
CSBM in the Western Mediterranean

NATO – EAPC Research Programme 1999-2001

Javier Jordán
University of Granada (Spain)
jjordan@ugr.es
June 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	3
1. Introduction	4
1.1. Definition of the problem.....	4
1.2. Temporal frame.....	5
1.3. Sources.....	5
1.4. Theoretical frame.....	6
2. Security problems in the Western Mediterranean.....	9
2.1 The socio-economic problems of the South bank.....	9
2.2. Political instability.....	11
2.3. The islamism as a risk for the security	13
2.4. Consequences in security terms.....	14
2.5. Conclusions over the problems of security and recommendations.....	15
3. Security initiatives in the Western Mediterranean.....	21
3.1. The Euromediterranean Process.....	21
3.2. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.....	25
3.3. Other initiatives of cooperation: WEU and OSCE.....	28
3.4. Bilateral Measures	30
3.5. The cooperation and the military capacities for crisis management in Mediterranean	33
4. Confidence Measures.....	34
4.1. General considerations on CSBM.....	34
4.2. Characteristics of confidence building in the Western Mediterranean and recommendations	36
Bibliography.....	45

ABSTRACT

"CSBM in the Western Mediterranean"

This research examines the general situation of the Western Mediterranean from the security view point, and specially the problems of perception between the two sides of the Mediterranean. Misperceptions not only in the military field but, of historic and cultural origin. The theoretical frame of the research is based on the cooperative realism, which belongs to the neorealism theory of the International Relations. Fostering confidence constitutes one of the objectives of the defence policy and it is necessary for the achievement of international pacific and cooperative relations. Because of this, CSBM must occupy an important place in the destined measures to improve the stability and the security in the Western Mediterranean. A part of the investigation is dedicated to study briefly the general concept of Confidence and Security Building Measure. On the following part, the investigation studies the CSBM adopted in the multilateral and bilateral levels. In the multilateral level, we examine what the European Union, the Atlantic Alliance, the Western European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Mediterranean Euroforces (EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR and SIAF) do to this respect. In the bilateral level, we study the measures applied by three European countries of the region: France, Italy and Spain. During the analysis of each one of the groups of the CSBM adopted until the moment we make what seem to us the opportune comments on the validity of these measures.

Lastly, the investigation finalizes with some general conclusions and recommendations to the creation and implementation of the CSBM in the Western Mediterranean.

CSBM in the Western Mediterranean

Javier Jordán

University of Granada (Spain)

jjordan@ugr.es

This report analyses the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) applied in the Western Mediterranean and the problems of perception between the two banks. The purpose of this investigation is to offer an overview on the promotion of confidence in the region.

1. Introduction

The methodology employed in our investigation will be the following. First we will expose the problem of investigation; secondly, we will develop the theorist frame and will formulate the hypothesis; at last, after having gathered the data (primary and secondary sources, and personal interviews) and having proceeded into the analysis, we will pass to elaborate the conclusions.

1.1. Definition of the problem

The answers to the questions this investigation pretends to respond come from two related problems:

a) Which are the characteristics of CSBM applied in Western Mediterranean? Concretely, what is the relation with the region's security problems?

b) What are the clues for the correct development of the military cooperation and to encourage the confidence between the two banks of the Western Mediterranean?

1.2. Temporal frame

The investigation starts approximately in the year 1990 and lasts until nowadays. The election of this period of time is based on the following reasons.

The start of the “post cold war era”: a time of change in the conception of the security and in the functions and structure of some of the security organizations which will be studied: NATO, WEU and OSCE. In that year the Persian Gulf crisis started. As a consequence, the Mediterranean questions received a renovated attention. In a first moment some actors adopted a “cold war vision”, which afterwards was substituted by a most cooperative attitude.

1.3. Sources

The sources that we have used on the research have basically been secondary. The access to this documentation in Spain has been accomplished by the Documentation Centre of the Defence Ministry, of the Spanish Centre for International Relations in Madrid, the University of Granada, NATO Library (NATO Hq), the Library of the Centre for International Studies (Oxford University) and the King’s College Library (University of London). We have also used abundant primary sources, specially, official documents from NATO, WEU, OSCE, Euromediterranean Conferences, Defence Ministries, Foreign Affairs Ministries, etc.

On the other hand, the personal interviews with military and civilian officers from NATO, WEU, and the Spanish Defence Ministry and Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry have been very interesting. In the academic realm I am very grateful to the opinions and advices from specialists and partners from the University of Granada, University Complutense of Madrid, Centre for International Studies (Oxford University), Centre for Defence Studies of the King’s College (University of London), and University of Casablanca (Morocco).

I would like to heartily recognise the relevancy for the present report of the participation during four years on a working group on Mediterranean issues at the Centre for National Defence Studies (CESEDEN) in Madrid.

1.4. Theoretical frame

We are going to do a very brief exposition of the theoretical frame in which the investigation has been developed. We are going to employ the “cooperative realism”, applied to the concept of military security. The cooperative realism uses the central premises of the classical realism (Barbé, 1995: 54). The principal characteristic of this theoretic approach consists on the possibility of the States co-operating in those problems where there are common interests. To arrive into that conclusion, the cooperative realism assumes some elements of the neoliberalism, of the institutionalism and of the Theory of Games. In a synthetic manner, the theorist principles of a cooperative realism are the following:

- The international anarchy. A supracountry Government do not exist on a worldwide level and, by so, there is a situation of anarchy in which the States and other international actors establish relations between them, conditioned by anarchy, but not always determined by him (Powell, 1994; Keohane & Martin, 1995).

- The State as a unitary and rational actor. States are the principal actors, though not only, of an international system (Kapstein, 1995). At the same time, a State is not a monolithic and unchangeable entity. There are diverse factors (as the type of State, the political regime, the leader’s mind, the geography, the history, the national cohesion, and so forth) that influence in the conduct (Ayoob, 1995). The egotistical character of the international relations. As a consequence of the anarchy and of the unitary and rational character of the principal actor of the international relations, States calculate the actions in terms of interest (Williams, 1993). Nevertheless, at the hour to reach and to defend the self-interest, States try to avoid the resource to the war. The reason is the high social, political and material costs of the conflict. In every way, the armed conflicts keep existing on the International Relations and States go to war when there is not another way to defend the vital interests. In this

context, the cooperation is an option that States can employ to achieve the self-interest. Not with standing, the cooperation isn't possible and the alternative can be the conflict. Some conditions which influence in the adoption of cooperation by the States are: that the cooperation is necessary to reach the proposed objective; the number of actors that participate in the cooperation; the intern characteristics of the actors; the mutual confidence; the shadow of the future; and the role of determined international institutions (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Axelrod, 1986; Jervis, 1987; Calduch, 1991).

We will check that the application of this theoretical focus upon the study of the military security and to the building of confidence results especially adequate. The military security is understood in this work as a dimension of security, defined as a multidimensional concept. Security refers to other aspects different to the military as political, economic, social and environmental issues. Three are the mechanisms employed to achieve the military security: The defence (includes dissuasion and negation), the Confidence and Security Building Measures, and the arms control. The theoretical study of the military security, from the point of view of the cooperative realism, is based on the following principles:

- The protagonists of the military security are the States, which are also the principal actors of the cooperative realism.
- In the realm of military security is particularly possible a confluence of interests. The primary objective of the States in this question is the security. The war is not the continuation of the policy by other means but the negation of all policy. In consequence, States have negative and positive interests to this respect: avoid the conflict and improve security (Booth, 1991; Thompson, 1994).
- The similitude of objectives is greater, and most probable also to choose the cooperation. The cooperation reduces the conflicts and increases the capacities (Axelrod, 1981; Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Milner, 1992; Axelrod, 1996).

Cooperation establishes pacific mechanisms of conflict resolution and encourages the stability and the common interests.

- At the same time, the adoption of a cooperative strategy, must not neglect of the effort of keeping mechanisms of dissuasion that reinforce the cooperation. The capacities of defence make also preferable the cooperation to deception.
- It is important that the cooperation in military security questions goes together with the development of cooperation in other matters, to increase the incentives for the military cooperation, and as a consequence of a conception of the security that concedes great importance to other aspects, as are economic, social, political and environmental (Buzan, 1991).
- Nevertheless, not all are good news. The cooperation in relative questions to the military security copes with important difficulties. Security affects very directly the vital interests of the States. The principal of those obstacles is the confidence and the misperceptions, and by this CSBM constitutes the first stage of cooperation (Downs, Rocke & Siverson, 1985; Van Evera, 1985; Morrow, 1994).

1.4. Formulation of hypothesis

The investigation begins with the formulation of the following hypothesis:

- a) The strategic environment of the Western Mediterranean differs from other in which the CSBM has been applied with success, for example Eastern Europe. Therefore, the conceptions and procedures must also be distinct. To encourage the confidence is a priority, but also it is necessary to promote the social and economic development of the South bank of the Western Mediterranean.
- b) In fact, the situation of instability in North Africa advises to keep the capacities of defence and of crisis management, which at the same time represents an obstacle for encourage the confidence. A true confidence between two banks

cannot be achieved , if CSBM are not accompanied by other directed means to improve the socio-economic situation of the South.

2. Security problems in the Western Mediterranean

Once the temporal space and the methodology of our study have been delimited, the first idea to stress out is that the risks that could emerge in the region are not so of a military nature, as derived from the problems of instability and underdevelopment of the South bank. It explained that the initiatives are fundamentally directed to the cooperation and to improve the confidence: that is to say, “soft security”. On the other side, the “hard security” measures are oriented to the crisis management and intervention capacity, more than to a classical concept of dissuasion. We will follow with a brief analysis of the sources of risk.

