

# **NATO RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS PROGRAMME**

## **Final report**

On the project

### **Attitude of masses and elites in Donbass, Galichina and Poland to NATO: level of determination and factors of influence (comparative analysis)**

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**DONETSK - 2001, June**

## **CONTENTS:**

- I. INTRODUCTION**
  
- II. VIEW OF THE SOURCES AND METHODS OF GATHERING THE DATA**
  
- III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE ESTIMATION OF REGIONAL ELITES AND MASSES OF UKRAINE AND POLAND**
  
- IV. ATTITUDE TOWARDS NATO OF THE REGIONAL COMMUNITIES AND ELITES OF DONBASS, GALICHINA AND LUBLIN REGION**
  
- V. CONCLUSION**

## I. INTRODUCTION

NATO as an international military and political organization of the West, which has been executing the mission of protecting and securing Euro-Atlantic interests and values for more than 50 years, has always been the object of concerned attention and various assessments. The interest to this organization has especially sharpened recently. This is connected with a set of various factors.

*Firstly*, it is connected with the changes of geopolitical character, amendments on the political map of the world in 1990-s, disintegration of totalitarian systems, etc. In this connection the place and role of the Alliance in the system of international relations and international collective security has objectively changed.

*Secondly*, changes in political systems of Central and Eastern Europe have called for new needs in the national security of those countries and hopes to meet these needs together or with the help of the Alliance.

*Thirdly*, the expansion of interstate and ethnic conflicts in the regions situated in circumference of the NATO frontiers resulted in the necessity for the latter to define its position with regard to them; this gave new reasons to discuss and evaluate the Alliance's steps and intentions.

*Fourthly*, in this period the NATO proclaims and implements the new strategy of development, heads for expanding its functions and membership, which also evokes ambiguous and sometimes harsh reaction.

That is why the attitude to the Alliance has become the subject of discussions in a number of post-communist countries. Moreover, the organization has constantly been in the limelight, from time to time becoming the cause of indignation and harsh discussions among political groups and public. *Such situation with regard to the NATO made the topic of attitude to the bloc a certain indicator of political circles' and population's understanding of the country's national interests and of general orientations both in the international policy and*

*geopolitical and cultural-political choice of their own.* Besides, the saturation with events, width of attention and acute character of the problems that accompany various NATO steps on the background of profound political changes in the former countries of the socialist bloc could not help influencing the perception of this organization by various people. Political time in which the North-Atlantic Alliance is moving now, if use the concept of political philosophy, is very pressing. This makes the attitude to the Alliance at least dynamic. Political elites and the population in many post-communist countries have come a long way to perceive it. At the same time it is apparent that the length of this way and depth of changes in the values orientation may significantly vary not only in various countries but also in various regions of the same state.

There is the need to clarify the present state, current changes and the causes of these changes with regard to the attitude to the North-Atlantic Alliance in Ukraine. Ukraine has officially and openly declared its European choice and orientation towards the partnership with the NATO. However, any course of any country may be stable provided that it is legitimate in its citizens' opinion. And on the contrary, the state's political orientations will have no validity and irrevocability without being supported by the majority of the people, without civic consensus about basic national interests and principal ways of their satisfaction. That is why the success of Ukrainian way to Europe and Euro-Atlantic partnership depends, at long last, on the availability and depth of changes in mentality of elites and the population. The direction of these changes is clear in general: from communist propaganda stereotypes, in which NATO was painted only black, to a new non-manipulated view on the Alliance as an organic structure of the western civilization. It still remains unclear which part of the way has been passed by various groups to realize this, what are the rates of these changes in perception of various generations, how possible the reverse movement, return, recurrence of old thinking may be, which factors speed up or hinder this overturn in mentality, "revolutionary" for many.

Here *we proceed from understanding the significance of the regional factor for Ukraine*. Ukraine has obvious regional differences that are especially important in the context of our problem. The difference between the West and the East of the state is significant and many-faced. It has deep historical roots and manifests itself clearly in the contemporary history of independent Ukraine. The West and the East do not only speak differently: the former speaks Ukrainian, the latter speaks mostly Russian. There are differences in the attitude towards the state system, towards national self-identification and economic development, cultural and political preferences, and, of course, in international political orientations. That is why comprehensive picture as to the tendencies and contradictions in transformations of attitudes to the NATO is especially vividly traced in the regions which by many criteria are mutually connected antitheses in geopolitical and cultural-political landscape of Ukraine. Such regions in the Ukrainian political habitat are Donbass as the eastern part of the state and Galichina as its western part.

To add up to this, *one of the basic ideas of the research project proceeded from the necessity to clarify, within the framework of the problem analyzed, the specificity of values and orientations of Ukrainian society on two levels*. The first refers to the regional communities in the whole and reflects the characteristic features of mass consciousness of the population in the regions selected. Another characterizes the typical features of foreign political orientations and attitude to the NATO on the level of regional elites in the wide meaning of this word. Because what the experts on Ukrainian reality of the present time have the common opinion about is the admission of special, if not the determining, role of national elite in the development of the country. The elites of such powerful and typical of Ukraine regions as Donetsk and Lviv play special and very important role in the state, each exerting its specific influence on the positions of the central elites. One of the hypotheses of the research declared the existence of not only class similarities in the opinions of masses and their elites, but also of certain meaningful discrepancies.

Taking into account all peculiarities of the values transformation processes in mass and elite consciousness of Ukrainian society connected with its historic development and specific cultural and geopolitical position between Europe and Eurasia, between classical ‘thalasocratic’ Atlantic political body of data and classical ‘telurocratic’ Eurasian body of data, current Ukrainian values re-orientation processes cannot be qualified as unique. *The research has been built on the methodological premise of the principled possibility to compare the Ukrainian realities referring to the problem with the processes in the neighboring countries of the former socialist camp.* According to the rather long list of criteria the comparison of the situation in Ukraine with that of neighboring Poland proved to be the most heuristic. On many parameters Poland has moved ahead much further on its way of building a free market and democratic society. The advantages of the current international status of this country are also significant. Having become the new member of the NATO, Poland has principally strengthened its status as a part of western democratic world and qualitatively increased the level of its own international security. Ukraine cannot be proud of the same. Yet the starting conditions of the both countries after the communist power overthrow were not very different, vice versa. That is why the comparative analysis of how masses and elites in both countries understand their own national interests, their place in the international and European politics, comparison of dominant values allows essential expansion of scope and deepening of level of the research subject analysis.

*The attitude to the NATO as a certain political orientation is included into a wider whole of people’s opinions about the world, international relations, and foreign politics.* To consider the former only without its positioning in the context of more overwhelming and deeper orientations and foreign political values of mass and elite consciousness is little productive.

Based on this understanding of the problem, the research analyzes two levels of the consciousness of regional communities and elites.

Initially, the general perception of the role of external factor in country development, understanding of national interests, the assessment of priorities, effectiveness, and directions of contemporary foreign policies of Ukraine and Poland were analyzed. The third part of the report is devoted to this.

The next, fourth part illuminates the attitudes towards the NATO proper, the evaluation of Ukraine-NATO-Russia relationships and the Polish perception of these problems. Additionally, the influence of certain factors and international developments on the changes in attitudes towards the Alliance of various regional groups is analyzed.

The last part of the work contains final remarks and main conclusions of the research.

## **II. VIEW OF THE SOURCES AND METHODS OF GATHERING THE DATA**

Theoretical compositions of Ukrainian and foreign researchers on the issues of international relations development as well as international and national security, state's foreign policy, NATO's role in contemporary conditions were used while elaborating methodological part of researching problem. Compositions of V. Kremin, I. Binko, S. Golovashenko, S. Daciuk assisted in elaboration of research's concept and its instrumental part. Previously executed sociological surveys within the frames of this topic served as a source for some ideas and mean for comparison of our positions with certain results. Especial attention should be made to publications of Ukrainian Center for economical and political studies (UCEPS), National Institution of strategic research, materials of polish sociologists from CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center). NATO's official web-site's materials along with those distributed by NATO's Center for Information and documentation in Kiev assisted while working on the project.

