

NATO RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP

THE ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN THE
SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Final Report

by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to assess the modern role of the conventional armed forces in the system of European security.

The end of the Cold War has given a new pulse to the thesis that a big war has no perspective. However, the war, as a phenomenon, is hardly dead. It has simply changed its appearance at the present stage of human being development. During all most three centuries it was considered a norm for national states. And there is nothing surprising in it that appearance on the world arena of other, than states, actors, has brought about growth of number of "private" armies considering an armed conflict as a "legal" business. All this provoked appearance of new, having military character, threats.

In general, in peace time, defining tasks and goals of military force application is still the main problem for the political establishment of many countries. Deciding when, where and how to use military force is in fact a very complicated matter. In the post bipolar world in the large – scale war safe conditions it is extremely difficult to take a decision when, where and how to use limited, as compared with the " Cold War" period, military resources.

Use of military force may take a number of different forms and methods. Today, the role of military force as a factor of international relations undergoes significant changes. It is necessary to emphasize, that parameters of the international relations system, correspondingly involving the European, are under transformation process.

Actually, conventional armed forces in the future should answer two challenges: on the one hand, the development of advanced weapons allows forces to play a strategic role of deterrence, and won the other, main goals there will be a participation and victory in the local conflicts and in guerilla warfare.

It is obvious, that various on structure, preparation and composition of armed forces need to answer these challenges. Also it is obvious, that the lack of financial resources will not allow any country to have, as a matter of fact, two different armies. Therefore, as it is supposed, this problem will be decided by the creation of rapid deployment and reaction forces and special units to participate in operations distinct from conducting classical war.

So, the character of such intrastate military conflicts are significantly differ from "classic" form of warfare. That is why the armed forces should be special trained and equipped for the military operations other than "classic" war.

Analyzing the latest examples of use of military force by the USA, NATO and Russia one may come to a conclusion that by themselves, even hundred percent accomplished, military operations are not sufficient for the general victory (within this context – victory is fulfillment of given political tasks). We can say about a success only then when armed forces are used in complex with other instruments of big politics.

INTRODUCTION

The report is devoted to the general problems concerning conventional armed forces within the European security system. As it seems, this theme is mainly connected with the realities of the modern international relations and also with the forming up in the European countries and the USA approaches to the use of military force by a state or a group of states in order to intervene on humanitarian reasons (mass repression, civilian population atrocity and flagrant violation of human rights) into internal affairs of the other country.

Instability and uncertainties are the characteristic features of the whole system of international relations, which is determined by the transition period of its development. Along with this, with a certain degree of confidence, one can say about the main parameters of the European security system. The new European system is being created by means of consolidation and spread of the main western military, political and economic institutions. Russia must play an important role within this system too. In the European Security Charter adopted in Istanbul in 1999 it is stressed that prevention (every where possible) of violent conflicts is the one of the main security tasks, which can be solved only by consolidation of forces and use of all means available. So, it makes sense, to talk about general approaches to the use of force in peacetime (to solve tasks not connected with the immediate defense

The problem of the use of armed forces (AF) is so complicated and multiform, that makes it not possible to expose all of its aspects within one research study. That is why we will take only general problems faced, first of all, by countries anyhow involved within the European security orbit.

The notion "military force" may reflect both capability of a state to influence the other state using military coercion and also means necessary for it. It is preconditioned by economic, social, scientific, technical, moral and political capabilities of a state and find the direct reflection in the armed forces, in their capability to fulfill tasks set by political leaders.

However, at present day one can not speak about a state as of a single player on the international arena, and the more so, it is necessary to bear in mind that armed actions can be performed by irregular military and paramilitary formations and not only by the Armed

Forces of one or the other country. Here, it is necessary to specify that the "force" is a dynamic not a static notion. It is first of all not a potential but a capability to effectively use it, to achieve not mainly military, but political results.

Close attention of many politicians and military to problems of use of military force in new conditions can be explained both by searching for optimal instruments to strengthen security and stability and also by a counter motion from the side of military establishment, trying to find its proper place in conditions of lack of a clear large-scale danger.

The work given is devoted only to one component of military force, which are conventional armed forces. It is preconditioned by the fact that it is them who are to practically react to new security challenges. In modern world nuclear weapons are to be considered as a part of spectrum of political components of "force" (because possession of nuclear weapons provides prestige and a status for a state on the world arena). The matter also is in the fact that in peace time and in conditions of limited armed conflicts nuclear weapons have mainly political functions, it is kind of the "last argument".

1. VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF MILITARY FORCE AND ON THE PLACE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN THE POST BIPOLAR WORLD.

Today, on the threshold of the XXI century humankind still faces the same seemed to be insoluble, questions of war and peace. In the light of complex processes of continuing transformation of international relations system these questions have possessed special actuality. As the chain of historical events shows, despite radical changes in the world, not a single state, including Switzerland, has not renounced national armed forces, has not proved by concrete deeds numerous statements of politicians that military force cannot be a political instrument in the modern world. Apparently, one can say here only about changes in forms and methods of their using. Obviously, without determining a place of military force in the world arena, one can not only build a proper military organization of a country to defend the national interests and provide security, but even to say about pursuing more or less effective policy.

Lots of theories and conceptions differently explaining development of military force, essence, causes, sources and nature of wars exist at present. Very often representatives of different political schools have different understanding of basic notions such as "force", "power", "war" and "military power". It is worth mentioning that under modern conditions, which are characterized by significant changes, as compared with the Cold War times, inevitable revaluation of the formed up notions and categories is going on and more precise definition of the notions system has become the necessity for the military trying to prove their fitness.¹

Use of military force may take a number of different forms and methods. Today, the majority of military and scientists admit, that role of the military force as a factor of international relations undergoes significant changes. Their character, in many ways, is determined by the new post Cold War and decay of the USSR balance of forces, by disorder in the existed system of international relations and by evolution of views of leading military powers concerning methods and forms of force application on sources of threats, on those

¹ The problem of definitions of "war", "military conflict", etc. and their influence on the building of modern armed forces are discussed in the book by Col. (ret.) Valery I. Korchmit-Matyushov, "The Our Mission Is Primary. About Philosophy, Sense and Perception of War and State," SIP RIA, Moscow, 1998.

centers of force which may hamper national interests and extension of influence within the sphere of international relations.² In the light of the above-mentioned, the most important now is the question: What is (or will be) the reason for use of military force in the dramatically changed post Cold War international conditions?"

After the decay of the Soviet Union and the whole Eastern block a discussion about the new world arrangement went on with the new intensity. However, it is too early to say that a clear picture of the forming up new world order exists. Representatives of different political schools and trends till now failed to agree concerning main parameters of the world system development. All this also points on complicity of the ongoing changes, which enables some political scientist to say not about a new world order, but about "a disorder".³ Thus, at present one can only guess about a new place, which military force, and in particular conventional armed forces, will occupy as a political instrument built into the new system of international relations.

According to a rather unanimous opinion of scientists, sudden termination of the Cold War and collapse of one of the opponents led to a transition to a new phase of international geopolitical balance between the new, still forming up, "power centers". The main characteristics of a "future balance point" can be seen only in general. As a result, capabilities for management of the world transition processes are narrowed significantly.

In the opinion of Gregory Coply, editor of "Strategic Policy Magazine", even the only World's superpower (the USA) is not yet capable to completely dominate in the World using political, military or economic power levers. That means there is no a country capable of exercising total dictatorship in the world within the framework of "the new world order" to maintain discipline, regulated from a single center.

Thus, opposing the forecasts of a famous political scientist F.Fukuyama, one can say that after the victory of one of the sides in the "West-East" conflict the world has not simplified, but has become more complicated, conflicts have not disappeared but possessed a more complicated character (that means the "end of the World" has not come yet). In this

² I.Y. Zhinkina, "The Factor of Military Force in the U.S. system of strategic purposes," USA - EPI, No.4, April 1996, p. 50.

connection in articles of analysts, devoted to the political situation in the world, one can more and more frequently come across such words as "chaos", "lack of organization and control". Clifford Bill, editor of "The Janes' International Defence Review", says that the so-called "peaceful period of history", because of the unprecedented frequency and level of use of armed forces was, probably, was hard to be imagined in the edge of 80-90 –ties.⁴

The growing linguistic, religious and cultural diversification, connected, mainly, with strong migration waves of the "third world countries" to the countries of "the first world" is considered to be one of the main sources of future conflicts. Along with this, many big, industrially developed countries find themselves in new realities, when within a country's geographic borders live not only a hundreds years old, characterized by more or less unified cultural traditions nation, but a number of rather numerous nationalities with different culture. In such conditions - facing new stability, security and economic prosperity threats, when the key notion "national identity" is differently understood by different groups of population it becomes difficult to maintain national unity.

According to Lawrence Freedman, famous professor of war studies, the situation has been also aggravated by the fact of de-colonization. Today the world counts unprecedented number of countries and , as a result of arms trade, many of them are capable of purchasing of considerable military arsenals, which very often are being distributed among non governmental groups , such as: groups of dissidents, religious sects, organized criminal structures, radical political parties of opposition, groups of terrorists and so on.⁵ In addition internal violence, and sometimes between the states is still a rather common business in the world arena.

Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War has given a new pulse to the thesis that a big war has no perspective. However, the war, as a phenomenon, is hardly dead. It has simply changed its appearance at the present stage of human being development. During all most three centuries it was considered a norm for national states. And there is nothing surprising in it that appearance on the world arena of other, than states, actors, has brought about growth of

³ See, for instance, Zb. Brzezinski, *Out of Control. Global Turmoil on the Eve of XXI-st Century*, N.Y., 1993.

⁴ *Jane's IDR*, May 1997, v.30, p.1.

⁵ Lawrence Freedman, "The Changing Forms of Military Conflict", *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, pp.39-56.

number of "private" armies considering an armed conflict as a "legal" business. All this provoked appearance of new, having military character, threats.

David Shearer, a researcher from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, considers that the main cause for such situation is in the increasing incapacity of weak governments to resolve violence problems within their states, which promotes "private" armies and freelance market prosperity.⁶

It is necessary to emphasize, that parameters of the international relations system, correspondingly involving the European, are under transformation process. Recently political scientists and researchers considered a state as the main and the only actor on the international political stage. In spite of structure variety existing within international relations system, a sovereign state, recognized by the World Community, remains its main structural element, because the national state is only capable of ensuring effective and comprehensive defense of a person and society from different threats, which in other words can be attributed as "national security". The national security goals, however, differ from state to state. For one group it is a matter of survival, for the other – reaching welfare and even prosperity. In conditions of limited amount of the world resources (in the broad sense) such differences bear a powerful confrontation element. The backward countries are being "pushed out" from the world development orbit and become international outcast.

A tendency of governmental structures to loose capability of solving problems faced by citizens of sovereign states is one of the characteristic features of today, which predetermines desire of a part of population to separate. External forces in their interests, including mercenary motives, often use this fact (example closing of "infrastructure corridors").

