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Future Tasks of the Alliance - Sub-Group I

--- The attached draft report, <sup>leading to one amendment is</sup> prepared by  
State Secretary Schutz and Mr Watson will be  
the subject of discussion at the next meeting  
of Sub-Group I on 18/19 September.

German Delegation to NATO/U.K. Delegation to NATO  
11 September, 1967.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS, DETENTE AND A  
EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

1. The Allies recognise that the present artificial division of Europe is unstable and the real hindrance to peaceful cooperation between states in East and West. The basic common aim of Allied policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remains to provide effective protection for freedom, peace and security in the North Atlantic area, and at the same time to develop plans and methods for overcoming the division of Europe and for achieving a just and lasting peaceful order there.
2. The political objective of our Alliance is a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe which provides adequate and durable stability for all states of Europe, the members of our Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact and other states in neither grouping. This must include a just and durable settlement of the German problem. This objective could hardly be attained at a time of tension and hostile confrontation of blocs, but rather in a period of détente. Relaxation of tension is not the final goal but a step on the way towards a European settlement which in itself no longer gives rise to renewed tension.
3. Soviet objectives with respect to détente continue to differ from ours. The Soviet have in recent years come to see a certain relaxation of tensions as meeting their own national interests: but how far their ultimate aims in Europe have changed is arguable.
4. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe communist dogma and the conservatism of the party bureaucracies

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- 2 -

operate against a relaxation of tension and the achievement of a European settlement. So do fears that it would be difficult to limit the consequences of a change in the structure of Europe. On the other hand the world wide responsibilities of the Soviet Union including the conflict with the People's Republic of China and the differentiations within the communist world, especially the growing self-assertion of Eastern Europe may incline the governments of the Warsaw Pact towards further exploring the possibilities of a European settlement. A relaxation of tensions in Europe and limited cooperation with the West would also make it possible for them to meet growing economic and technological requirements in their own countries, as well as the desires for a higher standard of living and a somewhat more open society. Eastern governments have so far shown themselves able to control these forces; this gives ground for hope that Eastern governments can be persuaded of the advantages for them in cooperation and a stable settlement in Europe.

5. In general these trends and influences have resulted in less rigidity in the attitudes of some Eastern governments towards various members of the Alliance. Although there is without doubt a genuine interest in a European détente the Soviet government on the other hand still hopes, by relaxing tensions selectively, to weaken the cohesion of the Alliance, to drive wedges between the states of Western Europe, in particular to isolate the Federal Republic of Germany and open up differences between Western Europe and the United States. The East European governments would be well suited by a détente that perpetuates the present situation in Eastern Europe. But the hope of these

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governments are probably tempered by what they think they can achieve; and they may come to realise that their more ambitious objectives are unattainable.

6. Thus the relaxation of tensions is a fluctuating process, and there are still objectives in the policy of East European states that in a period of détente run counter to ours. It may take a long time to reach significant results. A policy aimed at achieving a settlement through détente will ultimately succeed only if the other side too is willing to contribute towards a just and peaceful order in Europe. In particular, if a relaxation of tensions is to be effective it will have to be comprehensive and must include everybody.

Nevertheless it remains an Allied interest to persist in our efforts to relax tensions, and to use to our best advantage such displays of reasonableness as the Eastern governments may show. In fact, a period of relaxing tension provides new opportunities for all the states in Europe.

7. NATO and a policy of détente are not alternatives which exclude each other. On the contrary, only the continued existence of the Alliance, its political weight and readiness for defence will convince the Soviets that a policy of engendering crises brings no advantage. The North Atlantic Alliance will not have fulfilled its military task until its political tasks have also been resolved. Until a lasting and just European settlement is assured the Alliance remains an irreplaceable guarantor of European security.

/8.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

8. Although it is still too early to forecast the shape of a future peaceful order in Europe, we should already at this stage reach agreement on some of the basic elements to be considered in such a European settlement, e.g.

- The states united in the North Atlantic Alliance must be sure that a European settlement guarantees them (as is stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty) "the freedom, common heritage, and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law".

