

**The transatlantic link and the European Defence and
Security Identity in the Mediterranean context**

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Introduction¹

The end of the Cold War and its consequences over the international scenario had its own reflections upon the theoretical and empirical approaches to security issues. The aim of this study is to analyse the impact of such changes, over the evolution of the security speech and their repercussions over co-operation regional projects, within the context of the transatlantic link and the European Security and Defence Identity in the Mediterranean context.

The outcome of this study will not focus on an analysis of the internal political and strategic situation of the Maghreb countries considered (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), but rather on three possible security models for the Mediterranean region in the context of transatlantic co-operation.

The present study will be divided into two major parts: a theoretical part and an empirical one applied to the Western Mediterranean context.

The first part will be divided into four chapters: first, we will analyse security as a conceptual framework. Second, we will examine the new discursive elements of security in the post Cold War environment and the way they identified a specific strategic culture. Third, we will emphasise the present competing security roles in the international arena, among states and organisations, such as NATO and the European Union. Fourth, we will outline the current challenges to security considering: the problems of misperception, the present quest for alternative paradigms in international relations and the different political and strategic cultures approach, as relevant components in the security co-operation processes shaping.

The second part will focus on the practical aspects that emanate from the new alternative transatlantic security model, taking into account the evaluation of a possible set of common references for the Mediterranean region and the importance of benefits perception for co-operation partners in building a common background of co-operation. Finally, we will discuss how the Alliance and the EU, in the context of the transatlantic link, may enhance their co-operation performance in the Mediterranean region.

¹ The analysis of the situation in former Yugoslavia, Kosovo or Albania are beyond the scope of this study, given the fact these conflicting areas have their own particularities and internal dynamics, distinct from those existent in the Maghreb region.

The end of the Cold War paradigm, based on ideology, produced a particular security discourse orientated to new political and public ways to legitimise and justify foreign and defence policy choices and options. Security is today, more than in the past, determined by political, jurisdictional, strategic and humanitarian imperatives.

To that aim the analysis of discursive elements of security, namely those that emanate from diverse strategic cultures and domestic political uses of rhetoric (both within NATO countries and Maghreb countries), are most relevant in the mobilisation of interests around common political references.

Not only, security speech became more or less homogenous within the transatlantic context, but also a new set of organisations are intervening as competing actors for the security role provider, in the international arena. Each of them is trying to reaffirm a broader scope of security concerns and at the same time to satisfy regional or national interests, that would fulfil their member states enough, to keep them both interested in sharing security and defence responsibilities.

The importance of misperceptions, about the images actors project, are frequently forgotten when analysing security in the context above mentioned and they do have an important share over the way actors evaluate threats such as: fundamentalism, arms proliferation, terrorism and migrations. The impact of misperception is particularly relevant, when different security settings may affect the definition of related policies, as it is the case in the Mediterranean.

States and organisations, have a certain difficulty in justifying their existence in the absence of an identifiable political, strategic and even cultural paradigm according to which they were created and for which they have been existing. It will be our concern to highlight the importance that the changes of political paradigms, after the Cold War, have been having both as instrument of togetherness and sources of insecurity and mistrust for both the Alliance and its European allies.

On the other hand, the breakdown of the ideological paradigm in the aftermath of the Cold War created a strategic void. From that moment on, security as a concept required a redefinition, without a clear geographical and ideological reference, forcing organisations to adapt their security structures to new political and strategic scenarios. This situation increased the number of active security providers in the international arena and an overlapping of security structures competing for the same goals, similar political and security agendas, with similar external behaviour patterns, co-operating with the same partners, in the same geographical scope.

An active security provider- namely NATO and the European Union – must be able to generate common political references and values, that might help to mobilise allies and potential partners around common interests, for the case under consideration: the Mediterranean region, in order to create common platforms of understanding.

No matter what political agendas aim at and treaties and declarations state, it has proved difficult to increase political confidence and mobilise political will, towards common security perceptions, namely in the Mediterranean, when regional actors involved, are simultaneously seen as sources of mistrust and potential partners. This means that, to be able to gather common interests, it is important to understand the question of formation of perception and misperception. Quite often, security problems have their origin in historical, cultural and religious aspects, for which neither NATO nor the European Union are ready to deal with, regardless their technological or manpower potential.

Our final goal will be to emphasise the potential capabilities of the Alliance and the European allies, to improve their co-operation abilities in a region characterised by diversity, such as the Mediterranean, aiming at organisation's skill specialisation benefiting from the experience achieved in the recent years.

1. Security – a conceptual framework

1.1. Tradition was...

Taking as a starting point the end of the Cold War period, one can witness an undeniable impact of the new international scenario on the redefinition of theoretical approaches and practices to security. The concept of security gained a new political, societal, military and even environmental dimension, which actors cannot ignore. If one takes into account, that this way of thinking security today is inherent to political approaches to security problems, one should not avoid to apply it to NATO's security approaches in the context of the transatlantic relationship and the European Security and Defence Identity.

Until the 90's, security studies were much confined to issues centred on "the threat and the use of force". Despite the fact strategic analysis was much oriented to military aspects of security, does not mean it refuses the " need for people, nations,

states or alliances to procure, deploy, engage or withdraw military forces (to remain) as primary purpose of the strategic analysts inquiries”.²

Redefining security implies to consider a variety of options that might justify security policies, that is: the kind of significance that security discourses confer in justifying and legitimising international practices. To achieved a certain common ground of consensus among political and military elite, on what constitutes the condition of security proves to be essential. Is the condition of security :“the protection against enemies? External or internal ones? Protection against neighbours?”³, Protection against refugee flows? Environmental impact of military interventions? To take into account these new security problems will surely re-orientate the definition of non traditional missions for NATO and the European Union, such as humanitarian relief and civil emergency planning missions as part of their security agendas.

Redefining security also has an impact over the way civil society is mobilise through agendas of good governance based on political, rather than strategic or military conditionality.

This good governance policy is frequently based on two premises. The first is based on a discursive practice of wishfully common values such as: respect for human rights, feeling of global responsibility, claims for universal justice, expression of humanitarian concerns and global consciousness about the preservation of natural resources, as part of today’s political agenda. These core values provide a symbolic, even a “moral” guidance to political and security policies outlined by states and organisations. The second is associated with a discursive practice of universal values which constitute a basic core of concerns, whose consequences can hardly be dissociated from: the impact of global challenges (demographic pressures, migrations, refugee flow, famine, natural catastrophes), from transnational threats (terrorism, organised crime, armaments and drug traffic) and from the over exploitation of natural resources, such as oil and water which has a particular relevance in the Mediterranean dialogue partners regional context.

² See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp de Wilde, *Security- A New Framework for Analysis* (London:Lynne Rienner 1998),p.3

³ Ronnie Lipschutz ed., *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press 1995),p.1

The mobilising effect ⁴of these two premises came to add value to the traditional concept of national security as an instrument of political and military orientation for states' and organisations' political agendas.

Political leaders, as traditional authority cores responsible for generating solidarity among the public opinion, are confronted today with emergent “national and transnational networks, which work as a base of ethnic identity, human rights and humanitarian concerns ⁵, with which they are compelled to compete in the field of mobilising arguments for new security concerns.

The increasing level of interdependence of world politics has been responsible for a “shifting of the referent object for security, away from individual states toward larger collective identities, whether they take the form of security communities as NATO or common markets as the EU.⁶

Alternative ways of considering security demand new means to address security problems based on different political agendas and selective approaches to the public, as meaningful instruments that help legitimising and justifying foreign and defence policy choices, by sharing a common discourse of justification for NATO and the EU. This is why “most of the institutions associated with the Cold War remain in place (...) although they are casting about for new ontologies of their own, not to mention policies that can fit the hardware and procedures left behind”⁷ allowing them to shift to policies of constructive engagement adapted to the new international arena. Security has become “less status quo oriented, less state-centric and less reliant on the military instrument”⁸

The task has become harder, now that the Cold War paradigm no longer works as a convincing common ground for sustaining security policies and political culture is no longer confined within the frame of bipolarity . There are no longer clear ideological differences separated by the monolithic nature of each political and defence system represented by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Instead, there is a multitude of variances and motives for mutual exclusion, that make “otherness” more evident through political

⁴ On the aspect of “mobilisation potential” see Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp.131-133; Tim Dunne, Nicholas Wheeler, *Human Rights in Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michael Harbottle, “New Roles for the Military-Humanitarian and Environmental Security”, in: *Conflict Studies* 285, November 1995, pp.1-23.

⁵ Ronnie Lipschutz ed., *idem*, p.135

⁶ *Idem*, *ibidem*, p.198

⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Japp de Wilde, *idem*, *ibidem*

⁸ Pinar Bilgin, Ken Booth, Richard Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage” in: *Nação e Defesa*, nº84, Inverno 98, 2ª série, p.148. See also Ken Booth, A.J.R. Groom, Margot Light eds. *Contemporary International Relations: A guide to theory* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994)

culture practices, religious belief, ethnic belonging or nationalistic impel. Its immaterial nature makes it even more difficult to deal with, which may affect communication between actors and compromise future opportunities of regional commitment and dialogue initiatives in the field of security.⁹

Security is always referred to a “wider framework of meaning (call it symbolic order, cultural environment or discursive structure)”¹⁰ according to which actors organise their own security concerns and interests.

2. Discursive elements of security in a post Cold War environment

2.1. Justifying security policies in the 90's

The analysis focused on discourse, ideas and processes of socialisation among political elite allow to understand the way security goals are named and communicated, how processes of interest formation are build up and security agendas are outlined in the Western world, namely within NATO countries.

A close examination of discursive elements of security proves the diversity and illustrates different domestic uses of political rhetoric within the frame of different strategic cultures.

This is particularly evident when one considers two different security settings, as it is the case, represented by the transatlantic link and the southern rim Mediterranean dialogue partners. This establishes an important base of departure to consider and apprehend the different ways, through which, political elites (European, American and North African) are motivated to keep certain political references and interests that would allow them to promote common values and share common perceptions.

The ontological domain, frequently forgotten in theoretical analysis allow us to emphasise the security speech level, as a way to explain and legitimise security options. The security speech is nowadays characterised by the replacement, within democracies of a strategic and military conditionality, by a political conditionality based on a convenient, convincing and publicly generally acceptable security discursive practice, which privileges the primacy of universal values.

⁹ Cf. Alaister Iain Johnston “Thinking about strategic culture” ,in: *International Security*, Spring 1995,vol.19:4, pp:32-64 and Michael C. Desch, “Cultural Clash-Assessing the Importance of ideas in Security Studies” in: *International Security*, Vol.32, N°1, Summer 1998,pp:141-170

¹⁰ Jeff Huysmans, “Security! What do you mean? From concept to thick signifier”, in: *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.8, June 1998, p.228. As Huysmans points out, the meaning of e.g. refugee question (as a

Redefining security has also an influence over the way civil society is mobilised through agendas of “good governance” based on political premises, rather than strategic and military ones. The pressure for an increasing demand over governments, for accountability in the justification of political and military options, have a direct consequence over the type of security speech they forge at two levels.

One identified with a discursive practice of common values such as: the idea of “moral obligation to respect human rights”, “the feeling of global responsibility” and “the claim for universal justice” . These core values provide a symbolic frame of meaning and a “moral” guidance to political and security strategies outlined by states and organisations after the Cold War.

The other is associated with the discursive practice of universal concerns ¹¹, the consequences of which can hardly be dissociated from the impact of global challenges (e.g. demographic pressure, migrations, refugee flows, famine, natural catastrophes), neither from transnational threats (terrorism, organised crime, armaments race and drug traffic) nor from the unbalanced exploitation of natural resources, such as oil and water. Most of these concerns are particularly relevant in the context of NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue Maghreb partners.

Alternative ways of considering security, demand new means to address security problems, based on optional approaches to the public, as meaningful instruments that help to legitimise and justify foreign and defence policy choices, through a similar discourse of justification shared both by NATO and the EU.

This change in security discourse was possible due to the end of bipolarity and the decreasing possibility of an eminent nuclear confrontation, which allowed the introduction of more abstract security goals, replacing the fear of massive destruction, by other threats of non-territorial scope.

States and organisations, such as NATO or institutional arrangements such as the EU, are responsible for the identification, selection and interpretation of security concerns that might be seen as sources of insecurity. In this process of identification and interpretation of the international affairs, elites produce a specific security language

security concern) differs according to the security set defined , whether we are talking about political discourse or political culture.

¹¹ Which might be seen as primary concerns by the public opinion, which means they have a high mobilising effect over civil society in general.

capable of generating the unity of their member states and gather the means to react against threats.

The reorientation of the security speech, more than interpreting reality, produces new justifications for security policies based on an alternative legitimising and normative order, which itself encloses a new speech. This situation allows organisations like NATO to expand their security agendas into the domain of values and exploring the new possibilities offered by institutional, normative¹² and operational frameworks. This new core of opportunities comprehend the issue of intervention for humanitarian imperatives, which constitutes a powerful discursive argument in the decision making process for its mobilising and legitimising effect in the field of security.

The invocation of non military security arguments at the political and diplomatic level does not imply an withdraw of military force in the exercise of security. On the contrary it re-enforces its importance on a system no longer relying exclusively on the balance of power, on the emphasis of sovereignty or on the separation of internal and foreign affairs.¹³

Security speech in the transatlantic context is today mainly concentrated on the presence of global threats, which solution must be international in scope, multilateral in dimension and integrated in form, in order to guarantee common stability, according to a set of national interests, potential enemies and possible scenarios.