Along with that there were very rare research attempts executed using such kind of view. This was not only creating certain hardships but also opened the broad possibilities for creative search for ways of problem solving. It was decided to ground project on own results of our mutual with Lviv and Poland partners theoretical and empirical researches.

Realization of the above mentioned research principles were carried out in two stages. At the first stage Ukrainian and Polish regional elites were in research.

The research was carried out by the members of the Department of political science and Department of international relationships of Faculty of history of Donetsk National University in January – April 2000. The partners in the realization of the project were the Laboratory of social research in Lviv and the Center of the east studios in Warszawa. Correspondence with stated four groups counted on the weight of each in its own region. 50 representatives of regional

elites of Donbass, Galichina and Lublin region in Poland were interviewed. Chosen groups in two regions of Ukraine included 7-9 state employed officials, 12-13 deputies of legislative branch as well as local governments, heads of different party organizations in regions, 17-15 heads of economical structures, state and private firms, enterprises, organizations, 13 representatives of Mass-media managing body in each region, journalists, rectors and pro-rectors of Higher educational Institutions, poets, actors. 150 persons were interviewed in general. The theoretic model of regional elite was created. The model of the regional elite consisted of the representatives of the national, political, economic and cultural-informational spheres.

The Polish sociologists adopted the instruments that were carried out by us in the Polish part of the elites' research with accordance to the Polish specifics. The Centre for eastern studies in Warsaw employees conducted series of interviews with respondents in Lublin voevodstvo in Poland.

The essence of the second stage of the realization of the project laid in public opinion sociological questioning. It was carried out in January – April 2001. The population of two Ukrainian regions – Donbass and Galichina – was questioned. The sample was made in accordance with 450 persons in every region. General number of the questioned was 900 persons. The criteria of the sample were marked as sex, age, education, and place of living. It is representative in relation to the grown-up population of the above-mentioned regions according to these criteria.

The turning to the public opinion of the population was based on the data of sociological questioning of the all-polish Center of the public opinion research (CBOS). We used the results of the CBOS questioning in the year 2000 – 2001. These questionings studied Polish attitude towards the questions of the foreign policy and towards NATO.

Such complex cross-regional and international researches as for the attitude of the wide masses and elite groups in regions towards NATO were held out before, neither in Ukraine, nor in Poland. The results were received on the basis of methods, which can be relied on, and can be accounted as true.

### **III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EXTERNAL POLICY OF THE STATE IN ESTIMATIONS OF REGIONAL ELITES AND PUBLIC OPINION OF UKRAINE AND POLAND**

For 10 years of its independence Ukraine, appreciably, was already ratified in the world as the sovereign subject of international law. Its external policy seems, as a whole, to be weighted and prognostic one. It is directed on development of a good-neighborhood, strengthening of security in Europe and in the world. Foreign policy of Ukraine, as a policy of the state that is taking place in a condition of transformation, can and should assist towards resolving of urgent internal problems. By virtue of it, for Ukraine at the present stage main task of foreign policy is a usage of potential cooperation with the foreign partners (their resources, influence, experience, and practical help) for rise of domestic economy, construction of the democratic state and formation of a civil society.

The foreign policy of any state as subject of the international relations is one of major elements distinguishing it from the other states. Unfortunately, the search own external-political identity for Ukraine on an extent of ten years keeps the urgency.

Objectively support of foreign policy provided by the citizens is capable to promote consolidation of a society and can even help to generate national idea. The optimistic position stated by former minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine B. Tarasiyuk that exactly the idea of the European choice of Ukraine, idea of «returning in Europe» can become national, is having serious bases. The present chief of Ukrainian foreign department A. Zlenko emphasized the same idea also. He noted, that in the relations with the European Union Ukraine proceeds from an obvious conceptual sight: we - Europeans also have the right to enter into incorporated Europe. The consolidation of Ukrainians around of the European idea should become our main task.

The opinions of the population and regional elites of the two most politicized and powerful regions of Ukraine and of the typical Polish region on questions connected to the international situation of Ukraine. Its foreign policy orientations are appreciably caused by their objective characteristics as also by moods, degree of adaptation and political sympathies.

The population of eastern and western regions evaluated *the character of modern foreign policy course of Ukraine* in a curious way. In Donbass the relative majority considers that Ukrainian foreign policy is prowestern (44%) but in Galichina they consider it to be prorussian (35%). In fact in Lviv region even more respondents are convinced that policy of Ukraine is still not determined (38%). In Donbass the same number of the respondents (38%) supports this position.

An attempt was made to evaluate the perception of the public opinion of the regions in question concerning foreign policy of their own state in this investigation. Political climate changes between Ukraine and the West at the time of political crisis caused by the cassette row and the Gongadze case are felt by a very great number of people (49% respondents). However the public opinion in politicised Galichina proved to be more sensitive and expressed.

Evaluating the shifts in foreign policy course of Ukraine at the beginning of 2001 the majority of Galichina residents are convinced in reorientation of Ukrainian foreign policy into prorussian one (61%) while in Donbass this opinion is shared by 36%; 31% of the residents were difficult to answer.

*Personal evaluation of foreign policy quality* of the Ukrainian State in both regions coincides practically in spite of evident different motivation. Ukrainian foreign policy course is evaluated by 14-16% of population to some extent.

In both regions 27% and 20% gives neutral evaluation whereas negative evaluation is given by 38% in Donbass and by 50% in Galichina. Three times prevailing of negative evaluation of foreign policy being perceived in a different way by the majority of population of the regions. The policy carried out by political elite, testifies at least the existence of 2 things: first of all low legitimacy

of the political elite and its course; secondly about existence of social-psychological basis for hesitations uncertainty, reverse movements of foreign policy of the Ukrainian state. This picture greatly contrasts with the state of public opinion in Poland, where almost half of the citizens (44%) approve of foreign policy of their state; however they admit limited possibilities in carrying out absolutely independent line.

*The main achievements and weak points of Ukrainian foreign policy* practically coincided in principal indices according to the opinion of the regional elites. As main weak points of international activity both in Donbass and Galichina are called:

- economic dependants on the West (49% & 35%);
- economic dependants on Russia (55% & 84%);
- not great authority in the world (45% & 39%);
- declarativeness of foreign policy (45% & 41%);
- insufficient development of economic co-operation with Central European countries (57% & 61%);
- poor provision of economic interests abroad (71% & 49%).

The interest is in differences in evaluating by elite of foreign policy defects. They concern statement of extra prowest orientation of this policy in Donbass (14%) and prorussian orientation in Galichina (33%). The quarter of Donetsk residents and half of Galichina residents do not apprehend Multivectority. Neutrality is nearly not considered as defect in Donbass and is not perceived by 18% Galichina residents.

Nearly identical position of the population of both region about critical approaches to the state power of the whole and to the foreign policy course in particular appeared in the mass ideas about *whose interests Ukraine's foreign policy is made for*. This block of the survey stresses that the foreign policy continues the home policy, especially in Ukraine, where open mechanisms of decision-making have not been developed yet, and national interests-as the objective for diplomacy-remain considerably undetermined.

