

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
KYIV TARAS SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY

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**THE SECURITY QUADRANGLE
FOR THE XXI CENTURY:
NATO, NATO PARTNERS,
RUSSIA AND UKRAINE**

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INTRODUCTION

The political situation in the world is changing rapidly. During the East-West confrontation period, when the total nuclear war has been considered as a real threat, we have been living in conditions of the imaginary stability. Right after the Central European revolutions of the late 80s many politicians and experts started thinking that unification of two parts of Europe and creation of the universal security system would be a reality under new circumstances. But the real life has turned to be quite different.

Instead of the “cold war” we are facing now a series of the local “hot wars” in some regions of Europe, primarily in the Balkans and on the post-Soviet area. Deep economic decline in the East, as well as a disability of the international community and its institutions to manage with the new problems, has led to the emergence of new conflicts, most of which are of ethnic origin.

Leonid Haidukov

*Institute of International Relations
Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University*

**TRANSFORMATION OF NATO WITHIN MODERN AND FUTURE
EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE:
UKRAINIAN VIEW**

The Ukrainian view on the transformation of NATO within the modern and future European security structure is defined by the character and content of state creation processes, which have been taking place in Ukraine from the time it acquired its independence and status of a full and equal subject of international relations. Formation of the Ukrainian view on its future, in general, and in the area of European security and establishment of relations with NATO in particular, has gone through several stages and is characterised by a number of peculiarities. The processes of understanding the European security problems in conditions of defunct block opposition and a search for one's own place in the new conditions, took place in Ukraine under very complex circumstances. Having said "Yes" at the all-Ukrainian referendum on December 1, 1991, Ukrainian society split almost in two soon after that. One part of it maintained that Ukraine above all should develop relations with the Western states; the other part considered that it was necessary to follow the direction of Russia and the CIS. There was no general national consensus as to the foreign policy targets. The problem was complicated by the fact that, unfortunately, the economic hardships of Ukraine became more acute and extensive. This meant that a number of people in the society living below the poverty line kept increasing more and more. Naturally, they were sharing views and assessments close to the left ones. In particular, they continued to treat the West and NATO, as in the Soviet times, that is with hostility as a rule. The anti-western and anti-NATO moods have been, and still remain, very strong in the Southern and Eastern parts of Ukraine; that is in the large industrial centres, where a considerable part of the country's

population resides. In spite of the domestic political problems covered above, some steps have been made in Ukraine to establish and to expand relations with NATO. The first contacts with NATO were initiated in 1991, and in January of the next year, for the first time, a representative of Ukraine took part in the High Level Working Group of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. On February 22-23, 1992 the Secretary General Manfred Wörner paid visit Kyiv for the first time. On June 8 of the same year President Kravchuk visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Ukraine confirmed the importance of the necessity to establish military and political cooperation with NATO on July 2, 1993, when the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine adopted a resolution “On Main Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine”. This document, which may be looked upon as a foreign policy concept of Ukraine, said that the chief priorities of Ukraine in the field of security include the development of close partnership links, in particular with the EU and NATO member-states. “The Main Directions...” stressed that in the conditions of a defunct block opposition, the problem of creating a general European security structure on the basis of existing international institutions, and NATO in particular, is acquiring priority significance. A statement made on January 20, 1994 by the President of Ukraine, L.Kravchuk, and the President of the Kazakh Republic, N.Nazarbayev, was important from the point of view of defining Ukraine’s stand on NATO. Specifically, it said that problems in the field of security must be resolved with assistance of such international organizations and institutions such as the UN, OSCE, NATO, NACC, etc. It also said that the idea of a “Partnership for Peace” programme approved by the heads of NATO member-states, had a great potential. In February 1994 Ukraine signed the PFP Framework Document. In many respects this was a courageous and very important step for Ukraine – both in view of the domestic political situation in the country and from the point of view of enhancing the international status of the state. It should be particularly

emphasized that Ukraine was the first country out of the states which emerged from the territory of the former USSR to join this NATO programme and in this manner to show the example to other Euro-Asian countries, which doubted the necessity to embark on the PFP programme. In March 1994 Ukraine started holding direct consultations with NATO in “16+1” format (16 NATO Alliance nations and Ukraine). In May of the same year, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, V.Radetsky, at the instruction of the Ukrainian Government, submitted Ukraine’s PFP Presentation Documents to NATO. Together with the Ukrainian delegation he participated in the opening of the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium, where the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe is also located. A separate office has been allocated here for the Ukrainian representation. One can say, without exaggeration, that a new page in Ukraine-NATO relations opened up after the 1994 Presidential Elections, when L.Kuchma was elected Head of the State. In September 1995 at the instruction of the President of Ukraine, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, H.Udovenko, submitted to NATO top executives the Ukrainian PFP Individual Partnership Programme. One can say that this was the end of the first preparatory stage of Ukraine-NATO relations formation. The final phase of this stage has been characterised by the fact that Ukraine officially declared cooperation with NATO, and that statements about this now started to transfer into specific, practical dimensions. On September 12, 1994 the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. G.Joulwan, paid an official visit to Kyiv. This was a first visit to Ukraine of a NATO representative of such level.

In October of the same year a sub-unit of the Ukrainian Army participated for the first time in the joint training exercise under PFP, which was held in Poland. The same year the Ukrainian automobile sub-unit also participated in the training exercise “Cooperative Spirit-94”, under the PFP programme, held in the Netherlands. A visit of the President of Ukraine, L. Kuchma, to NATO

Headquarters in Brussels on June 1, 1995 had very important implications for deepening and activitisation of Ukraine-NATO relations. On May 23-27, 1995 the first joint training exercise “Peace Shield-95” was held in Yavoriv near Lviv. September 14 of the same year was marked by a very important event in Ukraine-NATO relations: Ukraine and NATO issued a Joint Statement, which established a new level of bilateral relations – the level of “expanded and deeper Ukraine-NATO relations”. The developments during 1996 serve as convicting proof of this. On April 15-16 the Secretary General of NATO, J.Solana, paid an official visit to Ukraine. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, H.Udoenko, had been invited to participate in the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of NATO Alliance nations, which was held on June 2-3, 1996 in Berlin, which is further evidence of closer cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. On July 1-2, 1996 the Ambassadors of Ukraine to NATO member-states, EU and the Russian Federation paid a visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, where they had a meeting with the Secretary General of NATO J. Solana. In autumn of the same year the Minister of Defence of Ukraine O.Kuzmuk visited NATO Headquarters. In September 1996, the Assistant Secretary General for Infrastructure, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning, Vice-Admiral H.van Foreest, visited Ukraine within the framework of an on-site meeting of the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee. A North Atlantic Assembly seminar on European security was held in Kyiv on September 13-19, 1996 and became an important event in the development of Ukraine-NATO relations. Expansion of Ukraine-NATO relations in 1996 was characterised by the fact that these relations acquired further conceptual definition and legal framework.

The year 1996 may be characterised as a year of active promotion of Ukrainian interests in relations with NATO in the broad general European context. This, as is known, was noticed in Europe, and in particular, in Euro-Atlantic security structures. The final Communiqué of the North-Atlantic Council

on the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, as of December 10, 1996 reflected the basic principles of Ukraine's stand in the field of security and cooperation with NATO. The statement, in particular, confirmed that nuclear weapons will not be deployed in the territories of new NATO member-states.

A visit to Kyiv by J.Solana on May 7, 1997 was of fundamental importance for the expansion of relations between Ukraine and NATO. During the visit the NATO Documentation and Information Office was opened in the building of the Institute of International Relations of Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University. The Office is fulfilling important work on providing objective information to the people of Ukraine on what NATO is, what the tasks of this organization are, and the main area of its activities. Due to this work, the Ukrainian citizens, who from the Soviet times treated this organization as hostile, get to know about the peacekeeping activities of NATO, its participation in humanitarian, scientific and technical cooperation, and, therefore, gradually change their attitude to NATO. The Ukrainian public is taking an active interest in NATO activities, including the non-military issues, which is attested by the attention paid to the information materials recently published in Ukraine, such as "NATO Handbook", "NATO Scientific Programme Guidebook", "Guidebook on NATO Summit Meeting Held in Washington on April 23-25, 1999", "Security is Expanding in Euro-Atlantic Region: Role of NATO and Alliance Nations", etc. Therefore one can say that information activities held in Ukraine by the NATO Documentation and Information Office make an important contribution into the matter of shaping the public opinion in Ukraine on NATO.

During the visit paid to Kyiv by the Secretary General, J.Solana, on May 7, 1997, he met with the President of Ukraine, L.Kuchma. In the "Ukrainian Dim" Centre, the Secretary General addressed the Kyiv public. The "Charter on Special Partnership between Ukraine and NATO" was initialed on May 29 of the same year, during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, on the level of Ministers

for Foreign Affairs of NATO member-states, and was signed on 8-9 July 1997 during the NATO Summit Meeting held in Madrid. A statement of fundamental importance was included into this document, wherein it was said that NATO allies will support the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, its territorial integrity, democratic development, economic flourishing, non-nuclear status, and principles of inviolability of its borders, as key factors of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe and on the continent in general.

It was also important for us that NATO welcomes and supports the fact that Ukraine received security assurances from all five nuclear states, which have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as a non-nuclear weapon state, which adhered to this Treaty. In its turn, Ukraine welcomes the statement of NATO member-states reiterating that the “enlargement of the Alliance shall not require any changes in present organization of nuclear armaments of NATO, and in particular, the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of its new members”.

In the Ukrainian view, the expanded collaboration of Ukraine with NATO extends the political dialogue between Ukraine and the Alliance on a broad range of security issues, which makes an essential contribution into the matter of improving a general security environment in Europe. Therefore, one can come to the conclusion that the signing of the “Charter on Special Partnership between Ukraine and NATO” represented the chief gain of the first stage of establishing and developing relations between them. This document is also important because it recognizes Ukraine as a Central European state with its own national interests. The Charter essentially accelerated and expanded our relations with NATO, which is attested by further acceleration of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO.

The seminar of the North Atlantic Assembly and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on “Economic Security of Ukraine” was held in Kyiv on September 24-

27, 1997. Another important step on the way to further development of Ukraine-NATO relations was the meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission and the European Atlantic Council, on the level of Foreign Ministers, in Brussels on December 16-17, 1997. The meeting adopted a Working Plan of Special Partnership Charter implementation in 1998. On the occasion of the first anniversary of signing the Charter on Special Partnership, the Secretary General of NATO, J.Solana paid an official visit to Kyiv on July 8-9, 1998. In the course of a meeting with the President of Ukraine, L.Kuchma, he discussed the issues of military, political, scientific and technical cooperation, peacekeeping activities, participation of Ukraine in the measures of the PFP programme, etc. Touching upon the issue of Ukraine's role in construction of the new architecture of the European security J.Solana, in particular, pointed out that Ukraine continues to play a fundamental role in the construction and structure of the continent's security.

In our view, it was symptomatic that after Kyiv the Secretary General of NATO visited the rocket-building enterprise "Pivdenmash" (Dniepropetrovsk). Addressing the workers and employees of the enterprise J.Solana once again underscored that Ukraine is an important factor of European security. He welcomed the efforts of Ukraine directed to establish peaceful, friendly relations with Russia, Romania, Poland, and other neighbours, which are vitally important for European stability and security.

On May 29, 1998 the second meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission, on the level of Foreign Ministers, was held in Luxembourg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, B.Tarasiuk, headed the Ukrainian delegation. At this meeting agreement was reached on appointing the liaison-with-NATO officers by end 1998, as a basis for future NATO mission in Ukraine, on foundation of the Centre for Training Peacekeeping Forces on the grounds of Lviv General Military Polygon, and on the development of a Crisis Management Consultancy

mechanism. On June 12 of the same year J.Solana, discussing the issues connected with further development of Ukraine-NATO relations, pointed out: “Today I may say that NATO and Ukraine are very close partners. We fully recognize the implication of independent and flourishing Ukraine for preservation of security in Europe and will continue developing our collaboration”. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister, in his turn, underscored that Ukraine fully understands the critical role it has to play in the process of establishing an integral Europe. On June 12, 1998 the first meeting of a Ukraine-NATO commission on the level of Defence Ministers was held in Brussels in NATO Headquarters. It was dedicated to discussion of the following subject: “Exchange of Views on Issues of Security, Joint Working Group (JWG) for Military Reform and Cooperation Under the PFP Programme”. The meeting attested to the unity of the political and military areas of Ukraine-NATO cooperation.

At the end of June 1998, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, K.P.Kliaber, paid a visit to Ukraine. The aim of this visit to Ukraine was to study the social, political and economic situation in the country, specifically the course of economic reforms, restructuring of the Armed Forces and level of civil control over the Armed Forces. The first visit of experts from the Ukraine-NATO Joint Working Group for Military Reform took place at the same time. Readiness of Ukraine to continue cooperation with NATO was attested by the Edict of the President of Ukraine L.Kuchma of November 4, 1998, which adopted the State Cooperation Programme of Ukraine and NATO for the period up to 2001. Touching upon this topic at the meeting of the working group in Brussels of December 9, 1998 J.Solana, in particular, pointed out: “We welcome the declaration of the State Cooperation Programme of Ukraine and NATO for the period up to 2001 by the President of Ukraine, and consider it a major confirmation of Ukraine’s adherence to maintenance of fruitful relations with NATO”.

On November 26-27, 1998 a senior Ukrainian delegation headed by the Secretary of the National Security Council V.Horbulin visited Brussels to submit the “State Cooperation Programme of Ukraine with NATO for the period up to 2001” to representatives of NATO member-states. This document defined the strategic goal of Ukraine as full integration into the European and European Atlantic structures, and a full-fledged participation in the general European security system. The Ukrainian representatives underscored that the document considers NATO to be the “most effective structure of collective security in Europe and an important component of the general European security system”.

The Meeting of the European Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Ukraine-NATO commission held on December 8-9, 1998 in Brussels was another important contribution into the further development of relations between Ukraine and NATO. The Foreign Minister of Ukraine B.Tarasiuk headed the Ukrainian delegation. The topic of the discussion was “Future Challenges to Security and NATO Cooperation with Partners”.

The year 1999 was especially important, and at the same time complex, from the point of view of formation and realization of the Ukrainian view on the problems of European security, in general, and relations with NATO. The main reason for this, in our opinion, was that the general security processes became more complicated, first of all, because of the Yugoslavian crisis. The public opinion of Ukraine was adversely affected by the methods employed by NATO to manage this crisis. This was a serious and difficult examination for Ukrainian diplomacy, and for the political actions of Ukraine during this period. For the major part, in our view, Ukraine managed to pass this difficult examination, and proved that it remained devoted to the undertaken commitments and that it had a clear and justified position on the Kosovo crisis, as well as the specific proposals aimed at its management. How our partners perceived the Ukrainian proposals is another matter. In spite of all these difficulties the year 1999 represented a new

important step forward in the direction of further development of Ukraine-NATO relations.

From this point of view, the first Summit Meeting of the Ukraine-NATO commission, held during the Washington Summit in April 1999, had special implications and without exaggeration became one of the central events of the political life of Ukraine in 1999. The Washington Meeting gave a fresh powerful impetus to our partnership with NATO. This was reflected in the Declaration of Heads of Governments who participated in the Summit. In this manner, they laid a solid foundation for further rapprochement of our approaches to the solution of the European security problems.

From the Ukrainian point of view, it was very important that the Washington Summit adopted a number of conceptual documents and adapted to changes and processes taking place throughout the world. A new Strategic Concept of NATO holds a special place among them. For the Ukrainian society, which is still split on a social, political and party basis, it is very important that NATO to a greater extent is transforming into the organization which takes care not only of the military problems, but also of the humanitarian, political, scientific and educational issues. The final document of the Washington Summit clearly defines the place and the role of our state in relations with the Alliance. Specifically, it reiterates that Ukraine holds a special place in Europe, in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in the strengthening of stability and democratic values. For us it is very important that the Summit documents underscore that NATO is dedicated to further strengthening of its special partnership with Ukraine, and that the Alliance continues to support the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state. A number of other important developments took place during 1999, which attested to the acceleration and expansion of Ukraine-NATO relations. In May, the meeting of

the Ukraine-NATO commission was held in Brussels, with the participation of the Foreign Minister of Ukraine B.Tarasiuk. In the same month the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs, Head of NATO Science Committee I.Scillard paid a visit to Kyiv to present the “Scientific Programmes of NATO”. In October of the same year, the Head of NATO Economic Committee, D.George arrived in Kyiv. So one can come to a conclusion that after the signing of the Special Partnership Charter, the level of relations between Ukraine and NATO significantly increased, and gained qualitatively new characteristics.