2.1 The socio-economic problems of the South bank.

Presently five Mediterranean countries of the European Union add near of the 85% of the total GNP of the region. If we narrow the comparison, the difference results even sharper. According to data of 2000, GNP of France, Spain, and Italy represented the 90% of the Interior Gross Product of the Western Basin (compared with five countries of the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia). In that way, the per capita rent of a Spanish is over three times superior to one from Algeria and almost five times of a Moroccan. In general terms, these countries suffer of irregular economic growth, elevated external debt, commercial deficit, reduced rent per capita, inadequate infrastructures, elevated levels of corruption and scarce exterior investment. Logically all this is a cause of serious social problems. In the great part of these countries exist a high rate of unemployment. And the incapacity of the work market to absorb the growth of the population has caused a great part of the new workers to be integrated in the circles of the informal economy, in the unemployment, or to the emigration. The unemployment affects all the sectors of the society and in a special way the young people, included the graduates, which with frequency are obliged

to be sub employed. Though the rate of growth of the population has diminished in the last years, insures for next decades a wide mass of young people that will face serious problems to obtain a work, and this represents an important social challenge (Devoluy, 1998: 28- 29; Badini, 1995: 104). The high levels of illiteracy, the difficulty to get a stable and well rewarded work (every year over 600.000 persons are incorporated to the limited labour market), the conditions of precarious life, and, in definitive, very few vital expectations, transform the energy of that young people in an important source of frustration. As Bichara Khader affirms (1995a: 51), "*Concerning to Europe, to let that situation thus to 14 kilometres of the Spanish frontier is to be near of the unconsciousness*".

The exit of the country in search of work as alternative to the unemployment was an option more or less viable until not many years. By the end of the eighties the migrant population in Europe was near the 2.150.000 people, approximately one million and a half were residing in France, and over 500.000 in an irregular situation (Khader, 1995b: 141). Since the Schengen Agreement the migrant's flow has been limited, but it continues through the national borders and the illegal immigration. This phenomenon could generate security problems if it became an origin of tensions between North and South societies by spreading out the xenophobia against the immigrants of the Maghreb, and improving the frustration of the societies of Northern Africa.

The abandon of the countryside and the increase of the population in the towns, that has originated the formation of *bidonvilles* and slums of poverty, constitute another factor of instability. The social tension that generates gave place in the eighties and nineties to popular riots (Lacomba, 1996: 64- 69). The food dependence of these countries from foreign countries has as a consequence that the economic crisis have an direct effect on the primary needs of the citizens, because of an important quantity of such products used to be subsidized by the State. At the same time there is the problem of the desertification in some countries that count currently with scarce surfaces to

cultivate in relation with the territory: 1.2 % in Libya, 10 % in Tunisia, 3% in Algeria, 20% in Morocco (Brauch, 1998: 71).

2.2. Political instability

Presently, the countries of the Maghreb have different political systems among them, in which -according to the cases- is permitted a different degree of political participation to the population. But the common note is that none of them can be considered truly democratic. In general terms, the civil society and the concept of citizenship are scarcely developed (Nair, 1995: 121). The political evolution of the Maghreb differs chronologically with the experience of the European countries during the Modern and Contemporary Age. Furthermore, the colonization and the transplant of Western institutions supposed a rupture of the natural process of political development, originating a dissociation between the State and the population that the political evolution, directed by national elites after the independence, has still not achieved to solve. The fight by the liberation consists in a substitution of "foreign" by the national element, but without an actual democratic project. As a result: the excesses of repression, the absence of the democracy, the no legitimacy of the models of proposed State by the nationalist movements, and the erosion of the "limited consensus" of the first years of the independence. As a consequence, according to the cases, the regimes of the Maghreb suffer a latent crisis of legitimacy. Despite of the "symbolic capital" of legitimacy of the State, numerous political and cultural movements -in general of religious inspiration- claim the right to an actual participation in the management of the political life, on certain cases counting with mobilizing capacity between the underprivileged sectors of the society. The lack of liberties and political rights, the precarious of the economic and social situation, and a very extended corruption, situate under question the current model of State, which has defrauded to broad sectors of some of these countries.

Frequently, there is not freedom to defend a distinct posture or counter to the regime's leaders. Some times, the official speech of some of these countries has

registered a rotund failure, enclosing to respective societies in a climate of no recognition of the political rights and of economic underdevelopment. As a result, it has fed the indifference of the population, when not the resistance to accept the situation. Given that not always it has been permitted to this political opposition to manifest legally his contestation -denied from the power- the only possible alternative has frequently been the clandestine protest and the confrontation by violent means (Martin Muñoz & Núñez Villaverde, 1995: 122). In these conditions it does not result easy to identify valid interlocutors, capable of developing a constructive dialogue that serves to the global end of create the political climate of the population, avoiding at the same time the social riots. If the solution to the problems the Maghreb suffers can be found on the interior of these societies, the absence of an enlarged middle class, with a central role in the economic development and in the political reforms, and of some adequate canals of transmission of different existing feelings, adds new difficulties to the task (Núñez Villaverde, 1997: 36- 37). The question is if the political leaders of those countries will decide to travel the road of the democratisation, and if the civil societies will be prepared for the exercise of the democracy. It is evident that it is not going to be an easy process. The serious social and economic problems, and the political difficulties, create doubts on the success of the democratic transition in these countries. The theorist absence and practice of previous full experiences of democratisation in the Arab world obstruct the compared analysis and the possibility of establishing rules over such processes (Cazorla & Montabes, 1994: 244- 245). The brief conclusion of these considerations -very generals- on the reality politics of the Maghreb is that these countries present factors of risk that could arrive to affect the political stability. In appearance, the regimes of the Maghreb are strong, and the proof is the their longevity: the mandates of determined leaders (Hassan II, Bourguiba, Gaddafi, Ben Ali) which are accounted in decades. Nevertheless, the precarious of the civil society and of the political culture, added to the serious economic problems -principally the unemployment-, and the existence of certain radical groups, forms an unstable base that argues against the long term stability of the systems, especially if those regimes

initiate the change and the liberalization. Traditionally the authoritarian systems are particularly vulnerable in the processes of political change.

2.3. The islamism as a risk for the security

Frequently the islamism, also called Islamic fundamentalism, or radical Islam is considerate as one of most important challenges of the Mediterranean security. The limitation of space impedes a broad explanation of the creation, characteristics of this phenomenon in the countries of Northern Africa. Therefore we will simply comment possible risks that could generate islamism in the Western Mediterranean:

The islamism could challenge the stability of the region. The concept of Islamic State, that defends the islamism, obstructs the development of the democracy in some countries where the democracy already results very troublesome. The instability that could create those groups was situated over all at the level of opposition force, in some social and economic circumstances that could arrive to be explosive. In this sense the major risk -but very unlikely- that could generate the islamism would be the outset of riots of serious consequences in some of the countries of the Maghreb. The case of Algeria is in this sense a paradigm. The interruption of the electoral process by the army, that was granting the victory to the Islamic Front of Salvation, created an internal conflict of great violence in the first moments, that has caused thousands of casualties, and that has affected in major or minor measure all States of the region.

Obstruct the dialogue and the cooperation. The islamism has a very negative vision of the Western countries. This perception responds to objective and subjective causes, to reasons more or less justified. The islamism accuses the Western States of having practiced a double policy, supporting to regimes of Arab countries, no democratic, which violate the human rights and limit the civic liberties. In many cases, those "friends" governments of Western Europe or of the United States have exercised a hard repression against the islamist groups, tacitly approved by some Western

countries considering a minor bad and a way of defending a democracy that in reality did not exist. For the islamist, Europe is the responsible of the period of colonial domination that so deeply has marked the collective consciousness of many of those societies. At the same time, episodes as the Gulf War and other military interventions against Iraq, or the interruptions of the peace process in the Middle East, worsen the perception of the West as an enemy of the Muslim world. In addition to these reasons there is a broad burden of historic, cultural and psychological prejudices, that reinforces the negative vision of the Other, and that is combined with a sincere admiration to the scientist and technological development. According to some, ancient Christendom, antagonist by excellence of Half-moon, is now the lay West, full of counter-values, which derides and slights to them who follow the message of the Prophet (Taher, 1994/1995: 161-168). As a consequence, the islamist, in the head of the government or in the political opposition, could obstruct the cooperation between both shores, and specially security matters. On the other side, the islamist movements have mobilizing and pressure capacity, and influence in the society, and could limit the capacity of manoeuvre of the government, accusing the leaders of carrying out a policy for the service of the Western interests.

The action of terrorist islamic groups. The terrorist outrages in France in 1995 and the take down of networks of the Islamic Armed Group in France, Belgium and Spain evidence the reality of this threat. Until the moment it has been a peripheral terrorism. The real objectives are in the countries of the Maghreb. The European countries play an important logistic role for these groups, and terrorist outrages in the territory of the EU could result counterproductive.

