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Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance

Sub-Group I: "The Political Aims of the Alliance"

In the paper circulated on 6 May a reference was made (page 5) to an annex to be supplied by the United States Representatives on Sub-Group I.

This annex is now circulated herewith.

Ulrich Sahm

J.H.A. Watson

9 May, 1967.

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FUTURE OF ALLIANCE STUDY
SUBGROUP ONE

The following "scenarios" have been prepared by the U.S. members of Subgroup One of the Future of the Alliance Study as a contribution to the paper of 6 May, 1967, prepared by the Corapporteurs of this group. These outlines, based on the most optimistic and pessimistic probabilities, are unofficial and personal. The authors point out that the sequence of events set forth are extreme and unlikely to eventuate in the combinations indicated, and that a more likely eventuality is a mixture of various developments described in both scenarios.

ASSUMPTIONS:

1. During the next five years there will be no general settlement of the European problem, including the reunification of Germany;
2. During the next five years there will be no military conflict in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

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SCENARIO I

A. Developments in internal Soviet and East European affairs:

1. Ideological Evolution

The erosion of the more militant aspects of Marxism-Leninism will permit more Communist leaders, especially those of the East European states, to view greater unity in the West not as a threat to themselves but as a logical and even positive development, inherent in modern economic and social organization. The Sino-Soviet dispute and domestic pressures in the Soviet Union will conspire to bring on also such a change in perspective in the Soviet leadership, although later than that in Czechoslovakia, Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

2. Political Moderation

Although for a long time to come the Soviet Union and most of the European states will remain single party dictatorships, it is likely that in some East European states there will be considerable movement towards weakening of the domestic role of ideology and of party dictatorship. Thus Yugoslavia and even Czechoslovakia may come to resemble in their domestic political orders the existing dictatorships in Spain or even Mexico.

3. Economic Reforms

Progressive decentralization of the Communist economies will make possible more international economic cooperation, hitherto handicapped by centralized national planning. Economic reforms are most likely to move forward in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary in that order.

4. Economic Cooperation

CEMA will have given up its efforts to achieve economic integration in Eastern Europe, and subregional cooperation will develop in its place. Clearing and convertibility will have been arranged between the East European states and the Soviet

/Union.

Union. There will be a proliferation of more specialized subregional arrangements among the East European states.

5. Alliance

The Warsaw Pact will not be formally disbanded, but Soviet troops will have been withdrawn from Poland and Hungary. The Alliance will serve as a symbol of political interdependence and for Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia as a source of Soviet guarantee against the politically exploited popular fears of Germany.

6. Regional Conditions

Apart from lip service to Warsaw Pact, Czechoslovakia will probably have moved away from its position of subservience to Soviet control, and will be seeking extensive contacts with the West. Soviet control over the Balkans will have probably eroded entirely. The Bulgarians will have imitated the Romanians, although without the violent anti-Soviet overtones.

7. Impact of China

Continued, and perhaps even intensified, Chinese hostility towards the Soviet Union will pose a security threat to the USSR, and will also have a general "Europeanizing" impact on Soviet outlook.

8. Strategic Factors

Soviet fear of a possible encirclement (from the East and the West), as well as growing Soviet appreciation of the ultimate futility of arms races will reinforce the Soviet stake in European stability.

B. The next five years will see the following changes in East-West relations:

1. East-West Economic Cooperation

Due to considerable expansion in multilateral East-West cooperation, the East European states in all probability will be participating in several East-West multilateral organs.

/Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia will have obtained preferential trade agreements with the EEC. The idea of European unity will become more and more appealing to the East Europeans.

2. Formal Political Consultation

Some form of political consultation on an East-West basis will probably develop. Informal East-West consultative committees will have developed, although it is unlikely that a formal NATO-Warsaw Pact arrangement will have been made.

3. Normalization of FRG Relations with East Europe

Diplomatic relations will have been established between the Federal Republic of Germany and the East European states, with obvious exception of East Germany.

4. All-German Institutional Framework

More extensive West-East German economic relations will have been developed, including even indirect relations between the EEC and East Germany under the cover of all-German arrangements, including freedom of personal movement. Mixed all-German commissions will be operative.

