

Permanent Delegation  
of the Federal Republic of Germany  
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

20-02-5/3382/67 VSV

PARIS 16e, 28 September  
1967



My dear Secretary General,

I am referring to the discussion which we had in sub-group 1 of the Harmel exercise and to the proposal for a re-draft of paragraphs 7 and 8 in Part II (German Problem) of the report which the Netherlands Permanent Representative made in a letter of 21 September 1967. The German co-rapporteur, State Secretary Schütz, was very interested in these suggestions and asked me to send to you his reply as an enclosure.

I am sending copies of this letter to those Permanent Representatives who have received the Netherlands proposal.

Sincerely yours,

*Dirk Oncken*

(Dirk Oncken)

Deputy Permanent Representative

His Excellency

Manlio Brosio

Secretary General of the  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

P a r i s

*2/10/67*

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CONFIDENTIAL

1. The relationship of the Federal Republic of Germany to the other part of Germany is not adequately defined by the words in the Netherlands draft "the inter-German relations are bound to be of a different character than the informal contacts which may be developed by the other Allies in a variety of fields."

The Netherlands proposal does not reflect the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany has in this regard a special task which is essentially different from that of her Allies. This fact, however, was and is a basis of our membership in NATO. The Allies have explicitly recognized this in the Paris Agreements of 23 October 1954 which contain the following passage "They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs."

2. This is something quite different from a "monopoly" of the Federal Republic of Germany in relations with the other part of Germany. Of such a monopoly one could only speak if one recognizes in the other part of Germany a second German state. That is not the case as far as relations of the Western countries with the other part of Germany are concerned. On the other hand, it is not astonishing if of all people the East-Berlin Minister President Stoph, in his speech of 20 September, accuses the Federal Government of attempting to monopolize the relationship between the NATO partners and the Zone, referring at the same time to internal consultations and confidential documents of NATO. We shall not be able to prevent him from indulging

in such propagandistic distortions of our policy. But we hope to meet with understanding if we consider the expression "monopoly" in the Harmel report or elsewhere as not well chosen. In the interest of our common cause, we should better avoid it.

3. We attach great importance to stressing the mediator rôle of the Federal Republic of Germany in facilitating the participation of the Eastern German population in international life, and to underlining explicitly the importance of internal German trade as a link between the two parts of Germany, as was done in the original draft.
4. The Netherlands text speaks of the "mistrust" and of the "feelings of enmity" prevalent within the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries towards initiatives of the Federal Republic of Germany. A generalizing statement of this nature, however, is apt to make matters appear in a wrong light. In many countries, the attitude of the population -as opposed to their régimes- towards us is very open-minded. The policy of the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union towards the Federal Republic of Germany is not founded on sentiments but on cool calculation. If the propaganda of these states attempts to incite mistrust towards us, this is done on the one hand in order to raise understanding among their own population for their rigid policy towards us, and on the other hand to make us suspect in the eyes of our Allies. We therefore always highly appreciate it when our Allies refuse to be impressed by, and oppose, such propaganda.
5. Based on the discussion at the last meeting of Working Group I, we intend to present in the final report our ideas on the German policy, on the rôle of our Allies, and in particular also on that of the Three Powers, in some more detail while keeping in mind as much as possible the suggestions made by our Allies.