As further developments demonstrated, this positive tendency has gained momentum in 2000. One can say, without exaggeration, that in 2000 we witnessed unprecedented, exceptional developments in relations between Ukraine and NATO. The case in point is that in March 2000 a senior NATO representative delegation headed by the Secretary General, Lord Robertson, paid an official visit to Kyiv. For the first time in the 50-years history of NATO, its representatives met not in one of the Alliance member-states, but in a country which is not a member of NATO, and which is not raising the question of its accession to this organization today. In the course of the visit the President of Ukraine L.Kuchma and the Prime Minister of Ukraine V.Yushchenko received the Secretary General of NATO. He also had meetings and discussions with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine B.Tarasiuk, Minister of Defence of Ukraine O.Kuz'muk, Secretary of the National Security Council Y.Marchuk, command of the Southern operational direction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, professors, lecturers, and students of the Diplomatic Academy and the Institute of International Relations of Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University. The delegation, consisting of ambassadors of 19 NATO member-countries, arrived in Kyiv within the framework of the regular meeting of Ukraine-NATO commission.

One of the implications of the visit of the NATO delegation is that possibly for the first time in the history of Ukraine-NATO relations so much attention was paid to the non-military aspects of NATO activities, specifically, in the field of science, training of scientists, and exchange of experience in the area of scientific and technical cooperation. At the Institute of International Relations, where one of the meetings with the NATO delegation was held, a special exhibition on NATO activities in the above areas has been opened. As of January 1, 2000 more than 480 Ukrainian researchers have received grants or stipends for scientific cooperation with colleagues from NATO countries, including the project: "Security Quadrangle for XXI Century: NATO, Partners of NATO, Russia and Ukraine". Within the framework of this project we have prepared and submitted for publishing in the "Politics and Time" journal the following article: "NATO and Public Views in Ukraine: From the Cold War Stereotypes to Cooperation and Partnership". The main provisions of this article have been made public at the international conference in the city of Yalta on May 8, 2000 and will be published in English and Ukrainian in the papers of this conference.

The visit of the NATO delegation to Ukraine in January 2000 was characterized, in our view, by one more peculiarity: probably for the first time, the representatives of NATO who came to Kyiv did not restrict themselves to the stay in the capital of the state and contacts with the Government officials. Almost all of them went to visit the regions of Ukraine. In particular, they visited Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dniepropetrovsk and other oblasts and towns in the East and South of Ukraine, i.e. where the majority of population, as a rule, preserved their anti-NATO views from the Soviet times. This allowed the population of these regions to receive, as it were, "first-hand" information about NATO and, to some extent, to change their opinion of the Alliance. In a wider context, this facilitated the formation of weighed, politics-free understanding of

NATO role, its implication in the modern world and the process of its transformation.

Touching upon this topic, the Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson said when in Kyiv: “The goal of our partnership is to give the Ukrainian people a possibility to understand better what NATO is and how we can work together for the sake of Ukraine”. The Minister for Foreign Affairs B. Tarasiuk argued along similar lines that in due course Ukrainians will stop associating the word “NATO” with the stereotypes of the “Cold War”, and that they start seeing that NATO is not a military Alliance only, but a union of democratic countries united to preserve peace and to maintain the international security. The Foreign Minister of Ukraine also underscored that development of relations between Ukraine and NATO is based not on likes and dislikes, but takes account of the leading role of NATO in maintaining international peace.

From this point of view Ukraine is addressing the problem of NATO enlargement to the East. The Ukrainian view on this topic is clear and consistent. Our official position is that accession to NATO of new members is solely a prerogative of each country, and expansion of NATO implies the enlargement of peace, stability and a security zone. Ukraine assumes that NATO, as a constituent part of a new model of European security, will acquire greater significance, and at the same time will transform in line with the new facts of the European and world development. The important constituent of the Ukrainian view on NATO is the recognition that, from the time of its establishment, it carried out serious political, and not only military functions. Suffice it to say, for example, the role played by NATO in the 50s in repairing relations between France and Germany, when the foundation of the European Union was actually laid. At the beginning of 80s NATO played a considerable role in the establishment of democracy in Spain, and in the return of this country to the European community. The role played by NATO in the prevention of the armed conflict between Greece and

Turkey is a matter of common knowledge. One cannot leave out of this reckoning the fact that the wish to accede to the Alliance, and recognition of the role of the Alliance in the maintaining of peace and stability in Europe made a number of the post-Communist states accelerate domestic reforms and improve relations with each other. Due to these motives, Ukraine improved its relations, for example, with Romania, and other border states. One can say that NATO did a lot to return the notion of Central Europe to our vocabulary. It also helped this region to fill its place in the world.

At the same time, it is necessary to admit to the existence of many problems and difficulties connected with practical implementation of the Ukraine course as to NATO. As we have already mentioned, from the domestic point of view there exists an ambiguous attitude of the society to relations with the states of Western Europe in general and with NATO in particular. A considerable part of Ukraine's population continues to look at NATO as in Soviet times. From the point of view of external factors related to the development of Ukraine-NATO relations, we cannot ignore the attitude of Russia to NATO, and the fact that according to polling results, a part of the Ukrainian population who reside in the Eastern and Southern regions of the country, is directed by Russia and therefore shares the Russian view on NATO. And this is at the time when Russia, as well as Ukraine, participates in the Council of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and has formal relations with the Alliance. In spite of this, Russia occupies an irreconcilable position with reference to NATO's enlargement to the East. And from this point of view, it builds up its relations with the neighbouring countries, including Ukraine.

After Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary acceded to NATO, Ukraine found itself in a largely new geopolitical situation. It faces the issue of self-determination, which is becoming more and more vital: Does Ukraine consider itself a European country or something different? This problem, in our view, may

aggravate in perspective, if Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Baltic states accede to NATO. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister B. Tarasiuk underscored that this must be viewed as a step in the direction of realization of the integral right of the three countries to choose the ways of ensuring their national security, as it is pointed out in the Paris Charter for the New Europe. According to the view of the Prime Ministers of Italy and Hungary d'Alene and V.Orban, which they expressed on March 12, 1999, after the accession of former Warsaw Treaty members countries, NATO must continue its enlargement to the East. We are confident that the Alliance must follow the policy of "open doors". N.Mikhailova, the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, made a statement that NATO membership of Bulgaria is important for Bulgaria because of the Kosovo crisis. Assisting NATO to resolve the Kosovo problem, Bulgaria proved the expedience of its aspiration to become a member of the Alliance.

As it was mentioned earlier, this issue is not on Ukraine's agenda. At the same time, Ukraine does not think that NATO's enlargement will threaten its national interests and security in Europe. The Ukrainian point of view, in this respect, is essentially different from the stand of Belarus and Russia. The Ukrainian stand on NATO did not change, according to the statement made by the President of Ukraine L. Kuchma at the joint press conference with the President of Belarus on March 12, 1999. The Ukrainian President underscored that he respects a sovereign right of the Belarus people to define their position on NATO. The President L. Kuchma also expressed his opinion about the possible deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus after Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary acceded to NATO. He pointed out that from the technical point of view it makes no difference where nuclear weapons are located. He also maintained that on the contrary, the further such weapons are from the border, the safer it is for the nuclear state.

It needs to be mentioned that Ukraine carefully studies the processes and conditions for accession to NATO. This is attested by the fact, that at the beginning of March 1999 the Defence Ministry delegation headed by the Chief of the General Headquarters, First Deputy Defence Minister V.Shkidchenko arrived in Budapest. The General, in particular, pointed out that the Ukrainian delegation received very important information on the issues in question. In the course of the two-day Ukrainian-Hungarian negotiations in Budapest they have discussed further measures to implement the programme of military cooperation of the two countries, initiated in 1992, and they have identified the conditions for formation of the Ukrainian-Hungarian-Romanian engineering and technical battalion "Tisza".

This is the official position of Ukraine on NATO and its enlargement to the East; yet, as it was mentioned earlier, Ukraine has constantly put both on serious domestic and external trial. We will not overstate if we say that, possibly, no other country finds itself under such pressure today. We have already mentioned the Russian factor. We would only add that the process of bilateral relations with Russia was and is one of the chief factors in the build up of Ukraine-NATO relations in the wider context. Russia is playing the role of both a catalyst and a deterrent, which makes Ukraine look for the safe assurances of its national security. One can say that Russia is an important partner for Ukraine, yet at the same time it is one of the reasons of Ukraine's concern about its security. This is due, as it were, to "historical" aspects of the Soviet times, which remind about themselves time and again. When Russian politicians, and even state agencies make statements about their territorial claims (Crimea, Sevastopol), we have to remind our opponents of the famous historical facts. However, unfortunately, there are a lot of problems and issues, which have not been caused by historical reasons, or by the Soviet past. These are notorious developments in Chechnya, and Russian support of the regime of Milosevic in Belgrade, including after the

end of the armed stage of Kosovo crisis management in Yugoslavia. Concerns are also caused by the changes in the defence policy of Russia. One can say that the new national security concept of the Russian Federation summed up the tendencies, which appeared during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. What are the implications here? First, a transfer to the confrontation paradigm has actually taken place. In our view, Russia is opposing almost the whole world. Second, it is declaring itself a global power with geopolitical interests in different regions of the world. Third, a new concept of the national security of the Russian Federation emphasizes that the area of its national interests includes Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Near East, and the Asian-Pacific Region. It is symptomatic that in May 2000 the Press Secretary of the Russian President S.Yasterzhembsky publicly declared that Russia may strike missile and bombing blows on Afghanistan, where, in the Press Secretary's view, the camps for training Chechen militants have been operating. A certain problem is presented by the fact that in line with the above doctrine, Russia may interfere in conflicts, which appear not on the borders of Russia but on the borders of the CIS, and in particular in Pridnestrovie, Tajikistan, etc. It is typical that the threat in this doctrine is defined as the appearance of the military contingent on the immediate proximity to Russia's borders. Such formulation of the problem is more than surprising. If Ukraine accedes to NATO, then its army will automatically start presenting a threat to the national interests of Russia with all the following repercussions. In line with this concept, NATO's enlargement to the East is regarded as a threat to the national security of Russia. Therefore, Russia is especially concerned about the Ukraine-NATO relationship. In light of the new national security concept of Russia, the question arises as to the number of border problems. This document three times mentions that Russia has border problems; yet, they are not specified. This is not coincidental. It is safer; besides, one can imply anything needed in such a statement. Unclear wording is dangerous,

because any country may freely interpret the national security in general and from the point of view of the border issues, in particular. In our view, Ukraine, under such conditions, including the fact of creating the Belarus-Russia union must display adherence to principles in the issues of the border policy.

Turning back to the topic of possible prospective accession of Ukraine to NATO, it is necessary to emphasize that Ukraine must overcome its domestic problems as quickly as possible, and first of all in the area of economy, Armed Forces restructuring, exercising of civil-military relations, and formation of a general national consensus on the whole range of issues relating to domestic and foreign policy. In our view, the problems exist mainly because of domestic, and not external, reasons, at least at the present time. And our efforts must be focused on this. Only if we resolve our domestic problems may we really become an important and safe element of the general European security system. Undoubtedly, this is our task and no one else will do this for us.

Yet, we think that it is not entirely ours. This is a common problem of the European countries, since only a developed, independent and democratic Ukraine may enrich the process of European integration and change the system of general European security. They say that history is a teacher of life. This may be the case; however, only when nobody forgets the history. It is common knowledge, for instance, that Germany was not left alone with its problems of after-war restoration of its economy. In these difficult times it received significant assistance from the European and world communities and largely due to this fact it became independent and started developing dynamically. One can say this about many other states, which suffered during W.W.II. Ukraine, as is known, suffered not less than the others at that time, but unlike other European states it suffered from the tragedy of Chernobyl, a tragedy with consequences, which will continue haunting Ukraine and the world for a long time. They sometimes tell us: Chernobyl is your, Ukrainian, problem; first rise to your feet and then we will

help you. We cannot agree with this approach, since it is anti-historical and erroneous. Liquidation of consequences of this planetary catastrophe may not be carried out by one state only. We are convinced that this is a common matter. Such understanding of the Chernobyl problem is an important constituent element of the Ukrainian view on the problems of European security in general and on Ukraine-NATO relations. We have to emphasize once again, that in spite of all the difficulties and problems Ukraine remains loyal to its European choice and, therefore, it has the right to reciprocity on the side of the European and world communities. The Ukrainian Government constantly takes efforts to ensure that Europe, and its political and economic structures, have a chance to convince Ukrainian citizens that we have made the right choice, and that the European, and not any other, way, will ensure the prosperity and security of Ukraine and of its citizens. An important constituent part of the Ukrainian view on NATO's role in the modern world is Ukraine's position on the Kosovo conflict. As is known, the Ukrainian battalion was present in Yugoslavia as a part of the UN peacekeeping forces starting from the times of the Bosnian crisis. On October 1, 1992 the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine addressed the United Nations with a persistent request to use all its authority and possibilities to ensure that Resolution 770 of the Security Council be fulfilled. Further developments have shown that the UN failed to achieve this. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in its statement of February 22, 1994, emphasized the requirement that Serb troops must be completely withdrawn from Sarajevo. On May 4, 1995 Ukraine denounced the missile strikes of Serbs on Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, and other cities, which resulted in numerous victims among the peaceful population, and the peacekeeping contingent. As the Foreign Minister of Ukraine H.Udovenko declared at the international meeting on Bosnia in London on July 21, 1995, the Ukrainian military contingent near Zhepa was used by the Serbs as a "live shield", threatening that they will attack the

Ukrainian servicemen in case NATO employ force against them. It was also emphasized that “protection of Sarajevo and resumption of the humanitarian aid supplies will show the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs the decisive aspiration of the international community to oppose the aggressive actions”.

On November 25, 1995 the General Framework Document on Bosnia-Herzegovina was ratified in the city of Dayton (USA). It seemed that a crisis termination formula was found. However, as further developments have shown that peace in the Balkans was short. An always sharp national conflict between the Serbs and Croats has given way to an even sharper conflict between the leaders of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanians. The latter considered the Serb leadership to be guilty of the economic and cultural backwardness of Kosovo, and of purposeful humiliation of its state and political status. As is known, almost 2 million people lived there, and almost 90% of them were Albanians. At the same time, this was a territory whose population had almost the lowest standard of living in Yugoslavia. On the basis of the number of residents and size of the territory, Albanians thought that their region had every reason to enjoy the status not of autonomy, but of the Republic forming a part of Yugoslavia. The number of residents of the region at that time exceeded the population of Slovenia and was two times more than population of Montenegro – two of the six republics which comprised the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Belgrade said “No” to the Kosovo Albanians. “Ethnic cleansing” started in the region, so Albanians had to look for salvation in the neighbouring republics of the federation.

“Ethnic cleansing” achieved an especially high level in 1998 and at the beginning of 1999. The Government of Serbia introduced a state of emergency in Kosovo. The targeted “ethnic cleansing” in the autonomous region of Kosovo acquired a mass character when S.Milosevic, who occupied a position of the Head of the Serb Communists Union from January 1986, came to power in

Belgrade. On his initiative, amendments to the Constitution of Serbia, which practically reduced to zero the rights of autonomy, were adopted in 1987. In February 1998, the Yugoslavian police started active actions against the Albanian resistance movement. In the course of this operation by the village of Likoshani, Serb policemen killed 12 Albanians. This is how the first blood was shed. On January 15, 1999, near the village of Rachak, they killed 45 more peaceful residents of the region. Western states, the UN, and other international organizations addressed Belgrade with the demand to stop the use of force against Kosovo Albanians. In order to maintain peace and to prevent a further development of the conflict, an international contact group proposed to deploy the peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. Serbs met this proposal with hostility. However, due to the efforts of the international community, negotiations between the two opposing parties were organized, and took place in Rambouillet, near Paris. Serbs were categorically against the presence of peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and negotiations collapsed. On February 22, 1999 M. Albright announced that if diplomatic efforts did not bring about positive results, air strikes might be carried out against military objects in Serbia. Yet, even after that tough statement Belgrade declined to hold negotiations. In this way, the regime of Milosevic provoked the war. On March 24, 1999, having received the authorization of parliaments and governments of the NATO member-countries, the Alliance started bombing military objects in Yugoslavia. However, NATO did not receive the agreement of the United Nations. The right of “veto” was in force here. The Security Council did not take a decision to conduct air strikes.

Ukraine, as well as many countries of the world, exerted every effort to resolve the Kosovo problem by political methods. As is known, it was one of the first countries, which put forward their specific proposals on that. The Foreign Minister of Ukraine B. Tarasiuk initiated a number of consultations on the Kosovo problem, arrived in Belgrade and had discussions with Milosevic.