5. East-West Security arrangement

Some form of security arrangement for Central Europe, involving a direct relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, will be under active consideration, if not yet implemented. It will have prompted a partial US-Soviet reciprocal troop thin out.

SCENARIO IIA. Developments in Soviet and East European Affairs.1. Ideology

General conservatism among Soviet leaders will lead them to view any relaxation of controls with the greatest caution. Improvement in certain forms of communication with the West and the continuation of modest cultural exchanges will make party apparatchiki doubly concerned about ideological contamination and lead to periodic crackdowns on intellectuals, artists, etc. Concern for maintaining party supremacy will lead to renewed efforts to generate ideological conformity. These tendencies will transmit themselves to Eastern Europe where they will tend to reinforce similar tendencies and efforts by party traditionalists.

2. Political Developments

Efforts to modernize and loosen political institutions and processes will be halting and cautious, marked by setbacks. Party regulars, frightened by experimentation, will seek to hold to a minimum any tampering with the political system. If, despite these endeavors, one or another Communist country shows notable signs of evolution toward political pluralism, the rest of the group will band together to contain the infection.

3. Economic Reforms

Reforms will move slowly largely because of the inherent resistance of party bureaucrats and the inertia of economic managers. Fears of adverse political consequences will hinder meaningful cooperation with non-Communist countries, though trade will grow. At best both reforms and joint ventures with "capitalists" will be spotty and subject to halts and starts.

4. Intra-Communist Economic Cooperation

The picture will remain confused, much as it is today. The Soviets will try from time to time to induce various types of coordination but by and large the tendency toward separate, albeit somewhat attuned, economic plans will persist.

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5. Warsaw Pact

The demands of modern strategy and advanced weapons will produce a measure of military coordination. Soviet forces will remain in East Germany in substantial number and hence in Poland as well. At least as a check on Romania but also because of Kadar's anxieties they will also still be present in Hungary. The East German army will play a significant role in "northern tier" forces, which through joint maneuvers and war plans will become more closely integrated. East forces as a whole will continue to be modernized and backed by a large number of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons.

6. Regional Conditions

Trends toward diversity will continue but in most cases will be subject to severe limitation. Most if not all East European regimes will recognize that ultimately their survival depends upon ties with the USSR and Moscow itself will periodically apply pressures to force excessively autonomous regimes to heel. Indeed, either under circumstances of detente (and better East-West European relations) or under conditions of greater tension, the Soviets will find themselves impelled to tighten the reigns of control in Eastern Europe. While tensions between and among the Eastern Europeans and the Soviets will persist, essential Soviet dominance will remain.

7. Impact of China

If successor regime in Peking attenuates dispute with Soviets, the latter will be under less compulsion to stress the "liberal" aspects of their own system. The East Europeans will lose maneuverability they have gained because of Sino-Soviet dispute.

8. Strategic Factors

Growing Soviet strategic power will tend to make Soviet leaders more self-confident and more venturesome, at least at the political level, in international affairs.

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B. Developments in East-West Relations

1. Political

The Soviets and East Europeans will view "detente" as essentially political warfare strategy against Western cohesion. They will employ it selectively with individual Western countries to encourage as much divisiveness as possible. No appreciable progress will have been made to heal the basic division of Europe and East Germany will receive a wider measure of international recognition as a separate sovereignty.

2. Economic

While trade and some other forms of economic and technical relations will have increased, broader forms of cooperation will remain sparse, ECE will remain a forum divided along ideological lines and no meaningful association between Eastern countries and OECD will have proved feasible. Notions of an organic unification of Europe will be repugnant to the existing regimes.

3. FRG Relations with the East

Although the FRG will have established diplomatic relations with some additional Eastern countries, relations will be extremely cool, marred by disputes arising from differences over the juridical position of West Berlin and East Germany.

4. FRG-East German Relations

No essential change from the present.

5. East-West Military Confrontation

No basic change in military relationship and no explicit security arrangements. Because of military trends in Warsaw Pact noted above (A.5 and 8) relative military position of East vis-a-vis West will have improved, accentuated by difficulties over strategy and force requirements in the West.

