

received from North. Delegation

September 21, 1967

No. 5686

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

During the discussions of Sub-Group I on the second Chapter of the draft-report, the joint Chairmen, Mr. Watson and Mr. Sahm, requested my Ambassador to summarize in writing some of the views he had expressed so that they could be taken into account at the next meeting of the two rapporteurs in London on Monday September 25th.

My Ambassador originally intended to prepare this draft jointly with the Belgian, Canadian and Norwegian Delegations, who made comments on similar lines, which found a wide acceptance among the group. Time did not permit him to do so, but I am sending at his request copies of the enclosure to the Belgian, Canadian and Norwegian Permanent Representatives, so that they themselves could send additional comments to the two rapporteurs if they wish to do so.

My Ambassador hopes very much that the enclosure could be transmitted to the two rapporteurs in time for their consideration at the next meeting.

I am, dear Mr. Ambassador,

yours sincerely,

J.H.O. Insinger  
Deputy Permanent Representative

His Excellency  
Sir Bernard Burrows, K.C.M.G.,  
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom,  
NATO  
Paris

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Re-draft with additions of Part II (German Problem) paragraphs 7 and 8

7. In order to make life more bearable for the Germans in the Eastern part of Germany and to ease the tension in relations between the two parts of Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany and the other Allies both have their part to play.

The policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has been outlined in its statement on internal German relations, made before the Bundestag on 12. April 1967.

8. The Allies can make a significant contribution to the relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany. Their approach in this respect can be largely based on the principles which govern their policy towards the Eastern European States and the Soviet Union, as outlined in this paper. They should, however, avoid actions which could be interpreted by Moscow and East-Berlin as a direct or implicit recognition of the East-German régime.

In their contacts with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European States the Allies should continue to make clear that the East-Berlin régime is not legitimate and that they do not recognize the Soviet Zone of Germany as a sovereign state. It should be borne in mind, however, that the mistrust in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is considerably greater with regard to initiatives by the Federal Republic of Germany than towards similar endeavours emanating from other members of the Alliance directed at a general relaxation of tension. In certain instances activities to stimulate commercial exchanges with Eastern Germany, to promote cultural relations and private contacts may be easier for some of the Allies than for the Federal Republic. Actions undertaken after close consultation within NATO could help to overcome the feelings of enmity still prevalent within the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries towards the Federal Republic of Germany and pave the way for increased exchanges between the two parts of Germany.

While obviously the inter-German relations are bound to be of a different character than the informal contacts which may be developed by the other Allies in a variety of fields, they can be contributory to each other if handled with sufficient caution.

It would be counterproductive for the desired relaxation of tension between East and West, if the impression were to be created that with regard to Western relations with Eastern Germany the Federal Republic enjoyed a monopoly. In this respect the Allies of the Federal Republic of Germany have both a negative and a positive role to play. The negative role has been manifested in allied actions containing the ambitions of the Eastern German régime and the Government of East-Berlin to proclaim themselves as sovereign entities.

A positive allied contribution to the relaxation of tension within Germany could be found in the development of relations in a variety of fields. The Eastern German population would be justified to believe from such an approach, that they are indeed participating, at least to some extent, in the general relaxation of tension between East and West, now common allied policy.

In all contacts, of either the Federal German Government or other NATO members, with the Eastern German population in the spheres of science, culture and sports, the influence on the internal German relations of whatever is undertaken should constantly be borne in mind. Continuous consultation should take place in the appropriate organs of the Alliance concerning initiatives which could assist in reducing the tension between East and West - most clearly discernable in the two parts of Germany - in order to create the atmosphere which will be most beneficial for the ultimate re-unification of Germany.

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