51% in Donbass and 45% in Galichina are convinced that the foreign is subordinated to the interests of the so-called oligarchs and 'new Ukrainians'. The retired and unemployed mainly support this point of view. About a third of the Donetsk and Galichina residents think that international activity is carried out for the sake of interests of the President and his entourage. A vivid point characterizing Ukrainian society as not participating in the foreign policy course and deprived of the instrument of public pressure remains the low level of taking into account the people's interests. Only 6-7% of the respondents believes that the state's foreign policy is pursued today for the people's interests. The differences in the regional understanding concern only the idea that Ukraine's foreign policy is pursued for the interests of Russia (1% and 5% in Donbass and Galichina respectively) and the West (10% and 4%).

*Orientations of regional communities, mass opinions have peculiarities.* By virtue of it, the significant distinctions on the majority of positions are traced in many respects. At the same time, number of major and basic estimations of the representatives of regions coincide or are rather close. It is capable to cause constrained optimism concerning consolidating role of foreign policy of the state. Opinion of the population of Donetsk and Lviv regions on questions of external activity allow to judge upon a degree and depth of its acquaintance with this side of life of the state, as well as eagerness to support or not to support the actions of the country on the international arena.

Foreign policy and the political problems in general cause interest in half of Donbass inhabitants (43 %) and more than half of Galichina inhabitants (55 %). This confirms existing opinion about greater politicization of the west of the country. Both regions have more politicized men. The degree of interest towards politics in Donetsk region essentially depends on political orientations. More than half of citizens identify themselves as left-wings. Here one may notice some substantial interest towards politics. In the Lviv area such dependence was not discovered. Features of population's formation in this region as well as its larger

pragmatism can explain the rather smaller interest of Donbass inhabitants towards politics.

About identical number of questioned representatives of elites in both regions consider role of external international conditions in maintenance of successful development of the country at the present stage as important one (42-44 %). However on the majority of concrete positions the essential distinctions in the answers Donetsk's and Galichina's elites are traced. The majority in Galichina (56 %) have cautious and bias attitude to external conditions as to the positive factor of development of Ukraine. Galichina's elite treats the external environment in its majority as the certain threat, at least, as the opponent. It is typical introversive-kind position with orientation on accumulation of internal forces in the state. The representatives of the Eastern-Ukrainian elite if not in the greater degree have trust to the external world, but at least show more flexible position. By estimation of almost half of Donbass dwellers internal and external conditions of development of the country posses equal nature.

Role of external international conditions in maintenance of successful development of the country identical number of the inhabitants in both regions consider as important (from 41 % in Donetsk area up to 48 % - in Lviv) or recognize equivalence of the internal and external factors (accordingly - 26 % and 27 %). Among interested by politics and those highly estimating the external factors for successful development of the country the persons of hired work and pensioners (from 82 % up to 90 %) prevail. The persons are more senior than 45 years are convinced of the special importance of external conditions in maintenance of successful development of the country at the given stage (from 51 % up to 67 %).

Thus, both elites, and the wide layers of the Donbass's and Galichina's population in their majority, are interested in politics and consider the external factors important for further development of the state.

Successfulness of realization of national interests depends on a *choice of priorities in foreign policy*. Conceptual criterion of estimation by the population of

foreign course of Ukraine serves its attitude to prospects of the state participation in military-political blocks and security structures. Neutrality as a priority in realization of foreign policy course was named approximately by the equal number of the inhabitants in both regions (21 % - Donbass and 22 % - Galichina). Symptomatically, however, that in definition of other priorities the essential difference between positions of the population of East and West of the country is traced. In Donetsk area 59 % as a priority refer to development of mainly of economic cooperation with Russia (in Lviv - 12 %), but in Lviv's area superiority belongs to development of mainly economic cooperation with Western Europe with prospect of the integration in the European Union - 58 % (in Donetsk area - only 17 %).

Curiously, the data on Galichina practically coincide with the Polish data. From 55 % up to 60 % of the citizens of this country during last years have been convinced in necessity of integration in EU. In Galichina preference to western orientations sound precisely and boldly: 21 % of the inhabitants of region name a priority of development of the military-political relations with West with prospect of the integration in NATO (in Donbass the such clearly expressed political position is not popular - only 3 %).

At the same time it is necessary to emphasize, that the military-political cooperation with Russia as a priority, not only almost was not named by the Lviv's area inhabitants (3 %), but in Donbass has found only 17 % of the adherents. The nostalgia for the Soviet Union is precisely traced only in Donetsk area (for a reconstruction of union similar to USSR 21 %, and in Lviv - only 2 %). Obviously, that exactly such answers confirm steady opinion that in the Ukrainian society in East of the country in the greater extent are inherent prorussian and procommunist moods. For the benefit of it the data testify also that on necessity of a relations' deepening with the countries - former republics USSR specified mainly in Donbass - 31 % (in Galichina - 4 %).

As to priority of the relations' development with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, those are of interest rather in Lviv - 17 % (in Donetsk area - 9 %).

The carried out analysis of priorities in external policy of Ukraine understanding in east and west of the country testifies that there are essential distinctions in their definition that, however, does not exclude also similar approaches on key questions. Nevertheless, the data received in Donbass, do not testify to support by the majority of the population of an official position about the European choice of the state. Prorussian and even prosoviet orientations keep here significant and even overwhelming densities within the frames of mass consciousness. Though the average data on Ukraine testify that the path of the European integration supports more than half of population of the country.

In Donetsk area is also precisely disclosed gender and age aspect in definition of external priorities. The women in a little greater degree in comparison with the men prefer development mainly economic relations with Russia, and men - relations with the West. The citizens are more senior than 45 years in the much greater measure are convinced in priority of military-political cooperation with Russia (64 %) and speak for a reconstruction something similar to USSR (68 %).

In Galichina on a choice of external priorities of the population the serious influence renders a financial and educational level. The persons with a very bad and bad financial situation, with incomplete average and secondary education make the majority from convinced in importance of partnership with Russia. The citizens with the incomes average and higher, as well as with education average and higher give priority to directions of the European Union, Poland, NATO and USA.

It is remarkable, that the military-political cooperation with Russia in Donbass seems as a priority not only for left-wing dwellers, but for those who has placed themselves to the centrists. However among young generation of Donbass inhabitants the European priorities are more spread in comparison with the other groups.

*The definition of national interests of Ukraine* in external sphere causes the much greater interest of regional elites. In both regions there is an understanding, that to such interests concern creation of favorable external conditions for

formation of the independent, democratic and economically strong state of the European type (Donetsk area - 84 %, Lviv area - 72 %), maintenance of vigorous integration in system of global economic and European political institutes (accordingly - 64 % and 74 %). In Donetsk region more than half of representatives of elites have named also such interests, as - to become key region connecting East and West, North and the South of Eurasia (56 %, and in Lvov - it is even more - 74 %), expansion of security and territorial integrity guarantees (Donetsk inhabitants- 52 %, Lviv's - 48 %), to expand communications with foreign Diaspora (61 % and 39 % - obviously, that in Galichina the level of such communications suits majority).

In the Lviv region, except for the specified answers more than half of elite representatives questioned arrogantly have specified the purpose - to achieve a stable and serious geopolitical place in Europe as the regional leader (70 %, in Donbass - only 40 %) and deepening of partnership relations with NATO with the purpose of the further integration (62 %, in Donbass - 22 %).

At the same time there are some anti-western moods presented in elite groups. In an equal to latter proportion the variants - not go on rapprochement with the West, that is not ready to perceive Ukraine as the equal in rights partner (till 10 %) were named. Escalating of own military power named in Donbass and in Galichina (accordingly - 10 % and 16 %), as well as reception of firm guarantees from NATO concerning the Ukrainian security (38 % and 48 %), use of the contradictions of Russia and West in interests of Ukraine (22 % and 36 %). Some part of Donetsk region's elite have also named among interests joint opposition with Russia to pressure of the West (15 %) and creation with the countries of CIS the uniform political, economic, defensive and information environment (10 %).