However, Belgrade did not use the opportunity to listen to peace proposals and to achieve peace on the basis of compromise. After the air strikes on Yugoslavia stopped, Ukraine, together with other countries, took an active part in peace maintenance in the Balkans as part of the peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR). Within the context of events in Kosovo, one has to pay attention to two issues which are especially important from the point of view of the Ukrainian stand on the military position of NATO and of how the information on the developments in Yugoslavia was presented in Ukraine. Ukraine, as is known, did not support the NATO air strikes, yet it did not denounce them officially. The policies of Kyiv during the conflict was mainly focused on the termination of Serbian bombing and on termination of ethnical purges among the Kosovo Albanians, on organization of negotiations between the conflicting parties, and on return of refugees back to their homes. Possibly this was consistent with the dominating moods of the electorate and with the real political, diplomatic and economic resources of Ukraine.

Now let's consider the information coverage of the Kosovo crisis in Ukraine. Unfortunately, sometimes it reminded a reiteration of the Russian or pro-Russian mass media presentations. Information was almost unambiguously of the anti-NATO and pro-Serb character. The leftist and Communist press, which have the biggest circulation in Ukraine were especially notable for it. Here are several examples of titles of articles published in January-December 1999 on the pages of the "Communist" paper: "No Room for Ukraine in the Criminal Alliance", "NATO – Collective Torturer of Yugoslavia". Such assessment of NATO's actions in Yugoslavia represent the position of a considerable part of the Ukrainian society, and this is a fact of life, which must be taken into account. So that the idea of rapprochement with NATO had practical support in the state, it must become the idea of the majority. This is not the case so far. The Ukrainian society does not know much about the "new" NATO, about its transformation

and about the non-military activities of the Alliance. The work in this direction, in our view, has a quite complex and systemic character and must be directed to support the governmental course. Such efforts will be even more effective if NATO actions are more weighed and justified, especially when and where diplomatic efforts are exhausted and the use of force appears on the agenda. We believe that only under such conditions may the official Ukrainian view of NATO become the view of the Ukrainian society in general. Now, a few other considerations and conclusions as to the prospects of Ukraine-NATO relations. As we already noted earlier, Ukraine, first of all, needs to essentially dynamize the restructuring of the Ukrainian society, to accelerate economic reform, to strengthen democratic institutions, and to fight corruption. Furthermore, in our view, today Ukraine is far from meeting the criteria, which define the degree of readiness of the state for NATO membership. Today one can only make a positive assessment of what Ukraine did and is doing to prevent territorial conflicts with neighbours. But even in this area there are some problems. It is common knowledge that we still do not have a generally accepted interpretation of a state border with Russia and Belarus. Yet, these two countries created their own union and do not share the Ukrainian views on NATO. Ukraine has a military base of a foreign state in its territory, and this may, under some circumstances, become a destabilizing factor. We would like to remember, once again, numerous statements of Russian politicians and of the official power bodies of the Russian Federation containing real territorial claims to Ukraine. The latter has a certain “positive” implication, because it shows Ukrainians who threatens Ukraine – NATO or Russia, and where they should look for the allies. From this point of view, one has to consider whether it is worthwhile for Ukraine to conclude a military and political union with Russia and Belarus. We think this must not be done. In our view, this does not correspond to the national interests of Ukraine and to the interests of general European security. Creation of the

above union would lead to the creation of new borders of Europe's delineation. This would be a step back into the past, a step, which would not correspond to the national interests of Russia and Belarus in the generally accepted understanding of this notion.

This is a general picture of the Ukrainian view of NATO transformation, its achievements and problems in its activities, and on NATO's role in the general European security system. Ukraine proceeds from the fact that cooperation with NATO corresponds to its national interests, and that NATO is a chief element of European and regional security. In view of this, Ukraine, as the President of Ukraine L. Kuchma emphasized, has been and still remains loyal to its European choice, and to its wish to make its own contribution into the strengthening of the general peace and security.

Igor Mingazutdinov

*Institute of International Relations
Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University*

UKRAINE-RUSSIA-CIS IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN EUROPEAN SECURITY

After the galloping crisis and unexpectedly quick collapse of the Eastern block and its driving force – USSR – one sixth of the Earth surface, which during all the postwar years was associated in the world with a notion of a single centralized superpower, instantly transferred into a somewhat amorphous and not always obvious category named “post-Soviet countries”. The attempt to create a new institution, i.e. the CIS, for various reasons did not unite the former USSR republics. Almost at once the leading actors of the post-Soviet countries began to show, at least in the area of the security issues, namely, Russia and Ukraine. Their ambitions and actions in the world arena, activities within the CIS framework, and, finally, their bilateral relations all together quite quickly became one of the most prominent factors of the new European architecture formation.

Yet, in all fairness it needs to be noted that the appearance of almost all the newly independent states in the ex-Soviet territory (with exception of the Baltic republics and a legal successor of the former Soviet Union – Russia) has been engendered first of all by the fact of the USSR’s dissolution, and not by the natural logic of their national and state development. This statement is based on the following arguments.

Firstly, in eleven out of the fifteen ex-Soviet republics traditions of the independent development within the limits of national and state formations have

been practically missing. During the period of the recent history, their experience in this area has been limited by several post-revolutionary years, if any at all.

Secondly, the above-mentioned countries have been characterized by the under-developed political systems, i.e. government institutions, stable political parties, etc, and other integral institutions and functions of the independent state (army, foreign trade, availability and possibility of personnel training). The political system, borders, internal state division have been inherited mainly from the former USSR republics, which in reality have been the decorative formations within the framework of a single Union.

Thirdly, the level of economic integration of the newly created states has been extremely high. The inter-republican trade in 1998 in the USSR constituted 21% of the gross national product (14% in the EU). At the same time, if Russia, given isolated from the other republics, could ensure 2/3 of the end product output, Ukraine could ensure only 15%.¹

The latter factor has been consistently hushed up in Ukraine itself, since provided such calculations had been made public, the idea of independence to a significant degree would have lost its appeal for the majority of ordinary people. At the same time a better selection of food products in shops - the main deficit of the Soviet era - as compared to the other regions of the USSR, was a more visible and tangible argument “pro”, than the catastrophic dependence of Ukraine on external energy suppliers which was nearly inconspicuous to the “naked eye”, as an argument “con”.

Ukraine being one of the major “disintegrators” of the USSR proceeded not from the objective logic of social and economic development and pragmatism, but from the “mythical logic”. The core element here was the “myth on origin”, which characterizes the majority of newly-created countries, since the state ideology by all means has to use the elements of the live history, because

¹ Kolchin S. Russia-Close Foreign Countries: Relations, Interests, Policy Objectives // World economy and International Relations. - 1995. - № 4.

without this it loses any kind of sense for the ordinary people. Therefore, it is fully natural that the first waves of democratic changes (first within the limits of the former USSR and later during the post-Soviet period) in the majority of the CIS countries, including Ukraine, have been mainly characterized by the ideology of the national renaissance. This ideology gave the republican elites a key to power and a powerful method of fighting for the republican independence.

The following developments have shown that social reality in the newly created states is far from the legend about the “single nation – source of the state”, which could help to keep the power and ensure domestic stability. So all the short post-Soviet history became a history of fighting between the “ideological” and pragmatic approaches to the development of people, state and economy.

Renunciation of “ideologism” in Ukraine has been marked by the victory of L.Kuchma at the Presidential elections in 1994. Unlike in all other post-Soviet republics, after L.Kravchuk had been defeated, the leading executive government positions have been occupied by the representatives of industrial and economic complex, and not by the next nomenclature group. Ideology of economic pragmatism, which started to being firmly established in Ukraine during the first period of Kuchma’s office, reduced the excessive tension in society connected with non-acceptance of the “national policy”. At the same time, due to some de-ideologisation of the economic reforms, purely social problems became very vital – growth of unemployment, non-payment of wages, deterioration of financial state of low-income households, catastrophic situation in the areas of education and health care, etc. The developments, which took place in Ukraine over the last 5 years, can be characterized as a “civil crisis”, which cannot be resolved with assistance of ideological methods only or by a change of the political mask, which was attempted at the beginning of the second office of L.Kuchma at the end of 1999 - spring 2000.

Unlike Ukraine, Russia had a long-term state and even imperial traditions, and from the very beginning it did not require any artificial enforcement of “national and renaissance” mythical logic, so it focused, first of all, on purely “civil” aspects of its development, and on the implementation of non-ideological social and economic reforms.

However, the state which was “the most democratic in the Commonwealth” and “not infected with the virus of nationalism” in reality appeared to be one of the most conservative in relation to political changes. Year in and year out the Russian policy reproduced one and the same scheme: kind ruler (with almost czarist constitutional powers) and a bad but weak and tractable opposition (like the old time *boyar дума*). Foreign policy priorities of Yeltsin’s Russia have also been somewhat inconsistent: strategic partnership with the West – and attempts to play a role of the world superpower, claims of regional leadership in CIS as a voluntary association – and attempts of trivial economic pressure of neighbours, similar to the behaviour of a feudal lord in his relations with a vassal. Situation was also aggravated by the internal disintegration of the Russian Federation, which more and more reminded collapse of the USSR in 1990-1991: Chechen war, economic separatism of regions (Tatarstan, Primoriye, Sakha-Yakutia and others).

V.Putin’s acquisition of power did not change the situation radically. Meanwhile it is necessary to understand that geopolitical and ideological crises, which have gripped Russia, can become fatal for all the CIS, if Moscow does not overcome its complex of historical duality. Today Russia is a chief creditor of the majority of the CIS countries, and trade and cooperative relations with it are playing a key role for practically all of its member-states. Therefore, the stability in Russia and the end of crisis (both the economic one and the crisis of the Russian political elite) – is not only a condition of the CIS development but also a

guarantee that the economic and social stability is preserved in all the former Soviet republics.

As to the area of external relations one can state that, in spite of some eclecticism of both Russian and Ukrainian foreign political doctrines, they have been essentially different almost from the very beginning. Differences in understanding of their roles in international relations, place in the system of modern geopolitical coordinates, forms and methods of diplomacy are manifested in the bilateral relations of these states.

Ukraine in her relations with Russia has chosen a strategy of transferring from relations of dependence and subordination to mutual relations between the equal parties. Ukraine's interest in normal relations with the Russian Federation is caused, among other reasons, by understanding that huge material resources of Russia are necessary for Ukraine as much as the financial support and advanced technologies of the developed Western countries. Besides, if Russia becomes a powerful and economically robust country in the future (which may not be excluded albeit theoretically), it will be much better for Ukraine if Russia becomes her partner and not an enemy. Yet the way to the partnership, which is one of the most important political tasks, is paved with many subjective difficulties, connected with complex processes of national self-identification and the necessity to improve the domestic and foreign policies, and hardly effective restructuring of social and economic life.

The first group of factors, which complicate the equal partnership of Ukraine and Russia, is as follows. Ukrainian factors: unfinished formation of the national state, excessive, unbalanced integration of the national economy into the economies of the CIS states, unilateral dependence on Russian energy sources and some kinds of raw materials, insufficiently developed feeling of national identity and patriotism among the considerable part of Ukrainian population, presence of a certain "complex of little significance".

Yet, the position of Russia is not a lesser obstacle for the formation of equal inter-state relations. First of all, the Russian population and the governing elite are convinced that, whatever the odds might be, Ukraine is an integral part of Russia; Slavonic origin of the two peoples enforces such opinions. Such feelings are most strong in Moscow, which for a long time has been establishing itself as a capital of the over-centralized authoritative state, subordinating the neighbouring territories in different ways. Secondly, it is necessary to understand that after the euphoria of victory over the State Committee for Emergency Situation (GKChP) and “a free give away of sovereignties” even the traditionally democratic part of the Russian establishment started to understand the huge losses caused by the collapse of the USSR, the main of which was the loss of a superpower status by Russia. Therefore, Moscow is painfully reacting to any cooperation and integration formations created without its participation, which can be demonstrated by the initiative of Ukraine to institutionalize GUUAM, the appearance of which created a somewhat new situation in the process of the CIS integration.

Another important factor, which was mentioned earlier, is a domestic instability of the Russian Federation, connected with aspirations of different political elites and groups to attain power, and with desire of some autonomies to achieve even more autonomy, if not independence. Russia is concerned about its own integrity and therefore it somewhat weakened the reintegration policy with reference to the former Soviet republics. However, if the Russian statehood strengthens, and its domestic situation stabilizes (or in case there appears a sustained tendency of this) the post-Soviet countries are not guaranteed against the practical manifestations of imperial domination.

As to Ukraine, the Russian foreign policy permanently aims to keep her under its influence, to preserve real levers of pressure. Traditional ways of implementing this mandate are represented by attempts to draw Ukraine into the

new integration structures under the Russian leadership, for example, the union of Russia and Belarus, or strengthening of organizational CIS structures by way of soft transformation of this association from the commonwealth of states into the state commonwealth. Lately, the policy of Russian leaders has generally toughened and it became possible to observe one more method, which can be called “*a contrario*”. Thus, it is proposed to refuse from the notions of “*close foreign countries*” and “*far foreign countries*” in its foreign political doctrine and to establish relations with the former Soviet republics on the so-called “general basis”, without any privileges, excuses or references to the “common historical past”. In this case, it is expected that the post-Soviet countries, which still continue to be firmly integrated into the single economic and political organism, will gradually decide to integrate with Russia on the subordination basis. In that context there appeared so far an unofficial proposal to establish a direct dependence between the requirements of the full payment of the Ukrainian debts for the Russian energy sources and granting of the state status to the Russian language in Ukraine and creation of a single (Russian speaking) information environment.

At the same time, it is necessary to point out that Ukraine and the Russian Federation really have significant common interests. The most important, of course, is preservation of peace and stability in the European continent in spite of any differences of tactical character. Today, in principle, the basic legal and political problems in bilateral Ukrainian-Russian relations are resolved. A comprehensive Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and a number of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet came into effect in 1999. There is every reason to believe that these documents may be considered as an important contribution into stabilization of the European security.

The two countries may cooperate in the following areas: conversion of the military and industrial complex, ecology, and development of some scientific and technical areas.

Apart from the above issues, the Ukrainian-Russian relations are influenced by some other subjective factors. In this connection it is necessary to remember about the differences in the professional characteristics of the political and intellectual elites of the two countries. The Russian Federation has inherited from the Soviet Union a highly professional elite, which had a considerable history of establishment and a rich experience of work on the general state level. The former Soviet elite over a long period of time was maintaining close contacts with the elite groups of the other states, including the developed ones, and therefore is much closer and naturally integrated into the world political and intellectual elite. In its relations with Ukraine and other post-Soviet republics, a considerable part of the Russian elite did not give up their position of state arrogance and political unceremoniousness, which is manifested, for instance, in the perception of the Ukrainian independence as a random and temporary phenomenon, and in the readiness to take some measures in order to restore the status quo (including by force).

Ukraine, which never enjoyed a real statehood, was deprived of a possibility to develop a fully-fledged elite group. It started appearing only at the beginning of the 90s and so far is undergoing a stage of its formation. Today you can hardly speak about the existence of the political elite in Ukraine as a single category. It can be provisionally divided into two subgroups, each laying claims to its own monopoly (here we do not mean a formal power only, but the ability of the political elite to define the state development for the long-term perspective).

The first subgroup consists of the former Soviet functionaries, who “radically transformed” only under the pressure of the specific circumstances, and first of all, the August 1991 *putsch* defeat in Moscow, which finally cleared

the way for the Ukrainian independence. They are characterized by a naked pragmatism and have little ideological convictions, since their principal aim is power itself, independent of its content. Both Ukrainian Presidents of the post-Soviet era can be included into this subgroup.

The second subgroup consists of more or less active opponents of the previous regime, and includes both the active dissidents and those who have been actively cooperating with the Soviet power, but who at some stage (during the Communist Party ruling) changed their political position. Such famous Ukrainian politicians as H.Udoenko, I.Drach, S.Holovaty, etc. may represent the latter category.

As to the Ukrainian-Russian relations, it needs to be mentioned that representatives of the first subgroup take more realistic and pragmatic positions, whereas representatives of the second subgroup often set no limits to the meaning of the national idea in the creation of Ukrainian state and to different degrees suffer from the political romanticism. With reference to the issue of relations with Russia the Ukrainian elite may also be divided by territory of residence. Individuals from the Eastern Ukraine have pro-Russian feelings and individuals from the Western Ukraine are openly west orientated.

The both states have an objective need to give up the idea of Ukraine-Russia's opposition. The latter is supported by the part of leading politicians both in Russia and in Ukraine and is confrontational and openly isolationistic, since it reduces the Ukrainian-Russian relations to historical mistakes and shuns the both states from the world community.

