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To: Secretaries of Delegations

From: Directeur du Cabinet du Secrétaire Général *7*

FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE: SUB-GROUP 1

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE

I am forwarding, under cover of this note, copies of a paper on Soviet Foreign Policy, prepared on the instructions of the Secretary General by the International Staff, which might be discussed by Sub-Group 1 of the Special Group.

cc *Mr. Jaenicke* -
for inf.

(without enclosure)

a note to Legat L.S.
PR

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE

This note briefly examines Soviet European policy, chiefly in the light of the March cycle of election speeches by Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny as well as other public statements(1).

It may be argued that the public remarks of Soviet leaders do not reflect the USSR's "actual intentions". However, there is no convincing evidence to show that Soviet diplomacy runs on an alleged "double track". If allowance is made for the peculiar nature of Soviet Communist semantics, the stated objectives may be taken as real ones.

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1. The election speeches of all three top Soviet leaders expressed considerable satisfaction with the course of recent developments in Europe and the "relaxation of tension" there. Podgorny, for example, noted that the "active policy of the socialist and other peaceloving states, and the persistent activities of all democratic forces are beginning to bear fruit." Brezhnev said, "The confident and consistent efforts by socialist states in the European arena are producing tangible results." Kosygin said, "At the conference in Bucharest, the member states of the Warsaw Treaty put forward a concrete political program...it can be noted with satisfaction that this program is finding ever greater support in all countries of Europe."

Brezhnev said, "We Communists believe that wishing alone, appeals for co-operation, and even readiness to develop such co-operation between the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe in conformity with the principle of peaceful coexistence are not enough to safeguard European security. Equally necessary is active, irreconcilable and persistent struggle against everything that endangers peace in Europe." Kosygin added, "It would have been naïve to expect it (the process of reducing tension) to occur automatically without any effort, without any struggle." Thus, the Soviet expression of détente, as in the past, gives the impression of a vigorous political struggle toward certain fixed goals rather than a respite from expense or effort. Détente is portrayed in terms of a gradual Western acquiescence to a concrete Soviet or "socialist" political programme.

(1) An annex of excerpts from recent Soviet statements and press articles on European security is attached.

2. If the Soviet view of détente in Europe is "struggle", the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is the primary target of that struggle. Brezhnev said, "As the idea of ensuring peace, security, and peaceful co-operation in Europe gains ground among European states, it is becoming increasingly clear that the aggressive policy of West German imperialism...is the main obstacle to the solution of this important problem." Radio Moscow in French to Europe on 28th February reiterated: "However important the economic problem is, however profitable cultural co-operation may be, the essential point is to strengthen peace on the continent and to suppress the danger of war originating in West Germany." All the Soviet March election speeches continued to link détente with the political isolation of the Federal Republic and the imposition there of Soviet pre-conditions for détente. For example, Brezhnev expressed satisfaction that "no Western European state" now supports the FRG's position on post-World War II borders although, he said, "unfortunately many of them are not consistent and avoid stating their views...publicly"; and that there is a "wide coincidence of views between Eastern and Western Europe" on FRG access to nuclear weapons. Brezhnev and Kosygin again repeated their denial that the FRG coalition government has yet made any meaningful change in FRG foreign policy, while indicating Moscow's willingness for détente at the familiar Soviet price: renunciation of territorial claims, nuclear weapons, the claim to represent all of Germany, and (Podgorny added) the claim to West Berlin. Kosygin added, "if Western Germany continues to pursue a policy which bars the way to a broad détente, then sharp contradictions will arise with most West European states, and she will find herself in a state of complete isolation." Kosygin stated in March - "For a relaxation of tension in Europe it is essential above all to realize that the results of the Second World War have been established as a firm political fact and cannot be subjected to revision in any form." Kosygin's speech of 3rd August summed up: "Our relations with the FRG will naturally depend largely on its line in questions of European security." With respect to Germany, then, the Soviet desire to operate in a climate of reduced tension is a form of political action directed at freezing the Central European status quo, including the indefinite division of Germany into two or three states, and at evoking differences within the Bonn coalition and distrust and hostility between democratic Germany and its Allies.