*Thus, on the majority of positions in definition of national interests, priority directions of foreign policy of Ukraine in opinions of elites of Donetsk and Lviv regions coincide or nearly coincide. Regional elites being a part of national elites in Ukraine seriously influence not only the public opinion in regions but also the*

foreign policy of central authorities due to their specific cultural and territorial differences. The comparative analysis of national interests of the two most powerful groups in the Ukrainian elite and the regional elite of more integrated Poland in their attitude towards NATO and Russia makes it possible to show major specifications of their choice.

The Polish elite considers external factor of greater importance than the Ukrainian regional elites do. The latter one is more closed. Although there exists a difference in the views of elite of Eastern and Western Ukraine: the first one seems to consider both external and internal conditions of country development of the same importance while the second one regards the role of external factor as less important than internal one.

The Poles named the international event, which influenced the situation in the country greatly, is joining the NATO and the vast majority of respondents considers this influence to be positive (76 %). The both groups of Ukrainian elite emphasized two processes: the events in Russia (financial crisis, Putin, Chechnya, ratification of the treaty between Ukraine and Russia) and NATO broadening. At the same time their attitude towards these events is more critic; evaluating their influence the Ukrainians divided into two equal groups of “positivists” and “negativists”.

Defining national priorities of foreign policy, the Polish regional elite displays its complete consolidation while the Ukrainian – only partial one. The main Polish priorities are following: joining EU while protecting its own interests and an active “eastern policy” at the same time, in which Ukraine is assigned the leading role.

The regional Ukrainian elites have both agreement and disagreement in priorities defining. They agree on promoting mainly the economic cooperation with Europe looking ahead at joining EU as well as establishing the closest relations with eastern neighbours and avoiding getting into dependence either of West (USA) or East (Russia). They disagree on promoting both military and political relations with the Western countries looking forward to joining NATO as

well as economic cooperation mainly with Russia and intensification of relations with post-communist countries first of all. The East gives its preference to Eurasian orientation (Russia and the countries of CIS) while the West supports Atlantic direction.

*At the same time positions of population vary essentially. It is possible to explain that the interests of elites and state interests are more interdependent, than masses and state ones.* Essential regional distinctions having civilization nature roots continue to influence public opinion. Besides, the population of Donbass has been traditionally, from the Soviet times placed in the Moscow information environment. As is not paradoxical, but during last years this situation was even aggravated. The most readable newspapers in region remain Russian (though and registered in Ukraine – *Komsomolskaya Pravda, Trud* ) or local, but not having precisely expressed state-kind orientation. The overwhelming majority of population prefers Russian TV channels having besides precisely expressed anti-state orientation.

The more bold ones are regional distinctions in public opinion's definitions *of the concrete states and international organizations, the cooperation with that for Ukraine may be more important.* The European Union and Western Europe as a whole, is named only by 23% of Donbass inhabitants and by 66% of Galichina's dwellers. At the same time priority of relations with Russia in Donetsk reached 79%, whereas in Lviv - only 7%! About the same proportions are traced concerning NATO. The relative affinity of positions is fixed only concerning cooperation with USA and Poland.

The representatives of elites of both regions in an equal proportion have named a priority in adjustment of the closest relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (accordingly 52 % and 46 %). In Galichina preference of elites to western orientations sound precisely and boldly: 72 % have named a priority of development of the military-political relations with West with prospect of further integration in NATO (in Donetsk such clearly expressed political position is not popular and among elites - 12 %). It is indicative, that the military-political

cooperation with Russia as a priority, not only at all is not named by Lviv's elite but in Donbass has collected only 18 % of the adherents among local elite.

The determining of the strategic partners of Ukraine, despite of official declaration by those 19 states, at the representatives of regional elites was caused some difficulty. Almost half from them were at a loss to decide. Have agreed that the partners do exist hardly than half (52 % - in Donbass and 55 % - in Galichina). There is among them - in Donbass the majority named Russia - 85 % (in Galichina - 10 %), and in Galichina - Poland - 76 % (in Donbass - almost third 31 %). Also in both regions significant amount of regional elite have named USA as the partner (accordingly - 27 % and 48 %). The numbers of countries were determined as the strategic partners by elite only of one of regions.

Priority in definition «more strategic partners» has shown the presence of the certain regional distinctions caused by a complex of various factors. The Donbass elite as the first strategic partner named mainly Russia (75%). Other countries were much less often mentioned: Poland (13%), USA (8%) and EU (4 %). In Galichina the palm tree of superiority is occupied by Poland (44%), third of Lviv's elite has preferred USA. Besides the countries of NATO (11%), country of EU (8%) and Russia (4%) were named. Poland's regional elite among the most important partners named Germany, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus.

The tendency of nearing a number of the supporters of coming closer to Germany and Ukraine is observed at it.

After presidential elections of 1999 *the European choice* was confidently made public as official strategy of the state development and integration into European Union became the main foreign policy priority. However no evident movement in this direction is observed on the contrary, the distance between Ukraine and Europe, which is being integrated, goes on increasing. But the region of Central-Eastern Europe, in which Ukraine traditionally tries to play a significant role, experiences the division into those for whom it exists only as an abstract ideologem. Ukraine refers to the latter.

Diametrical position of the population of the regions of Ukraine is observed concerning such principal questions as making *Treaty on friendship and co-operation with Russian Federation* (91% & 41%) as well as signing the *Charter on distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine* (22% & 60%). Treaties were evaluated in a positive way in the East and the West of Ukraine.

The males who evaluated the Charter on distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine proved to be 10% more than females. The fact that the young Donbassovites (aged 25) evaluated the Charter Ukraine-NATO in a positive way (80%) testifies the perspective of proatlantic tendencies. In Galichina among those who evaluated Ukraine-Russia treaty positively are the people with the average income and the lower one (93%) and those with secondary education (49% prevail).

Similarity in positive approaches to *the particular events* and process by the residents of the Donbass and Galichina is clearly seen when evaluating Ukraine participation in peacemaking events (70% & 54%), closure of Chernobyl nuclear power station (54% & 65%). Refusal from nuclear weapon owing to the natural psychophysiological differences is differently evaluated by males & females: 43% of Donetsk male residents and 57% of Donetsk female residents evaluated this event in a positive way while in Galichina this difference is more sufficient (34% & 57% relatively).

It's not doubted that efficient foreign policy of any state, Ukraine in particular, with its regional differences, depends on comprehensive taking into account all *interests of different parts of the country*. Traditional dissatisfaction of the degree of taking into account regional interests by the centre is clearly observed in public opinion both in Donetsk and Lviv regions. Only every the tenth resident thinks that Kiev, in general, takes into account their regional interests in determining and following foreign policy. The opinion is prevailed that Kiev doesn't mainly or fully take into account the interests of their region (45% in the West of the country, 55% - in the East). In both regions many people (more than

one third) share the statement that centre takes into account regional interests in some aspects (35%) and in some aspects – doesn't (35%).

Despite the closeness in evaluation of taking into account by Kiev of Its regional interests in foreign policy activity, population understanding of definite filling of these interests in regions in questions in most cases doesn't coincide, and sometimes fully opposite. Specific interests of Donbass are seen in economic (86%), cultural (53%) and even political (47%) nearing with Russia, in economic co-operation with the West (23%) and Poland (8%). More than one third of young Donbassovites respondents (to 25 year old) spoke in favor of extension of economic co-operation with the West. Most of Galichina residents named economic co-operation with the West (59%) and Poland (46%), political (37%) and cultural (32%) nearing with the West. Residents with poor and very low incomes with secondary education name political, cultural and economic nearing with Russia as particular regional interest in Galichina. It should be noted that Polish evaluating the significance of co-operation, especially economic, with Russia are nearer to Donbass' than to Galichina's. Only 54% in Poland are convinced in the existence of friendly relations with Russian Federation and only 29% doubt it.

