

M. J. J. J.
cc: ~~Mr. C. Chapman~~ (2 copies)

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

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19th April, 1967.

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

I was delighted to have had an opportunity to meet with you yesterday morning and discuss the work of your sub-group.

As I mentioned, I found your preliminary paper most stimulating. Since you were courteous enough to ask my views and since I have recently had a staff paper completed on Soviet foreign policy, I am taking the liberty of enclosing a list of questions on this subject. While the elements that produce Soviet decisions should rightly be examined, I believe that in the final analysis we must base our judgments and actions on the known and definable lines of Soviet policy as it affects the external world.

I leave it entirely to you as to what use you make of this paper. I very much appreciated your desire for co-operation, and I can assure you that you will always find me ready to help you in any way possible, and look forward to our maintaining close working relations throughout this study.

Let me finally express my appreciation more formally than I could yesterday for your very courteous letter and call.

Yours sincerely,

Manlio Brosio.

His Excellency Mr. J.H.A. Watson,
United Kingdom Delegation to the
North Atlantic Council.

QUESTIONNAIRE - SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE

1. What are the foreign policy aims the Soviet Union are pursuing through a policy of detente towards the West?
2. To what extent do the Soviets, as before, portray detente in terms of a gradual Western acquiescence to a concrete Soviet or Russian political programme? What are the elements of this programme?
3. What reasons do Soviet spokesmen express for the stepped-up 'detente' political activity of the USSR in Europe? What conclusions may be drawn from these statements?
4. How does the Soviet desire to operate in a climate of reduced tension affect the German problem?
5. What are the implications of Soviet political action? Is it directed at freezing the Central European status quo? Does it envisage the indefinite division of Germany into two or three states? Is it intended to evoke differences within the Bonn Coalition and distrust and hostility between the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies?
6. What are the implications of the Soviet 'return to Potsdam' detente theme with regard both to Germany and to the wider European context?
7. Has the Soviet Union sought to induce the Federal Republic of Germany to reorient her ties in the direction of a Soviet formulate status quo arrangement in Central Europe? If so, in what ways?
8. What are the Soviet pre-conditions for allowing the reunification of Germany?
9. Is there any evidence that the Soviet concept of 'detente' includes a Soviet desire for compromise on major East-West issues, for example, on the question of Germany's future?
10. What part does NATO play in the Soviet view of detente?
11. What is the purpose of the concept of detente through 'pan-Europeanism', promoted by the USSR as a security alternative to NATO?
12. Do the Soviets continue to oppose the European Communities and other forms of Western integration? Do the Communist parties in Europe follow the same policy?
13. To what extent does the USSR wish a diminished U.S. presence in Europe? By what methods has Soviet policy attempted to induce Western European states to follow a line 'independent' of the U.S.?

14. In what ways have the 'bourgeoisie' and its particular nationalist susceptibilities, rather than the European working classes, become the political target and effective lever of Soviet political action? What are the implications of this shift of emphasis?

15. What kind of Europe do Soviet political and economic actions seek to form?

16. Could Soviet political moves by themselves affect the stability of the relative power balance between the Western and Soviet camps?

17. What are the political implications of changes and prospective changes in Soviet defence expenditures and recent missile deployment?