Special Group on the Future Tasks of the Alliance

Sub-Group I: "The Political Aims of the Alliance"

We circulate the enclosed paper as a basis for discussion at the next meeting of the Sub-Group.

It is hoped that other members of the Sub-Group will provide substantive comments in writing before this next meeting, if they are able to do so. In any case members of the Sub-Group are asked to be prepared for a discussion of substance at this meeting.

We also suggest that the Sub-Group should discuss the Secretary-General's paper, which is being circulated separately.

Ulrich Sahm

J.H.A. Watson

6 May, 1967.

THE POLITICAL AIMS OF THE ALLIANCE WITH REGARD TO

- A) EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL
- B) EUROPEAN SECURITY, THE GERMAN PROBLEM AND THE NATURE OF A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

Draft Outline

Assuming that Allied Governments

- are in agreement that the basic common aim of their policies towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the next decade remains to provide effective protection for freedom, peace and security in the North Atlantic area
- increasingly try to promote this basic aim by pursuing a policy of détente and to develop plans and methods for achieving a European settlement including the German problem

certain questions arise for consideration:

- I. East-West Relations in general
- II. European settlement
- III. The German Problem
- IV. Practical steps and procedures

I. EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL

- 1. What do we understand by the expression "détente"?
 - (a) "Détente" is sometimes used simply to describe a relaxation of the tension between the Soviet system and the West which originally brought the Alliance into being. To the extent that this tension has already relaxed somewhat, should we say that a détente in Europe has already begun?

/So far

So far, this relaxation of tension has resulted in the establishment of more diplomatic and other bilateral intercourse between European states; and made possible a number of bilateral contacts between European states designed to explore the possibilities of achieving more durable European co-operation. Is there something especially significant about European contacts? Or are they matched by similar ones with the United States and other countries outside Europe?

(b) "Détente" is also sometimes used to mean a condition where all significant hostility and suspicion have evaporated; leaving the states of Europe, with their differing political, economic and social systems, in more or less "normal" relations with each other. If we use the term in this sense, all we have at present is some progress towards a détente, which is regarded as a possible goal of international policy.

2. Can détente by itself achieve a European settlement?

(a) How far has the normalisation of bilateral relations now been achieved?

(b) Is it generally accepted by the members of the Alliance that the détente should continue to be pursued, and the possibility of a European settlement explored, by a wide range of bilateral contacts?

(c) How should these bilateral contacts be pursued once they begin to involve the interests of others, particularly other members of the Alliance?

(d) Is it the case that as the détente progresses the need for consultation and harmonisation of Allied policies also increases, so that as the détente grows, the importance of the N.A.T. Organisation (or equivalent machinery) grows with it?

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3. What trends and pressures currently push the Soviet Government and the Governments of Eastern Europe towards extending the détente beyond the present normalisation of bilateral relations towards a European settlement?

These trends and pressures are set out in an Annex to this paper. Briefly, it is possible to distinguish three main types of pressure on the Soviet Government. What weight should we give to them?

(a) The effectiveness of the Western Alliance backed by the nuclear power of the United States, which has provided and continues to provide an adequate defence against aggression and has deterred the Soviet Union from adventurous policies while it is itself manifestly non-aggressive;

(b) Difficulties within the communist world; notably, the resurgence of nationalism and polycentrism and in particular the major quarrel with China;

(c) Internal pressures: including economic difficulties (especially food production), the mounting cost of the arms race and modern technology and the popular demand for "more goulash" and a more libertarian society.

Do the Soviet and East European Governments still envisage a European order based on world revolutionary ideas, and if so how far does this influence their policies towards the West.

In the East European countries how significant is the pressure exercised by the resurgence of patriotism? (While East European Governments identify themselves with this nationalist current, the East German cannot).

In general it would seem that these pressures, and the structure of government and society in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, have produced considerable areas of hesitation and flexibility in foreign relations, perhaps with alternative

/objectives

objectives in the medium term. Can we identify these? The East European Governments especially tend to welcome a quieter, more prosperous life and greater independence; and most of them are keenly aware of the advantages of a European settlement and of collaboration with the West.

