


20th September, 1967

To: Secretary General

Copies to: ~~Deputy Secretary General~~  
Directeur du Cabinet  
A.S.G. (PA)  
A.S.G. (DP&A)  
Mr. Chapman  
Mr. de Camaret  
Mr. Menne  
Mr. Lintall Smith

From: W.E. Newton



Meeting of Sub-Group 1 on  
Future Tasks of the Alliance

Attached are copies of my report on the discussions of the Sub-Group on Parts II and III of their draft report.

*W. E. Newton*

REPORT ON DISCUSSION IN SUB-GROUP 1  
ON PART II OF THE REPORT (THE GERMAN PROBLEM)

MEETING ON MONDAY, 18th SEPTEMBER, 1967

Mr. Sahm was in the chair for this discussion, and invited general comments on Part II.

The two UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES (Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Professor Brzezinski) made contradictory suggestions: the former suggested that paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 should be transferred to Part III and the latter said that if this were done it might leave Part II somewhat unbalanced.

TURKEY expressed itself as quite satisfied with Part II.

FRANCE asked for a clearer separation of the responsibilities of the three powers in respect of Germany and Berlin.

DENMARK criticised this part of the report as being on the level of generalities without listing concrete ways of moving forward, such as had been suggested in public speeches by Chancellor Kiesinger and other German Ministers.

CANADA supported this criticism and described Mr. Brandt as having publicly given "a blue-print for the amalgamation of Germany" which could usefully be put into the report. He also thought that the report gave insufficient recognition to the time-scale of the various measures involved in the long and developing process of East-West détente.

BELGIUM, like the NETHERLANDS, supported Mr. Sonnenfeldt's suggestion for re-organising the report.

DENMARK, CANADA and BELGIUM also wanted a more developed analysis of policy ideas put forth by spokesmen of the Federal Republic.

The CHAIRMAN replied that we were dealing with a draft report not of the German Government but of the Sub-Group. His impression was that not all the allies saw these questions in the same way. As regards the question of a timetable, this raised a difficulty if it involved referring a solution of the German problem to the final stage of a process.

With regard to suggestions to include quotations from German political leaders, his feeling was that the paper already contained the essence of the Federal Government's view of the German problem as aligned with the views of the other 14 governments.

ITALY thought that the section on the German problem was somewhat static and included only the most prudent hypotheses: he asked whether some more substance could not be brought into this part of the report.

DENMARK said that this was a question on which the Federal Government had a special responsibility and no-one would wish to go further than the FRG on this question.

This concluded the meeting on 18th September.

REPORT OF MEETING OF SUB-GROUP 1 ON  
FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

Meeting of the morning of Tuesday, 19th September

The CHAIRMAN invited any further general comments (i.e. additional to those made at the previous day's meeting).

NORWAY reiterated the suggestion of drawing on statements by German Ministers. He would also suggest that this Part 2 of the report (the German problem) should go forward solely on the responsibility of the Rapporteurs.

GREECE thought that Part 2 needed to be more concrete, not necessarily in presenting concrete solutions but at any rate in giving clear presentation of the basic character and complexity of the German problem.

CANADA agreed that we should not expect the report to propound a concrete solution to the German problem, which would be giving away our hand. But he had noted that FRG spokesmen had stated the contribution Germany could make towards a settlement. The present draft was a step backward from these public statements.

GERMANY (Mr. Wickert) pointed out that much that was relevant to the German problem was to be found in Parts 1 and 3 of the report. Part 2 had been described as "backward" and "disappointing to public opinion", but public opinion had to be told that there were hard facts in the German problem including Ulbricht's aim of setting up a separate German state. The USSR and Ulbricht have stated their price and at this moment there could be no contribution from the FRG to meet this. This means that over the German problem we face a long-term task for the solution of which we must all stand together.

The NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR also expressed the disappointment of his authorities at Part 2. On a reading of it as it stood he thought that it would be concluded that German thinking on the problem is shrinking rather than advancing. According to Part 2, the Allies were to help the FRG, but if they could only contact East Germany through the Federal Republic, in questions of culture, science, etc., this would suggest a sort of exclusivity for the FRG in contacts with East Germany. This had never been endorsed in NATO policy nor did it tally with the "facts of life". There were in existence, commercial contacts with East Germany, as the Leipzig Fair demonstrated.

BELGIUM also expressed disappointment in Part 2 as "incomplete" and as marking a "retreat" on public declarations of FRG leaders. It was too static. Despite the difficulties, we must have a projection for the future. The FRG had the primary responsibility to set a policy in consultation with its Allies and this report should state positions which the FRG could expect to develop. We should either leave the report as it stands and regard it as the Rapporteurs' own, or start a vigorous effort to draw up a line acceptable to the FRG which the other Allies could follow.

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Ambassador WATSON tried to clarify these various criticisms and suggestions, and elicited further statements from the Netherlands and Canada in the form of more concrete suggestions for re-casting Part 2 of the report. These included e.g. using some of the public statements of FRG statesmen, a clearer statement of the role of the FRG and of the other Allies in relations to the other part of Germany, and a listing of ways in which the Allies of Germany could make a helpful contribution to the whole problem.