All this enables to say that the majority of dangers which humankind may face in the XXI-st century will contain military factors, capable, under certain conditions, of transforming into a direct military threat. However, the direct military dangers and threats increasingly loose signs of belonging to a certain state. At present this fact forces political researchers to say about degradation of the Westphalia system of international relations, in which the

international arena actor was unanimously associated with the "nation-state" notion. Dominic Moisi, a French scientist Deputy Director of the French Institute of International Relations and Editor of "The International Policy" magazine, after the recent events in Yugoslavia said that " war in Kosovo has introduced a new order, which significantly diminished both sanctity of national sovereignty and also the borders." ⁷

The changes taken place within the system of international relations resulted, as it has been said above, in the fact that not only states with their armed forces, but also not structuralized or under structuralized subjects can be the main participants in the armed struggle. This fact, in many respects, determines changes of forms of a military conflict and opposition. Nowadays, the majority of politicians are unanimous in an opinion that the large-scale, total war has been left in the past. The so-called "small wars" are coming to substitute it. The experts are including subversive activities, guerilla struggle and similar actions within this notion. In general such kind of a war can be attributed as "improvised active actions of small (in comparison with a regular army) detachments, arranged by population, army, a government or a party under a special, for a certain case, principle in order to inflict direct moral or other kind of damage to the enemy with the use of all means available". ⁸ The main danger of this form of war is impossibility in fact to separate civilian population from the armed groupings, and arms and violence becomes main instruments for reaching political goals.

Along with this, during last decades the developed European states have showed out an increasing reluctance to use military force against one another or against less strong countries. Many politicians and scientists attributed their hesitations as a proof for a conclusion of diminishing of the role of the armed forces in politics. They put the following arguments for it: the cost, risks and difficulties of use of military force and the armed forces are significantly increasing but probable benefits have a tendency to decrease. Ivan S. Bloch a Russian economist and statesman, who believed that a low parameter "cost-effectiveness" will make a big war extremely unprofitable, paid attention to this fact even in the end of the

⁶ David Shearer, "Outsourcing War", Foreign Policy, Fall 1998, p.68.

⁷ Dominique Moisi, "The Last Gasp of a Former Superpower", Financial Times, 25 November 1999, p.15.

⁸ See M.A. Drobov, "Small War: guerilla wars and diversion activity», Almanac "Vympel" (Pennant), Moscow, 1998.

XIX-th century.⁹

With the invention of nuclear weapons the large-scale war automatically possessed the destructive character, which gave a significant support for views that the military force has no perspective. Development of integration processes, globalization and increasing interdependence between the states have increased the negative attitude of a number of scientists towards use of force for political reasons.

With the collapse of socialist camp and appearance of new democratic states in Western and Central Europe, a liberal theory of "democratic world" was reborn. Its essence is in the statement that democracies are more peace loving by its nature than autocratic or totalitarian regimes. Thus, apologists of this theory state that democracies will never fight democracies and history does not know such examples. A close according to which democracies profess compromise principles, and this, correspondingly, serve as the restriction for the use of force against groups adhere the same norms has become a popular explanation for this tendency. Liberal theories are based on the fact that economic interdependence forces countries to renounce the using of force against each other because war will endanger prosperity of both sides. Thus advocates of this point of view made a conclusion, that instead of elaborating mechanisms of building in armed forces into the European security system one must , using all means possible, stimulate democratization development and "impose democratic values" in the whole Europe and then in the whole World.¹⁰

Another pillar of liberalism (which is being connected with the name the US President Woodrow Wilson) is the postulate that spread of democracy ensures peace in the World because by its nature democratic countries are more peaceful than authoritarian and the world "must be made safe for democracy." At last, according to the latest liberal theories, international institutions such as International Atomic Energetic Agency, International Monetary Fund and other organizations could render a significant support in curbing

⁹ The Ivan Bloch Commemorative Conference "The Future of War" was held at St.Petersburg 24-27 February 1999. It was dedicated to the urgent issues of war and conflict studies. In particular, some researchers stated at the conference that the total major war became disadvantage and unprofitable as a result of ongoing process of globalization and world economic and political integration.

¹⁰ See, for example, Stephen M.Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", Foreign Policy, No 110, Spring 1998, p.39. Also this thesis was emphasized by Prof. Kulagin from Moscow Institute for International Relation Studies of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the St.Petersburg's Conference "The Future of War".

"egoism" in behavior of countries striving for an immediate profit by showing them that continuing cooperation will bring them greater dividends.

But in reality might and power, and also aspiration to possess them are the significant factors determining behavior of countries in the international arena and have deep roots in the history. As Hans J. Morgenthau, an American political scientist, noted that like other policies, international policy is the struggle for power and influence.¹¹ "The struggle for power is part of human nature and takes form in society according either to the competition or to the alignment of interests. Collaboration occurs when parties find their interests are coinciding. Rivalry, competition, and conflict result from the clash of interests."

No matter what will be the final goals in international policy, power is the immediate goal. State leaders and individuals may, in the end, provide freedom, prosperity and flourishing of the nation. They may define the goals as religious, philosophical, economic or social ideals. They may hope that these ideals, thanks to their internal power, or by miraculous outer interference, or as a result of natural development of humankind will triumph. They even may try to support these ideals by non political means, such as technical cooperation with other countries or international organizations. But as soon as they will try to reach their goals by means of international politics, they inevitably do it by striving for power. So, the very nature of states, which is the same as human being, has an innate desire to dominate, and pushes them to use armed forces for political reasons.

The more so, in opinion of representatives of realistic school, who still hold leading positions in political establishment of western society, the issue of non effectiveness of war is rather disputable. Very often it is war that prevents appearance of states –vamps (like fascist Germany), which carry threat for survival. That is why not being sure whether a revisionist regime threatening other states appears or not most of the countries try to maximize their relative force.

So, one can conclude, that the states are still paying special attention on the balance of force and worrying about possibility of an armed conflict. The analysis of debates which taken place in the popular political magazine "The Foreign Policy" in 1998 enable to make a

conclusion that the most world famous political scientists demonstrate their inclination to the conclusion that the end of the "Cold War" has not put the end to the policy of force. The more so, there is a rapidly spreading new tendency in international practice to solve problems endangering global and regional stability by military force.

Along with this, the recent events, such as American missile attacks on bases of terrorists in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998, NATO's operation in Yugoslavia and Russia's struggle against terrorism in Chechnya have marked the central position of military force within internal and external policies. Offering from the first glance, the clear prospect of rapid, simple, permissible and along with these possible solutions to difficult and hard to solve problems, military force becomes a preferable instrument of state policy. The more so, Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University, considers that "the deployment of U.S. forces into harm's way, once thought to be fraught with hazard and certain to generate controversy, has become common place. The result has been the renewed, intensified - and perhaps irreversible - militarization of U.S. foreign policy."¹² It can be partly explained by the fact that the USA remains the most powerful state from the military point of view.

In general, politicians of different trends more and more often started to resort to an instrument that used to be the "last reason". As the result the mankind witness "a spectacular outburst of military activism - not campaigns and battles, but myriad experiments in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement; the repeated use or threatened use of air power to warn, coerce or punish; and the employment of armed forces to bolster economic sanctions or to respond to anarchy, natural disaster and social disintegration."¹³ Related to this issue is the fact, that military "activism" is related to the so-called operations other than war, rather than to classic forms of war.

Very rarely such missions pursue classic victory over the enemy as the main goal. Like battle, "victory" has become an anachronism. The goal of such armed interventions is very rarely defined as a complete destruction of the enemy. More often the goal consists of

¹¹ H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*. N.Y. 1978.

¹² Andrew J. Bacevich, "Policing Utopia: The Military Imperatives of Globalization", *The National Interest*, No. 56, Summer 1999, p.5.

demonstration of disagreement with political or economic course of a political regime, changing its attitude to politics and dictating him the behavior line. Thus, the reassessment of the Clausewitz's historic dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means" is going on.

The peculiar feature of the present day state of affairs in the sphere of military policy and security is the beginning of the new stage of the broad discussion on matters pertaining to military building and the role of military force in the process of settlement of problems of foreign policy. A number of politicians, military experts and scientists are showing their inclination towards the thought that at present force and policy can not be separated. The former US President Bill Clinton in his speech in the National Defense University in January 1998 stressed, that "diplomacy and force are two sides of the same coin".¹⁴

Along with this, resent appearance of military conceptions (such as the "preventive defense" conception by the former Defense Secretary W. Perry, which give priority to non-military instruments is rather demonstrative. After the Cold War period, when the scale of military rivalry significantly decreased and former opponents stopped contest, there is the need for a principally new peacekeeping instruments. It is obvious now, that use only of military levers in the politics will promote sliding to mistrust between the states, which may turn into the total confrontation of the old times. That is why the search for a combination of forcible and diplomatic elements in military sphere, which will be the most effective in solving of the security problems, is going on.

Military force by no means is excluded from the spectrum of instruments for state policy implementation. For example in the American "A National Security Strategy for a New Century" adopted in 1999, great attention was paid to military means to uphold the American national interests all over the World including European continent. First of all, an important role "in creation of coalitions and forming of such in international situation which is able to protect and promote American interests" is given to the American Armed Forces. It is worth stressing that priority in this matter is given to the conventional armed forces: "The U.S. military plays a crucial role in shaping the international security environment in

¹³ Ibidem, p.5,6.

ways that protect and promote U.S. interests, but is not a substitute for other forms of engagement, such as diplomatic, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and educational activities. Through overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and training and exercises with allies and friends, our Armed Forces help to deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional stability and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies."¹⁵

American and West European military analysts stress that the desire to use military force does not automatically mean the desire to wage war. In February 1998 secretary of State M. Albright declared in her speech in the Tennessee State University, "We are talking about using military force, but we are not talking about a war... I think that is an important distinction".¹⁶ In fact it is a significant difference for military policy in general. Classical war presupposes significant material expenditures, victims and readiness of conflict sides for its escalation. Moreover, each war has features, named "mist of war" by the great military theorist Clausewitz. That is unpredictability of the course of war and its results and lack of control. That is why modern approaches to use of military force are based on the position that when conducting small-scale, limited in time and aims military operations, using the latest achievements in military science and technology it is possible to exercise necessary control over their course and to reach the predetermined results.

Reluctance of Western and also of Russian politicians to call violent actions with the use of armed forces a War has valid reasons. This is the way used by political establishment to control the situation, thus realizing the famous postulate - "War is very serious business to be given to the military". However, in this case it is very important to give limited in scale and time tasks for the military actions and to provide strict political control over course. Otherwise a danger of escalation and spread of the conflict will remain as a result of the momentum of the military machine's fly-wheel. It may bring to the situation when politicians will find themselves hostages of the military, which in the absence of a strict guidance, sometimes, set for themselves clear tasks.

¹⁴ Quoted in The National Interest, No. 56, Summer 1999, p.6.

¹⁵ A National Security Strategy for a New Century of the U.S., The White House, US GPO, Washington DC, December 1999, p.14.

¹⁶ Quoted in The National Interest, No. 56, Summer 1999, p.7.