4. What do the Soviet and East European Governments hope to achieve by a policy of détente?

The Soviet Government, and the various national governments of Eastern Europe, declare that they wish to extend the détente, and to realise a European settlement, on the basis of the present status quo. But they also demand a shift of the balance of power in their favour, notably by the expulsion of the U.S. from Europe ("Europe for the Europeans") and the dissolution of NATO. How much are these governments wedded to their argument that the essential pre-condition of any general settlement is the formal acceptance of the status quo? How prepared are they to accept, as part of a bargain based on the status quo, the present Federal German Government, a substantial U.S. presence in Europe, and the continued existence of NATO? How many of the advantages they would derive from bilateral and multi-lateral contacts - collaboration with Western countries, lower level of armaments, greater freedom of manoeuvre in other areas, etc. - could be obtained without a just or lasting settlement of the German question, if other Western powers accepted this? What would be the disadvantages of such a development for the West? Are Soviet and some East European Governments therefore trying out a wedge-driving operation: showing cordiality to most other members of the Western Alliance and improving bilateral relations with them,

/while

while refusing to do the same with the German Federal Republic. In estimating the intentions and elasticity of the Soviet, Polish and Czech Governments in particular, it would also be necessary to make some estimate of which elements they consider expendable and which indispensable to their security in any general settlement. In other words, how far would they be prepared to modify the status quo to their disadvantage (e.g. over Germany); and at what price?

On the basis of this analysis can we attempt to foresee the range of possible ways in which present trends in East/West relations may develop over the next five years in Europe? Annexed are two alternative scenarios based on the most optimistic and pessimistic probabilities limiting the range of what we may expect to be supplied by the U.S. Delegation⁷.

II. European Settlement

A European settlement means an equitable, lasting and peaceful order in Europe. In particular, it would provide adequate and durable security for all the states of Europe, the members of our Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact and other European states in neither grouping; and provide a just and durable settlement of the "German problem".

We must consider what principles should form the basis of relations between the countries of Europe under such a settlement. Any feasible settlement would have to accept the differing political, economic and social systems of the states composing it, and the sovereignty of each government in internal matters. Among the principles to be considered are:

- (a) the right of every nation to self-determination;

/(b)

- (b) formal acceptance of the right of every state to determine its own political, economic, social and cultural system;
- (c) recognition of the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all states;
- (d) renunciation of the use of force, the threat of force and all forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other states;
- (e) relations between states to be governed by the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations;
- (f) good neighbourly co-operation among all the countries of Europe in all fields, irrespective of their social and economic systems.

Even if the differences in the political, economic and social systems of individual European countries must be accepted in future, there remains the question whether there should be certain common principles of internal order in the European states if a just and lasting European settlement is to be guaranteed.

Should these principles include the following, or are they irrelevant to a European settlement? Should the allies aim at the observance of these principles in all European countries?

- (a) Human rights (UN Charter, UN Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights),
- (b) Rule of law,
- (c) Free movement of persons,
- (d) Free flow of information
- (e)

We should also consider what inter-European machinery might be necessary to organise the peaceful order in

/Europe

Europe.

- (a) What common institutions would help to promote political, economic and cultural co-operation in Europe? How far can existing institutions be expanded, and what new machinery will be necessary?
- (b) What should be done to ensure the observance of the principles on which the settlement is based?
- (c) How can the peaceful European order be protected against external menace?

A European settlement furthermore poses the following questions:

- (a) which geographical area should it cover?
- (b) What should be the role of the non-European NATO powers and the USSR in the process of reaching and guaranteeing such a settlement?

III. German Problem

An equitable and lasting European Settlement must include or guarantee a solution for the problem of Germany and Berlin.

What can be done - on the basis of the Declarations of the North Atlantic Council on 22 October 1954 - to overcome the division of Germany?

- (a) How could the principles and measures mentioned in this paper be severally applied with regard to the solution of the German problem?
- (b) How can a solution of the German problem be advanced by means of a relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany?
- (c) What part does the Berlin question play in this connexion?