The vivid example of this is *de facto* present in the Ukrainian political elite dichotomy – it is a split of the Verkhovna Rada into the “majority” and “minority” (which, in view of some analysts, can become the beginning of further, deep split of the Ukrainian society). However, this may have more

serious and far-reaching consequences, than one might think may have at the first glance, including the impact on the geopolitical situation in Europe.

The majority, consisting of the “nationally conscious” individuals, democrats set against the communists and representatives of the large and medium-sized business which also seem to be set against the communists, is destined to split up. The main reason of the forthcoming disintegration of the existing coalition is that the political interests of the national democrats and economic interests of the “businessmen” do not coincide and are totally different. The first see Ukraine as a part of the united Europe, the second see this prospect as negative for the three reasons. Firstly, the “European Ukraine” means additional and quite aggressive competitors. Secondly, the western rules of game will put an end to the traditionally illegal post-Soviet business, whose representatives are currently voting together with the majority of the Verkhovna Rada. And finally, introduction of the European legal framework in Ukraine can lead to the detention and arrests of individuals, whose accounts in the western banks are being blocked from time to time.

It is clear that even under the most favorable conditions Ukraine may become a member of the European community (NATO or EU) not earlier than in 2015. However, this remote possibility can make the ‘businessmen’ chose the way opposite to the European one and (taking into account their financial and other possibilities) they may involve into this the President, executive government, and the whole country. In this case, we will have no democracy, no free market, and no rule of law. The political nature of this system will be if not dictatorship, then at least authoritarianism. One may see two scenarios of such developments, which can be provisionally called “Chinese” and “Small Russian”.

The latter scenario looks most simple, since it is more habitual and understandable for the majority of the Ukrainian elite. It means a voluntary “surrender” to Moscow. In order to implement it, the “businessmen” will need a

new majority, which will be created with “communists” in place of the “democrats”. Ukraine will restore its former status of the “breadbasket” and will disappear from the map as an independent formation. However, after the political absorption, the time will come for the financial absorption, when the Russian oligarchs will appropriate somewhat local Ukrainian business.

Such developments may be impeded by the “Chinese” scenario, which envisages self-isolation not only from the West but also from the East. At the early stages of this scenario, the national democrats may also participate in it under the motto of the domestic producer protection. However, the chief strategic and political leading partner will be represented by the “communists”, which will unite with the “businessmen” on the basis of non-perception of the “spiritless, cosmopolitan western values”. Alliance of the large business and the Communist Party should not be perceived as Utopia. It is sufficient to look at the Russian State Duma, where “*Yedinstvo*” together with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation have made their yesterday’s right centre allies, who seemed to have shared the same views with them, outsiders.

Yet this scenario is temporary because, firstly, if a geographically European country (experience of Serbia) distances itself from the Europe, this leads to the confrontation with the latter, and, secondly, it started its implementation in Russia, and existence of the two twin-neighbours, who “defend themselves in all directions” sooner or later will lead to their merger.

Thus both scenarios lead to one result: first to Moscow, and then into the dead end. Annexation of Ukraine to Russia will unambiguously and immediately transform the latter into the empire, which cannot be democratic by definition. Besides, there will remain millions of Ukrainians (and not only in Halychina), who under any perturbations and troubles will continue to consider the state independence a highest priority. Successes of the western neighbours, yesterday’s

socialist camp allies, will be an eternal catalyst of such opinions with all ensuing dissatisfaction and instability.

However, the above scenarios touch upon only one, although important, side of the problem, since we are now covering the domestic policy aspects. But in addition to the domestic factors, the relations between Ukraine and Russia and, more broadly, their conduct in the CIS territory, will be influenced by the external factors, and first of all, by the stand of the European-Atlantic community. One can say that during the last years the tendency of the better-balanced approaches has begun to show in the Western policies relating to Ukraine and Russia.

Now it is clear that it is not sufficient to help consolidate democracy in Russia in order to ensure a civilized development of the other post-Soviet states. This point of view may to some extent restrain the growth of chauvinistic moods in some Russian political circles, which treated the former attitude of the USA and Western Europe to the CIS countries as recognition of the prevailing influence of Russia in this part of the world.

At the same time, it is necessary to point out that relations of the western countries with the Russian Federation will remain to be the priority for them in the nearest future. This is determined by the place occupied by Russia in the world, her potential and nuclear weapons arsenal, which is second in the world. The situation may radically change in case of a sharp growth of the anti-western moods and Russia's aggressiveness. Yet, the development of a confrontation scenario seems to be hardly possible in the real future.

As to Ukraine, here the western position is determined first of all by the ability of this country to play a role of a force, which under certain circumstances, may neutralize the influence of Russia on the European part of the post-Soviet territories, and in case the Russian Federation moves to the compulsory reintegration policy, it may become a leading country of the anti-Russian sanitary

border. But Ukraine itself as well as its own legitimate interests in the area of security and economic problems will hardly become a priority for the West (if you look at the objective facts and do not rely on the complimentary provisions of the numerous declarations and communiqué).

In 1992-1993 the Western post-Soviet policy, in spite of some deviations, has been generally focused on Russia, which reduced possibilities of interaction with Ukraine. This was explained by the necessity to ensure liquidation of nuclear weapons of the former USSR, which remained on the Ukrainian territory, and by the lack of effective market reforms in Ukraine. From the beginning of 1994 the western policies towards Ukraine became more active. As the vitality of the nuclear issue has gradually subsided, the problem of motivating political and economic transformation has become more important, during this process the interests of Ukraine have been taken into account to a greater extent.

In the second half of the 90s the relative significance of Ukraine in the foreign policy of the West has grown together with their partial refusal from the exclusively Russian orientation. Ukraine started receiving indirect and sometimes direct support in the areas where her interests contradicted the interests of Russia. The western policies have been aiming to separate Ukraine from Russia more and more, especially in the area of security. At the same time the western course continues to be pro-Ukrainian only with relation to Russia, and not absolutely.

The Russian factor was and remains to be decisive during the planning of western approaches to Ukraine. If Russia tries to force Ukraine to subdue or to destabilize her domestic situation, the western countries are likely to support Kyiv. At the same time, it is clear that in spite of the wish to isolate Russia geopolitically, the West is not practically ready to oppose Russian economic penetration into Ukraine, if it takes place gradually, stabilizes the economic situation and facilitates market reforms.

It is absolutely clear, that under such conditions Ukraine cannot count on a wide and full support of the west. This circumstance is an additional factor in favour of good neighbourly relations with Russia, which is possible, given the Russian interests relating to Ukraine are to some extent taken into account. First of all, this refers to the interaction in the Black Sea region, decision on the future of the Black Sea Fleet, consideration of issues of status of the Crimea and Sevastopol as integral parts of Ukraine within the legal framework, etc.

At the same time the assessment of modern state and further prospects of the Ukrainian and Russian relations requires to consider the whole complex of problems connected with the foreign political tasks of the Russian Federation. From the middle of 90s the Russia geo-strategy has been based on the theoretical doctrine of “multipolar world”, which according to many analysts, first of all, has applied significance and justifies a new pressure on the West in order to persuade it to take Moscow into consideration more than the others.

Russia, while denying a possibility of comprehensive domination of the USA in the world arena, underscores the creation of such a multipolar world, in which there will be no dictates on the side of one country or a group of countries. The Russian Federation considers the CIS region to be the zone of its exceptional influence, and defines “poles” as integrated groups of states. In line with the Russian geo-strategy, Ukraine has to become part of the integrated formation in the post-Soviet territory under the Russian leadership. So under the condition of a new political reality, the foreign policy of the Russian Federation is characterized by the attempt to keep the situation on the territory of the former Soviet Union under its full control, which is different from the strategic European choice of Ukraine.

Russia, which adopted the Concept of Development and Use of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in May of 1999, and which declared its readiness to review the basic foundations of its nuclear security, is now demonstrating its

transfer from tactics of the declarative warnings, first of all to the USA, to the specific actions (which was made during the aggravation of crisis in Kosovo). Therefore, the possibility of a sweeping confrontation between Russia and the West may become a political reality (a very “decorative” statement of V.Putin during his pre-election campaign about the possibility of Russia’s joining NATO should not be taken seriously). Yet this threatens current intentions of Ukraine to integrate, even if it happens in the far future, into the Euro-Atlantic structures and requires the development and implementation of a whole complex of preventive measures, which may preclude aggravation of bilateral relations. So the “multi-vector” Ukrainian foreign policy, which has been criticized so many times may paradoxically become the only immediate palliative, which could help avoid the “lethal crisis” until the effective medicine is found.

A dynamic process of the European integration also influences the international position of Ukraine and her relations with the Russian Federation in a contradictory way. The post-socialist countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, and the newly independent states of the post-Soviet territories currently need to specify their own geopolitical coordinates, which would comply with their parameters, political and economic interests, cultural values. In this connection, the strategy of the Ukrainian foreign policy for the nearest decade consists in the gradual but purposeful integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community. This can be considered as one of the ways of strengthening her sovereignty, which, unfortunately, does not always go with the Russian claims.

Yet, today’s process of Euro-Atlantic integration requires determination of its stages, rate, and, which is very important, authentic borders of the future united Europe. This is one of the key issues in the creation of a new architecture of the European security. One should take into account that some leading western

politicians and experts are afraid of the accelerated expansion of NATO and EU, which, in their view, may inhibit integration in due course.

One may speak about a clear differentiation of policies of the leading western countries relating to integration of the Central and Eastern European countries with separation of the political, economic and military-political component. As to the economic integration, it is practically recognized that it is impossible to expand EU quickly, however, as far as the political and security cooperation is concerned, the western countries appear to be very interested in the increase of influence and in gradual involvement of the Central and Eastern European states in such organizations as NATO, EU etc. This statement is vividly demonstrated by the fact that Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic joined the NATO in 1999, while the specific timing of their acceding to the EU is still not defined.

While the European policy of Russia, which wants to become a renewed centre of force, is aimed at cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic community, i.e. the other centre of force, the final objective of the Ukrainian policy is a full-scale integration. One of the incentives of such course is the desire to reduce the influence of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet territory. This determines the deepest contradiction in the Ukrainian-Russian relations as to the development of links with the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The western states generally declare that they recognize a potential possibility of a fully-fledged integration of Ukraine into the EU (her joining NATO remains to be a more delicate topic, and if you take account of the non-block status of the country, the chief content of such declarations can be prevailingly read “between the lines”), which fully coincides with the priorities of the official Kyiv. However, the economic factor is dominating at this stage of the Eastern European integration development. Unfortunately, in spite of all the western declarations

about the support of Ukraine's wish to integrate into Europe, the real state of things remains different.

Europe needs a predictable, moderately economically robust and stable Ukraine, which will ensure the absence of conflicts in the Eastern and, possibly, Northern-Eastern direction. However, in order to achieve this state, which could meet the European requirements in the future, today Ukraine is pushed by the West to expand cooperation with Russia as a geographically closest partner. The meaning of this position can be formulated as follows: Ukraine may accede to Europe only via Russia.

This approach clearly corresponds with the Russian vision, in line with which Ukraine and Russia must move to Europe simultaneously. Yet it is evident that one cannot speak about Ukraine's integration into Europe this way, since between the western and Russian visions there exists a principal difference, which is often left without attention. Namely, the West is interested in this scenario for the economic reasons, and Russia – for the political ones.

It is extremely important for Ukraine to develop relations with the Central and Eastern European countries, which during the last years did not come into the view of the Russian Federation. Therefore, it seems to be expedient if Ukraine integrates into the Euro-Atlantic community not via Russia, but at least in parallel, and which is better – independent of it. The issue of security is high on the agenda, since unification of Europe, if it takes place without direct participation of Ukraine, may create some difficulties of political, economic and even military character in the East of Europe.

Although, as it was already mentioned, Ukraine's priority is a European direction of integration, relations with the Russian Federation will still have to be treated as being of no less importance for a long period of time. It will be difficult to unite these two directions, because Kyiv and Moscow have different understanding of relations between the two states. The Russian approach

envisages a comprehensive integration, specifically, re-integration, while the Ukrainian vision is based on the bilateral equal and neighbourly cooperation of the two independent states, generally accepted in the world community. Ukraine sees the strategy of integration, first of all, with reference to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. In this way, contradictions in Ukrainian and Russian relations reflect on relations with the western countries.

Analyzing the complex of relations of Ukraine with different states, international communities and institutions in 1998-2000 in practical terms, one can point out that in general, if compared to the previous periods of time, their intensiveness somewhat reduced. The exception is represented by the sub-region of the Black Sea, where the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization has been created largely due to the efforts of the Ukrainian side.

There are reasons to believe that relations between Ukraine, Russia and other post-Soviet countries may be assessed as “slow disintegration”. Signature in February 1998 of the Agreement on Economic Co-operation and Interstate Economic Relations Development Programme for 1998-2007 almost did not influence the climate of the Ukrainian-Russian relations, the intensiveness of which continues to decline. Perception of the CIS as a sub-regional international organization is more and more often characterized as an impermanent, temporary structure with no future. At the same time, you can more and more often hear in Ukraine that under the CIS Statute, Ukraine is not a member of this organization, and her relations with the post-Soviet republics continue to be more and more evidently differentiated. The CIS is interpreted by the majority of the Ukrainian politicians not as an international organization or integration association, but as an institutional form of interaction between the political elites of the newly independent countries.

As to the prospects of cooperation with the western countries, situation here is not unambiguous. During 1998-1999 the Ukrainian executive government

was striving for the status of an associated member of the European Union with no result, although government officials understood that Ukraine objectively does not meet the European integration requirements. Moreover, deepening of the economic crisis in the country means the objective increase of a distance between Ukraine and Central and Eastern European states, which have been recognized as candidates for the EU membership (a differential proof of this tendency is that in 2000 the Central and Eastern European states started introducing a system of visas for the Ukrainian citizens).

In view of the fact that Ukraine does not comply with the criteria of EU and even of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which Ukraine is unable to join, the political circles of the western countries increasingly consider Ukraine a European periphery. The EU representatives more and more often try to formulate joint policies as to Ukraine and Russia, and Ukrainian diplomacy has been insistently resisting this during the years of independence. Yet, it is evident that the new architecture of the European security is considerably different from a rather idealistic concept outlined in the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On Guidelines of Foreign Policy of Ukraine” as of July 2, 1993. Specifically, currently the creation of the general European mechanisms of collective security looks unrealistic.

Relations between Ukraine and NATO are more successful, however, they cannot be called clear and transparent. Due to different objective and subjective reasons, the ruling circles of Ukraine many times presented assurances that under the circumstances as of the end of the 90s the issue of NATO membership will not be raised. Yet, Ukraine’s active collaboration with NATO objectively facilitates creation of pre-requisites for acquisition of such membership in the far future, in case this will correspond to the interests of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.

If foundations of the general European cooperation are not ruined by the Balkan crisis of 1998-2000, participation of the European countries in the European security system controlled by NATO could be recognized as the one, which has no alternative, since even in view of the specific positions of Russia and Serbia, this system would cover all the Europe. Non-participation would mean that a country refuses to defend its own interests, and for Ukraine it might mean a loss of a possibility to temper the negative consequences of the NATO and EU's expansion. The fact that the NATO's expansion considerably complicates foreign political situation of Ukraine was fully confirmed during the Kosovo crisis in spring 1999, which aggravated almost immediately after Poland, Hungary and Czech republic joined the Alliance.

On the other side, the establishment of the European security system under the auspices of NATO will to some extent ensure a non-reversal of changes in the Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time the development of multilateral relations will gradually lead to the devaluation of the neutral position. Criteria of neutrality are somewhat revised within the limits of the inter-state relations in both directions of cooperation in the security area (NATO+EU+WEU and NATO+EAPC+PFP), since the traditional neutrality denies modern forms of the military and political integration which have spread during the 90s.

The degree of military policy coordination by the NATO partner-states within the facilities of EAPC/PFP, which were also signed by Ukraine, is considerably smaller, than coordination among the permanent members of the Euro-Atlantic community. There are different approaches here, which are brought to life by the specific features of some countries and by the comparatively little experience of military and political integration of the majority of them.

Although the development of multilateral cooperation does not mean elimination of differences in the vision of the European security in XXI century, direct participation in the formation of new relations of cooperation and

responsibility mechanisms may allow the European states to defend their national interests and implement their own vision of the future world. Ukraine in particular demonstrates a firm consistency, insisting on using the OSCE mechanisms to support peace, envisaged by the final document of the Helsinki 1992 Summit.