Thus, when using military force as a political instrument one must strictly adhere to the parameters assigned for its application. American analysts, for example, stress that one must be extremely careful when intending to use military force. Every military action must be followed by a clear diplomatic strategy aimed at the end of the conflict. It means, that political leaders must clearly imagine what tasks they want and are able to solve with the help of military force. They also must define a threshold of its further application in order to prevent undesirable escalation of the conflict. Within the context of limited interests, and thus, limited involvement, one must be ready for a decisive application of military force if it was chosen for the military solution to the problem. Only "spotted" air strikes or other symbolic actions will hardly have an effect. At last, not being sure in the victory, one must not resort to military actions. One must weigh the consequences of a probable failure before starting military operations.

Analyzing the latest examples of use of military force by the USA, NATO and Russia one may come to a conclusion that by themselves, even hundred percent accomplished, military operations are not sufficient for the general victory (within this context – victory is fulfillment of given political tasks). We can say about a success only then when armed forces are used in complex with other instruments of big politics. For example, the NATO military operation in Yugoslavia was accomplished in combination with political, economic and diplomatic pressure on Miloshević regime. The military phase of the operation envisaged limited tasks, aimed not at seizure of the territory but, first of all, at inflicting economic damage to the enemy, at destroying his industrial base and breach of his will to resist in order to force him to start negotiations on favorable to the North –Atlantic Alliance conditions. Nobody tasked the military to take Belgrade and for reaching political goals, as it seemed for the politicians, massed air-missile strikes without use of the Army seemed to be sufficient. But measures known as informational and psychological special operations, diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions preceded and accompanied the operation. Thus, the USA and NATO tried to deploy in Yugoslavia a "system" within which military force acted as one (may be the most important) component. In this connection many analysts used to say, that the Kosovo operation was a touchstone for new approaches to the use of the armed forces within the European security system.

On the contrary, Russians failed to achieve the desirable goals during the first Chechen campaign and the second one is still under way. Of course, one must understand the difference between these two conflicts. If the Kosovo conflict leveled up to an international or an interstate level, the latter, with no doubts, is a classical example of an internal armed conflict. But, as it seems, one can draw some parallels. Then, as it seems, despite of the seizure of key strongholds of the rebels and control over the main part of the Chechen republic, the general goals of the war were not reached and Russia suffered a political defeat (nothing to say about the tremendous losses in personnel and materiel). Weak preparation of the whole operation, nothing to say about purely military miscalculations, when some components (military, political, diplomatic, economic and so on) were used with no connection and were not bound within one system and joint by a general clear task. As a result of it, Russian actions in the Northern Caucuses brought along a lot of questions pertaining to their legality, expediency and were not properly supported by the local population.

In general, in peace time, defining tasks and goals of military force application is still the main problem for the political establishment of many countries. Deciding when, where and how to use military force is in fact a very complicated matter. In the post bipolar world in the large – scale war safe conditions it is extremely difficult to take a decision when, where and how to use limited, as compared with the " Cold War" period, military resources.

2. EUROPEAN SECURITY DIMENSIONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM.

2.1. Problems of European Strategic Balance and Control on Conventional Weapons

Europe is a unique region, which used to possess a rather stable security system. At present a large-scale major war is hardly probable on the continent, but probability of emergence of limited armed conflicts along the so called "instability arch" (from Turkey along southern borders of the former Soviet Union) and in the Balkans still exists. Unlikely the such conflicts will endanger seriously the European security system. But, like the last Yugoslavian conflict, they may cast doubt on firmness of Euro-Atlantic defensive and security partnership and negatively affect relations within the triangle USA/NATO-Europe/EU-Russia. The most grave dangers are in the outlying regions. In this connection, topic issues faced by politicians of European countries are: if they are ready to react on "marginal" challenges and, proceeding from that, what kind of the future security system to build?

Integration processes in Western and Central Europe, role of OSCE, NATO, Russia and efforts of the EU within the context of their Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) influence the future of the European Security System.

At present significant efforts are undertaken to consolidate of the European security system. So, the European Security Charter called in other words a "New European Constitution" was adopted in the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November, 1997. The document stresses, that the existing challenges for security in the European continent are to be solved jointly by means of coordinated policy of all OSCE countries. As for politico-military dimension it says that:

"The politico-military aspects of security remain vital to the interests of participating States. They constitute a core element of the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security. Disarmament, arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) are important parts of the overall effort to enhance security by fostering stability, transparency and predictability in the military field. Full implementation, timely adaptation and, when required, further development of arms control agreements and CSBMs are key contributions

to our political and military stability."¹⁷

Apparently, the OSCE will focus its main efforts on non-military instruments for providing security, such as the arms control (CFE), confidence building measures, setting missions to monitor a conflict development. In particular, it is expressed that the CFE Treaty "must continue to serve as a cornerstone of European security." The adapted Treaty thereby is aimed at providing an important additional contribution to European stability and security.

It should be emphasized, however, that in the definite sense it is possible to speak about the qualitative other agreement, which, nevertheless, has retained its initial essence. In the adapted CFE Treaty, the national and territorial principle is already realized, rather than being a block pattern.¹⁸ For each State Party the National and Territorial Ceilings (NC, TC) of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (TLE) are stipulated. As a whole in comparison with the old edition the CFE Treaty, political constituting has increased. As a result the essential downturn of levels of armaments, first of all, in ground categories was consolidated, in comparison with the old Treaty.

Also in the Treaty, the modern tendency of expanding peacekeeping operations is taken into account. In this connection, the Territorial Ceilings are temporarily authorized to exceed the established level, in the case that military operations are conducted in the interest of peace, under the mandate of the United Nations or OSCE. So, amount of arms and troops, and also duration of their deployment in definite territory will be regulated according to the given mandate.

Thus, CFE Treaty is built in toolkit of OSCE, for the prevention of crises and post conflict regulation. The adapted Treaty has open character and it will allow the consolidation of the CFE as one of major tools for ensuring the European stability and security.

However, Russia can be irritated by a number of unsolved problems in the adapted CFE Treaty.¹⁹ For example, the fact, that the Territorial Ceilings do not cover an air component,

¹⁷ Charter For European Security, OSCE, Istanbul, November 1999, www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/istachart99e.htm.

¹⁸ Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe// CFE.DOC/1/99. 19 November 1999.

¹⁹ Sergei M.Yermakov, "The CFE Treaty as a Stability Factor of the New System of European Security", Peace and

and, hence, number of the countries, first of all, the NATO nations have a possibility of escalating of air power in the region. As far as withdrawal of aircraft from territorial limitations is concerned, Russia proceeds from experience of conducting modern battle actions, reconfirming leading role of aviation in successful conducting of military operation. The special importance of this problem was confirmed by military actions of NATO against Yugoslavia, when the air component constituted the main projection of military power. The aircraft, as a matter of fact, is inferential from territorial limitations, can deposit an element of unpredictability to influence political-military conditions. Also, the conservation of flank limitations allows to speak about non-confidence, remaining in the West, towards Russia and other new independent states. So, the adapted Treaty are still focusing on the main Cold War threat of large-scale war in Europe.

However, at present it is necessary to solve new problems, which were not in a zone of attention of the CFE Treaty. First of all, it is the control of the Navy. Though this question has a key meaning for the security of Europe, and Russia has repeatedly put forward the offers concerning a scope of trust measures for the Navy, there is as yet no coordinated position amongst the States Parties concerning this problem.²⁰

Some experts suggest the reconsideration of categories of arms limited to the Treaty (TLE), the establishment of a measure of control on military-transport aircraft and an infrastructure, as supplementary measures on the strengthening of security, trust and strengthening of a verification mode above conventional armaments.²¹

The analysis of the weapon, used during contemporary armed conflicts, allows to make a conclusion, that the majority of arms can be potentially considered as being subject to limitation in any new agreement on an arms control. Therefore list of conventional armaments limited CFE Treaty, can be expanded in the future agreements on an arms control at the expense of including new kinds.

In particular, the artillery systems are necessary also in a category for including howitzers,

Security, International Institute for Peace. Vol.XXXI, December 1999, pp.1-9.

²⁰ V.Mukhin, V.Proshkin, "The New European Balance of Power Has Been Established", *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* (Independent Military Review), No. 48(171), December 10, 1999, pp. 1,2.

²¹ J.E. Peters, *CFE and Military Stability in Europe*. National Defense Research Institute. RAND. 1997.

cannon and mortars of smaller caliber, than it is provided in CFE Treaty (up to 81 mm.). It is also expedient to enter anti-tank guided missile complexes, both air-defence and anti-tank guns with the purpose of an establishment of the control above air-defence guns of caliber up to 23 mm and anti-tank guns of caliber up to 76 mm. It is necessary to note, that in the Balkan and North Caucasus conflicts plenty of modern anti-tank guided missiles having high destructive fire power were applied, therefore it also necessary to include these in the list of controllable arms. Of course, it is very difficult, but there is urgent need for control on trade and distribution light-weapons.

Also there is need to pay more attention on the new capabilities of conventional precision guided weapons (PGW).²² Importance of this problem is underscored by the fact that development of U.S. precision guided weapons advanced to a new qualitative level in the last decade, and, as the analysis shows, new types of PGWs can present a real threat to the Russian Strategic Forces. It is notable, that there is a clear trend to shift the deterrence role from nuclear to conventional precision guided weapons in developing U.S. military doctrine. Existing plans of the U.S. Department of Defense for the next decade assume deployment of nearly 150,000 PGWs as well as corresponding infrastructure, ensuring efficient use of these weapons. These tendencies can not help causing agitation of the Russian side on the background of its growing economical problems and further degradation of its conventional forces. Moreover, the Russian positive attitudes toward the intentions of the West were undermined by a sequence of events in the end of 1990-s: NATO expansion to the East, NATO military operation in Yugoslavia and U.S. preparations for deployment of the National Missile Defense system. The listed events and tendencies are more often perceived in Russia as parts of one chain aimed at depriving Russia of its nuclear deterrence capability, the last symbol of superpower.

In particular, the existing number of U.S. delivery systems may become sufficient for inflicting a preemptive disarming conventional strike at the Russian land based strategic forces, unless measures are taken to limit strategic delivery systems with conventional payloads.

²² Eugene Miasnikov, Precision Guided Weapons and Strategic Balance, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology <http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/default.htm>

Given the circumstances, Eugene Miasnikov, a Russian arms control expert from Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology supposes that Russia should very carefully consider and choose measures on bilateral de-alerting of strategic nuclear arsenals.²³ These measures need to be followed by imposing unilateral limits on U.S. conventional weapons. Measures, diminishing destabilizing effects of long range sea launched cruise missiles (SLCM), may include limiting the number of SLCMs allowed for deployment per a submarine and limiting attack submarine patrol areas. E.Miasnikov also concludes that there is the need of imposing limits on tactical and reconnaissance aviation deployed at territories of new NATO members.

Thus, one can stress that the modern arms control system (and in particular conventional arms control) in Europe does not meet to the realities and developing military balance in region.