To build up a similar security community in North Africa it would require the constitution of identities¹⁴ and interests by shared understanding and normative principles, other than territorial sovereignty, according to which citizens may impel the constituent states of the community-region, to act as agents of regional stability, on the

¹² See Anthony Clark Arend, Robert J.Beck; *International law and the use of force- Beyond the UN Charter paradigm* (London: Routledge, 1992) pp.1-25

¹³ Robert Cooper, *The Post-Modern State and the World Order*, (London: DEMOS, 1996) p.21

¹⁴ The processes of identity construction helps to define enemies and friends, by providing references fundamental for the construction of binary oppositions aimed to divided and exclude what is not identical. On this matter see Michael Barret, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo", in : *European Journal of International Relations*, volume 5, number 1, March 1999, pp:5-36 and Roy Olivier, "Moyen-Orient:Faiblesse des États, enracinement des nations", in: *Critique Internationale*, n 4, Étè 1999, pp:79-104. Both studies provide good examples of what was stated before. The first is particularly interesting by the way it uses the concepts of identity and historical narrative (as the most powerful mechanism in the construction of collective identity by a nation) , as well as the use of of discursive metaphors responsible for the projection of symbolic representations, through which a certain security or foreign policy project is sustained. From that association it results a certain speech which legitimises foreign policy actions. Barret outlines the importance that national identity and historical narratives have in the mobilisation of societies in favour of a certain political project (p.9). By using the Israeli – Arab case study the author shows how national identity may be contingent and may influence foreign policy practices in the measure that might be considered convenient to political authorities (e.g the production of a security speech that will make the withdraw from territories be accepted by public opinion).This capacity to adapt could provide the political environment to mobilise a larger internal consensus on how to shift Israel's traditional foreign policy.

basis of a similar regional system of governance.¹⁵ This security frame generates what Ken Booth refers as a “frame of division and exclusion”¹⁶ based on the existence of boundaries and identities, within which security has been conceived and a specific discourse of danger is created to protect a specific national identity.

The importance of discourse analysis in security relays on the fact, that it helps to find the frame for political representation and to understand the systems of signification associated with the undertaking of certain political choices and decision making by international organisations. Any politics of representation and system of signification traduces a determined strategic predisposition to make choices, in the domain of security, orientated to a specific scope of threats. This has a textual expression in official documents emanating from organisations e.g. declarations, press releases and in diplomatic documents, which comprehend a binary opposition (modern/traditional, Western/Arab, North/South) which defines the relation of power inherent to strategic choices and military doctrines. It is that binary opposition¹⁷ that defines the boundaries of political identities and political cultures (Western, American, European, NATO, EU) according to the historically contingent surroundings (direct threat to a major actor, direct threat to member state countries, direct threat to potential future partners or external demonstrations of force that may disrupt the circulation of vital resources such as oil etc.) .

This binary opposition also reinforces legitimacy of external actions by organisations, by creating a security speech with a mobilising effect over member states and friendly countries. This mobilising effect is achieved through a common language, a mutual set of interests and mutual reassurances in the domain common defence and security.

Differences in security discourses correspond to different material cultures, different historical pasts, different perceptions of threat, different worldviews and different concepts of national interest. All these backgrounds have a determinant effect over future possibilities of co-operation, between NATO and Maghreb countries taking into account two distinct strategic and cultural systems.

¹⁵ Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations”, in: *Millenium*, vol.26,n°2, 1997, p.253

¹⁶ J. Ann Tickner, “Re-visioning Security” ,in: Ken Booth; Steve Smith, *International Relations Theory Today*,(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), p.188

¹⁷ Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in the International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”, in: *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.5,number 2, June 1999, p.229

In each local elite produces “regimes of truth” which validate, both politically and publicly the courses of action taken (e.g. military intervention in foreign countries like the action taken by the coalition force in the Gulf region). Their setting helps to establish the border and define a criteria of difference (inclusion/exclusion) between the action taken by a main core of member states and the actions (responses) taken by states, which might be viewed as dissident or marginal, that is as potentially threatening. This assessment is particularly relevant if one wishes to situate strategic analysis in a cultural context.

3. Competing for security roles in the international arena

The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of competitive national interests, which still works much as a *leitmotiv* for states and organisation’s foreign and defence policies.

The post Cold War international system of balance of power, alliance policy, deterrence and bipolar hegemony were followed by the establishment of an international arena, which centre (US and Europe) is being consolidated around integrated forms of security.

Today, there is a larger number of organisations competing for the role of security provider. Each of them making use of global security agendas to satisfy regional and sub-regional concerns, that would ensure member states’ interests enough to hold them together, to keep them on sharing political and operational responsibilities and guarantee financial and operational support to the fulfilment of the organisations’ tasks.

This is why most organisations, namely NATO, need to expand their scope of action and find new instruments to fulfil it, whether the problem is of regional or international dimension. Whether it fits into conflict prevention, crisis management or humanitarian aid.

On the present shifting international environment, competition among organisation means to acquire new resources whether we talk about institutional or operational ones, that will allow them to adapt to new security challenges.

If we considered the enlargement processes undergoing, the competition level is also present by the forms through which organisations are setting their deepening/widening mechanisms for new members states.

These processes are happening almost in simultaneous, involving security and defence guarantees, re-evaluation of present voting method (in the case of UE), challenges for existent voting methods making more difficult to achieve a decision making outcome (in the case of NATO) and adaptation of institutional and military structures.

Competing for the security role provider, it also involves having adequate military structures to ensure the effectiveness of that very same role: smaller in dimension, with a high level of deployability , multi-functional assets, possessing integrated structures able to “provide” security, within a scope of tasks from: technical-military assistance to conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution. These military structures should be ready to operate in unfriendly and cultural diversified crisis management and armed conflict environments, such as those involving disputes where the main reason for conflict might be a violent expression of national identity or ethnic militancy.

Also from the burden/risk sharing point of view, competing security environments have a disperse effect over national contributions for the security and defence organisations, which may affect its effectiveness. This is particularly relevant on what concerns: force planning, forces structures redefinition, political willingness for sponsor countries to participate and engage in military operations in the future.

If competing environments may have a negative consequence over organisations’ effectiveness, they may stimulate them to respond to security challenges and threats through means of a differentiation of security roles among allies (Cf. Chapter 8) . This takes us to the conclusion that certain allies are better tailored to operate in new adverse scenarios than others due to: their own historical past, long tradition of involvement in the domain of certain types of conflict eg. ethnical conflict resolution; availability of certain military assets needed for crisis management (e.g sea and air lift capabilities and force projection capabilities); privileged relationship with parties in conflict; geographical location; political affinity (former colony status e.g.) with the part to be defended or due to the existence of a special bilateral relationship with one of the parts involved in a crisis or conflict.

“NATO, no less than the EU, has always founded its key policies on compromises between its members interests(...)leadership for the US, enlargement for Gemany, re-engagement and power-sharing for France; the lion’s share of glory in

crisis-management missions for France and the UK; and a Mediterranean policy and exemption from radical budget and command reforms for the Southern region ¹⁸

The outcome of this balance of compromises between : leadership, engagement, sharing burden/risk/responsibility and adequacy of political and military resources, that competition for “security role provider” will be defined in the future for both NATO and the EU.

4. Present Challenges

4.1. Misperceptions and the shaping of security goals

Misperceptions about the images actors project are frequently minimised, as a key elements in the analysis of foreign and security policies of states. The image a state projects has a determinant impact on the way states outline their own policies, specially if there are vital interests involved and if political, diplomatic and operational capacities can in fact materialise the image projected.

The image an actor projects and the way it is assessed as a threat might have a negative impact in the field of security and serious consequences over political and military actions of “externalisation of fear”.¹⁹

Distorted perceptions do have a considerable impact over the way actors define their security concerns and most of all, over the way they outline their perceptions of threat. From these distorted perceptions, new threat images are produced and states that do not fit into “our” security setting may be seen as potentially threatening.

The Arab world has been frequently regarded as a source of insecurity by the Western countries. This image has been shaped for years, by the impact of : the actions perpetrated by radical Islamic movements in the Israel-Arab conflict; by the regional consequences of the Iranian Revolution; by the sponsoring of terrorist acts against Western interests by Libya and more recently, by the domestic effects of political Islam in Algeria. In this context, the media has been having its own responsibility on the way the negative image of some domestic and foreign policy agendas’ are considered as

¹⁸ Alyson J.K. Bailes, “Towards a New Synthesis”, in: *Survival*, vol.38, n°3, Autumn 1996, p:32

¹⁹ Jeff Huysmans, op.cit, p.235

contributing to promote terrorism²⁰. Such image provides the perception that there are two potentially destabilising forces involving different types of actors: those “politically dispossessed” and those who are “violently possessed”.²¹ Most frequently the first feature leads to the second one, as it is the case for most groups perpetrating terrorist acts.²²

As it will be possible to assess, when we will consider (Chapter 4.3) the impact of political and strategic culture on perception shaping; the evaluation of strategic culture is an important analytical tool, when one wishes to consider its consequences on the way the images of the “Other” are constructed; how does that influences the adoption of a particular “strategic style” and ultimately how do strategic options influence security options and vice versa.

Political and strategic culture also influences the way states and organisations define their world views and how do they define the boundary between “zones of safety” and “zones of chaos”, which outlines the limits within which organisations, such as NATO, need to extend and preserve political and strategic stability.²³ Preserving and extending stability, it means to transform unilateral threats into common challenges and to broaden common security concerns to a larger geographical scope of countries. That seems to be the starting point for any partnership programme, as it has been the case for the Eastern European countries and the Partnership for Peace programme.

Co-operation in the Mediterranean region, namely with North African countries is and it will continue to be much influenced by perceptions and by the nature of regional challenges and interests in stake. If we take the Maghreb countries, as a case study, to illustrate possible forms of co-operation in the region, one must consider the perception the Western countries have in general and NATO in particular, towards the implementation of a broad security agenda for the region. Future perceptions will be much conditioned by internal political evolution of events, specially those related with

²⁰ The media acts as a vehicle of reception, interpretation and expansion of terrorism due to the fact it provides information to a mass audience, reproduces systematically images that shape perception of the public and provides a contextualizes terrorism for global audiences.

²¹ James der Derian, “The Terrorist Discourse: Signs, States and Systems of Global Political Violence”, in: Michael Klare and David C. Thomas, *World Security-Trends and Challenges at the Century's end*, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 241

²² While acts of war are forms of organised violence conducted by states, where a set of rules concerning its conduct are “accepted” by the community of states involved. Terrorism relies on random acts of violence to achieve its various objectives as a strategy of intimidation.

²³ In this context, organisations follow criteria already applied to their member states, that they might be willing to extend to their neighbouring countries or potential foreign policy partners, at the bilateral or multilateral level. That is: open democratic institutions, open market economies and open multilateral/transnational diplomacy. The

the possibility of ethnic conflict and the need for a peaceful settlement of disputes (e.g. the Western Sahara), illegal immigration to European countries and the emergence of potential conflicting factors, that might arise from an exacerbation of politics of identity in European immigrant hosting countries.

The Mediterranean region is a particularly good example of how long term cultural and historical factors interfere in the way threat perception is formed and its impact over foreign policies of some European countries. In this context, perception is particularly relevant, as an essential part of the construction of images of the “other”(enemy) and the way this affects the idea one has about a particular strategic culture.

Misperceptions about the Arab world are particularly relevant on what concerns the analysis of factors felt as instruments of insecurity by transatlantic allies, such as: fundamentalism, conventional and NCB arms proliferation, terrorism and illegal immigrations among others.

Multilateral co-operation and most of all, confidence building requires a clear and consensual perception of challenges, risks and threats for both the elite and civil societies in both rims of the Mediterranean region.

4.2. The quest for paradigms

Any actor in the international system has difficulty in justifying its existence in the absence of an identifiable political, strategic and even cultural paradigm according to which it was created and for which it has been existing.

The changes occurred at the international level system, in the post Cold War, that caused the end of bipolarity, the break up of USSR and collapse of the Warsaw Pact had a major impact over states and organisations worldviews. That of religious fundamentalism and terrorism replaced the threat of communism²⁴. There is a general

fulfilment of these criterion helps to improve loyalty and legitimacy among participants and increases co-operation among members and partners.

²⁴ For further reading on this matter see *inter alia* : James der Derian, Op.cit., pp:237-265; Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Los Angeles,University of California Press:1993), Christophe Carle, “Le sud éclaté - Conflits et prolifération après la Guerre Froide”, in :*Cahiers Français-Les Tiers Monde*,n°270,Mars-Avril 1995,pp.65-82; Philippe Moreau Defarges, “Le facteur religieux dans les relations internationales”,in: *Cahiers Français – Religions et Société*, n°273,Octobre-Décembre 1995, pp:80-88; Christopher Layne, “Sin Enimigos:La Nueva Hegemonia Norte Americana”,in: *Política Exterior*, vol.VIII, n°37, Febrero-Marso1994; Zaki Laïdi, *Le monde privé de sens*, (Fayard,Paris:1994); Joseph S.Nye, “Conflicts after the Cold War”, in: *The Washington Quarterly*, vol.19,Number 1,Winter 1996,pp.5-24,”Tribalism revisited”, in : *The Economist*, December 21st, 1991-January 3 rd, 1992, p.73-74, “Defence in the 21st Century”, in: *The Economist*, September 1991, pp:3-20; G.R.Berridge, “States and Conflict”, in : *International Politics-States, Power and Conflicts since 1945*, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf,1997)

idea, in theory and practice, that ideology gave place to religion, civilisation, nationalistic, cultural and ethnical motivations as sources of international and regional insecurity and conflict.