Assessing the contents of the non-alliance declaration of Ukraine made by her in 1990, we have to point out that under the present circumstances its renunciation (which is demanded by the significant part of the domestic political establishment) will be premature in terms of strategic considerations, and unjustified in view of the possible internal policy complications. A functional role of non-alliance may be defined as interim, transit situation between the more stable forms of security, such as membership in multilateral defence union or internationally recognized and guaranteed neutrality. The forced dichotomy of the foreign policy of Ukraine is caused by her specific geopolitical position – it is simultaneously a part of the two subregional zones – Central and Eastern Europe and post-Soviet area.

Of course, a rather unstable social and political situation, and underdeveloped economy do not allow implementing the “reasonable dichotomy” of the foreign policy in full (which, as we again stress, has some negative features, of course, together with the positive ones). In the future everything will depend on the political and economic capacity of Ukraine, on her ability to occupy the appropriate place within the system of relations among the USA, Russia, Western, and Central and Eastern Europe.

Serhiy Galaka

*Institute of International Relations
Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University*

**PROBLEM OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REGION IN THE
CONTEXT OF NATO'S ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST**

NATO's enlargement to the East resulted in change of all strategic configurations in the region of the Central and Eastern Europe.

One of the aspects of these changes was characterized by a potential possibility of the nuclear weapons' reappearance in the territory of the Central and Eastern Europe and by the attempts to level off this latent threat to the European security. The most widespread idea among the proposed alternatives was to establish a Central and Eastern European nuclear weapon-free zone.

The idea of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone is still discussed by the military and politicians, and it has become the basis for the initiatives put forward by the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, this idea and a historical experience of non-nuclear zones appearance and existence are worth studying.

The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation is recognized in the world as one of the main threats to the global mankind security. The battle against the proliferation is one of the principal priorities of the foreign policy implemented

by the majority of modern countries, including the only superpower – the United States.

The idea of creating nuclear weapon-free zones has also been internationally supported. In 1995 a conference, which approved the decision about the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was held in New York. The conference approved a document titled “Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. It says that “ the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear weapon-free zones, ... enhances global and regional peace” and their development “should be encouraged as a matter of priority”.²

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was concluded in 1968 and became effective in 1970, forms the basis for a global non-proliferation regime. To supplement these efforts, non-nuclear zones have been established in many world regions over the last decades with an aim to reduce the threat of a nuclear war, and to avoid dangers connected with production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. The history of non-nuclear zones’ establishment during the Cold War shows that such attempts have been successful first of all at the periphery of superpowers rivalry.

The first attempt to apply the regional or zonal approach to the non-proliferation problem was represented by signing of the Agreement on Antarctica, which declared the entire Antarctic region a demilitarized region, and consequently, a nuclear weapon-free zone. The first successful attempt to establish a full-scale nuclear-free zone was the Tlatelolco Agreement, signed in 1967, which, together with the two protocols attached to it, regulated the nuclear-free zone regimes in the Latin America. The Rarotonga Agreement signed in 1985 declared the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Southern part of the Pacific Ocean.

² PPNN Newsbrief. – Second Quarter 1995.- P.23.

The tendency to establish nuclear-free zones in the world received a new impact due to the termination of opposition between the East and the West after the end of the Cold War and due to the successes achieved in the area of restricting and reducing nuclear armaments. On April 11, 1996 in Cairo representatives of more than 40 countries signed the Pelindaba Agreement declaring a nuclear-free zone in Africa.³ Under the Bangkok Agreement signed on December 15, 1999, a nuclear-free zone was also established in the Northern-Eastern Asia.⁴

The experts are discussing a possibility of establishing such zones in the Central Asia and in the Near East.⁵ All this demonstrates the importance and positive impact of nuclear-free zones on the situation in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, support of peace, security and stability in the world.

In contrast to the successful attempts to establish the nuclear-free zones in many regions of the world, the similar attempts undertaken in Europe have not been successful, although the idea of such a zone from the very beginning was closely connected with Europe and for the first time the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone was officially formulated with reference to Europe. The first proposal to restrict the deployment of nuclear weapons in some regions, which was submitted by the UN in 1956, referred to the Central Europe. In 1957 it was proposed to remove all nuclear weapons from the Central Europe. This initiative entered into the history of international relations as “Rapatsky’s Plan” named after the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland. The plan has not been supported by NATO member-countries, which treated it as an attempt of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to deprive the West of the means to restrain a possible Soviet military aggression in Europe.⁶

³ Trust and Verify. - № 65. - 1996. April - P.4.

⁴ Trust and Verify. - № 63.- 1996. - January.-P.1.

⁵ See: Nuclear Control. - № 20-21. - Moscow, 1996. - P.26-30.

⁶ History of Diplomacy.- Vol.5, Book 1. - Moscow, 1974. - P.729.

An attempt to revive this idea in the other historical conditions was made in 1982, when it was proposed to establish a nuclear-free corridor in the Central Europe. Borders of the corridor have not been connected with the state borders, and no security assurances have been envisaged. This proposal may be considered as an attempt to establish a shield against the automatic escalation of any conflict in Europe and its transformation into the large-scale collision of NATO and Warsaw Treaty member-countries with the employment of nuclear weapons, which would have caused catastrophic consequences.⁷ Actually, this measure was aiming to separate the nuclear forces of both military and political alliances, which opposed each other in Europe. These proposals failed mainly because the West was afraid of the advantage of the conventional forces of the Warsaw Treaty member-countries in Europe. NATO's strategy in Europe was based on the readiness to employ the nuclear weapons to fight the Warsaw Treaty Organization troops, which had essential advantages over the Alliance forces, especially in tanks.

In spite of the failure, these attempts, as well as different anti-nuclear movements in the European states, have been preparing the ground for the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone. A new life has been infused into the idea of nuclear weapons-free zone under the new conditions, which have been characterized by the end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the Soviet Union, absence of the tactical nuclear weapons in the centre of Europe and implementation of Ukraine and Belarus' decisions to become non-nuclear states. Its revival has been prompted by the applications from the Central European countries – former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization – to join NATO.

NATO's enlargement to the East has radically changed the entire strategic situation in Europe, and opened new possibilities for security but at the same time

⁷ Prawitz J. From Nuclear Option to Non-Nuclear Promotion: The Sweden Case. Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1994. - P.75.

strengthened the potential threats. Specifically the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to the Alliance enlarged the NATO borders further to the East and opened a potential possibility of nuclear weapons deployment in these countries. This possibility, although a hypothetical one, annoyed Russia, and was bitterly perceived in Ukraine and Belarus, which voluntarily refused from the huge nuclear potential.

NATO's enlargement aggravates the problem of geopolitical choice of Ukraine, narrows the space for maneuvers and forces to take decisions under the pressure of time. This process contains a range of potential threats for Ukraine, but opens new possibilities in the future.

Due to NATO's enlargement, Ukraine became the object of a large political game. As J. Matlock, the former US Ambassador, rightly pointed out in his interview to the American TV channel C-SPAN in November 1995, NATO's enlargement will place Ukraine into an almost impossible situation. She will find itself in the "security vacuum" between the two poles of force with assurances instead of the legally binding security guarantees and with no allies. Not wishing to get under the Russian "nuclear umbrella" and not having a chance to accede to NATO at least in the nearest future, Ukraine appears in a rather complicated situation. Its strategic vulnerability will increase due to the increase of pressure on the side of Russia, which has many means of influencing Ukraine – both economic (and, first of all, the dependence on the Russian energy sources) and political, which has been demonstrated by the new leadership of Russia, which aspires to unite as many post-Soviet countries as possible under its supervision, using a motto of the "battle with terrorism", in particular. Russia aims to involve Ukraine into the Tashkent Pact and in this way to enhance its positions with reference to the Alliance.

The priority as to the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Europe under the new historical conditions is taken by Belarus. On April 18, 1995 at the New York

Conference on Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belarus V Sin'ko proposed to create a nuclear-free zone in the Central Europe.⁸

This idea was treated with no interest by the West for a number of reasons, in particular, because the international reputation of Minsk at that time started to deteriorate sharply and because the Belarus policy was considered by many to be very pro-Russian. Yet, Russia's reaction also was not enthusiastic, and Moscow decided to support this initiative only a few months after.

Russia extremely negatively perceived the prospect of NATO's enlargement to the East, seeing it as an attempt of the West to redistribute the spheres of influence in Europe and isolate Russia. There exists an anti-NATO consensus within the wide spectrum of political forces – from the Communists to the right nationalists. At the same time the authorities use the issue of NATO enlargement to enforce its positions and to divert the attention of population from social and economic problems of the country. In spite of signing the Fundamental Act with NATO in July 1997, which may be considered as recognition of the new European realities pre-conditioned by several reasons, Russia is categorically against the very possibility of nuclear weapons' appearance on the territories of Central and Eastern European states.

Apart from Russia's objections, NATO's position on the possibility of nuclear weapons deployment in the Central and Eastern Europe was influenced by some other factors as well. In particular, it is a fear of non-regulated problems, which existed between the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe due to the stormy history. Concern about the possible complication of relations between these states has been reflected in the Study on NATO Enlargement, which was published in 1995. Its authors maintained that there was no "a priori requirement on nuclear weapons to be deployed in the territories of the new member-states",

⁸ DOC. NPT/CONF. 1995/SR. 3,10.

however, they pointed out that the “new member-states will share the benefits and responsibility for this as much as the other members of the Alliance”.⁹

In view of the negative impact of NATO’s enlargement on the relations between the Alliance and Russia, and in view of the complication of situation for Ukraine and the other states, it seems to be fully justifiable to look for a compromise formula, which would take account of hopes of countries aspiring to join NATO as soon as possible, of pursuit of the West to preserve stability and would also take account of Russia’s objections and concerns of Ukraine and the other countries, which find themselves into the so-called “buffer zone”.

From that point of view it would be ideal if the Alliance transformed into the foundation of the general European security system and re-focused its activities from the military to the political area. Such evolution of NATO seems to be inevitable in the long-term period, but current leaders of the Alliance and its member-states are not ready for that. Therefore, the most optimal decision from the point of view of the current situation will be to develop a number of compromises reducing tension following the Alliance enlargement plans. A special place among these compromises is occupied by the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Central and Eastern Europe.

A specific position as to the nuclear weapons-free zone is taken by the countries, which wanted to accede to NATO. Unlike in 1994-1995, when Warsaw and Prague have been openly expressing their readiness to accept the nuclear weapons of NATO, on the eve of joining the Alliance the leadership of these countries took a more careful stand. Explaining his unreadiness to discuss the idea of a nuclear-free zone, the President of Czech Republic, V. Gavel said that his country “would like to become a NATO member-state without any reservations”. This was due to the fear to damage the genuine prospect of joining NATO. At the same time he underscored: “I do not see a reason why NATO

⁹ Study on NATO Enlargement. Brussels, 1995. - September. - Paragraph 58.

should deploy its nuclear weapons on the territories of its new member-states”.¹⁰ Simultaneously, some countries, and Poland in particular, have been unofficially discussing a possibility of refusal to deploy the nuclear weapons in its territory, the way Norway did.¹¹

It looked almost definite that neither of the applying countries will venture to support the idea of a nuclear-free zone before it accedes to the Alliance. And after joining NATO they will be governed, first of all, by the stand of the Western allies, and primarily of the United States of America.

The USA has drafted a number of conditions, under which the idea of any zone can count on the US support. The key conditions among them are represented by the requirement that the establishment of a future nuclear weapons-free zone must be initiated by the countries of this region; that all countries whose participation is considered to be important must be involved in the nuclear weapons-free zone; that zone establishment should not reflect adversely on the existing security agreements, on the regional or international security, or restrict the right of the individual and collective self-defence in line with the UN Charter.¹²

Both the fear of states, which wanted to join NATO, and consequently avoided to support the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone, since they did not want to risk the true prospect of joining this organization or to become the “second sort” members, and the possibility of damaging the freedom of actions of the Alliance itself, which will immanently lead to its weakening - could be seen by the US as an obstacle to the support of a nuclear-free zone establishment in the Central and Eastern Europe.

That particular stand of the United States, which do not accept the idea of zones, will be critical for the future of this country. Washington was ready to

¹⁰ Holos Ukrainy.- 1996. - November 6.- P.5.

¹¹ Den - 1996. - December 6. - P.3.

¹² Arms Control Today. - 1993. - P.3.

confirm the existing status quo as to the deployment of the nuclear weapons in Europe. During the meeting of V.Horbulin with the US Defence Secretary W.Perry in September 1996 the latter was assuring the Ukrainian guest, that NATO does not intend to deploy nuclear weapons in the territories of countries, which will join the Alliance.¹³

The attitude of the Northern Atlantic Alliance to the nuclear weapons-free zone in the Central and Eastern Europe was also determined by the US stand. The General Secretary of NATO J.Solana also made a statement about “no necessity” to deploy nuclear weapons in the states, which will become members of the Alliance.¹⁴

On December 10, 1996 the Northern Atlantic Council Communique stated: “The enlargement of the Alliance shall not require changes in modern disposition of the nuclear forces of NATO, due to which NATO member-states do not have intention, plans and reasons to deploy nuclear weapons in the territories of the new members...”. At the same time the Communique stressed that the new members “shall be fully-fledged members of the Alliance in all respects, and it is expected that they will support the concept of deterrence and the necessary role played by the nuclear weapons in the strategy of the Alliance”.¹⁵

For Ukraine the consequence of NATO’s enlargement to the East will be represented by complication of the strategic situation, increase of pressure on the side of Russia, and the necessity to look for the countermeasures and compromises to protect her national interests against the background of a time-handicap in the question of final resolution of its foreign policy orientation. This has led to the attempts to delay NATO’s enlargement, make this process

¹³ Uriadovy Kurier. - 1996. - September 26. - P.2.

¹⁴ Izvestiya . - 1997. - March 7. - P.3.

¹⁵ Meeting the Challenges of a Post-Cold War World: NATO Enlargement and US-Russia Relations. A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, by Joseph R.Biden, Jr., 105th Cong., May 1997.-Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1997. - P.41.

evolutionary, negotiate concessions to be made by the Alliance in the matter of expanding its infrastructure to the East, including with the nuclear weapons.

During the first years of independence the policy of Ukraine as to the use of the political possibilities, given by the Soviet nuclear arsenal share deployed in its territory, was not overly successful. Having transferred its tactical nuclear weapons under the pressure of Russia, the leadership of Ukraine tried to use the strategic systems deployed in the territory of the country to strengthen its independence. This policy has been partially successful, because Ukraine was not granted any legally binding security assurances she needed. She also failed to use to a full extent the political capital, which she gained in the world by way of eliminating a potential threat of the nuclear weapons proliferation and by way of declaring its non-block status. The Ukrainian policy has also lacked the initiative.

In spite of the lost possibilities, Ukraine enjoys the unique position from the point of view of a possible compromise, connected with NATO enlargement. Generally positive image of Ukraine in the West and its geopolitical position make it an optimal source of initiatives referring to the most urgent problems, which will appear in the wake of the Alliance's enlargement to the East. Among such initiatives, the key one is the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Central and Eastern Europe. In this issue Ukraine has at least parallel interests with Russia and the other CIS states. This idea is supported by the practically general consensus of all branches of power and political forces in Ukraine.

President L.Kuchma in the statement, made in connection with the completion of nuclear warheads transfer from Ukraine, pointed out that "liquidation of nuclear weapons deployed in the territory of Ukraine will give a unique possibility to implement the idea of a nuclear-free Central and Eastern Europe – from the Black Sea to the Baltic one". Establishment of such a zone underscored the President of Ukraine, "will facilitate the development of the

atmosphere of trust between the countries of the region and will considerably reduce the threat of new dividing lines in the European continent”.¹⁶

This idea has been supported by the legislative power. The former Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine O.Moroz in his speech at the plenary meeting of the 5th session of the OSCE Interparliamentary Assembly in Stockholm on July 8, 1996 said: “We attach particular importance to the process of establishing nuclear-free zones in the OSCE region”.¹⁷

At the same time, the leadership of Ukraine clearly demonstrated that Ukraine would not accept the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of the states, future members of NATO, which do not have any such weapons now. The former Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council V. Horbulin stressed that “even a theoretical possibility” of such a deployment “is taken critically by Ukraine”, which considers the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region to be “very vital”.¹⁸

The Chairman of the Defence and State Security Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine was even more categorical in saying that when Ukraine was acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the guarantor-states promised that the nuclear weapons would not be deployed in the territories of the other European states in the future, and in case this promise is violated “the Ukrainian Parliament will have the right to raise the issue of reclaiming the tactical nuclear weapons (owned by Ukraine) from Russia”.¹⁹

Trying to obviate the “buffer zone” status, Ukraine was aspiring to sign the agreement on special partnership with NATO and considers it to be the first step to her future integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine H.Udovenko underscored: “Formalization of

¹⁶ Uriadovy Kurier. - 1996. - June 6. - P.2.

¹⁷ Holos Ukrainy. - 1996. - July 11. - P.2.