- Any feasible European settlement would have to accept the differing political, economic and social systems of the states comprising it, and the sovereignty of each government in internal matters;

- the right of every state to determine its own political, economic, social and cultural system;

- Renunciation of the use of force, the threat of force and all forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other states;

- Relations between states to be governed by the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance should, moreover, try to ensure that the right of free movement of persons and of free flow of information are as widely respected as possible in Europe.

9. In working towards a new peaceful order in Europe, the position of the United States is of vital importance. The European members of the Alliance are not in a position to maintain their freedom and independence alone in face of

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

the presence and power of the Soviet Union. A corresponding North American presence remains as necessary as when the Alliance was founded, in order to preserve the freedom of its European members. The United States contribution must not be limited to defence and deterrence: its active participation is equally necessary in the process of utilising the détente for achieving a peaceful order in Europe. Moreover any European settlement, once achieved, will require the continuing support and cooperation of the United States.

10. On the other hand it is clear that no substantial progress can be made towards a European settlement without Soviet agreement or at least acquiescence; and it is also clear that in present circumstances the Soviet Government does not consider that it is in its interest to make a major change.

11. Many East European governments regard Soviet support as necessary to ensure their internal stability, and at their present stage of development close economic relations with the Soviet Union are essential to them. We should therefore take care that our policy could not be interpreted as setting Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union. Our aim should be to involve both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in more constructive forms of cooperation.

12. The core of the problem is therefore to convince the East European states and the Soviet Union by means of a purposeful, patient and undramatic policy of the greater advantages to both sides inherent in East-West collaboration.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

We will have to offer them a politically and economically attractive alternative to the present state of Europe.

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II. The German Problem

1. The existence of the two pact systems and the incorporation of each of the two parts of Germany in one or the other of these systems is the most significant manifestation of the division of Europe. It will be impossible to separate the German Problem from the division of Europe. They are indissolubly connected.

The Soviet Union and some of their Allies claim that there exist two German states and that Berlin is a special political unit. The acceptance of this "reality" by the West cannot be accepted as a prerequisite for a détente.

2. Any solution of German problems contributing to a just and lasting European settlement

- must start from the principle that the German people in both parts of Germany have the right of free decision,
- requires action of the Four Powers with special responsibility for Germany,
- requires the co-operation not only of our Allies but of those states of Europe which have a vital interest in establishing a lasting and peaceful order in Europe.

While, after the Second World War, peace treaties and similar agreements were concluded with all former allies of the German Reich and with Austria, there has been no peace treaty for Germany. All efforts of the Three Western Powers with special responsibility for Germany to bring about a solution of the German question in direct negotiations with the Soviet Union have so far been unsuccessful.

3. Berlin is still a cardinal point of Soviet policy in Germany. A crisis might flare up here at any time with implications and repercussions that could be worldwide. Moscow and East Berlin are constantly perfecting their means of creating and manipulating critical situations in this area.

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4. It is therefore necessary that

- each member of the Alliance in its endeavour to overcome the division of Europe and achieve a relaxation of tension between East and West should at the same time strive for a just solution of the problems of Germany and Berlin,
- the Federal Republic of Germany in its efforts to overcome the division of the German people should strive for a relaxation of tension in its relations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as well as the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

5. As long as a part of the German people is denied the right of self-determination and has to live in a separated state-like entity, ruled by a régime imposed upon them by a foreign power and kept by force, that régime must be denied international recognition. There are not two German states. Nevertheless the Federal Republic of Germany is trying to include the other part of Germany in a policy of détente by retaining and strengthening the ties between the Germans in East and West. In this context the Federal Government accepts the fact that the authorities in the Soviet Zone perform administrative functions.

6. The relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the other part of Germany are of an internal nature, while the relations between other states and the communist ruled part of Germany are not. In their efforts to solve German problems within the framework of a policy of détente the Federal Republic of Germany, the Allies (especially the Three Powers), and the Alliance as such have their parts to play.