2.4. Consequences in security terms

A crisis produced as a consequence of some of the factors of risk analysed would affect on a different manner -but without doubt negatively- the countries of the region. The scenarios could be very varied. An internal crisis with high levels of violence could

generate population's floods of great magnitude, creation of terrorist groups that attack other countries, threatens against the foreign residents and the foreign investments, instability in other countries of the region, or also a regional conflict by the interference of neighbours or the aggressive attitude of the country in crisis. A conflict, internal or interstate, could affect also the maritime traffic in Mediterranean or the energetic supply from the Northern Africa; or could justify an horizontal arms race, that perhaps would include weapons of mass destruction.

The geographical characteristics of the Mediterranean region motivate that the consequences of a crisis affects all the neighbouring countries. Logically, the principals affected from the instability in the South are the people of the Maghreb. But, if the crisis grows up, the interests of the European countries could also be damaged. The risks for the security of the Mediterranean Europe are not direct. There are not military threats –nor in the capacities, nor in the intentions-, but certainly collateral risks, derived of a possible violent crisis in the region or of the progressive deterioration of the socio-economic situation.

2.5. Conclusions over the problems of security and recommendations

Once analysed the principals factors of risk in the Western Mediterranean, we could extract some conclusions that will be useful to establish the principles to build the confidence in the region:

- a) A "threat from the South" do not exist, nor in the intentions, nor in the capabilities. Though in occasions there are suspiciousness and problems of perception between the governments and the societies of both shores, we cannot speak of threaten or aggressive will in the leaders of States of the region. There is not "clash of civilizations", nor faced ideologies; vital contradictory interests do not exist. As a conclusion, we do not discover justified reasons that could originate a warlike conflict in the region initiated by the countries of the

bank South, and many less by States of the Western Europe. The analysis of the Mediterranean relations between two shores reflected mutual need and cooperative will by both parts. The problem could arise, Nevertheless, from the asymmetry of the actors, from the interests and from the perceptions. But, in a first moment, the Western Mediterranean is a scene in which it results most logical the understanding that the conflict. The countries of Northern Africa are facing some internal challenges that can difficultly be resolved on their own; and, by their part, the neighbours of the North are conscious of such problems and of the risks that a critic denouement of the situation could create for their proper interests and security. The question is the way to develop the cooperation between both shores. It is an asymmetrical relation -of superior to inferior-, in which the first offers a help to change determined conditions that the second is not always prepared to admit. In this relation, the European countries are not always in conditions to give such attendance, because this attendance is countered to the proper interests or because it exceeds their own capacity. And, finally, a cooperation in which the Western actors compete between them to obtain a greater influence in the region, and in which the receivers of the South do the same by reasons of self-interest and of competition with the neighbours. It isn't possible, by so, to identify the Western Mediterranean as an area in which faced systems coexist, in which different powers concur and try to preserve a fragile balance of power, or where the actors practice an aggressive and predatory policy against the opposites. Western Mediterranean is not similar to the Europe of blocks of the cold war, or the Europe of the balance of power of the XVIII and XIX centuries, or the Mediterranean of the beginning of Modern Age. It is a very different scene in which the armed conflict does not result profitable or justifiable for none of the actors of the region. It is a frontier between the centre and the periphery, in terms of development, and by this reason it is presented as a complex area, but not as a scene of conflict.

- b) In relation to the capacities, we cannot speak of a "military threat of the South". The comparative boards of armed forces of both banks, especially the terrestrial equipment, does not well reflect the military capacities. The comparison case could be useful at the level North-North and South-South. It is not useful for Libya to have various thousands of tanks -doubtful operative, certainly-, if the country does not count with means of force projection in the opposed bank. Making calculations of simple military capacity, the military threat from the South would be limited to the possibility of penetration of the airplanes in the aerial space of the European countries of the region, and to the possibility of naval and aerial harassment of the maritime traffic. The capacity to project troops to the other shore depended of the control of the sea and of means of projection and, in this sense, the balance inclines clearly on favour of the armed European forces. The weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles improve the capacity of projection, but actually it isn't a concerning threat. Though Libya has a modest arsenal of this type of arms, it is very unlikely that it
- c) could have the intention to employ it, except under a situation of extreme defence. The finality of the precarious program of chemical and ballistic missile seems to respond to a strategy defensive of no conventional dissuasion, and possibly to the procurement of a political instrument of regional leadership. It is a very limited capacity, and the employment against the Western Europe would be surely counterproductive. Nevertheless, we cannot discard completely the possibility of a proliferation of this type because of the reorientation of Tripoli towards a leadership of the Sub-Saharan Africa.
- d) There are factors of risk for the security, as are the analysed phenomena of political and socio-economic instability that could originate serious internal or regional crisis. With the analysis carried out we do not want to offer a dispirited or alarmist panorama. The political social and economic evolution of the

Maghreb in the next years, and also decades, can be positive, negative, or simply sustained, without large alterations. And, in the second case, perhaps the effects wouldn't be catastrophic for the country in question or for the region. It does not exist a science that permits us to know the future. The simple projection of the past over the present, does not illuminate sufficiently the realities which find the other side of the temporal horizon. Nevertheless, it is possible to carry out an exploratory prospective that defines most diverse scenes or less probable from a series of events with base in the present situation (Bas, 1999). A prospective study of the evolution of the Northern Africa -that by the evident complexity exceeded the limits of this investigation-, must include necessarily the factors of signalled risk, specially in relation to the problems of political and socio-economical stability. In consequence, some of the resulting scenarios of that work could be qualified as crisis and conflict scenarios, and surely with a not low probability. In any case, it is evident that the time is not a good healer for the problems of instability -though certainly for the definitive resolution will be necessary decades-, And if the measures initiated for cooperation by the Euromediterranean Process fail, it is probable that the situation would be aggravated. By so, the advances of those countries in the political economic and social realms are going to result crucial for the maintenance of the peace and the security of the region. The islamist phenomenon, that in occasions is signed as one of the principals threatens to the security in the zone, constitutes certainly a factor of risk to the stability, but it must not be understood necessarily as a danger. In our opinion, the European governments must adopt a policy of prudent opening. Though, presently, it does not seem that the islamist are going to get the power in any State of the Maghreb, it is undoubted his consolidation as a political and social force in these countries. In some of them the presence is improving and the islamism has a broad acceptance of the society. It is a political reality, backed socially, and that defends his proper aspirations.

Western Europe, and especially the Mediterranean countries must have a vision of future understanding the islamist phenomenon. Certainly the hard social and economic situation of the Maghreb States facilitates the diffusion of those movements. If the problems of unemployment, illiteracy, misery, and corruption, would be solved, the radical postures would find fewer echoes on the society. Nevertheless, the cause of the islamism is not exclusively the precarious of the socio-economic situation of such countries: it would be an incomplete analysis. The islamism responded to a vision of the reality in which politics and religion are inseparably united. Many of the leaders and members of these groups are graduates and belong to the middle class. They defend a model of society and a political regime which they consider the most adequate for the correct development of their nations. The reality of broad sectors of the population that suffer the effects of the socio-economic situation increase the number of sympathizers. Surely, the underdevelopment constitutes a fertile terrain in which the ideologies which promise radical changes easily win partisans. But with crisis or without it, the islamic fundamentalism responds to the aspirations of many citizens of the Arab world, and for years it will be a phenomenon to bear in mind.

Then, which should be our attitude toward the islamism? We propose the following: Western Europe must learn to coexist with them and they must learn to coexist with us. Some Arab States have permitted the supervised participation of the islamist in their respective political systems. The slow democratisation of those regimes could facilitate the moderation of the entire political spectrum. At the same time, the exercise of the politics will force the islamist representatives to improve in realism and in political experience. On the other side, the society, benefited by the civic dividends that the democracy produces, would demand the respect of such liberties to the islamist leaders. The moderate evolution of the "islamic democracy" of Iran could represent an interesting experience in this sense. Therefore is not a good policy to support authoritarian regimes in their

effort to exclude or to eradicate the islamist. Such strategy reaffirms the most radical sectors of those movements, weakening the moderate. The best solution is to favour the dialogue between the different sides and to promote the opening politics of the system.

In relation with the prejudices which difficult the relations with the islamist, the efforts must be directed to a mutual knowledge of similitude and of differences, and to a respect of them. In that way, all the initiatives that promote the dialogue between cultures and religions could result very interesting from the perspective of the building of confidence. This last aspect, the religious dialogue between the Christianity and the Islam must be especially promoted. There are undeniable differences, but there also exist important common points. In relation to the democracy, that exercise of mutual knowledge could be very useful because the Christian religion has resolved the question of the Church-State separation. A question that in the Middle Age was understood in some similar terms as it is currently done in the islamism. The success of such dialog will not be arrive to similar conclusions, because they are different cultures and diverse visions of the world. The question is to learn the mutual respect.

- e) The solution to the security risks in the Western Mediterranean are in the nature of these problems, that is to say, in the economic, political, social and cultural development. Therefore, the measures to apply must be focused basically upon those aspects, as is the case of the baskets of cooperation of the Euromediterranean Conferences. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to take in consideration the military security aspects at the global security conception of the region. In one hand, it is necessary to have military capacities that permit to act in situations of crisis, motivated by the analysed risks and that might require the European participation to defend the legitimate interests. As a consequence, the powerful mechanisms of classic defence are not necessary (oriented to prevent an invasion of the national territory), but it is convenient to develop the capacities of force projection and of rapid reaction, with the objective of

accomplishing –if it would be the case- tasks of preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building, or humanitarian relief operations. It does not seem justified or prudent to disregard completely the military capacities, as some authors postulate (Carabaza & De Santos, 1997, Fisas, 1993), because the reality of risk factors could make necessary the employment of these means.