"Return to Potsdam" has been a regular Soviet détente theme, most categorically reaffirmed by Gromyko in December 1965 to the Supreme Soviet: "The Soviet Union, true to its commitments, judges and will continue to judge the actions of particular powers in (European) security matters primarily on the basis of how they comply with the Potsdam Agreement, on respect for which it builds and will continue to build its policy with respect to the FRG." It would be easy to misunderstand or minimize the full force of this statement of Soviet policy on Germany: for a "return to Potsdam" means literally a return to occupation control, to discrimination and disarmament, and to the pre-Paris Agreement period when Germany, not yet accepted as a NATO member, was just property to be disposed of. In a wider European context, "return to Potsdam" connotes a harking back to a Stalinist inundation of Eastern Europe and a power vacuum in middle Europe dominated by the giant Soviet state.

Use of the lure of the future reunification of Germany to induce the FRG to reorient her ties in the direction of a Soviet-formulated status quo arrangement is implicit in such statements as Gromyko's Supreme Soviet speech, "The FRG ruling circles have bartered the unity of Germany for the Bundeswehr...and NATO", or Gromyko's hints at a "choice between 'pan-European' co-operation and a policy of peace" on the one hand and a FRG NATO policy on the other. Kosygin's March election speech repeated, "If the leaders of the new German Government were to base their policy on the results of the Second World War,...there is no doubt that such steps would find an appropriate response from the Soviet Union..."

At Bremen on 29th March, Semyon Tsarapkin, Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, hinted at "positive changes" in the FRG (this is the first time a Soviet spokesman has gone so far), but at the same time he stressed that FRG recognition of the Pankow régime is a prerequisite for better FRG-USSR relations. Tsarapkin said, "I am confident not only that we shall achieve a normalization of relations between Bonn and Moscow on the basis of the present situation, but also that we shall someday establish friendly relations." Thus, Tsarapkin sees "normalization" contingent upon Bonn's acceptance of the Soviet status quo package, while implying that "friendly" relations must await still other Soviet political provisos.

As for a hypothetical "post-détente" reunification of both German states, the Soviets have had little to say. However, the Bucharest Declaration's formula was "...the way to this lies through relaxation, through gradual rapprochement between the two sovereign German states, and agreement between them, through agreements on disarmament in Germany and Europe, and on the basis of the principle that when Germany is reunited, the united German state would be truly peaceful and democratic and would never again be a danger to its neighbours or to peace in Europe." In Soviet terminology, generally no state qualifies as "truly peaceful and democratic" unless ruled by a Communist party, preferably Soviet-controlled. Thus, the ultimate condition of German reunification would seem to be that both Germanies be "socialist" even after a status quo comprised of two or three German states had been long consolidated, and unspecified but major disarmament measures effected throughout Europe. In other words, "détente" over Germany means to the Soviets that Germany would remain divided, disarmed, and "neutralized" or "socialized" under Soviet auspices until the political topography of Europe had altered to accord with Soviet interests.

3. The March speeches of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny all equated the idea of détente with the decline or disappearance of NATO, and with European co-operation free from the so-called "discrimination and limitations of blocs." Said Kosygin, "...in many Western European states the bankruptcy of the policy associated with the NATO military bloc is being recognized." Earlier, Brezhnev, in an October speech to the Rally of Brotherhood in Moscow, had even more candidly expressed this Soviet objective: "The consistently peace-loving policy of the Warsaw Pact countries is increasingly undermining the very foundations of the so-called North Atlantic policy, which is dictated to the Western European countries from overseas. The aggressive NATO bloc has been staggering and showing fissures. In the West, too, the conviction is growing that the whole NATO system is a dangerous anachronism designed to preserve artificially a spirit of cold war and mistrust in Europe."

