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of a

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

held on

WEDNESDAY 15th FEBRUARY 1967 at 10.15 a.m. & 15 h

at

NATO HEADQUARTERSPORTE DAUPHINE, PARIS (16e)COMPTE RENDU

d'une

REUNION DU CONSEIL

tenue le

MERCREDI 15 FEVRIER 1967 à 10h15 & 15 heures

au

SIEGE DE L'OTANPORTE DAUPHINE, PARIS (16e)OTAN/NATO
Paris (16e)

NATO SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED AND PUBLIC DISCLOSED

I. STATEMENTS ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS (Restricted attendance)Mr. BROGIO

First of all may I welcome very warmly the distinguished guests from the capitals who have come to attend this particularly interesting meeting. There is Mr. Harmel from Belgium, Mr. Sølvehøj of Denmark, Mr. Schütz from Germany, Mr. Lupis from Italy, Mr. de Ranitz from the Netherlands, Mr. Jacobsen from Norway, Mr. Menemoglu from Turkey, Mr. George Thomson from the United Kingdom and Mr. Eugene Rostow from the United States.

Before opening the main discussion of today, I think that the Council will be very interested in listening to a statement by Mr. George Thomson. He has just attended the meetings which have had such a large echo in the Press and public opinion - the occasion of the visit of Mr. Kosygin to London. I am sure that the Council will be grateful to Mr. Thomson to give us just a very first-hand report about this important and very interesting talk.

Mr. THOMSON

Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to try to give my colleagues on the Council a few impressions of the visit of the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin, to the United Kingdom - a visit, which, you know, lasted eight days and ended on Monday of this week. I think we feel, looking back on it, that it was a most useful visit. It was first of all a constructive continuation of the bilateral approaches between Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the countries of the Western Alliance, which are being made at the moment by ourselves and by other NATO members, and I think the main importance of the visit was on the bilateral side. On the greater problems of international affairs, I think what the meeting did was to help to clarify the differences between the position of the Soviet Union and its allies and the position of the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Altogether, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the visit showed the value of this kind of bilateral contact, conducted as it was throughout, to use the words of my own Prime Minister, from a position four square within the framework of this Alliance of ours.

Mr. THOMSON (Contd)

Now, I thought perhaps a few personal impressions of Mr. Kosygin might be of interest to colleagues round the table. What he did give us, I think throughout the visit, both in public and in private, was an impressive and authoritative performance. It was the performance of a man who was very obviously in command of the subjects and very obviously in command of himself. Some of his public utterances, I think, have to be regarded as mandatory upon any Soviet leader travelling abroad and this was widely recognised by his listeners. His first public speech was in the Guildhall, the centre of the City of London and in that speech, I think, the thing that one had to notice in the setting was that the television cameras of Eurovision were trained on him and he was really, I think, speaking over the heads of the somewhat stunned aldermen and their ladies of the City of London, to his own constituents around the television sets in Moscow and in the Soviet Union. At the conference table itself and in the many informal private conversations, Mr. Kosygin showed himself skilful in presentation of his case. He obviously listened to what was being said to him and really only to a limited degree did he engage in the sort of formula answer which has been familiar to us from Soviet leaders in the past. He gave us the strong impression that while the Soviet Union maintains important lines of policy which are not to the interest of the West, he is also convinced of the need to develop co-operation in those fields where it is possible and that he does see possibilities increasing of such co-operation.

Mr. Chairman, on the German question, Mr. Kosygin had nothing useful or new to say. In addition to the usual points about the two Germanys, he made a good deal of play both in public and also in private about the electoral successes of the NDP. During the talks, we made a strong rebuttal of these accusations on the lines that the Foreign Secretary has repeated in public on a number of occasions. We made it clear to him that our policy in regard to German re-unification remains unchanged. We expressed to him our strong view that he was totally wrong in his assessment of the NDP results, and we expressed the view to him that we thought the Soviet Union would be better to abandon its present line and to set about trying to develop its relations with the Federal Republic.

Mr. THOMSON (Contd)

The question of a European Security Conference was also discussed and figures in the communiqué. We expressed our view to the Russians that while we are not against the European Security Conference in principle, at the right time and with the right sort of preparation, we do believe that such a conference, held at the wrong time and without adequate and lengthy preparation, could easily produce simply propaganda results and any conference that produced propaganda results instead of real results would do harm to the progress of the talks between East and West. Mr. Kosygin, in reply, said that he recognised that it was necessary to prepare properly, and he did not suppose that it would be possible to hold the conference this year, though he hoped that it might be held in 1968. He wanted a preparatory conference to meet as soon as possible. Mr. Kosygin was difficult towards the question of American participation, which we said was essential. Mr. Kosygin proposed in reply to our view that the question of American participation should be discussed by a preparatory conference or even by the full conference itself. We said that the United States must be in from the beginning. We also made it clear that the preparation needed for the conference included progress towards the solution of the German question. Now these differences, Mr. Chairman, as colleagues who studied the communiqué will know, are reflected in the communiqué, but what is important in our view is that the Russians agreed to our formula in the communiqué that the countries of Europe would be among the participants at a European Security Conference. I underline the word "among" which I think has caused a certain amount of interest; from our point of view in the battle over the drafting, the word "among" in this context acknowledges our point about the participation by members of NATO outside Europe, and therefore we regard this as an important point in the communiqué.

There was also, apart from the discussion of a European Security Conference, a general discussion about the respective views on the future of Europe. We made to the Russians a full statement of our views about developments in our continent and on relations between countries in Eastern and Western Europe. The Russians fully agreed on the importance of bilateral contacts and co-operation between European countries. They were anxious to get into the communiqué a reference to the immutability of the present boundaries in Europe but of course we on our side would not agree to this. There was a good deal of difficulty over the drafting of this section of the communiqué and in settling on the formula about respect for the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all the countries of Europe. Mr. Chairman, we made it clear in finally agreeing to this formula that this did not imply and must not be taken to imply any change in our position over the German question, and the Russians accepted that this was our position, and that this was the interpretation to be put on that section of the communiqué.

MR. THOMSON (Contd)

On non-proliferation, Mr. Kosygin spoke very strongly in favour of an agreement and seemed pretty confident that there would be one. He recognised that there was an important question of meeting the interests of non-nuclear states which acceded to the agreement. In private, as in public, he, of course, emphasised that Germany must not have access to nuclear weapons. We assured him that Germany herself had no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons; although this was one of Mr. Kosygin's main points, I think it is fair to say that he did not allow it to dominate the entire discussion on non-proliferation.

Apart from non-proliferation, we also explained our concern at the possible developments in the anti-ballistic missile system race and we explained our concern at the possible effects on the prospects for arms control and disarmament of major deployments of anti-ballistic missile systems. We asked Mr. Kosygin to give serious consideration to some kind of mutual understanding to halt the development of these systems. He said that the Russians had not taken a final decision; I might add that he was a good deal less impressive on this subject than on almost any other and this suggested to us that the Russians may genuinely not have made up their minds and therefore are putting out a good deal of smoke on this subject at the moment.

The other point in relation to the European area of subjects that was discussed was, of course, the proposal that was announced in the communiqué of a treaty of friendship and peaceful co-existence. This was a Russian initiative and Mr. Kosygin, when he announced the proposal, indicated that he wanted to add the words "and non-aggression", to have made it a treaty of friendship, peaceful co-existence and non-aggression. We made it clear that the inclusion of any reference to non-aggression would not be acceptable to us. Mr. Kosygin kept returning to this charge; there was an attempt in the drafting of the communiqué to bring it up again, but we remained, of course, in the position that we had taken. We expect to start discussions with the Russians soon on what should go into the treaty. I would like to emphasise to my colleagues at this Council that it will, of course, be concerned strictly with our bilateral relations, many aspects of which are noted in the communiqué, and, in our view, this treaty of friendship follows naturally from our policy, which we share with other members of the Alliance, of promoting bilateral relations, as I emphasised earlier, within the framework of the Alliance itself. We made it clear to Mr. Kosygin that the treaty would contain nothing taken to imply any weakening of our position on matters of concern to us and our allies, or any change, either actual or potential, in our attitude to NATO or our commitments to the Alliance. Mr. Kosygin said

Mr. THOMSON (Contd)

that he fully accepted this interpretation. Our thought in agreeing to the negotiation of such a treaty is that it will be a further step in the policy of developing bilateral links. We shall have in mind some of the ideas contained in our proposed declaration on Europe, which was discussed with this Council at some length during the winter, and some of those on developing relations with the East which are held in common by the members of NATO, as was confirmed in the discussions that we had at the NATO Council meeting in December.

I perhaps ought to add in this connection a word or two about the proposed long-term trade agreement. The Russians came forward with this suggestion and we have taken them up on it. Our basic interest in this matter, of course, lies in the fact that we have a substantial imbalance of trade at the moment with the Soviet Union. There is a gap of the order of £70 million in our trade with the Soviet Union and we are therefore anxious to do anything we can to encourage the Soviet Union to fill this gap by increasing their level of purchases in the United Kingdom. It's going to be interesting, I think, to see whether the Russians genuinely have in mind something which goes beyond the sort of agreement which we have at present. On the whole we are inclined to think that they will produce some new and useful ideas. I don't think I need add that we for our part have fully in mind our trading relations with other countries, and of course, our policy towards entry to the Common Market.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think that covers the European and Atlantic aspects of the topics that were discussed, but a great deal of the time of the meeting was taken up with discussing the war in Vietnam. The meeting with Mr. Kosygin itself coincided, as you know, with the Tet truce, the Vietnamese New Year truce and we were anxious to see if anything could be done to use the opportunity of this truce to bring about an advance towards a peaceful settlement.

The Russians seem to us to be genuinely concerned to get things moving towards a settlement and it was valuable to have their recognition of their involvement in the search for a solution recorded in the communiqué. As for the steps to be taken, the Russian views were, of course, a good deal less forthcoming than we would have wished. They stuck to the North Vietnamese offer - the offer made by the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister - which they said that they regarded as wholly genuine, that talks between North Vietnam and the United States could start, if the bombing stopped. They made a good deal of the point that the North Vietnamese recognised that a military solution was out of the question and that it would have to be a political solution.

Mr. THOMSON (Contd)

The British Prime Minister and the Soviet Prime Minister worked very long and very hard on this question. There were a number of sleepless nights out of it and I think there is a feeling, on our side, that we came very close to finding a formula that might have led to advance towards peace in Vietnam.

The one little thing that was missing was any sort of concession or offer from the North Vietnamese side that would have allowed the ideas that were produced about a machinery for advancing towards peace going into operation and it was in the absence of that sign from Hanoi that I think we have to record our failure to obtain progress at this stage; and it's against that background of that failure of any sign from Hanoi that one has to view the resumption of hostilities in Vietnam. I might, perhaps, add that, in these discussions, we were in close touch, of course, with the United States and from them we had every possible help in regard to creating the conditions that would have allowed a settlement to be advanced.

One of the difficulties that was obviously very much in the mind of the Soviet Prime Minister, on Vietnam and, indeed, over the range of international issues, was the situation in China. We were very struck by the fact that, not only in private, but even in his television broadcast, Mr. Kosygin was ready to express himself so frankly about the situation in China and to make it clear that he had little hope of mending relations with China in the near future - and none at all, as long as Mao remained as the leader of China.

Mr. Chairman, I hope I've not delayed unduly the discussion of the main and important item that we gathered here together to deal with, but I think that summarises my impressions of Mr. Kosygin's visit to London.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much. Mr. Rostow?

Mr. ROSTOW

I might simply add that, from our point of view, these enormously useful conversations - as the President said in the very brief, but very important, statement which was issued in Washington the day before yesterday - that, as Mr. Thomson said, there was no response from Hanoi, which means, not that Hanoi said "No", but that Hanoi said nothing; so that we must realise that the door is open and remains open.