¹⁸ Uriadovy Kurier. - 1996. - August 22 - P.3.

¹⁹ Holos Ukrainy. - 1996. - October 17. - P.3.

relations with NATO is considered by us to be a step on the way to a full-scale integration with the European and Atlantic structures”.²⁰

Further evolution of developments has shown that the idea of nuclear-free zone in the Central and Eastern Europe has become a small coin in the geopolitical opposition between the United States and Russia. Russia, which viewed the Belarus initiative in 1995 and the active attempt of Ukraine to initiate the implementation of the nuclear-free zone in Europe with little interest, has actively supported the “second wording” of the Belarus initiative. This time the President of Belarus mentioned the idea of the nuclear-free territory in the Central and Eastern Europe.²¹

One can share the view of the Ukrainian researcher V.Chumak, who maintains that Russia treated negatively the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the Central and Eastern Europe, because it did not want to restrict its ability to deploy and to use nuclear weapons in the conditions when its conventional armed forces were degrading and the ratio of forces has changed due to NATO’s enlargement. It also did not want to give political support to Kyiv, but at the same time it did not want to oppose this popular idea. This understanding explains the absence of reaction to the Ukrainian initiative and support of the Belarus initiative, which must have been agreed with the Moscow. The anticipated absence of the Western reaction to the Belarus initiative has given space to Russia for maneuvering.²²

The absence of interest of the key actors – USA and Russia - has led to the failure to implement the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Europe in the middle of the 90s. But this does not mean that it has been completely taken off the agenda and “buried”. And Ukraine will never initiate a refusal from the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Central and Eastern Europe.

²⁰ Den. - 1997. - March 4.- P.4.

²¹ Katsva M. Conference in Minsk // Nuclear Control.-1997.- May. - № 29. - P.4-5.

²² Chumak V. Nuclear Strategy of the USA: From Surpassing to Non-Proliferation. - Kyiv, 1999.- P.162.

The question of a future zone delineation, and legal obligations of the member-countries etc can become the subject of negotiations in the future, but Ukraine should not refuse from the idea of a nuclear-free zone, and just remain satisfied with NATO promises not to deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of the new member-states in the peace-time. NATO member-states view the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Central and Eastern Europe with very little interest, especially the USA, yet the impossibility of its support by the Central European states at the present stage does not mean that Ukraine has to refuse from it. Ukraine must proceed only from her own long-term national interests. Further nuclear disarmament and restriction of regions for nuclear weapons deployment, refer to the category of phenomena which correspond to the national interests of Ukraine – the state which deliberately became a non-nuclear weapons state and under the present conditions appeared in the so-called “grey zone” of security. Such zone exists *de facto* and it would be irresponsible not to try to seal it *de jure*. Even if today this does not look very realistic, in a few years the situation may totally change due to the modern dynamic conditions and the zone will become an integral part of the future general European security system.

Objections against the zone, like the one which says that the nuclear tactical means may be quickly deployed in the centre of Europe, and that therefore the nuclear zone is not worth anything, raise the issue of the international and legal foundations of relations in the modern world. According to this logic, many treaties on the strategic nuclear forces may appear to be doubtful, and some of them – like agreements on mutual non-targeting of the strategic missiles will be totally senseless. Yet, the effectiveness of such agreements has been confirmed by the long-standing experience, and one cannot overestimate the meaning of stability and trust in the modern world.

Consistency and predictability of the foreign policy of Ukraine, the battle for her national interests will allow her to occupy a deserved place in Europe and the world.

Valeriy Kopyyka

**NATO AND EU ENLARGEMENT TO THE EAST IN
THE CONTEXT OF INTERESTS OF UKRAINE
IN FORMATION OF A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM**

We are witnessing a fundamental transformation of the system of international relations. The future of the mankind does not depend any longer on the balance of the two antagonistic systems, which was typical for the period of opposition between the West and the East during the Cold War times. The present multi-centred system of the world policy is characterized by a whole range of centres of attraction and influence: powerful world state – United States of America; countries of the European Union which comprehensively extend the process of the European integration; Russia. The powerful and influential poles of attraction are being actively established in the Southern and Eastern Asia as well as in the Asian and Pacific region. In the modern world, which is characterized by the accelerated dynamics of the development, one can see the new dominants of economic, social and political, and cultural development of the mankind, which will determine the features of the future. The new states and their groups, which wish to gain a foothold in the geopolitical space of the planet, are now entering the world arena, which causes change in configuration of the international relations.

Dissolution of the powerful quasi-empire of the USSR resulted in the creation of a “grey security zone” delimited by the borders of the “young democracy” countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. The vacuum of force, leads to the battle and to the conflict of interests of the great western states members of NATO and EU, and Russia, which inherited imperialistic ideas of the USSR’s domination. Within these states one can observe the tendency of a clash between the ethnic communities. In order to prevent these negative tendencies a

Euro-Atlantic civilization is being artificially created. The latter is one of the main constituents of the European Security environment, which, together with challenges to the interests of the states representing it, will stimulate the development of the military and political cooperation of NATO and EU member-states.

Appearance of the new challenges and threats to the security of the European countries, specifically, the domestic ethnic and national conflicts, ecological catastrophes, international terrorism, proliferation of the conventional and nuclear weapons etc. essentially transform the security concept. From the practical point of view, the security concept is being defined of late as the state of security in any country achieved by a possibility to resolve problems and crises by way of the diplomatic dialogue and comprehensive co-operation between the countries having different interests in the security area. Employment of the military force and compulsion measures will be necessary only in the cases agreed by the world community, by way of entering into the appropriate international legal agreements.²³ A principle, which is vitally important for the formation of the European security system, is deducted from this postulate – the principle of the indivisibility of security. According to the author, its main idea is to take account of interests of all countries of the European continent while establishing a security system, irrespective of their force potential. Then the question arises what the security system is. In structural relation, the measures taken by some institutions and organizations and their interconnected actions would be usually called the European security system²⁴. In this context the European Security Environment (ESE) is a practically and geographically filled concept based on the above-mentioned principles and regularities, and representing a clearly geographically outlined territory, where the European

²³ Challenges to Human Security. - Finnish Institute of International Affairs. - 1997. - Pages 1-4.

²⁴ Oudenaren D. Ukraine and European Security. International Seminar in Odessa, 22-25 November, 1996. "American View of the European Security. - P.17.

regional security system operates and protects the European countries from the domestic and foreign threats, but at the same time allows every member-state to develop politically and economically, which in its turn objectively takes account of the interests of societies within these countries. An effective operation of the ESE as the European regional security system in the clearly defined territory is ensured by the global, transatlantic, regional, sub-regional, inter-state organizations, unions and institutions.

The theory of the European Security Environment is able to modify continuously and harmoniously. Today its geographic determinants stretch beyond the European borders, stressing participation of all member-countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and transformation of the idea of atlantism. The idea of the European and transformed atlantism is being presently established on the basis of the proto-idea of Alexis de Tokville and the doctrine of deterrence by G.Kennan. In the political aspect it transforms into a new vision of the role of the main consolidating basis of the concept - North Atlantic cooperation and is implemented in the policy of strengthening the European colony of the North Atlantic Alliance with attraction of processes of enlargement of the EU, NATO to the East in line with vision of J.Solana and G.Robertson.²⁵ The development of events under this scenario from the very beginning included vital and problematic issues - shadow aggravation and deepening of disputes between the USA, a transatlantic leader from the one side, and France with Germany, political and economic leaders of the EU on the other side, with reference to the future level of the political and military aspects of integration, subordination and interaction within the framework of NATO agreement. This contradiction in views may become a delayed-action mine under the basement of the North Atlantic relations. The only catalyst, which can accelerate and cause a quick explosion is the economic and political competition of the EU and the USA, enforced by the

²⁵ Tolstov S.. After the Cold War // Politics and Time. - 1999. - № 4. - P.9.

differences of the political stands and interests relating to the support of peace in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and especially on the Balkans. If NATO enlargement is held without a prior serious reform of the Alliance and without introduction of changes into the NATO Treaty, the peaceful expansion may develop from the process of stabilization into the uncontrollable process of the Central and Eastern Europe's split. Partition of zones of geopolitical influence between Russia, EU and USA, for instance the Balkans example, potentially threatens that the main geopolitical assignment of the rarity military block's survival will remain to be the search for NATO's enemy.²⁶ Attempts to change the role of the Alliance in the New Strategic Concept have caused the violation of the UN Charter and of the main principles of the international law during the last "peacekeeping operation" in the Balkans. Having ruined the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia economically and politically, the Allied Forces did not remove neither the threat of a catastrophe, nor the undemocratic regime of S.Milosevic. Air strikes and support of Albanians only aggravated the ethnic and national hostility, and revealed the new lines of the world division. The demonstrated weakness makes Russia and China look for the ways of creating political and military alliances with the countries which treat the USA and NATO domination as a direct threat to their national security and existence.²⁷ In the global geopolitical understanding, creation of a Euro-Atlantic civilization by the countries of Europe and North America, characterized by the Christianity domination will force the Muslim countries of the Middle East to consolidate quickly with the radically-minded countries of the Near East. All these destructive tendencies of the development have nothing in common with the effective and indivisible security system in Europe. The countries of Europe must primarily focus on the prevention of establishment of a security system which has

²⁶ Matseiko Y. NATO: New Possibilities and New Dangers // Politics and Time. - 1999. - № 4. - P.15.

been in existence for 50 years. An opposition factor should not serve to consolidate the Euro-Atlantic system from inside, even if there is a powerful Euro-Atlantic nucleus which is able to protect itself from the outside threats. The approach, which envisages the establishment of the system on the opposition basis is a false one, since it leads to the construction of an awry monolith of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Maximization of the outside threats in order to stimulate the development of cooperation with no resolution of problems of the increasing pressure of ethnic and national crises, will detonate the explosion in the nucleus countries, which wasted all their resources but could not find the effective mechanisms of crisis regulation.

This distribution of the world politics undercurrents is a concealed precondition of the fact that Europeans, who see the necessity to resolve these key issues before the crisis appears, are trying to strengthen themselves and are aiming to achieve a far-reaching goal – to become a decisive member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Strategy of creating a powerful European security environment centre out of the developed Western European countries with the satellite spheres of the Central and Eastern European stable and democratic countries surrounding it is cementing the above-mentioned monolith from inside. This allows to ensure the maximum stability of the North Atlantic region while creating the effective security and air defence, and even more- to strengthen and to draw the Central and Eastern Europe out of the economic and political crisis together with the former Soviet republics. Leadership of the EU countries must understand that creation of a homogeneous single security environment requires the geographical and layer stratification of the security system and a gradual “overflow” – harmonious merger of the processes of “enlargement and deepening”. In this context it becomes clear why NATO, EU and Russia with its

²⁷ See: Gusarov Ye. European Security: The Role of Russia./Global Security on the Threshold to the Next Millennium. February 5-7, 1999 // 35th Munich Conference on Security Policy. Edited by Hornst Teltschik. Volume 1. Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz GmbH., 1999.- P. 61, 112.

allies are fighting for the influence in the Central and Eastern European countries. The attempt to fill the “security vacuum” made by the Central and Eastern European countries by way of joining NATO has caused the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, which in its turn, has caused a sharp counter-action of Russia. Russia was in the opposition because it suffered defeats in the Caucasus and was slowly losing its positions in the Central Asia, so it had to transfer to the policy which will stipulate, firstly, the restoration of its former influence in Europe, and secondly, in the countries of the Eastern Europe – former USSR republics and establish its political and military domination. The most important geopolitical interests of Russia are not connected with Europe, which is a distant goal of integration, but with the “*close foreign countries*”.²⁸ These interests, first of all, are relating to the reintegration of the post-Soviet territory. These steps remind us the processes of EU integration development. In case of Russia the centre of reintegration is represented by the union of Ukraine, possibly Baltic states, Belarus and Russia, desirable for the Russian strategists, either in the form of the union of states, or in the form of a single state. The latter two countries have already started the process of reintegration by signing an agreement on creation of an alliance of Belarus and Russia in 1999. Russia would be unable to exercise the former influence in Europe without this first step. Therefore, it is very important for Russia that NATO and USA recognize the Ukraine and Baltic Republics represent a zone, which is vitally important for Russia. Such recognition, given the Alliance agrees, will mean the actual division of spheres of influence in Europe, which for a long time will continue to be one of the key problems of the European security.

Analyzing the last transformation of a system of international relations, an outstanding Ukrainian researcher and analyst, Director of the National Institute of the Strategic Studies of Ukraine, O.Belov, stressed that “in view of the radical

²⁸ Dugin A. Foundations of Geo-Politics. - Moscow, 1993. - P.419-436.

changes, which took place over the last decade, it will be more accurate to speak about the multi-polar composition of geopolitical environment, which was created out of the virtually mono-polar composition of the world order, I mean the undoubted domination of the USA as the world leader.” He underscores that “under these conditions the priority task of Ukraine is to integrate organically into the European and world communities, and enter the multi-dimensional world of the complex international relations. Ukraine must find her own place in this environment, which would correspond to its potential of a great European state.”²⁹

At present the Ukrainian strategists understand that miscalculations in the foreign political course of the country may degrade the country’s status and transform it into the “buffer zone”.³⁰ The loss of initiative, after the nuclear weapons have been transferred out of the country in exchange for doubtful security assurances, will not give the state a possibility to be heard. The result of these factors - is the unattainability of positive results of diplomatic maneuvers during the establishment of a new security system without a strong “strategic partner”. This is why the chief principles of the foreign policy of Ukraine, which have been clearly defined and outlined by the basic documents of the state: Declaration of the State Sovereignty of July 16, 1990, The Guidelines of Foreign Policy of Ukraine of July 2, 1993 and the Constitution of Ukraine of August 28, 1996, specifically, consistency, openness, deliberation, predictability and, at the same time, a “multi-polarity” of the foreign policy, need to be revised and updated. One of the chief problems of the country and society’s development is the “multi-polarity” interpretation, which is restricted in practice by the two factors – Russia and the West. Presence of the two “strategic partners” – USA and Russia, which have fundamentally different interests, enforces the post-

²⁹ Ukraine 2000 and Later: Geopolitical Priorities and Development Scenarios. National Security and Defence Council. National Institute of Strategic Studies. National Institute of Ukrainian and Russian Relations. - Kyiv. - 1999. - P.6.

³⁰ Bukkvoll T. Ukraine and European Security. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. - 1997. -P.1-3.

Soviet syndrome of confrontation and search for the new enemy, whoever it might be – NATO or Russia. This, in its turn, aggravates the battle of the chief domestic political forces in the country and directly and or indirectly slows down the development of progressive foreign policy trends of the state – integration with the most democratically and economically developed western European society. In spite of all these negative social tendencies on the way to the democratic and market transformation, recognition of cardinal changes in all spheres of life on the threshold of centuries pre-conditions the review of the “multi-polarity”³¹ concept of Ukraine in the post-bipolar world and outlines the only principal “strategic goal” – integration into the European structures. The President Kuchma in his Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2000 “Ukraine: Stepping into XXI Century. Strategy of Economic and Social Development for 2000-2004” underscored that “the basic foundation for our further development is the European choice..., rapprochement with the European Union...”³². Ukraine, in spite of her economic indicators, has good chances to be harmoniously and almost mandatorily involved into the system of the European security by the Western countries. The international community has frequently called it a “key European country”³³ and according to J.Solana it is “a country with an absolutely unique role in the support of the continent’s stability”.³⁴ Today Ukraine is playing and will continue playing a bigger role in the formation of a new system of the collective security. To that end there exist at least four chief geopolitical pre-conditions: Ukraine, as it was already mentioned, is a key state in the completion of process of the post-Soviet territory reintegration conducted by Russia; Ukraine and Romania become missing links of strengthening the

³¹ Udovenko H. Foreign Policy of Ukraine // Diplomacy of Modern Ukraine. - Kyiv, 1997. - P.37.

³² Kuchma L. Nation is Glorified by Great Goals and Deeds. - Kyiv, 2000. - P.36.

³³ Mroz J.E. and Pavliuk O. Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin // Foreign Affairs. - Vol.75, № 3. - 1996, May/June. - P.59.