At the same time, it is convenient to develop the CSBM that solve the problems of perception between the two banks, and which contribute also to create an environment of confidence and of pacific resolution of controversies in the South-South relations. A second positive consequence of these measures would be the contribution to the democratisation of the armed forces of the Maghreb. It would derive from the relation of the North African military elites with officials of countries where exist a correct military subordination to the civil power. Finally these CSBM could constitute a previous stadium of arms control and no proliferation in the South region.

3. Security initiatives in the Western Mediterranean

The solution to the security problems have been oriented to the improvement of the social and economic development, the stability and the confidence. Also in the purely military realm the protagonists have been the cooperation aspects, and at the same time, mechanisms for crisis management which could surge in the zone have been developed. In the following epigraphs we will analyse briefly how organizations and countries of the region have designed and implemented policies for cooperation and building of confidence.

3.1. The Euromediterranean Process

The attention that the European Union has paid progressively to the Mediterranean responded especially to the preoccupation of France's, Spain's and Italy's governments by the situation in the South region. Before the beginning of the Euromediterranean Conferences, these three countries started various initiatives of

cooperation, as Group 5+5 and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Mediterranean (CSCM) that did not become consolidated.

The first Euromediterranean Conference was celebrated in Barcelona in November 1995; 27 countries from the European Union and the Mediterranean basin participated. The security was in the spirit of this initiative, therefore the objective was to achieve the stability in the region, to promote the economic development and the democratisation, and, as a consequence, the security. For this, the Conference established three baskets of cooperation: Political and security; Economic and financial; and social, cultural and human cooperation. The strictly military questions hardly were presented in the final text of the Declaration, except in those regarding the proliferation of weapons mass destruction.

According to the final Declaration (1995), the tenets in the cooperation on political and security aspects were: The development of the democracy, the respect of the human rights, of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the right to the self-determination and the plurality of the societies, the no interference in the internal issues, the pacific resolution of differences, the cooperation to combat and to prevent the terrorism and the organized crime, and, finally, the no proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The second Euromediterranean Conference was held in Malt, between the 15 and April 16, 1997. In a principle the Conference was going to be celebrated in Tunisia, but the dissents between Syrian and Israeli obligated that the encounter had place in a no Arab country. A positive fact was that all the member States that participated in the first Conference assisted. A negative one, the no adoption of tangible measures, except in those regarding the economical and financial Association. The advances in security questions were scarce. In the intermediate time between both Conferences periodic meetings of high officials were held directed to create progressively a space of peace, stability and security. In the third meeting of officials (23-24 July, 1996), the dialogue was blocked by the aggravating situation in the occupied territories and the deterioration of the process of peace in the Middle East, after the victory of the Likud

in the elections of May on that year. Six months later, on the sixth meeting, January 28th, 1997, the delegations examined the project of Euromediterranean Chart, proposed by the European Union. In the Chart was included the respect of the international and universal commitments, and the prohibition of possession of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean. The Arab countries did consider premature the establishment of obligatory instruments and presented an alternative draft of the Euromediterranean Chart, suggesting a direct connection between the creation of a zone of peace and stability in Mediterranean and the process of peace in the Middle East. In the high officials meeting, celebrated in march 1997, a list of measures destined to favour the dialogue and the interchange of information on security questions was approved. In this sense it is relevant the creation of the network of institutes of foreign policy, EuroMeSco (Fernández, 1997: 177). The instruments to encourage the confidence were limited to the political dialogue and interchanges of scarce compromising information. The Arab countries, in special Lebanon and Syria, opposed the participation in contacts and military activities where also participated Israel (Menéndez del Valle, 1997: 38-41). As a consequence, in Malt a list of confidence measures that had been elaborated by the high officials during the previous months, was not approved. The project of the creation of a centre for conflicts prevention in the Mediterranean region and a project for the establishment of a network of defence institutes were frozen. The French-Malt proposal of a Stability Pact in the Mediterranean, designed to implement the principles and objectives of the Barcelona Declaration was not approved. The Middle East conflict created serious difficulties in the work of the Conference, which in fact, finished without Conclusions. The Conclusions were finished some weeks later in Brussels on May 6th (López Aguirrebengoa, 1997: 46-47).

The Stuttgart Euromediterranean Conference, in April 1999, and the Marseille Euromediterranean Conference, in November 2000, have not achieved any advances in matters of political and security cooperation. The approval of the Euromediterranean Chart has not been achieved. The stalemate and deterioration of the Middle East peace

process has obstructed the dialogue on these questions. The economical and financial cooperation -vital for the development of the South- has achieved major attention by the Arab countries, but all the effective consequences have not been achieved due to other reasons, by the reorientation of the economic help of the non-European Mediterranean countries to favour the development in Balkans and East Europe. The general balance is that there are good news in the elapsed years since the Barcelona Conference, but the achievements have varied according to the baskets of cooperation. Concretely, in the political and security chapter the successes have been minimum, because of the existing distrust and misperceptions between the participants, and because of the continuous difficulties derived from the Middle East problem. Generally, the Arab countries behold with mistrust the European interest to include security questions in the Euromediterranean agenda, when there exist other issues -for example, the negotiation of the external debt or the free circulation of people between the countries of the region- that they consider most important and in which the European partners are evasive. In any case, the hope is maintained that the continuity of the process, the slower and deeper mutual knowledge, the increment of the global cooperation, the consequent creation of confidence, and the development of a base of common and permanent interests, will contribute to achieve the security objective of the Euromediterranean Dialogue. It is a long term initiative, and therefore it can suffer interruptions and delays. It is important to achieve and to keep an equalized advance between diverse components, that is the result of the interactivity (López Aguirrebengoa, 1997: 46-47). On the other hand, though Euromediterranean Partnership has shown little interest on integrating or being coordinated with the initiatives of cooperation and dialogue of NATO and WEU, the development of a solid politics of security and European defence, and the convergence between EU and WEU, could contribute to the European Union might acquire proper voice in the realm of security inside the Partnership and to continue activities carried out by WEU Mediterranean Group. This situation, that in any case will not be achieved in a few

years, could contribute effectively to the cooperation in defence issues in the Euromediterranean Process.

3.2. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue

In the institutional level, Spain and Italy have been the principal promoters of the Allied attention to the problems of the Mediterranean. France does not behold with good eyes the action of NATO in the region, due to the traditional rivalry with United States concerning the European matters. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was initiated on February 8th, 1995 and was directed on a first moment to Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. After, Jordan (on November 1995) and Algeria (on the first half of 2000) were added to the initiative. In words of Giovanni Jannuzi, in that time the Foreign Affairs Italian Minister, the finality was not to impose the cooperation or a new alliance, but to make clear that NATO is a defensive organization, and to determine if NATO could respond to the preoccupations of security without meaning that is the platform for a new alliance (De Rato, 1995: 12). The initiative differs of other activities of NATO, as are Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) or the Partnership for Peace (PfP). These two organisms are oriented towards the East European countries, and other important differences exist, no one of the MD participants is considered by the Alliance as a potential member, and the financing and the help to the development to satisfy the main need of the Mediterranean countries and to resolve the roots of the problem, comes from the European Union (Euromediterranean Process) and from the other international financial institutions (De Rato, 1996: 2). On November 1995, the North Atlantic Council started the second phase of the Dialogue. A few months later, three countries of the Dialogue members (Egypt, Jordanian and Morocco) participated in the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), and later on in the Stabilization Force (SFOR), deployed in Bosnia (Echevarría Jesús, 1999: 32-33). In the Madrid Summit on July 1997 the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MGC) was created, responsible since then of the good development of the MD. On the other hand, the Madrid Declaration on Euro Atlantic Security and

Cooperation (1997) dedicated the 13th epigraph to this question. GCM is composed by political advisors of the national delegations of NATO, and acted under the authority of the North Atlantic Council. It has permitted that MD passes from the administrative level to the political level, which supposes an advance, because the interlocutors are not only NATO officials, with a limited margin of manoeuvre, but representatives of the countries members. The objective consist in explaining to the partners of the South the pacific nature of Alliance and the defensive character of the military activities. The first political dialogue between allies and partners Mediterranean was at the end of 1997, and it has been repeated in the following years (Bin, 1998: 26). Other ancient spotlights was the decision adopted in May by the Foreign Ministers of the Alliance to establish "NATO Contact Embassies" in these countries. With this system -similar to the one functioning with success from 1992 in Central and Eastern Europe- the embassy of a country member of the Alliance represents NATO in each one of those seven States. The Alliance has elaborated a concept of military cooperation, designed for the integral countries of the MD, which includes four fundamental components: Activities of the International Staff (IS), courses in the NATO School in Oberammergau, courses and other academic activities in the NATO Defence College in Rome (NADEFCOL), and specific activities to carry out under the responsibility of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) and the Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). The elaboration of the working programme, that includes an annex in the working programme of the GCM (Mediterranean Dialogue Working Programme), is a responsibility of the Military Committee Working Group (cooperation) (MCWG (coop)), which deals with the issue since the end of 1998, with other questions as the cooperation with Russia, Ucraina and the Pfp countries. This Working Group has a representative of the Military Staff, two from both Strategic Commands and a representative of every country. They get together in distinct manners: 19 + 1, 19 + 44... As one can suppose, not all the activities organized by the Alliance have been welcome with the same interest by the countries of the South bank, because they are conscious that NATO doesn't represent a solution to their particular security problems.