Thus, we can stress that the modern arms control system (and in particular conventional arms control) in Europe does not meet the realities and developing military balance in region. It should be emphasized, however, that the existing agreements in this sphere, for example the adapted CFE Treaty, are useful but insufficient. The problem is that this Treaty satisfies only initially assigned goals of removing the threat of sudden large-scale war in Europe with massive using of heavy armament

Today, however, there is no rivalry of a similar nature to NATO - WTO, and the old Cold War danger of large-scale war in Europe is not high-priority issue. The basic threat now refers to the possible distribution of regional and local conflicts, which, for example, take place in the Balkans or in Chechnya. So, ongoing guerilla wars, terrorist actions, insurgent military activities etc. endanger regional stability. The lessons taken from modern armed conflicts demonstrate that light armaments, especially small-arms, are used more often. Moreover, a necessary condition for development of internal armed conflict (or even intergovernmental) is if there is sufficient amount of armament at so-called insurgent groupings and these groupings have reliable weapon supply. Taking above mentioned into account, politicians should work out clear and strict approaches to military insurgent and

²³ Ibidem.

separatist groupings, and also to so-called "private armies".

However, a number of political scientists suppose that the similar "private armies" can be useful (when, for example, security structures or developed countries are not ready to sacrifice their soldier lives, or when they simply are not capable to deploy the peace-making forces in time). For example, above mentioned David Shearer offers a view that the use of paid foreign military force is as old as warfare itself. "Its nature has, however, altered significantly in the late twentieth century," considers British researcher. "Military companies" have exploited the increasing reluctance of Western governments and multilateral organizations to intervene directly in civil conflicts.²⁴

D. Shearer emphasized, that the reluctance of multilateral intervention in low-level civil conflicts opens a market opportunity for military companies, which have in some cases acted as foreign policy proxies for governments unable or unwilling to play a direct and open role.

Foreign forces or mercenaries tended to prosper in unstable conditions, or following a change in the existing order. Increases in private military forces have also often coincided with the end of a period of conflict which saw standing armies reduced. Both conditions prevail after the end of the Cold War, as they did in mid-fourteenth century Europe, when mercenary activity expanded rapidly at the end of the first phase of The Hundred Years' War. As with post-Cold War era, the loosening of a rigidly defined order and the absence of firm central control created an atmosphere conducive to the "privatised" soldier.

The expansion of the private military sector since the end of the Cold War stems partly from Western military-force reductions. Demobilization has released former soldiers on to the job market, while indirectly the contraction of a state's armed forces has narrowed opportunities for promotion and advancement and encouraged others to leave. The net result is a sharp increase in expertise in the private sector.

The armed teenagers, criminals and guerillas that frequently comprise insurgent forces prosper from instability. Also Shearer notes that "given the particular challenges of low-

²⁴ David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper No.316, IISS 1998, p.9.

level internal conflict, some western states have appeared to tolerate the activities of private military and security companies."²⁵

So, it should be emphasized, that private-sector intervention in civil conflicts will chiefly be determined by a state's willingness or ability to pay for it. Military companies may give governments the means to quell civil conflicts that appear intractable. The increasing role of the private sector in the security field has coincided with a perceptible shift in international approaches to internal conflict since the end of the Cold War.

But, as the events show, for example Balkan and North Caucasus cases, the presence of such "private" armies becomes destabilizing element. Frequently, such armed groupings are transformed to the ordinary mercenaries to which there is an unequivocal relation. And very frequently presence of such "liberation" armies does not allow to solve a conflict. The clear example is a situation around the Liberation Army of Kosovo (KLA), which was organized and well equipped by clandestine forces and actually under NATO's support has waged "liberation" war against the Yugoslavian regular armed forces. At present, it has gone beyond the control. The measures on its disarmament were failed and now KLA's activities leads to the escalation and the expansion of the Balkan conflict to the territory of Macedonia. (It is possible to notice, here, that the Chechen separatists have also provided a conflict escalation and unleashing of the second Chechen war. Their assault and armed aggression in Dagestan in summer 1999 have triggered the mechanism for involving the Russian armed forces into the conflict).

Meanwhile, Robert Neil Cooper, a senior lecturer in politics and international relations from University of Plymouth, argues that disarmament and demobilization agreements between warring parties on the one hand, with supply side initiatives to prevent the excessive or inappropriate acquisition of arms by actors in post-conflict states on the other, are very important.²⁶ But traditional approaches to post-conflict demilitarization are problematic. Moreover, as the 'security first' approach recognizes, demilitarization also has to proceed alongside the development of effective law and order and defense capabilities for the

²⁵ Ibidem, p.34.

²⁶ Robert Neil Cooper, "Demilitarisation and (Lack of?) Transformation in Kosovo", Arms Control and Disarmament Cluster, Geneva Centre for Security Policy GCSP, 2000, <http://www.fsk.ethz.ch>

political entities that emerge out of conflict. At best this presents complex challenges for the management of peacebuilding processes, at worst it can become a contradiction which undermines peacebuilding.

A further crucial element in any process of demilitarization and peacebuilding is the provision of law and order. In particular, it is important to establish a secure environment so that a cycle of revenge and hatred is halted and so that those elements of society more willing to contemplate reconciliation can begin the process without fear of intimidation. However, for instance Kosovo and Chechnya have experienced serious flaws in the provision of security and enforcement of the law.

Thus, summing-up above-stated, it is possible to make the following conclusions:

- the balance of power in Europe is in transition. So, today it is still early to speak about its precise structure;

- the modern conventional arms control system has does not meet the new realities in region. The existing arms control agreements satisfy only goals of removing the threat of sudden large-scale war in Europe with massive using of heavy armament, but this system can not resolve new problems in the modern security environment which characterize the tendencies to change the nature of the military conflicts and the ways of battle actions (such as spread of "small wars" and guerillas activities and development of modern conventional high precision and smart weapons).

That is why there is strong necessity

- to take the appropriate measures on regional or sub-regional levels on conventional arms control;
- to establish measures interfering to distribution on continent light armaments and small arms, and
- to develop the clear approaches to armed private armies, volunteers and so on.

As to the volunteers, they could be involved in military operations for peace goals only under the strict control of regional or sub-regional security structures. Otherwise such armed groups should be equated to the mercenaries with all consequences following from it. Besides, deep reductions and restructuring of conventional forces for joint peacekeeping operations could be a goal for the Conventional Armed Forces of Europe-2 (CFE-2) treaty

process.

2.2. EU's Defense and Security Initiatives

All in all, today it is still early to speak about clear security and defense system in Europe. As a whole, modern strategic balance in region is defined by the relations in a "triangle": the USA- Western Europe - Russia. Last initiatives of the EU speed up the process of development of the new security and defense relations in the European region.

At present the EU is eager to become a force ensuring hard security in the continent and around it. There are also motions that with the approval of the European Parliament the EU could ask the UN SC for a mandate to carry out its own peace making actions.

Still, one must point out, that the EU pre-crisis and crisis settlement experience, excluding the civilian component, was more negative than positive. Carl Bildt, a former EU Supreme Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995-97, directly witnesses it. He said that "the EU interference to the Bosnian crisis as an unlucky mediator, then as ineffective peace-keeper and then as American junior partner in the role of a peace-maker was an ominous experience."²⁷ In C.Bildt's opinion, the EU failure in Bosnian crisis prevention was a lesson for the CFSP and showed out that all political strategies of such a kind of matters must have military support.

Appointment of Javier Solana as EU' s High Representative for CFSP in the end of November 1999 and simultaneously as the Secretary General of the WEU has marked the practical fusion process of two organizations. The Helsinki EU summit on 10-11 December 1999 eliminated completely existing during the last few years strategic uncertainty as for the European component within the continental security system. It is clearly pointed out in the Summit's documents that the process is to be over by the end of 2000, when WEU fulfil its historic predestination.

The more so, the documents terminologically clearly cut determine that EU will pursue Common European Security and Defense Policy(CESDP) to support the CFSP. There were

also determined general directions of its development. One of them is a "non military crisis management" in which EU is going to play the leading role. The other is ensuring of EU capability to carry out independently military crisis management operations within the framework of Petersberg's tasks in case "if NATO is not involved in the crisis settlement". The Helsinki's decisions allowed Europe's future defense structure to be formulated. So, the European Union has added military potential to its already significant economic and financial power by establishing new permanent political and military bodies within the EU Council:²⁸

- A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC), to deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP. During a military crisis, this PSC will exercise political and strategic direction of the operation—under the authority of the Council;
- A Military Committee (MC), composed of EU Member States' Chiefs of Defense, or their military representatives. The MC will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC; and
- A Military Staff (MS) to provide the Council with military expertise and support to the CESDP. The MS will perform early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for the EU's conflict prevention and crisis management ("Petersberg") tasks.

At Helsinki, EU Member States further committed themselves to a number of military "headline goals": by the year 2003, the EU should be able to deploy up to 15 brigades (or 50,000–60,000 troops) for Petersberg missions. The brigades should be militarily self-sustaining and be comprised of the necessary command, control, and intelligence capabilities; logistics; and other infrastructures, to include about 500 aircraft and 15 ships. These new EU troops should be rapidly deployable—within 60 days—and be able to sustain such a deployment for at least 1 year. Around 150,000 troops will be required for rotation purposes. The main aim would, therefore, be for EU states to have enough forces at hand to form the equivalent of an army corps of anywhere from 40,000 to 60,000 men. Such a corps would out of necessity be self-sufficient in terms of logistics, intelligence, and communications, and be ready for use in time of need for tasks in which the United States and/or NATO decide not to become engaged.

²⁷ Carl Bildt "The global lessons of Bosnia. What global role for the EU?", The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, Brussels, September 1997, p19-27. Also this opinion was expressed by author at the conference "The Future of War", St.Petersburg 24-27 February 1999.

²⁸ Presidency Conclusions – Helsinki, 10 and 11 December 1999/ SN 300/99, p.38-42.

Although the dimensions of the CESDP are now becoming clear, much remains ambiguous and undecided. Some experts, for example Dr. Peter van Ham, professor of West European Politics at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch - Partenkirchen, argues that there are still serious questions about EU's possibility to set up a credible and effective military infrastructure and future relations with NATO and the U.S.²⁹ Nevertheless, he characterizes the US's approach to the European military initiatives as "ambiguous enthusiasm". Dr. P. Ham stresses, in particular, that "unlike NATO, the "New EU" will not only have a sturdy military capability at its disposal, but also a broad arsenal of economic, financial, and political instruments of statecraft. "Given that most of Europe' s regional problems and conflicts may not be truly resolved by military means—at least not in the long run - the EU is bound to become the actor of choice to address European security challenges."³⁰

In this connection, the main objective for the EU is establishment a common European defense policy with a minimum military dependency on America. However, the US is concerned that a more self-reliant Europe will undermine the old NATO tradition of US hegemony and, therefore, risk a transatlantic decoupling.

