

PC/67/709

22nd September, 1967.

My dear Ambassador,

As I told you, I have read with great interest the report prepared by yourself and Mr. Schutz for Sub-Group 1 of the Special Group. I must say that I greatly admire the way in which you have mastered a more than difficult subject and the very crux of the whole Allied policy.

You know my point of view about the need to be very clear when one uses such terms as "Europe" and the "Division of Europe" and so on. This is necessary, I think, in order to avoid any possible ambiguity and to prevent interpretations occurring which might not be entirely consistent with our common policy and aims. We know that to the Soviets "ending the division of Europe" means driving a wedge between Europe and the United States, i.e. destroying the Atlantic Alliance, preventing the union of Western Europe, putting a divided Germany into a neutral position, and placing Europe under their political control by the recreation of the situation of 1945. On the other hand, General de Gaulle has expressed his own general ideas of what he means by a Europe united from the Atlantic to the Urals. During his recent visit to Poland he said that Europe is composed of a Western, a Central and an Eastern part. I know that the word "bloc" is no

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longer fashionable, but we should think carefully about what we really want before envisaging a merging of the two systems into what some call "Europe". Geographically, the term Europe has a meaning; politically, a united Europe has meant for a long time in current thinking and terminology only a united Western Europe. Before accepting a fundamental change in language, we should agree ourselves on what we exactly mean.

On the other hand, if we accept that the reunification of Germany would coincide with the so-called reunification of Europe, this would mean that we are prepared to put an end to the participation of Germany in Western Europe and in the Western Alliance. In practice, this would imply an encouragement of the tendencies which aim at a Europe organized in Western, Central and Eastern parts, with Germany being the main part of a more or less neutralised and disarmed Central Europe. This would again mean that the Soviet Union would reach a position of overwhelming superiority. Is this what we want and would that be in the real interests of the Alliance and of Germany itself? So far, we have been following a different path to improve the European situation. Our aim has been to improve the relationship between the two systems, to reach a fair settlement between Western and Eastern Europe. It is true that this path did not offer and is not offering any quick solutions - for the time being we have no quid pro quo to offer to the Soviets in return for the reunification of Germany other than the complete disintegration of the Western Alliance. But the spirit of this position was that we relied on the slow but inevitable developments in the future - the worsening of Sino-Russian relations, gradual changes in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself, and a freer expression of the deep desire of the German people for unification. That is, we were prepared to play for time with patient firmness. Should we now decide to change this course?

My great fear is that for the sake of "ending the division of Europe", we may lead public opinion to believe that any agreement with the Soviet Union formally ending such a division is good, even if it were to weaken Europe's position vis-a-vis the Soviets. Some expressions, such as the one used in paragraph 14 of Section III "the temporarily divided parts of the continent", may give rise to some misunderstanding. If we mention the reunification of Europe, we must start from the assumption that Europe was previously united. Have we in mind the Europe of 1939 or of 1914? And was it really united?

In your paragraph 2, you outlined the relationship between the relaxation of tension and the settlement of the basic political problem of the unification of Germany. Clearly you have taken into account President Johnson's speech of 7th October, 1966. It may certainly prove useful to constantly improve the atmosphere in order to increase the chances for fruitful negotiations with the Russians about the basic problems. But I think we should make clear to public opinion that the tension is not caused by us and that the origin of the tension is to be found in the long-standing Soviet policy in Germany. Thus some misunderstanding may arise, I think, if the Federal Republic of Germany may appear to be pressed to strive for easier relations with the communist countries, when we know of her repeated efforts in this regard and of the cold reception she has received from the East. Or do we believe that the Germans should go further, that is, recognise the existing frontiers before making any progress in unification, or even recognise the D.D.R. as a basis for reunification?

Another limited point on which I should express a doubt is in paragraph 4 of your document. Are we sure that the present Soviet policy is caused by internal factors such as the influence of the party bureaucracy? It seems to me that the Soviets are, with great tenacity and consistency, striving to reach their aims, the very aims they have had since the end of the war. I do not see any real substance in a supposed split between government and bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. Their obvious leader is Mr. Brezhnev, who is the Communist Party Secretary, and while Russian public opinion may well desire an easier life and a more relaxed policy, its influence on foreign policy decisions is nil.

I would have some doubts also over paragraph 7 - in which it is said that the Alliance remains an irreplaceable guarantor of European security until a lasting and just European settlement is assured - if it were not for what is added in paragraph 9, in which you have very rightly pointed out that even if and when we reach a European settlement, we still need American presence; the two paragraphs may perhaps be linked together for greater clarity.

These observations, sometimes merely of semantics, I think I had to make, not because I want to interfere with the work of the Sub-Group at this stage, but because I think that on a confidential basis my remarks may not be completely useless to you. They are

merely a more precise form of what I said to you orally when I had the pleasure of meeting you. Perhaps you would be kind enough to send a copy of this letter to Mr. Schutz. I am writing to you, as you sent me this report and as Mr. Schutz was not present in Paris when we met and discussed this matter.

Again I would express my highest admiration for the outstanding work you are doing, and my trust that you will bring an invaluable contribution to the future development of the Harmel study.

Yours sincerely,

Nanlio Brosio.