The subsequent impact, over the way inter-state and inter-organisation security and defence arrangements shape and define their security agendas and goals for the future, is indeed significant. If security is meaningless without an “Other” to help specify the conditions of insecurity,²⁵ the replacement of paradigms that contribute to orientate states and organisations remains essential for their survival.

In that sense, the suppression of a traditional enemy (USSR) might have a compromising effect over a certain core of features that had contributed to constitute a strategic identity²⁶ (goals, doctrines, political and strategic culture) might stimulate the search for a new enemy. The problem with the post Cold War environment is that “the search for enemies and new security threats is less easily solved, inasmuch as the disappearance of the only “Others” that counted (USSR and the Warsaw Pact) leaves no “Others” that can credibly fill its place”.²⁷

The disintegration of USSR caused the disappearing of ideological and geopolitical rivalries identified with the existence of a geo-strategic area of dominance connoted with communist ideology and militarily controlled²⁸ by USSR. The end of bipolarity, suppressed the immediate political object of the US foreign and defence policy: the URSS and the Alliance’s main military counterpart: the Warsaw Pact.

The 90’s produced a security speech, which clearly traduces the existence of different international scenarios and the correspondent change in international paradigms based on the values of democracy, international peace, economic liberalism, fundamental individual freedoms and international law.

This changing in paradigm, also had an important effect on the institutions re-structure and on the organisations’ enlargement processes after 1994, as well as on the new forms of bilateral and multilateral relationship between states, organisations and

²⁵ Ronnie Lipschutz ed., Op.cit., p.9

²⁶ By “strategic identity” among member states of security and defence organisations, one refers to a core of political and cultural affinities, interests, set of rights and duties, rules of commitment, operational procedures adopted by state members, which grant consistency and effectiveness to their external behaviour and unity to their internal relationship.

²⁷ Ronnie Lipschutz ed, Op.cit,p.219

²⁸ Despite the fact from the ideological point of view, this control was not fully achieved by URSS, once there were some dissidences such as Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam on what concerns the communist regime adopted. From the military point of view that control was almost fully achieved, specially among Warsaw Pact members.

new country partners. An alternative paradigm to the traditional “communism versus democracy”, not only provided a set of criterion of acceptance for former enemies, within Western frameworks of political, security and defence relationship such as NATO and the EU, but also defined a new criteria of exclusion towards the “Other”, whenever the parameters of this criteria are not met.

The enlargement processes of the 90’s, as part of organisations external co-operation programmes and of the states foreign policies’ were not the only ones affected by changes occurred at the international level, which created a multiplicity of strategic scenarios, no longer unified under two ideological paradigms. In today’s politics, religious fundamentalism, cultural and ethnical belonging extremisms, social unrest and exacerbated nationalism ²⁹ have an excluding effect, by enclosing in a potential for conflict.

All these forms of extremism might imply a negative status of belonging, which excludes them from integrated security frameworks. In this case, the criteria of exclusion resulting from a paradigm change in international relations, which shifted from: ideological orientation and cause effect relation based on military power/ threat perception, geographically defined by the Western versus the Eastern bloc and two major defence organisations, to a criteria of exclusion based on elements of subjective nature (e.g. religion, ethnicity, culture). These are geographically spread, transnational on its effects and difficult to gather under one single institutional framework that might work as mediator in case of conflict.

Finally, the introduction of new parameters of evaluation of international relations, based on alternative paradigms (whether one considers religion, culture, ethnicity, nationalism or development, on the assessment states and organisations make of their own external role in the international affairs) has a repercussion over the profile of the missions where they might be involved. Today’s direct confrontation is much less accepted due to the fading effect that traditional threats have suffered, making them less evident to the public’s eye and more difficult to handle through traditional military means due to their transnational nature.

4.3. Different political and strategic cultures

²⁹ Which are much more unstable variables for paradigm definition, then those of security and power commonly used during the Cold War period.

The analysis of political and strategic cultures constitutes an important basis to understand what has been separating the transatlantic allies from adjacent areas, namely those from the southern rim of the Mediterranean, conditioning the relationship with NATO and the EU.

Both states and regional *fora*, such as NATO and the EU are confronted with the difficulty in justifying certain internal and external political and military options³⁰ in the absence of identifiable enemies or threatening forces.

This brings into the discussion, another matter of concern for the definition of present challenges to security policies, which is the need for an intelligible public justification for foreign and defence policies and consequent actions on those domains.

Political culture frameworks set strategic preferences, which determine strategic predispositions. This term falls into the category of “strategic culture” commonly used as a theoretical tool to understand the relationship between strategy and culture. Strategic culture determines strategic preferences traduced in a external behaviour³¹, whether we analyse states’ behaviour or organisations’ behaviour in the domain of foreign and security policies. In this context, political and military elites perform an important role, once they are responsible for shaping strategic preferences. That is why the degree of socialisation³² among elites determined how homogeneous are the political choices made on the domains above referred.

After the end of bipolarity, strategic structural conditions loss their more or less constant character, allowing an adaptation of strategic cultures and strategic behaviours to new scenarios where main strategic counterparts (US, Europe and Russia) coexist now, with other international actors competing for a security provider role.

³⁰ For example to provide a public explanation for national commitment to new missions within multilateral security and defence structures, assign military means to fulfil them, increase national defence budgets, justify deployment of multinational forces to foreign countries.

³¹ According to Alastair Iain Johnston, strategic preferences are rooted in formative experiences of the state and are influenced by philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites. The relevance of historical experiences and long time rooted strategic preferences, tend to limit responses to changes in the strategic environment with consequences over strategic choices. For further reading see Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture” in: *International Security* Spring 1995, vol.19,n° 4, pp:32-64

³² Socialisation in this specific context means, the degree of historical, political and cultural affinities shared by elites, providing a common ground for common interests and strategic choices. The fact allied European elites, between 1939-45, were forced to experienced and confront the consequences of II World War in similar conditions, it increased and enhanced the degree of socialisation among them. This high level of socialisation have facilitated the creation and acceptance of NATO, as the main defence organisation for the majority of winning powers after the war, who shared identical values, political interests and strategic goals. This degree of affinity is determinant over their strategic preference shaping.

Despite the fact structural conditions of security and defence have been changing, the degree of socialisation among Western state elites' and organisations' has considerably increased due to : the existence of a larger number of integrated political, defence and security structures; more integrated political decision making *fora*; a higher level of subsidiarity at decision shaping level; increased expansion of co-operation opportunities at the multilateral and international level; broaden dialogue conditions; closer harmonisation of policies and synchronisation of multilateral events and meetings between NATO and other organisations namely EU.³³

Some schools of thought on strategic culture³⁴ consider the weigh of culture, as a variable that limits the range of options, acting as a lens that alters the appearance and efficiency of different political preferences shaping, which in the process of policy making circumscribes options available to decision makers.

The existence of different national strategic discourses tries to accentuate “us-them” differences and lead to similarly stark visions of a threatening external world.³⁵ These national strategic discourses are a product of political culture considered as a gathering of political codes of behaviour and assumptions, which impose a certain order within a political culture system.³⁶ Several political cultures may coexist within one same political system, whether we are talking about communities, organisations or states, gathered under the influence of a dominant culture. For the case that matters, there are two overlapping cultures. A NATO culture in the domain of security and defence and a European Union culture in the domain of political institutions, practices and economic policies. From these, it results a strategic culture with a considerable degree of integrated political symbolic references, similar political languages, common institutional settings.

Some states, such as the United States, have a culture of national security, which has a determinant effect over its strategic predisposition and its own posture inside

³³ The category of “ strategic culture has a potential for conscious manipulation to justify the competence of decision matters, deflect criticism, suppress dissent or limit access to the decision process” in : Alastair Iain Johnston, Op.cit.,p.38. According to Jack Snyder, strategic culture is seen as “the sum of ideas, that conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of national strategic communities have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other” in: Michael Desch, “Culture Clash- Assessing the importance of ideas in security studies”, in: *International Security*, Vol.23,N° 1(Summer 1998), p.152

³⁴ What Alastair Iain Johnston calls the Third Generation, dated from the beginning of the 90's and that considers organisational culture as an intervening variable along with military culture and political-military culture in: Idem, pp:42-43

³⁵ Alastair Iain Johnston, Idem, p.41

³⁶ Political culture determines goals in political life and defines the relative value of risk-acceptant versus risk-averse strategies. Defines who belongs to a certain political community, what type of events, actions and institutions are

NATO. This strategic predisposition acts dominantly, by its capacity to be projected and influence other member states strategic cultures as well as security and defence policy orientation.

For this reason, any potential programme of co-operation, between NATO and the Maghreb countries, should take into account the differences present between the political cultures of both rims, which will determine the level of success of any initiative in the field of security and defence.

In each side of the Mediterranean, elites create official languages destined to exclude other strategic cultures, which might challenge their supremacy and compromise their hegemony in the field of security and defence. So it happens with the kind of security speech issued within NATO political and its military circles. The Alliance members produce dominant security aims, interests and debates and those outside of the debates “who want to join them have self-interested reasons to conform to the official language of strategic discourse”.³⁷ Making part of the debate, it means to meet the implicit security and defence interests and requirements outlined by the dominant strategic actor.

On the other hand, different domestic political cultures will tend to adopt divergent means of controlling their military apparatus based on domestic political considerations, not external strategic concerns.³⁸ That is, the use of force is partially shaped by domestic political attitudes varying according to states’ posture inside and outside their own political systems. Not only domestic constraints determine the level of control over the military apparatus. The role of historical experience and its interpretation by domestic political actors may develop beliefs and values traduced in external defence and security outcomes.

In the case of North African countries five features, related to their historical past, help us to comprehend the need for a closer look when co-operation initiatives with NATO and UE are to be considered.

First, the fact Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were all former colonies of European countries, which may raise sensitive issues concerning co-operation

political and provides references to evaluate the level of trust other political actors are worthy of. in :Alastair Iain Johnston, Idem, p.45

³⁷ Stephen M. Walt, ”The Search for a Science of Strategy: A Review Essay on ‘Makers of Modern Strategy’”, in: *International Security*, Vol.12, N° 1 (Summer 1987),pp.147-148

³⁸ Michael Desch, Op .cit., p.142

initiatives. Second, all lead wars of independence³⁹, which reinforces the concern for a careful approach. Third, they do share what might be called a “warrior culture”, based on ancient traditions of fighting among different tribes in the region, which results in a weak propensity for integrated forms of co-operation. Fourth, their national identities have a strong religious background, different from country to country and within the same country,⁴⁰ which weakens the shaping of a common ground based on national identities affinities.

Structural changes on defence and security states posture may be determined by three sorts of mechanisms of different nature and consequences. The mechanism of socialisation when, working in co-operation may provide positive outcomes for partners involved or when there is only one or at most only a few satisfactory strategic choices.

The one of emulation, when state actors are trying to approach criteria pre-settled by, lets say, organisations such as NATO or the EU that would make them attractive as potential future co-operation partners. Finally competition, when the aim is not to achieve benefits, nor to fulfil criteria for future co-operation initiatives or to acquire a status for future membership.⁴¹

The adoption of the mechanisms of socialisation and emulation in co-operation initiatives with NATO or EU are determined by the adoption of a certain strategic culture underlined. This has as a consequence the fact that: socialisation will demand the adoption of similar strategic patterns of behaviour, similar strategic practices and similar operational working methods. On the other hand, emulation is destined to convince participants of their potential to act as valid partners inside the organisations. Emulation involves adopting common goals and trying to meet any political requirements that might be set to them, in order to join an organisation or process of political co-operation.

³⁹ Despite the fact during Second World War they act as allies of their coloniser: France.

⁴⁰ Some of the cultural variables, which are present under these four considerations, may explain why some states have a potential to act contrary to the structural imperatives of the international system, based on the affirmation of their own cultural/religious specificity.

⁴¹ For further reading see Michael Desch, *Op. cit.*, pp: 166-169. The fact remains that, when there is a strong contradiction between external conditions and cultural tendencies, strategic culture will likely adapt. That is the case for PFP partners, after the Warsaw Pact ended and western european states realise the potential of emulation and socialisation mechanisms, unfamiliar to their previously adopted strategic culture, rather than to insist on competition. The old strategic culture produced by the dominant soviet strategic culture was slowly overcame by Western, NATO strategic culture, much influenced by changes occurred especially in Europe, after the fall of Berlin Wall and the re-unification of Germany.

In the northern Mediterranean rim, the level of democratic scrutiny, the importance of accountability⁴² and political/civil control of military apparatus, not only traduces an important characteristic of Western strategic culture, but also determines the level of political predisposition for co-operation initiatives.

This brings to the debate an important question, which is that of the importance of public scrutiny of policies and demonstrates how different the situation is among North African countries where the relevance of a close relationship, between political / military authorities and civil society is almost non-existent. In the Southern rim, the absence of democratic scrutiny, the presence of different regional attitudes towards the Western assumption of what good governance should be and the weak degree of accountability, allows local political and military elite a greater freedom of choice in the field of security and defence, most of the time kept away from the public's knowledge and scrutiny.