/IV.

IV. PRACTICAL STEPS AND PROCEDURES

Finally, we should consider what practical steps are open to the Alliance and to its individual members, to promote favourable developments in our relations with Eastern Europe, within the limits of the possible. There is general agreement that exploratory contacts with Soviet and Eastern European governments should be pursued bilaterally.

- (a) Is such bilateral activity entirely sufficient? Or can discussion, and perhaps co-ordination through the machinery of the Alliance make a valuable or indeed indispensable contribution?
- (b) Can a distinction be made between bilateral exchanges which affect only the participants and those which have a multilateral aspect because they affect the interests of other Allies, particularly in the field of national security? What obligations does the Alliance imply in such cases?
- (c) If bilateral explorations are designed to find out the possibilities of moving towards a settlement of European problems, and to establish the areas of doubt and hesitation in the policies of Eastern governments, is it desirable to organise concerted probing operations, to be conducted bilaterally by various members of the Alliance, in order to establish what these possibilities are?
- (d) What machinery for exchange of information, and for consultation, about bilateral contacts in the political, economic and defence fields

/are

are required in order to provide the maximum advantages to members of the Alliance in the new context of the détente? Is the machinery provided by the Three Wise Men adequate for this purpose; or is additional machinery required now that the relaxation of tension and bilateral contacts are beginning to open up possibilities of negotiation with the East which scarcely existed in practice in 1956?

- (e) Would the effectiveness of consultation, and of co-ordination of bilateral contacts, depend on agreement between the Allies about the European settlement they consider desirable and possible? Or will the possibilities of a settlement emerge more clearly from consultation and discussion about the experience of individual allies?

In this context we should consider the various possible procedures for a solution of the European security problem, the German problem and, generally, for a European settlement. What are the pros and cons of the following possibilities?

- (a) Submission of the matter to the United Nations,
- (b) negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
- (c) negotiations in the Group of Nine or a similar body,
- (d) Four-Power negotiations,
- (e) Soviet proposal for a security conference,
- (f) Western initiatives for a new East-West conference on more extensively-developed peace plans,
- (g) bilateral negotiations between the individual member states of the Alliance and East European countries.

Which of the following measures may be necessary or expedient as steps towards a peaceful order in Europe?

1. In the sphere of disarmament and security:

/a)

- (a) Exchange of declarations renouncing the use of force,
- (b) guarantee of existing frontiers,
- (c) conclusion of non-aggression pacts,
- (d) setting up of security zones,
- (e) neutralisation of areas,
- (f) denuclearised zones,
- (g) gradual reduction of foreign troops, and
- (h) other disarmament and armament control measures,
- (i) dissolution of the military pacts in East and West,
- (j) a collective security system for Europe.

2. In other fields:

- (a) the conclusion of individual pacts of friendship and co-operation,
- (b) the establishment of a general code of conduct,
- (c) institutions for the promotion of co-operation in Europe: especially communications, culture and sport,
- (d) improved economic co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe including imaginative proposals by the Western Alliance and some of its members for collaboration on mutually beneficial projects,
- (e) greater use of existing East-West bodies in Europe like the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe?

ANNEX I

Pressures currently pushing the
Governments of the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe towards extending
the détente into a European settlement

It may be that the basic aim of the Soviet Government is still to extend its influence on a global scale: to establish throughout the world communist governments responsive to the wishes of the Kremlin. But it is generally recognized that the Soviet Government does not regard such aims as practical politics at present. Aggression against non-communist states in Europe, leading to war, has become unlikely.

