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# I. EAST-WEST RELATIONS, DETENTE AND A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

1. The essential function of the North Atlantic Alliance is the relationship between East and West in the North Atlantic area. The basic common aim of Allied policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remains to provide effective protection for our own territorial integrity, political independence and security. The second purpose of the Allies is, without jeopardizing our freedom or weakening our security, to develop plans and methods for eliminating the present unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe (which are not of our choosing) including the division of Germany. The Allies wish to promote easier movement and intercourse between the countries of Europe, and develop peaceful co-operation among them; in order finally to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order which will provide adequate and durable security for all Europe.

2. Our final objective can hardly be attained at a time of tension and hostile confrontation of blocs, and requires to be pursued in a climate of détente. The core of the problem is to convince the East European states and the Soviet Union by means of a persuasive, patient and undramatic policy that there are greater advantages to both sides in collaboration between East and West. Relaxation of tension is not the final goal, but a step on the way towards co-operation between the states of Europe and a European settlement which in itself no longer gives rise to renewed tension.

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3. Soviet objectives with respect to the future of Europe continue to differ from ours. The Soviets have in recent years come to see a certain relaxation of tensions as meeting their own national interests: but how far their ultimate aims in Europe have changed and how far they are prepared to move towards co-operation with the West is arguable.

4. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe communist dogma and the desire of the Communist Parties to maintain their present power operate against a relaxation of tension and the achievement of a European settlement. So do fears that it would be difficult to limit the consequences of a change in the structure of Europe, and that communist control of East European countries might be imperilled as a result. On the other hand, the worldwide responsibilities of the Soviet Union including the tension with the People's Republic of China, and the differentiations within the communist world and especially the growing self-assertion of Eastern Europe, may incline these governments towards further exploring the possibilities of a European settlement. A relaxation of tensions in Europe and limited co-operation with the West would also make it possible for them to meet their own growing economic and technological requirements, as well as widespread desires for a higher standard of living and a somewhat more open society. The economic practices followed by the East, although effective in the early stages of industrialization, are showing themselves inadequate to meet the needs of a more complex and technological economy; and several East European states have begun to understand that the further development they seek requires them to specialize. Since on the whole the best markets, technology and sources of supply are not within the communist grouping, increased exchanges with the West are likely to result. The resulting contacts tend to engender new practices and fresh thinking, which could have significant political consequences in furthering the process of détente and closer ties in Europe.

5. Eastern governments have so far shown themselves able to control these forces; but they are increasingly aware of the problems raised. This gives ground for hope that the Eastern governments can gradually be persuaded of the advantages for them in helping to organise a Europe where states and communities with differing social systems cannot only co-exist in uneasy confrontation but can progress through détente to closer collaboration in a stable settlement for their mutual benefit.

6. These trends and influences have had varying results in different East European countries. Some Eastern governments now maintain less rigid attitudes than others towards various members of the Alliance. Although there is without doubt a genuine interest in a European détente, the Soviet Government still hopes, by relaxing tensions selectively, to weaken the cohesion of the Alliance and to drive wedges between the states of Western Europe and in particular to open up differences between Western Europe and the United States. Many Eastern European governments would be well suited by a limited improvement in bilateral relations based on the status quo that perpetuates the present situation in Eastern Europe. But the hopes of all those governments are probably tempered by what they think they can achieve; and they may come to realize that the more ambitious Soviet objectives are unattainable.

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7. Thus the relaxation of tensions is a fluctuating process, and there are still objectives in the policy of some East European states that in a period of détente run counter to ours. It may take a long time to reach significant results; for a policy aimed at achieving a settlement through détente will ultimately succeed only if the other side too is willing to contribute to a just and peaceful order in Europe. In particular, if a relaxation of tensions is to be effective and to lead to a European settlement, it will have to be comprehensive and must include everybody. Nevertheless it remains the task of the Allies to persist in our efforts to relax tensions, and to welcome such co-operation as the Eastern governments are willing to show. In fact, a period of relaxing tensions provides new and constructive opportunities for all the countries of Europe.

8. The North Atlantic Alliance and a policy of détente are not contradictory. Indeed, the Allies have already been able to initiate a policy of détente towards the countries of the East. This policy has been made possible by the general

evolution of relations between East and West in Europe, and also by the balance of forces resulting from the continued cohesion of the Alliance and its readiness for defence. Meanwhile the Alliance has not discharged its military tasks; though it may prove possible to fulfil them at lower force levels and so accelerate a political settlement. The Atlantic Alliance remains an irreplaceable guarantor of security in Western Europe.