This has a decisive impact over the kind of relationship NATO and the EU wish to build up with the Mediterranean dialogue partners. In the long term, the tendency in western societies, will be that of an increasing adaptation of political culture to the presence of a more active civil society, especially on matters with implications in the field of security and defence. This will tend to be a common pattern of relationship among European countries, even if the forms of direct democratic scrutiny will eventually decrease, due to the alienation of traditional sovereign attributes, in favour of supranational entities responsible for the harmonisation of policies, namely those of security and defence.

On the other hand, people in western societies have a better and widespread access to information and communication, leading to a better-informed civil society, which will increasingly limit governments' political options and choices. Civil societies will have, already do, alternative *fora* of political debate and more active pressure groups with a considerable amount of influence over governments and their policy making.

To consider the possibilities of a future closer co-operation, between the transatlantic link and the European Security and Defence Identity in the Mediterranean context, it implies to consider several essential questions.

⁴² Which marks an important difference between civilian and military relationship, when one considers the possibility of future co-operation initiatives between the three Maghrebian countries and NATO.

First, how to acquire security assurances on a similar basis, from regional partners some of which with a recent democratic political experience and others who still keep authoritarian forms of power associated with a weak civil control of the armed forces. Second, civil societies in the Maghreb have less access to information and communication and consequently, do have constraints over how to internally express their views. Third, local media and political opposition have a limited scope of intervention in politics, not contributing to shape political or strategic culture in their countries. Fourth, citizenship rights are not fully ensured. Fifth the exercise of the political authority is characterised by a weak separation of powers, a tenuous internal political stability, limited public scrutiny and weak political accountability.

There is less to say, when one wishes to avoid the traditional analytical approach requirement of “the need to spread democratic political practices and its inherent values” to non western societies. To question traditional approaches and solutions is important enough in order to consider differences on which to base future political co-operation. Are NATO and the European Union willing to consider differences? Will they know how to deal with it? Can co-operation be successful, among such different strategic cultures? How compatible are strategic preferences and state interests in the transatlantic and Mediterranean contexts? Should dialogue partners be able to cope with differences before trying to rule themselves according to similar rules of international conduct and multilateral relationship?

These are some of the open questions, that nowadays we are confronted with when one intends to evaluate an alternative approach for a transatlantic security framework, in such different security settings as the two Mediterranean rims.

5. Approaches to a transatlantic security framework on a competitive international environment

The breakdown of the ideological paradigm in the aftermath of the Cold War created a strategic void, the consequences of which were soon felt by security and defence organisations, in the transatlantic context. Security was requiring a redefinition without a clear geographical and ideological reference. This created the need for an analogue political and security model, which would allow both NATO and the European allies, to adapt their security structures to new political and strategic scenarios.

This situation increased the competitiveness among organisations, causing the emergence of a larger variety of ways for organisations to play the role of security provider. The concept of “interlocking” institutions became fashionable in academic and political writings, because it bounded the justification for the existence of overlapping security structures competing for the same goals, same political agendas, with similar external behaviour patterns, same partners, in the same geographical areas.

If we want to equate reasons to enhance comprehensive security and co-operation settlements between the two Mediterranean rims, it is important to reflect upon the changes that have occurred over political paradigms and their effect over security and defence settings.

One most important consequence was the replacement of the ideological paradigm by other archetypes, namely the religious, ethnic or nationalistic one. This new situation did not bring innovative responses to the adaptation to new political scenarios and to the justification of strategic imperatives. On the contrary, they became recognised by the parts involved, as sources of insecurity for both the Alliance and its European allies. This attitude, from elite and public opinion in general, corresponded to a negative impact of the analysis of strategic culture, whenever it reinforces stereotypes about certain regional political and strategic predisposition considered as threatening to the status quo. These are convenient arguments to justify interference in domestic affairs, on a crisis management or in conducting a war.

The new paradigms do not create a bloc to bloc kind of relation, but a variety of confusing senses and attitudes of differentiation and exclusion towards “otherness”, which might apart and differentiate state actors and organisations, mitigating all potential for a solid basis of co-operation. But even worst, they do not help to overcome the existing “enemy” images in the Mediterranean region, whether from a northern perspective or southern one. That is particularly true when one considers internal sources of instability in the Mediterranean (terrorist activities, arms race, migrations, and drugs traffic) and their slipover latent ability, affecting both NATO and the European Union’s internal stability.⁴³ Those are not new threats. Today they are just objects of a re-evaluated concern, now that the end of the bloc to bloc relation set threats free from a direct control by regional state actors or by the superpowers in particular. Terrorism became less identified with states such as Libya or Iran, benefiting

nowadays from dispersed hosts and less known identities. Facts such as these have to be taken into account, when considering the possibility of a renewed transatlantic security model for the Mediterranean.

The expansion of security agendas due to the multiplicity of sources of threat⁴⁴, contributed to increase legitimacy of security organisations in dealing with crisis management and conflict prevention. On the other hand, security organisations and state actors have shifted⁴⁵ their primary security concerns, from nuclear deterrence, arms control and limited war to ethnic and identity conflicts, rough states, refugee flows, humanitarian intervention, high intensity conventional warfare and an intensification of efforts on preventive diplomacy.

After the 90's, one could witness a proliferation of security communities whose future and success relies on "the depth of trust between states and on the nature and degree of institutionalisation of governance system at the regional level".⁴⁶ But not only on those, the mechanism of emulation referred previously also determines the degree of political willingness⁴⁷ to co-operate.

Any enhancement of transatlantic security settings for the Mediterranean region demands the existence of capacities to face international and regional crisis through means of: autonomous capacity to intervene⁴⁸; political credibility able to generate support and legitimatise actions; diplomatic and military means with projection capacity and readiness to intervene in out of area contexts and public support.⁴⁹

The future steps towards NATO's enlargement⁵⁰ risk increasing the gap between the Alliance's interest, as security and defence organisation and the new members

⁴³ Alessandro Politi, "European Security: The New Transnational Risks" in: *Chaillot Papers*, 29 October 1997, (Institute for Security Studies, 1997), pp:4 - 40

⁴⁴ Insecurity is a necessary condition for security, which means it is also a precondition to evaluate security frameworks.

⁴⁵ Which does not mean that they have abandoned their own primary national security concerns.

⁴⁶ Emanuel Adler, Op.cit., p.255

⁴⁷ Former American ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter quoted on The Economist's issue entitled "Defining NATO's aims" concerning post Cold War intervention for interests of humanitarianism and international order said "If your willingness to take casualties is limited, then someone else with a different calculation is likely to take advantage", "Defining NATO's aims" in: *The Economist*, April 24th 1999, p.15

⁴⁸ David Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union", in: *Survival*, vol.42, n°4, Winter 2000-2001, pp:97-128

⁴⁹ This is particularly relevant when political decisions involve sending conscripts abroad, to potentially dangerous missions, in situations where national interest is not directly affected by the course of events.

⁵⁰ Enlargement will mean increased difficulties in reaching consensual political decisions, in particular on what comes to out-of-area issues (as the Maghreb region), once several member states will share different political views and strategic interests in the region.

national interests in presence, which might diminish the prospects of a future co-operation in the Mediterranean region .

Both NATO and the European Union have been working at decision making level (whether we talk about force re-structuring in the case of NATO or institutional political procedures adaptation in the case of the EU), that will allow them to go ahead with a political decision that others do not agree upon, even when they have implications in the field of security and defence.

Although in the case of NATO, the rule of consensus is still the prevailing one, the concept of Combined Task Forces approved during January 1994 NATO Summit allows member states to use NATO assets separable, but not separated to undertake non Article 5 missions in out-of-area contexts.

In the case of EU, the approval during the December 2000 Nice Summit of the “enhanced co-operation” mechanism permits a partial circumvention of certain decision making constraints that might be imposed by the presence of new member states.⁵¹

To consider the outlining of a possible transatlantic security model for the Mediterranean demands accurate readings on a wide spectrum of issues. In this context, it is important to take into account the prominence and substance of agreements, the value of its real normative character and the effectiveness in establishing rules and codes of conduct that might work as successful mechanism of political dialogue, for both NATO and the European Union.

On the other hand, paradigms replacement and the construction of new security perceptions result from international changes and circumstantial political and strategic opportunities shaped by dominant political and strategic cultures, which will frame political outcomes. Their analysis is fundamental to understand, what has been separating the transatlantic allies from adjacent areas, namely the Southern rim of the Mediterranean and what has been restraining a full dialogue between NATO, the EU and the Maghreb countries.

Later we will come back to this issue, when focusing on political references, common values and shared interests in the Mediterranean region.

⁵¹ In the case of the EU the opting out clause, approved by the Amsterdam Treaty, allows member states to exclude themselves from participating in actions with implications in the field of security and defence, by invoking reasons of national interest.

The Southern Mediterranean rim with an apparent external resemblance has a strong internal unlikeness closing in a diversity that, if not taken into account, might imperil any attempt to develop fruitful confidence building and political dialogue processes.

In practical terms, the end of bipolarity created a strategic void which was soon felt by security and defence organisations in the transatlantic context, specially on what concerns geographical areas outside Article 5. The contents of security had to be redefined, without the comfort of clear geographical and ideological references.

The lack of a well-defined and monolithic threat multiplied the number of security providers (as NATO and the European Union) of stability and effective defence and security structures and mechanisms. The search for: a new significance for security; for more attractive ways to strengthen membership and redefining goals that could emphasise the new security profile, generated a multitude of options of multilateral nature to meet the multiplicity of risks and threats.

NATO, despite the fact is still the only organisation with the best structure and means to face most of security challenges, it is no longer alone. The European Union is trying to affirm itself as a security entity and a relevant diplomatic partner in North Africa and the Arab world in general. This brings us back to the concept and practice of “interlocking” institutions, which could show the opportunities that a form of regional co-operation based on overlapping security structures, might offer.

Further will consider these opportunities, when outlining a possible regional security model for the Mediterranean, on the last chapter of this study.

6. Political references, common values and shared interests in the Mediterranean region

It is not possible to define alternative political and security settings to adapt changing and unforeseeable regional scenarios, unless entities – such as NATO and the European Union - are able to generate common political references and values that help to gather allies and potential partners around common interests, in areas like the Mediterranean region where political, social and economical diversity seems to be the rule.

The identification of a framework within which common principles may coexist, becomes a pre-requisite, when it comes to equate a perceived “common ground” of understanding frequently stated in political declarations. But the task to build up a more consistent dialogue in the Mediterranean becomes more difficult, once actors involved are simultaneously seen as sources of mistrust and potential partners. Because this is a two-side question, the identification of problems of perception and misperception (Cf.Chapter 4.1) concerning processes related with confidence building and the prospects of dialogue proves to be essential.

Frameworks of co-operation in the field of security and defence, as in any other field, require the previous establishment of practices of political dialogue based on models of integrated decision making.⁵² This practices add stability to political relations and consistency to multilateral regional relationship. That is, creates the conditions for the setting of a dialogue structure, according to similar patterns of international behaviour, which commit state actors involved to similar international rules, codes of arbitration and promotes transnational co-operation.

In the case of Maghrebian countries the historical presence of what G.John Ikenberry refers to as “founding moments” after independence, has a major influence over principles and laws outlined on those moments and that will act as enduring principles according to which polity is organised, the basic limitation to the exercise of power is circumscribed and the scope of politics is defined. In the case of the North African partner countries, there is a strong influence of religious law which provides a code of conduct for all aspects of the states’ life and from which order is formulated.

After 1994, when NATO launched its Mediterranean Initiative and in 1995 with the send forth of the Barcelona Process⁵³, these countries assessed reasonable possibilities to co-operate within the framework of both NATO and the EU. Most of the initiatives launched in the beginning of the nineties had a weak co-binding nature due to existent fears of domination⁵⁴ over local domestic policies, rather than external ones.

⁵² This is a practice not too common among North African partners, which makes co-operation initiatives in the Mediterranean sometimes difficult to become well succeeded.

⁵³ Not to mention early co-operation initiatives such as: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (1990), “Five plus Five”(1990), the ones set by the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration(1992) and the Forum for Dialogue and Co-operation in the Mediterranean(1994) all related with European co-operation initiatives in the region.

⁵⁴ This despite the fact most of the co-operation initiatives, launched after the Cold War, have become less interventionist and more regulatory, which might also frequently be considered by states, as a form of domination and interventionism, in their own internal and external affairs, by the organisations with which they co-operate.

The setting of rules and principles is a basic requirement for the building up of political references and generation of common values and shared interests. If one wishes to consider the possibility of enhancing co-operation between NATO, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia one must consider the issues of: shared identity, institutions stability and political authority⁵⁵ within the region and among North and South rims.

The subsidiarian way of integrating policies from economy, to politics and internal affairs, as it is the case for the EU, makes co-operation initiatives a sensitive matter for states multilateral relationship, especially when considerably different national political practices are involved. This may have a direct impact over the sensitive prerogatives of participation and consent on which any bilateral agreement formulated between the EU and non EU members is based.

Once non legally binding processes do not seem to work effectively, as it has been the case for most regional initiatives in the Mediterranean region, the establishment of binding mechanism remains as the only alternative to promote regional co-operation through a larger consensus over joint responsibilities and principles of external relationship. This kind of legally binding mechanisms create a “voice opportunity” providing mechanisms to mitigate or resolve conflicts.⁵⁶

The existence of mechanisms able to provide a “voice of opportunity” are simultaneously vehicles of promotion of common values and interests and a solid basis to promote political references in the Mediterranean region.⁵⁷ Without the pre-existence of this three conditions: common political references, common values and interests, any future opportunity for consultation and decision-making is compromised.