Kosygin, in a 1966 speech, elaborated the Soviet anti-NATO slant, equating "relaxation of military tension" in Europe with disbanding the military-political alliances or as a first step...disbanding their military organizations

and also...eliminating foreign military bases on the European continent" (Pravda, 4th August, 1966). The Bucharest Declaration called for "withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from alien territories within their national frontiers", and "liquidation of foreign war bases".

Appeals for this sort of "base-less" détente, if literally executed, would of course tip the relative continental power balance in favour of the USSR, and underline a continuing Soviet desire to weaken, undermine (in Brezhnev's phrase), or eventually end the Atlantic Alliance and to detach the United States from Europe. Mr. Khrushchev learned, and the present Soviet leadership now seems to have relearned an important lesson from their post-war experience in Europe: "reduced tensions" can tend to produce cheap political gains for the USSR by encouraging "fissiparous tendencies" in the West, and thereby strengthening the Soviet camp relative to the Western countries.

4. Another prominent factor in the Soviet conception of détente is the vaguely articulated "pan-Europeanism" which the USSR has promoted as a possible security alternative to NATO. "The awareness is growing in the majority of West European countries belonging to NATO that...the real threat to peace in Europe now comes from the Bonn militarists who cling stubbornly to the cold war... As for the European countries, the majority of them cannot but realize that their national interests can be ensured not by seeking some special privileges within the NATO framework but by setting up a stable system of European security." (Boris Gurnov, Pravda, 20th February, 1967).

Brezhnev said in October, "Influenced by constructive ideas from the socialist states, sentiments are increasing for creating a pan-European system of inter-state relations in which, as the Bucharest Declaration said so well, security for each would at the same time be security for all." Podgorny in March referred to a "pan-European security system under which each and every state would not feel anxious about its peaceful tomorrow." Hardly through coincidence, "pan-Europeanism" is reportedly slated to be the basic line at any forthcoming meeting of European Communist parties and in Communist-front activity concerning European security sponsored by the World Peace Council.

Notably, the Soviet leadership's March speeches, unlike some previous occasions, did not mention the idea of a European security conference aimed at achieving a European security pact. Kosygin's speech, for example, merely hinted in a low key that "the idea that security in Europe and the solution of its problems could be best ensured by...developing co-operation on a pan-European basis is penetrating more and more deeply into the consciousness of wide strata of the population." It would seem, therefore, that the Soviets hereby mean deliberately to encourage a sense of formless "détente" fluidity and expectation in Western public opinion and the Western official mind while, for the present, stopping short of concrete procedural proposals.

This Soviet campaign recalls the "Europe for the Europeans" theme in Khrushchev's call in February 1956 for a European regional security organization (through which the USSR could have hoped to eradicate anti-Communist tendencies in Western Europe and, once the U.S. was out of Europe, to dominate the new organization).

The oft-expressed Soviet concern over eliminating the "discrimination and limitations of blocs" and "special or exclusive Western European groupings or privileges" in Europe has clearly registered the USSR's opposition not only to NATO but to the institution of a common Western European market. This continuing thread in recent Soviet statements is reminiscent of the earlier USSR proposal at Geneva in March 1956 of "a pan-European agreement on economic co-operation" to be prepared under the guidance of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). This arrangement, the Soviets said at the time, would replace or supersede the Western OEEC.

The hostile Soviet attitude towards Western integration would tend to suggest that, inter alia, the Soviet demand for total German renunciation of nuclear weapons applies not only to Germany but, by inference, to a possible United Europe which included Germany or the Federal Republic.

"Détente" ignored. Soviet spokesmen continually insinuate that the United States is not a European state and that "pan-Europeanism" and the security conference should constitute an assertion of European independence vis-à-vis the United States. For example, the Bucharest Declaration states, "...the aims of United States policy have nothing to do with the vital interests of the European peoples, with the tasks of European security." Kossygin, more coyly, stated in Paris in December and again at London in February that "Europeans themselves should decide" whether the U.S. might participate.

