

See 3-12-01
for Details

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N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

9th September 1987

DPA(87)609

To: Director of the Private Office
cc: Executive Secretary
From: ASG for Political Affairs
Subject: Jaruzelski Disarmament Plan

P.A. Sub - Registry
File N° 19-10-01 (POLAND)


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Jaruzelski launched the Polish disarmament proposal during a speech in May. It has subsequently been amplified somewhat in various fora, including a July presentation by the Polish Foreign Minister in Warsaw (copy attached). Nonetheless, the plan remains extremely vague and so lacking in specifics as to defy serious analysis.

2. In general, the plan appears to be largely a rehash of earlier Eastern proposals going back to the Rapacki Plan including the obligatory endorsement of existing Soviet nuclear arms control positions. One new element is the call for arms control in a zone which would expand the MBFR NGA by including Denmark and Hungary. The proposal would also focus on all types of nuclear weapons not being dealt with in other negotiations. In addition, enhanced CSBMs and the Eastern proposal to discuss military doctrines are predictably included.

3. The proposal is far less concrete than the Budapest Appeal with which it overlaps considerably. Thus, it is difficult to accept as seriously intended to advance the arms control process. Rather, it is almost certainly an attempt by Poland to win back for itself the role of Warsaw Pact spokesman on arms control which it lost during the early 1980s as a result of its internal problems. Perhaps the most eloquent comment on the intrinsic unimportance of Jaruzelski's proposal was the absence of any reference to it in June's Warsaw Pact Summit Communiqué.

4. Despite some prefatory Polish efforts, the plan has generated virtually no interest in the West. Such "benign neglect" appears to be an entirely appropriate reaction to the plan. Given its sketchy nature plus the fact that it traverses ground already covered by other Eastern proposals, it seems to provide little scope for further analysis. In any event, its basic themes are all being examined by the HLTF Red Team, which has subsumed Jaruzelski's proposal in its wider examination of Eastern negotiating objectives and tactics.



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DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2014)0007 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MIS EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

Text handed over by Polish Foreign Affairs
Minister to Western ambassadors in
Warsaw on 17 July 87 to amplify

MEMORANDUM OF THE

original
presenta-
tion of
Jarnzeiski-
plan
in
early
May

GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
ON DECREASING ARMAMENTS AND INCREASING CONFIDENCE
IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The Government of the Polish People's Republic reiterates its will to contribute substantively to efforts leading to disarmament and the strengthening of international security, particularly in Central Europe, as evidenced in its previous initiatives. It is in Central Europe that the two political and military groupings are in direct contact; it is also here that the greatest concentration of military potential in the world exists. The situation in this region weighs particularly heavily on the security of all States on this continent as well as of those States whose security interests are closely linked with it.

In the past, the Government of the Polish People's Republic has presented a number of proposals, the purpose of which was to restrain the arms race in Europe and to create conditions which would lead to more comprehensive disarmament measures. These included the 1957 plan to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone and the 1964 plan envisaging a freeze of nuclear armaments, both concerning Central Europe. For many years these plans were continually subject of the international dialogue and contributed to the search for solutions which would enhance security in Europe and in the world.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic presents the view that the shape of political, economic, and cultural relations in Europe, which has developed particularly in the wake of the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, renders the present high level of armaments and military preparedness in Europe unwarranted.

The Polish Government is convinced that conditions exist at present to initiate steps which would assure the European States undiminished and equal security at a considerably lower level of military potential. The outcome of such steps would be to diminish the still existing danger of a military conflict breaking out in Europe, and particularly to prevent the possibility of a surprise attack. These steps, if taken, would contribute to establishing common security in Europe, through cooperation and by taking the interests of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe into greater consideration.

Taking the above premises as its starting point the Government of the Polish People's Republic submits herewith a Plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Central Europe. It covers the territories of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Polish People's Republic, together with their territorial waters and airspace.

The Plan envisages:

1. The gradual withdrawal and/or reduction of specified, mutually agreed kinds and quantities of nuclear weapons. Such undertakings would encompass all kinds of nuclear weapons, as long as they are not subject of other agreements, in particular such weapons as: operational and tactical missiles, particularly those up to 500 km range; nuclear artillery; nuclear-capable aircraft; also any type of nuclear charges, including nuclear mines and bombs. All these should be reviewed bearing into consideration measures related to the withdrawal and reduction of conventional weapons.