The present international environment gives opportunity for both the Alliance and the Mediterranean partners to fulfil their regional, political and strategic needs. For NATO, it contributes to reinforce its new role of security provider on the basis of co-

⁵⁵ On this subject see G.John Ikenberry , “Constitutional Politics in International Relations” in: *European Journal of International Relations*,(vol.4(2),June 1998,pp:147-177. Ikenberry calls attention to the fact some countries have international politics remarkably consensual and institutionalised by the existence of “founding moments” such as those made possible by independence, revolution or civil wars. Such is the case of the three Maghreb countries after de-colonisation period. The case of Algeria remains to be seen due to the internal political stability.

⁵⁶ G.John Ikenberry, Op.cit.,pp:156-158

⁵⁷ The possibility of affirmation of such mechanisms is facilitated by the historical experience of countries in general. While in Europe the fact most Western countries were allies during the II World War and were able to settle democratic regimes after it, made ease the implementation of a “constitutional” settlement after 1945, whether through NATO or the EU. North African countries faced a different historical experience after 1945, with their wars of independence, decolonisation processes and the frustrated attempts to promote a framework of regional co-operation as it was the case of Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union set up not too long ago, in 1989.

operation and partnership, for the Maghreb countries it offers opportunities of co-operation with an important strategic ally.

The increasing interdependence of international environment makes multilateral co-operation a way of assuring countries commitment to peace and stability. If an approach to NATO by the North African countries provide them security guarantees, even if not politically and legally binding, it also promotes an approach to EU political relationship and access to development aid programmes through bilateral agreements.

In this context the Mediterranean non-members of each organisations will have to get closer to a political model of democratisation, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, respect for minorities and civic rights. They should also observe political internal practices that indicate a will to move towards the direction of political and social pluralism. Any effort to establish common political references and common interests should depart from a successful enhancement of regional co-operation in the Mediterranean. This has not been the case, mostly due to the presence of a strong internal regional diversity traduced in a variety of domestic and foreign policy goals, which make regional bilateral and multilateral relationship difficult. The issues related with the crisis in Algeria and the problematic situation related with Western Sahara have been compromising any successful attempts, within e.g. the Arab Maghreb Union, to reduce and solve these two situations with a highly conflict potential, not to mention the constant side effects over the Arab world in general, every time an impasse or deterioration of the peace process in the Middle East occurs.

The Alliance and the EU may offer a privilege space to develop initiatives in the domain of civil emergency planning, peacekeeping missions search and rescue missions, evacuation, humanitarian and refugee control operations and environmental protection. A recent RAND study recommended a region-specific agenda for the Mediterranean region, that would include issues such as: terrorism, energy security, refugee flows, civil emergency planning and WMD (Weapons of Massive Destruction) proliferation.⁵⁸

The presence of several regional interests of inter and intra state nature traduced in rivalries between non state actors (territorial, frontiers, water supply management, energy security, minorities' rights reinvindication, political and religious

⁵⁸ Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, F.Stephen Larrabee and Michele Zanini, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps*, MR-1164-SMD, (version on line/web vetsion), RAND, 2000, p.xiii

fundamentalism) enclose two major regional challenges to any co-operation initiative. On one hand, its potential destabilising effect in the region, on the other, the fact they do not presuppose the traditional military responses that an organisation, such as NATO is expected and ready to provide.

7. Security perceptions: allies, "enemies" and partners

The end of bipolarity altered considerably the relationship between security sets and perception of threat. Several new constraints associated with : the need for security organisations to adapt to the new strategic scenarios, the search for alternative dimensions for foreign defence and security policies and the imposition of constraints to defence budgets, led to the redefinition of external commitments and strategic interests. Which means, to the redefinition of political and economical co-operation projects and partnership initiatives.

If the redefinition of external commitments and strategic interests caused a shift in the orientation of the "geography of threats" from Eastern Europe to the Southern rim of the Mediterranean. The overlapping of political and economical co-operation projects and partnership initiatives launched confusion among the several processes in course for the region.

In early 90, the isolationist attitude of superpowers towards external commitments not only attenuated the strategic value of regions such as the Maghreb, but provided the chance for European countries (France, Great Britain and Spain) and organisations such as EU and OSCE to start playing renewed diplomatic and security roles in the region.

In international terms, the threat perception over religious fundamentalism and terrorism replaced the major threats identified with communism. This means that security perceptions are no longer shaped by ideological patterns, but rather by religious, civilisation, cultural and ethnical ones.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Since the beginning of the 90's there is a large scientific production on the value of civilisation, culture and ethnicity in the explanation of conflicts. In 1993 the Foreign Affairs journal (vol.72,number 3, Summer 1993) published Samuel Huntington's controversial article "The Clash of Civilizations" which outlined the existence of fault lines between civilisations and that conflict between civilizations would supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict. Further that "conflicts between groups in different civilisations were the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars" (p.48). For further reading on the subject see Pierre Hassner, "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World order", in: *Survival*, vol.35, n°2, Summer 1993,pp.49-65, Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic

On the other hand, superpowers have changed the “geography” of their own military presence from traditional areas, replacing it by alternative ways of showing their presence. Mechanisms of financial aid and aid to development, to the so called moderate Arab countries, promotion of bilateral co-operation agreements and reinforcement of bilateral and multilateral relations with North African and Middle East countries have been widely developed.

Organisations such as NATO and EU have been emphasising the need to act within the field of conflict prevention, crisis management and low intensity conflicts in order to limit situations of tension or potential conflict in the Mediterranean region.

No matter what political agendas define and treaties and declarations state, it has proved difficult to increase political confidence and mobilise political will towards common security perceptions aimed at co-operation in the Mediterranean context ,once regional actors involved are simultaneously seen as sources of mistrust and potential partners. Because this is a two-sided issue, by considering it, namely from the point of view of the Maghreb countries, this chapter will contribute to identify issues of perception concerning security problems in the region and the consequent need to increase processes related with confidence building.

The loss of the ideological paradigm, as a model of international political reference and behaviour among states, allowed the emergence of alternative references in the Mediterranean region such as: the rehabilitation of local national identities⁶⁰ and the return to the purest traditions of Islam.

During the 60’s , most of the former colonised countries in the Mediterranean region had already achieved independence status, by undertaking wars of independence⁶¹ and developed strong anti-western feelings, supported by the pan-Arab movement which pretended to be a transnational model of orientation for the region⁶².

Conflict”, in: *Survival*, vol.35, n°1, Spring 1993, pp.27-47, Stanley Hoffman, *The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention*, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Paris, 1996.

The year 1993 marked the withdraw of American forces from Somalia, that is the first failure of the western military forces in this case American forces in a war scenario where ethnic component took a major role in the conflict. The break up of war in Former Yugoslavia stressed the importance of nationalism, ethnicity and religion in conflicts. The Gulf War however, gave way to less writings that emphasised civilisation as an important element in the conflict, probably due to the fact part of the Arab world supported the coalition force action in the region.

⁶⁰ For further reading see Samir Bouzid, Mythes, “Quête des Origines et Mythe de l’Arabite” “Philosophie de la Resurrection Nationale”, “Pédagogie de la Foi Nationale”, “Politique de La Resurrection Nationale”, in: *Utopie et Messianisme dans le Discours Politique Arabe Modern et Contemporain* (Paris, Harmattan, 1997), pp:80-84 ; 86-90 and 90-95.

⁶¹ René Gallissot, “Le Maghreb entre trois guerres” and “La question nationale au Maghreb: une approche comparée Maroc-Algérie-Tunisie “ in: *Le Maghreb de traverse*, (Paris, Editions Bouchene, 2000), pp:55-74 e 11-45.

⁶² Idem, pp:134-139

In the 70's, the Iranian revolution have opened a new era for the expression of fundamentalism against what was considered modern, liberal, and symbol of western culture. The Iranian revolution induced the expansion of violent and radical forms of Islamism, through out the Arab world, providing an alternative political model which would be introduced as able to solve social and economical expectations and problems, that the regimes implanted after the independence have not been able to solve.

The crisis of secular nationalism in the region is another issue to be considered, when evaluating security perceptions in the Mediterranean and evaluate in what measure this might affect co-operation initiatives. The unfulfilment of individual or communities' expectations such as political individual freedom, social justice and economical benefits has been helping the emergence of regional identities moved by ethnical or religious motivations. These can have a potential destabilising effect in some countries of the region, namely Algeria. The idea of political revolution and religious fight still has a mobilising effect within societies of southern Mediterranean rim. These sort of arguments serve to fulfil the need for a collective identity, loyalty and moral authority. Once radicalised, any of these national aspirations is used internally to acquire domestic political influence or to obtain a role as regional player in the Mediterranean region, can be seen as sources of instability by NATO, the EU and neighbouring countries.⁶³

Societies with a low level of social, economical and cultural development, associated to democratic deficits offer a privilege stage for the spread out of forms of nationalism linked with religious fundamentalism, which constitute a source of concern for NATO an the EU.

Security problems in the Mediterranean are focused on two different levels: the one which derivative from non-military aspects of domestic policies and that which corresponds to traditional military threats to security.

These are related with the regional and external impact of the lack of regional unity ⁶⁴; instability within domestic policies ⁶⁵; the unchangeable nature of political

⁶³ In Europe the expression of violence, with origin on the radicalisation of islamism, does not result from exhorting Islam as a religion. This means that it does not have a theological fundament, but rather works as a value of social identification for Muslims, which consider themselves as victims of social exclusion in the hosting European countries. For further reading see the interesting work of Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1993

⁶⁴ This fact is pointed out has one of the main reasons to compromise successful co-operation initiatives in Western Mediterranean.

regimes in the Maghreb, too concentrated on the personality⁶⁶ of the King or President; the presence of a military apparatus that are far beyond territorial or regional defence and security needs⁶⁷, increase in arms procurement. The first two are clearly far beyond the domain of intervention for organisations with a security and defence profile such as NATO or an economical and political institutional framework such as the EU.

The second type of security concerns is related with traditional threats that involve military aspects of defence and security in the region. There are particularly two major types of security problems in the Western Mediterranean region. The first type relies within the category of hard security expressed in: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction⁶⁸, intra-state disputes over energy resources management and drugs traffic. The second type falls into the domain of soft security related problems, identified with: deficits in political accountability and pluralism, demographic pressures, illegal immigration, economic asymmetries and social instability.

When analysts consider these factors with a potential destabilising effect in the region, there is much inaccuracy about perceptions on threats and risks coming from North African countries.

First of all, there is not a direct military threat oriented to Europe coming from North African countries. Up until now, non-of the three Maghreb countries considered in this study (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) have shown any political will or military intention against European or American interests.

Secondly, to be or to become a military threat, it means not only to have the military capacity to launch a military offensive, but also the capacity to maintain it and to generate and sustain regional and international solidarity on its behalf. That does not seem to be the case or a possibility.

Third, the Maghreb countries are facing a lack of regional unity and internal political and social unrest, which decreases quite much their capabilities to generate

⁶⁵ Which affects political confidence among NATO and EU representatives to define and implement long term co-operation processes.

⁶⁶ For a very interesting reading on the cult of political heroes (les heros politique et le heros civilisateur) in the Arab world see Samir Bouzid, "Le Heros Politique", in Op.cit., pp:162-179; pp:169-179.

⁶⁷ This causes apprehension among neighbouring countries in particular Southern European countries

⁶⁸ In this case there is the need for an effective arms proliferation control system in the Mediterranean region, for which the signature of the Non Proliferation Treaty, the Convention on Chemical Weapons, the reinforcement of the treaty's contents on biological weapons, as well as the improvement of confidence and verification measures and the limitation of ballistic missiles transfer and technology related are important steps to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

regional solidarity and limits the possibility for any of the three countries considered to become a major regional threat.

Fourth, the existence of internal conflicts or with neighbouring countries⁶⁹ related with claims for self determination, control over natural resources and disputes over frontiers does not leave the Maghreb countries too much political space to undertake offensive actions against Northern Mediterranean rim countries.

Security and defence organisations with interests in the region, as NATO and EU must have objective approaches to real threats, not the ones that fit into their own paradigms to explain international conflicts, nor those that seem to fulfil the processes of adaptation of their defence and security systems to new strategic environments.

Hard security concerns can be considered as a category shared by both NATO and the Maghreb countries. Most of them are seen as direct military risks, more threatening in a South to South relation, than South to North. That potential for confrontation might be high due to the military risks involving the difficult relationship between Morocco and Algeria or Libya and Tunisia. Under the current political circumstances, the only high potential for conflict seems to emanate from Islamic political insurgency, which might cause major internal unrest in Algeria.

Regional specificities in the region require a close look to alternatives in order to promote local stability. The Mediterranean region should not be seen as a whole, but rather to take into account the needs and perspectives of each Mediterranean country, to find the best way to establish dialogue, confidence measures and structural co-operation projects, in the field of security and defence.

These two should be seen as a complement to other areas, rather than the main issue, despite the fact, a certain level of security and stability will certainly have to be established for development to happen. The mechanisms of dialogue, confidence building and co-operation are considered to be the best ways to develop a political approach to security and defence issues in the Mediterranean region.

8. Outlining a security model for the Mediterranean in the context of the transatlantic link

⁶⁹ Morocco and the Western Sahara issue, deterioration of internal political situation in Algeria with the spread up of political Islam, Tunisia and Algeria with border problems related with tuaregue minorities and control natural resources as natural gas.