Traditional regional blaming the centre is clearly observed in the positions of local elites. However, Lviv elite claims centre much more often than Donbass one. Though, It's generally considered that Donbass withstands centre to higher extent. The majority in Donbass region thinks that centre takes into account or nearly takes into account regional interests (64%), Lviv residents are convinced that centre doesn't take into account the interests of their region (64%).

Nevertheless, the representatives of left-wing elites (these are Donbass residents) in majority think that regional interests in carrying out of foreign policy are not fully or partly taken into account by the centre (86%). The most centrists think that local interests are partly or fully taken into account (62%), but the rights testify about partial taking into account regional interests (69%). Local elite sees particular Donbass interests in economic co-operation with Russia (82%), in

foreign investments for the economic rise (72%), in economic co-operation with Poland (44%). Galichina elite is unique in not mentioning Russia in respect of their regional interests, but in most cases they called comprehensive – political, economic and cultural – co-operation with the West (from 65% to 88%) and with Poland (from 56% to 85%). Alongside these differences the common interest is relations with Poland for both Donetsk and Lviv elites.

Thus, differences not only regional, but in the positions of Donetsk region elites and population, are again clearly observed.

Regional approaches take place in determining of *the existence and directions of external threats* to the country. The existence of external enemies to Ukraine is evaluated in Donbass and Galichina in different ways. 66% of Donetsk residents think that there are nearly no external threats and on the contrary, the most of Lviv residents are convinced that threats are serious and at any rate exist in reality – 57%. Troubled expectations and fixation of threat existence are connected with the real political crisis, which showed, in particular, inability of structures, which are responsible for state security, to fulfil their functions in society's interests.

Having serious divergences concerning threat existences as such one should observe principal approach differences in certain determinations of dangerous directions. More than a quarter of Donetsk residents and more than a half of Lviv residents not only admit external threat existence but also make them detailed.

The greatest threat carriers in both regions were named:

- Russia (6% - in Donbass and 81% - in Galichina),
- USA (38% and 9%),
- IMF (43% and 9%),
- NATO (30% and 8%),
- Turkey (4% and 2%),
- Poland (2% and 5%);

Such an opposing threat evaluation on the part of our north-eastern neighbor didn't practically influence the evaluation of the possible Russia's aspiration to

restore its influence in Eastern Europe in the nearest future. With different degree of conviction 65% of Donetsk residents and 76% of Lviv residents consider it so. By the way, the questioning results carried out in Poland by CBOS at the beginning of 2000 also testify that the majority of the Poles (60%) are convinced that Russia will strive for strengthening its influence in our region.

In connection with it the Treaty about creating single union state signed by the Presidents of Russia and Byelorussia in December 1999 shows regional elites interest of both state. The eastern part of Ukraine evaluation of this event is mainly neutral (46%). But there is both noticeable improvement (30%) and definite negative suggestions (24%). Western Ukraine elite negatively evaluated this treaty (82%), and only one/fifth of the respondents occupied a neutral position. Polish regional elite negatively evaluated the Treaty (94%).

Elites explanation of their evaluation is rather evident. In the East of Ukraine there is quiet neutral attitude which means, first of all, confidence that there will not be either positive or negative consequences for the country and secondly, nothing will come out of this treaty. The West of the country as well as Polish elite consider the Treaty as a means of strengthening position of imperial Russia as a threat to security and independence, reanimation of the USSR and soon.

Thus, first of all, elite consciousness, especially of Western ones, admit the importance of Russian factor in question of their own security and their deep concern about possible real threats on the part of modern Russia.

The Donbass male residents consider that external threat comes from Russia (it's twice as much as the female). In Galichina the people who consider Poland as a threat carrier are 71%, aged more than 45 which is explained by not a simple history of Ukrainian-Polish relations in the period of World War II and first post-war years.

The differences in the regional approaches concern determining threat directions of national security by the elites. The existence of external enemies for Ukraine are evaluated differently in Donbass and Galichina: 60% of Donetsk elite

consider that there are no nearly outer threats and almost all the Lviv elite is sure that the threats are serious and present 92% in reality.

The representatives of the left-wing elite are convinced in absence of the outer threats for Ukraine (71%) and the right-wing ones doubt it (76%). The centrists' position divided into equal parts. Nevertheless, there are common approaches in certain dangerous directions. From 40% of the Donetsk elite and about 92% of the Lviv elite admitting existence of outer threats were determined as follows: Russia (46% in Donbass, 92% in Galichina) and also international criminal structures (42% and 71% respectively).

Among other threats in the two regions there were named:

- multinational corporations (19% and 33%);
- international terrorism (19% and 15%);
- illegal emigration (12% and 33%);
- the USA (23% and 12%);
- Romania (7% and 23%);
- IMF (31% and 8%).

In Galichina NATO is not mentioned as a threat at all. One can clearly see the discrepancies between the evaluation of threats coming from Russia and NATO by the elite masses of the Donetsk region. Whereas in Poland the feeling of safety as for the country's international situation has become widespread. In Poland 74% of the population are convinced in the absence of outside threats for their country. Those few, who consider otherwise, name Russia (6%) and Germany (2%) as the sources of threats.

The contents of threats in both Ukrainian regions are regarded first of all as: bearers of economic pressure (78% in Donbass and 83% in Galichina); territorial claims (41% and 63%); interference into internal affairs (26% and 61%)

Admitting the presence of absence of external threats did not remove the necessity to evaluate *factors negatively influencing the state of Ukrainian national security*. Here a larger consensus of the elites has been achieved. The representatives of both regions named as a significant negative low efficiency of

the military organizations (76% in Donbass, 82% in Galichina). The majority of both Galichina's and Donetsk 's elite (62% and 61% respectively) negatively assessed the presence of foreign bases and formations on Ukrainian territory.

The majority of elite representatives in both regions also named the absence of strategy and integral policy in the field of national security as a significant negative factor (70% and 90% respectively). The majority is also convinced that the foreign policy is negatively influenced by non-usage of multivectorial opportunities (64% and 56%). The regional elites in their majority claim that an important harmful factor affecting the national security is the expansionist ambitions of certain political circles of Russian (58% in Donbass, 88% in Galichina). Experts' viewpoints of the two region considerably coincide in determining as a negative factor the importance of potential territorial claims and the possibility of turning Ukraine into the 'buffer zone' (65% and 79% respectively). The equal numbers of elite representatives in the East and West of the country agree to the fact that Ukrainian security is not consolidated by the incomplete integration into the existing systems of collective security (79% each).

Still greater unanimity in determining the significance of the negative factor was achieved by the elite of the two regions as for economic dependence on international financial institutions (Donetsk-96%, Lviv 86%). Economic dependence on other countries is undoubtedly a negative factor and 71% in the Donetsk region and 83% in Galichina determine it as such.

At the same time there are substantial differences in defining the factors presenting a threat to national security. In Donbass the elite, in fact, does not pay much attention to such a negative factor as importing ideological propaganda of anti-state nature (71%), whereas in Galichina nearly two-thirds are of an opposite optional (63%).

The development of political processes in the last three months of the year 2000 was marked by the activation of political struggle, which was accompanied for the first time since the early 90-s by the public activity. The forecasts of sharpening the inner political situation came true, though the contents and the

dynamics of the main conflict turned out unpredictable. The case of the journalist G.Gongadze, continued in the sensational so-called 'cassette scandal', became the main theme of the survey background. Both the course of the conflict and the declared versions of its sources and consequence prove not only indirect influence of the above events on the object in question (which is foreign policy), but also the possible indirect connection between the case of the murdered journalist and the general political course of Ukraine (both domestic and international). The closeness of approaches of the population of both regions was trace through the attitude to the West's position about the 'cassette scandal' and its consequence.