Soviet opacity about the U.S. rôle in Europe actually marks a regression from 1954, when the USSR, in order to undercut NATO and the Paris Agreements, invited 23 European nations and the United States to a European security conference in Moscow.

Still another Soviet objective implicit in the security conference idea has been expressed: "The West has as yet shown no signs of readiness to convene a European conference at the governmental level primarily because the leaders of the German Federal Republic stubbornly refuse to sit at the same conference table with the leaders of the other German state, the GDR...the day will come when all Europeans, including the Germans of both German states, will sit at a single conference table to discuss earnestly their pressing matters." Primarily through press comment such as this (Yuriy Zhukov, Pravda, 1st November, 1966), the Soviets have clearly signalled that another objective of the European security conference idea would be the attendance of the Ulbricht régime, that is, as a preliminary step the West would have to recognize, at least tacitly, the Soviet Zone as an independent state.

What now seems chiefly to matter to the Soviets, in the short run at least, is whether through "pan-European" détente the Western European states can be induced to follow a line sufficiently "independent" of Washington for Soviet purposes. In October Brezhnev hinted: "There are new forces, new countries, new hopes, and new people in Europe who want to decide their own affairs themselves without interference from outside."

Ultimately, promotion of the "pan-Europe" idea recalls the other attempts of Soviet diplomacy ever since Potsdam to diminish or remove the American presence in Europe, and the traditional Soviet desire to foster a loosely organized "greater" Europe where the Soviet Union would be the arbiter and natural ruler among divided and weaker countries. In this respect hostility to the very existence of NATO remains a constant of Soviet policy.

5. "It might be asked why Soviet diplomacy has chosen this particular moment for stepping up efforts in the search for solutions to eliminate the threat of war in Europe and to improve the atmosphere there." L. Matveyev's three reasons (Izvestiya, 15th June, 1966) answered his own question: "More and more (West European) governmental figures are coming to the practical conclusion that they must respond and react favourably, not unfavourably, to the foreign policy actions of the socialist countries... The French example...a strengthening of France's position in Western Europe...(rid) of the onerous tutelage of the U.S.A. ... The intensification of the U.S.A.'s aggressiveness causes bourgeois politicians to shy away from close alignment with such a partner out of fear their fingers will be burned."

Statements such as this attest to the fact that Soviet interest has shifted from the not-so-revolutionary European working classes to the "bourgeoisie" and to particular nationalist susceptibilities as the political target and effective lever through which the USSR hopes for an even greater influence on the policy of Western governments.

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In short, Soviet statements themselves indicate that deep and basic East-West political conflicts exist, and that "détente" certainly does not imply a Soviet desire for political compromise, particularly on the key question of Germany's future. The Soviets believe that conditions are ripe to take somewhat more positive steps towards moulding a "New Europe" in which effective decisions would, in the main, be Soviet ones. They aim at having a Europe with very loose links - if any - with the U.S. and in which the overwhelming power of the USSR would be decisive in influencing the policy of the other European countries.

The USSR's major objectives are an end to NATO, its replacement by a loose, divided Europe, and consolidation of the Central European status quo.

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While the USSR's interests in Europe, as its leaders enunciate them, have changed unappreciably in broad outline, clearly the USSR has been forced to accept the necessity of advancing these interests by more indirect and political means rather than by the militant advocacy of revolution, the use of force, or military threat and pressure.

The most important causes of this seem to be mutual deterrence in the strategic weapons field, the firm resistance of NATO members to Soviet probes, and the economic growth of Western Europe, with political and social consequences unfavourable to revolutionary potentialities.

Thus, the Soviet régime now operates primarily on the plane of political rivalry, striving to increase its power, influence, prestige, and security against the existing distribution of power in Europe. Soviet power aspirations are clearly reflected in the familiar daily activities of Soviet diplomacy: selective administrative harassment of access to West Berlin, calculated shifts of political favour or economic inducements as between one NATO ally and another, exploitation of disarmament negotiations for political advantage, and cultural exchanges for propaganda effects or technological borrowing.

