

DRAFTNATO SECRETRECORD OF MEETING IN THE OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL, 25th FEBRUARY 1967AT 10.30 a.m.Procedures of the Study of the Future Tasks  
of the Alliance

Present: Secretary General  
Deputy Secretary General  
Acting ASG for Political Affairs  
Directeur du Cabinet  
Special Adviser for Policy Planning

It was generally felt that the Secretary General should open the meeting of the Special Group with a statement which, whether or not it contained references to more fundamental issues, should at least contain possible alternative suggestions on procedures for organizing the Group's work. Or the Secretary General might distribute a paper setting forth his suggestions before the meeting.

2. There are indeed several ways of proceeding. To make these clear, we have broken them down under <sup>two</sup> ~~three~~ headings - What issues are to be studied? Who will do the actual work?

a) What issues are to be studied? The meeting agreed generally that PO/67/89 identified the specific subjects which had to be treated:

- (i) Soviet Foreign Policy. (Should not this subject be expanded to deal more fully with the whole evolution of the Soviet Union and examine the internal as well as external forces affecting its foreign policy? Should not studies also be undertaken on Eastern <sup>Europe</sup> ~~Germany~~ and the Soviet Zone of Germany?

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- (ii) East/West relations, European security and the German problem.
- (iii) Western Europe and its relations with overseas members.
- (iv) Regions outside the NATO area.
- (v) Possibly another issue might be included called "The Consultative Process in NATO and its Relationship with the commitment of members".

In connection with these studies, it was noted that military factors should perhaps be included to a greater extent than had originally been foreseen or desired. Such military discussions would not go into great detail but might serve as a basis for a collective appreciation of the situation and as a deterrent against unilateral military reductions. Given the present conditions within the Alliance, such a study might also serve to unify the disparate efforts being undertaken in the tripartite group as well as in the DPWG, and make the exercise more meaningful by addressing it to a concrete problem.

b) Who should do the work? On this question, several suggestions were made -

- (i) the International Staff;
- (ii) National rapporteurs; Although this method was considered acceptable and even desired by Delegations, it was noted that the selection of rapporteurs might be difficult as necessarily a national rapporteur would reflect his national outlook.

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(iii) To obviate the difficulties of a national rapporteur, it was suggested that sub-groups might be created on each issue. This solution still left open the question of who would actually write the paper.

(iv) It was also conceivable that the Special Group as a whole would discuss each subject intensely and the product of their discussion might then be formulated in a paper. Again, the question of the identity of the writer of the report remains a difficult question.

(v) Finally, it was suggested that there might be a mix of these suggestions. For instance, one suggestion was advanced regarding the distribution of work:

Soviet Foreign Policy	- International Secretariat
East/West relations	- Benelux or Germany
Western Europe and its relations with overseas members	- United Kingdom or France
Regions outside the NATO area	- United States
Consultation and commitment	Canada, or Norway and Denmark

5.3. Whatever solution was adopted, there remained the question of whether studies should precede or follow discussions of the Group or sub-Group as might be the case.

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