7. It is up to the Federal Republic of Germany, by means of internal contacts with the authorities and with the people of the Soviet Zone, to make life more bearable for the East Germans and to ease the tension in relations between the two parts of Germany. The 16 proposals

/contained

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

contained in the declaration of the Federal Government of April 12, 1967, and the letter written by Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger on June 13, 1967, to Chairman Stoph in East Berlin are examples of this policy.

A continuing increase of internal German trade which is a significant link between the two parts of Germany, and economic co-operation, would be an important instrument in this respect.

Furthermore, it is up to the Federal Republic of Germany, if significant results in inner-German relations have been achieved, to facilitate the participation of the population of the Soviet Zone in international life, in scientific cultural and sporting exchanges without thereby furthering the political objectives of the East Berlin régime.

8. On the other hand, it is up to the Allies to assist these efforts for a relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany. This can be done by counteracting attempts by Moscow and East Berlin to interpret these contacts as international relations between two German states. The Allies should use every opportunity, particularly in their contacts with the Soviet Union and East European states, to make it clear that the East Berlin regime is not legitimate and that it does not represent a sovereign state. Any action to enhance its international status would not only disregard the will of the people living under its power but would hamper internal German contacts and relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany. The Allies should open up and facilitate, in co-operation with the Federal Government, private contacts with the East German population in the sphere of science, culture and sports. The link with progress in internal German relations should be kept in mind.

/9.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

9. The Alliance as such should be instrumental in harmonizing and co-ordinating the policy of the Federal Government and that of the other Allies.

10. It is also the task of the Alliance to ensure the freedom and viability of Berlin and to remain aware of the constant threat to Berlin even in times when the East is hoping for Western interest to wane and resistance gradually to flag.

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PRACTICAL STEPS AND PROCEDURES

The present chapter is designed to point out, with reference to the Alliance, the possibilities of East-West contacts in a period of relaxed tension. From time to time various measures have been proposed which might further this purpose, but their merits and demerits are complex and will need to be discussed in an appropriate forum within the Alliance. It is not possible at this stage to draw up a comprehensive solution for all the problems which divide Europe.

2. In order to overcome the present division of Europe and to promote peaceful cooperation between its states, both bilateral and multilateral contacts will be needed.

3. Bilateral contacts between Western and Eastern states are indispensable and can be of great value if they proceed from a basis of prior Allied consultation. But they will be harmful if Eastern governments get the impression that they could play off one Western state against the other. A bilateral approach makes possible direct and individual contacts with East European governments. The Allies should avoid treating the East Europeans as a single bloc led by the Soviet Union. We should value collaboration with them both for its own sake and also as a means of influencing the Soviet Union to accept a mutually beneficial settlement.

4. There are practical limits to what can be achieved bilaterally. As contacts develop, conversations with Eastern governments will deal

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increasingly with problems of concern to all members of the Alliance. In order to shape a stable, larger European structure, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union participate, it will be desirable increasingly to work towards multilateral exchanges. They will probably develop more slowly than the bilateral ones.

5. They too have their limits. Proposals with a specific NATO label are at this stage liable to be received with suspicion by Eastern governments. An undue or premature emphasis by the Western Allies on multilateral negotiations could lead to an undesirable consolidation of the links which bind the East Europeans to each other and to the Soviet Union. We must also ensure that a multilateral approach to a European settlement does not perpetuate the existing division in Europe or allow it to crystallise on its present lines.

6. There is agreement in principle on the importance of consultation between the Western Allies on the central questions of East-West relations. But consultation in fact needs to go further than this, especially if the Allies are to use the present fluctuating relaxation of tensions to work in a coordinated fashion towards a general European settlement involving multilateral agreements. There should be agreement on the general aims which the Alliance as a whole is seeking to achieve in its dealings with the East, so that each Ally may harmonise its own actions with these common aims.

7. As bilateral contacts and agreements

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between individual Western and Eastern states frequently affect the interests of other states of the Alliance, it is important to harmonise our views on all matters which concern our Allies before they are discussed bilaterally with the East. The chances of fruitful results may indeed be enhanced if the Soviet and East European governments understand that individual members of the Alliance, while speaking for themselves, do so in agreement with their Allies. The closer the consultation, the clearer our adherence to common principles and to agreed basic positions, the more flexibility and initiative will be possible in bilateral contacts with the East.