MR. de LEUSSE

M. le Président, un mot seulement en remerciant M. Thomson de son intervention. Il a fait allusion à la proposition que les Soviétiques avait faite au Gouvernement britannique de signer un traité d'amitié entre les deux pays. Je voudrais simplement dire en passant, au Conseil, que nous avons été nous aussi objet de la même proposition du côté soviétique il y a quelques mois.

MR. BROSIO

Est-ce qu'il y a d'autres questions ou commentaires?

I think the Council should be grateful to Mr. George Thomson for these very exhaustive and interesting first-hand reports about his talks. The matters handled in these talks were of the first importance from the European and from the Atlantic and from the more general point of view. This will certainly be a matter for study and active reflection on the side of the governments and maybe that may give the opportunity to this Council to discuss again at the first opportunity some of the matters of general interest which have been considered in these very interesting talks. I think that for the time being we may just conclude this part of our meeting by expressing our thanks to Mr. George Thomson again.

Now we may pass to Item II of the Agenda. May I point out immediately that one delegation has asked that a verbatim record of our meeting this morning be issued, so I would ask if the Council has no objection and if there are no objections to a verbatim record I would give the necessary instructions that the record be kept. It is so understood.

I don't think I have to stress the importance of the subject we are going to discuss today. The very presence of so many distinguished guests from the capitals is a confirmation of its importance. By the way may I welcome to our table M. de la Granville who wasn't there just before and I am very pleased to see him. So that I have nothing to say about underlining his importance.

Our task is to examine ways and means of putting into effect the resolution adopted by the Ministers on the future task of the Alliance. This resolution has been circulated officially as document C-M(66)145 so I don't think there is any need to read it. This task of putting into effect the resolution implies first of all the definition in terms of the resolution itself, and I quote "...the most appropriate possible procedures for fulfilling its mandate", given by the Ministers and also of subjects which should be identified and analysed in the course of these exercises - a matter of procedure and a

MR. BROSIO (Contd)

matter of substance. Both on the substance and on the procedures the Council has before it a paper from the United Kingdom Delegation and also a paper which I myself circulated to the delegations. This is PO/67/89.

For my part I don't think I have anything to add for the time being to what I suggested in the paper I just mentioned and it seems to me that both these papers, to which others may be perhaps added later, may offer a useful starting point for the Council's discussion. Whether or not we can arrive today at certain decisions either on procedure or substance will be revealed by our discussion itself. So it seems to me appropriate that the shape of this study explained first to the Council is further ideas and conceptions and so I am proposing to ask Mr. Minister Harmel to be so kind as to initiate our discussion.

II. COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

M. HARMEL

M. le Président je ne résiste pas d'abord au plaisir de vous dire combien il m'est agréable ce matin de travailler sous votre présidence et avec le concours de nos collègues Messieurs les représentants permanents que j'ai retrouvés autour de cette table.

Nous nous trouvons donc devant la résolution qui a été prise par le Conseil atlantique le 17 décembre. Dans ses termes même elle nous commande deux devoirs : d'abord l'analyse des événements politiques survenus depuis la signature du traité en vue de déterminer leur influence sur les relations internationales et sur l'Alliance elle-même, c'est le texte; ensuite, et c'est encore le texte, sur la base de cette analyse la description des tâches futures de l'Alliance et les mesures à prendre pour y faire face afin de renforcer l'Alliance en tant qu'élément d'une paix durable. Enfin la résolution terminait par des suggestions de procédure. Pour effectuer cette double étude les directives du Conseil sont : d'abord qu'il faut les mener à un niveau politique élevé, ensuite en recourant aux méthodes les plus appropriées à l'exécution du mandat. Voilà le point de départ. Nous sommes donc réunis pour assurer la mise en oeuvre du mandat et je voudrais me permettre trois remarques préliminaires.

En y ayant bien réfléchi, je crois devoir rappeler que c'est sûrement un trait de sagesse de la part des auteurs du Pacte atlantique d'avoir imposé qu'après vingt ans chaque membre de l'Alliance ait à réfléchir sur ses motifs d'une adhésion continuée à l'Alliance. Mais je crois que c'est un fait plus remarquable encore, et sans doute unique dans l'histoire des Alliances, que l'unanimité de ses membres ait décidé le 17 décembre dernier de mener cette réflexion en commun et d'apprécier à quinze les étapes parcourues, afin d'y ajouter pour l'avenir des objectifs communs. Il y a dans cette double démarche d'aggiornamento,

M. HARMEL (Suite)

celle d'il y a vingt ans et plus encore celle d'aujourd'hui, un signe de progrès pour les institutions internationales, il est bon que régulièrement elles soient amenées à se repenser pour s'ajuster aux circonstances.

C'était une première remarque préliminaire. Je voudrais en faire une seconde : quoique notre pays ait pris en décembre dernier des initiatives dans la matière qui nous occupe ce matin, nous n'avons pas cru devoir déposer de document de travail dans la matière actuelle avant la présente réunion. Bien sûr, comme chaque délégation certainement, nous avons réfléchi, mais je dois m'excuser de n'avoir pas pu comme en décembre dernier soumettre nos idées à la majorité des gouvernements, et c'est pourquoi aujourd'hui nous avons préféré apporter verbalement nos suggestions. Depuis un instant j'ai le texte dactylographié et il est bien entendu que si les autres délégations trouvent quelque intérêt aux idées que nous allons exprimer, nous pourrions communiquer ensuite ces idées par écrit.

Troisième remarque préliminaire : c'est que de toute façon notre proposition d'aujourd'hui sera très simple et elle sera de pure procédure. Elle visera à exécuter scrupuleusement le mandat reçu, sans nous amener à prendre quelque décision que ce soit qui touche pour le moment au fond politique du sujet.

Ces remarques étant faites, voici comment nous voyons la mise en oeuvre du mandat. D'abord, nous croyons qu'il y a lieu de distinguer dans son exécution deux phases : la première phase serait consacrée à l'analyse des faits, des événements, la deuxième aurait pour mission de dégager les orientations, les objectifs et les méthodes inspirés par l'analyse des faits. On peut imaginer qu'entre-temps le rapport intérimaire qui a été prévu par la résolution pour la réunion du Conseil du mois de juin, et qui serait donc soumis aux ministres, pourrait s'il échéait - pour autant que les travaux de cette première phase puissent être déjà terminés à ce moment-là, ou bien à l'inverse à moins que l'on ait déjà abordé la deuxième - conduire de toute manière au mois de juin à un moment de réflexion politique, qui est prévu par la résolution et qui certainement orientera de façon importante la réflexion de la deuxième phase. Il va de soi qu'on ne saurait tirer au cordeau une ligne de démarcation entre les deux phases que je viens d'indiquer ; elles sont peut-être exprimées d'une façon trop abstraite et, de toute manière, la différence ou la ligne de démarcation entre ces deux phases ne se situera donc pas nécessairement au moment de la réunion des Ministres.

M. HARMEL (Suite)

La deuxième idée concerne la méthode, nous croyons que les travaux de ces deux phases seraient le plus opportunément confiés, sous la présidence du Secrétaire Général, à un groupe de travail et de consultation, évidemment temporaire, où chaque pays déléguerait, selon les termes mêmes de la résolution, des personnalités au niveau politique élevé de son choix.

Ainsi donc la proposition que je vais maintenant expliciter dans les quelques éléments que je viens d'indiquer ne concerne que la méthode. Je voudrais dire quelques mots de la première phase, quelques mots de la seconde, et puis quelques mots du Groupe de travail.

Sur la première phase, comme la Délégation permanente du Royaume-Uni l'a judicieusement souligné dans la note qu'elle a bien voulu distribuer, nous ne croyons pas que la première phase d'analyse des événements puisse consister en une étude historique donc rétrospective. Il s'agit au contraire d'une analyse de situations actuelles dans leurs éléments les plus caractéristiques, comparées aux circonstances politiques ayant prévalu lors de la signature du Traité. Il faut procéder d'abord à l'inventaire et à l'analyse de ces événements et situations nouvelles et remarquables qui concernent l'Alliance avant, nous semble-t-il, d'en tirer si possible, des conclusions communes. Certainement, dès maintenant, chacun pourrait fournir sa propre liste d'événements caractéristiques, mais nous croyons qu'il appartiendra au Groupe de travail de l'arrêter définitivement dans son sein. Mais, à titre d'exemple et selon nous, il serait sans doute difficile de passer à côté des analyses suivantes : il en est une première à laquelle, pour notre part, nous attachons assez de prix (elle est liée à la Charte des Nations unies, à l'organisation de la sécurité collective mondiale) : est-ce que la sécurité collective mondiale a progressé pendant les vingt dernières années ? et on peut certainement s'interroger sur le rôle que les accords régionaux y jouent, ou y ont joué et y jouent encore à l'heure actuelle.

Un deuxième thème à côté duquel il semble que l'on ne puisse pas ne pas passer, c'est le développement et l'évolution du bloc communiste, l'arrêt de l'expansion communiste à l'Ouest, au contraire son extension à l'Est et tout le problème de l'insécurité asiatique.

Un autre thème : le développement et l'évolution du monde atlantique et particulièrement, en son sein, la solidification européenne occidentale.

M. HARMEL (Suite)

Un autre thème : l'évolution du tiers monde et la prise de conscience du problème du sous-développement, la fin des empires coloniaux, les responsabilités sociales des peuples atlantiques. Déjà, dans une note d'un intérêt considérable, M. le Secrétaire Général a suggéré nombre d'autres points susceptibles d'analyse, et il n'est pas douteux qu'à son inspiration, le Groupe de travail veuille également étudier les événements internes à l'Alliance tels que l'état des relations entre ses membres, les relations de l'Alliance avec les Parlements, l'Alliance dans ses relations avec l'opinion publique. Nous croyons donc qu'il y a un certain nombre d'événements caractéristiques et actuels assez différents des circonstances qui prévalaient en 1949, qui méritent une analyse qui n'a pas de caractère académique, qui aurait un caractère politique évident et qui, dans la comparaison des événements actuels avec le passé, permettrait de marquer les points forts de la réflexion politique tout à fait contemporaine, et faciliterait dès lors le dégagement, si je puis ainsi m'exprimer, des objectifs communs à l'ensemble de nos peuples.

La deuxième phase, une fois dégagée des lignes générales résultant des analyses que nous venons d'indiquer, le Groupe aurait alors à mettre en oeuvre le troisième paragraphe de la résolution. Je cite : "~~les tâches futures de l'Alliance,~~ le renforcement de l'Alliance en tant qu'élément de paix durable, le perfectionnement des consultations atlantiques au sein de l'Alliance, y compris entre partenaires européens, et c'est là que, selon notre espoir, serait étudiée notamment l'idée que nous avons exprimée comme ceci au mois de décembre dernier : "peut-être, disions-nous, sera-t-il possible alors de donner à l'idée européenne une consistance au sein de notre Alliance sans attendre que soient créées des institutions politiques européennes qui demeurent notre ferme objectif".

Ainsi donc, essaie-t-on de couvrir, avec un peu d'ordre, les matières qui étaient décrites dans le mandat, et la proposition est donc faite par nous de distinguer, pour autant que ce soit possible, la phase de la description et de l'analyse, et la phase de la construction. Qui procéderait à ces travaux ? De quelle manière seraient-ils aménagés ? C'est ici le dernier sujet, le Groupe de consultation. Et ici, je voudrais faire cinq remarques : d'abord, nous disons un groupe de consultation et d'étude, qui serait constitué aussitôt et composé de membres que chaque gouvernement, s'il le désire - sans que chaque gouvernement doive nécessairement s'imposer la participation à ce travail, encore que ce soit souhaitable - s'il le désire, lui désignerait. Deuxième remarque : nous croyons que le Groupe ne saurait être bien présidé que s'il l'était par M. le Secrétaire Général. Le

M. HARMEI (Suite)

Secrétariat international en assurerait le Secrétariat, et le Secrétariat, comme les délégations nationales servant de soutien aux membres nationaux du Groupe, serait, si nécessaire, renforcé.