Although less immediately hazardous than a direct frontal challenge by force, Soviet political moves could, if mishandled or unopposed, decisively affect the stability of relative power balance of the Western and Soviet camps.

In such a destabilized Europe, of course, military blackmail might become ever more tempting to Soviet politicians still imbued with the universalist ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Assertions of the USSR's rapidly growing strategic strength would become more probable and more persuasive to the extent that the USSR developed into a giant among lilliputians.

While at present the Soviet régime does not wish to take actions which would project a threatening image and so tend to re-cement solidarity among the Western allies, its restraint could quickly disappear if the Soviet-promoted vision of a "New Europe" became a reality.

ANNEX A: SELECTED STATEMENTS ON SOVIET
EUROPEAN POLICYPEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

"The Soviet people well know that all important questions of international relations, and primarily of war and peace, of the security of peoples, are being decided in a relentless and furious struggle in which the forces of peace, socialism, and progress are opposed by imperialist reaction." (Brezhnev, Tbilisi speech, 2nd November, 1966).

"By waging a struggle against the aggressive forces of imperialism and consistently following a Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have achieved further strengthening of our country's international positions" (Pravda editorial, re: December CC CPSU Plenum, 15th December, 1966).

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

"The consistently peace-loving policy of the Warsaw Pact countries is increasingly undermining the very foundations of the so-called North Atlantic Policy, which is dictated to the West European countries from overseas. The aggressive NATO bloc has been staggering and showing signs of deep fissures. In the West too, the conviction now is growing that the whole NATO system is a dangerous anachronism designed to preserve artificially a spirit of cold war and mutual distrust in Europe. Influenced by constructive ideas from the socialist states, sentiments are increasing for creating a pan-European system of inter-state relations in which, as the Bucharest Declaration said so well, security for each would at the same time be security for all. The idea of guaranteeing lasting peace and security in Europe by the collective efforts of all the European peoples is ever more confidently pushing its way through ..." (Brezhnev, Rally of Brotherhood speech, Pravda, 16th October, 1966).

"The idea of ensuring a reliable peace and security in Europe through the collective efforts of all European peoples is more and more surely becoming credible. This is being promoted in no small degree by the movements now taking place in public opinion in Western countries. In that part of Europe forces are arising which no longer wish to obey the dictates of the United States and are prepared to act to insure a new role for our continent in preserving peace and ensuring the security of the peoples. The fresh wind of international détente is undermining the foundations of the so-called North Atlantic policy dictated to the countries of West Europe from across the ocean. The slanderous myth of a "Communist danger" has collapsed. Understanding is ripening among Europeans of the fact that the whole NATO system is a dangerous anachronism called on to preserve the spirit of the cold war in Europe ..." (Vitaliy Koriyonov, Pravda, 11th February 1967).

"A conference on European security and cooperation could contribute to the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe ... agreement reached at such a conference could find expression, for example, in a general European Declaration on cooperation for the maintenance and strengthening of European security." (Bucharest Declaration, 5th July 1966).

"The crisis of NATO and its drastic aggravation caused by France's withdrawal from the bloc's military organization compels many participants of exclusive West European groupings to revise their views and to admit that the continent's security can be ensured only on a European basis. One increasingly hears in Britain the voices of those who want a new approach to the problem of cooperation, to the dialogue between all Europeans and to the search for rapprochement between the West and the East in Europe." (Bragin and Orestov, Pravda, 5th February 1967).

"... the programme for their (countries of socialism) joint actions in Europe is the Bucharest Declaration, which has already played a positive role and which has a growing influence on the course of European development ...

"...the proposals for a general European conference to examine the questions of security and cooperation in Europe advanced by the socialist countries is making ever greater headway. This idea is already supported in principle by France, Great Britain, Italy, and a number of other West European states. It is observed that views are converging on questions of cardinal importance for ensuring peace, such as the need to prevent West Germany

from getting nuclear weapons, recognition of the inviolability of existing borders, and others."