8. The position of Allies taking part in multilateral East-West negotiations should be /concerted/ fully discussed/ in advance within the Alliance.

9. The Atlantic Alliance offers an excellent forum for establishing this harmonisation on our side, and for maintaining a necessary degree of coordination in our bilateral and multilateral dealings with the East. This is one of the ways in which the Alliance can make an essential contribution to the organisation of collective arrangements designed to remove East-West antagonisms and ensure peace and unity in Europe.

10. Economic, technological and cultural collaboration with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can contribute to a relaxation of tensions, and foster the concept that states and communities with differing social systems can not only co-exist but collaborate to their mutual benefit. But it will not by itself be sufficient to achieve a lasting settlement in Europe.

/11.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 14 -

11. The development of economic and technological collaboration seems to be the aspect of détente which most interests the governments of Eastern Europe, and even perhaps which also most attracts the Soviet Government at this stage. And it has the advantage to the West that it can be made mutually beneficial, and if sufficiently attractive will induce the East European economies to become more closely involved with the West.

12. Cultural and personal contacts have a corresponding effect. They have a considerable impact on the artificially isolated societies of the East. We must therefore expect the Soviet and East European governments to limit these contacts which potentially weaken their hold over their countries.

13. We therefore invite the Allied Ministers to agree that the fields of economics, technology, cultural and personal contacts offer good prospects for significant steps towards the forging of mutually beneficial links between the divided halves of the European continent; and that within the framework of the Alliance continuous study should be given to the ways in which agreements and opportunities in these fields can help to further this objective.

14. In the field of political arrangements and security we should make it clear that while we welcome such mutually beneficial arrangements as the Soviet and particularly the East European governments are prepared to accept, we seek wider and deeper forms of cooperation between

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the temporarily divided parts of the continent. In this way we may be able to increase the readiness of Eastern governments to respond to our approaches.

15. In this context special consideration must be given to the prospect of a conference on European security. An overall European conference, such as the Soviet-sponsored "European Security Conference" does not at present promise success. But an East-West conference may be desirable, and indeed necessary, at the right time. For such a conference to succeed:

- (a) it must be properly prepared and have a satisfactory agenda;
- (b) the Allies will need to /reach agreement/ discuss fully/ beforehand on all items on the agenda;
- (c) it must be clear from exchanges with Eastern governments that the participation of our American Allies is assured and that the Soviet Union and its allies are also prepared to contribute to a lasting and equitable settlement in Europe, and do not regard the conference merely as a tool for propaganda, for cementing the status quo and for disrupting the Western Alliance.

16. What is required, in the present phase of bilateral exploratory exchanges with the Eastern governments on these subjects, is to give close and urgent study to the sort of European settlement towards which the Allies should work, as set out in the preceding chapter, and to the way in which they should approach this settlement.

/17.



CONFIDENTIAL

- 16 -

17. In addition cooperation between East and West can take ~~several forms which may~~ prove valuable, depending on the circumstances and opportunity:

- (a) cooperation with those Communist states that have evolved sufficiently, in some aspects of existing Western multilateral institutions, thereby encouraging others to evolve in a similar fashion;
- (b) cooperation in existing international organisation;
- (c) regional West-East cooperation, involving a few states from each side, in special ventures inside or outside Europe, thereby cutting across political and ideological divisions;
- (d) various semi-official or non-governmental activities in technical, scientific, cultural, athletic etc. fields;
- (e) utilisation of special West-East forums to develop additional means of dialogue and communication and, in time, to consider political and security issues.

18. /The composition and terms of reference of the groups to which the studies mentioned in paragraphs 13 and 16 should be entrusted are of concern to other rapporteurs and sub-groups also. Therefore it is necessary to discuss them at the next coordination meeting of the rapporteurs. Their proposals will be communicated to members of the sub-groups as soon as possible./

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