Il s'agit en effet d'un travail assez approfondi, de courte durée, puisque normalement il doit se terminer à la fin de cette année-ci et qui demande par conséquent des moyens humains dont il n'est pas certain que ni nos délégations permanentes, ni le Secrétariat international puissent les assurer en supplément sans un certain renforcement provisoire. Troisième idée, et c'est peut-être celle sur laquelle je dois le plus préciser notre pensée, il s'agirait d'une façon tout à fait spécifique d'un Groupe d'études - bien sûr, ses membres recevraient-ils leurs instructions de leur gouvernement - mais il conviendrait que le Groupe cherche dans son travail en commun une certaine homogénéité ; il faudrait qu'il dispose d'une certaine souplesse d'action, il serait probablement prudent qu'il ne rédige pas de verbatim de telle manière que l'échange des réflexions soit ouvert, il serait libre de sa propre approche des problèmes, et, s'il le fallait, il devrait pouvoir faire apparaître dans ses rapports par exemple la diversité des interprétations des événements. De toute manière, il n'aurait pour mission que de préparer les options à prendre par le Conseil ministériel et même, si son Président l'estimait nécessaire, conviendrait-il peut-être qu'à un certain moment le Conseil des Représentants permanents soit amené à préparer, sur la base des rapports proposés par le Groupe de travail, les réunions plénières ministérielles.

Quatrième idée, en tant que Groupe de travail, nous croyons que celui-ci ne pourrait identifier ses méthodes ni sa discipline avec celles d'une instance de décision. C'est pourquoi, même s'il était, comme c'est probable, composé en totalité ou en grande majorité de MM. les Représentants permanents, il ne se confondrait donc pas avec la réunion du Conseil de ces représentants. En réalité, nous croyons qu'il faudrait s'inspirer là d'une autre méthode souple déjà utilisée au sein de l'Alliance, à savoir celle des Comités MacNamara.

Enfin, cinquième suggestion, c'est le Groupe qui établirait sa propre procédure. Il devrait pouvoir constituer s'il le lui paraissait nécessaire des sous-groupes, il devrait, si c'était nécessaire à son information, pouvoir convoquer des spécialistes ou des personnalités, et il ne devrait pas être exclu, selon nous, qu'il confie des études particulières à des institutions spécialisées s'il le trouvait opportun.

M. HARMEL (Suite)

Pour indiquer enfin le rythme et la méthode d'un groupe de travail semblable et le caractère approfondi des échanges de vues qui devraient pouvoir s'y donner cours, nous suggérons que le Groupe tienne, environ toutes les six semaines, des sessions relativement longues de quatre ou cinq jours. Nous ne voulons pas pousser plus loin notre réflexion sur la méthode, nous avons essayé de suivre pas à pas la résolution du 17 décembre, mais nous sommes tout à fait persuadés que l'expérience de ce matin aidera tout particulièrement M.M. les Représentants permanents à ajuster la méthode que nous préconisons. C'est donc très volontiers, M. le Président, que , pour ouvrir sur une proposition concrète la mise en oeuvre du mandat, nous avons pris les premiers la parole ce matin.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup M. le Ministre, je ne m'attendais pas à moins. Cela a été certainement une contribution précieuse aux travaux du Conseil et tout le monde aura cette impression. Dans sa clarté, dans sa simplicité, cette contribution révèle une réflexion approfondie et certainement sera un point de départ extrêmement utile, soit sur la procédure et soit aussi dans ses indications générales de fond.

May I now ask Mr. George Thomson to speak.

Mr. THOMSON

Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by expressing sincere gratitude to M. Harmel, first for his initiative in making the proposal which led to the Council Resolution of 16th December and then for coming here today to follow up that initiative and that Resolution by giving us his views in greater detail as to how it can most constructively be executed. I am sure that it's right that at the end of a year of intense activity and change for our Alliance we should take stock of the position which we have reached and assess the tasks which face us in the future. For that reason, I think you Mr. Chairman have provided us as Secretary General with a particularly valuable paper about these problems, full of ideas which we are studying with the greatest possible interest.

We find ourselves, I think, in the Alliance at a moment of transition for various reasons. I would only utter, I think, this cautionary word that despite this being a moment of transition, despite the uncertainties about the future, I don't think we should under-estimate the degree of adaptability and the degree of decisiveness that this Alliance has shown during the past twelve months, faced with the challenge of changing circumstances both inside the Alliance and in the international environment which surrounds the Alliance.

Mr. THOMSON (Contd)

We have first of all taken the decision to move the headquarters of the Alliance and to regroup the main political and military directing bodies together in a new relationship at Brussels. We have taken decisions about the streamlining of the military structure of the Alliance. But I think it does follow that from these important decisions we ought to consider the implications of the move for the structure of the Alliance itself. And we should also consider the tasks which the new regrouped and I hope streamlined organization should best employ itself.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I think we are all conscious that there is a new atmosphere in East/West relations and that the Alliance should not concern itself exclusively with defence and deterrents, but, also, I would hope increasingly with détente.

And then thirdly, it is, I think, generally recognised that the voice of Europe should be heard as strongly as possible in the counsels of the Alliance. This in no way implies any weakening of the essential transatlantic links of which this Alliance is the supreme expression. But I think it would be in accordance with the wish of all member governments that we should ~~explore ways and means of increasing European consultation within~~ the Alliance and taking account of specifically European interests where these can be identified.

These, I take it, were the main objectives which lay behind the resolution of the 16th December. Mr. Harmel has been suggesting to us, if I understood his very interesting speech right, that we should approach the problem in two phases: first of all we should analyse the present situation, taking account of the changes which have occurred since the formation of the Alliance, and then, secondly, on the basis of that analysis of these changes we should set about identifying the future tasks of the Alliance. I agree that these are both essential elements of the study on which we are embarking. We must certainly have well in our minds the political background to any new tasks which we undertake. I have already referred to some of the main changes in the political background to our present discussions. Most of them are, I think, familiar to all of us and I should have thought that it would be a comparatively swift and simple task to draw up the analysis of them. This is something, indeed, which we might entrust, Mr. Chairman, to the International Staff in the first instance, with appropriate help from national delegations. What I am suggesting is, in our view, we need not seek to draw too sharp or too logical a distinction between the analysis phase and the action phase.

Mr. THOMSON (Contd)

It is important, I think, that the Alliance facing these changing circumstances, with the eyes of many people somewhat sceptically on the Alliance, as we must recognise these days, that we show ourselves capable of steady progress. There seem to us to be certain tasks on which I would have thought that we can reach early agreement and for which we can begin to consider the appropriate action without further delay, without waiting for the final conclusions of the analysis. We don't need a preliminary analysis before embarking on certain particular tasks. The other tasks will, as I think Mr. Harmel suggests, become apparent as a result of the analysis. In this way I should hope that even before the June meeting we should be able to show that the Alliance is taking lively action in certain fields and not just reviewing the situation with which it is confronted. I think for public presentational purposes, Mr. Chairman, it is rather important that by the June meeting we should have more than a review of past events to show for our work but in a number of concrete instances some progress in terms of action.

Looking to the future, it doesn't seem to us that we need spend too much time on a redefinition of the aims and purposes of the Alliance. We are, I think, all well aware of the rôle which the Alliance plays in binding us together, not only for our common security but also for our common political purposes. The decisions which have been taken over the past year have shown that we all intend to continue to make the Alliance a reality, even though we shall not all take part in the integrated defence organization. For the same reason, I would suggest that we need not fix our eyes too sharply on the date of 1969; admittedly from that date it becomes possible for any member country to withdraw from the Alliance under Article 13 of the Treaty, but we ought to remember that already in 1954 the nine Powers which took part in the London Conference in October of that year, affirmed their intention to regard the Alliance as being of indefinite duration. More recently, there have been reaffirmations of the view that the Alliance should continue after 1969. My own Government, for one, Mr. Chairman, certainly intends that this should be so and have no apprehensions about the similar views of the Allies.

My own feeling, therefore, on this point would be that our main purpose in giving effect to the Resolution of 16th December should be to identify the most important specific tasks which face us over the months and years ahead, and this of course is one purpose of the paper which the United Kingdom Government have circulated for today's discussion. Now I don't pretend that the items listed in that paper are by any means exhaustive and comprehensive.

Mr. THOMSON (Contd)

We are very ready to consider any other suggestions. I would suggest, however, that our task is not to try to produce an exhaustive list of all the aims and purposes of the Alliance; it should rather be to isolate those matters which we all agree to be of supreme and special importance and then to consider how our attention and resources, which after all, are not unlimited, should be concentrated on achieving these priorities.

The list which we have circulated in our paper also raises another general point. It will be seen that it contains items of military as well as of political significance. We believe that it would be quite unrealistic for an Alliance of which defence and deterrence remain among the main purposes to give the impression that it was now solely concerned with political and non-military matters. In saying this, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasise that we are not for a moment suggesting that this exercise should deal with military organization or duplicate existing machinery of the Defence Planning Committee of the Nuclear Planning Group. But there are, I think, certain broad defence questions which necessarily have important political implications such as those mentioned in our paper. Moreover, it would not be necessary that all member governments should take part in the study of all the items, military as well as political. It is I think for each government to decide in which aspects of the study it wants to take part and we should seek to make our organization suitably open-ended for this purpose.

Now this brings me, Mr. Chairman, to the procedure for these studies on which Mr. Harmel has outlined such interesting ideas. We also have some suggestions in the paper which the Secretary General has circulated and to which I have already referred, and some other suggestions on procedure in our own paper. I think, looking at Mr. Harmel's speech, the Secretary General's paper and at our paper, it is I think common to all these that this exercise should be conducted with the authority of the Council. This is agreed. I think it is also common ground that the procedure should be flexible and in its early stages it should be informal and without commitment by governments. If one is going to try to do some new and fresh thinking, I think it is important to give that room for manoeuvre to those who are engaged in the operation. I suggest also that there would be advantage in using the practice of small Sub-Groups with national rapporteurs as was successfully done during the past year in another context. There doesn't seem to be much difference between the two ways in which this arrangement can be formulated.

Mr. THOMSON (Contd)

We for our part have suggested that the Council of Permanent Representatives with occasional Ministerial Meetings would be the way to do it. We would certainly understand that for the preparatory work the Permanent Representatives would be able to meet informally and without committing their governments. Now the alternative, as I understood it, suggested by Mr Harmel is that a Special Group should be set up whose members would be appointed by governments but I suppose might in practice largely be the Permanent Representatives, but there would of course be the understanding that the Special Group would be able to work on its own responsibility in a more flexible way than the Council, but equally that all drafts and recommendations from this Special Group would require endorsement by the Council at either Permanent Representative or Ministerial level. If this kind of formulation were generally preferred we for our part could see no objection to it. In any case, I agree entirely with Mr. Harmel that the work should be done under the Chairmanship of the Secretary General.

But in order to provide more time for our overworked and overburdened Permanent Representatives, if they're going to carry out this additional and very important work, we believe that it would be worthwhile having a look at the present working of the Council and that there are a number of suggestions for streamlining the work of the Council and easing the burden on the Permanent Representatives that lie within our power now without even any need for formal decision. It seems to us, for example, that the working of the Council can be considerably compressed by arranging that a large number of the more or less routine matters could be settled first of all perhaps out of Committee altogether. Or secondly by meetings of the deputies of the Permanent Representatives. We see no reason why this sort of procedural improvement should not be introduced now without waiting for the next Ministerial Meeting in June.

I commend these ideas to you, Mr, Chairman, as Secretary General and to my colleagues around the table as means by which we can give out Permanent Representatives rather more thinking time for tackling these very important tasks that we are going to lay on them. Similarly, once the Council or its subordinate bodies have formulated questions on which it would be useful to have outside advice, we could, I think, certainly consider whether such questions should be remitted to appropriate outside bodies or even to outside individuals for their advice. One such body, whose advice we might perhaps seek in the view of the British Government, is the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. For I believe we all share the objective of interesting parliamentary opinion as closely as possible in the affairs of the Alliance.