"While noting the positive factors we must not, however, close our eyes to the intrigues of the warmongers in Europe. The nuclear and territorial strivings of the West German ruling circles and their hostile policy towards East Germany continue to lead to the preservation of tension on the continent." (Pravda editorial, 18th February, 1967).

"The important fact is that the path of détente which Europe has entered is evidently leading from economic cooperation to political dialogue, and to an increasing proximity of views on the chief problems of European security.

"In this connection I must also note that the USSR and France are paving the road that must be taken as an example. However important the economic problem is, however profitable cultural cooperation may be, the essential point is to strengthen peace on the continent and to suppress the danger of war originating in West Germany. It is precisely the concern to strengthen European security which forms the basis of the friendship and cooperation between the USSR and France ..." (Kuznetsov discussion, Radio Moscow in French to Europe, 1730 GMT, 28th February 1967).

"...The awareness is growing in the majority of West European countries belonging to NATO that the source of danger lies elsewhere than in the place against which NATO strategists have been directing their military efforts all these years. Broad sections of West European opinion are coming to realize that the real threat to peace in Europe now comes from the Bonn militarists, who cling stubbornly to the old policy of the cold war.

"This is why the proposal of the Warsaw Pact countries for the disbanding of both alignments now existing in Europe or, as an initial step, their military organizations, was received with such great attention, interest, and gratitude by the peoples of Europe.

"As for the European countries, the majority of them cannot but realize that their national interests can be ensured not by seeking some special privileges within the NATO framework, and thus deepening the split of Europe but by setting up a stable system of European security." (Pravda, 20th February 1967, Boris GURNOV).

"If one turns to the development of the situation in Europe, it may be noted that the active policy of the socialist and other peace-loving states, and the persistent activities of all democratic forces are beginning to bear fruit. Understanding is growing of the necessity of eliminate obstacles hindering normal pan-European cooperation, creation of a security system under which each and every state would not feel anxieties about its peaceful tomorrow." (Podgorny, Moscow oblast speech, Pravda, 4th March 1967).

GERMANY

"... a constructive approach to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world is only possible through a realistic approach, primarily recognition of the existence of two German states." (V. Kononov, Pravda, 11th February 1967).

"(The ruling circles of the Federal Republic) should proceed from the fact of the existence of two German states. Abandon their intention to recarve the European frontiers, and their claims to the exclusive right to represent the whole of Germany, give up their attempts to bring pressure to bear on states ready to recognize the GDR, renounce the criminal Munich dictates, and acknowledge that it has been null and void from the beginning." (Bucharest Declaration, 5th July 196).

"Bonn is now engaging in old acts while using only slightly new words to change somewhat the camouflage of its previous course." (Izvestiya, 27th December 1966)

"Of course there are still quite a few obstacles on the path to ensuring the security of Europe's peoples. The question of West German revanchism is as acute as ever. The aims of West German imperialism, unfortunately, are unchanged." (Brezhnev, speech, 13th January 1967).

"The statements and actions of the new Bonn Government indicate that it has adopted the policy of its predecessors, a policy subordinated to revanchist and military goals." (Pravda editorial, 18th February 1967)

"But of course it would be a mistake to assume that the dangers threatening European peace are past. Above all it must be said that the new Kiesinger Government in the FRG is trying to conduct essentially an old policy ... that is, a revanchist policy." (Podgorny, speech, 4th March 1967).

"The high-level (Bucharest) conference of socialist states places a choice before West Germany: either it renounces its collusion with the aggressive circles of the U.S.A. and gives up as a bad job its policy of urging on revanchist forces to paths of new military adventures or it will have to pay severely for the consequences of this policy." (Ye. Pralnikov, Izvestiya, 26th July, 1966)

"The ruling circles of the FRG are faced with a choice: either to contribute jointly with the other European states to the strengthening of peace, or to carry on their previous peace-endangering policy, deepening the gulf between themselves and the rest of Europe.

"Twelve years ago Bonn signed the Paris agreements, aware that it rushed aside the interests of the peoples and the interests of peace. Now it must choose between two things - pan-European cooperation or the old 'policy of strength' which is fraught with painful new failures.