As for Russia, a lot of political experts note that the EU's and WEU's focus on Petersberg missions seems to create a benign psychological climate in Russia which makes cooperation with the EU/WEU easier and politically less sensitive.³¹ Europe's efforts to set up a CESDP clearly point in the direction of a strengthening and rapprochement of Western Europe' s security institutions (WEU and the EU's CFSP) are perceived positively within Russia, mainly because they strengthen Western Europe's voice within NATO, which may give Russia more political incentives and possibilities for cooperation with the Alliance. In some degree this approach is Cold War reflection, when the USSR actively encouraged West European military cooperation in an effort to weaken the transatlantic link and to "decouple" the United States from its European allies. So, at present Russia is not negative about the EU' s defense plans. However the situation could change as the Europeans will

²⁹ Peter van Ham, Europe' s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia, The Marshall Center Papers No.1, 2000, p.15.

³⁰ Ibidem, p.20

³¹ Dmitry Danilov, Stephan De Spieggeleire, From Decoupling to Recoupling. Russia and Western Europe: a New

manage to establish their own "separable but not separate" armed forces.

That is why, Richard Cohen, the Director of the Senior Executive Seminar and a professor of NATO and European Security Studies George of C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, emphasised that "the ultimate goal, in the longer term, is that all the countries of the OSCE, including Russia, are brought into a larger Eurasian–Atlantic Cooperative Security organization that could bring harmony and stability to much of the northern half of our planet."³²

In its turn, NATO plans to continue and develop its policy within the framework of the European Security and Defense Identity conception and Defense Capability Initiative, entitled to minimize the existing gap between military potentials of European countries and the USA and to give the European partners an opportunity to act independently depending on the situation.

As the result of this reforming process the West European defense and security system has become more harmonious and clear. NATO still constitute its base, EU "just in case" will create its own operational potential and fusion with the WEU will exclude duplicate elements and a certain ephemerality from this sphere.

Thus, we can stress, that today and in the nearest future the armed forces of EU will not be completely ready to conduct independent operations and will depend on the NATO and the USA.

On the whole, it is obvious, that the NATO is and will remain in the nearest future the basic military force in region capable force projection for the peace-making purposes. The new Strategic concept of an Alliance is devoted to this mission in many respects.

2.3. NATO's Strategic Concept

The new NATO Strategic Concept adopted in April 1999 makes attempts to entitle the Alliance armed forces with new tasks. At present a new system of Euro-Atlantic security the

Security Relationship, Chaillot Paper No.31, Paris, WEU_ISS, April 1998.

³² Richard Cohen, Michael Mihalka, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, The Marshall Center Papers No.3, 2001, p.2.

main body of which will consist, according to the views of Western politicians, of NATO and the renewed EU is being deployed. Thus, the Alliance military machine obtains a new predestination. In its new conception the Alliance entitles itself with the right to use military force without the UN SC authorization in different situations such as: counteraction to the mass destruction weapons, in cases of international terrorism, drugs spread and so forth. However, military activism of the North Atlantic Treaty directly comes in antagonism with the pre-declared tasks of the Alliance and contradicts the OSCE provisions in the legal sphere.

The Strategic Concept declares, that at present the Alliance adheres to a broader approach to the security problem. Effective reacting on crisis situations, also by means of operations not envisaged by Article 5 means use of military force in cases other than self-defense or the UN Charter actions. The Concept gives a bigger stress on such kind of operations than on immediate defensive tasks. In particular it underlines that operations not envisaged by Article 5 may be as vitally important as settlement of some tasks of collective defense.

However, the Concept declares, that "the primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance's forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and - in case of conflict - to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw."³³

To enlarge the scopes and possibilities for conducting of operations not connected with Article 5, the Concept gives a wide number of reasons. As a result regional crises on the Alliance periphery, ethnic and political hostility, territorial disputes, inadequate or lame attempts of reforms, breach of human rights and decay of states were attributed as risks and dangers for security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region

Thus, all those negative occurrences which is a characteristic of the current moment connected with the transitional period from one (the bipolar) model of international relations

³³ The Alliances Strategic Concept, The reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999, Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 1999.

to the other (multipolar) are attributed by the Concept as factors which may precondition NATO military–force actions. In particular, the Concept stresses that a broader circle (than an armed attack) including terrorism, subversive activities and organized crime, irregularity in vital resources supply and even uncontrolled movement of huge masses of people, especially as a result of armed conflicts may jeopardize the Alliance security interests.

Such goals influence armed forces; "As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO's borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning, and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons."³⁴

It is clearly understood, that the necessity of adoption of the new Alliance's Strategic Concept by the North Atlantic Treaty was preconditioned by the NATO strong wish to carry out the future armed actions to react on crises in accordance with its own necessity notion. Nevertheless, being stick to declarations of defense of human rights and democratic values, NATO makes an attempt of regulation of use of armed force by saying "in accordance with international law". It should be also emphasized, that the Concept puts serious attention to cooperation between the Alliance's military and civil bodies.

³⁴ Ibidem.

3. TASKS OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN THE LIGHT OF NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

3.1. US approaches to the use of armed forces

With its victory in the Gulf War and leading role in "Allied Force" operation in Yugoslavia the United States demonstrated an unprecedented mastery of conventional warfare, especially in the area of information technologies. Actually, according to the doctrinal documents U.S. forces have to protect and promote American interests: shaping the international security environment, responding to the full spectrum of crises, and preparing for the challenges of the future. In addition to shaping the security environment, U.S. forces have to responded to the full spectrum of crises and threats to American interests around the world:

"To sustain the position of leadership, the United States must maintain ready and versatile forces capable of conducting a wide range of military activities and operations—from deterring and defeating large-scale, cross-border aggression, to participating in smaller-scale contingencies, to dealing with transnational threats like terrorism."³⁵

However, as it is emphasized in the 2001 Annual Report to the President and the Congress of former Defense Secretary William S.Cohen, "U.S. national interests and limited resources argue for the selective use of U.S. forces. Decisions about whether and when to use military forces should be guided, first and foremost, by the U.S. national interests at stake—be they vital, important, or humanitarian in nature—and by whether the costs and risks of a particular military involvement are commensurate with those interests."³⁶ When vital national interests (when they are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality of the nation)are in the face of a threat, the U.S. can use their military power unilaterally. In other cases, use of the military should be both selective and limited, reflecting the importance of the U.S. interests at stake.

At the same time the decision to commit U.S. military forces will depend on the magnitude

³⁵ Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2001, William S.Cohen, DoD, U.S. GPO, Washington DC, 2001, p.4

³⁶ Ibidem, p.5

of the suffering, the ability of U.S. military forces to alleviate this suffering, and the expected cost to the United States both in terms of American lives and materiel, and in terms of limitations on the United States' ability to respond to other crises. Military forces will be committed only if other means have been exhausted or are judged inadequate. Such decisions also require identification of a clear mission, the desired end state of the situation, and a strategy for withdrawal once goals are achieved.

Thus, there is strong interest to limited use of military force. So, the Pentagon has elaborated a concept of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power.³⁷ The specific goal of MOOTW may be peaceful settlement, assistance rendered to civil authorities, or providing security for humanitarian assistance (HA) and peacekeeping. So, these operations comprise a wide range of possible response options, ranging from noncombat operations such as HA to combat operations such as peace enforcement and strikes and raids.

Thus, the limited military interventions include such missions as:

- * Military deployment in support of diplomacy.
- * The evacuation or rescue of U.S. and allied citizens.
- * The enforcement of sanctions, embargoes and exclusion zones.
- * Limited air strikes.
- * Noncombat support for allies in small wars.
- * Combat operations in small wars.

However, the conceptual document of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff "Joint Vision 2020" stresses that the overall goal of the America's Armed Forces transformation is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.³⁸

³⁷ JP1-02

³⁸ Joint Vision 2020. U.S. GPO, Washington DC, June 2000, p.1

effectively, it must prioritize where and how it chooses to defend its vital, important, and marginal interests, thereby avoiding both excessive activism that diffuses important resources and isolationism that eschews important opportunities to shape events.

Criterion #2 Military intervention should not jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to meet more important security commitments. America's current national military strategy is strategically bankrupt. Not only is the Bottom Up Review force too small to execute the two major regional conflicts strategy, but it is woefully underfunded as well. Huge interventions in areas of marginal security interest have exacerbated the strain on the U.S. military and made it doubtful that the military can mobilize the resources necessary to defend vital national interests and honor current security commitments.

Criterion #3 Military intervention should strive to achieve military goals that are clearly defined, decisive, attainable, and sustainable. Military interventions should be conducted to accomplish clearly definable military goals that are militarily achievable, consistent with overriding political objectives, and supported by enough force to achieve these goals. In Bosnia, the Clinton Administration has failed to define these military objectives clearly, and those objectives that have been articulated are insufficient to achieve the larger political goal of reaching a sustainable peace. Thus, there is no reliable way to measure success or failure, which is why Clinton has imposed a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The President, in effect, has made withdrawing U.S. forces on schedule the only clearcut, identifiable U.S. military goal in Bosnia.

Criterion #4 Military intervention should enjoy congressional and public support. President Clinton has made a habit of circumventing Congress in deciding to undertake military interventions. In nonemergency contingencies like Haiti and Bosnia, Congress should have the opportunity to vote on the merits of an intervention, not merely whether to support American troops already on the ground. Such decisions should not be made by polls; Americans traditionally are reluctant to intervene. However, when intervention is required, the President should mobilize public support (as President Bush did during the Persian Gulf War) so that American troops abroad will know that the nation and the

³⁹ American Military Intervention: A User's Guide, Background, No.1079, May 2, 1996, <http://www.heritage.org/>

Congress support not only the troops, but the actual goals of the operation.

Criterion #5 The armed forces must be allowed to create the conditions for success.

The U.S. armed forces must be allowed the operational freedom to create the conditions within which they can succeed. The U.S. military should never be placed in a situation where it has no control over the outcome, as was the case in both Haiti and Bosnia.

3.2. Evolution of the Russian Military Doctrines

The Russian still ongoing military reform has a thorny destiny. A number of uncertainties, a leapfrog of Ministries of Defense, economic perturbations, political dislocation and social disruption have affected Russia's military. Nowadays, however, there are key military doctrinal and conceptual documents. They are:

- the National Security Concept (10 January 2000);
- the Naval Doctrine, setting out the policy to 2010 (4 March 2000); and
- the Military Doctrine (21 April 2000).

The principal point addressed by the new National Security Concept is that military threats to Russia are on the increase: "The level and scope of military threats are growing. Elevated to the rank of strategic doctrine, NATO's transition to the practice of using military force outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could destabilize the entire global strategic situation. The growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new weapons and military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter the forms and methods of warfare."⁴⁰

The new Military Doctrine defines main threats to Russian security as external and internal. And several internal threats such as organized crime, terrorism, smuggling, and other illegal activities could threaten the Russian Federation's military security.⁴¹ On the whole, both

⁴⁰ "The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye* (Independent Military Review), No.1, 14 -20 January 2000, pp.1-6.

⁴¹ "The Military Doctrine of The Russian Federation," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Independent Newspaper), 22 April 2000.