2. The gradual withdrawal and/or reduction of specified mutually agreed kinds and quantities of conventional weapons. The first to be considered being weapons of the greatest destructive power and accuracy which could be employed in offensive operations including surprise attacks, for example, strike aircraft; tanks; armed helicopters; long-range artillery, including rocket artillery. An exchange of the lists of weapons considered by each State to be particularly threatening and offensive might prove helpful.

These measures could find substantiation by withdrawing the weapons with their crews from the zone envisaged by the Plan, by destroying those weapons or by withdrawing them from operational military stockpiles with the aim to convert them to peaceful purpose or to place them in internationally controlled storage premises.

3. Joint actions which would ensure such an evolution of the nature of military doctrines that they could reciprocally be assessed as being strictly defensive. To achieve this the doctrines would have to be based on the principle of adequacy which would justify the possession by a State only of such a military potential as is indispensable for effective defence. A joint discussion and comparison of military concepts and doctrines and an analysis of their nature and development trends could prove helpful.

4. Agreement on appropriate far-reaching confidence- and security-building measures and the mechanisms for the strict verification of compliance with the undertaken commitments, including such which for various reasons it would be difficult to introduce to Europe as a whole.

Such measures would be complementary to those already in existence and could envisage, *inter alia*, an agreement on parameters to constrain the size and/or the intensity

of the specified types of military activities (for example, exercises and concentrations of forces on the respective territories), the exchange of military information, procedures for the prompt clarification of situations arousing the concern of either side. The efforts of the States should also be aimed at bringing the independent activities of air and naval forces within the framework of confidence- and security-building measures.

To ensure that the accepted measures are effectively implemented an appropriate system of verification would be established. It would encompass means of national and international control mutually accepted as effective, including observation and on-site inspection. An international institution(s) of control could be established, with the participation of the States concerned and others. The control mechanism might visualize, *inter alia*, an exchange of information indispensable for effective verification; notification of the commencement and completion of the withdrawal or reduction of armaments and their observation; establishment of control points on the borders of the zone through which the arms would be withdrawn, as well as at large railway junctions, airfields, seaports, and other measures. A procedure of bilateral and multilateral consultations could be included in this system.

On its part the Government of the Polish People's Republic expresses its readiness to accept, on a reciprocal basis, any method of control indispensable to attain the purposes of the Plan.

The nuclear powers would issue appropriate agreed guarantees to ensure the effectiveness of the measures envisaged in the Plan, the security of States included in the zone, and that the status established by the agreement be respected.

In presenting this Plan, the Government of Poland assumes as purposeful to negotiate and introduce parallelly and stage-by-stage disarmament measures in Europe, depending on their substance, procedure and time, in three territorial realms, that is in a corridor on both sides of the line of contact of the two opposing politico-military groupings, in Central Europe and in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Plan dovetails aptly with other propositions related to the above mentioned territorial realms, including the 1986 Budapest Appeal of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the initiative of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic relative to a corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The measures proposed in the Plan constitute a mutually supplemental entity. Nevertheless each of its postulates may be negotiated and implemented separately and in stages with regard to territorial scope, as well as their stated subjects and objects.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic accepts that the zone of application visualized by the Plan could, with time, be enlarged through the access of other European States, including neutral and non-aligned States.

The substance of the Plan could be the subject of the negotiations currently being held or to be held in the future within the framework of or in connection with the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Decisions on the withdrawal and reduction of the kinds of weapons mentioned in the Plan would be accompanied by a consent not to substitute them with new designs of weapons and equipment or those obtained by conversion as well as not to introduce entirely new kinds of weapons with particularly offensive characteristics.

Another issue on which agreement could be sought is that of historically formed disproportions and asymmetries in particular kinds of weapons and military forces, together with ways to eradicate them through a reduction to an agreed level by the side which possesses the superiority.

The assumed measures would be based on the principles of equality of rights and security of all parties, balance and reciprocity and would be taken without detriment to the security of any State.

Warsaw, July 17, 1987.