Mr. SAHM (Germany) said he would report all that had been said but he also wished to point out that there appeared to be a profound misunderstanding of the role of the Rapporteurs. It was not the Rapporteurs' role to supply a national paper on the German problem but to listen to all the views round the table and to seek to embody them in the report.

BELGIUM supported the Canadian view that public declarations of FRG leaders must be included, and said that there must be something more positive and dynamic in the report, especially e.g. in respect of the role of the Alliance. He agreed with Mr. Sahm as regards the role of the Rapporteurs but the fact remained that on the German problem the "point de départ" for a discussion by the Allies must surely be the ideas and views of the FRG.

FRANCE said that if Part 2 by itself seemed to some to emphasise difficulties and appeared negative this Part should be seen in the context of its position following the positive elements set out in Part 1, but there were in fact positive elements in Part 2 e.g. paragraph 4. Perhaps some quotations could be added from declarations of FRG statesmen.

The CHAIRMAN, Mr. Sahm said that the two Rapporteurs would go back to the task and try again to make everybody happy. This would be facilitated if fully detailed suggestions were made in the course of the paragraph by paragraph discussion. He said that an attempt would be made to bring in passages from speeches e.g. Mr. Brandt, but that there was the difficulty that any passage from a speech should be read in the context of the speech as a whole. Furthermore it should be recalled that since these speeches were made there had been negative reactions from the other side and we should therefore be careful not to over-emphasise ideas which may no longer be applicable to the stages ahead.

There followed a prolonged discussion on the draft text, taken paragraph by paragraph, dealing not only with verbal points but also with possible re-arrangements of the various ideas in the draft. In the course of this, the Chairman repeatedly said he would try to meet the various points made.

This concluded the morning session of the Sub-Group.

MEETING OF SUB-GROUP 1 ON FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE(Meeting of the afternoon of 19th September)

The CHAIRMAN, Ambassador Watson, invited general comments on Part III of the draft, which deals with "Practical Steps and Procedures".

ITALY said that we should be very careful in our use of such terms as "consultation", "harmonisation of views", "necessary degree of co-ordination", because we were using different words in different contexts and we had to be clear that we were applying them correctly. Care was even more necessary when using terminology referring to exchanges, contacts, talks or co-operation in relation to Eastern European countries.

DENMARK supported this and said we must be clear to what extent prior agreement was necessary among ourselves before developing bilateral or other contacts with the East.

There followed a discussion of the draft paragraph by paragraph. Although mainly concerned with re-arrangement of ideas and verbal changes, the discussion sometimes raised important issues relating to e.g. consultations, concerting of policy, etc., as well as the question of a European Security Conference. On this last point, ITALY suggested that there should be active study of the conditions for a successful European Security Conference.

DENMARK again raised the public relations angle and said we either had to tell our public that we do not like the idea of such a conference or that we favour it on certain conditions.

The UNITED STATES said we should wean the public away from the idea that a conference will solve our problems and we should rather say to the public that we are concerned to move towards solutions and a settlement.

The UNITED STATES proposed ending the report with two paragraphs, the first of which would specifically suggest instituting a "continuing body" to study various questions; the second paragraph would define the tasks of the Alliance in the 70's as "to help in the construction of a viable system of East-West security".

Very similar wording was put forward by BELGIUM: the proposed continuing body should make suggestions "without in any way detracting from the authority of the Council".

Ambassador Watson (Chairman) said that in Group 3 Mr. Kohler's proposal, which was very similar, had gone forward, and that Sub-Group 1 could no doubt do the same.

FRANCE had some idea that the formulations envisaged seemed to mix together the military functions and the political aims of the Alliance and said that this would leave us open to propaganda attack from the other side.

BELGIUM replied that it was not a question of mixture of military and political functions but of "complémentarité".

In conclusion it was agreed to authorise the rapporteurs to put forward their revised draft which they can say takes into account as far as possible the observations made in the Group. Any further observations or remarks would henceforth be at governmental level in the Special Group. It was therefore agreed that Sub-Group 1 will not meet again as such.

Ambassador Watson added that he would circulate the re-drafted report soon or a little after the October 11th meeting of rapporteurs with the Secretary General.

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Herewith is the text proposed by the BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE as the final paragraph in the report of Sub-Group 1:

"L'Alliance Atlantique a rempli avec succès sa mission première qui était de garantir ses membres contre le danger d'une agression. En maintenant la paix, elle a contribué au relâchement de la tension entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Aujourd'hui elle se trouve devant une triple tâche politique: l'amélioration des relations entre les divers pays européens, la suppression des antagonismes qui les divisent et la création d'un système de sécurité européenne. Au-delà de sa fonction traditionnelle, que les circonstances rendent toujours nécessaire, l'Alliance s'efforce ainsi de trouver aux problèmes qui ont justifié sa création une solution telle que son existence ne soit plus indispensable.