The most frequent mistake in the analysis of security agendas has been to insist on the consequences of events, rather than to focus on the causes of instability and conflict across the Mediterranean.

How the Alliance may improve its capacity to dialogue and co-operate in the Mediterranean region, in the field of crisis prevention and regional instability management, through mechanisms such as: the reinforcement of political dialogue and confidence building, exchange of experts, larger participation in the field of peacekeeping and co-operation with regional organisations remains a central question for the organisation's regional enhancement performance.

Most situations of crisis have their origin in historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, which neither NATO nor the European Union are ready to deal with, regardless of their technological or manpower potential. To focus on the functional enhancement that would allow the Alliance and the European allies, to improve its capacities in the field of conflict prevention and co-operation, it means to consider what are we securing and in which cases NATO and the EU are in the best position to play a security provider role.

If NATO is not entirely in the position to promote a solution for certain Mediterranean security issues, due to the fact it suffers from an image problem in the region, caused by its preferential relationship with Israel and its policy for the Middle East, the EU lacks the operational weight to reaffirm its role in the region.

In this chapter we will evaluate the conditions that might and did limited dialogue and co-operation options for NATO and the EU. Second, we will analyse the present co-operation mechanisms, highlighting incoherencies that might compromise transatlantic security approaches in the Magreb . Third, we will try to outline a possible model of co-operation in the context of the transatlantic link and the European Security and Defence Identity in the Mediterranean region.

Regional specificities must be taken into account, in order to find the adequate alternatives to regional stability. It is important to NATO and the European Union not to consider the region as a whole, but to take into account the needs and expectations of each Mediterranean country, to find out the best way to establish dialogue and structural co-operation projects, in the field of security and defence.

In political terms, the “last word” has become *co-operation and partnership*, as the best approach to increase stability, prevent crisis and conflicts and stimulate development aid to the region .

In mid 90’s a few important initiatives concerning the Mediterranean region were taken under NATO, European Union and WEU auspices. Many inter-regional or regional initiatives were taken before that, through the 5 + 5 Group, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean and the Arab Maghreb Union. Only after 1994, more hopeful initiatives were undertaken according to changes that occurred within defence and security organisations. To all these co-operation projects it was not alien the fact, most multilateral approaches are nowadays generally oriented to peace preservation and stability, to crisis prevention or peacekeeping related with low intensity conflicts, rather than to warfare or to offensive strategies with a global dimension.

Most of inter-regional and regional initiatives did not work, once they were not able to respond to the challenges present in the region, nor were they able to work as effective reconciliation mechanisms in situations where co-operation was possible or gathering regional solidarity a need.

The majority of early 90’s regional co-operation initiatives did not work out as security and confidence building projects, first because they were not outlined to be applied to a heterogeneous cultural and strategic space⁷⁰, as the Mediterranean. Secondly, because there have always been some ambiguity over the aims of the processes undergoing and third because most of these initiatives are lacking operational mechanisms to implement political actions, as a consequence of political decisions.

Another fact that compromised the success of political initiatives for the region has been the lack of a practical dimension and short-term applicability. If to this one add an environment of mutual mistrust, over the ways to achieve goals previously defined, the chances for a positive outcome are rather small.

Lastly, it is important to consider the small amount of bilateral agreements between southern rim Mediterranean countries, which might contribute to give consistency to co-operation programmes and increase a sense of commonality in the

⁷⁰ The strategic heterogeneity in the region is quite evident when one observes the variety of sources of dispute. Since mid seventies dispute between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara, territorial dispute between Algeria and Libya, dispute over maritime boundary between Libya and Tunisia, presence of liberation movements such as Polisario, Islamic Tendency Movement, Islamic Salvation Front and internal Algeria armed conflict between the government and Islamic groups. This not to mention the larger scope of disputes from Levant region to the Balkans and the Middle East.

region. This situation not only compromises the political will to co-operate, but also weakens the expectations to find a mutual confidence environment between the two Mediterranean shores.

Another point we wish to stress is related with the ambiguity of the aims of the various processes undergoing.

After 1993 Southern European countries and the United States have decided, almost simultaneously, to promote within NATO, European Union and WEU closer political, security and economical contacts between the two Mediterranean rims. Multilateral initiatives among the first and the last were more oriented to military co-operation, while the second focused on development assistance and growth of trade relations.

The profound alterations occurred in the security environment, after the end of the Cold War and the suppression of the Soviet communist threat, generate in NATO an “identity crisis, agenda gaps or a deprivation of its *raison d’être*”⁷¹, which accelerated the need for new strategic goals. The setting of new goals was the only way to avoid the renationalisation of European defence and keeping the US linked to European security through the maintenance of a strong transatlantic solidarity. In this context, out-of-area issues certainly acquired a new significance.

In the beginning of the 90’s the Alliance, through the London Declaration⁷² outlined its first process of internal adaptation to new security scenarios, especially in the domain of selective multilateralism⁷³, by regional security and defence organisations such as WEU and the OSCE and global ones as UN.

The outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991 and the involvement of the US in Somalia also contributed to stress the selective form through which the US and its European partners would, from that moment on, get involved in crisis management, conflict

⁷¹ Brynjar Lia, “Security Challenges in Europe’s Mediterranean Periphery- Perspectives and Policy Dilemmas”, in: *European Security*, Vol.8,N°4, Winter 1999,p.28

⁷² London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 5th-6th, 1990 and Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, November 7th- 8th, 1991.

⁷³ For further reading on selective multilateralism see: “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement”, July 1994, Washington D.C.,US, July 1994 and the same report February 1995. The first document under the form of a US Presidential Decision declared that the US would only support UN peacekeeping missions that were “backed by adequate means, had realistic criteria for effective operations and would serve the United States national interest.” Also Michael Brenner, “Multilateralism and European Security”, in: *Survival*, vol.35,n°2, Summer 1993,pp.138-155; Gordon Wilson, “European Response Mechanisms Post-Madrid and Amsterdam” pp:1-11 communication presented at the Seminar on *Peacekeeping European-Led operations* at King’s College 1997; Hon.Les Aspins, “Forces and Alliances for a New Era”, *Adelphi Paper*, n°285,ISS/Brassey’s, London, February 1994,pp:12-16; Mark T. Clark, “The Trouble with Collective security”, in: *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, vol.39,n°2, Spring 1995,pp:237-258; Uwe Nerlich, “The Relationship Between a European Common Defence and NATO, the OSCE and the United Nations”, in: Laurence Martin and John Roper, *Towards a Common Defence Policy*,(ISS, Paris, 1995),pp: 69-97

resolution and peace enforcement operations within Washington Treaty non Article 5 missions. In 1994 the Alliance proceeded to a revision of its Strategic Concept outlining the organisation's political role in the field of crisis prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution. This political role was based on an enforcement of its dialogue capacity, its ability to generate *fora* of co-operation, its own military capacities for collective defence and expanded mechanisms of force projection.⁷⁴

These institutional and operational adaptations to new security contingencies by the Alliance and its European allies contributed to shape its multilateral regional co-operation projects, namely those for the Mediterranean region.

Two consequences emanated from these circumstances. At the institutional level, it created the political will and interest to establish new frameworks of dialogue. At the operational one, it stimulated the creation of multinational military units⁷⁵ more flexible, smaller, structured and articulated in a way that would meet the criteria of flexibility and power projection. The management of crisis outside the scope of Washington Treaty's Article 5 became more a prominent feature of European and transatlantic security co-operation⁷⁶ context.

Any successful co-operation initiative implies: the existence of a common security agenda perceived by both as *useful*; the existence of a consented scope of application for that very same agenda and the definition of common goals and practices emanating from a sense of common regional political and cultural identity.

Among the Maghreb countries, the lack of regional institutions that would help to tailor common goals and interests, compromises the development of integrated regional domestic and foreign policies, with enough affinities to serve as a base of meaningful local co-operation in political defence and security terms with the Northern rim of the Mediterranean.

To this, one must add the presence of co-operation processes undergoing simultaneously, which are responsible for a situation of dialogue fatigue and for the confusing messages given to the Mediterranean partners. The fact geography places the Maghreb countries at the doorstep of Europe facilitating co-operation with Europe and

⁷⁴ This was achieved mainly through the Combined Joint Task Force concept and the implementation of a Rapid Reaction Corp.

⁷⁵ Based on new concept of military forces launched by the London Declaration on 6 July 1990 (paragraph 14) that pointed out to the need to increase force projection capabilities within the Alliance. The consequences of this security arrangement were double: at defence and security level expanded the possibilities of unilateral and selective employment of military force. At the diplomatic one produced the opportunity to develop a new multilateral diplomacy, based on co-operation policies oriented to the increment of democracy, respect for human rights, economic aid and development assistance.

⁷⁶ For further reading see Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, F. Stephen Larrabee and Michele Zanini, Op.cit., p.11

Euro-Atlantic institutions, does not avoid the fact regional heterogeneity limits the scope of common goals and interests, between south and northern rims of the Mediterranean.

Previous co-operation initiatives to NATO's Mediterranean Initiative (1994) and the Barcelona Process (1995)⁷⁷ proved their limited efficiency.

The Conference for Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (1990) showed its inefficiency when trying to implement a too vast regional scope of application, by adopting decision making processes of too complex nature and by failing to obtain support from the US .

The Five +Five (1990) was affected by intra state divergences, domestic instability and end up by excluding discussions on military security issues.

The Forum for Dialogue and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (1994) had most of its goals overtaken by the Barcelona Process and became frozen by a situation of competition between local and European initiatives.

The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (1991) despite its nature of conceptual and operational is indeed lacking the presence of some of the major regional players such as: Syria and Lebanon, whom detach themselves from this framework.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Economic Summits were able to increment partnership, between regional public and private sectors and even succeed in creating the MENA Development Bank. Despite all, this co-operation initiative has been much affected in regional terms by the stalemate of the Arab-Israeli peace process and by its proximity to US policy. Its investment in North Africa it is not significant, when compared to the one granted to development projects for the Middle East.

The WEU Mediterranean Framework (1992), which aim was to promote the exchange of views on security and defence issues affecting the Mediterranean, did not achieve much success due to the occasional frequency of its meetings and diplomatic contacts between WEU and the embassies of the Mediterranean partners in Brussels. The level of dialogue transparency between the parts was not sufficient to create a constructive environment of confidence. Even the creation of Eurofor and Euromarfor were regarded with suspicion, by the Maghreb countries, once their scope of missions seem tailored to operate in the Mediterranean region on behalf of European interests.

⁷⁷ The present study will concentrate fundamentally on these two initiatives, representative of NATO and EU co-operation projects in the region.

The OSCE Mediterranean Contact Group (1994), by taking advantage from past experience, achieved in the field of confidence building measures, has been showing a higher degree of effectiveness, due to its regional scope and capacity to work as a dialogue framework.

It is also important to consider that Europe and the US share common political aims, strategic concepts and doctrines, which means in a broad sense, they share a common political language and integrated political institutions and working methods tested for years. A prosperous co-operation within the Mediterranean must take into account the fact, there is a need to make this common language understandable to Maghrebian countries, if a successful co-operation is to be promoted.

The two major processes in progress: Mediterranean Initiative and the Barcelona Process have a potential to succeed in the field of co-operation, where other initiatives were not able to. Both sponsor organisations: NATO and the EU share a high level of: internal political socialisation; similar patterns of political behaviour and upgraded perceptions on common interests according to the evolution of strategic scenarios. Despite they reunite multiple political identities, their co-existence rarely compromises co-operation initiatives among member countries. The presence of a long shared practice of joint working methods, meetings, decision making and actions contribute to consolidate similar goals, if not the same. The practice of consensus and intergovernmental decision making processes also increased their level of political affinity⁷⁸ and practical efficiency.

This practice of political commonality does not exist in the Southern Mediterranean rim affected by weak regional institutional frameworks, fragile regional loyalties, identity crises and internal conflicts. This situation undoubtedly affects the potential for co-operation, between international and regional institutions in the two Mediterranean rims, compromising possibilities for future approaches in the field of security.

Another question to consider, when one analysis a possible NATO functional enhancement, in the context of regional crisis and conflict prevention, is related with the level at which co-operation may occur and depends on the sort of security model NATO and the EU will wish to implement in the region.

⁷⁸According to Christopher Hill, patterns of national policy are commonly shared through: habits of co-operation, acceptance of the advantages of shared information; practice of response to common threats and cost saving through increased collaboration. For further reading see Christopher Hill (ed), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*,(London: Routledge,1996), pp:1-15

On this last chapter of this study, we will consider three alternative models of security for the region. Each one has distinctive implications for NATO, the EU and related co-operation processes, namely Mediterranean Initiative and the Barcelona Process. The aim is to evaluate, which organisation and co-operation process is best tailored to deal with each of the three levels of regional security co-operation to be enumerated.

The analytical security model presented in this study was set according to two major variables: organisation's (NATO and EU) level of suitability and capacity to promote co-operation. These two were defined according to the following criteria: existent security structures; present political bodies profile; contents of the security agenda; type of political or military resources available; need for a UN mandate according to the profile of the missions; geographical scope of application; level of commitment and membership requisites for parts involved.

The first level corresponds to the highest level of co-operation and may be considered an optimal one and occurs, when states and organisations share a broad common security denominator. The second level, corresponds to a middle level of co-operation and occurs when actors and organisations share a medium common security denominator. The third, corresponds to the lowest level of co-operation and occurs when co-operation is forged on a case by case basis to ensure regional security and stability.

