

20th January, 1967

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

11.30 a.m.

Meeting of Secretary General with selected members
of the International Staff: Council Resolution on
Future Tasks of the Alliance.

Present: Mr. Jaenicke
Mr. Chapman
Mr. Van Campen
Mr. Hockaday
Mr. Bacchetti
Mr. Simms

The Secretary General suggested that Mr. Van Campen draft a paper summing up the principal elements of the discussion on procedure which had taken place at the meeting of the group on 16th January. He asked Mr. Van Campen to describe them as he recalled them. Mr. Van Campen said that it seemed to him that there were two major questions. One was whether or not the committee should be open-ended and, if restricted, whether or not the French should be represented. He thought the French should be invited to participate; they probably could not be kept out and if they should refuse, the onus would be on them. The other question had to do with the degree of control to be exercised by the Council.

The Secretary General commented that, in any case, no International Staff paper should be circulated until the Belgian paper had been received by delegations. It might then be suggested that a meeting of the Council take place on either 1st or 8th February to discuss the procedural aspects and the terms of reference of the exercise. The Council might decide to entrust the conduct of the exercise to an open-ended group composed of high-level governmental representatives and/or Permanent Representatives, such group to report periodically and regularly to the Council on its progress. It seemed clear that the Secretary General should be chairman of the group. The question of whether and how the work might be carried on by a more restricted group might be left to the larger group itself to decide; the possibility that the group might divide into sub-groups should not be ruled out. Mr. Chapman expressed the view that the high-level people could not be expected to do the work themselves. The Secretary General replied that it was

understood that they would have the assistance of the Political Division. Nevertheless, they might wish to reserve the actual drafting of the report to themselves or their own staff. Mr. Chapman envisaged the possibility that the high-level group might appoint a director from one of the countries to do the detailed work. He thought they might also wish to call in outside experts. The Secretary General doubted that this matter needed to be settled at the present time. He thought it sufficient to assume that the International Staff was ready and able to do the work, leaving open the possibility that reinforcement by national experts might prove desirable.

With respect to hearings to be held in connexion with the exercise, the Secretary General thought the group would wish to hear all kinds of persons of international repute. Whether or not such hearings should be public was a difficult question, as public hearings might be dangerous and rather disorderly. In connexion with the Three Wise Men exercise, all hearings had been private. Mr. Van Campen added that the Three Wise Men had, in fact, rejected the idea of public hearings, and he thought it advisable that the precedent they had set be followed in the present case. In the first place, those who were testifying would be less likely to express themselves frankly if hearings were public. Moreover, as they would have to deal with delicate issues, they might not wish to do so in public, and such issues might therefore not be considered at all. Mr. Bacchetti pointed out that if politicians were called upon to testify, they would wish to appear optimistic in public, whereas private hearings would be more likely to result in a realistic appraisal of the situation. The Secretary General said that Ambassador Cleveland favoured having the hearings conducted on television, in order that they might receive maximum publicity. In this connexion, the Ambassador had cited the hearings conducted by Senator Jackson on NATO. He (the Secretary General) thought, however, that this suggestion was fraught with dangers. Mr. Bacchetti observed that a more effective means of giving the exercise publicity might be to concentrate on the report itself. The Secretary General suggested that Mr. Van Campen, in drafting his paper, might simply put the question, citing the precedent of the Three Wise Men

exercise and noting the Secretary General's doubts. Mr. Chapman expressed the view that one way of limiting the dangers of televised hearings would be for the staff of the high-level group to organise the presentation in advance. Mr. Jaenicke favoured private hearings and thought that Ambassador Cleveland was mistaken in supposing that a national exercise, i.e. the Jackson hearings, could be transposed to the international scene. The two situations were only superficially similar, and an international exercise could not be controlled in the same way as a national one. Mr. Chapman asked whether Parliamentarians would be asked to testify. The Secretary General replied in the affirmative. Mr. Jaenicke commented that he had seen a number of reports by NATO Parliamentarians, some of which contained a great deal of nonsense which could only be harmful to the Organization. The Secretary General said that, however, not all the suggestions by Parliamentarians were nonsense: on the contrary, some of them were very serious and merited study.