Russia's Security Concept and Military Doctrine recognise "a decline in the threat of the unleashing of a large-scale war, including a nuclear war."

However, one way for Russia to respond to this threat is to enhance its nuclear forces to deter not just nuclear, but also, large-scale conventional attacks of the type demonstrated in the Balkans. For instance the new Military Doctrine states: "The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons—weapons [used] against Russia and its allies—as well as in response to a large-scale conventional aggression in critical situations for Russia and its allies."

But it is perhaps not surprising, since Russia's traditional, conventional military superiority all over the world has in fact declined during the last decade. That is why nuclear arsenals are so attractive for the Russian military and "hard" politicians. So, since 1993, Russia has adopted a nuclear first use strategic concept in order to de-emphasize the weaknesses in its conventional military forces.

Colonel-General Valerii Manilov, the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, in particular, expressed in this relation that "the integral formula of Russian policy in the field of nuclear weapons application may be reduced to the following: no aggression, no use of nuclear weapons."⁴² So, it is obviously, that Russia relies on its nuclear deterrent in order to forestall any military action against it, or its allies.

Nonetheless, some Russian critics claim that the threat of nuclear first use would not be a credible deterrent against NATO. For instance, Dr. Alexei G. Arbatov, a deputy chair of the State Duma Defense Committee of the RF (Parliament) stresses that "due to Russia's shortage of funding for maintenance and modernization of its nuclear forces, NATO will acquire a clear-cut nuclear strategic and tactical superiority over Russia during the next 10 years. Whereas a suicidal threat of nuclear escalation could present a credible deterrent against a full-scale, theater-wide conventional aggression - including major ground warfare - Balkan-type selective air and naval strikes, even if massive and prolonged, might not be

⁴² Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper), 25 April 2000.

deterred."⁴³

In the whole, A.Arbatov considers that "NATO's attack on Yugoslavia in March 1999 marked a watershed in Russia's assessment of its own military requirements and defense priorities. "Today Yugoslavia—Tomorrow Russia." This is the deeply felt public consensus since NATO's attack. "It has to be recognized that Russia's new war in Chechnya, initiated in the Fall of 1999, and its effect on the relationship between Russia and the West are closely tied to the events that took place in Kosovo earlier in the year. The war in Yugoslavia had a significant impact on Russia's leadership and public opinion."⁴⁴

The new doctrine outlines four priorities for military restructuring:

- establishing combined groups of the different types of armed forces of the Russian Federation (including those of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Interior Ministry, Border Guard Service and other services);
- improving the mobilization system and readiness of the MOD and other armed forces;
- improving staffing, equipment and training to enable conventional permanent-readiness forces to fulfil their missions;
- strengthening the armed forces' strategic-deterrence capabilities, including nuclear deterrence.

Once again conventional forces would need to be ready for the type of high-technology warfare (RMA type) dictated by NATO and the West, rather than focusing on the requirements of local or regional ground wars in the south. In reality, however, A.Arbatov notes that development and deployment of sophisticated military capabilities, analogous to that of NATO's massive, precision-guided, conventional air and naval potential, would for a long time be beyond Russia's financial capacity.

Hence, the new emphasis on building up and modernizing Russia's conventional air defense, air force, and naval assets (in particular S-300 and S-400 SAMs, a new air superiority fighter, Multi-role Front-line Fighter [MFI], and new Yahont-type naval missiles, as well as a new precision-guided, long-range, conventional Air-to-Ship Missile

⁴³ Alexei G.Arbatov, "The transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya," The Marshall Center Papers No.2, 2000, p.18.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p.20.

[ASM] to be based on heavy bombers). These should be capable of inflicting sufficient losses on attacking NATO forces and bases to induce NATO either to stop its aggression, or to escalate it to the level of massive conventional warfare, including a ground offensive. This would then justify Russia's first use of tactical nuclear weapons. The main portion of the supplemental appropriations for the year 2000 defense budget (approximately 26 billion rubles) was allocated to such programs.⁴⁵ (p.19)

Actually, in spite of all the emphasis on enhanced nuclear deterrence, a clear shift of defense priorities exists. In the short-run, the new defense priorities are local, conventional combat and peacekeeping operations along Russia's borders, in post-Soviet space. In the longer term, the new defense priorities include planning for a robust conventional defense against a "Balkan-type" threat to Russia and its allies: strong conventional defenses to prevent Balkan-type aggression; and at the same time address the requirements of managing local conflicts around Russia's perimeters, plus peacekeeping operations. The requirement to manage border conflicts has just recently arisen with the new, Kosovo-influenced, war in the North Caucasus.

A crucial provision of the new National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine is that they clearly spell out the possibility of employing armed forces in domestic conflicts. Although at present this doctrinal point is evidently and directly related to the war in Chechnya, the precedent of using military force to control domestic conflicts could be extended to any other domestic issue. The use of armed forces to resolve domestic problems, however, must be regulated by strict legal rules and procedures.

As Dr. S.J.Main from Conflict Studies Research Centre notes, the Russian Federation has extended the scope of its military doctrine considerably, especially in the sphere of protecting its citizens:

"Support (where necessary) for political acts of the Russian Federation by means of the implementation of corresponding measures of a military nature and a naval presence, safeguarding the security of Russian Federation citizens and protecting them from military

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p.19.

threats."⁴⁶

In the whole, Military Doctrine defines a wide spectrum of the goals and ways of using Russian Federation Armed Forces:

- strategic operations, operations, and combat operations: in large-scale and regional wars;
- operations and combat operations: in local wars and international armed conflicts;
- joint special operations: in internal armed conflicts;
- counter-terrorist operations: in the fight against terrorism in accordance with federal legislation;
- peacekeeping operations.

The main missions of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in domestic armed conflicts include:

- the routing and liquidation of illegal armed formations and bandit and terrorist groups and organizations and the destruction of their bases, training centers, depots, and communications;
- restoration of the rule of law, and of law and order;
- safeguarding of public security and stability;
- maintenance of the legal regime of a state of emergency in the conflict zone;
- localization and blockading of the conflict zone;
- termination of armed clashes and disengagement of the warring parties;
- confiscation of weapons from the population in the conflict zone;
- strengthening of protection of public order and security in regions adjacent to the conflict zone.

Thus, the new Military Doctrine indicates that the Russian Federation's Armed Forces will play a more "interventionist" role.

Besides, at present the Russian armed forces experience the next stage of their reforming - reductions and restructuring. Today it is still difficult to say about future shape and character of armed forces. However, one can suppose that new doctrines, combat experience gained in Chechnya and participation in the wide-spectrum peacekeeping operations in former Yugoslavia and in the territory of CIS, and also the process of development of revolution in military affairs will render significant influence on shape of the future armed

⁴⁶ S.J.Main, "Russia's Military Doctrine", Conflict Studies Research Centre, Occasional Brief No.77, April 2000, p.4.

forces.

Actually, conventional armed forces in the future should answer two challenges: on the one hand, the development of advanced weapons allows forces to play a strategic role of deterrence, and on the other, main goals there will be a participation and victory in the local conflicts and in guerilla warfare.

It is obvious, that various on structure, preparation and composition of armed forces need to answer these challenges. Also it is obvious, that the lack of financial resources will not allow any country to have, as a matter of fact, two different armies. Therefore, as it is supposed, this problem will be decided by the creation of rapid deployment and reaction forces and special units to participate in operations distinct from conducting classical war.

Nowadays the Russian high-ranking commanders refer to an idea about division of conventional Armed Forces into strategic forces of deterrence and rapid deployment and reaction forces halfheartedly. However if to consider overall military structure of Russia, it is possible to notice, that actually in Russia there are such forces whose basic purpose is the participation in military intrastate conflicts, "small wars", counter-insurgency operations, struggle with separatists etc (Internal Forces of Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Table 2. Russian Armed Forces in transition.

	1992	2000
Total Armed Forces (Ministry of Defense - MD)	2,720,000	1,004,100
Army	1,400,000	348,000
Navy	320,000	171,500
Air Force	300,000	184,600
Paramilitary	520,000	423,000
Border troops	220,000	140,000
Interior troops (MVD)	170,000	140,000
Army v. MVD	8.2:1	2.4:1
MD v. Paramilitary	5.2:1	2.4:1
Army v. Paramilitary	2.7:1	1:1.2

Source: The Military Balance 1993-1993/ 2000-2001, IISS, London.

The problem however consists in their weak preparation and training. Though recently in a composition of the Internal troops a number of squads of special purpose (assignment) (so-called "crimson berets") was created which have recommended themselves best in

Chechnya. It may conclude that a share of such paramilitary force in the Russian military structure has risen for some time past and Army has been shrunk significantly. (see table.2) So, it is possible to conclude, that such balance between military and paramilitary armed forces reflects general approaches of the Russian military command to use of military force in peacetime.

3.3. Lessons of Kosovo and Chechnya

The conflicts in Kosovo and Chechnya deserve careful study as models for the conduct of future wars and, more urgently, for insights on how to prevent them. It is hardly surprising that scholars from different countries find dissimilar lessons. And the military dimensions of these military campaign are a subject to be explored in a separate study.

Kosovo

At the beginning, the concept for Operation Allied Force envisaged a phased air campaign, designed to achieve NATO's political objectives with minimum force.⁴⁷ The campaign continued for 78 days, with the participation of 14 out of 19 NATO member states. Altogether the NATO campaign employed 1,260 aircraft and 30 combat ships, including three aircraft carriers and six nuclear attack submarines with cruise missiles. NATO air power conducted 35,000 sorties, and about 15,000 bombs and missiles hit Yugoslavia. In preparation for a ground offensive, 27,000 troops were re-deployed to Albania and Macedonia. During the war the newest technology was extensively employed: stealth B-2 and F-117 airplanes; long-range, sea- and air-launched cruise missiles; guided bombs; cluster and penetrating munitions; space reconnaissance, communication and navigation systems; new, airborne warning and control systems; electronic warfare and counter-radar systems; and various kinds of drones, etc. Yugoslavia essentially failed to resist the massive air-campaign thrust upon it, symbolically firing back with only anti-aircraft guns and obsolete SA-6 and SA-7 missile systems.

But as, Russian expert A. Arbatov notes, this "strange war in a post-Cold War Europe was technically well executed, but totally failed on the tactical and operational levels. It was a short-term strategic success, but appears to have failed to achieve the long-term strategic and political goals."⁴⁸

The Serbian Army survived a terrible beating in Kosovo and was prepared to meet a ground offensive and to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. Apparently Western statistics on the

⁴⁷ Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, "Kosovo One Year On. Achievement and Challenge", NATO, Brussels, 2000.

Yugoslav Army's losses in Kosovo, and elsewhere, were highly exaggerated. In fact, the Serbian Army and police continued their operations in Kosovo up to the very last day before the truce. The KLA was fully defeated and driven out of the province. Ethnic cleansing was conducted against Albanians at an unprecedented scale (ethnic cleansing of the Albanians escalated only after the initiation of the NATO air campaign). And, the Kosovo war expanded the humanitarian catastrophe.