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9. The European members of the Alliance are not in a position to maintain their freedom and independence alone in face of the presence and power of the Soviet Union in its present manifestations; and a corresponding North American presence thus remains as necessary as when the Alliance was founded, in order to preserve the freedom of its European members. This contribution must not be limited to defence and deterrence: active North American participation is equally necessary in the process of utilizing the détente for achieving a peaceful order in Europe. Moreover, any general European settlement and security system, once achieved, will require the continuing support and co-operation of the United States. Therefore the participation of the United States and of Canada is of vital importance, both in working towards a new peaceful order in Europe, and in maintaining it afterwards.

10. On the other hand it is clear that no substantial progress can be made towards a European settlement without Soviet agreement, though it would also appear that so far the Soviet Government has not been persuaded that it is in its interest to make a major change. The Soviet Government can effectively block any European settlement that it regards as opposed to its own interests. Moreover many East European régimes regard Soviet support as necessary for their national security and to keep them in power; and at their present stage of development close economic relations with the Soviet Union are also essential to them. In working towards

a general European settlement our policy should therefore be not to set Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union but rather to involve both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in more constructive forms of co-operation which will be of greater advantage to both sides than the present confrontation.

11. Thus a just and stable European settlement, and a European security system designed to guarantee it, will have to provide for rights and duties of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a system may develop out of collaboration between the two existing groupings. A security system may be more effectively organised, and involve less risks for individual countries, if it is based on an equilibrium between two groupings rather than exclusively on agreements between separate states.

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12. Although it is still too early to forecast the shape of a future peaceful order in Europe, the Allies should already at this stage reach agreement among themselves on some of the basic elements to be considered in such a European settlement, e.g.

- The states united in the North Atlantic Alliance must be sure that a European settlement guarantees them (as is stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty) "the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law";

- Any feasible European settlement will have to recognize that the states comprising it will have differing political, economic and social system, and to accept the domestic sovereignty of each government;

- Every nation must have the right to determine its own political, economic, social and cultural system;

/ - Renunciation

- Renunciation of the use of force, the threat of force and all forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other states;

- Relations between states should be governed by the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance should, moreover, try to ensure that the right of free movement of persons and of free flow of information are as widely respected as possible throughout Europe.

13. The North Atlantic Alliance was formed to deal with the problems caused for the Allies in the treaty area by the power and policies of the Soviet Government and the existence of communist governments in Eastern Europe. It is fulfilling successfully its first task, which circumstances still make necessary, to guarantee its members against the danger of aggression. By keeping the peace the Alliance contributes to the developing relaxation of tension. In the field of East-West relations it now has a threefold political task: to improve relations between the various countries of Europe; to help achieve a just and lasting European settlement which will remove the barriers that now divide the continent; and to help with the construction of a balanced and viable system of European security to make this possible. The Allies must persuade the Eastern governments to accept an alternative to the present state of Europe which is politically and economically more attractive to both sides.

## II. The German Problem

1. The present division of Europe is one of the main obstacles on the road to this goal. It manifests itself most clearly in the division of Germany. The two problems are indissolubly connected. The Soviet Union and their Allies claim that there exist two German states and that West Berlin is an autonomous political unit. The acceptance of this "reality" by the West cannot be a prerequisite for a détente.

2. Any solution of German problems contributing to a just and lasting European settlement

- must start from the principle that the German people in both parts of Germany have the right of free decision;
- requires action of the Four Powers with special responsibility for Germany;
- must satisfy the legitimate security needs of all the states concerned;
- requires the co-operation not only of our Allies but of other states of Europe which also have a vital interest in establishing a lasting and peaceful order in Europe.

While, after the second World War, peace treaties and similar agreements were concluded with all former allies of the German Reich and with Austria, there has been no peace treaty for Germany. All efforts of the Three Western Powers with special responsibility for Germany to bring about a solution of the German question in direct negotiation with the Soviet Union have so far been unsuccessful, but it was thanks to their firmness, the solidarity of the Alliance and the courage of the Berliners that Soviet and Soviet-Zonal attempts against the freedom of West Berlin were thwarted.

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3. Berlin still is a focal point of Soviet policy in Germany. A crisis might flare up here at any time with implications and repercussions that could be worldwide. Moscow and East Berlin are constantly perfecting their technique of creating and manipulating critical situations in this area.

4. It is therefore necessary that

- each member of the Alliance should, as part of its endeavour to overcome the division of Europe and achieve a relaxation of tension between East and West, strive for a just solution of the problems of Germany and Berlin,
- the Federal Republic of Germany in its efforts to overcome the division of the German people should strive for a relaxation of tension in its relations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as well as the countries of Eastern and South Eastern Europe.

5. As long as a part of the German people is denied the right of self-determination and has to live in a separated state-like entity, ruled by a régime imposed upon them by a foreign power and kept by force, that régime must be denied international recognition. There are not two German states.

The relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the other part of Germany are of an internal nature; the relations of the other members of the Alliance to the Soviet Zone are governed by the understanding that it forms part of Germany. The German authorities in the Soviet Zone perform certain administrative functions. However, the members of the Alliance continue to consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.



6. It is not possible at present to draw up a blueprint for a solution of the German problem; there does not exist a magic formula for overcoming the division of Germany. The solution of this question, as it seems today, will be a long process, closely connected with progress in overcoming the present division of Europe.

In their efforts to solve the German problem within the framework of a policy of détente the Federal Republic of Germany, the Allies (especially the Three Powers) and the Alliance as such have their parts to play.

7. It is up to the Federal Republic of Germany, to include the other part of Germany in its policy of détente by retaining and strengthening the ties between the Germans in East and West. At the same time the Federal Government should make it clear that the more freedom is granted to the Germans in East Germany the more the division of Germany will be overcome.

Pursuant to this policy the Federal Government has made many proposals to the Soviet Zone authorities destined to facilitate the relations between the people in both parts of Germany, to alleviate the life of the Germans in the Soviet Zone, to promote co-operation in inner German trade as well as communication and exchanges in the fields of culture, science and sport.

The Federal Government ought to continue this policy, because the Germans in the other part of the country should not be isolated but, on the contrary, this region should be included in a general process of détente. The 16 proposals contained in the declaration of the Federal Government of 12 April, 1967, and the letters written by Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger to Chairman Stoph in East Berlin are examples of this policy. A continuing increase of internal German trade which is a significant link between the two parts of Germany, and economic co-operation, would be an important instrument in this respect.

Furthermore, it is up to the Federal Republic of Germany, progressively to facilitate the participation of the population of the Soviet Zone in international life, in scientific cultural and sporting exchanges without thereby furthering the political objectives of the East Berlin régime.

8. On the other hand it is up to the Allies to assist the Federal Government's efforts for a relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany and for improving conditions of life of the individuals in East Germany. They should in co-operation with the Federal Government open up and facilitate private contacts with the Germans of the other part of Germany, particularly in the sphere of science, culture and sports. The link with progress in internal German relations should be kept in mind. The Allies should assist the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany by counteracting attempts to interpret contacts between the authorities of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany as international relations between two German states. They should explain to their own populations as well as to the world (e.g. in international forums, like the UN)

- that the division of Germany is a main obstacle on the road towards a lasting, just and peaceful order of Europe which also satisfies the legitimate security needs of the states concerned;
- that they, including the Federal Republic of Germany, persistently try to overcome the division of Germany, but that so far their numerous proposals to this effect have been rejected;
- that they want the population in the other part of Germany to be free and allowed to determine their own political fate;
- that the East Berlin régime is not legitimate and that it does not represent a sovereign state and that any action to enhance its international status

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would not only disregard the will of the people living under its power but would hamper internal German contacts and relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany.

9. The Alliance as such should be instrumental in harmonizing and co-ordinating the policies of the Federal Government and those of the other Allies in this context. It is also the task of the Alliance to help ensure the freedom and viability of Berlin, and to remain aware of the constant threat to Berlin even in times when the East is hoping for Western interest to wane and resistance gradually to flag.

### III. PRACTICAL STEPS AND PROCEDURES

The present chapter is designed to suggest ways in which the Allied objectives described above can be achieved. It is not possible at this stage to draw up a comprehensive solution for all the problems which divide Europe. From time to time various measures have been proposed which might contribute to a solution: further detailed study will be needed to show which are the most advantageous and so the ones to be pursued by the Allies.

#### Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations

2. Bilateral discussions between Eastern and Western states are an indispensable means of improving relations between East and West in a period of relaxation in tension. They can be of great value if they proceed within the framework of agreed objectives, and if the governments concerned continue to observe their responsibilities to each other as members of the Alliance. But they will be harmful if Eastern governments get the impression that they can play off one Western state against the other; because then they will continue to pursue their more ambitious and disruptive objectives.
3. A bilateral approach makes possible direct contacts with individual European governments. The East European countries are at different stages of national self-assertion, and the Allies should avoid treating them as a single bloc led by the Soviet Union. We should value co-operation with each of them; both for its own sake and also as a means of influencing the Soviet Union and other East European countries to accept mutually beneficial settlements.
4. There are practical limits to what can be achieved bilaterally. As relations develop, discussions with Eastern governments will deal increasingly with problems of concern to several or all members of the Alliance. In order to shape a stable larger European structure, involving both the United States and the Soviet Union, it will be  
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desirable increasingly to work towards multilateral exchanges with Eastern governments in addition to bilateral ones.