What kind of Europe do Soviet political and economic actions now seek to form? Most examinations of present Soviet objectives in Europe suggest that some aspects of them are "defensive" in the sense that they aim to maintain the status quo. For instance, they want to hold together Eastern Europe under Soviet suzerainty and control, in spite of the desire of the East European peoples and even of their communist governments for greater autonomy. The Soviets also want to maintain the position they have acquired in Germany by perpetuating the division of that country into two separate states. But the Soviet Government is also trying to modify the status quo in certain respects. Thus it aims to weaken the political and military cohesion of the Western Alliance; to end the U.S. presence in Europe and guarantee of European security; and to strengthen Soviet influence in non-communist Europe through local communist parties and other means. In

/the

the German context it is trying to obtain Western recognition of the "DDR" as a separate state. The significant new feature of Soviet policy seems to be a pursuit of these objectives by a détente or relaxation of tension with other members of the Western Alliance, while maintaining a state of tension with the Federal German Republic.

It is also generally recognized that the governments of East Europe have interests of their own which may be distinguished from those of the Soviet Union: and that the policies of each East European Government should be examined separately.

Perhaps the crucial question to be explored in the various bilateral contacts which are now taking place between the various governments in the Alliance and those of the East is how far these objectives are immutable, and how far they may be subject to modification. In general, to what extent does the Soviet Government tend to have "plan A and plan B": that is to say, a policy of détente, united fronts and respectability as an alternative to extending Soviet power and influence, in places where and in times when this seems inexpedient or doomed to failure? Does revolutionary seizure of power remain plan A, a real aim in the medium term? Or are the Chinese right: are the Soviets now so revisionist in practice that their declarations of fidelity to revolution, and occasional support for it, are like "church on Sundays"? Is it possible to identify groups of parties in the Soviet Union who incline towards one course more than another? If most of the Soviet leaders believe themselves to be faithful to the ideal of active struggle to shift the balance of power in their favour, and regard other policies as only provisional expedients, what will be the effect of finding that more peaceful policies (plan B) pay them, and the Soviet people better than plan A? What are the chances of some plan B proving 'le

/provisoire

provisoire qui dure' - the face that finally takes on the shape of the mask?

More specifically, if we are to identify the areas of flexibility and hesitation in the policies of the Soviet and East European Governments, in order to use the present détente to the maximum advantage of members of the Alliance, we need to examine the pressures and circumstances which have brought about this ambivalence. The questions to be answered in this context may be listed as follows:

SOVIET UNION

What are the strength, and the effects, of:

I. Internal

- (a) The Soviet Government's preoccupation with transforming the machinery of the Soviet economy onto a more realistic basis - decentralisation, cost accounting, etc. - and the need for time to achieve this?
- (b) The huge and mounting cost of the arms race; and of modern technology generally?
- (c) The inadequacy of agriculture, leading in bad years to expenditure of up to \$ $\frac{1}{2}$ billion on imports of food?
- (d) The wane of simplistic dogma, and the growth of revisionism, especially among the intellectuals, scientists and the young?
- (e) The separate task of squaring the modernisation of the Soviet economy and Soviet society with the petty communist establishment and with ideological purity?
- (f) "The Rise of the Russian Consumer", particularly the increasing demand for more consumption goods, and the dangers of "surplus cash/rejection of inferior product", inflation?
- (g) Claustrophobia and the (traditional Russian) desire for foreign contacts and travel, especially in managerial and cultural circles?
- (h) The belief that the Soviet Union is now, for the first time, strong enough to be safe from attack

(though they took the lead in ABM installations)?

II. Policies and achievements of the West

- (a) The U.S. nuclear deterrent, both absolute and relative?
- (b) The solidity of the Western alliance, which blocks adventurous policies in Europe?
- (c) The manifestly peaceable intentions of the West (defensive nature of NATO, reality of de-colonisation, etc.)?
- (d) The readiness of the West, including its largest powers, to seek agreements with the Soviet Government?
- (e) The belief that Western solidarity is loosening, and that bilateral dealings can be used to drive wedges between the Allies?
- (f) The evolution of "capitalism" away from crisis: the relative prosperity of Western economies, the improving conditions of the working class?
- (g) The advantages to the Soviet Union of trade and scientific exchanges with the West?

III. Other external pressures

- (a) The growth of pluralism, polycentrism and national communism?
- (b) The Sino-Soviet conflict?
- (c) The uneven Soviet performance in the Third World?
- (d) Aid problems, particularly the growing demand for food, which Soviet agriculture cannot supply?
(This question seems especially important).