And on its own, NATO has started since 2000 to consult partners in the elaboration of the military program, with the purpose to adequate it to their preferences and interests. On the other hand, the financial problems also have motivated the abortion of some foreseen activities. NATO doesn't covers the expenses of the students in NATO School -though some of the courses in NADEFCOL were financed- or the transport or the diets of the visits to installations or of manoeuvres observation. To resolve this contingency, some countries members of the Alliance are financing unofficially the expenses of the partners States. In the 50th Anniversary Summit, the Alliance gave another impulse to the initiative, approving a document of the MCG that was impelled by Spain and by other Mediterranean members, and in which numerous proposals were gathered to reinforce the MD, inspired in the Valence Seminar of the same year. In the political level a major frequency of periodic bilateral meetings was proposed, the celebration of multilateral character meetings, also at the ambassadors level, and the participation of the DM countries in the elaboration of the programme of annual work. In the practical terrain it was suggested to enlarge the type of activities with these countries, especially in those areas in which the Alliance can give an added value with respect to other similar initiatives. For example: Search and rescue operations, maritime security, medical evacuation, and in formation activities for the military officials of the Mediterranean countries in the realms of security and defence, including the related questions with the operations of peacekeeping. Likewise, the report of the MCG proposed the study of new forms of financing with the purpose of avoiding the economic difficulties to hinder the participation of these countries in these programmes of cooperation. In this sense, the problem was found in the different interests which the Mediterranean Dialogue awakes in the allies, that is depending on the geographic area. It is logical that some of them, alien to the problems of security in the zone, might prefer to dedicate the Alliance's funds to other activities more related to their interests. At the same time, the peculiar relations between some of the participants in Dialogue also limit the possible reach of the initiative. Since their independence, there have been difficult relations among the countries of North Africa and this has motivated a high

degree of mutual distrust. The suspicions are constant in the perceptions of the countries of the region. Due to this reason, the acceptance of some CSBM by these States, as for example the interchange of information of military character in a supranational frame, seems very difficult nowadays. It will be necessary to expect an amelioration of the old disputes existing between them so that this type of CSBM could be applied. To this difficulty we must add, the Israeli presence in the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. It is evident that the Arab countries will not interchange information over sensitive questions of the national security until the enmity with Israel would disappear.

3.3. Other initiatives of cooperation: WEU and OSCE

The Euromediterranean Process and the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue are in our opinion the two principal security initiatives in the region. This is a consequence of the entity of the institutions (European Union and the Atlantic Alliance) and of the actual results that, though limited, are tangible and favouring the cooperation between the two banks in the security realm. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to pay attention to the paper played by the WEU (before the transfer of functions to UE on November 2000) and by the OSCE. This is a proof of the interest of South European countries in involving all the security organizations in the Mediterranean cooperation. The Western European Union initiated in 1992 a Mediterranean Dialogue in which initially Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia participated, and afterwards Egypt in 1994 and Jordan in 1998. The objective of the initiative consists in the interchange of opinions on the security and the defence in the region, and in proportioning information to Mediterranean partners on the advances in the institutional development of the WEU. Since the beginning there have been two multilateral meetings every year with the ambassadors of the South bank countries. The meetings have been at diplomat level, with personal of the embassies of these countries in Belgium or in neighbouring countries (France or Germany). This reduced the effectiveness of the initiative, because the scope of the activity was limited. In addition to the multilateral meetings with the

Group, the ambassadors of these countries assist on bilateral meetings with WEU of approximately annual character. Other activities to improve confidence and dialogue were visits of representatives of the Mediterranean partners to the WEU's Satellites Centre, in December 1997, and to the Military Staff and to the Planning Cell in WEU Headquarters in April 1998. Likewise, WEU has offered explanatory briefings to the representatives of Mediterranean partners with occasion of the celebration of the annual exercises CRISSEX. And WEU has recommended to EUROFOR and to EUROMARFOR the organization of cooperation activities to improve the transparency with these countries. For the functioning of the Group other initiatives of WEU related with Mediterranean were initiated. The Parliamentary Assembly has paid attention in his work and reports on the Mediterranean basin. And the WEU Institute for Security Studies has dedicated some of the activities to study the problems of the region, counting with the collaboration of other European institutes and with the participation of academic personalities from North Africa. The work of WEU in the Mediterranean cooperation has been meaningful, but has had a limited reach by the insufficient transcendence of the Dialogue in the riparian countries. On the other hand, the scarce relevance and credibility of the Organization as a pillar of the European security has also diminished the interest of Mediterranean partners for the initiative.

The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had since the beginning a weak Mediterranean dimension. The end of the cold war and the interest of the Mediterranean members States permitted that the recently baptized OSCE approved in the Summit of Budapest, of December 1994, the beginning of the Dialogue with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia. These countries were conceded the observer status. The Summit of Budapest established also a Group of Informal Contact of Expert, in the permanent Council of OSCE. The initiative, resulted as a consequence of the pressures of Spain, France and Italy. On the other side, the presidency in exercise of OSCE maintains high level consults with these countries, and some times it invites the representatives of those States to the meetings

of the Superior Council in which the agenda includes questions related with Mediterranean, and also to the meetings of the Forum for Cooperation in Security and to the Permanent Council sessions dedicated to similar matters. All this has had as a finality to apply the conception of the security and the mechanisms to encourage the confidence, that contributed to diminish the tensions East-West, to a context North-South, localized in the Mediterranean region. Certainly, the European experience can result interesting for the security problems management in the zone, but has also demonstrated that the model CSCE is not one hundred per cent applicable to the Mediterranean (Spencer, 1997 :30- 31). Therefore, it is not expected a major commitment of OSCE to the matters of the Mare Nostrum and, especially, a possible admittance of the South bank countries in this Organization, which has already with 55 States. In anyway, the OSCE Mediterranean Dialogue can be an useful instrument for the knowledge and the mutual understanding between the two shores. Finally an important role of OSCE is not expected in a hypothetic crisis management in the Western Mediterranean, because of the peripheral character of the region for OSCE, and -fundamentally- because of the coercive deficit that suffers this organization. OSCE is actually a diplomatic forum of Pan European Dialogue, more than an effectual instrument for crisis management

3.4. Bilateral Measures

The military cooperation of the riparian countries of Western Mediterranean constitutes is also another important factor for the military confidence in the region. We are not going to make a detailed study of such cooperation in this epigraph. We will refer only to those aspects of the military cooperation which play a relevant role to encourage the confidence.

The narrow military links of France, Italy and Spain with their neighbours of the South bank began since the beginning of the independence and since the creation of the national armed forces of the former colonized. In different measure the European countries of the region, and especially France, have contributed to improve the armies

of the Maghreb and to the formation of the military personal. Logically, the level of cooperation in every case depends of the historic linkage, of the coincidence of interests and of the potential of the country in question. By these motives, and also by the linguistics relationship, France is the first in the volume of activities of cooperation and in the amount of commercial transactions of military material to the Maghreb. This constitutes a positive factor for the mutual knowledge. It is very high the number of Moroccan officials, Tunisian, Algerian and Mauritanian that have studied in the academies or the high formation centres of the Hexagon. On the other hand, Paris has military personal destined in these countries that carry out task of formation and training. And the combined exercises between the French armed forces and North African armed forces are also frequent.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to mention that the situation of these links depends in great measure of how it is developed in other realms the relations between France and each one of those nations. The process to build the confidence do not consist simply in interchanging information. The nature must be global, without being limited in exclusive to the military questions. Thus occurred in the case of France with the former colonies. The military relations between Paris and Alger have been marked by the mode in which this Arab country acceded to the independence: a bloody war which finished with the negotiated exit of France, the expropriation of the lands of the colons, the nationalizations of French enterprises, and the Algerian approximation to the Warsaw Pact. These events slowed the beginning of the cooperation in military matters until the eighties. A decade later the explosion of violence in Algeria has supposed a new obstacle for the normality of the relations. The relations with Morocco are more stable. Though also there were some highs and downs in the course of these years, the reality is that the major part of the Moroccan officials have been trained by French teachers in the academies of the kingdom or in the French formation centres. There are also important links between France and Tunisia and, especially, until 1999, between France and Mauritania due to the scarce of trained military officials in this country. It has conceded a major relevance to the role of the French instructors

The measures to improve the confidence applied by Italy in the Western Mediterranean are focus also on the military formation of personal from the North African countries and in the sale of equipment to their armies. Though they are not comparable to the relations which France or Spain maintain with these nations, Italy has the advantage of a no colonial past in these countries – with the exception of Libya- and with these States interest's in diversifying the sources of military personal formation and of armament purchase. In that way, the military cooperation is not perceived as a possible issue of neo-colonialism in a sensitive realm as it is the national defence, such as it could occur in the case of the relations with the former metropolis.

