

16 JAN 1967

9th January, 1967

To: A.S.G.(P.A.) 7
cc: Mr. Chapman
Mr. van Campen
Mr. Newton o.r.
From: A.G. Kühn 141
Subject: Resolution on Future Tasks of the Alliance - C-M(66)145

A. Substance

In trying to interpret the ideas underlying the "Belgian resolution" three subjects come to mind which might be studied with some usefulness:

- I - as NATO was primarily established to counter the Soviet threat it would be essential to assess this threat and its changes taking into consideration Soviet capabilities and intentions.
- II - it would also be necessary to analyse through which means NATO has been successful in meeting this threat and until now deterring aggression.
- III - this would involve the question of developments within NATO and of the internal balance of the Alliance.

The conclusions to be drawn will very much depend on the kind of answers given to these basic questions and the practical consequences will differ accordingly.

A few examples of possible lines of thought might be sufficient here:

1. It might, for instance, be concluded that the Soviet threat has greatly diminished:

- because the Soviets and their partners in the "bloc" are less powerful now (which is certainly not true);
- or because their power is counter-balanced - and by far - by the Western deterrent either by the US nuclear power alone or in combination with overall NATO strength (this is probably true and a separation of the two elements of the deterrent is difficult to undertake);
- and/or because other elements play some part (Chinese threat, lessening of cohesion in the Warsaw Pact);
- and/or because the Soviets have radically changed their minds and decided to concentrate on peaceful development of their own country (which is possible but cannot be completely ascertained).

2. If there is a consensus - which is likely - that the threat has significantly diminished, what is the evidence that this can reasonably be considered a permanent factor?

3. If the answer is in the affirmative what are the consequences for NATO?

- is it necessary to maintain NATO strength and coherence at present levels in order to make sure that the threat does not arise again because the Soviets consider the West weakened?
- is it still necessary to maintain a costly common defence structure and political organization and where is streamlining possible?
- is there realism in the proposition that a process of reducing NATO can be used to stimulate similar processes on the other side, in the field of disarmament and security and for the solution of the German problem? Where are the limits of this process?
- would NATO thus - at least for a transitional period - find a new political rôle and in which form?

4. If it be concluded that the Soviet threat has not significantly diminished:

- should NATO continue in its present form to meet it?
- how far is military integration necessary under present circumstances?

5. In both cases:

- what kind of strategy (alternatives) should NATO elaborate, taking into consideration also the French withdrawal from integration?

6. At some stage in answering these questions it would become necessary to analyse the internal balance of power within NATO:

- has the recovery of Europe since 1949 found concrete and sufficient expression within NATO?
- what would the "two pillar" concept mean in terms of building up the European "pillar"?
 - closer co-operation of the European members of NATO and in which form?
 - establishment of a kind of "inner circle"?
 - establishment of a form of European Defence Community?
 - the setting up of a European Nuclear Power as distinguished from the US deterrent and which form might this take?

- would this pre-suppose a European political community and of which "Europe"?
- how far are any such political projects, even if reasonable and plausible in theory, feasible in practice?

B. Procedure

If a really serious and meaningful study of the "future tasks of the Alliance" is intended it should certainly have a scope approximately as large as outlined above.

How could such a study be carried out? There are various possibilities:

- ad hoc study group composed of government experts;
- group of "wise men" composed of Ministers and/or government experts or independent experts;
- study by the Permanent Council or POLADS and/or experts.

In my view, it would be advisable to have a group of high-level experts (not Ministers) of political standing and a measure of independence.

It may be noted here that the proposed subject for the next meeting of APAG (April 1967) is "the problem of balance within the Atlantic Alliance in the 1970s". This exercise might prove very useful for the study to be undertaken as a follow-up to the "Belgian resolution". Perhaps it should be suggested to the Secretary General to draw the attention of the Council to this when it discusses the APAG report on the 11th of January. The members of APAG might then be informed of the conclusions of the Council discussion.