³⁴ Zerkalo Nedely. - 1996. - 6-12 April.

southern borders of NATO enlargement³⁵; Ukraine supports the establishment of new security structures in the East, especially in the Caucasian and Central Asian regions, since this forms the necessary balance for deterring of some pro-imperialistic forces which still have significant influence on the policy of the great country; Ukraine unites Europe with the newly-independent states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from the cultural, political and economic point of views, and in prospect creates a new situation in the area of security as well as ensures establishment of the favourable balance of forces in the region. The future of Europe and construction of the effective system of the transatlantic security depends on the clear stand of the West on the issue of relation to the countries, which have emerged on the ruins of the USSR. According to Z.Brzezinski, any attempts of the Russian Federation to isolate and to subordinate Ukraine with the help of the Moscow citadel in Crimea (along with invasion into the Baltic states) must be considered to be a motive for the comprehensive assistance of the West.³⁶ Support of the states from the Baltic and Black Sea zones must become a strategic goal of the West. In the geopolitical dimension it is important for Ukraine to stabilize as a strong independent country of the Central Europe, which in its turn will consolidate the hopes for evolution of the Russian Federation as a democratic European state. Therefore, an important component of the western strategy in the Central Europe today is the support of economic and political consolidation of Ukraine.³⁷ In this respect, the main strategic mistake of the EU and NATO, during the formation of the European security system, in relations with the “grey zone” countries, is that in this area the western countries employ economic profiles instead of the strategic

³⁵ Babiuc V. Further Enlargement of NATO / Global Security on the Threshold to the Next Millennium. February 5-7, 1999 // 35th Munich Conference on Security Policy. Edited by Hornst Teltschik. Volume 1. Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz GmbH. 1999. - P. 74, 112.

³⁶ See Brzezinski Z. Great Chessboard. - Moscow, 1998. - P.108-142.

³⁷ See. Ukraine 2000 and Further: Geopolitical Priorities and Development Scenarios. National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. National Institute of Strategic Studies. National Institute of Ukrainian-Russian Relations. Kyiv.- 1999.

ones, when they screen applications for participation in their chief security institutions. One can see the fallibility of this approach on the example of Ukraine, with relation to which the policy of the economically weak Russia seems to be more successful than the similar actions of the EU and NATO countries.

Analysis of the economic indicators of Ukraine shows that it has the closest relations with Russia. Ukrainian export to Russia constitutes 24.3%, while the share of Russian import in the general amount of imports to Ukraine reaches 56.1%. For comparison – the share of German import to Ukraine constitutes 5.3%, and of Ukraine’s export to Germany – 6.7%. Debt of Ukraine to Russia remains to be one of the most vital problems of the Russian and Ukrainian relations. Ukraine, as one of the chief consumers of the Russian energy sources buys 30% (57.2 billion cubic meters) of the total amount of gas export by Russia, which constitutes 196.5 billion cubic meters.³⁸ Large dependence on Russia, especially of the Eastern industrially developed regions of Ukraine, increases the pro-Russian geopolitical feelings of population living in these regions. A concealed political reason for signing the Comprehensive Ukrainian-Russian Agreement was represented by Article 6, which restricts actions of the Parties to the Agreement with relation to the arrangements with the Third Party, if they contradict the interests of one of the Parties.³⁹ Since the Agreement will be valid for 10 years, Ukraine, over this period of time, shall not have the right to conclude the appropriate treaties on rapprochement (joining) NATO without the agreement of the Russian Federation. In its turn, provisions about the “crisis management consultative mechanism” which are present in the Ukraine-NATO Charter undoubtedly irritate Russia, because they do not correlate with Articles 2,3,4 of the Agreement on Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership between

³⁸ Interfax-Ukraine F/information a/input/Temp/19980617-442.

³⁹ Sherr J. Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Fleet Accords // Survival.- 1997. - Autumn. -Oxford University Press. - P. 40.

Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which confirms “territorial inviolability of the borders”, “respect to the territorial integrity of the Parties”, “non-employing of force and threat of force”, etc⁴⁰. Really, who needs creation of the “mechanism”, if the 1997 Agreement with Romania also confirms similar principles. Signature of the Black Sea Agreements between Ukraine and Russia permitted the Russian troops and weapons to be present on the territory of Ukraine, and created an objective situation when any independent, large-scale use of the Naval Force of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet of Russia may take place only under the secret control of Ukraine and Russia accordingly. Given the above facts, Ukraine is facing the major task – she should adjust her policy with reference to Russia, she should not violate the achieved priorities but should gradually spread them in the West, and re-focus on the full integration into the economic, political and stable EU environment⁴¹. The result of realization of this goal will directly depend on the support of these steps by the EU and NATO countries.

However, it becomes evident, that although Ukraine in her statement on the strategy of integration into the EU of June 11, 1998 mentioned about the necessity of “clear and comprehensive identification of the foreign political strategy as to the integration of Ukraine into the European political, economic and legal environment”⁴², at the present stage and in the medium-term perspective Ukraine finds herself aside from the major areas of the European co-operation. Even now, at the first stage of NATO enlargement and at the preparative EU stage, the reduction of her partnership rating is very conspicuous. The second half of the 90s is a period of transition to the new European architecture. The first practical step in this direction was represented by Poland,

⁴⁰ ITAR-TASS. - 1977. - 23 May. - in ibid.

⁴¹ See interview with V.Horbulin in: Politychna Dumka.- 1997. - June 5.

⁴² Strategy of integration of Ukraine into the European Union. Adopted by the Edict of the President of Ukraine of June 11, 1998 // Uriadovy Kurier. Orientir. Information Annex. - 1998. - June 18.

Czech Republic and Hungary's accession to NATO, and they will probably be followed by Romania and Slovenia. The zone of political influence of the "Partnership for Peace" programme covers the states of the Central and Eastern Europe and all the CIS countries (45 states altogether). Simultaneously, the EU is enlarging; it has started negotiations about accession with the Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia and Slovenia. Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Malta and Turkey represent the second group of candidates to accession; generally this constitutes 13 countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, at the beginning of the next millennium Ukraine will face a consolidated Europe consisting of the three groups of states: 19 members of NATO and EU; countries which closely collaborate with these organizations; Russia and Belarus in the opposition. Only two countries of the region differ from such conglomerate of the states: Ukraine and Moldova. Analyzing the above facts, it needs to be mentioned that, a general enlargement of the EU to the East without the involvement of Ukraine may shun it from the rest of the more developed Central European countries, and the new EU border may become a "demarcation line", which will be more insecure (for Ukraine), than for instance, it was expected due to NATO enlargement in 1992-95. The newest EU plan of the Northern and Eastern Europe stabilization stipulates the involvement of the five Balkan states into the European integration process by way of giving them a possibility to establish closer links with the EU, and again places Ukraine and Moldova out of the process of economic integration of Europe. Of course, the western neighbours of Ukraine, which are going to join the EU, will have to establish the new border regulations and introduce a tougher visa policy at the eastern borders. In autumn of 1999 the Czech Republic and Hungary announced that they are introducing a visa regime for the citizens of Ukraine. Such measures may undoubtedly ruin the trade and social contacts, as well as the international cooperation between Ukraine and the rest of the Central European

countries, and especially with Poland, the most open “Western” country for Ukraine⁴³.

The way out of this situation is a maximum concentration of all efforts of the country to deepen cooperation with the EU in all areas, which is presently characterized by the inertia and amorphousness.

Realization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in line with the Treaty on European Union, which came into force on November 1, 1993, was a significant step on the way to development of the European cooperation in the security area. The Treaty on European Union and the appropriate Maastricht declarations envisage, that the Western European Union will become an integral part in the development of the European Union construction, while the latter may request the Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement decisions or to take measures within the framework of the joint foreign and security policies, which have defence implications. In order to achieve consistency in the actions of the European Union, WEU and NATO, member-states of the European Union have been invited to accede to the WEU or to become observes, and the other European members of NATO, have been invited to become associated members of the WEU, the so-called “symmetrical membership”⁴⁴ in structures.

The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on May 1, 1999 envisaged realization of the Common Foreign Policy in the field of security, including the gradual creation of the Common European Defence Policy (CEDP). The Treaty also envisaged a possibility of the WEU integration into the European Union if the EU takes such decision. At the meeting in Cologne on June 3-4, 1999, the EU managed to identify the effective framework of the CEDP development. In December 1999 in Helsinki the essential progress has been achieved in the

⁴³ Phantom of Europe./Analytical Report.-Kyiv, 1999.- P.8.

⁴⁴ Matseiko Yu. NATO: New Possibilities and New Insecurities // Politics and Time. -1999.- № 4.- P.9-16.

solution of such important issues as borderlines of relations between the EU and NATO, and a possibility of participation of NATO member-states, which are not the EU members⁴⁵. After these two meetings the WEU accession to EU remains the issue of time only. One of the major tasks of the CEDP is creation of conditions for peace-keeping operations for crisis management under the auspices of the EU, and in particular, creation of a Rapid Reaction Corps consisting of 50,000 – 60,000 military by 2003⁴⁶.

Such tasks are being set at the time when the existing military structure of NATO in Europe includes: the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, Immediate Reaction Forces (Maritime), ACE Mobile Force. The important element of the Alliance adaptation to changes in Europe is the concept of the Multi-National Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) endorsed at the Brussels Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1994. If plans of creating the Rapid Reaction Corps do not envisage participation of the partner-states, the last CJTF concept allows strengthening the CJTF headquarters during some missions with the staff of other NATO headquarters, and also of the partner-states.

So the prospects of the CEDP development do not seem to be very attractive for Ukraine, if she is not invited to participate and does not become an associate partner. It is evident that relations between Ukraine and the EU are not as productive and developed as her relations with NATO. The only way to enhance relations with the Euro-Atlantic organizations in the field of security is to grant Ukraine a status of the WEU associated partner. The value of this status has sharply increased after the unambiguous statement made by J.Solana who said that it is necessary to invite the states-associated members to participate in the CEDP, and that he will exert every effort to achieve this⁴⁷.

⁴⁵ Fischer J. Perspectives of the Future Development of the Atlantic Alliance // Global Security on the Threshold to the Next Millennium. February 5-7, 1999 // 35th Munich Conference on Security Policy. - Ed. by Hornst Teltschik. Vol.1. - Berlin: Verlag Arno Spitz GmbH., 1999. - P 53, 112.

⁴⁶ Solana J. Wir bewegen uns mit Lichtgeschwindigkeit // Berliner Zeitung Freitag. - 2000. - 25 Februar. - S. 6.

⁴⁷ See: Ibidem.

The associated partners may participate in the joint military exercises and other operations, exchange information, and hold briefings and consultations on issues of common interest. In any case, if Ukraine becomes an associated member, this will not entail any difficulties for the EU, which it is afraid of, and which will appear if Ukraine becomes a EU member. However, this status could stabilize and strengthen a precarious position of this country in the Western structures of the European security.

However, the economic expediency of selection outweighs the strategic and geopolitical interest in Ukraine. Since the European Agreement on Association is necessary to receive this status, it is impossible for Ukraine to receive it, which incites her to deepen relations with Russia, which automatically damages the relations of special partnership with NATO and bilateral relations with NATO member-states, the majority of which are the EU members. Since “Ukraine participates in construction of the “top ceiling” of a new security architecture, which consists of the existing organizations and structures, particularly, OSCE, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, in their harmonious evolution”⁴⁸, that is since Ukraine is interested in creation of a system with no demarcation lines and since she proceeds from her foreign political security interests, she cannot support simultaneous establishment of the new competing systems of collective security, that is she should choose her “strategic partner”.

The way out of this situation lies in establishment of close relations between the chief actors of international relations due to the clash of geopolitical interests of actors of international relations. In our case these are the European Union and the United States of America. The USA is a self-evident ally of Ukraine in questions related to the CEDP, because this country tries to oppose the weakening of trans-Atlantic links by way of “deepening” the core integration of the European Security Environment of the Western European Countries of the

⁴⁸ Report of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine B.Tarasiuk in the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow, 18 November, 1998) // Politics and Time. - 1998. - № 11-12. - P.6.

EU, and will lobby the process of inviting the NATO programme-members to participate in the appropriate EU institutions and will diversify the single front of EU allies with the strategic partners of America. Besides, it is easier to accede to NATO in case if the “asymmetric accession” becomes possible, that is without accession to the EU, than to meet all the requirements of integration into the economic union of Europe. In case of the direct interest, Ukraine can rely on cooperation first of all with the USA in the field of the Armed Forces restructuring⁴⁹. Washington is interested to consolidate its positions in the oil region of the Caspian Sea, which makes Ukraine, due to her close GUUAM relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, an outpost of America in its battle with Russia for the huge oil deposits of the Caspian Sea and for the oil and gas fields of Kazakhstan. These interests, together with the “US strategic partner” status, consolidate the friendly relations of Ukraine with her two most important neighbours – Poland and Turkey. The Ukrainian experts consider the first as a priority partner. Really, Poland is the only consistent advocate of the Ukrainian interests in the Central and Eastern European region, and even in front of the EU. And it was Poland, which publicly declared that it would be ready to postpone the introduction of a visa regime on the eastern border of Ukraine, which is required by its western partners within the context of preparation for the EU membership.⁵⁰ Due to the common geopolitical interests and historical fortune, the role, which will be played by Poland for Ukraine, can be defined as “to Europe due to Poland”. This scheme is based on the influence of the Ukrainian independence factor on the stability of the Polish eastern borders. Relations with the other country – Turkey, which is a US special strategic partner - are almost similar to the above-mentioned ones. At present the scheme “to NATO with the help of Turkey” is supported by a number of the international agreements among

⁴⁹ Foreign Policy of Ukraine and Policy in the Field of Security 1999/2000. Monitoring of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine and Security Policy. - Kyiv: Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Cooperation Office in Ukraine of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2000. - P.11.

which it will be necessary to mention the Treaty on Cooperation in the Field of Military Training, Technology and Science” of July 27, 1994 and a package of nine agreements in the area of trade, military cooperation, protection of investments and health care signed on May 23, 1998 during the visit of the Turkish President to Kyiv. At the same time, cooperation of Ukraine with Turkey together with NATO keeps the latter in the sphere of the European orientation and simultaneously restrains the Turkish policy from slipping down to the positions of Islamic fundamentalism and expansion.

Among the powerful countries of the Western Europe, Ukraine has only two reliable supporters of her integration to the EU – the Netherlands and the chief initiator of the EU enlargement to the East – Germany. These two countries are the main investors of Ukraine. As of January 1, 1998, direct Dutch investments in Ukraine made USD 213.3 million, and German investments – USD 179.2 million. As of January, 1, 1999, these indicators achieved USD 264.1 million (9.5% of the total foreign investments in Ukraine) and USD 231.8 million (8.3%)⁵¹. However, the visit of the new Federal Chancellor, G.Schröder, to Ukraine in July 1999 demonstrated that the German party was hardly interested in the discussion of the strategic problems with Ukraine, and of the European integration, in particular. Yet the attention was focused on the local issues. No political documents have been signed.

Summing up the achievements and errors of the Ukrainian contribution into the construction of a new system of the European security, it needs to be mentioned that Ukraine has one alternative possibility to make the military and political structures of NATO and EU interested in her accession to these organizations. Implementing the programmes of economic and political reforms even only to approach the relevant EU standards, Ukraine must achieve

⁵⁰ Ibidem. - P. 10.

⁵¹ Phantom of Europe. Analytical Report. -Kyiv, 2000. - P.9

maximum success in the formation of the sub-regional security structures by way of filling the vacuum which will be left before the beginning of the second wave of NATO enlargement and the first wave of the EU one. Although NATO intends to exert its influence on all countries of the Eastern Europe, the mechanism of such an influence so far is not available, with exception of the PFP programme. If the second wave of the Alliance's enlargement does not follow the first one, the better way to strengthen the European security will be to create the outposts of stability in the sub-regions of the Eastern Europe. This may transfer the line of confrontation and instability between NATO and Russia in the Eastern Europe into the arc of stability. To that end it will be necessary to have a country, which will perform the role of an outpost in this sub-region, the policy of which, strengthened by the NATO and EU countries, will be directed to regulate the conflicts, and to strengthen the stability and security in the region. Geopolitical position of Ukraine, as it was mentioned earlier, will give her a possibility to exert the stabilizing influence on the possible conflict areas, such as Moldova, Belarus, Russia, Caucasian and Black Sea region, all the European part of the post-Soviet territory.

If Ukraine chooses the following course, she will have great chances to implement it successfully. A leading role of Ukraine in the two regions – Eastern European and the Black Sea one – will guarantee that the Russian plans of consolidation and reintegration will depend on her policies, and that she will have a potential to influence the correlation of forces formed between the West and Russia. If Ukraine manages to create a strategic chain Brussels-Warsaw-Kyiv in the northern direction and Brussels-Ankara-Kyiv chain in the southern direction, and becomes the last link in the strategic chain of the European security Brussels-Warsaw-Kyiv-Ankara, she will automatically become a key outpost of stability creating the arc which can be later joined by lines Kyiv-Kishinev, and Kyiv-Tbilisi-Azerbaijan. The above construction has been reflected in the idea of

creating the Baltic and Black Sea Union. Transfer of the development of cooperation within the framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization to the qualitatively new level of military and political collaboration assumes important significance in the field of security. GUUAM structure evidently lacks such an aspect.