In the Spanish case, the military links are especially intense with Morocco. Spain has destined teachers in the naval academy and in the school of Military Staff of the neighbour country and are numerous Moroccan officials that have followed courses in Spanish military centres. Every year there are naval, aerial and amphibious manoeuvres, with the participation of forces from the two countries. And in the context of the Friendship and Cooperation Treatise, signed by both nations, numerous activities are carried out and they contribute to the improvement of confidence: since annual meetings between members of respective Military Staff, until the organization of summer camps for the child of officials from the respective aerial forces. All these measures contribute to the existence of an understanding between the armies of the two countries. The relations between Morocco and Spain in the Defence realm enjoy currently of good health. It is important to stress out that the former events related with the retreat of Spain from the Sahara and the repeated Moroccan claims against the Spanish territories in North Africa caused deep suspicious between the armed forces of both countries, particularly in Spain

On the other hand, Spain maintain military relations with Tunisia and Mauritania, which consist fundamentally in formation activities to the military personal of the armed forces from the two countries. The cooperation in this realm is developed in the context of the signed Agreements by Spain with Tunisia and Mauritania in the military and defence fields respectively. Until the moment Spain have conceded almost

a hundred of military scholarships to Tunisian personal for the realization of courses in Spain. Also it is important to stress out the visits of military and civilians personalities to institutions of teaching, as it can be the Spanish CESEDEN and the equivalent Tunisian, and to the Defence Ministries. There are also visits of Spanish ships in Tunisian ports; the interchange of observers during manoeuvres; and the visits of small units from both armies. Regarding to military exercises, the Spanish Air Force trains periodically with the Tunisian in *Hannibal Extues* manoeuvres.

The lines of cooperation between Spain and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania consist exclusively in the formation of Mauritanian military personal in Spanish centres, These activities are founded by the Spanish Teaching General Direction. There were also visits of military from one and other country to the respective Schools of Military Staff and Academies. It exists, moreover, a Technical Agreement in the field of hospitable attendance, and every year 20 people can receive medical specialized attendance in the military hospital *Gómez Ulla* of Madrid and in the military hospital of Canary Islands. Generally, the number of people attended is superior to the number accorded. The military Spanish-Mauritanian relations are excellent, because a colonial past do not to exist, nor contentious territorial which impinges negatively in the mutual perception.

3.5. The cooperation and the military capacities for crisis management in Mediterranean

The development of military instruments to prevent the effects of a crisis in the region is other dimension of European countries initiatives. These measures have been in general bad interpreted in the South bank, being considered as forces preparation for the intrusion in their internal matters. Idea that, for some, has been confirmed by the new doctrine on the armed interventions, present in NATO Strategic Concept of 1999, and the allied action in Kosovo in the same year. By this reason, the Alliance, WEU, and the bilateral contacts, have tried to dissipate the fears and to do possible that the acquisition of these capacities does not impede to encourage the confidence in the

region. The multinational forces of crisis management which have caused a especial misunderstanding in the South have been the integrated by four European countries of the zone: EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.

4. Confidence Measures

4.1. General considerations on CSBM

According to a document elaborated by United Nations (1993: 39-40): The measures to encourage the confidence and the military security try to regulate the military activity of States in order to impede the employment of the armed force in international conflicts, and in order to proportionate a basis for the amelioration of the relations between States. These measures achieve the objective by the creation of barriers against the use of the force and by actions of the States which could demonstrate the pacific intentions. In a broad sense they could be defined as unilateral or multilateral acts, which are the result of a clear and specific decision that has as finality to modify and to reform the hostile perceptions, of those who make the decisions on the potential, the intentions and the current capacities of the adversary. They can be of military, political, economic or socio-cultural nature, and they are susceptible of varying according to the situations.

The concept of CSBM was born in the context of NATO, in the final sixties, during the interchanges of points of view between the members in order to achieve a reduction of conventional forces in Europe. United States and URRS had adopted previously some measures of this kind in a bilateral basis, as the establishment of a hot line between Washington and Moscow after the Cuba missiles crisis, or as the Sea Incidents Agreement. But it was with occasion of the MBFR negotiations (initiated in Comes in 1973), when allies elaborated a first basket of measures to encourage the confidence, which in that moment received the name of Associated Measures. The concept of Confidence Building Measures (CBM), the “S” added of “Security” belongs to the end of cold war), was formally proposed in 1973, with occasion of preparatory

consult of Dipoli (Helsinki) for the elaboration of the order of the day of an eventual CSCE (Gheballi, 1994: 275-308).

The reasons which facilitated that allies continued with this concept are varied: Firstly, to facilitate to the Warsaw Pact countries the reduction of the exaggerated secret of their military activities, and as a consequence to carry out a policy of transparency comparable to the NATO members. Extreme informative impenetrability which was surrounding the military activities of the communist block was originating an uncertainty and insecurity which in a crisis situation could cause a conflict by errors of calculation. It was necessary to establish measures which diminished the capacity of surprise attack by one and other adversaries. Secondly, CSBM were oriented to diminish the pressure and the intimidating policy of URRS against the other Warsaw Pact members. The transparency should obstruct an armed intervention from Soviet Union in East Europe, similar to the actions produced in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Finally, it was necessary to give to the nascent CSCE a function -at less symbolic- in the military security field. In that way, CBMS should proportionate to CSCE some credibility as a security forum. All these factors caused the elaboration of which have been called the three generations of Confidence Measures in the context of Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe: Helsinki Final Act; Stockholm Document; and two Vienna Documents (Brauch, 1994: 190-195). The negotiations which permit to achieve these accords were very complicated. Building confidence does not depends only in the adoption of mechanism. It requires an evolution in the perceptions of the actors, and it is the inherent difficulty by this reason. The confidence is not achieved by the simple interchange of information in which are based many of these measures. This idea responded to the rational actor model which suffers numerous limitations. The procedure to improve confidence must consider the political, military, socio-cultural and economic circumstances of States, and it must apply those process to all the fields, attending also to the specify relations between the different actors

The contacts must not be limited to information's exchange, but it must permit the dialogue and the reciprocity between different points of sight. Generally the actors opine according to some established principles (map of knowledge), which is difficult to modify. Therefore the simple notification is not sufficient, because it would be interpreted from the perspective of those points of view. Building of confidence must achieve to change these systems of perception. By this, it is necessary multidimensional focus, the experience, and the open dialogue which permits to contrast diverse opinions, and to discuss frankly the problems and the solutions (Grin, 1994: 152-253).

4.2. Characteristics of confidence building in the Western Mediterranean and recommendations

CSBM put in practice between the countries of the North and South shores of the Western Mediterranean differ in the nature of those applied in the sinus of CSCE at the end of his eighties and the beginning of his nineties by the European States, which establish different procedures to encourage the confidence between two areas that have been adversaries during decades. The misperception was broadly justified at the moment in which the adopted measures in Helsinki, Stocholm and Vienna, were implemented, since on both sides of the Iron Curtain were a great number of forces which year after year trained to fight against the other. This is not the situation of the Mediterranean, and therefore the measures that encourage confidence must receive a different orientation.

The countries of the South bank have been, until the middle of the Twentieth Century, colonies or protectorates salesmen of States from the opposite bank. Despite of the elapsed time from the independence, groups of opinion exist in these countries which manifest with great force against what they understand as neo-colonialism: linguistics and economic dependence, influence of the customs of ancient metropolis, great influence of the educated establishments and with interests in ancient colonial power, and so forth. In this context, the exchange of information related with the defence of their country (defence budget, military policy, unit's deployment...) is

considered by these sectors as a continuation of the colonization and a interference in the internal issues of the country.

In the other side, the Eastern European States have formed part, during almost fifty years, of a same military block (the Warsaw Pact) in which was excluded any type of showdown between its members, and in which the political system was similar in all of them. This is not the case of the Maghreb. Ever since it gained independence, the clashes between them have been frequent, and this has motivated a high degree of distrust between them. Though in the last years there has been an improvement in the inter-Maghreb relations, the suspicion is a constant in the mutual perceptions of the countries of the region. By this reason, to pretend that these States interchange information of military character, in a supranational frame, seems nowadays very distant. It will be necessary to wait for the old enmity existing between them dilutes some more before this type of measures of confidence can be applied. Furthermore, the presence of Israel in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and in the Euromediterranean Summits adds another difficulty: Evidently, the Arab countries will not interchange information over sensitive questions of the national security until the enmity with Israel disappears.

In addition, to encourage the North-South confidence, it has not sense the prior announce of manoeuvres or to limit the contingent taking part in them. None of the countries of the region considers the possibility of a massive attack by other from the opposed bank, such and as during years feared NATO from the Warsaw Pact. The existing distrust in the Maghreb refers, to a possible western intervention in the zone of a regional crisis that affects the Western European or USA interests; perhaps this is the most founded fear. Other sources of misperceptions are the prejudices that suffers the Atlantic Alliance by his markedly military character and the self feeling of these countries being identified as adversaries of the West in an hypothetical scene of a “Clash of Civilizations”.

In the contemporary epoch and after the processes of colonization and the liberation wars, the Muslim perception on the West has been negatively affected by the

feeling of frustration which produced the Arab disaster in the Six Days War. This event marked also the decadence of the Arab nationalism, leathered by Nasser. In that way, some international events of the last years have contributed to form in the collective consciousness of the societies of the South shore an stereotyped image of the Western world, of Europe and- especially- of United States. Between those recent events they are very important the still unsolved problem of the Middle East, and the war -and military interventions- against Iraq.