Mr. THOMSON (Contd)

And we mustn't ignore the fact that one of the important questions for us for the Alliance in these changing circumstances is to maintain an active public opinion in support of the rôle of the Alliance. Mr. Chairman, I would simply conclude by saying that I think that these tasks which we are now discussing are of immense importance for the future of the Alliance. I think in many ways the success with which we shall decide these procedures and carry them out is going to make a most important contribution to the future effectiveness of the Alliance and in making a contribution to the effectiveness of the Alliance, it will therefore make a very considerable contribution to the solving of a number of very difficult international problems. It therefore seems to me that in tackling this we are in fact deciding how in the years that lie ahead the Alliance can most effectively contribute to the rate of progress towards a more durable world order and towards a world order in which the nations of the world will be able to face the problems of world peace without the present burdens and dangers of the arms race.

Mr. Secretary General, can I perhaps just add that for the convenience of my colleagues I should be glad to follow Mr. Harmel's example and circulate the text of what I've said so that the procedural proposals in it may be studied at leisure?

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Thomson, that would be very helpful indeed. Mr. Schutz, please.

Mr. SCHÜTZ

Mr. Chairman, the decision taken by the Ministerial Meeting on 16th December, which is the subject of our discussion today, gives us an opportunity to proceed to a thorough stocktaking of the Alliance and define its future tasks and possibilities, and to see how the Alliance can be adapted to these tasks. I would like to thank the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Harmel, for having taken the initiative for this useful and necessary work, and I would like to also thank him for his helpful presentation today.

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In our deliberations ~~we~~ will extend over the whole year, and the final report is not to be submitted until the end of this year, ~~and~~ our meeting today is, I think, only of an introductory and preparatory nature. It will obviously be our first task to agree on the subjects of the studies which are to be carried out in implementation of the Ministerial decision, as well as on the procedure to be applied. Both the British Delegation and the Secretary General have already submitted proposals to this end and have thus done extremely useful preparatory work for this meeting.

Mr. SCHÜTZ (Contd)

Before I make some observations, Mr. Chairman, on these proposals and suggest some subjects which should be studied in the opinion of the German Government, I should like to emphasise the preliminary character of the consideration I am going to offer.

Only in the course of the studies will it be possible to see which subjects will have to be studied in detail. It will therefore probably be neither necessary nor advisable to draw up a very detailed list of subjects. In particular it doesn't appear advisable to me to place these studies on such a broad basis, that they comprise all aspects of the activities of the Alliance. Rather I feel that we should confine ourselves to the most important and most urgent subjects.

The following conclusions emerge from these general observations. While I am in full agreement with Minister Thomson's remarks, it doesn't appear advisable to me to deal in the framework of these studies with the military questions coming under the Terms of Reference of the Defence Planning Committee and other NATO Committees, for example the bodies responsible for co-operation in the field of armament production. We should concentrate ourselves on political problems and not deal with the question of force planning and strategy with which the Defence Planning Committee is dealing and which should now be the responsibility of our Defence Ministers and secondly, in identifying the political subjects we should concentrate our attention on those questions which directly concern the Treaty area of the Alliance and which are or may be in the future of decisive importance for East/West relations. Let me make it quite clear that in the view of my Government the bloc-to-bloc approach is neither advisable nor feasible and that it will be a matter for the individual NATO countries to make use of the results of the joint analysis in their national foreign policy; and it will be known, Mr. Chairman, the present German Government has a policy of its own in this respect.

Thirdly, we should not enter into discussion of day-to-day political events which are, or should in any event, be the subject of political consultation in NATO. We should rather look ahead and deal with the problems and tasks in the years to come.

Fourthly, we agree with your view, Mr. Chairman, that it might be useful to carry out the studies in two phases. I believe that it might be useful if we analyse first of all the situation and political tasks of the Alliance. This might be done in the period between now and the June Conference. In the second phase we might try to draw the conclusion from these analyses and examine their effects on the Alliance.

Mr. SCHUTZ (Contd)

Mr. Chairman, proceeding from these general observations, it appears to me that the following subjects should be examined in the following order.

One, the present and anticipated future political objectives and the strategy of the Soviet Union. A study of this subject which is in substance identical with the first subject proposed by the Secretary General, seems to me to provide a basis for all further studies which will be carried out in implementation of the decisions taken by the Ministers on 16th December, 1966 and, by the way, the future policies of NATO countries are of course also bound to have repercussions from the policy of the Soviet Union, and I think that a study of this subject need not take too much time considering that valuable studies have already been undertaken previously.

The second point, the field of European security with special reference to the possibilities of gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides of the demarcation line of Central Europe. This subject, which in substance has also been proposed by you, Mr. Chairman, and which follows on an idea which has been reflected in the final Communiqué of the Ministerial meeting in December should comprise all those problems which must be solved in order to arrive at a lasting peaceful order. Of special and topical importance is in our view the question of the balanced revision of force levels on both sides of the demarcation line which is closely related to the question of the American and British forces stationed in Germany.

Third, the meaning of détente and the maintenance of the military balance between East and West as a necessary prerequisite to a successful détente policy.

Fourth, conclusions to be drawn from the studies referred in paragraphs 1 and 2.- I will circulate my remarks also, Mr. President, afterwards - about the tasks and organization of the Alliance.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to include in this subject all these problems which, according to your proposal, should be examined in the second phase of the studies. A particularly important aspect concerns the question of which special rôle the European NATO partners can play within the Atlantic Alliance. This subject should also include other questions affecting the structure and the organization of the Alliance as well as the procedures of political co-operation.

Mr. SCHÜTZ (Contd)

In our opinion these questions should be examined at the end and not at the beginning of the work. These suggestions for subjects to be studied, which as I said before represent only preliminary considerations from our Government, need not necessarily mean that we intend to restrict the study to these subjects. But as far as the procedure is concerned the proposals made by our Chairman, the Secretary General, appear acceptable to us. However, it should be decided from case to case which rank the national representatives in the Working Group established to deal with the various subjects should have. I think it is in the line with this proposal and with the remark of Minister Harmel to submit the following practical suggestion for your consideration. Why don't we ask APAG or an APAG-like Group under the Chairmanship of the Secretary General to serve as our instrument for this purpose and to report from time to time to the Council if this is possible in the presence of high-ranking officials from our capitals. In our case this would be an ideal solution. APAG members are clearly familiar with the views of the government, they can be made available more easily than other high officials, they are accustomed to similar problems and tasks and their schedules and discussions can be postponed for a while.

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen, the North Atlantic Alliance which we are very anxious to see consolidated and as our Government declaration from December said, developed in keeping with the present day requirements, is today as in the past the basis for the freedom and well-being of our peoples. This is the conviction also of the new German Government and will I believe be the main conclusion which we shall draw from our deliberations. Thank you very much.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Schütz. Now would Mr. Menemengioğlu take the floor, please.

Mr. MENEMENÇOĞLU

Mr. Chairman, I wish to begin by joining others who preceded me in paying tribute to the distinguished Foreign Minister of Belgium as well as to his Government for their constructive and imaginative initiative which led to the resolution now before us.

We are of the opinion that the questions raised in the text of the resolution are both timely and appropriate and wish to place on our records here and now our firm intention to co-operate fully with all our partners in formulating proposals for the further ~~sanctioning~~ and increasing the solidarity of our Alliance in the period ahead of us.

Stamphand

Mr. MENEMENÖĞLU

We have heard today in the form of preliminary suggestions by Mr. Harmel the further development of his ideas on certain substantive and procedural aspects of our work. We also have before us the working papers of the Secretary General and of the United Kingdom Delegation and we have taken note of the statements made here today. All these, of course, will be studied with due care by the Turkish Government. The Turkish Authorities also wish to note with deep appreciation efforts made previously by other member governments in the same general direction as the Council has now laid down in its Resolution of 16th December, 1966. In particular we wish to mention the letter of March 11th, 1965 and its Addenda, circulated by the Canadian Delegation as a preliminary proposal in this respect.

Sir, although our brief remarks at this juncture ~~would~~ *will* be of a very general and preliminary character, we wish to reaffirm our satisfaction that our Terms of Reference do not require a minute analysis of events and happenings in the past. Our directives would rather have us lean on the essentials of past and present experiences and developments as a basis for the study of ways and means for rendering more effective and more appropriately-suited to present day problems, an Alliance which ~~has been successful on its main objective, that of preserving~~ peace in freedom and dignity upon the area entrusted to it. It goes without saying that the effectiveness of an Alliance like ours depends primarily on the solidarity of its members and solidarity has its roots in the common evaluation and understanding of the common interests. It is also natural that our proposals should keep in mind the importance of preserving and further strengthening the individual sense of security and confidence which each member is entitled to share as a result of our collective determination embodied in Article 5 of the Treaty.

We are also gratified that our Terms of Reference do not envisage a priori any structural or institutional changes in reaching for the goals set before us. For example, although much can be done to improve the practice of political consultation within the Alliance, we can say even at this early stage of our work, that the necessary means for this improvement can be found in the existing channels and in the methods suggested over ten years ago by the Committee of Three. What may be necessary might be an increased willingness to take full advantage of existing channels with due respect, of course, to the equality of all members. If our present work could induce such an improvement it would indeed have served a highly constructive purpose. Among the suggestions which we have heard today there is one which we would like to touch upon at this stage, and that is the place to be allotted to the military questions within the Study Group.

NATO SECRET
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Mr. LUPIS

"Monsieur le Président,

Lorsque le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Belgique, M. Harmel, lors de la dernière réunion du Conseil Atlantique, a eu l'occasion de nous présenter sa proposition, c'est-à-dire que l'Alliance étudie le problème ~~des tâches futures~~ qui l'attendent, le Gouvernement italien a accueilli, par la bouche de M. Fanfani, cette proposition avec la plus grande satisfaction. Comme toutes les organisations politiques qui ont vraiment une vitalité considérable, l'Alliance Atlantique a toujours eu devant ses yeux ce problème: être constamment à jour, être toujours prête à faire face aux tâches qui se présentent dans une situation toujours en pleine évolution. S'il n'en était pas ainsi, si l'Alliance était un instrument rigide, incapable de s'adapter et incapable d'évoluer, nous finirions par douter nous-mêmes des possibilités qu'a cette Alliance de répondre pleinement aux exigences les plus profondes, les plus senties de nos peuples.

L'Italie a toujours été de cet avis, permettez-moi de vous dire que vraiment l'Italie a même été un promoteur dans ce sens. Voilà pourquoi les propositions de M. Harmel trouvent chez nous un écho extrêmement favorable.

Qu'il suffise de vous rappeler les efforts de la Commission des Trois Sages, dont faisait partie M. Martino, à l'époque Ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Italie, et les propositions visant à approfondir les consultations politiques, que les Ministres des Affaires étrangères d'Italie ont eu l'occasion de développer au sein du Conseil Atlantique à plusieurs reprises.

Les problèmes qui se présentaient au moment où a été rédigé ce rapport des Trois Sages, qui est maintenant considéré comme un document historique, étaient évidemment différents dans le fond de la situation actuelle. Aujourd'hui on peut dire qu'il y a une certaine détente en Europe qui peu à peu passe, disons, des souhaits à des réalités politiques. Et nous ne pouvons pas faire abstraction des conséquences qui découlent dans le domaine militaire des progrès techniques et du nombre des pays ayant une puissance militaire nucléaire, et de l'ensemble des réalisations qui ont accompagné la renaissance économique de notre Europe. Il faut enfin que l'on tienne compte des nouvelles possibilités sociales, des nouvelles possibilités économiques qui sont intimement liées au développement de la technologie toujours en progrès.

