1956 the members of the Alliance felt that there was a need to take stock of their actions and likewise for adjustments to take account of world developments during the previous seven years, in the light of their experience.

The result of their self-examination, described in the Report by Mr. Pearson, Mr. Lange and Mr. Martino, and adopted unanimously at the Ministerial Meeting in December 1957, is quite clear.

At that time, the fifteen members of the Alliance believed in the need for a gradual evolution of the Alliance and for its step-by-step transformation into an Atlantic Community (see in particular paragraphs 9, 12, 13, 17 and 30 and the conclusions of the Report of the Committee of Three).

- (d) Between 1957 and 1958 the Alliance followed the line advocated in this report and some progress was made.
- (e) When General de Gaulle came to power in France in 1958 this period ended. The memorandum sent by General de Gaulle to President Eisenhower and Mr. MacMillan in September 1958 put forward a completely different political concept based essentially on the existence of a triumvirate (United States, United Kingdom, France) responsible for directing a world-wide policy in the name of the West.

This approach having been rejected by the English-speaking powers, France pursued a policy which led it to quit NATO in 1966 and to adopt an increasingly independent attitude vis-à-vis the United States and its other Atlantic partners.

In these circumstances, it would seem impossible to continue the policy outlined in the Treaty of Washington and formalised in the Report by the Three Wise Men. One member of the Alliance is openly opposed to such a course and others may have certain hesitations. The way towards an Atlantic Community is at present barred.

- (f) This is, in my opinion, a regrettable state of affairs.

The Western world has an unfortunate tendency to minimise the dangers of Communism. While these dangers may not take the same form as in 1949 they are just as great and just as menacing for the future of the Free World. The danger in 1949 was essentially European. The USSR, under Stalin, formed the spearhead. Today the danger comes essentially from Asia and China is the leader of the movement.

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Europe's indifference, and what one might call its somnolence, arise from the fact that geographically the danger has moved further afield. However, from the long-term standpoint this danger is no less real.

There has, of course, been a change in the policy of the USSR and the European Communist countries. Peaceful coexistence in our part of the world is desirable and appears possible, but the fact that the threat has become geographically more remote and no longer takes the form we knew twenty years ago does not basically alter the problem facing us.

Consequently, the Rapporteur deplores the fact that the initial conception of the Alliance would no longer seem to receive the support of all members.

- (g) It is, however, encouraging that all the countries of the Alliance appear to agree that the latter should continue after 1969.

WHY?

The report by Sub-Group No. 1 should provide us with the answers to this question.

It is probable that after having noted the far-reaching changes which have come about in the policy of the European Communist countries, it will be seen that it is not absolutely proven that peaceful coexistence is an irreversible policy for every one of these countries. The attitude of the Soviet Union during the recent Middle East conflict, the resolutions adopted at the last meetings of Communist countries and Parties, a stiffening of their attitude to the German question in spite of the efforts made by the Federal Republic, are aspects of the problem we should bear in mind and which should cause us to restrain unfounded hopes.

In the military field, it must be said that no move towards disarmament has been made by the Eastern bloc and that this threat to Europe has not diminished. Furthermore, the assumption that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is bound to be signed, lends further support to the conclusion that, in the prevailing circumstances, the Atlantic Alliance is still essential, and if the non-proliferation treaty is in fact signed, it will be even more essential than in 1949.

Apart from the Atlantic Alliance, the defence of Europe against an attack which has become less likely but has not yet disappeared, continues to be the only effective answer.

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- (h) Now that this military necessity has once more been recognised, a question arises which the Atlantic Alliance has had to face from the outset. It has always been rightly said that a military alliance could not exist without a common policy.

It is therefore essential that in the geographical area covered by the Washington Treaty, the members of the Atlantic Alliance should adopt the same attitude to the problems arising in that area. Luckily, there are not many such problems. They primarily relate to the reunification of Germany and to the status of Berlin. In twenty years, there has fortunately never been any divergence of views on these problems within the Alliance. The discussions held in the Permanent Council have invariably led to the adoption of jointly-agreed solutions. It is absolutely necessary - and this is a matter of life or death for the Atlantic Alliance - that this should continue to be so.

On these matters, permanent consultation is indispensable. It is not merely a question of exchanging information; what is required is the development of a truly common policy, accepted and put into effect by each member country.

On other questions, such as the dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, I have always thought, and I continue to think, that the same principles should be observed. *3*

- (i) A divergence of views seems to me inconceivable on the point I have just dealt with.

It is much more difficult to solve the questions studied by Sub-Group No. 4, which relate to a concerted policy by NATO members with regard to the problems arising outside the geographical confines of the Treaty.

I can approve, with virtually no reservations, what Mr. Pattijn has written on this subject in his draft report. I am in favour of encouraging whatever can be done to improve consultation between the members of the Alliance.

Every crisis in NATO has been caused by events which have occurred outside its geographical area.

If, as I believe, there is a desire to prolong the life of the Alliance, it is clearly logical to work out the best possible system for political consultation in order to forestall critical incidents, if possible, and in any event, to handle them on lines accepted by all or the majority of the members.

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Mr. Pattijn suggests the creation of certain bodies and of machinery for consultation, the adoption of which would result in a great improvement over the system previously devised and tried out.

Speaking personally, I am convinced that this is the path we must follow.

II. Prospects for inter-European co-operation
and consequences of the possible unification
of Europe

I shall try to reply later to the questions raised in this connection. It seems to me that, unless we are prepared to accept purely theoretical ideas, we must wait until we know whether or not the United Kingdom is to join the Common Market and what the prospects for Europe are likely to be in either eventuality.

I believe that it is too early, at this stage, to enlarge upon this subject.