With respect to substance, the Secretary General said that he had studied the suggestions in Mr. Chapman's and Mr. Van Campen's papers carefully. He had himself drafted a paper and proposed to read the principal headings to the group. These headings, which were as follows, might be regarded as constituting an agenda for the study:

- (1) Affirmation of the common intention and will of member countries to see NATO continue.
- (2) Justification, in basic terms for the benefit of public opinion, for the continuation of the Alliance. It could be shown that, despite the absence of an imminent threat to NATO, the Alliance was necessary to maintain the balance of power, not only in the sense of ~~an organization~~ a group of countries with certain possibilities, but also in the sense of an organization of such countries with forces, plans, etc.
- (3) Changes in the world situation. No attempt should be made to write a history of everything that had happened since the establishment of NATO; rather, on the basis of certain elemental and well-known facts, an assessment should be made of the effect on the balance of power and on the Alliance of the principal developments.

- (4) The meaning of detente. Does detente signify simply an effort on the part of the West to develop their relations with the East in so far as possible, in order to provide a basis for the settlement of outstanding political questions, or does it also imply making progress towards the resolution of such political questions?
- (5) Basic military requirements as of now (not a detailed examination of the organization of forces).
- (6) Relationship between Europe and North America. Does the two-pillar concept imply the organization of the European pillar inside the Alliance or does it suggest its autonomous development in another framework? A strengthened and enlarged Western European Union would seem to be the natural place for the development of a more cohesive Western Europe. The special position of Canada should also be studied.
- (7) Special study of European Security in Germany. Should the Alliance take a new initiative in this connexion?
- (8) NATO's rôle with respect to areas outside NATO. This question interested the US and Portugal particularly.
- (9) Consultation among member states. The French had called into doubt the validity of this concept as developed by the Three Wise Men.
- (10) Re-affirmation of the links between the Treaty and the Organization.
- (11) The possibility of extending the Treaty for a fixed period. Whether this subject should be anticipated at the present time or left to be raised in the course of the discussion, however, was a matter for consideration.

Mr. Chapman suggested that the task of NATO with respect to the Third World might be added to the Secretary General's list. Mr. Van Campen pointed out that certain delegations were likely to raise the question of Article 2 both in terms of mutual assistance among the allies and of assistance to non-NATO countries, and he thought consequently it should be added too. Mr. Jaenicke proposed a third addition, the question of the Alliance information policy. He pointed out

that, at the present time, the task of informing public opinion was essentially a national responsibility. The nations, however, had done nothing, the budget of the NATO Information Service was manifestly inadequate to permit that Service to assume any large part of the responsibility, and the national associations forming the Atlantic Treaty Association, too, had made only a woefully inadequate effort. ~~Further~~ These associations should be given greater means and reorganised and revitalised, or the NATO Information Service should be given a new rôle, or the nations should be made to carry out their responsibility. The Secretary General accepted all three suggested additions.

With respect to the question of the duration of the Treaty, Mr. Van Campen expressed the view that, as certain national delegations would certainly raise the matter, it would be preferable for the Secretary General to do so first. The Secretary General observed that an extension of the period would require a change in the Treaty itself and ratification by Parliaments, which would create difficulties. Also, one had to take into account the French position in this matter. Mr. Bacchetti thought the matter would certainly arise in the course of the exercise and doubted that it would be wise to raise it at the beginning. Mr. Jaenicke pointed out that, while certain delegates undoubtedly favoured extension, others were adamantly opposed, and this difference of opinion, if reflected in the press, could harm the Organization. The Secretary General proposed the question be put in the following fashion: should the Alliance, after 1970, go on on an indefinite duration basis, or should measures be taken to give it greater stability? Mr. Bacchetti observed that the Council had been asked to undertake a study of the "future tasks of the Alliance"; such tasks clearly were not military, as strengthening the integrated military system was out of the question. They necessarily had to do with political cohesion therefore, and in this connexion the French position was a major stumbling block. Mr. Jaenicke said that, since NATO had been assured by Mr. Couve de Murville that France considered the Alliance should go on, it would not be in NATO's interest to press the French too hard.

In conclusion, the Secretary General asked Mr. Van Campen to add to his paper on procedure a section dealing with substance. In order to assist him in this, he would give him

his own paper. Mr. Bacchetti had also prepared a paper which would be available to Mr. Van Campen, and the ideas contained in both Mr. Chapman's and his own (Mr. Van Campen's) papers should be taken into account. The paper should simply put ~~the~~ questions, and should not try to give any answers to them.

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