A certain opposition potential can be seen through the fact that either completely or in general the tough position of the Western democracies is supported by 53% the Donbass residents and 65% of the Galichina ones. The support of the West position about the cassette scandal is characteristic of all age groups, particularly those who are between 25 and 54 years of age (over 60% in Donbass, 67% in Galichina). Among those supporting the West's position are mainly students (75%) and people of hired labor (58%).

Thus, the collected dates differences of the public opinion about the foreign policy issues and certain points in common, which are mainly of a negative character. At the same time the elite's attitudes in both regions have much more in common than those of rank and file citizens. Moreover, foreign political reference points of the Donetsk regional elite are significantly similar to those of Galichina population and elite. This enables us to make a restrained optimistic forecast about the possibilities of positive evolution of views of Donetsk residents as for European choice.

However, such evolution seems real only on condition of constant hard work on the part of pro-European elite of the regions which would be supported by state institutions, political parties and public organizations of the corresponding orientation, as well as would be helped by state and non-state structures of the European Union and NATO. As a particular instance, the strategy and tactics of the work with the Donetsk region on the part of the Centre of information and

documentation of NATO in Kiev needs reconsidering. Comparing foreign political reference points and evaluations in the two Ukrainian regions and Poland it should be stated that in most items the Poles are close to west Ukrainian. However, in some principal matters (attitude to Russia, evaluation of outside threats) the Donbass and Polish approaches are quit close. This is the evidence of the availability of common views and similarity of positions about some issues of foreign policy and the possibility of expanding mutually beneficial cooperation of Ukrainians and Poles.

#### **IV. Attitudes of the Regional Communities and Elites of the Donbass, Galichina, and Lublin region towards NATO**

The analysis of the results of sociological surveys (not only within the Donetsk project, but also those carried out by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after O. Razumkov, the National Institute for Strategic Research, the Ukrainian Centre for Studies of Peace, Conversion and Conflict Situations etc.) makes it possible to define rather stable tendencies in the opinions of both ordinary people and elites of Ukraine.

*Attitude towards the NATO is changing.* The vast majority of the Ukrainian population, including the eastern part of our country, does not consider the organization as a threat. This correlates with a rather low level of feeling of an external threat especially by the elite. In the East, the process of change is going more slowly than in the West while the elite outrun the masses. In Donbass the quantity of those whose opinion has improved is a little bigger than that of those whose opinion has worsened. In Galichina the vast majority of people has improved their attitude towards NATO.

*Stereotypes, inherited from the Soviet period, still influence the minds of the population.* And again, the respondents of Lvivshina and the elite have the lowest level of influence. Nearly 62% of Eastern Ukrainians tend to think that the essence of NATO has not changed since the end of the Cold War while only 33% of the Western respondents support the thesis of the invariability of NATO. The population of the Western region is more likely to think that NATO considerably decreased the expenditures of defense and army. Nearly the same attitude one can see in the answers about the essence, aims and the results of the Alliance activity. The population of Donbass thinks of NATO as of an aggressive military bloc (37%), or a political bloc with military component (39%). Only 12% of Galichina respondents consider NATO as an aggressive military bloc, 26% - as a

peacemaking organisation and 40 % as a political bloc with military component. The attitude of the pensioners in the East mostly worsened – more than 40%. Housewives have the worst attitude – approximately 50%. These categories of the population more often than other (over 40%) defined NATO as an aggressive military bloc. The pensioners of the East are more likely to think that the real essence of NATO has not changed. Because of distrust, 79% of the Eastern population are suspicious in their attitude towards NATO extension (as well as towards joining of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary to the Alliance); they consider such extension as a threat for stability in the region. Western Ukrainians tend to think in the opposite way.

Divergence in perception of the Alliance makes it possible to make a conclusion of *extremely opposite orientations of Donbass and Galichina*. The East shows rather distinctly its orientation to Russia both in external policy as a whole and in the issues of defense. More than 60% of respondents there consider as necessary to join the union of Russia and Byelorussia while only 13% support joining NATO. At the same time, the population of Galichina has the opposite point of view – nearly 80% are against of joining the union of Russia and Byelorussia and some more than a third is in favour of the North-Atlantic Alliance membership. In both regions the population realizes the opposition of NATO and Russia. It is an interesting fact that in spite of anti-Russia attitude in the West, the third of the respondents admits the role of Russia and agrees that it is impossible to build the European security without it. In the Donetsk region 78% consider promoting relations with Russia to be the most important activity; 2% support developing relations with NATO, 6% - with Poland and 23% - with the EU and Western Europe. The population of Galichina is less likely to cooperate with NATO (6%). They are in favour of cooperating with the EU (64%) and have an indifferent attitude towards Russia.

The different views of Donbass and Galichina respondents in foreign policy orientations can be explained by the set of factors. *The first* one is the different

levels of national consciousness. A little bit over a third of Donetsk respondents consider Ukraine to be their Motherland while among the Galichina respondents this index is 90%. The citizens' of Lvivshina idea of a foreign policy of the country as well as that of cooperation with the North-Atlantic Alliance is mostly caused by their national interests. The representatives of the East still consider the place of Ukraine at international arena in the light of the Soviet ideology. The citizens of Galichina almost evenly in age groups acknowledge Ukraine as the Motherland while in the East the group of 25-34 along with the most aged are less likely to consider Ukraine to be the Motherland. Answering on the question "what do you think your nationality is" the part of Ukrainians and Russians decreases as the respondents become younger. In this case it is necessary to take into account the factor of time – in the past it was hard to acknowledge oneself as the representative of another nationality; at the same time, the migration factor should be born in mind.

*Secondly*, in spite of general small interest in politics, the Western Ukrainians are more politicized. It is especially true for the youth of Galichina. In Donbass the youngest age group (18-24 years) is less likely to interest in politics while the oldest people tend to be very interested in it. In the East there are only 17% of 18-24 respondents who interest in politics and in the West this index is more than 55%. This information partially explains the political preferences in both regions – the level of national consciousness is in direct proportion to the right-wing political preferences and in inverse proportion to the age. That's why, and it is the *third reason*, the majority of respondents in Western Ukraine in spite of their age thinks that they have centrist or right-wing orientations while in the East there are few people who acknowledge himself as right-wing oriented person. Undoubtedly, the reserves for changing an attitude towards NATO, changing the orientations of a foreign policy and successful implementation of reforms are based in the work with the youth, involvement of young people in political processes.

And the *fourth*, the population of Western Ukraine can be evaluated as more optimistic. Living under objectively worse material conditions, more people in this region assess these conditions as average and high.

