

NATO SECRETARIAT
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To: Secretary General

From: Acting ASG(PA)

Subject: Izvestiya Article on European Security

The attached summary of a disquisition of Professor I. BLISHCHENKO in Izvestiya 21st June, 1967 on creation of a European collective security system was circulated in Group I of the Harmel Exercise on 27th June, 1967 by the German Delegation.

BLISHCHENKO's article is significant as one of the most detailed Soviet attempts to date to spell out what USSR spokesmen mean when they speak of "European collective security", and as such, may be of more than routine interest. I am forwarding the summary to you in case you have not already received a copy.

RAM/RED

German Delegation

Paris, 27 June 1967

I. In its edition of 21st June, the "Izvestija" published a lengthy article by I. Blishchenko, professor of international law, commenting on proposals made at the Karlsbad conference on a collective security system in Europe. The foremost problem in the creation of a collective security system was recognition of the real situation as it is expressed in the standards of international law. As was known, the Potsdam agreements of 1945 had established an international legal basis for a peaceful post-war settlement of the frontier question. The absolute necessity of recognizing the Oder-Neisse-line followed from these agreements. The demand for recognition was based on the principle, generally accepted under international law, of the territorial integrity of states pursuant to Article 2, para 4, of the United Nations Charter. Recognition of the existing situation in Europe was a most important condition in view of the revision demanded by Bonn. Any reasonably thinking person would realize that the effectiveness of the security system was dependent upon the participation of all European states on the basis of equality of rights. This concerned first of all the two German states.

II. The principle content of the security system was, according to Blishchenko, the contractual commitments by all European states on a renunciation of force, or threat of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Renunciation of force was closely connected with the obligation assumed by the European states not to disseminate nuclear weapons and not to accept them in any form. The policy of the Federal Republic placed obstacles in the way towards this aim. The effectiveness of a European security system was therefore dependent on the measure in which the European states succeeded to keep the Federal Republic away from nuclear weapons in any form.

The conclusion of a treaty concerning the renunciation of force would make it possible to dissolve both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organizations and reduce the burden of the defence budget. It is true that a possible accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to a non-proliferation treaty was qualified by the remark that technical and industrial preconditions for the production of nuclear weapons would be created there.

The security system would have to be based on the strict observation of the principle of non-interference, and every state should be free to solve the question of its development as long as it did not threaten international peace and security. A system should be established for the settlement of disputes by amical arrangements or arbitration, in which either special committees, or third countries, or international organizations, would function as bodies for the settlement of disputes.

Since the establishment of a collective security system in Europe was difficult, one would first have to arrive at a contractual settlement of partial questions. The creation of nuclear-free zones, the dissolution of foreign military bases, and non-aggression pacts between the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty and those of NATO, were called partial aims. The present international law provided a basis for a security system serving the interests of all European states and peace.