EASTERN EUROPE

What are the strength, and the effects, of:

I. Internal

- (a) Patriotism as a driving force, in the peoples and in the governments?
- (b) The religious beliefs of the East European peoples?
- (c) The conflict between economic decentralisation and communist party control?

/(d)

- (d) Differing patterns of internal development and economic realism (reflecting independent judgements)?

(f) to (g) Questions (d) to (f) in Soviet Internal above.

II. External

- (a) The policies and achievements of the West, listed in Questions above, in so far as these differ from Soviet reactions?
- (b) The growth of polycentrism and the Sino-Soviet split?
- (c) Historical affiliations and memories: especially the relations of certain countries with Germany and also with Greece and Turkey?
- (d) The sense of being members of "Europe" (especially the role of the nine nation European Solidarity Conference)?
- (e) The insistence on wider consultation within a looser Warsaw Pact and the limited scope of COMECON?
- (f) Soviet economic nationalism and Soviet demands for higher prices for their raw materials?
- (g) The points in para. 20 of 66/128 - "progressively more disposed to seek links which will serve their own immediate interests and an easier general relationship with the West" etc?
- (h) Awareness of the general value to Europe of a U.S./Soviet settlement?
- (i) Aid problems: desire to devote resources to national reconstruction; resentment at being used as agents of Soviet imperial policy in the Third World, Cuba etc?

III. Economic

- (a) Are individual East European governments willing

/to

to go beyond the approximately 30 per cent ceiling they have set for their trade outside the East European bloc?

- (b) What importance do the various East European countries attach to:
- (i) purchase of Western technical know-how?
 - (ii) linked production with Western firms?
 - (iii) mixed enterprises?
 - (iv) collaboration with the West in improving communications (the Danube, ports such as Hamburg, railways, underground railways, road surfaces and systems, radio and television, oil pipelines)?
 - (v) Western investment capital?
 - (vi) Sending migrant workers to the West which would produce foreign currency and technical training?
- (c) How do East European governments see the future role of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe?

IV. General

- (a) How far do the various East European Governments share the limited medium-term objectives of the Soviets?
- (b) How much opportunity do these governments have for shaping and modifying Soviet policies, particularly in Europe?
- (c) How anxious are they to emancipate themselves further from Soviet control and to show a greater degree of self-assertion?
- (d) To what extent are they more keenly aware than the Soviets of the advantages of extending the détente and of collaboration with Western Europe?

- (e) Is communist ideology still a cohesive factor in Warsaw Pact countries? How much do they stress common ideological bonds? How does this affect their practical policies?
- (f) Does Soviet support of Ulbricht's political aims affect the willingness of other Warsaw Pact countries to pursue a policy of détente?
- (g) How important is it that the peoples of East Europe "remember" in the sense that the Soviet peoples do not: the critical difference between fifty years and twenty years of communism?
- (h) Is there a leaven at work in East European countries which tends to reduce the social and political barriers between them and the rest of Europe?
- (i) How far does the Soviet Government think in terms of a balance of power? Does this concept mean to them a simple bilateral balance between themselves and the countries they control or influence, and a rival Western grouping (perhaps with the United States as the strategic equivalent of the Soviet Union)? Or are the Soviet leaders considering a more complex balance, at least in Europe, where a number of states, both Eastern and Western maintain varying relations with one another and so produce an adjustable equilibrium (that is the sense in which the term balance of power was used in the 18th century)?

In considering the pressures operating on the Soviet and East European Governments, can we estimate not only those

at present, but also the effects of a developing détente and even a European settlement, which will lead to increased economic and technical collaboration, and perhaps freer movement of people and ideas (i.e. the effects of the favourable scenario in the second Annex)? What will be the effects on Soviet and East European society and in particular on communism, of increasing exchanges with the West? How far does multilateral economic co-operation run counter to centralised communist direction of individual East European states? Could multilateral co-operation "provide the missing link between the technological progress of Eastern society and the liberal political evolution of the communist system". How alarmed are communist bureaucrats and theorists by the prospect that increasing contacts with the West will gradually undermine their authority?