One can assume that there are following *obstacles (except stereotypes) which hamper growing of sympathies towards cooperation with NATO* in both regions:

- desire of the population of both regions to develop mainly economic relations with other countries and international organizations. It is also necessary to note that it is socio-economic problems, which are the most actual for the population of the country. The foreign policy is expected to be successful in overcoming internal problems;
- reluctance to be involved in new global opposition, the evidence of which is the emphasis on economic relations and supporting the neutral status of Ukraine by nearly one/fifth of respondents in both regions. This thesis is also confirmed by the hope of cooperation with NATO and Russia in name of stability on the continent (64% in the East and 59% in the West). These indices are more likely to be caused by the superficial idea of geopolitical rivalry of NATO and Russia. 65% in the East don't feel an external threat while 53% in the West feel such a threat. The difference is mostly explained by the attitude towards Russia. In the West 46% of the respondents (and 80% of those who feel a threat) consider Russia to be such a threat. In the East the "leaders" are IMF (12% and 42%), USA (10% and 38%) and NATO (8% and 30%);
- some actions of the Alliance, especially in Yugoslavia, as well as extension of the organization eastwards. The survey has confirmed the negative attitude of the Ukrainians towards the action of NATO in Yugoslavia – strongly negative in the East and moderately negative in the West. In the western region the majority of those who have changed an attitude towards NATO, changed it into negative. An interesting fact is not the existence of anti-NATO minority in Galichina but 17% of those who has changed their attitude from neutral into

negative. (The evidence of the strength of stereotypes and fixed beliefs of the citizens of the East is the reaction on the actions of Russia in Chechnya. 43% haven't changed their opinions of necessity of union with it while 10% of respondents even strengthened in their desire of union. It is only pro-NATO minority of Donbass which is against of the union with Russia.);

- bad distribution of information among the population and especially masses. There are a lot of evidences of this thesis. It is interesting to note the high percentage of responses “don't know” and “in something – yes, in something – no”. (Though, on the other hand, the “transition state” of the population's consciousness can also be of some influence). Over the half of respondents (in Donbass this figure is considerably higher) hear nothing about the key documents, which define the Atlantic vector of the Ukrainian foreign policy – the Charter on particular cooperation with the Alliance, participation of Ukraine in the Programme “Partnership in name of peace”. The population turns to be especially uninformed in the issues of the Centre of NATO information and documentation in Kyiv, which is expected to fill these information gaps. Nearly 90% of ordinary people of Donbass and Galichina have no idea of its activity;
- rather significant is the example of Poland. The experience of NATO membership has strengthened its population in opinion that this membership is the guarantee of independence of the country (from 41% to 56 %), peace and security (from 55% to 60%);
- among the important factors, which give the regions different political colours and different geopolitical orientations, are the following. It is rather distinct dependence between the quantity and quality of information on the NATO activity, cooperation of Kyiv-Brussel and the attitude towards the North-Atlantic Alliance. The population of the East is not simply less informed; it draws an information from the other sources. Donbass is more likely to support pro-Russia, and sometimes, Russian mass media – TV channels and newspapers, which offer mostly anti-NATO materials. The same misbalance of the information is in Galichina, except one very essential difference. Donbass is

overloaded with the information, which contains ratings of the international situation, policy of different states, organizations from the position of the neighbour country.

Let's attract attention to absence of these factors in the case of Poland. It partially explains more successful integration of Warsaw in Euro-Atlantic and European structures, more dynamic progress towards the market and democracy.

*The attitude towards NATO is rather precisely being formed in the context of opposition of this organization with Russia.* The base for such conclusion is that the significant quantity of the Ukrainians has supported the thesis about the desire of NATO to involve Ukraine in cooperation in order to oppose it to Russia. On the other hand, even in the East of our country (not to mention the West) about 65% have agreed that Russia will try to restore the influence in East Europe. The same opinion is supported by nearly 60% of the Poles. Such a “consensus” gives the serious reasons to worry about the possibility of transformation of East Europe in an object of encroachments within the new global opposition.

An attitude of the Ukrainians towards Russia, especially in the East, is rather mythologized. In fact, the main reasons of it are nostalgia, and inadequate to realities idea about the status and prospects of the Ukrainian-Russian relations. Pro-Russia views of the population are also caused by the myth about the brotherhood of our peoples, their common historical destiny, which was put in the consciousness by the decades of Soviet "education". One more acting myth, which is an acquisition of the present, is an idea of “uncloudedness” and almost “klondikeness” of the results of economic cooperation of Ukraine and Russia. The belief in this is actively supported by the certain political forces and financial and industrial groupings. The fact is pronounced that the majority of the population of Ukraine is not capable to estimate adequately the following phenomena: numerous trade wars between Ukraine and Russia (tube, confectionery, sugar and others), the delay of creating the zone of free trade on the territory of CIS by Moscow,

expansion of the Russian capital; the consequence of such incapacity can be the loss of economic independence of our state.

*Despite of the important role, which Poland plays in foreign policy of Ukraine, it is not regarded by Ukrainians as the most important partner.* Even in Galichina only 10 % are in favour of such a partnership. Though, the citizens of Galichina could be more attentive to Poland – currently an economic cooperation with this country (at state and individual levels) is of great value for this region. The majority of our population does not consider Poland as the member of western community, underestimates its opportunities of rendering assistance to Ukraine in integrating Europe. At the same time the survey shows, that 56% of the Poles would like to see Ukraine in NATO.

The Ukrainian elite in both regions demonstrates belonging both to the region, and to elite. The elite evaluations of external policy of Ukraine as well as international situation are more adequate to realities. Let's consider some examples. The elite in greater extent pins its hopes on NATO as the organization, which is responsible for safety and peace in Europe. NATO leads in Galichina in this aspect and in Donbass concede only to UNO Security Council. Thus, 52% of the representatives of Donetsk elite and 74% of the elite of Galichina consider the North-Atlantic alliance as the most effective structure of collective safety in Europe. The leadership of UNO Security Council as the tool of the international security is sooner the consequence of existence of the Soviet times stereotype, which is still present in the conscience of the population. There is also a conflict between idealistic idea of who should worry about the international safety and the one who really is capable to fulfil this function.

Besides, the vast majority of the representatives of elite in both regions haven't got the negative attitude towards the cooperation of Ukraine and NATO. It is necessary to bear in mind skeptical evaluation of CIS and Tashkent treaty prospects. Only 30% of the Ukrainian experts regard as necessary to join this agreement in future while 42% reject this idea radically. They do not hasten "to become the third" in the Russian-Byelorussian union. It is incapacity of CIS, and

not nationalism, which turns the certain part of the Ukrainians, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Black Sea fleet admiral Komoedov revealed "with face to Europe and back to Russia".

Let's remember also that even the Donetsk experts consider Russia to be the greatest threat to the security of Ukraine.

Taking into account the realities of a modern international situation, the geopolitical situation of Ukraine, the opinions of masses and opportunities of elites, it is possible to allocate the group of factors, which will influence European and Euro-Atlantic prospect of Ukraine.

*Ukraine should reconsider such feature of its foreign policy as multivectorness.* Today multivectorness actually means instability of priorities as well as disorientation dangerous to the national interests. What is mentioned by the vector? As one of directions of external policy, because of banality, it is not very understandable substantial loading of concept. If the vector is a priority direction then the two questions raise. How many priority directions can it be in our external policy? Whether the opposite directions can be priority (opposite in essence, rather than in geography)? From the point of view of compatibility of priority, the European and Russian vectors are very doubtful.

"In expert ratings, east and west integration processes were again going in different directions compared to the appropriate vectors in March. It prejudices the stability and logicity of a foreign direction of Ukraine, as it is heavy to define any certain tendency. There are fluctuations of integration vectors (and hence, of geopolitical orientations of the country), which are of a short character (short amplitude)".

*(Analytical material of the National Institute for strategic studies on the basis of surveys of experts).*

Both elite, and the masses feel uncertainty of our foreign policy. 36 % in the West and 38% in the East frankly define it as uncertain. In assessing this policy as pro-Russia or pro-Europe, the respondents of the East consider the foreign policy

of the state as pro-Europe while in the West – as pro-Russia. In Donetchina 43% of the respondents have evaluated it as pro-Europe, at the same time in Galichina almost 35% consider it as pro-Russia. In the East 36% have acknowledge that the foreign policy of Ukraine is Russia-oriented (though less than 9% are absolutely agree with this statement). At the same time 60% of citizens of Galichina consider it to be pro-Russia while the number of “completely agreed” is 32%.

Yes, Ukraine should take into account our geopolitical location between Europe and Russia. But our "between" location cannot be the "strategy to the beginning of XXI century". The strategic task of our foreign policy (and internal too) is to stop being between the Western Europe and Russia. Ukraine can remain Ukraine only through becoming a component of Europe. If we don't become Europe, we are to become doomed by Russia, even when keeping the external attributes of state. Theoretically there is one more variant - to join Europe together with Russia. The latter variant is improbable in the near future for the Russian management has unequivocally made up its mind to restore Great Russia as the independent global centre of force.