Then, failing to destroy Serbia's air defense, NATO avoided flying at lower altitudes. That is why, in the end, NATO losses were so amazingly small: two airplanes and 16 drones, and not a single pilot killed in combat. At the same time, however, the Serbian Army was not seriously crippled.

Seven weeks of bombarding Yugoslavia destroyed 100 per cent of the oil refineries, 70 percent of the defense industry, 60 per cent of the fuel storage facilities, 100 per cent of the electrical line transformers, and 40 per cent of the TV and radio stations—including the Belgrade TV center, where 16 civilian employees were killed by missiles. In addition, 68 bridges were destroyed, and 70 per cent of the roads and 50 per cent of the railroads were put out of action.

Altogether 1,500 people were killed—two-thirds of them civilians—2,500 lost their homes, and two million became jobless. Other collateral damage included 86 historic monuments, and more than 300 schools, hospitals, etc.

Russian military experts from Center for Military and Strategic Analysis of General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces emphasize that the actions of NATO's Allied Forces during the military operation were characterized by the integrated approach to using of all-arms forces and assets.⁴⁹ Also the significant attention was given to improvement of the perspective ways of conducting information war which was developing on the directions:

use of intelligence for a support of troops by the necessary information;
misinformation and deception of the opponent;

⁴⁸ Alexei G.Arbatov, "The transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya," The Marshall Center Papers No.2, 2000, p.15.

⁴⁹ Y.V.Morozov, V.V.Glushkov, A.A.Sharavin, "Balkans Today and Tomorrow: military and political aspects of peacekeeping," Moscow, 2001, pp.250-256.

ensuring of secrecy discipline;
conducting of psychological operations;
using of combat electronic systems for defeating of enemy information system and manpower;
break of information flows;
destroying of enemy system of combat command, control, communication and intelligence (C³I);
secure own C³I system.

Assessing the lessons of coalition warfare a number of experts conclude: The air operations against Yugoslavia, at least for the first month, went well for NATO, despite the fact that it was an ad hoc conflict, with no goals and no real military objectives. It produced neither the military nor political goals which the politicians said they sought, but that was not the fault of the military, who clearly had little say on much of the target selection. But the coordination of aircraft, and particularly the use of airborne sensors and command and control, was effective.⁵⁰ The NATO administrative machinery, involved in its first war in 50 years, worked well. Secrecy of operations, and particularly on operational problems, was good. There seemed to be good airspace management, with little confusion, despite the fact that a wide range of forces were being thrown into the mix without any real planning. So, from some view-points, NATO showed that it could operate effectively at very short notice. And under normal circumstances, it would be responding to a proper military crisis, not a political war ("Clinton's War", as it is termed in the US Congress). This means that professionals would be in charge of (military) target selection, and objectives would be clearly-defined.

The Russia's General Staff, in its turn, has made their own military-political conclusions:⁵¹

- NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia has fundamentally changed the situation in Europe by demonstrating its readiness to continue to act in the spirit of the Alliance's new strategy - to impose upon sovereign nations, as its own discretion and by force of arms, its own ideas of ending crisis situation;
- the Alliance brought its troops into Yugoslavia under the guise of a peacekeeping operation, thus taking up a strategic base of operations in the heart of Europe;

⁵⁰ See, for instance, article of the editor Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy Gregory R. Copley, "The New Rome & The New Religious Wars", Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, No.3, 1999, 3-19.

⁵¹ See the article of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: A.Kvashnin, "Main Security Challenges: A Military Response", International Affairs, Vol.46, No.1, 2000, pp.48-60.

- the US used the colossal surplus of force to consolidate its domination on the European continent;
- the aggression came as a continuation of the NATO leadership's policy aimed at consolidating its leading role in the newly constructed system of European and world security;
- the US is trying to take advantage of the inevitable differences between its European NATO partners ... to prevent or to at least delay the formation of united Europe as a realistic rival of the United States in the financial-economic and political regard.

However, the further events have shown, that the NATO's armed intervention entailed the large human victims among the peace population and huge destroying of Yugoslavian infrastructure has not eradicated a source (or sources) of the conflict. It confirms the point of view, that even the successful accomplishment of the military objectives does not automatically lead to termination of conflict.

Chechnya

As, Dr. A.Arbatov argues, "Russia has learned many lessons from Kosovo. Above all, the end justifies the means. The use of force is the most efficient problem solver, if applied decisively and massively. Negotiations are of dubious value and should be used as a cover for military action. International law and human suffering are of secondary significance in achieving the goal."⁵²

NATO's decisive and efficient military action against Yugoslavia served as an example to Russia and provided Russia a powerful push toward a new military campaign in Chechnya. Western employment of large-scale forces in the Balkans lifted the taboo against the use of military force as an instrument for resolving ethnic problems and conflicts that had been in place since the end of the first Chechen war of 1994–1996. (From 1996–1999 there was not a single instance of Russian armed forces firing a shot in any “hot spot,” in or outside of Russia.) Following September 1999 clashes with the Wahhabis in Daghestan, Russia once again engaged military force in Chechnya.

Many elements of the new military doctrine were tested during the second military

⁵² Alexei G.Arbatov, "The transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya," The Marshall Center Papers No.2, 2000, p.V.

campaign in Chechnya. This was termed an 'anti-terrorist operation' which allowed the government to use force without seeking approval from the Duma and to use MOD forces in support of the Civil Power and Interior Troops. It also enabled the government to play on international concerns about terrorism and international terrorist networks, particularly in relation to groups with Islamic connections.

The tactics applied by the Russian armed forces evolved throughout the campaign. There have been three distinct periods.⁵³

First stage: 2 August-30 September 1999: a counter-insurgency operation in Daghestan conducted by Russian forces with support from the local militia and self-defence forces;

Second stage: October 1999-22 April 2000: Large-scale military intervention in Chechnya to gain control of territory, culminating in the storming of Grozny in December 1999-January 2000;

Third stage: From May 2000 onwards: Guerrilla warfare by small Chechen groups against Russian bases, checkpoints and convoys, as well as terrorist attacks in large towns.

In the first stage of the war, Russian MOD forces (106 Brigade), Interior Troops (102 Brigade), local and federal militia and self-defence forces conducted an operation to remove Chechen armed groups (with an estimated strength of 1,700-2,000) from the Botlikh region in southwestern Daghestan. Mi-24 and Mi-8 attack helicopters were used for air and artillery attacks and the key mountain passes were mined extensively. Although there were shortcomings, Russian forces coordinated well between the commands of the MOD and Interior troops. Nevertheless, there were casualties from 'friendly fire' due to a lack of joint training for the Air Force and Interior Troops. During this stage of the campaign, Russian forces lost 118 servicemen, three helicopters and one Su-25 fighter, ground attack (FGA) aircraft.

During the war's second stage, troops engaged reached a peak of 100,000 in January, gradually reducing to about 80,000 by the end of April. The tactics included extensive use of artillery and air strikes to reduce the need for close combat. The need to minimize

casualties and low training standards were the main reasons for this approach. As a result, every major offensive was characterized by Russian forces surrounding towns and villages and subjecting them to prolonged artillery barrages and air-strikes to try to force the guerrillas to abandon their positions. Many area weapons - such as fuel-air explosives and cluster bombs - were used against towns and villages, causing casualties among the civilian population. In purely military terms, this tactic proved successful in capturing major Chechen towns like Grozny, Argun and Gudermes.

And as Major-General of the Federal Security Service A.Zdanovitch stresses at present heavy armaments (main battle tank and heavy-caliber artillery) are partly withdrawing from Chechnya. Today the Russian military command counts on activities of special teams and units rather than on large-scale using of armed forces. Moreover civil-military relations, information operations, police retrieval, etc. are very important under modern circumstances⁵⁴

It should be emphasized, that present military campaign in Chechnya is more complicated and comprehensive than previous one. So, Colonel-General Valerii Manilov notes that alongside the military operation the Russian Armed Forces have also conducted three other parallel operations; first the restoration of the political standards, political norms and a civil administration so as to regulate the life of the people.⁵⁵ Secondly, the restoration of employment, of education, the restoration for viable conditions of life which would permit all the people who left their country to return. And finally information and media coverage.

During the Chechen military campaign the Russian Armed forces have learned important military lessons:

- Reconnaissance More emphasis was placed on effective reconnaissance and intelligence-collection: from the air, using electronic intelligence (ELINT); by special forces; and by the internal security service. Air reconnaissance was conducted mainly by Su-24MR, Su-25, and M1G-25RB aircraft, while ELINT was gathered by An-30B and An-50 aircraft. In this campaign, Russian forces introduced upgraded Pchela-IT unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)

⁵³ The Military Balance 2000-2001, IISS, 2000, pp.112-114.

⁵⁴ Bratishka (Compeer), No.5, May 2001, p.10.

as a part of the Story-P UAV reconnaissance system. This system allowed Russian commanders to obtain real-time aerial-reconnaissance data on guerrilla positions. Better communications and reconnaissance allowed Russian forces to locate mobile groups of fighters and to restrict supplies of weapons and ammunition to the guerrillas from outside Chechnya. However, the main source of reliable information is the activities of reconnaissance and military intelligence units.

- More effective manpower Much better conditions of service for military personnel have been provided in this campaign compared with 1994-96 and public support and strong political leadership have meant morale has been much higher. The Russian armed forces have included more contract soldiers from permanent-readiness units and better-trained conscripts than previously. Many units have been given special training (including Special Forces training for mountain and urban warfare). Many troops had combat experience from the earlier war. However, there were still shortages of some specialist personnel, particularly airborne forces, forward air controllers and specialists in mountain operations, within both the MOD and the Interior Troops.
- Improved logistics A much better organized logistic system than in 1994-96 supported the recent campaign, although this remained one of the operation's weakest points. There were still shortages of munitions, medicine, food and fuel but they were less severe than before, helped by the Ministry of Defense having prepared logistic units and facilities in the neighboring regions of North Caucasus before the current campaign started.
- New weapons In the course of the campaign, particularly towards the end of 1999, the armed forces started to receive new weapons and equipment, including night-vision equipment, artillery systems, light weapons, and reconnaissance and communications equipment. However, there have still been shortages, particularly of night-vision equipment for aircrew. New equipment was tested, such as the modernized Su-25T fighter, the KA-50 Black Shark helicopter and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle. However, Russian forces primarily used older equipment such as the Su-24 and Su-26 and the Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters. The newer aircraft, such as the KA-50 helicopter and modernized Su-26. MiG-

⁵⁵ Valerii Manilov, "The War in Chechnya", RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No.3, June 2000, pp.28-30.

29SMTs are ill-suited to missions in mountainous regions against targets such as small groups of guerrillas. The forces improved their ground-to-air communications by creating tactical aviation groups and training additional forward air controllers.