Voilà pourquoi l'exigence essentielle de la solidarité entre alliés, la recherche d'une entente et d'un rapprochement constant entre nous pour que cette Alliance soit constamment tenue, disons, à jour, ainsi que l'étude des moyens pour réaliser nos objectifs sont aujourd'hui plus actuelles que jamais.

Le document très intéressant qui a été préparé par le Secrétaire Général de l'OTAN pour amorcer justement la discussion d'aujourd'hui, et en préciser les points essentiels, nous est arrivé tard et nous n'avons malheureusement pas eu le temps matériel de l'examiner à fond. Nous pouvons néanmoins affirmer qu'il s'agit d'un document qui représente indiscutablement une synthèse très valable des problèmes que nous allons devoir affronter. L'excellente qualité du travail à laquelle le Secrétariat de l'OTAN nous a habitués a eu une nouvelle confirmation. Nous considérons comme particulièrement intéressante la partie qui est au centre de ce document, où il est question des problèmes politiques, et où est indiqué le schéma possible d'un document commun. Nous avons suivi aussi avec beaucoup d'intérêt tout ce qui a été dit par M. Harmel lui-même et par M. le Ministre Thomson quant aux développements pratiques qui pourraient avoir les études que le Conseil a décidé d'entreprendre lors de la session de décembre dernier. Les remarques de M. Schutz et de M. Menemenjoglu nous ont semblé aussi extrêmement pertinentes et intéressantes.

Permettez-nous de nous réserver une étude plus précise, suite aux résultats des discussions d'aujourd'hui, de la proposition concernant la formation d'un groupe de travail composé de représentants politiques ou de Représentants Permanents, pour donner un caractère concret aux travaux. Nous n'ignorons pas que ce travail sera difficile et de longue haleine, les problèmes en eux-mêmes étant compliqués et - en l'état actuel des choses, dans cette phase particulièrement fluide - le problème de trouver des solutions valables étant évidemment difficile. Il suffit de penser aux difficultés du communisme chinois et aux répercussions que cela peut avoir dans les rapports entre la Chine et l'URSS, comportant la possibilité que même l'évaluation actuelle de la menace venant de l'Est soit modifiée au cours du temps.

Nous pensons que la procédure qu'il faudrait suivre devrait être une procédure éminemment souple, qui puisse être adaptée aux problèmes concrets pratiques, qui pourraient se présenter au fur et à mesure. Nous estimons de plus qu'il vaudrait mieux nous concentrer sur les problèmes politiques en laissant pour le moment aux organes déjà existants le soin d'examiner les aspects militaires des problèmes.

Permettez-moi de conclure - pour l'instant - sur des points plus généraux. Les problèmes de la vitalité même de notre Alliance, de ses tâches futures et de sa possibilité d'y faire face ne sont liés qu'en partie à la transformation et à l'amélioration des structures et de l'organisation: le problème essentiel est celui de l'esprit de solidarité constructive avec lequel nous saurons rendre de plus en plus vivante cette Alliance. Si nous gardions la conviction que nos idées politiques et morales sont bonnes, si chacun d'entre nous de son côté sera capable de faire le sacrifice indispensable de ses propres points de vue trop particuliers afin de nous permettre d'atteindre tous un but commun - qui n'est autre que la sauvegarde de la paix par une collaboration efficace avant tout entre nous - nous aurons fait un pas en avant essentiel pour donner une nouvelle vigueur à l'Alliance Atlantique."

M. LUPIS (suite)

26. Nous avons suivi avec énormément d'intérêt tout ce qui a été déclaré ici par M. Harmel lui-même, par M. le Ministre Thomson quant aux rebondissements rapides que pourront avoir les études que le Conseil a décidé d'entreprendre lors de la session de décembre dernier, et qu'il a maintenant décidé d'accélérer. Le travail qui a été fait par M. Schütz, les remarques qu'il nous a faites et les remarques de M. Menemenjoglu nous ont semblé vraiment extrêmement pertinentes et intéressantes. Permettez-nous de nous réserver une étude plus précise de tout ceci suite aux résultats des discussions d'aujourd'hui, portant sur la formation d'un groupe de travail, composé de représentants politiques et de représentants permanents, pour que nous puissions donner un caractère concret à ces aspirations. Nous n'ignorons pas que ce travail sera de longue haleine, probablement difficile, les problèmes en eux-mêmes sont des problèmes épineux, compliqués et en l'état actuel des choses, dans cette phase particulièrement fluide, la solution valable d'un problème est toujours quelque chose de difficile. Nous pensons aux difficultés du sino-communisme et aux répercussions que cela peut avoir dans les rapports entre la Chine et l'URSS, et l'évaluation de ces menaces venant d'Orient risque d'être modifiée au cours du temps. Nous pensons que la procédure souhaitable, celle qu'il faudrait suivre, devrait être une procédure éminemment souple, qui puisse être adaptée au fur et à mesure aux problèmes concrets, pratiques, qui pourraient se présenter au fur et à mesure. Nous estimons de plus, que nous allons devoir nous concentrer sur les problèmes politiques en laissant aux organes d'ores et déjà existants le soin d'examiner les problèmes sous leur aspect militaire. Pour l'instant, permettez-moi de conclure sur des points plus généraux : le problème de la vitalité même de notre Alliance, le problème des tâches futures de cette Alliance, ses possibilités de faire face à tous ces problèmes, ne sont liés qu'en partie à la transformation et à l'amélioration des structures essentiellement administratives.

Le problème essentiel au contraire, est vraiment celui de l'esprit agissant de solidarité qui va nous permettre de rendre de plus en plus vivante cette Alliance. Si nous gardons la conviction que nos idées politiques et morales sont bonnes, si chacun d'entre nous de son côté est capable de faire le sacrifice indispensable de ses propres points de vue trop particuliers afin de nous permettre d'atteindre tous un but commun, qui n'est autre que la sauvegarde d'une paix par une collaboration efficace entre nous, je pense que notre travail nous permettra de faire un pas en avant vers la réalisation d'une alliance atlantique vivante.

M. BROSIO

Je vous remercie Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat.
Lupis. Monsieur de Ranitz?

M. de RANITZ

M. le Président, je voudrais d'abord vous dire que M. Luns regrette de ne pas être ici mais il y a des élections en Hollande aujourd'hui. Je ne crois pas que M. Luns ne serait pas réélu membre du Parlement sans son propre vote, mais il est quand même nécessaire qu'il soit aux Pays-Bas.

M. le Président, mon gouvernement est très reconnaissant à M. le Ministre Harmel d'avoir abordé de nouveau ce problème qui nous intéresse tous, et je voudrais exprimer mon appréciation personnelle pour la façon dont il a présenté le problème ce matin. Il est évident, et je crois que là nous sommes tout à fait d'accord, que l'étude à entreprendre sur l'avenir de l'Alliance atlantique se trouve justifiée par les changements intervenus depuis 1949 dans les relations internationales et par la nécessité de reconsidérer les méthodes, l'organisation et les objectifs de l'Alliance qui en 1969 - bien que je ne veuille pas attacher trop d'importance à cette date - entrera dans une nouvelle phase de son existence. En fait, on pourrait dire que l'Alliance est toujours en mouvement, qu'il y a toujours raison de se demander s'il n'y a pas lieu de changer les méthodes et de se demander aussi si les objectifs sont encore les mêmes.

En ce qui nous concerne nous-mêmes, M. le Président, nous sommes d'avis que la raison d'être de l'OTAN ne se trouve pas mise en cause par l'évolution des relations internationales. Les objectifs présents, ne manqueront pas de garder, en tout cas en ce qui concerne un avenir pas trop éloigné, toute leur validité. En conséquence je crois que l'étude en question devra trouver sa base dans la volonté politique de continuer la coopération au sein de l'Alliance. Il s'agira donc, de l'avis de mon gouvernement, de trouver en premier lieu une réponse à la question de savoir de quelle manière il sera possible d'atteindre ce but, c'est-à-dire de maintenir l'existence d'une Alliance forte, efficace et adaptée aux circonstances. Cette recherche d'ailleurs s'inscrit tout à fait, je crois, dans la ligne poursuivie jusqu'à présent par l'Alliance et qui a été exprimée très clairement dans l'étude des Trois Sages entreprise en 1956. Je dois dire que je suis toujours étonné de voir combien les Sages ont vraiment été sages et combien les choses qu'ils ont écrites à ce moment-là sont toujours valables. Ceci dit, M. le Président, je ne crois pas qu'une étude très approfondie de l'évolution internationale soit nécessaire, comme d'ailleurs M. le Ministre Harmel l'a dit ; il serait utile d'étudier quelques changements importants. Il est évident que nous devons considérer l'évolution des rapports dans le monde communiste, l'évolution des problèmes liés à la sécurité européenne et certainement à la réunification de l'Allemagne, les changements intervenus dans l'Alliance atlantique même et notamment aussi avec le reste du monde.

M. de RANITZ (suite)

Après cela on pourrait, je crois, tirer les conclusions de cette analyse et examiner la question de la sécurité occidentale dans les années à venir, la politique à suivre envers les pays communistes. ^{aussi} Evidemment, car la chose est plus ou moins liée, il faudra, je crois, se demander comment les travaux que nous entreprenons ici devraient être liés avec les travaux qui sont actuellement faits dans le cadre du "defence planning". Il y a certainement une relation entre le Conseil et le Defence Planning Working Group, mais en fait c'est le Conseil ou le DPC qui s'est occupé de la question de savoir s'il y a lieu de changer les "political directives" ; il s'agit là évidemment d'une question qui est très liée à celle qui doit être étudiée dans le cadre de l'étude, préconisée par M. Harmel. Ensuite, naturellement, il faudra se demander s'il y a lieu d'étudier les problèmes économiques, comme dans le cas décrit dans l'Article 2 du Traité. Là aussi il faudra, je crois, y voir un peu plus clair que nous ne l'avons fait jusqu'à maintenant; tel devrait être le rôle de l'Alliance dans ce domaine, notamment dans un monde où, heureusement, on peut dire que se manifeste une certaine détente. Si je dis une certaine détente, je voudrais quand même faire un pas en arrière en disant qu'il y a d'autres régions du monde où la détente paraît moins sensible et je crois notamment qu'il faudrait étudier les rapports avec les pays de l'Asie (la Chine par exemple) et heureusement avec un endroit paisible, je veux dire le reste du Tiers Monde. Finalement, M. le Président il faudra étudier la structure de l'Alliance elle-même. Donc, dans ce contexte-là, il faudra examiner les relations entre les membres européens et les membres transatlantiques. Ceci pour le fond. Maintenant, en ce qui concerne la procédure, mon gouvernement est d'avis que l'étude à entreprendre devait être effectuée sous la conduite et la responsabilité du Conseil. Le Conseil reste l'organe central, le Conseil ministériel évidemment, le Conseil permanent aussi pour des raisons d'ordre pratique et, naturellement, il semble indiqué de confier certaines parties du travail à faire à un groupe ad hoc parce que je ne crois pas que les Représentants permanents puissent tout faire. Je crois cependant qu'ils devraient avoir la possibilité de dire que ce groupe de travail formerait un Conseil ou formerait le Conseil parce qu'il n'y a qu'un seul Conseil et c'est ce que nous sommes ici. J'espère que M. Boon me permettra de dire que je parle maintenant comme membre du Conseil et ceci pourrait aussi se faire dans le cadre du groupe ad hoc du groupe de travail, donc sous la responsabilité du Conseil et toujours avec la possibilité que les représentants permanents puissent dire : "Maintenant c'est le travail du Conseil en tant que tel". Une dernière remarque M. le Président, je crois qu'il serait utile de tenir compte que, dans le passé, l'impression que l'Alliance a faite sur l'opinion publique n'a pas toujours été favorable.