Whether the maneuvering should be one of the methods in the arsenal of the Ukrainian foreign policy? Undoubtedly - yes. But if using it, in my opinion, it is necessary to bear in mind at least the following:

- maneuvering is the method of tactical rather than a strategic arsenal;
- maneuvering is used with the certain strategic purpose;
- it is the strategic purpose which predetermines the borders of maneuvering.

In Ukrainian example of maneuvering between Europe and Russia all three rules mentioned above are ignored. The maneuvering turns into strategy, in the result of which we shall stop (if have not already stopped) to be “native” for Russia, having remained “outsiders” for Europe.

The integration with Europe means not the great amount of the documents signed by Ukraine with various international organizations, but the process of reforming of all spheres of our society. To be integrated in Europe means first of all to become the Europeans in the major standards of public life. It is hard to

disagree with those of the analysts, who consider, that the main threats to the safety of Ukraine are inside the country and are connected first of all with economic problems.

*In its turn, Europe should analyze its so-called liberal extremism.* It is necessary to take into account the stage of development of Ukraine. It objectively cannot meet a lot of standards of a democratic and market society. An impression is formed, that the help of the West to Ukraine in a near future will be reduced to periodic "measurements" of level of our country direction towards the market and democracy. The destiny of our competitive production in the western markets testifies not only of our, but also of the West unreadiness to equal, mutually advantageous cooperation.

*Russia has unequivocally made its aim to restore the status of the great state, one of the global centres of a force in the multipolar world.* Just therefore it can not be only the part of Europe, an uniform European home. Ukraine seems to direct towards Europe, and therefore is in favor of NATO extension; it has declared about its plans (probably, the remote ones) of entering EU. Russia consider the development of uniform Europe to be a threat, tries to prevent this process, actively works over the creation of own sphere of influence. So what is the base of our strategic partnership which, by rules, envisages a generality of strategic tasks? Is it again the "common historical destiny of two brotherly peoples"? "Brothers" in geopolitics is as insufficient argument, as well as "damned moscals".

The actions of Russia in Chechnya have shown military weakness of Russia to the whole world, a discrepancy of its claims to be the global centre of force to its real economic and military-political opportunities. The Russian army has shown inability to conduct modern war with the use of the usual weapon. Mainly therefore, the military doctrine of Russia from April, 2000 supposes the use of the nuclear weapon by Russia in first charge, including cases, when against it such a weapon was not applied. And this is going in the period of very convincing demonstration of the force by the Alliance in Yugoslavia. Peacemaking of the

Russians is very evident on the post-Soviet terrains. The conflicts in Pridnestrovye, Karabach, Abkhazia are skilfully supported in a decaying status and are used for the pressure on the appropriate countries.

From the point of view of security of Ukraine, from the point of view of a role of Moscow in the system of the European security, the union with Russia should be of disappointed character. The stereotypes and prejudice along with ignorance have been more likely to prevent it.

*The formation of new global and European security system requires reforming of such international establishments, as UN and OSCE.* Effectiveness is the major feature, which distinguishes the North-Atlantic Alliance from other potential defenders of safety –UN Security Council, OSCE, EU. In our opinion, it is one of the key factors, which change the attitude towards NATO. Practically each document of OSCE contains the link on "common values". The concept "common values" is closely connected to the concept of "consensus". For example, the countries of NATO really have common values and common interests. Therefore the presence of the consensus principle does not prevent an effective functioning of the organization. The states-members of OSCE have no common values, and their common interests are rather generalized. In this case, the consensus principle turns into an obstacle for a successful performance of the tasks of the Alliance.

**OSCE** requires radical reorganization. It is necessary to define what OSCE is: the tool for civilized and controllable rivalry or the tool of the real cooperation in the field of security. Now Russia uses the organization in order to paralyze the efforts of creation of the all-European complex of safety. It is Russia, which considers itself as the Euroasian state. As it was already stated above, it is not going to be simply the part of Europe, but also does not want the formation of incorporated Europe, the European security complex to take place without its participation.

## V. CONCLUSION

In its regional aspect of foreign policy orientations and attitudes towards NATO Ukraine very often looks like two-sided Janus. One face is turned to the West, towards Europe – this is Western Ukraine, Galichina. At the same time the another one is turned to the eastern neighbor, Russia – this is East of the country, Donbass. As data of research shows probably such kind of interminable geopolitical choice provides crucial differences with Ukrainian's western neighbor – Poland without paying attention on official declarations of state's heads.

Along with that such kind of picture while doing more precise overview discloses new sides and aspects. It deepens the understanding of the situation and provides broad vision on the real none-linear contradictory character of contemporary conditions in Ukraine.

1. Among essential characteristics of researched groups' consciousness are following ones:

- High degree of contradictory character, ambiguity as well as ambivalence of Ukrainian elites and masses. At the same time the presence of certain core of values that is common for various groups takes place;
- Interminability and mobility of views are under the influence of situational factors. Instability and internal contradictions of large part of population's opinions and even elites makes them quite sensitive towards concrete events and actions of foreign policy.

2. The regional Ukrainian elites have both agreement and disagreement in priorities defining. They agree on promoting mainly the economic cooperation with Europe looking ahead at joining EU as well as establishing the closest relations with eastern neighbors and avoiding getting into dependence either of West (USA) or East (Russia). They disagree on promoting both military and political relations with the Western countries looking forward to joining NATO as well as economic cooperating mainly with Russia and intensification of relations with post-communist countries first of all. The Ukrainian East gives its

preference to Eurasian orientation (Russia and the countries of CIS) while the West supports Atlantic direction.

3. The essential feature is that the attitude towards NATO changes. Age, education, level of awareness and at the first hand cultural and political background that is relevant to regional community are the essential factors of influence on foreign policy orientations. There is a distinct correlation between political views, age and attitude towards NATO. The left-wing and old respondents have more negative attitude to Alliance. Younger and more educated persons have more sympathetic attitude towards western vector of foreign policy and NATO. The same is true for the level of person's awareness.

4. The Ukrainian elite and masses percept NATO in the triangle NATO-Ukraine-Russia. It is only the Polish and West-Ukrainian regional elites which unambiguously interprets the extension of NATO as extension of peace boundaries, stability and welfare; at the same time they think that it is impossible to build the new architecture of European security without and against Russia.

5. The vast majority of West Ukrainians hopes that NATO extension is strengthening the security in Ukraine. At the same time the respondents of East Ukraine have some doubts, fears and even anti-NATO believes: the extension of the Alliance has led to geopolitical instability and NATO is still an aggressive military machine of American capitalism for its hegemony. It should be noted that the majority of both Ukrainian and Polish elite shares the opinion that NATO would like to involve Ukraine to oppose it to Russia.

6. Therefore, Ukraine doesn't want to participate in new geopolitical opposition. On the other hand we live in the time when it is necessary to make choice not for decades but centuries. The consequences of our today choice are a long-term strategy of cultural development for the next hundred of years. Strong values but not strong countries should be the criterion of such choice. This means the choice not between Russia and Europe, but that between Eurasian and democratic Atlantic values. The main feature of present internal situation in

Ukraine is the weakness and indecision of Ukrainian elite towards this problem as well as disunity of its views.

7. It is necessary to note that data obtained does not allow us to claim the complete dissimilarity between Galichina's and Donbass elites' points of views. According to some issues the differences are noticeable although there are large amount of such issues around which exists unity and consolidation of regional elites. Exactly this fact gives us hope on gradual formation of uniform platform of Ukrainian state's foreign policy where regional differences will become strengths and not weaknesses.