The Gulf War has influenced very negatively in the Arab perception of the West. Until that moment, the principal regional threat of the strategic Arab conception was situated in the State of Israel; the danger, or the threat, from the North hardly was considered (Saaf, 1994). The Western intervention against Iraq supposed an important change in this sense. Fatima Mernissi (1992: 14) describes it in this manner: In the agitation by the disappearance of the *hiyab* [wall] of Berlin, the European societies appeared before the Arab masses, just before the bombardment of Baghdad, as the defenders of the democratic creed which was proposing the resolution of the violence problem and reduction of the violence's use. A powerful surge of universal hope lifted by the song of liberty of European and by the promise of condemning the violence. But it was sharply, brutally outwitted by the war. A war in which the disconcerted Arab masses assisted to the disappearance of the humanist European youth people which was singing the non-violence and the apparition in the televisions of other race which it had been forgotten: the old generals with medals, identical to the colonial army, which counted proudly the tons of bombs which were being dropped over Baghdad. Despite of the ambiguous attitude of numerous Arab government, and also of the military support which some Muslim countries give to the international coalition, the societies of the Maghreb decanted in majority by the Iraq side. To the eyes of the Arab society, the war to liberate Kuwait acquired the character of a conflict between West and Islam; as affirmed King Hussein of Jordan :This is not a war against Iraq, it is a war against all the Arab. Saddam Hussein was presented himself before the world as the new Saladino,

comparison which in West resulted ridiculous, but one which for a Muslim spectator identified the Iraq dictator with the medieval prince who defeat to the Crossed.

According to Saaf, the Arab world has the perception of being permanently threatened, and the experience of the Gulf War has fed and justified subjectively such fears: Actually the strategic Arab authors coincide in their analysis on the situation afterwards the defeat of Iraq as the major incapacity of the Arab States. The feeling of a great insecurity predominates (Saaf, 1994: 20). The North American bombardments against the installations of storage and fabrication of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in December 1998, and the frequent struggles between the forces of both countries kept in mind the perception of a West Oppressor, which applied a double rod of measuring in function of his interests, especially when no such actions are accompanied of measures against the Israel State by the non-compliance and violation of the resolutions of UN, and of the Peace Agreement of Middle East. Some Arab governments of the Gulf region have not endorsed the North American actions against Iraq in the last years to the war because of the public disagreement that were provoking such interventions (Khalilzad & Lesser, 1998). On the other hand, the difficulties which the Middle East Peace Process suffered after the electoral victory of Benjamin Netanyahu, and which presently have created a low intensity war in the region, have worsened the image of the West, and it constitute a negative factor in the perception of the South bank, included the Maghreb.

The insistence of the Western governments in speaking on the security questions in the context of the relations with the countries of the South shore, and the sporadic and alarmists declarations on the "threat from the South" contribute also to improve the insecurity perception of the Arab countries, which consider themselves identified as possible enemies, and, by so, possible object of a military intervention. In addition, these declarations are skilfully utilized by some islamist leaders or by other anti-Western intellectual in order to criticise the European or North American attitude. All these events encourages the distrust in the Maghreb societies -and in the societies of other Muslim countries- which put in question the relations of the political leaders with

the European governments, in an especial sense in all referring to the military security cooperation (Maalmi, 1996).

Other Arab authors consider dangerous the Western insistence to implant the European political democracy in the Arab countries. According to the opinion of some Arab intellectuals, the participation of the citizens in the political system and in the national "prosperity" must be done without other pressure which the derived from the affected populations, in harmony with the cultural identity. This is the essence of the democracy. An intrusive European policy have a reek of "civilizing mission" whose wounds have not finished of scare in the region. Those political pressures worse the perception of a dominant Europe (Alaoui, 1992: 113). The declarations of some political Western leaders conditioning the cooperation with those governments which not respect the democracy and the human rights awake the fear of a new cultural imperialism and of intrusion in the internal issues (Chourou, 1998). This vision of the West is also shared and denounced by the political-religious groups.

The solution of the misperception must be found in the mutual knowledge and in the joint work. Firstly, proportioning abundant information over the structure and purposes of the European security, in order to dissipate the unfounded fears over a possible neo-colonialist or aggressive attitude by the Western Europe, and specially, by the Mediterranean Europe. On the other side, those facts which justify the theory of the Clash of Civilizations or the idea that have these countries of being perceived by Europe as a threat must be avoided.

By joint work we refer to incorporate the Maghreb States in the task of collective security and crisis management in the Mediterranean. Though the doctrinal differences and the operative limitations of the Maghreb armed forces can represent an obstacle, the truth is that the participation of these countries in exercises and peace operations would contribute to improve an open and cooperative mentality in their political and military elites. In this sense, must be avoided that the Arab countries consider as aggressive interference any "out of area" operation or the concept, increasingly accepted, of humanitarian interference. On the other hand, and though it is

not really an CSBM, the joint actions in the fight against illegal immigration, drugs or armaments traffic which employ military means could contribute also in the future to a best knowledge and to the procedural development of “joint work”.

A second positive consequence of these measures would be the contribution to the democratisation of the armed forces of the Maghreb. It would derive from the relation of the North African military elites with officials of countries where exist a correct military subordination to the civil power.

In this sense, it must be avoided that the Arab countries consider as aggressive interference any “out of area” operation or the concept, increasingly accepted, of humanitarian interference. On the other hand, and though it is not really an CSBM, the joint actions in the fight against illegal immigration, drugs or armaments traffic which employ military means could contribute also in the future to a best knowledge and to the procedural development of “joint work”.

The application of CSBM must not be initiated to a same level. In a display of opening and confidence toward his suspicious neighbours, the European countries would have to initiate the process of facilitating information and to permit their associates of the South bank the access to all data which do not put in danger their own security.

A second idea on CSBM in the Western Mediterranean is that to be effective they would have to go accompanied with a more enlarged process of confidence which pay attention to the social and cultural aspects. The frontiers that separate the two banks of the Mediterranean are not only geographic or political, but cultural and historic. Certainly it has existed periods of pacific live, but it is undeniable that during centuries, Mediterranean has been a scene of numerous clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations. In addition, during the half of the XIX and XX centuries all the countries of the Maghreb suffer the colonial experience. It results then inevitable that the collective memory of the peoples from one and another bank of the Mediterranean be marked negatively by that legacy (Aguirre, 1997). Roberto Aliboni, Professor of the Affari Internazionali Institute, summarizes in this manner the importance which have

the cultural and historic factors in the relations in the region: Mediterranean is not a natural destined centre to engender solidarity, it is a frontier which separate two worlds which, cultural, economic and politically, are very far one from the other as the Jewish, Christian and Islamic worlds are: the development and the underdevelopment, democracy and authoritative. It not signified that the cooperation and the security are excluded. The security and the cooperation are possible, but are not inevitable (Menéndez del Valle, 1995: 41). Something similar Mohamed Arkoun affirms, though with most pessimists words: With the current form of thinking, the ideological confrontations, the actual fears or imaginary, and the fed ignorance, is unreal to think in a political, economic, and less cultural and historic structure, of the Mediterranean space (Chourou, 1998: 293). On the other hand, to the cultural fracture it is added the socio-economic cleavage, whose consequence practice are the migrant flows, in the last years by illegal means. In that way, the perception is shaped also from the North-South perspective. The economic development and the welfare state of the European societies represent a claim for broad sectors of the populations of the countries of the Maghreb. The parabolic antennas of individuals and of the “cafetines” in the South bank transmit diversity of images -in great part idealized- of the welfare society from the other side of the Mediterranean, which contrast with the reality of the Maghreb. This phenomenon, added to the testimonies -critical and favourable- of the immigrants which live in the other bank, generates a contradictory feeling of admiration and frustration regarding to the Western world. On the other hand, the restrictions imposed by the Schengen Agreement for the entrance in the European space are perceived as a humiliation and an egotistical measure. The severity in the concession of visas causes anti-European feelings in broad sectors of the societies of the Maghreb (Yata, 1998). As Abdelwahab Biad affirms (1996: 41), the cooperation between both shores has become an imperative in order to avoid the vision of the Mediterranean as a new frontline of the imaginary conflict between the North and the South. In this sense, the baskets of cooperation in the civil, social and cultural field of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership plays a complementary role to the CSBM applied by NATO, WEU or the European

countries of the region. "Cultural CSBM" can play a very important role in the general building confidence process, because they are directed to eliminate prejudices and susceptibilities in other important issues. The cooperation in the cultural realm results particularly necessary for the progress of the Mediterranean initiatives. The actors of cultural CSBM are not only States, but also the cultural, educational, scientific and religious institutions, groups and associations, and the whole civil society. In our opinion two action lines have an especial importance, and it is important to insist specially in two of them in order to achieve major advances. They are the following :

A) To favour the knowledge of the "Other" reality especially by the action of the mass media. The information professionals play a determinant role to build cultural confidence.

B) To promote the knowledge of the "Other" reality and the prejudices suppression the elementary, middle and high education. This converts to the teachers and educators in the protagonist of this aspect of cultural CBMS, and requires the revision of the education programs with this finality.

On the other hand, in the related to the design frame and implementation of the measures of confidence, it is necessary to be realistic and to accept that the attention that puts the Atlantic Alliance or European Union to the Mediterranean issues will be always less of what those States members of the region would wish. By this, without desisting in the effort -therefore the achieved advances in the last years, though modest, are palpable- will be necessary to keep and to encourage the confidence and the cooperation through the actual bilateral links.

Lastly, we want to focus attention on two positive effects derived from CSBM applied until the moment. By a side, the building of vertical confidence, between the two banks, could improve the horizontal confidence, it is said, in the Maghreb. As we have explained formerly, these countries hardly count with networks of cooperation between them and actually is in this level where the confidence results most necessary. In this sense, the attendance and the joint work of military personnel of the Maghreb in

NATO, WEU, or bilateral activities, could proportionate a better knowledge and a cooperation which in no other manner would be achieved.