M. de RANITZ (Suite)

De ce point de vue, il existe même dans l'opinion publique des doutes et des incertitudes au sujet de l'Alliance. C'est dans ce sens, je crois, que M. Thomson a parlé quand il a mentionné aussi la possibilité de demander aux Parlementaires de l'OTAN de faire un plan de travail pour nous donner quelques indications sur la façon dont ils voient la question. Inutile de vous dire que nous sommes tout à fait d'accord avec cette suggestion qui va elle aussi dans le sens du renforcement du rôle des Parlementaires dont M. Luns a parlé pendant la ministérielle de décembre. Pour le moment, M. le Président, c'est tout ce que je voulais dire.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup M. de Ranitz.

Mr. BROSIO

Before asking Mr. Eugene Rostow to take the floor, may I just indicate those who are on the list of the following speakers : Ambassador Palamas, Ambassador Reuter, Mr. Jacobsen, Ambassador Ritchie, Ambassador Hjorth-Nielsen and M. de la Granville. Would Mr. Rostow take the floor now, please.

Mr. ROSTOW

Well, Gentlemen, welcome to this imaginative and realistic European initiative to which have so many have contributed, notably the distinguished Foreign Minister of Belgium and his collaborators. I shall be very brief in my intervention here because we agree with so much of what has been said so felicitously in the thoughtful and suggestive presentations that we have had both in the papers before us and the remarks which have been made around this table. We agree both as to the procedures we should adopt in general for carrying out the mandate of the Council at the last Ministerial meeting and as to the content of the study which has been clarified and supplemented in so many ways this morning. We regard this study on the basis of some very simple ideas. We regard a confidential and dynamic relationship among us in this room as an indispensable part of the foundation for world security, now and for as far ahead as we can readily see. We do not regard the study which has been authorised by our resolution as an inquiry into whether the Alliances need it as a factor, or element or component of a durable peace, to recall the language of our resolution, but how the Alliance should evolve in the future in the light of the political changes which have occurred and are occurring in the content of world politics.

Mr. ROSTOW (Contd)

The North Atlantic Alliance is one of the most successful peacetime alliances in diplomatic history. We believe that we can and should build together on the foundation of that success.

I use the words confident and dynamic to describe the quality of our relationships. I believe they are just. We have together overcome many difficulties and solved many problems. That fact gives us hope that our experience provides a foundation on which we can transform the present tentative stability of our collective relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries of the world, so that tentative stability can also become a confident and dynamic relationship, something that might proceed toward détente and then finally to a régime of peaceful co-existence, to use phrases which have become common in our vocabulary. Mr. Thomson referred to the distinction between defence and deterrent and deterrence and détente. We must never forget that what progress we have made in that direction, in the direction we all approve and share, has been made possible only because our military position has been firm but never provocative; it has been a defensive position, it has been, and remains, and should in our opinion remain, exactly of that character.

In the perspective then of these general ideas, we approach the particular questions of procedure we face today. Questions which are, I should say, the problem of defining and filling out a little bit, getting somewhat more flesh, to the abstract language of the resolution passed in December, abstract but very clear and precise, so that we can proceed now to implement the study which we were required by that resolution to undertake. We can divide these political questions which have been raised in the papers and in the discussion this morning into a relatively short list, I think, of topics which we should resolve today. In the first place there is the question of the general scope of the mandate for the study and the distinction between political and military questions. I believe we are all agreed, as I have heard our colleagues this morning. There is no disposition on anyone's part to reopen the military questions, the questions of military organization or the handling of military questions within the Alliance, which have been the subject of so much consideration over the years and the subject of very affirmative and forward-looking action on the part of the Ministerial meeting. On the other hand while the general subject matter of this study should be the political side of the Alliance, it does not mean that the political aspects of military questions can or should be totally excluded, so long as it is understood in that general sense which I took Mr. Thomson's remarks and his paper to mean, Mr. Schütz's comment to mean, I think we are in entire agreement.

Mr. ROSTOW (Contd)

Secondly, we have a question of how this special group should be set up and who should be members and what its mandate should be. First of all, I think the general idea to which all speakers have referred in one sense or another, is that the study should be conducted by a responsible group, that is a group of government representatives at a high political level or close to and under governmental direction, because these matters are of enormous sensitivity to governments and governments cannot disassociate themselves from the ongoing work of the study. It is only through supervision of that kind that we will come out with a report which will be of great political importance and have a real impact on policy. On the other hand, I think most speakers have felt that we should have men who, while they are responsible, are also free to think rather boldly and will be encouraged to think rather boldly about the problems which are set out in the resolution. But we want to come out of this exercise with a report and not a negotiated communiqué which, as we have so often seen, can be almost eviscerated in the process of negotiation.

Each government will decide on its own representatives to take part in this effort. We have had several thoughts before us: whether the Permanent Representatives as such should be entrusted with the work; whether the APAG Group should be entrusted with the work. On the whole, we are inclined to the view that it should be a special group, an ad hoc group, not a permanent group, a group which should be headed in each case by a person of responsibility close to the government; that each governmental delegation, each governmental group of representatives for this work should include obviously men who can devote a good deal of time, as Mr. Schütz said, to the work, who can come for a week at a time to study carefully prepared and fully documented papers for such meetings, so that out of the exercise through the group itself, and through its sub-groups, we could hope for a major document which would have an impact not only on policy but in the end on public opinion as well, reaffirming the Alliance and its tasks for the future, and greatly influencing public thought about the future of the Alliance. So that it seems to us that, if we proceed in that sense - each government deciding on its own representation and having a balanced representation so that there would be working members and political supervision over the appropriate reinforcement of the working group through the addition of appropriate people, each working group to have its own reporters and its own people preparing the documents - we think, at least, that a powerful and useful report could emerge.

MR. ROSTOW (Contd)

Thirdly, there has been a discussion of two separate elements in our Resolution: the analysis of political events which have occurred since the Treaty was signed and the definition of future tasks which face the Alliance and its procedures for fulfilling those tasks in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace. Obviously, both an analysis of events and a definition of tasks are needed, and in our view, it is impossible to reach a clear definition of tasks without having first rather carefully considered and analysed the political events which have occurred since 1949. As various people have said, we are all generally familiar with those events; on the other hand there is a great value we think in a careful analytical examination of these events not as a matter of antiquarian interest, or a historical study, but with a view to seeking to define future political tasks. Those two aspects of the study seem to us to be integrally related: one proceeds from the other, but they cannot be separated artificially and in our view should not be entrusted to different groups. We think that the same group should be responsible for both aspects of the study so that both the analysis and the definition of tasks should be integrated and considered in the same setting. We don't suppose that any artificial time schedule can be imposed upon the study, that is to have a report of past events emerge by June and have a report of tasks emerge at some later time. We think that, as the Resolution itself makes it clear, the study group should have freedom in the choice of its own procedures. We hope that the study group would come forward with an interim report for the June meeting and it would have, it should have considerable freedom in our view to define the content and substance of that report.

Then there is the question of whether, or to what extent the study should concern political events outside the NATO area itself. We welcome the general sense of most of the speakers this morning and of all the papers indicating that we should seriously consider the bearing of events outside Europe on the effectiveness of the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace. It is too soon to define which those events are, or to choose exactly which of the elements mentioned so far in that connection should be the subject of the study itself. We think it is safe and wise to entrust that further definition to the study group which will be operating, as I said, under the supervision of governments. That is one of the most important reasons for setting up the study as we did in December.

Mr. ROSTOW (Contd)

Now, in approaching that topic, and in welcoming the studies which are implicit in the reference, I might simply add one word that the Study Group should, in taking up such aspects of the problem, carefully examine the methods of political consultation on such issues which it might consider proposing, that is to say, modes of collaboration between this Organization, or members of it, and other countries or other regional organizations which also may have a very great and very direct primary interest in problems of that kind.

And there is the question of a European conference, of special arrangements for concerting European views which have been mentioned and are mentioned of course in the Resolution itself. On that question, our position is very clear: we have, of course, favoured the development of a Europe in many ways since the War and that remains our policy and that remains of great interest. We believe that such developments might have and should have potentialities for greatly reinforcing our work in our Alliance and our effectiveness even beyond the effectiveness and strength which has been achieved. How and whether and through what modes this collaboration should be achieved is for the European members of the Alliance to suggest and to consider, and not directly for us. As we have said before, we simply view such developments as constructive.

It seems to me, in view of the tenure of the discussions so far, that we ought to be able to reach a decision today. I think that the clarification of the mandate for the study which the discussion and the papers before us represent is a very healthy thing. It seems to us that the various ideas which have been put forward about our procedure are rather easily reconciled both as to procedure and substance. We welcome the flexibility of approaches which all speakers have stressed. So that our own view on procedure is, I think, subject to what others feel and believe that a simple summing-up by the Secretary General of the tenure of the discussion at the end of the day - a summing-up which, of course, we will all wish to read carefully before it becomes final - should suffice as a mode for implementing the Resolution whose implementation we were entrusted with in December.

MR. ROSTOW (Contd)

Let me say in conclusion that the fact that our views on how to proceed in carrying out this resolution are so easily reconciled and that all the speakers have expressed a desire to achieve an accommodation of views on these subjects, in fact represents our greatest strength and the ultimate achievement of our close co-operation since the war and more particularly since 1949. That is to say that it represents at its best our habit of reaching agreement through consultation, a habit which has become an integral part of our political lives. It is not always effective, as we all know, but it is a habit to which we return, as the history of this initiative demonstrates and demonstrates very well. On that basis, we believe and hope we can proceed with this study in an atmosphere I think I can describe as one of prudent optimism. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. BROSI

Thank you very much, Mr. Rostow. May I ask Mr. Hjorth Nielsen to take the floor now?

MR. HJORTH NIELSEN

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. May I at the same time express Minister Sølvehøj's regret that he was unable to stay after a quarter to eleven. He had an appointment which he could not possibly let slip. May I on his behalf express our appreciation of the initiative that has been taken by the Belgian Foreign Minister and the various contributions which have since been made to our work. We also find it most useful to take a fresh look at our Alliance and to make sure that it corresponds to the needs of the changing world. I shall not try to prejudge the outcome of this study but we do think that we can confidently expect that the Alliance will once more show its flexibility and its ability to adapt itself to the changing conditions. And we also think it will once more bring out the solidarity which is the essence of the Atlantic Alliance. This being said, I would like to stress, as several other speakers have done, the essential practical aspect of the work. I may not go as far as saying that the shorter the report is, the better, but I do think that to the extent that we can focus attention on the essential points of future methods and policy, to that extent the value of the work will increase. With regard to the various suggestions that have been made, it might be a good thing to phase the work but I don't think we should necessarily bind ourselves to do it. I think the thought has been expressed that the work study must be seen as a whole, as a very valuable idea.

Mr. HJORTH-NIELSEN (Contd)

Anyway we shall see how the work develops and adjust our procedures accordingly. The same goes, incidentally, for the kind of subjects which we would have to take up. There I think it would be wise to wait and see how the work develops.

As regards procedure, I shall have to use the same word once more. My Minister does stress the value of adopting a very flexible and pragmatic procedure and we can then adjust ourselves as the work develops and we shall see what we require. Our Ministers do, however, lay some stress on having the responsibility for the work remain with the Council itself. I think the words that our Dutch colleague used were exactly the same as I had noted down before he spoke. But this, of course, does not mean the Council will not, should not, call on expert advice, high-level, political advice. But we do think that in a piece of work as important as this, then it should eventually be for the Council at Ministerial level to decide on the matter, and to retain the responsibility for the day-to-day work. But I do not think that the shades of opinion on procedure which have been expressed round the table rules out this possibility of having the Council responsible.

Mr. BROGIO

Thank you, Mr. Hjorth-Nielsen. Ambassador Palamas, s'il vous plaît.