5. Multilateral exchanges will probably develop more slowly. They too have their limits. Proposals with a specific NATO label are at this stage liable to be received with suspicion by many Eastern governments. An undue or premature emphasis by the Western Allies on multilateral negotiations could lead to an undesirable consolidation of the links which bind the East Europeans to each other and to the Soviet Union. We must also ensure that a multilateral approach to a European settlement does not perpetuate the existing division in Europe or allow it to crystallize on its present lines. In this context the question of an East-West conference needs to be particularly carefully studied.

6. There is agreement in principle on the importance of consultation between the Western Allies on the central questions of East-West relations. But in fact more detailed exchanges between the allies will be necessary if we are to use the present fluctuating relaxation of tensions to work in a co-ordinated fashion towards a general European settlement which will ultimately be formulated in multilateral agreements. The Allies will need to discuss fully among themselves how their common aims described in Chapter I can be translated into practice, so that each Ally can work effectively towards these aims in its dealings with the East.

7. The Atlantic Alliance offers an excellent forum for establishing this consultation on our side, and for maintaining the necessary degree of co-ordination both in our bilateral and multilateral dealings with the East. This is one of the ways in which the Alliance can make an essential contribution to the organisation of the collective arrangements described in Chapter I, designed to remove East-West antagonisms and ensure peace and unity in Europe.

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Economic, Technological and Cultural  
Co-operation

8. For the reasons given in Chapter I, economic and technological exchanges for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe occupy an important place in breaking down communist rigidity and in furthering the process of détente. Moreover the development of such collaboration seems to be the aspect of the détente which most interests the governments of Eastern Europe and even perhaps the Soviet Government at this stage. It has the advantage to the West that it can be made beneficial to us as well: clearly, if such exchanges are to flourish, they must benefit both partners.

9. Cultural and personal contacts have a corresponding effect. They have a considerable impact on the artificially isolated societies of the East. We must therefore expect the Soviet and East European governments to limit these contacts which potentially weaken their hold over their countries.

10. Thus the fields of economics, technology, cultural and personal contacts offer good prospects for significant steps towards the forging of mutually beneficial links between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe; though these contacts will not by themselves be sufficient to bring about a just and lasting settlement. We recommend that within the framework of the Alliance continuous study should be given to the ways in which agreements and opportunities in these fields can help to further our objectives.

Other Forms of Co-operation

11. In addition co-operation between East and West can take several forms which may prove valuable, depending on the circumstances and opportunity.

- (a) co-operation in some aspects of existing Western multilateral institutions with those Communist states that have evolved sufficiently, thereby encouraging others to evolve in a similar fashion;

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- (b) co-operation in existing international organisations;
- (c) regional East-West co-operation, involving a few states from each side, in special ventures inside or outside Europe, thereby cutting across political and ideological divisions;
- (d) various semi-official or non-governmental activities in technical, scientific, cultural, athletic, etc., fields;
- (e) utilisation of special East-West forums to develop additional means of dialogue and communication and, in time, to consider political and security issues.

#### Political Arrangements and Security

12. In this field we should make it clear that while we welcome such mutually beneficial minor arrangements as the Soviet Union and particularly some East European governments have so far been prepared to accept, we look beyond this to wider and deeper forms of co-operation designed to establish a durable settlement guaranteed by an adequate security system. In this way we may be able gradually to increase the readiness of Eastern governments to respond to our approaches.

13. Special consideration must be given to proposals for an East-West conference on security matters, which has been proposed by some East European governments and has attracted public interest. An overall conference, such as the Soviet sponsored "European Security Conference" does not at present promise success. It seems to have been proposed largely as a tool for propaganda, for cementing the status quo, and for disrupting the Western alliance. But an East-West conference may be desirable, and indeed, necessary, at the right time, when we have already advanced a considerable distance along the road to a European settlement and a security system. For such a conference to succeed, it would have to be clear from exchanges with Eastern governments

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that the participation of our North American Allies was assured and that the Soviet Union and its allies were also prepared to contribute to a lasting and equitable settlement in Europe. Such a conference would also have to be properly prepared and have an agenda satisfactory to both sides. The Allies will need to reach agreement as far as possible both beforehand and during the conference about all the items on the agenda.

14. Such a conference is thus a long way off. What is required in the present phase of bilateral exploratory exchanges with the Eastern governments on political and security arrangements is for the Allies to make a close and urgent study of the European settlement which we aim to achieve, as set out in Chapter I, and of the elaboration of measures designed to further it and maintain it; and also of the ways in which the Allies should approach this settlement in their discussions with the East.

15. To promote consultations on these subjects among the Allies the Foreign Ministers may find it useful to constitute a special body, responsible to the North Atlantic Council, to study on a continuing basis all the substantive issues listed above which are related to a general settlement in Europe, European security, and procedural approaches to East-West negotiations in this field.