The lessons of Chechen war show that today the most battle-ready units are marines, special purposes units (designated to Ministry of Defense, Federal Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs) and airborne units. However the command assigns to special reconnaissance units very often the ill-suited objectives. For instance, besides directing reconnaissance, surface reconnaissance, ambushes, search and rescue operations, reconnaissance and subversive measures, electronic and signal intelligence, field intelligence officers and artillery observers have to conduct security operations, convoy close support and so on.

On the whole, the two Chechen military campaigns argue, that small units of armed forces (platoon, company) play key role in the local conflicts.⁵⁶ But the Russian Armed forces faces serious problems:

- old military mind of several commanders, who are not able to refuse classical tactics of large-scale combined-arms battle and to adopt new tactics of anti-guerrilla struggle wars;
- the redundant amount of heavy weapons which affect flexibility and mobility military units.
- poor trained soldiers and commanders, especially NCO;
- the gap between generals and junior and senior field officers (Very often high ranking officers do not take into account rich combat experience of their subordinate officers);
- difficulties of military operations in urban terrain. As a result troops suffer from diversions and sniper war. So, according to the medico-legal research of the Russian Ministry of Defense from researched 1937 bodies of the servicemen who have been lost during the military campaign in North Caucasus - 38 % deaths were caused by explosions, 15 % - by wounds, and 47 % were shot. And among the last category 447 soldiers were killed in

⁵⁶ Soldat Udachi (Soldier of Fortune, Russian edition), No.12, December 2000, p. 28.

battle, 392 soldiers - from sniper fire, and 72 soldiers were lost as a result of gangster assaults.⁵⁷

So, the character of such intrastate military conflicts are significantly differ from "classic" form of warfare. That is why the armed forces should be special trained and equipped for the military operations other than "classic" war.

⁵⁷ Soldat Udachi (Soldier of Fortune, Russian edition), No.6, June 2000, p. 7

CONCLUSIONS

Unfortunately, after the end of the Cold War the world has not become safer. The more so, the chain of conflicts of different intensity, which erupt in Europe lately, actualized war and peace matters. In connection with complex and complicated processes of continuing transformation of international relations system these matters acquired a special importance. The historical development shows that, despite dramatic changes in the world, neither of states has renounced the necessity of the national armed forces, nor confirmed by practical actions numerous statements of politicians saying that military force can not be considered as an instrument of policy in the modern world. Apparently, it means only transformation of forms and methods of its use. It is obvious, that without defining a place of the military force in the world arena, one can neither only properly build a state military organisation to defend the national interests and security, nor even talk about realisation of a more or less effective policy.

Europe is the region where the most effective security systems has been formed, where the most strong (including the direct involvement of the USA into the European Security system) military potential is concentrated, and because of these reasons military power acquires a special significance there.

Today, the overwhelming majority of military experts and civilian scientists recognise, that the role of military force, as a factor of international relations, suffers significant changes. Its character, in many respects, is being determined by: the post Cold War and, following the USSR disintegration, new balance of forces; disorder in the previously existed system of international ties and by evolution of views of the leading military powers concerning the methods and forms of applying pressure against “security threat carriers” and those power centres, which may impede the national interests advance and expansion of influence in the sphere of international relations. In the light of facts spoken about above, the questions: “What is the aim of military force? How it is used or can be used in the radically changed after the end of the Cold War international environment?” - are the top-priority issues.

It seems that conventional armed forces constitute the important element of military force in general, which plays a practical role in strengthening and support of European Security

system. Indeed the conventional rather than the strategic nuclear forces (which used mainly as a political instrument) are actively used to respond the modern security challenges.

It is very interesting to trace the process of changing of the role played by conventional military forces in the world policy. If someday they were used as the “last argument”, now this function pertains to the weapons of mass destruction and the conventional forces received rather concrete and real tasks to solve. To a significant extent it happened because the termination of the Cold War did not put end to the policy of force. The more so, a new tendency is being widely spread in the international practice – that is forcible solving of problems threatening the global and regional security.

The most of dangers, which the mankind may face in the XXI-st century, contains military factors, which, under certain conditions, may be transformed into a direct military threat. However, the direct military threats and dangers loose more and more distinguishing features of definite states. Today this fact permits politologists to speak about degradation of the Westphal system of international relations, when an actor in the world arena was associated with a “state-nation”.

So, war in Kosovo introduced the new order which reduced both the sanctity of national sovereignty and the significance of state borders.” The changes occurred within the system of international relations resulted in the fact that today not only states with their armed forces but not structured or slightly structured subjects can act as main participants to the armed struggle. All these, to a great extent, determine the change of forms of a military conflict. At present, most of politicians agree that the large – scale, “total” war has left in the past and is being substituted by the so-called “small wars”. Subversive and insurgent activities, guerrilla struggle and other actions are being included in this term by the experts. The main danger of this form of war is in fact that weapons and violence become the main instruments for achieving political goals and it is impossible to separate civilian population from the armed groups during its course.

Along with this, the latest events, such as the US missile strikes at terrorists’ bases in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998, NATO operations in Yugoslavia and counter terrorist struggle of Russia in Chechnya, outlined the central position of military force,

especially of conventional armed forces, in the internal and external policy. Proposing, from the first glance, a clear perspective of rapid, easy, permissible and, along with this possible and acceptable solutions to sophisticated and hard to solve problems, military force becomes a preferable instrument of the state policy. The more so, we can observe the process of the American external policy militarization strengthening which, to a certain extent, specified by the fact that the USA remains the most powerful state from the military point of view.

Thus, in the very end of the XX-th century and at the new century we witness a phenomenon of “military activism” which is being expressed not in full-scale military campaigns and battles, but in numerous experiments in the field of peace-making, more frequent cases of use of the Air Force or a threat of its use to warn, force or punish unacceptable regimes and also a wide usage of conventional military forces to reinforce economic sanctions or to react at anarchy manifestation, natural calamities and social disintegration.

Very rarely such kind of missions have the “classic” victory over the enemy as the main goal. Such victory turns out to be an anachronism. The goal of such involvement is very rarely being determined as the complete elimination of the enemy. More often it is done to demonstrate the disagreement with political or economic course, to change attitude and to dictate the behaviour line. Thus, the re-valuation of the Clausewitz’s historic postulate that “war is the continuation of policy by other means” is going on.

The specific feature of the present day events in the sphere of military policy is the beginning of the new stage of the wide-scale discussion on matters pertaining to military building and the role of conventional armed forces in the process of settlement of external policy problems. A number of politicians, military experts and scientists are showing their inclination towards the thought, that at present force and policy can not be separated. The former US President B. Clinton in his speech in the National Defense Institute in January 1998 stressed, that diplomacy and military power are the two sides of the same coin.

Nowadays, it is clear, that military force, in particular, conventional armed forces will keep playing a leading role as a instrument of policy. Nevertheless, it should be stated, that lately

methods and goals of using military force have changed significantly. It is related both to political factor and development of scientific and technical progress and the appearance of the new military technologies.

After the Cold War period, when the scale of military rivalry was significantly reduced and former opponents stopped to attribute each other as enemies, appeared the necessity in principally new peace saving instruments. It is already obvious, that employment only of military levers in the policy will promote sliding to mistrust between the states which may overgrow into the total confrontation of the old times. That is why the search for such a combination of forcible and diplomatic elements in military sphere which will be the most effective in solving of the security problems is going on.

It should be emphasized, however, that the face of armed forces have been changing. Armed forces or armed grouping which do not associate directly with the state are trying to play an ever increasing role. The growth of the number so-called private armies has significant influence both on the nature of combat operations, and security in the strategic context. The well-equipped and well-prepared private armies consider the war as their legitimate business and they are looking forward to the rising of the every possible conflict, which they consider as the field of their activity and vital interests.

Among the ways of conventional armed forces are used to strengthen European security the following can be mentioned:

- military demonstrations of power and deployment of troops to support diplomatic actions;
- rescue operations to save citizens within the conflict zone;
- providing different regimes of sanctions;
- delivering limited air-strikes;
- wide spectrum of peacekeeping operations.

Correspondingly, new the tasks require deep adaptation and reforming of the armed forces. Proceeding Revolution in Military Affairs became the answer to those challenges, which

face today the Armed Forces. The use of RMA advantages is expected give the armed forces new capabilities, needed for efficient participation in a wide spectrum of operations with the purposes of strengthening and ensuring security.

This process is in full swing in the majority of European countries and, as it is supposed, the use of advantages of RMA, will significantly speed it up. Utilisation of informational technologies, which constitute the RMA's base, will enable the USA and their allies to make their choice in favour of increasing of the general effectiveness of the armed forces in conditions of military budget cuts and the armed forces' structural reduction. Under the conditions of the effective employment of the RMA achievements, restrictions - (to carry out operations in maximally limited time, with minimal losses and, if possible, excluding victims among the civilian population and damage to the civilian sector), imposed in the Western countries on the use of armed forces as on an instrument for achieving of political goals, may be lifted. This will result in the increase of their effectiveness, especially if the armed forces will be used against enemy which is not capable of employing of the latest achievements in the military sphere.

However, analysing the latest examples of the use of armed forces by the USA, NATO and Russia, one can conclude, that even 100% fulfilment of military tasks is not sufficient to gain the general victory. (In this context victory means the achieving of political goals). Only then one can speak about success when the armed forces are used in complex with other instruments of the big policy. For example, NATO's military operation in Yugoslavia was carried in complex with political, economic and diplomatic pressure at Milosheвич regime. The military phase of the operation itself envisaged limited goals, aimed not at territorial seizure, but first of all at inflicting economic damage to the enemy, undermining its industrial base and the will to further resistance in order to make him start negotiations in conditions favourable to the North Atlantic Alliance. As far as it can be judged, the military did not have the task of Belgrade seizure and , as it turned out, massed air strikes, without use of the ground forces, were sufficient to reach political goals. But, measures known as informational and psychological special operations, diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions preceded and followed it. Thus, in Yugoslavia NATO made an attempt to deploy a kind of a system in which armed forces acted as one of the numerous (even the most

important) components.

On the contrary, solving of their tasks by the military in Chechnya during the first Chechen campaign was not a success. Despite the seizure of the key strong holds of the mutineers and control over the major part of the Chechen territory, the general goals of the war were not reached and Russia suffered political defeat (not counting great human and material losses). In my opinion, the major cause of the defeat of Russia in Chechnya in 1994-1996, along with purely military miscalculations, was the weak preparation of the operation in the whole, when constituting it (military, political, diplomatic, economic and so on) elements were used separately, a co-ordinated system and the clear goal lacked. As a result, actions of Russia in the Northern Caucasus provoked a lot of questions pertaining to the legitimacy, expediency and did not received the proper support among the population.

The new antiterrorist operation in Chechnya differs from the previous by the very fact, that Russian leadership, bearing in mind the mistakes, tries to use in this campaign the systematic approach. Joint actions of military and civilian state structures during the course of settlement of the crisis in the Chechen Republic, and also the appropriate informational and political support let us hope that Russian Army will succeed.

Thus, we can conclude that the Armed Forces become more and more integrated into “the policy of peace”, and their use has the systematic and complex character, when all possible non military measures are being employed along with the military means.