M. PALAMAS

Monsieur le Président. Je désire exprimer l'appréciation de mon gouvernement pour l'initiative de Son Excellence, M. Harmel; l'initiative qui a conduit à l'adoption de la résolution relative à la réunion ministérielle du Conseil tenue à Paris au mois de décembre l'année dernière. A ce propos, je dois aussi rappeler que nous avons soutenu en son temps une proposition identique du Canada. C'est dire combien nous sommes intéressés à ce travail de relance de l'activité de l'Alliance Atlantique. Je veux dire également que nous vous sommes reconnaissants, à vous Monsieur le Président, des suggestions contenues dans votre PO/67/89. Ces suggestions constituent, tant sur le fond que sur la procédure, un premier pas vers la mise en oeuvre de la Résolution Ministérielle. Je dois ajouter que la contribution britannique à l'étude de ce problème a retenu également toute notre attention. Je me réfère à la lettre datée du 10 février de l'année courante adressée au Secrétaire Général par Sir Bernard Burrows.

M. PALAMAS (suite)

A la lumière de ce travail de préparation déjà accompli, ainsi que des vues déjà exprimées aujourd'hui au cours de ce débat, je me permettrai de définir la position de ma délégation sur cet important problème. Nos vues ont un caractère préliminaire et expriment une orientation de pensée, orientation qui, à ce stade, reste toujours souple et susceptible de s'adapter éventuellement à des formules exprimant l'accord général. Beaucoup a été dit sur ce que nous devons faire dans le cadre de cette étude. Certaines de mes observations portent aussi sur un autre point, à savoir l'intérêt que nous aurons d'éviter de faire certaines choses. L'effort que nous allons entreprendre n'est pas un travail qui, à notre avis, puisse conduire à la révision des structures constitutionnelles de l'Alliance dans le Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, que les accords de Paris 1954 n'ont pas remis en question. Si l'Alliance doit continuer, comme semblent le penser tous ses membres, elle ne saurait mettre en doute la solidité de ses fondements. Il est vrai que ce point de vue est corroboré par la résolution ministérielle, mais nous pensons que sur des questions de base on ne saurait jamais être trop explicite. D'ailleurs, nous croyons toujours que les structures constitutionnelles de l'Alliance sont bonnes; elles ont fait leurs preuves, elles sont également assez flexibles pour contenir dans leur cadre les réalités qui se dégagent au fil des développements politiques des dernières années. C'est dans ce même ordre d'idées que nous croyons que le caractère militaire de l'Alliance ne devrait pas être remis en question ou amoindri. La coopération militaire pour la défense commune, coopération militaire intégrée, et à la rigueur même non intégrée, devrait à notre avis rester la base de l'Alliance. Le facteur militaire doit garder toute son importance, car pour nous, nous l'avons toujours dit ici, l'Alliance signifie sécurité et la sécurité constitue la pierre angulaire de notre politique étrangère. Tout le reste garde, personne ne saurait en douter, son importance, mais vient après. A notre avis, le travail à entreprendre ne devrait pas conduire à un relâchement politique, psychologique et militaire de la défense atlantique. Un troisième point - repenser les termes menace, détente, comme vous, M. le Président, vous le suggérez dans le papier que vous avez fait distribuer, cela pourrait être un exercice extrêmement utile. Nous pensons aussi qu'il serait salutaire de dissiper l'ambiguïté que peuvent recéler ces termes et éventuellement aussi d'autres termes dont l'utilisation jette la confusion dans notre esprit. Il faut essayer de voir si en disant les mêmes mots nous pensons les mêmes choses. Il faut essayer de nous comprendre avant de nous entendre, et par exemple, nous utilisons tous le mot "détente" et cela plusieurs fois par jour.

M. PALAMAS (suite)

Nous vivons à l'heure de la détente, mais il faut bien se rendre compte qu'il n'y a pas qu'une seule détente, mais plusieurs détentes, il y a une détente française, il y a une détente britannique, une détente américaine, peut-être autant de détentes que d'Etats membres. Il serait intéressant de voir s'il est possible de dégager de toutes ces détentes une détente atlantique. La consultation était nécessaire, elle a fait ses preuves, malheureusement ses possibilités sont limitées. Elle manque de souffle pour assurer une coordination politique, coordination qui devient de plus en plus problématique et difficile à atteindre. A l'ombre de la défense atlantique, chacun entend suivre sa propre politique. Il s'agit là de reconnaître la réalité sans faire de polémiques, cela ne changerait rien. Toutefois, pour ce qui nous concerne, nous partageons l'avis exprimé à ce sujet par nos alliés britanniques : essayer d'informer le Conseil et écouter les réactions des pays membres avant de procéder à des initiatives politiques pouvant influencer dans un sens ou dans un autre la situation internationale. Mais nous ne nous faisons pas d'illusions à ce sujet. En ce qui concerne la coopération européenne, notre désir est qu'elle soit renforcée et étendue. Toutefois, cette question ne concerne que les Européens. Au sein des organisations européennes existantes, et elles sont très nombreuses, ce sont les Européens désireux de promouvoir la coopération européenne dans tous les domaines qui viennent prendre les initiatives qu'ils jugent opportunes. Mais nous croyons que ce problème, quoique intéressant l'Alliance, n'est pas de son ressort et ne saurait être discuté utilement au sein du Conseil Atlantique. Un dernier point concernant la procédure : le Conseil reste l'instance suprême et retient sa compétence pour les décisions finales. Et nous entendons par cela le Conseil au niveau ministériel et aussi immédiatement après le Conseil Permanent, et c'est sur ce point de procédure que nous voulons insister, parce que, pour le reste, je peux très bien me rallier aux propositions qui ont été formulées par Son Excellence M. Harmel : constituer un groupe de travail qui serait composé par des personnalités politiques ou autres qui, de toute façon, auraient à soumettre leur rapport aux Représentants Permanents, et c'est le Conseil Permanent qui finalement adopterait le rapport et le soumettrait aux Ministres. C'est ainsi que mon gouvernement comprend la procédure. Je dois aussi remercier M. Thomson parce qu'il a eu une aimable pensée à l'égard des Représentants Permanents, et la chose est assez rare. J'espère qu'avec l'aide du Secrétaire Général, une suite pratique pourrait être donnée à cette suggestion qui est dans l'intérêt de mes collègues.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup M. l'Ambassadeur. Ambassadeur Reuter s'il vous plait.

M. REUTER

M. le Président, les autorités de mon pays se sont associées avec une totale conviction à la Résolution de décembre; elles ont le plus profond désir que le but proposé soit pleinement atteint. Elles estiment que cette étude devrait s'inspirer d'un esprit de coopération très ouvert, et qu'il importe que les résultats s'élèvent au-dessus des travaux de routine, suivant l'exemple que nous ont donné les Trois Sages en 1956. Dans cet esprit, j'ai été chargé d'appuyer sans réserve les propositions de M. le Ministre Harmel; il s'agit semble-t-il de faire un travail en commun suivant une procédure très souple, en faisant appel notamment à la compétence de personnalités hautement qualifiées sans méconnaître la responsabilité fondamentale du Conseil. Nous approuvons donc cette procédure.

Enfin, il convient de relever la valeur du document britannique et du texte distribués par le Secrétaire Général ainsi que, d'ailleurs, des interventions qui ont déjà été faites ce matin, et surtout aussi des quelques vérités remarquables que nous venons d'entendre il y a quelques instants.

Toutes les délégations ne seront pas en mesure de contribuer d'une manière équivalente, et je pense à ma délégation. Mais nous essaierons, de notre côté, de participer de notre mieux, fidèles à notre conviction que le maintien de la solidarité demeurera indispensable en toutes circonstances. Merci, M. le Président.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup M. l'Ambassadeur.

Mr. Jacobsen, please.

Mr. JACOBSEN

Mr. Chairman, I also wish to start by expressing my appreciation of the important documents which have been presented to us as a basis for our discussion. First of all of course the Belgian Foreign Minister's exposé, the Secretary General's, your own, Mr. Chairman, your own document and the British Working Paper and these documents will now of course receive due attention in the various capitals and may form the basis for further discussion on the details. I must admit that I don't quite see how we can already today arrive at a very clear conclusion and I would already now mention, or submit the idea, that we, at least in the first stage, leave it to our Permanent Representatives to try to reach a further definition and agreement on the actual tasks to be taken up.

Mr. JACOBSEN (Contd)

But if I may, Mr. Chairman, I should like to mention to you just in a general way some of the development of the thinking on our part in Norway as to how to carry out now this most valuable initiative by the Belgian Government. In this connection, perhaps, I think we should keep in mind also the valuable ideas of a somewhat similar kind which were at a previous stage put forward by the Canadian Government.

Now, frankly, we were in Norway to begin with rather much in doubt as to the necessity or even advisability of starting off an exercise of study on the past of our Alliance and I was glad to realise today from the Belgian Foreign Minister's statement that he is more concerned with the present and the future. Now, even as to this we were earlier also in doubt as to the advisability of starting off a general public debate because of course an exercise in our Organization will hardly be possible without stirring up a general public debate on NATO and the positions of the various member nations towards NATO.

Our doubts on this point were connected with the somewhat difficult times or difficulties which our Alliance has been going through not so long ago, but at the present time I think we agree that we have overcome some in the political field as well as in the military field, and we can say the position is so much consolidated at least that we have survived these difficulties in comparatively good health.

However, there is one danger signal in front of us, and that is connected with the 1969 position. We have been reminded of earlier steps taken by the Council to counter this weakness which would then face the Organization. We have been reminded of the 1954 Nine Power Declaration; still, I think in most member countries the wording of the Pact, the Charter itself, will, when we approach 1969, create some doubt, some discussion as to the advisability of continuing and therefore it is the question whether the time is not now ripe for a consideration of what more the Council, the Organization, can do to counter this weakness which we will be faced with; and I think in this connection we can consider another factor, that is the general international situation, the trend which came so clearly to light at the December meeting - a trend to lay more emphasis on the political rôle of NATO; to emphasise the part which NATO can play towards greater understanding between East and West and along this path there has already been considerable progress even since our December meeting, but on more of a bilateral basis. It is sufficient,

MR. JACOBSEN (Contd)

just to mention the recent political acts of the German Government, or the increased bilateral contacts between the United Kingdom Government and the Soviet Union. We feel that it is important for NATO as such to commence to make use of this momentum, this, first of all, for contributing to this general international development, but also for our own sake for keeping in the public mind the strength and the position of NATO and improving NATO's image in the world; it is also important for internal reasons in various member countries to strengthen the support for our organization in our own countries. We believe that as a result of what is now going on between East and West, perhaps the international atmosphere is at present more propitious than it has been earlier for a redefinition of the aims and purposes of the Alliance and such a redefinition would be a favourable basis for a public debate. At least in my country we feel this is the case for a public debate on our relations with NATO also in the post-1969 period. In fact, we believe that a new-look presentation more in accordance with the present somewhat more optimistic view on NATO's constructive rôle, is a necessary condition for a new public debate on NATO. This task is important also because the international situation today does lead many, mistakenly of course, to believe that as a defensive military Alliance NATO is no longer necessary, or even that NATO acts as a brake on the development of this process which is going on, especially on bilateral lines.

Also from the other side we hear that the time has come for dissolving NATO and the Warsaw Alliance - this was something which was brought forward very strongly, I believe, by Mr. Kosygin in London. Now to us, it seems to be an important task to make it clear to the East European nations, and to certain sectors in our own public opinion, that, on the contrary, the existence of the two organizations is a necessary condition for a successful furtherance of this relaxation of tensions.

Any my conclusion is, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that the present international situation justifies at least that we consider the possibility of redefining the aims and purposes of the Alliance. It is not inconceivable to us that such a redefinition and re-evaluation would make it possible for member countries to consider again what new steps may be taken to counter this weakness inherent in the 1969 situation, either by a revision of the Treaty, by a common declaration, or by individual, unilateral but co-ordinated declarations.