The consolidation of each of these levels would depend much on : the existent institutional frameworks, the organisations' skills and the co-operation instruments behind them.

The first level of co-operation demands a well established security structure⁷⁹ like NATO and the presence of highly organised political bodies, oriented to multilateral and regional affairs, policy planning, arms control and disarmament, verification and implementation agreements.

The contents of the security agenda, at this level, is preferably vocationed to hard security issues: non-proliferation of arms (which involves the existence of arms control mechanisms, specially on what concerns weapons of mass destruction, medium and long range missiles, the existence of arms control regimes for the region and consequently the implementation of non-proliferation policies); conflict prevention and

⁷⁹ This level of organisation implies a close relationship, preferably a high level of harmonisation between public diplomacy and security and defence policies, as it is the case for NATO.

resolution, peaceful settlement of conflicts and peacekeeping (including peace enforcement missions); resolution of territorial disputes; counter terrorism measures and energy security issues⁸⁰. In short, this level is mainly oriented to multidimensional hard security issues.

In operational terms, this level of co-operation requires a well tested military structure like the one NATO has multinational forces and capacity for force projection⁸¹ in out-of-area scope, as well as capacity for force deployability, mobility and sustainability.

Due to the nature of the missions that might emanate from this kind of co-operation settlements, especially on what concerns peace enforcement missions, a clear mandate under UN auspices would be a requirement conferring the mission legitimacy and a greater public support.

The geographical scope will be beyond traditional scope of application of Article 5 Washington Treaty or Article V Modified Brussels Treaty.

The profile mission will fit the one defined within the spectrum of NATO's New Strategic Concept, namely that outlined for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)⁸² or Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU)⁸³.

On what concerns FAWEU, they can perform a spectrum of military tasks from collective defence operations, to humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and missions for which combat forces may be assigned, in the field of crisis management, including peacemaking and peace enforcement. At a lower level of the military spectrum, they may also undertake humanitarian tasks and peacekeeping operations.

On what concerns CJTF, this force concept traduces the efforts undertaken by the Alliance, in order to update its forces and structures to new security challenges, while providing alternative capabilities for Europeans to deal with security concerns, under their own command. This new concept provides "separable, but not separated" military structures, avoiding duplication of assets in responding to security concerns,

⁸⁰ For further reading see *The Energy Factor in the Euro-Mediterranean Region*, Issue N° 12-January 2000, on line version <http://www.euromed.net/default.htm>

⁸¹ Among European allies the only countries, with a significant capacity for force projection are: France, Great Britain, Netherlands and Belgium. From these countries only Netherlands and GB are ready to assist the US in conflict scenarios, where air-transport aircraft, air-to-air refuelling tankers, carrier-battle groups, amphibious ships and other mobility assets are needed to trans-oceanic power projection and expeditionary operations.

For further reading see: David Yost, Op.cit; François Heisbourg, "European Defence Make it Work", in: *Chaillot Paper*, n° 42 September 2000, PP: 73-91

⁸² See Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice", in: *Survival*, vol.38,n°1, Spring 1996, pp:81-97

⁸³ See *Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin*, 3rd June 1996, Final Communiqué- M-NAC-196) 63 and *Les Forces Armées Européennes-Rapport présenté au nom de la Commission de Défense*, 12th June 1995, Document 1468, Assemblée de L'Union Occidentale.

inside and outside NATO's collective defence scope. A CJTF can be deployed as a NATO-led force or after consultations in the North Atlantic Council⁸⁴, as a WEU/EU-led force supported by collective assets of the Alliance. The range of missions is well adapted to new security contingencies, such as crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Despite its capacity to operate in out-of-area, as a WEU/EU-led force, the fact NATO has an image problem in the region may conditioned its adequacy to operate in the Western Mediterranean region, within the scope of the missions above mentioned.

The widespread of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean region is a matter of concern for the Alliance, despite the fact the level of procurement is much higher in Eastern Mediterranean region, than the one registered in the Western Mediterranean area. Although, arms proliferation is a major hard security aspect of the agenda for the region, it seems to be difficult to handle in the context of the Mediterranean Initiative⁸⁵. The inclusion of issues related with arms control and disarmament put in evidence the importance of workable arms control regimes in the region⁸⁶, able to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among radical or revolutionary groups.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threat is object of particular concern, specially when they are procured by actors with national policies with a revolutionary orientation. The only Maghreb country, included in this study, which might match this pre-disposition, is Algeria. But, even if internal instability in Algeria may increase, the main source of concern is presently associated with the possibility of uncontrolled refugee flows, illegal immigrants, spread of internal political violence and tribal clashes. The fears of an Islamic take-over have been supplanted by fears about the consequences of long-term instability in Algeria".⁸⁷ Although terrorism and the actions of the Armed Islamic Group are expressions of radicalism that should be taken seriously, due to their consequences over Southern European countries, issues related with energy dependency seem to enclose a greater concern for those NATO European allies, than arms proliferation.

⁸⁴ *Brussels Summit Declaration* 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 6 and 5

⁸⁵ Stephen Larrabee, Jerrold Greer, Ian Lesser, Michele Zanini, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative- Policy Issues and Dilemmas*, MR-957-IMD, RAND Report, 1998, p.14-16

⁸⁶ The existence of international regimes in the region helps to promote common interests of states, common rules and common institutions. For further reading see Nayef H. Samhat "International Regimes as Political Community", in: *Millenium* (Vol.28,nº2, 1997)pp:349-378

⁸⁷ Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, F. Stephen Larrabee, Michele Zanini, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps*, MR- 1164, SMD, RAND Report, 2000, on line version, p. 12

In any case, even if the possibility of a direct major threat is limited, such possibility has been contributing to develop and enhance the security and defence dimension of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative. Likewise in 1995, during WEU's Portuguese presidency, member countries agreed on the political conditions for the operational reinforcement of the organisation, through the constitution of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, as WEU forces.⁸⁸ Both forces will operate on an European multinational basis, for force projection within the scope of humanitarian missions, evacuation operations, peacekeeping operations, combat missions in crisis management and peace restore missions, namely in the Mediterranean region. WEU can also make use of CJTF to face contingencies, under NATO's or WEU's command. Despite WEU efforts, NATO has been so far, the only organisation able to engage in military initiatives in regional crisis, leaded by USA under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.

At the crisis management level, according to the latest NATO Strategic Concept, the Alliance will “stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations”⁸⁹.

In the context of Maghreb countries considered in this study (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) the need to deal with hard security issues does not seem to be, in the near future, a source of major concern in the context of transatlantic co-operation. Nevertheless, the potential role of an integrated Mediterranean dialogue in containing proliferation risks will acquire additional significance⁹⁰, within the transatlantic security framework.

The main problem to stimulate transatlantic co-operation at this level, emanates from the fact, hard security co-operation involves costs and political risks, which are difficult to deal with at the multilateral level, due to its limited possibility to gather consensus, especially within the Alliance. The goals defined by the Alliance's new strategic concept⁹¹, have not yet given place to a comprehensive security co-operation

⁸⁸ EUROFOR is a rapid reaction joint land force and EUROMARFOR an non permanent European naval force, created to increase security in the Mediterranean, gathering forces from Portugal, Spain, France and Italy. See *Declaration de Lisbonne*, Conseil des Ministres de L'UEO, Lisbonne 15 Mai 1995, Document 1455, Assemblée de L'Union de L'Europe Occidentale, paragraph 5

⁸⁹ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, paragraph 10

⁹⁰ Stephen Larrabee, Jerrold Greer, Ian Lesser, Michele Zanini, *Op.cit.*, pp:16-17

⁹¹ This concerning “wide-ranging partnership, co-operation and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance” in: *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, *ibidem*.

concept for the Mediterranean. Dialogue, partnership and co-operation mechanisms presupposes the existence of a structural basis of departure, on the principles and goals of co-operation, which would be particularly promising if harmonised at the transatlantic level.

In 1991, the Alliance's Strategic Concept expressed the will to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations, with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East considering their stability as important (not vital) for the security of the Alliance. The major hard security concerns for NATO, in the region were: the build-up of military power; proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.⁹²

In 1994, the Brussels Summit Declaration created the institutional setting that would reinforce NATO's role in out-of-area security issues, namely those related with the Mediterranean. The contents of the Declaration was much focused on the idea of a new climate of co-operation, between the US and Europe, through "a strong transatlantic link, considering the emergent European Security and Defence Identity as an expression of a mature Europe"⁹³, able to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy, with greater responsibilities on defence matters. By recognising the need to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and the existence of a EU's defence component through WEU, the Alliance would make collective assets available to the European allies, for WEU operations in the pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy⁹⁴. Regardless assets availability by NATO, the participation in the operations would remain subject of national decision of member states, in accordance to national constitutions. During January 1994 NATO Summit, the concept of Combined Joint Task Force was endorsed, as a way to facilitate contingency operations in out of area. Concerning the Mediterranean region, the Summit limited itself to "consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the region.

In 1996, the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council deliberated a reinforcement of an European Security and Defence Identity, within NATO and of the transatlantic partnership. Another relevant step, that might have an impact over the security and defence dimension of the Mediterranean Dialogue, was the

⁹² Idem, paragraphs 11 and 12.

⁹³ *Brussels Summit Declaration* 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 1

⁹⁴ Idem, paragraphs 4, 6 and 7.

implementation of an "ability to mount NATO non-Article 5 operations, guided by the concept of one system capable of performing multiple functions"⁹⁵ taking all the advantage of the approved CJTF concept.

The Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security Cooperation, issued on July 1997, refers the importance of enhancing the Mediterranean dialogue⁹⁶ and considers it a region "of great attention since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean". At the same time it was decided the establishment, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council of a new committee, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, which would have the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue.⁹⁷ Further steps were given concerning the strengthening of co-operation between NATO and WEU, in the field of crisis management planning, preparation, conduct and exercise of WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.⁹⁸

In 1999, the New Strategic Concept outlined "the Mediterranean region as an area of special interest to the Alliance (and) NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue process (as) an integral part of NATO's co-operative approach to security (able to) provide a framework for confidence building, to promote transparency and co-operation in the region".⁹⁹

In 1999, the Alliance launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative, which goal is to improve defence capabilities to ensure the future effectiveness of multinational operations, across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present security environment¹⁰⁰. This need to re-think force structure mounts back to early 90's and was much incentivated during the Gulf War, when it was understood that, the force structure should be redesign for multinational operations beyond Washington Treaty scope. With the recent escalation of violence in the Middle East, the need for adequate levels of readiness and effectiveness for multinational forces will undoubtedly increase.

During the North Atlantic Council of Defence Ministers session held in December 2000, the Mediterranean Dialogue was considered to be "an essential part of the Alliance's co-operative approach to security", especially on what NATO might

⁹⁵ *Final Communiqué-Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 3rd June 1996*, M-NAC-1(96)63 paragraph 7

⁹⁶ *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security Co-operation*, 8th July 1997, M-1 (97) 81, paragraph 1

⁹⁷ *Idem*, paragraph 13

⁹⁸ *Idem*, paragraph 20

⁹⁹ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept 23rd-24th April 1999*, NAC-S(99)65, paragraph 32

¹⁰⁰ Even if the Alliance is giving a special focus on forces interoperability, deployability, mobility, sustainability, logistics, effective engagement capability, command and control, any improvement of multinational performance in crisis management and conflict prevention will depend on the existence of real threats and on the presence of an adequate level of mutual consent to launch military operations.

bring of added value, namely “ in the field of search and rescue operations, maritime security, medical evacuation and humanitarian relief”¹⁰¹. This spectrum of co-operation initiatives, which falls within a very large security concept, appears to contradict the importance given to the Mediterranean region, on earlier NATO’s ministerial meetings on what concerns hard security issues.

Membership status at this level of optimal co-operation, although may not be considered as a pre-requisite, will undoubtedly contribute to increase internal cohesion among co-operation partners and provide political consistency to the security agenda.

The level of relationship among co-operation partners is of multilateral nature.

A second level corresponds to a middle level of co-operation and also requires a well-established security architecture and well organised institutional bodies.

This level of co-operation is based on a broad scope of soft security issues: migration; illegal immigration; security identity related aspects; growth of resurgent nationalism; religious radicalism; political legitimacy related issues; flows of refugees; human rights¹⁰²; minorities rights; humanitarian rescue operations; air and maritime search and rescue; development and democratisation.

The EU, through the Barcelona Process, seems more suitable to achieve these goals do to its more political, economic and social nature, than NATO. At this level, conflicts may raise from internal political instability, economic disparities and social unrest, for which a defence and security organisation, such as NATO is not always prepared to address to.

WEU’s Mediterranean Dialogue launched in 1992 despite being oriented to security and defence has not gone beyond political talks supported by “seminars on Mediterranean security, occasional briefings by the WEU military staff and planning cell, information seminars involving military staff from WEU and the Mediterranean partner countries”.¹⁰³ Despite the apparent willingness to build up a climate of transparency in the security dimension, the formation within WEU of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, with power projection capacity raised suspicion and was immediately

¹⁰¹North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers session held in Brussels on 5 Dec.2000, 2(2000)114,paragraph 42.

¹⁰² In April 1999, within the scope of the Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Barcelona III it was organised a “Conference on Human Rights and Citizenship in the Mediterranean” covering a range of issues from social human rights in relation to conflict, to women rights, civic rights, civil society organisations and democracy. In the context of this conference there was a particular interest for the case of internal situation in Algeria and the Balkans.

