


NATO SECRET

RECORD OF MEETING IN THE OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL, 25th FEBRUARY 1967
AT 10.30 a.m.



Aims and Purposes of the Study on the
Future Tasks of the Alliance

Present: Secretary General
Deputy Secretary General
Acting ASG for Political Affairs
Directeur du Cabinet
Special Adviser for Policy Planning

The first point made in the wide-ranging discussion was that if the above mentioned study were not to run into political difficulties, and actually reveal and accentuate basic differences, there should be a clear idea as to its objectives. In this context, three basic opinions were initially advanced:

- a) The study's main purpose should be to define - in the light of present and future circumstances - the political objective of the Alliance, e.g. a European settlement between Western and Eastern Europe, including a satisfactory solution for the German problem;
- b) The Special Group should content itself with a minimum programme, chiefly in the field of procedures required to fulfil our objectives. If so desired, it might also tackle marginal questions in the field of political objectives themselves;

- c) The Special Group should concentrate on improving the work, action and public image of the Alliance.

2. In the further discussion, the distinction was reaffirmed between a) objectives of the Alliance, and b) means to realise them. As regards the first, it was generally agreed that the Special Group was not the proper forum for working out detailed negotiating positions. On the other hand, the Group might be useful in clarifying our own ideas on what, for example, we understand by the term "European settlement". Such a settlement, it was suggested, need not necessarily include, at least initially, the reunification of Germany. Another aspect of such a settlement might be the achievement of a balance of power with Russia, in which Europe assumed a bigger share of the burden than hitherto, thus permitting the United States to reduce its share.

3. Generally speaking, the future tasks of the Alliance might be defined as "defence plus political objectives"; and the task of the Special Group might be said broadly to define these political targets. It should be made clear to public opinion that the Alliance's overall purpose is not merely to serve as a deterrent but also to solve certain political questions. A difficulty, however, lies in striking a proper balance between too much stress on "defence" or, conversely, on the need and the desire for a political settlement. The Special Group would have to find a satisfactory middle course. In this respect, the need for proper publicity for the results of the exercise was reaffirmed.

4. The discussion then turned to the future of the Alliance. There is no doubt that the Alliance will continue to be necessary as long as there is no settlement. As to the situation after such a settlement is reached, it was pointed out that no-one could wish for a Europe either under the control of the Soviet Union or under the permanent protection of the United States. Europe would have to learn to stand on its own feet. This might at some future date imply that it could do without United States protection; it does not imply that it can ever do without treaty links of friendship and mutual military assistance with the United States. The question is, therefore, whether the Alliance in such a situation would still continue was essentially a question of form; and it is conceivable that the continuing link between Europe and the United States, after a settlement in Europe, might be expressed in a new way.

5. Although there was no specific conclusion to this part of the discussion, the feeling of the meeting may be summed up in the following points:

- a) The Group should aim at formulating the future tasks of the Alliance in such a way as will make clear to public opinion that the Alliance has a role to play both in defence and in the solution of political problems;
- b) The broad definition of the political objectives of the Alliance should be undertaken by the Special Group;
- c) In doing so, it should not elaborate detailed negotiating positions, but it should examine which elements should be included in these objectives and which should not. It might, for instance, consider whether a European political

settlement must necessarily include the reunification of Germany or whether, at least initially, a different approach to the German problem might be envisaged. Some of these possible approaches were mentioned in the course of the discussion.

6. The discussion then turned to problems of procedure about which a separate paper is drawn up.

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