Mr. JACOBSEN (Contd)

On this basis, Mr. Chairman, I should like to support strongly the recommendation that has been put forward here, I understand first by Mr. Thomson, that it is desirable to concentrate on certain main points, that is to reach early agreement on certain main points. In general I would say, in our view, it is important that our exercise should not be too complicated; it should be as simple as possible. Finally, just a few words about procedure. I can say that we fully agree that the exercise we have in mind should be carried out under the responsibility of the Council, but I would also like to say that I thought a very interesting proposal was put forward by the German Representative of making some use of APAG in connection with this exercise; I think this should be considered again by the Council. We have in APAG a Group which may perhaps be put to better use by the Council than what is the case now.

Finally, I repeat my idea that at least in the first stages there might be something to be said for the Permanent Representatives carrying on the tasks in front of us, and until we reach such a phase, that they would find it perhaps necessary to call in support from other sources. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Jacobsen. Ambassador Ritchie, please.

Mr. RITCHIE

Mr. Chairman, my Government wishes me to state full co-operation and support for the implementation of our December resolution undertaken at the initiative of his Excellency the Belgian Foreign Minister, and I wish to say we have appreciated the very lucid exposition of the Belgian ideas which M. Harmel has put before us this morning. We have also read with great interest the Secretary General's paper, the United Kingdom paper, and we have heard various other suggestions round the table this morning as to procedure and as to the substance which we shall study carefully. The Canadian Government has, for a very long time, considered that it is essential to re-examine the factors now affecting the Alliance. As has been so kindly mentioned by the Turkish and Norwegian Representatives, we put forward a paper already in 1965 on this subject and perhaps some of the material in it may be of some use in our forthcoming discussions. We feel the case as has been stated here today that it is not just a question of analysis; it is a question also of the tasks which will spring from the analysis and when we ask ourselves what we hope in the long run to get out of this whole exercise of studies which we are going to engage, I suppose we must all hope that it will result in some movement towards a more stable world order and towards a settlement in Europe.

Mr. RITCHIE (Contd)

As to the necessity of not only achieving something in substance but also having it be seen that we achieve something, we feel like many other speakers the full importance of this, so far as our public opinion is concerned and we wish to study very carefully the various suggestions; we may have some of our own, for bringing this study into a significant relationship with the debate which is going on in our own countries as to the future.

I think that the process of discussion of such studies will stimulate, will itself be valuable. We have had so many recommendations on how to improve consultation in NATO. Actually every word of the Three Wise Men's report on consultations is equally valid today as when it was drafted. We have achieved a remarkable degree of consultation here, I suppose unique in any alliance and we all know that it could be improved. Whether it could be improved by recommendations on how to improve it or by the will to improve it, is another matter, but we think that this discussion will focus the consultative process within NATO. We hope that this will lead to a greater unity within the Alliance but we don't necessarily think that it is going to result in complete agreement.

The divergencies themselves, frankly discussed, will give us a greater insight into each other's points of view and this will be taken into account, we hope, in national policy. But anything in the nature of seeking unity or apparent unity where real divergencies exist would probably be counter-productive in our view. There has been mention made today of the specifically European aspects of these studies and, of course, we in Canada have always welcomed any trends towards European consultation and European co-operation and we've no doubt that our European Allies will want to discuss many things among themselves which primarily affect them, but of course we don't envisage that there would be any formalisation within the structure of NATO which could affect its primarily transatlantic character.

A word or two on procedure, if I may, Mr. Chairman, very briefly of course. We have very tentative ideas which cannot be very different from those which Mr. Harmel expressed this morning, but we will also want to think over the various other interesting suggestions which have been made here. We have thought, as a start, that it would be desirable to establish under the Secretary General's Chairmanship an open-ended committee to which governments could appoint either Permanent Representatives or special representatives. We had thought that that committee would be the master of its own procedure, would appoint sub-committees and would seek the advice of experts.

Mr. RITCHIE (Contd)

It would not keep records, other than reports by specified delegations on behalf of the Committee and an attempt should be made to create situations in which the Committee members would function under very broad instructions, so as to allow an informal real discussion, an informal frank discussion in which people would not feel committed, or feel they had committed their governments to every comma of their remarks.

We had visualised that the first task to be reviewed at the Spring meeting of Ministers would be the examination of the developments which have affected the Alliance and a selection of topics for study. The aim of the study should be to reach as wide an agreement as possible on the future tasks of the Alliance in the light of new developments, and to provide member governments with up-to-date rationale for the continuance of the Alliance. Those, in very simplified terms, were the way we saw the procedure and the objectives. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROGIO

Thank you very much, Ambassador Ritchie.
M. de la Granville, s'il vous plaît.

M. de la GRANVILLE

Monsieur le Président, M. Couve de Murville, au mois de décembre, lors de la réunion ministérielle, a déjà marqué au moment de la proposition faite par M. Harmel, l'intérêt très vif que nous y portions. Cette proposition venait d'ailleurs à la suite d'autres propositions faites notamment par le gouvernement canadien. Nous avons ce matin noté avec grand soin et grand intérêt les vues qui ont été exprimées autour de cette table et qui devront maintenant être étudiées en vue des décisions à prendre. Le travail qui nous est proposé, et qui est l'analyse des événements et la définition des tâches futures que nous devons prendre est bien évidemment celui même qui est depuis l'origine la tâche de l'Alliance, cette alliance qui, cela a été répété, vous le savez, souvent du côté français reste indispensable à notre sécurité, et qui par conséquent continue, sans que les dates marquées par le Traité signifient autre chose que des indications pour les situations juridiques dans lesquelles nous nous trouvons vis-à-vis de l'étude de ce Traité.

En somme, de quoi s'agit-il essentiellement? Suivant ce qui a été exprimé ce matin autour de cette table, il s'agit de la consultation politique entre nous. Consultation politique cela veut dire la revue des événements dans le monde, l'interprétation que nous en donnons et les conséquences que chacun des pays, chacun des quinze membres de l'Alliance dans ses politiques nationales, en tire.

M. de la GRANVILLE (suite)

L'énoncé de ce problème indique à la fois son intérêt et les limitations qu'il comporte; il est certain que tout le monde ici a reconnu, je crois, que le Conseil permanent avait depuis sa création, depuis le début de l'Alliance, la responsabilité essentielle de la tâche que nous entreprenons aujourd'hui, c'est donc lui, pensons-nous du côté français, qui doit conserver cette responsabilité, je dirais, qui devra dès aujourd'hui entreprendre la tâche aussi bien de définir les sujets qui devront être ceux mis à l'étude que la procédure qui devra être adoptée; à cette fin, plusieurs suggestions ont été faites par les différentes délégations, le Représentant de l'Allemagne a parlé de l'APAG, d'autres ont parlé de différents comités; je crois qu'il nous serait impossible ce matin de prendre, à ce sujet, une décision. Nous devons laisser les Représentants permanents dans leur sagesse définir quelle est la formule la meilleure pour trouver le système qui les aidera au mieux à élaborer ce rapport que nous nous sommes engagés en décembre dernier à fournir en première instance à la réunion de juin et en fin de compte à la réunion ministérielle de décembre.

Je crois qu'il faudra aussi que les Représentants permanents se penchent avec grand soin sur le problème qui a été évoqué de divers côtés, celui de la publicité à donner à ces travaux. Il est certain qu'il y a beaucoup à dire à ce sujet; il faut bien entendu se rendre compte des inconvénients qu'aurait une publicité trop grande donnée à des travaux, dont nous ne savons pas encore vers quoi ils pourront aboutir et déboucher. Je le répète, du côté français, nous avons enregistré avec beaucoup d'intérêt et de soin tout ce qui a été dit, nous nous apprêtons à l'étudier et nous faisons confiance aux Représentants permanents et à votre direction comme Secrétaire Général, Monsieur le Président, pour mettre au point un programme de travail et les procédures adéquates.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup, M. de la Granville.

Ambassadeur da Cunha, s'il vous plaît.

M. da CUNHA

Monsieur le Président, l'heure est déjà très avancée, je ne voudrais pas retenir trop longtemps l'attention du Conseil, d'autant plus que je n'ai pas de contribution spéciale à donner. En tout cas, mon Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, M. Nogueira, comme vous vous souviendrez, a, à plusieurs reprises, manifesté l'intérêt de notre gouvernement pour le sujet dont nous occupons aujourd'hui et il a même annoncé qu'il ferait connaître au Conseil en temps opportun le point de vue du gouvernement portugais.

M. da CUNHA (suite)

Ce point de vue, je ne le connais pas encore et quoique j'aie des idées personnelles au sujet des affaires que nous discutons ici, ce ne sont pas mes idées personnelles qui intéressent mais les idées de mon gouvernement. Je me réserve donc de les faire connaître plus tard. Ceci dit je peux en tout cas ajouter que nous avons pris connaissance avec le plus grand intérêt des documents qui nous ont été présentés et maintenant ici de tout ce que je viens d'entendre.

En particulier, je me permettrai de mettre en avant le document présenté par Son Excellence M. Harmel et lui dire toute l'appréciation de mon gouvernement pour son initiative. Je ne le cache pas et je crois que nous sommes tous d'accord sur l'extrême difficulté que nous aurons quand il s'agira de passer de la définition de principe à des décisions concrètes dans le domaine politique. En ce moment, nous sommes encore au stade de la procédure qui appelle toujours une première série de décisions du Conseil. Je suis sûr, M. le Secrétaire Général, que dans le "summing up" que vous allez nous faire, vous allez faire des suggestions à ce sujet qui pourront être acceptées par nous tous. En tout cas, je dois souligner dès maintenant - en ceci je suis sûr d'interpréter la pensée de mon gouvernement - que nous estimons que cette affaire dépend essentiellement du Conseil. Cela ne veut pas dire que l'on ne constitue pas du tout le Groupe mais en tout cas que la responsabilité reste au Conseil.

Je vois que j'ai déjà pris plus de temps que je voulais mais il y a deux remarques qui ont été faites ici, et qui m'ont paru presque correspondre exactement à nos pensées. L'une d'elles - et je crois qu'elle a été faite par le distingué Représentant de l'Italie - c'est que dans l'Alliance, ce qui importe surtout c'est l'état d'esprit des Alliés, c'est leur façon d'entreprendre et de remplir leurs engagements. Une autre remarque a été faite, je crois, par mon collègue grec : c'est qu'il ne faudrait pas minimiser l'importance du facteur ~~politique~~ dans les décisions que nous allons prendre. Cela, je le dis d'une façon générale sans entrer dans le détail des relations qui peuvent exister entre les décisions que nous allons prendre et les travaux du DPC, ce qui est une question à part. Je voudrais dire seulement la nécessité de ne pas oublier, dans la décision que nous allons prendre et dans les études que nous allons faire, que le côté militaire de l'Alliance ne peut pas être oublié.

Merci, M. le Président.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup, M. l'Ambassadeur. M. Ingvarsson ?

Mr. INGVARSSON

Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief. I have no substantial contribution; I only wish to join other speakers in expressing the interest of my Government in the Resolution under discussion. We have taken note of the suggestions for the substantial study and procedure and we shall be very happy to co-operate to the fullest extent possible. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN made a statement which he said might represent a fair summing-up of the Council's deliberations. After further discussion, he made the following modified summary:

- "(1) To carry out its mandate in the Ministerial Resolution of 16th December, 1966, the Council will direct the exercise and be responsible for it;
- (2) to that effect the Council constitutes an open-ended Special Group of Representatives designated by governments, under the chairmanship of the Secretary General;
- (3) the Special Group will study (a) the development of political events as it affects the purposes of the Alliance and (b) the consequent future tasks of the Alliance;
- (4) the Special Group will establish such special procedures, sub-groups and rapporteurs, and request such staff work from the International Staff, reinforced national delegations, and outside organizations, as it deems necessary;
- (5) when necessary, the Special Group would report to the Council and review with it the progress of the work and questions to be solved. In any case, the Special Group will make an interim report to the Council in Permanent Session in time for the Ministerial meeting in June and a final report in time for the December meeting."

The COUNCIL, having listened to the summing-up by the Chairman, agreed unanimously to discuss it at their next meeting as a draft decision.