¹⁰³ Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, F. Stephen Larrabee, Michele Zanini , *The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative:Evolution and Next Steps*, idem ,p.40

considered as “European instruments of military intervention”¹⁰⁴ across the Mediterranean.

NATO have a wide range of well tested military mechanisms available, which might allow it to deal with a wide spectrum of military threats to security¹⁰⁵, but the scope of its agenda seems less ambitious, on the domain of the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative, than EU’s/WEU’s. Its capacity to solve security problems related with internal clashes over territories and vital resources management (like natural gas, water and oil) is limited, despite the fact these are major security issues that might be affected by domestic instability in North Africa, with a direct impact over Europe’s strategic interests. .

Co-operation at soft security issues level demands very skilled political, diplomatic and bureaucratic bodies, able to ensure the effectiveness of mechanism of political dialogue, transparency and confidence building measures. Preventive measures against political violence during elections monitoring and mechanisms to guarantee individual security, during periods of political transition are essential instruments to deal with and control potential internal sources of instability.

At that level, the Barcelona Process is implementing measures that might help increasing partnership-building and confidence building measures such as: training seminars for Euromed diplomats and the creation of a network of Institutes of Foreign Policy (EuroMeSCo)¹⁰⁶. This level of co-operation may contribute to the creation of a closer diplomatic culture and to the consolidation of a true regional political co-operation.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership implemented, in 1996 known as the MEDA Democracy project aimed at promoting human rights, democracy, freedom of expression and protection of vulnerable groups, through means of education, training, awareness raising and networking, which might contribute to the consolidation of democratisation, as a main goal at this level.

¹⁰⁴ Regardless the fact North African countries observers have been invited to participate in exercises of both forces undertaken in 1998.

¹⁰⁵ This spectrum is mainly oriented to threats such as: terrorism counter measures, terrorist political violence, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

¹⁰⁶ EuroMeSCo also has two working groups: one dedicated to confidence building, conflict prevention and arms control and disarmament and a second on political and security co-operation. See Roberto Aliboni, Abdel Monem Said Aly and Alvaro Vasconcelos, *Joint Report of the EuroMeSCo Working Group on Political and Security Cooperation and Arms Control, Confidence-Building and Conflict Prevention*, April 1997

The geographical scope may go beyond the area of application of Modified Brussels Treaty, but most actions have been supported by the pre-existence of bilateral agreements, between EU and the Maghreb countries, namely Morocco and Tunisia¹⁰⁷.

According to a RAND Corporation detailed report¹⁰⁸ on several Mediterranean co-operation projects, a “shift in EU’s Mediterranean security agenda, from *soft* to defence related issues remains improbable for the foreseeable future”. Due to the nature of the co-operation relationship a UN mandate will not be needed, if backup by regional multilateral or bilateral agreement between European Union and Maghreb countries.

Membership status is not required, once this co-operation model can be implemented and proceed on the basis of bi-multilateral agreements.

The third and last level of co-operation is largely based on declaratory diplomacy, which is basically oriented to the transnational dimension of co-operation processes. In such scheme, the security agenda integrates global issues, whose resolution and consequent benefits are non-excludable and non- competing. Usually, the contents of this agenda has a spectrum that goes from environmental issues,¹⁰⁹ natural resources management (namely water supplies and energy resources), relentless urbanisation, humanitarian disasters relief, implementation of economic and development aid programmes.

In the context of the three last items of the security agenda for the third level, the Barcelona Process and EU bodies may provide an important contribution through the existing financial instruments of the European Union, as the MEDA programme.¹¹⁰

The security agenda for this third level may be better succeed, if there are multilateral general agreements or if active regional dialogue body takes part in the co-operation process. The regional commitment achieved in 1999 by the Barcelona

¹⁰⁷ Even if this co-operation agreements take place at the bilateral economical level backed by a series of trade liberalisation protocols (association agreements) between EU and each Mediterranean partner. This has been the case for Morocco and Tunisia. For further reading see *The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco*, Issue N°13 – 7 March 2000 on line version <http://www.euromed.net/default.htm>

¹⁰⁸ Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, F. Stephen Larrabee, Michele Zanini, *The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps*, p.37. The constraints on a possible evolution, from soft security to hard security are mainly due to the close link between the evolution of these co-operation initiatives and the outcome of the Middle East peace process talks.

¹⁰⁹ In April 1999, within the scope of the Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Barcelona III it took place the Conference on the Environment aiming to increase ONG awareness towards Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and promote environmental integration and civil society participation in the Euro-Mediterranean Process.

¹¹⁰ The MEDA programme for the period 1995-1999 it accounted for over 3.400 million ecus of the 4.685 million of budgetary resources allocated for financial co-operation, between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. For the year 2000 a MEDA fund of 945 million euro were estimated to be available for financing regional co-operation helping to support economic transition in the Mediterranean region and strengthening the socio-economic balance. This resources have been channelled bilaterally to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority.

Process, through a Charter for Peace and Stability ¹¹¹ “ in order to work for the consolidation of an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean and the perspective of implementing a Euro-Mediterranean pact”, despite its broad agenda, the fact it is politically, but not legally binding it compromises the perspectives for a fruitful and solid future co-operation.

This level of co-operation requires the presence of organisations, with specific skills to deal with a security agenda of transnational contents. NGO ‘s are apparently better tailored for this kind of security agenda, despite their limitations in the field of logistics (mainly air lift and sustainability capacity in the field of operations), as well as limited financial resources. Organisations, such as OSCE, can also contribute to the region’s stability, by means of preventive diplomacy and confidence building measures due to its long experience in those domains.

This level of co-operation calls for a wider involvement of the international community, of people with expertise on large scale humanitarian operations management and the commitment of local civil society’s representatives of both Mediterranean rims. On this domain, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been promoting several co-operation initiatives, between civil protection services, by training and exchanging experts and networking the civil protection institutions of both Mediterranean rims.

In political terms, relies widely on the level of political willingness, solidarity of the international community and preferences of major financing contributors (e.g. members of the UN Security Council) to the organisations involved and co-operation processes in progress.

Membership status is not a criterion of belonging or participation at this level.

Conclusion

Any co-operation initiative and subsequent security setting to be established, presupposes an objective perception of national interests, goals and common grounds of interest of participant states.

¹¹¹ Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers-Presidency’s formal conclusions (Marseilles, 15th and 16th November 2000. The main elements of the final document guidelines were: politically not legally binding; rule of consensus for decision making; focus on political and security issues; promotion of human rights, democracy, tolerance; co-operation on organised crime, terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; promotion of non-proliferation regimes; disarmament agreements such as NPT,CWC;BWC,CTBT and regional arrangements such as weapons free zones; conflict prevention; crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction.

In order to promote a regional space of co-operation, there is a need to find common interests on which to base co-operation agendas able to sustain decisions and stimulate co-operation actions between NATO, the EU and the Maghreb countries.

Around Europe's periphery it is evident the affirmation of new sources of instability, based on the negative mobilizing effects of religion and ethnical identity, as a way to legitimised the access to power for local radical political groups. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that conflict factors within the Mediterranean region related with inter-ethnical rivalries, religious differences, economical disparities and social unrest, have always had a more or less continuous expression along history and their consequences are mostly felt in internal/regional terms, rather than international ones.

In the Northern rim of the Mediterranean, NATO and the EU member countries benefit from the existence of integrated systems of symbolic references, political languages and institutional and material frameworks, which largely contribute to increase their level of political commonality. The southern rim of the region does not benefit from the same level of homogeneously and political commonality, for which the needs and expectations of each Maghreb country, must be taken into account before defining any structural form of dialogue and co-operation in the field of security and defence in the transatlantic context.

On the other hand, the presence of broader mechanisms of political socialisation within Western political cultures, like the American and European, are responsible for optimising the sharing of political and strategic choices. The same way, the degree of emulation, among member states, allows the perpetuation of political conditions that make co-operation not only a possibility, but also a need. Both derived from pre-existent similar political systems, similar strategic patterns of behaviour, similar strategic practices and similar joint working methods.

All these features are almost absent from Maghreb countries' political systems, institutions and regional organisations. To this we must add the differentiation of political regimes between the two Mediterranean rims, the limited intervention of local civil societies, weak political accountability and the presence of regional organisations with a low level of regional political influence.

To try to establish a co-operation pattern for the region, as diverse as the Mediterranean, may not be an easy task, but that does not mean one can forget regional

For complementary reading see "Revigorating the Barcelona Process" Brussels, 06-09-2000, COM(00)497 final (on line version) The EU's Mediterranean&Middle East Policy (The European Commission--External Relations) http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro-med-partnership/key_doc_barcelo_process.htm

specificity and tries to gather all western security concerns under the umbrella of the violent expression of political Islam, illegal migration and arms proliferations in the region. Any of these security concerns have its own variations according to local political and social contexts, for which they should not be assessed as global threats. The strong presence of feelings of social frustration and economical disparities transform those destabilising realities into mobilising internal alternatives for local political opposition groups.

Their anti western rhetoric is more a way to mobilize public opinions and to assure a certain level of internal cohesion within its partisans, than a real political or security threat to NATO or the EU.

Dialogue and co-operation in the field of security must be built on an equitable basis, but always taking into account local specifics and the imperative of structural reforms, able to contribute to regional stability. Economical and social development are indeed priority areas, if Maghreb countries wish to achieve stability and progress.

Nevertheless regional stability must be seen under the light of a broader scope of common principles able to regulate security and defence relations. The idea underlining the definition of a possible security model for the region is to create a basis of structural support, on the domain of defence and security, capable of balancing the lack of regional institutions strong enough to promote consensus and mutual understanding among the Mediterranean dialogue partners.

If local capacities to generate local regional solidarity are low, EU and NATO members have been developing their own mechanisms to surmount eventual internal differences already existent or in the process of happening, due to enlargement processes to third countries. In the field of co-operation in the transatlantic context, the effects of enlargement may affect considerably decision making, common actions shaping and common policies implementation for the Mediterranean. For this reason mechanisms such as: detachable military assets; independent command structures; enhanced co-operation mechanisms or opting out voting can be seen as constructive ways to put forward co-operation initiatives, for which at least some member states have the political will and the institutional means to implement them.

At this level of co-operation it is important not only to consider political will, adequate institutional structures and operational means, but also to evaluate the substance of subsequent agreements. That is, if goals and benefits are non-excludable

and non-competing, making sure they meet a certain degree of commitments legally binding in order to make rules and codes of conduct workable.

This has not been the case for most recent co-operation initiatives, whether within the transatlantic context or within the Southern rim. Due to the regional diversity of states involved, the concept of interlocking institutions seems most appropriate as a co-operation tool for the Mediterranean region. After the moment organisations, namely NATO and the EU, will be able to improve this concept in the domain of regional co-operation and if this effort will be backed up by bilateral agreements, between the two southern rims of the Mediterranean, then co-operation initiatives would serve the real purpose of promoting a sense of political commonality in the region.

Regional co-operation initiatives depend also much on the possibilities to share a common political language (better achieve within integrated political structures); to have similar interests in the domain of foreign, defence and security policies and to be able to count with the commitment of political actors with regional or international weight, such as the US and the EU.

As we tried to demonstrate on the last chapter of this study through the outline of a possible security model, with different levels of commitment one cannot ignore the importance of the following requirements.

First, any co-operation initiative benefits much from the presence of pre-existent political bodies and security structures, whose profile much adapt to local specificity, if that will be the case. For each co-operation agenda set in the domain of foreign, security and defence policy there must exist an equivalent set of political, diplomatic and military resources able to implement decisions and work as an adequate dialogue framework.

Second, there will be a need for an objective definition of membership requisites, which participants should meet before to be able to act as fully participants in the co-operation process and benefit from its results.

Third the existence of a legitimate mandate from a global or regional security organisation: such as United Nations or OCSE, would confer international acceptance to the decisions and actions undertaken, specially on the domain of crisis management and conflict prevention, improving their level of international legitimacy.

Fourth, most of the co-operation initiatives lack realistic goals, able to satisfy the regional or even local needs of the countries involved, not to mention a real structural orientation, rather than successive adjustments according to the initiatives of sponsor

countries'. The local consequences of the unrealistic and sometimes circumstantial nature of goals defined (whether because they fit into a EU's country presidency programme or because they tend to adapt to the evolution of the Middle East peace process) are : discredit and impasse of regional development and co-operation projects.

Fifth, the lack of harmonisation of purposes and the absence of a co-operation logic of "scale economy" compromises much the efficiency of results obtained, making the co-operation initiatives for the Mediterranean less attractive to potential partners.

Sixth, the consequences of regional structural conflicts, such as the Middle East and Western Sahara have major consequences over the success of regional co-operation initiatives at the transatlantic level. For the Mediterranean southern rim, the presence of Israel poses limitations to a comprehensive participation in the field of regional co-operation. For the transatlantic allies, the absence of Israel or any other major regional actor (such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan or even Morocco) in co-operation initiatives deprives it from an important local ally, whose foreign, defence and security policies do have considerable regional and international repercussions.

A last consideration goes to the fact North African countries do not share, for the moment, too many common interests, which limits the finding of common political aims and individualizes the perception of interests and foreign and defence policies, as well as the one of threats, making the task to establish a common base for future understanding a more challenging one, for both the Alliance and the European Union.

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