A second positive consequence of these measures would be the contribution to the democratisation of the armed forces of the Maghreb. It would derive from the relation of the North African military elites with officials of countries where exist a correct military subordination to the civil power.

Bibliography

AGUIRRE, M. "Fuera de área, peligros del sur", *Papeles para la Paz*, nº 39-40, 1990, pp. 181-203.

ALAOUI, A.B. "Europa-Magreb, el desafío de la co-prosperidad", *Revista Española de Defensa*, nº 55, 1992, pp. 112-113.

ALIBIONI, R. "Instability South of the Mediterranean: Recommendations for the West", *The International Spectator*, vol. XXVIII, nº3, 1993, pp. 87-95.

AXELROD, R. "The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoist", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 75, June 1981, pp. 306-318.

— *La evolución de la cooperación. El dilema del prisionero y la Teoría de Juegos*, Alianza Universidad, Madrid, 1986.

— & KEOHANE, R. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy", *World Politics*, vol. 38, nº1, 1985, pp. 226-254.

AYOUB, M. "Subnational and Transnational Actors"; en KANET, R.E. & KOLODZIEJ, E.A. *Coping with conflict after the Cold War*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1995, pp. 226-244.

BADINI, A. "Efforts at Mediterranean Cooperation", en HOLMES, J.W. *Maelstrom. The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of the Mediterranean*, The World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995, pp. 103-124.

BAS, E. *Prospectiva. Herramientas para la gestión estratégica del cambio*, Ariel, Barcelona, 1999.

BIN, A. "Contribución de la OTAN al fortalecimiento de la cooperación en el Mediterráneo", *Revista de la OTAN*, nº4 1998, pp. 24-27.

BOOTH, K. "War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace", en BOOTH, K. (Ed.), *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security*, Harper Collins Academic, London, 1991, pp. 335-375.

BRAUCH, H.G. "Confidence and Security Building Measures: Lessons from the CSCE for the Western Mediterranean", *UNISCI Papers*, nº 1, 1994, pp. 185-228.

—"Long Term Security Challenges to the Survival of the North African Countries: Population Growth, Urbanisation, Soil Erosion, Water Security, Food

Production Deficits and Impact of Climate Change (2000-2025)"; en MARQUINA, A. *Mutual Perceptions in the Mediterranean. Unity and Diversity*, UNISCI, Publisud, Afes-Press, Madrid, 1998, pp. 35-123.

BUZAN, B. "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century", *International Affairs*, vol. 67, n° 3, 1988, pp.428-439.

—*Peoples, State and Fear: An Agenda for Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 1991.

CALDUCH, R. *Relaciones Internacionales*, Ediciones Ciencias Sociales, Madrid, 1991.

CARABAZA, E. y DE SANTOS, M. "La seguridad en el Mediterráneo: un concepto a debatir", en VV.AA. *Las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y los países de la cuenca del Mediterráneo*, Coordinadora de ONGs para el Desarrollo, Madrid, 1996, pp. 95-103.

CAZORLA PEREZ, J. y MONTABES PEREIRA, J. "Cambio social y emigración en el Mediterráneo Occidental", en MONTABES PEREIRA, J. LOPEZ GARCIA, B. y DEL PINO, D. *Explosión demográfica, empleo y trabajadores en el Mediterráneo Occidental*, Universidad de Granada, 1994, pp. 471-482.

CHOUROU, B. "Redefining Mediterranean Security: a View from the South", en MARQUINA, A. *Mutual Perceptions in the Mediterranean. Unity and Diversity*, UNISCI, Publisud, Afes-Press, Madrid, 1998, pp. 274-294.

DE RATO, R. (rapporteur), "Cooperation et Sécurité en Méditerranée" [AM 295 PC/SR(95)2] Octubre 1995, Assemblée de L'Atlantique Nord, Commission Politique.

Declaración de Barcelona, adoptada en la Conferencia Euromediterránea, Barcelona, 27 y 28 de noviembre de 1995.

Declaración de Madrid sobre Seguridad y Cooperación Euroatlántica. Emitida por los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno participantes en la Reunión del Consejo del Atlántico Norte, Madrid, 8 de julio de 1997.

DEVOLUY, P. "La facture sociale", *Jeune Afrique*, n° 1977, 1998, pp. 28-29.

DOWNS, G.W., ROCKE, D.M. & SIVERSON, R.M. "Arm Races and Cooperation", *World Politics*, vol. 398, n°1, 1985, pp. 118-146.

FERNANDEZ, P. *Relaciones Euromediterráneas de Barcelona 1995 a Malta 1997*, Dossier Documental, CERI, Madrid, 1997.

FISAS ARMENGOL, V. "Mitos y realidades de la amenaza del sur"; en CENTRO

PIGNATELLI, *El Magreb y una nueva cultura de la paz*, Seminario de Investigación por la Paz, Zaragoza, 1993, pp. 169-184.

GHEBALI, V.Y. "Les mesures de confiance militaires dans la problematique de la securité collective"; en VV.AA. *Securité collective et crisis internationales*, Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale, Paris, 1994, pp. 276-277.

GODET, M. *De la anticipación a la acción. Manual de prospectiva y estrategia*, Marcombo, Barcelona, 1993.

GRIN, J. "Confidence Building beyond Cultural, Ideological and Disciplinary Differences. Technology Assessment as a Hermeneutic Dialogue", *UNISCI Papers*, nº 1, 1994, pp. 149-182.

KAPSTEIN, E.B. "Is realism dead? The domestic sources of international politics", *International Organization*, vol. 49, nº4, 1995, pp. 751-774.

KHADER, B. *El muro invisible*, Icaria, Barcelona, 1995.

—*Europa y el Mediterráneo*, Icaria, Barcelona, 1995.

KHALILZAD, Z. & LESSER, I.O. *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century*, RAND, Santa Monica, 1998.

KEOHANE, R.O. "Reciprocity in International Relations", *International Organizations*, vol. 40, nº1, 1986, pp. 1-27.

—*Neorealism and Its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986.

—& MARTIN, L.L. "The Promise of Institutional Theory", *International Security*, vol. 20, nº1, 1995, pp. 39-51.

LACOMBA, J. "Desarrollo, urbanización y movimientos sociales en el Magreb", *Papeles para la paz*, nº57, 1996, pp. 61-70.

—*Sociedad y política en el Magreb*, Los libros de la Catarata, Madrid, 1997.

LOPEZ AGUIREBENGOA, P. "Reflexiones sobre la II Cumbre Euromediterránea", *Revista Española de Defensa*, nº 111, 1997, pp. 46-47.

MAALMI, A. "L'OTAN et le Sud de la Méditerranée les malentendus d'un dialogue", en GROUPEMENT D'ETUDES ET DE RECHERCHES SUR LA MEDITERRANEE, *L'Annuaire de la Méditerranée*, GERM-Publisud, Rabat, 1996, pp. 52-55.

MENENDEZ DEL VALLE, E. "Civilizaciones: seguridad y cooperación", *Revista Española de Defensa*, nº 84, 1995, pp. 38-41.

MERNISSI, F. *El miedo a la modernidad. Islam y Democracia*, Ediciones del Oriente y del Mediterráneo, Madrid, 1992.

MILNER, H. "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations. Strengths and Weaknesses", *World Politics*, vol. 44, nº2, 1992, pp. 466-496.

MORROW, J.D. "Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution vs information", *International Organization*, vol. 48, nº3, 1994, pp. 387-423.

MARTIN MUÑOZ, G. "Los islamistas y el Estado en Egipto y Argelia", *Revista Española de Defensa*, nº77-78, 1994, pp. 78-81.

—y NUÑEZ VILLAVERDE, J. A. "Modernización e inmovilismo en el Magreb", *Política Exterior*, nº43, 1995, pp. 102-122.

NAIR, S. *En el nombre de Dios*, Icaria, Barcelona, 1995.

NUÑEZ VILLAVERDE, J. y HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI, M. *La política exterior y de cooperación de España hacia el Magreb*, Los libros de la Catarata, Madrid, 1996.

—"Diagnósticos y perspectivas de futuro en el Magreb" en VV.AA. *Los desafíos del Mediterráneo*, INET, Córdoba, 1997, pp. 19-45.

POWELL, R. "Anarchy in international relations theory: the neorealist-neoliberal debate" *International Organization*, vol. 48, nº2, 1994, pp. 313-344.

SAAF, A. *Le discours stratégique arabe. Constantes et variations*, Cahier du Lumier, nº 2, 1994.

TAHER, Amir "L'Occident face á la menace islamisté" *Politique Internationale*, nº6, Hiver 1994/1995, pp. 161-178.

THOMPSON, W.R. "The Future of Transitional Warfare", en BURK, J. (ed.), *The military in new times: adapting Armed Forces to a turbulent world*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1994, pp. 63-89.

SPENCER, C. "Building Confidence in the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 2, nº 2, 1997, pp. 23-48.

- "Partnership-building in the Mediterranean", *The International Spectator*, vol. 34, 4, 1999, pp.59-74.

VAN EVERA, S. "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914", *World Politics*, vol. 38, n°1, 1985, pp. 89-117.

YATA, F. "La perception marocaine de la sécurité en Méditerranée: ni alibi, ni placebo"; en MARQUINA, A. *Mutual Perceptions in the Mediterranean. Unity and Diversity*, UNISCI, Publisud, Afes-Press, Madrid, 1998, pp. 249-254.