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MEASURES TOWARDS A PEACEFUL ORDER IN EUROPEUK  
VGP I

The original steps in the field of disarmament and security, originally listed by State Secretary Schütz, can be divided into two categories: arms control measures and other political subjects.

Arms control measures

The Allies have taken the view in the past that substantial progress on arms control is unlikely unless it is accompanied by progress on political questions, in particular towards a settlement of the German problem. This remains true; but since it is now recognized that a European settlement, including an equitable solution of the German problem, requires a further relaxation of tension, there is good reason to try to make a start, even in present circumstances and in the absence of political progress, on certain relatively modest measures on arms limitation and control. Indeed, the British Government believes that some arms control measures, such as mutual reductions of forces, could contribute to movement in other fields by building up confidence and so bringing about the right sort of atmosphere for the constructive examination of political problems in Europe, including the German question. But progress along this path is likely to be limited; for the fact remains that the forces and armaments in Central Europe are there mainly because East and West have still not resolved their fundamental political differences in the area.

It is desirable that the Allies should as a first step assess at an early date the extent to which regional arms control measures could be pursued for their own merits. We hope that the Harmel report will endorse in general terms this means of moving forward. But neither sub-group I nor sub-group III seems to be the body in NATO best fitted to study and reach agreement on the detailed ways and means of achieving this. Complex technical questions of military, economic and other kinds are involved.

However, the report of the sub-group might note one general consideration, which applies not only to a balanced reduction of forces but also to other measures of arms control. There seems to be little chance of the Soviet or East European governments agreeing in present circumstances to the sort of verification measures that would have to be included in a formal agreement. It would therefore be best to try to proceed, at least initially, by way of "mutual example". If Eastern governments agree to

respond to Western initiatives, we shall need to consider very carefully how far roughly balanced reductions in forces can safely proceed by parallel actions.

If a process of balanced force reductions by mutual example came about, a point will be reached at which other disarmament and arms control measures (item h) would have to be undertaken in order to give each side assurance that security was not being endangered. Observation posts, at carefully selected points, might well have a role to play in this connexion. In particular it could be useful to discuss with Eastern governments, without commitment, whether arrangements for neutralization of areas (item e) on the lines of the Austrian peace settlement might have a part to play in the evolution towards a peaceful order in Europe.

Once a start has been made on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments, and if this were clearly making a real contribution to the strengthening of détente and of East-West confidence, other arms control possibilities might open up. The rapporteurs' paper lists three: setting up of security zones (item d); neutralization of areas (item e) and denuclearized zones (item f). All three proposals are of interest to East European governments, and variants of them are certain to figure in discussions with them as the détente progresses. All three have a direct bearing on the German problem; and a realistic but open-minded approach by the Allies might bring us nearer to the solution of major problems. A new and careful look should be given to what Allied governments might say in reply to Eastern governments when they raise these questions in future.

These three proposals, in the forms usually put forward for discussion hitherto, are essentially appropriate to the long-term. A possible intermediate step might be some variant on the Polish proposal for a nuclear freeze in Central Europe (the Gomulka plan). One of the main difficulties we have seen in the Gomulka plan is that the Soviets would be unlikely to accept the far-reaching and intrusive arrangements that we have considered necessary to make verification effective. But perhaps this particular difficulty would seem less formidable in the circumstances we are now envisaging. A nuclear freeze may also prove more attractive to the Poles and other East Europeans, who may be able to persuade the Soviet government. In any case,

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discussion of this proposal with Eastern governments would help to show whether they are prepared to engage in reciprocal measures of arms limitation, either by verified agreement or by "mutual example".

A freeze logically leads on to the establishment of zones of limited armament ("security zones" in item d) and eventually perhaps to denuclearized zones (item f). Proposals for such arrangements have been put forward in the Polish Rapacki plan, which suggests, in its second and final stage, complete denuclearization and reduction of armed forces and armaments in a zone including Poland, Czechoslovakia and East and West Germany. Apart from the effect of such ambitious proposals on Germany, they seem impracticable until the political situation has been transformed. In present circumstances, complete denuclearization in the area suggested by the Rapacki plan would have serious consequences for the military balance in Europe; and would necessitate a complete rethinking of NATO strategy.

#### Political steps

The most practical political measure for the immediate future would seem to be the exchange of declarations renouncing the use of force (item a). This measure was suggested in the German Peace Note of March 1966. Such declarations would need to be so worded as to exclude the defensive use of force for instance under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The original Soviet reaction to the German proposal was cautious but not negative; since then they seem to have become more reluctant, probably under East-German pressure. The Communists suggested at the Karlovy Vary Conference and on other occasions a European Treaty to cover the renunciation of the use of force and non-interference in internal affairs. A treaty of this sort would produce more procedural problems (such as the adherence of East Germany) than an exchange of declarations. Such a commitment would not in fact add anything to the obligations which members of the U.N. have undertaken under the Charter (Article 2, paragraph 4); but a move of this sort could be of particular value for the relations between Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe. It would help to discourage the myth, fed by propaganda, of German "aggressiveness" and to dispel such genuine fears as may exist. One possibility is that these two points may be covered in a

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broadier document. The draft of our own proposed Declaration on Europe covers them both. In short we consider that both measures are worth actively pursuing in whatever form turns out to be most expedient.

A guarantee of existing frontiers (item b) would hardly be practical until the frontiers themselves have been accepted. We have hitherto thought that such guarantees would have to follow a peace settlement, at which time they might well be a useful step. But this proposal seems worth discussing with Eastern governments, because they attach importance to it. Since the only frontiers that matter in practice in this context are those of Germany with Poland and Czechoslovakia and the interzonal and Berlin demarcation boundaries inside Germany, exploration of this issue may help to produce a framework within which German problems can be satisfactorily solved. The question of timing as well as of substance will need careful consultation between the Allies, especially with the German government whose interests are most directly involved.

Conclusion of Non-Aggression Pacts (item c) is an extension of the renunciation of the use of force. We do not favour a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which would tend to perpetuate the division in Europe. A pattern of bilateral non-aggression pacts is worth exploring with Eastern governments; as are specific mention of non-aggression in a European Treaty or alternatively its inclusion in a declaration on Europe (the British draft in effect does so). The Western Allies should make it quite clear that such a general agreement or pattern of bilateral pacts would have to include West Germany, and safeguard our existing obligations such as those under the North Atlantic Treaty, and our position in matters like Berlin. We could not, of course, agree to the Soviets using non-aggression as a wedge to divide some allies from others.

In present circumstances it does not seem practicable to try to foresee the outline of a new collective security system in Europe (item j). In the British view, the best way to approach the question of building a more secure Europe is by carefully thought out steps. These steps may in due course bring about a new situation, to which a quite

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different security system would be appropriate. But too many uncertain and arguable factors are involved for us to try to outline now the political and security content of such a final system.