"Objectively speaking the German peoples could derive more benefit than any other people from the development of pan-European cooperation. For them it is not only a question of ensuring their own security and vitally important economic ties but also a question of searches for approaches to the solution of the national problem." (P. Naumov, Pravda, 21st September 1966).

UNITED STATES' ROLE IN EUROPE

"There can be no doubt that the aims of United States policy have nothing to do with the vital interests of the European peoples, with the tasks of European security ... The European states are capable of solving the questions of relations between them without outside interference ..." (Bucharest Declaration, 5th July 1966).

"American imperialism continues to claim the role of uninvited manager of European affairs ... in posing as the guardians of Europe are Washington policy leaders really unaware of how absurd such claims are in our times? Obviously they have forgotten that there are new forces, new countries, new hopes, and new people in Europe who want to decide their own affairs themselves, without interference from outside." (Brezhnev, Rally of Brotherhood Speech, Pravda, 16th October, 1966).

"In the Western European countries themselves the conviction is growing more and more that Europe can and must find in itself the forces for the reliable ensuring of its own security. No one will bring this to the Europeans from outside." (Yurly Goloshubov, Izvestiya, 24th November, 1966).

"As for U.S. participation in this conference, it seems to me that this is a question that should be decided by the European countries themselves. When they do decide the question, you will receive an answer to it." (Kosygin, press conference, Paris, 4th December 1966).

"The authentic security of Europe can and must be ensured only on a pan-European basis ... the United States is the great force which divides Europe into two blocs ... those Western powers which wish to ensure their own security to the detriment of that of Eastern Europe and the USSR are promoting by any means the rearmament of Germany and the incitement of her against us." (Pravda, 8th March, 1967 Yuriy Zhukov).

"American politicians believe that European affairs - as well as Asian and Latin American affairs - cannot and should not be settled without their interference. This, to put it mildly, strange logic has no realistic basis. In our view it cannot be supported by any arguments about U.S. participation in the two world wars or the magnitude of American capital investments in the Western European economy. Neither the participation of the U.S.A. in the second world war nor the size of its gold reserves in the vaults of Fort Knox make Americans Europeans ... the assertion of American politicians that the supporters of convening an all-European conference are endeavouring completely to deprive the U.S.A. of the right to participate in the solution of European problems are unfounded. No one believes that the U.S.A. has no relation to European problems. The signatures of American representatives are on the Potsdam documents which have a most direct bearing on European affairs. But it is also impossible to leave out of the reckoning the fact that the U.S.A. has not fulfilled the obligation it assumed with respect to the eradication of German militarism and the defence of peace in Europe, that it is pursuing a policy at variance with previously concluded agreements.

"The essence of the problem is not that anyone wants to force the U.S.A. out of Europe. It is not the Europeans who are depriving the U.S.A. of the right to participate in the solution of problems of European security and the establishment of peaceful cooperation; on the contrary Washington wants to deprive the Europeans of this right..

One would like to think that the West European governments will determine their positions not according to peremptory shouts from overseas but on the basis of their own analyses of the actual situation in Europe.

...As far as the socialist countries of Europe are concerned they have expressed their views clearly and definitely. They have worked out a practical programme of action for strengthening peace and inter-state cooperation on the continent.

The first thing they are proposing is that representatives of all European states gather around a round table. There they will hear the viewpoints of other countries without obligation, without being bound by any formulas and without any preordained decisions or results. As a start, it is necessary to make a decision to meet. All the rest is the subject of future talks." (G. Anatolyev, Izvestiya, 13th September, 1966).

"Certain states believe that the United States should attend this European conference. I do not share this view. I do not think either that the problem of U.S. representation should become a stumbling block for the convening of this conference. When all is said and done it might be profitable to the United States to get to know what the Europeans think in this respect." (V. Ardatovskiy commentary, Moscow radio in French to Europe, 1100 GMT 25th January 1967).