Summing up the above material, we would like to point out that Ukraine has two ways of entering the European security system. The first one is to implement reforms, achieve economic growth and join the EU harmoniously by way of meeting all the requirements of the European Union. In our view, this way will take several decades. The second way – is to become an outpost of the stability and security, and to realize the latter geopolitical construction. The key states, cooperation with which will bring success, will be, or more precisely, will remain to be Poland, Turkey, Baltic states, Russia and Belarus. That is the countries, the expedience of cooperation with which is proved by the historical, economic and political relations. If Ukraine together with her partners manages to consolidate and to stabilize the “grey zone” of security, she will help the core states of the European Security Environment to unite around them a satellite halo of countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. This will automatically become a condition for accession to the EU or at least to the European Security Environment. The chief element of the process of bringing a country to the point of integration will be represented by acquisition of the status of an “associated WEU member” by way of achieving a lobbyist support from Washington, Berlin and Amsterdam. Ukraine should not lose touch with today’s reality; international political situation is changing very quickly. The state must learn not to seek after the illusive, idealistic goals, but should react to changes. The EU is going to meet with various economic and political crises relating to the dilemma of “enlargement” or “deepening”. A meeting of the Heads of States of the European Union and the USA, which recently took place in Lisbon, has highlighted the

differences in views of Washington and Brussels on the new American air defence system. In other words, one can see the beginning of crisis in the Euro-Atlantic relations. The policy of Russia is gradually becoming more weighed and clear with reference to the countries of the post-Soviet area. In these conditions Ukraine must finally decide on where to move, and proceed from the national interests of the country and not from the illusions and dreams.

RUSSIA, NATO AND THE WEST: WHAT KIND OF FUTURE?

At the turn of the millennium there are many questions to be answered about Russia's relationship with NATO and the West in general: What will Russia's role be in the new Europe? How can Russia and NATO build on their relationship with the eventual aim of strategic partnership? Will NATO and the West continue with their policy of expansion while excluding Russia from their policies? Has the distrust between NATO and the largest successor state of the Soviet Union - Russia finally been laid to rest now when the Cold War has been over for more than ten years?

Today the relationship between Russia and NATO is at a turning point. The relations between the Russian Federation and the alliance have been formally restored. The resumption of co-operation between Russia and NATO is the main result of the meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council at the level of Foreign Ministers, which took place on the 24 of May 2000 in Florence. The question, which is posed both in Russia and in Nato's member states is the following: how will this renewed relationship develop? Everybody seems to agree that in order to design a sound security architecture in the 21st century co-operation between these two major players is indispensable, only nobody seems to know what form this co-operation will take and how to manage the relationship between Russia and NATO.

For the years to come, we can presume, there will be a period of "peaceful co-existence", obliged co-operation, when the alliance will have some time of respite after the first wave of enlargement, time to become used to its new role and when Russia will concentrate more on her domestic problems and maybe adopt some new priorities in the field of her foreign and security policy. The co-

operation with NATO will be retained to the minimum necessary to prevent her isolation. In the longer term much will depend on the further transformation of the alliance, on the direction the Russian Federation will pursue in her internal and foreign policy, but more importantly a lot will depend on the political will from both sides to build a genuine partnership which is based not only on declarations but also on mutual commitment and on the desire to build a stable security environment in Europe.

Unfortunately, today the political will on both sides is lacking and the confidence on each side about what the other will and will not do on its own that affects the first side's interests is not yet there and it might never be, given the mistrust to overcome.⁵²

NATO is still viewed In Russia as an anti-Russian coalition. Most Russians are hostile and distrustful towards the alliance. There is a widespread consensus in Moscow that NATO's stated intention of developing a genuinely co-operative relationship cannot be trusted, and that the alliance seeks rather to marginalize and exclude Russia from European and international affairs.⁵³ The general feeling among public opinion and group elites is that NATO and the United States are deliberately exploiting Russia's weakness and undermining her efforts to make progress in order to keep her dependent upon the international financial institutions and that they are denying Russia a major role in developing the energy resources of the Caspian Basin and are limiting her access to the international arms and high-technology markets. Most Russians believe that the West and NATO's goal is to reduce Russia to a third-rate power and raw materials appendage. NATO's enlargement and increasing emphasis on out-of-area operations have only reinforced the feeling that the alliance is anti-Russian and is trying to inflict damage on Russian interests. This anger, suspicion and

⁵² Hunter R. Solving Russia: Final Piece in NATO's Puzzle // *The Washington Quarterly*. - 2000. - Winter. - P.127

⁵³ Dannreuther R. Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations // *Survival*. - 1999-2000. - Winter. - P.151-160.

hostility, which most Russians feel towards NATO, will not disappear very quickly.

At the same time, Russia understands very well that she is obliged to co-operate with West European and Euroatlantic institutions. The main reason for this is, of course, Russia's current economic weakness. Russia is well aware of her dependence on the West, in the short term for credits to deal with a mounting debt problem, and in the long term for the investment and technology to modernise the country. But even if the economic weakness is the main reason, it is not the only one. The most significant external threats to Russian national security come from the south and east. Russia has similar concerns to the West about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and of the hegemonic challenges of a rising China. Russia is dependent on co-operation with the West to deal with all of these problems.⁵⁴ Also, despite widespread talk of Russia as a Eurasian power, the Russian political elite and public see their country primarily as a European power.⁵⁵ As Vladimir Putin said, "Russia was, is and will be a European country. The basic principles, on which Europe stands, are the same for Russia."⁵⁶ Russia needs to believe in herself and in her worth as an individual power, and her position in Europe is critical to this. The country identifies heavily with Europe and regrets bitterly the fact that she has not taken part in many of the major European developments which occurred in the last ten years: the gradual but irreversible integration of Europe through the expansion and deepening of the European Union and the emergence of NATO as Europe's central security organization. Russia realises

⁵⁴ Ibidem. - P.148.

⁵⁵ According to Alexei Arbatov, this doctrine which places Russia as an Eurasian power, different from the rest of Europe is nothing but a lame attempt to find a psychological explanation of all Russia's current problems. The fact that at the beginning of the 90's Russia did not succeed in "throwing" herself into capitalism, does not mean that the European path is alien to Russia. It is because the reforms were carried out in a wrong way, in an authoritarian manner, brutally towards the majority of population. Russia just "copied" the Western methods without thinking about the final aim and without their necessary adaptation. But it does not mean that Russia is not a European country. Russia is not some mixture of Europe and Asia and does not play a role of bridge between the two civilisations. - Arbatov A. Security: Russia's choice. - Moscow: Epizentr, 1999. - P.29-30.

⁵⁶ Izvestia. - 2000. - 30 May.

that for some decades it cannot become a member of either organization. But Russia does seek a relationship that will allow her to continue to influence developments in Europe.⁵⁷

The questions which are posed today in Russia are the following: are the West and NATO ready to make Russia part of the West and allow her to play an important role in the decisions related to the building of a new security architecture in Europe in the 21st century or will they forge ahead with their previous strategy of pursuing their own interests without taking into account the interests of Russia? Is the West ready to change its strategy towards Russia and seek real co-operation with her on an equal basis, or will it continue to consider this co-operation simply as a necessary instrument? Will Russia still be considered as “a potential aggressor by NATO and the West”⁵⁸? Will they seek a genuine partnership which is not limited to the level of declarations or continue to exclude Russia from European and international decision-making? ⁵⁹

For the moment, when the mutual mistrust between the alliance and Russia is still acute, there is a possibility of the reinforcement of co-operation between the European Union and Russia. The European Union is viewed more positively in Moscow and can help in the construction of a more co-operative engagement of Russia in European affairs. The EU also has now the opportunity to start its own process of enlargement and should take the lead from NATO in projecting itself to the east and admitting new members. In strong contrast to the issue of NATO membership the issue of EU membership has not been contested by Russia. The EU common strategy towards Russia approved at the Cologne Summit and the medium-term Strategy for development of relations between the

⁵⁷ U.S. - Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century. Report of U.S. Working Group on U.S. - Russian Relations, Thomas Graham & Arnold Horelick (000201bf7df2\$ad609898@int-ws0156.hq.nato.int).

⁵⁸ Vladimir Putin claims that Western leaders “remain all too often still in the grip of old notions and tend to picture Russia as a potential aggressor” // Monitor: A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States. - The Jamestown Foundation, 2000. -Volume 6, Issue 46, March 6.

⁵⁹ Interview with Dmitry Danilov, Head of the Department for European Security Studies, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, made in Moscow on May 17, 2000.

Russian Federation and the European Union adopted by Russia provide a possibility for increased co-operation in the political-military sphere, particularly if Europe is more active in developing its autonomous foreign policies and defence capabilities. Nevertheless, regardless of progress by the EU countries in their efforts to build a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a European Security and Defence Identity, the EU in 2010 is unlikely to have taken the place of NATO as the most relevant and effective security organization.⁶⁰ The EU-Russia forum for dialogue may become just a temporary channel, which can help to overcome the present coolness in the relationship between Russia and the West, but it would be a mistake to view it as a kind of alternative to the relationship between Russia and NATO. In fact, nothing can replace their co-operation in the military sphere. The NATO-Russia relationship remains a central important element of European Security. There are a lot of challenges in this world, which demand their co-operation: instability, ethnic violence, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental challenges. All these issues, and many others can be solved only by means of their mutual co-operation. And, despite the fact that the period of “peaceful co-existence” is unavoidable, taking into account the still present mistrust,⁶¹ NATO and Russia have to continue their dialogue and perhaps seek some new form of co-operation.

In this respect, Russia and NATO could already base their dialogue on three elements, which we shall discuss below.

First of all, they could review all the serious disagreements, which exist between them and focus their dialogue on the *differences* that divide them, and not only on their mutual interests, as it was the case in the past.

Such a change in the approach would be profitable not only for NATO and Russia, but also for the system of European security as a whole. Otherwise, it

⁶⁰ Heuven Marten van. NATO in 2010. Occasional paper. - The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1999. - August. - P.2.

⁶¹ Interview with Timofei Bordachev, Assistant Editor of the “Pro et Contra” magazine, Carnegie Moscow Center.

would be very difficult to speak about any adaptation of European security, because the interests of Russia and NATO would always clash. On the contrary, by discussing their differences, they might reach compromises.

A very good example of finding a compromise on the basis of disagreements is the Charter for European Security signed at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Istanbul summit in November 1999.

Perhaps, the principal achievement of the Istanbul summit consists precisely in the fact that the West and Russia, having met while their disagreements were acute, were able to make important mutual concessions.

Russia and her Western interlocutors differed on the conception of European security and the OSCE's role. The Russian side wanted the European Security Charter to secure the OSCE the central place in the new security system. The Western side proceeded from a completely different idea: the idea of NATO-centrism and some even wanted to deprive the Charter of its legal meaning and turn it into a mere declaration of 2 or 3 pages just to complement the new strategic conception of NATO. They wanted to limit the OSCE to a role of a supervisor of the processes in the post-Soviet and Balkan territories with purely operational functions. Its role at the time that allowed it to interfere at early stages, prevent conflicts, settle crises and post-conflict rehabilitation would have been removed.⁶² The final version of the Charter was a result of compromises that took into account the interests of both sides.

On the one hand, Russia had to renounce her long-standing idea of making of the OSCE the umbrella organization for all European security efforts. On the other hand, Russia succeeded in including in the Charter three significant provisions particularly important to her. First of all, consensus was upheld as the basis for OSCE decision-making. Secondly, the states reaffirmed their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and recognised "the primary

⁶² Chizhov V. The Istanbul Summit // International Affairs (Moscow). - 2000. - Vol.46, № 1. - P.68.

responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its crucial role in contributing to security and stability” in the region. Thirdly, even if Russia did not succeed in limiting the tendency in Europe towards NATO-centrism, at least she tried to hold back its most dangerous manifestations such as the Kosovo crisis. The West did not succeed in securing Kosovo as a precedent.⁶³ As it is laid down in the Charter “Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence”.

As the Istanbul summit showed, compromises are possible and the search for them should be taken as a basis for future development of the relationship between Russia and NATO.

The second element of the dialogue between Russia and NATO could be called pragmatic co-operation in the spheres of mutual interests. Moreover, such co-operation should be depoliticised. An example of such co-operation is the collaboration between NATO and Russia in Kosovo. Despite serious mutual disagreements, Russian peacekeeping forces are participating alongside the NATO-led Kosovo Force.

Other points of co-operation might be found in a similar manner.

Russia and NATO could continue consultations on non-proliferation issues, disarmament and arms control issues as well as on scientific co-operation. There is a lot of common ground between Russia and NATO on such issues as fighting against international terrorism and organised crime, drugs and arms trade as well as the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The third element, which is the most difficult but also the most necessary one, is the dialogue on the future prospects of the NATO-Russia relationship. This dialogue should be concrete without high-flown but empty declarations.

⁶³ Dmitri Danilov. Russia in the Great Europe: National Security Policy - Private communication.

Russia and NATO should decide today what kind of relationship they would like to have in the future. If it is a strategic partnership, then it must influence the whole system of their relations. The previous “strategic partnership” proved to be ephemeral, when tested by the first serious political crisis. In this respect the Kosovo crisis also gave some positive results: it allowed critical appraisal of relations between Russia and NATO and showed the urgent necessity of revising the whole structure of the relationship, which existed before. “The best that can be said about the Kosovo war’s effects on Russia-NATO relations is that it ended the era of myths, not only for politicians but also for the general public.”⁶⁴ Today Russia is no longer satisfied with the relationship proposed by the alliance. The Permanent Joint Council is viewed in Russia as a kind of “talking” shop, where Russia has no influence.⁶⁵ Therefore, if NATO and Russia decide to continue to build a strategic partnership, it would be necessary to find out some new kinds of mechanisms for constructing such a relationship. For example, one of the options could be the participation of Russia in the sessions of the decision-making bodies of the alliance with a deliberative vote. On the contrary, if Russia and NATO come to the conclusion that they cannot formulate mutual strategic goals for the future, if NATO is not ready to build its policy while taking into account the interests of Russia, then this should be said openly and clearly in order to avoid too high expectations of the other side, which undermine the whole system of their relations.

The main stumbling block between Russia and NATO is, without doubt, the further expansion of the alliance. Russia has become used to the idea that the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary are from now on a part of NATO. It is also

⁶⁴ Antonenko O. *Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo // Survival*. - 1999-2000. - Winter. - P.130.

⁶⁵ According to O.Antonenko: “...NATO leaders - including the major European powers - have never shown any long-term vision of, or genuine commitment to, integrating Russia into a new security system. Instead, they have offered a series of palliatives, such as the ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PFP) and the Permanent Joint Council, to soften Russia’s opposition to enlargement. It was important to keep Russia ‘on board’; the new mantra held that there cannot be any European security against Russia, only with Russia. What this meant in practical terms was hard to identify.” - Antonenko O. *Op.cit.* - P.126.

clear that the second wave of enlargement will take place, the only question is: when?

Today NATO maintains a specific dual strategy as to further enlargement. On the one hand, it reaffirms that the door remains open for NATO membership; on the other hand, it tries to slow down the process of enlargement in order to avoid altering the political and military character of the alliance.⁶⁶ However, as a result of this dual strategy, nobody can see the final destination of the process of expansion.⁶⁷ It seems that NATO is trying specially to confuse the issue, not making its final goal known. This policy of uncertainty only undermines the efforts to build a genuinely co-operative relationship with Russia. As long as NATO continues to keep the final borders of the process of enlargement undefined and ambiguous, it will be very difficult to convince Russia, that the enlargement is not directed against her.

It is neither in NATO's nor in Russia's interests that a new wave of enlargement will take place too soon. There is an opportunity for the European Union to promote its own expansion. There are currently membership negotiations with ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. The EU enlargement is not opposed by Russia and it could allow some kind of temporary appeasement in the relationship between the Russian Federation and NATO. But sooner or later, the issue of the second wave of enlargement of the alliance will come up. And if this question continues to be avoided, as Russia and NATO are trying to do now, acting according to the principle "one way or another things will settle themselves", later the problem

⁶⁶ Rotfeld A.D. Europe: The Institutionalized Security Process // SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments and International Security. - New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. - P.248.

⁶⁷ As William Wallace pointed out: "The history of West European integration has always been one of indirection - of deliberately not defining the ultimate destination before setting out, of agreeing on each step and leaving the longer-term pattern to emerge. The processes of enlargement both of the European Union and NATO thus present a familiar picture." - Wallace W. One Move - Destination Unknown // The World Today. - 1997. - April, Vol. 53, № 4, p.99.

will turn up in the most acute form and could provoke a much more serious crisis than the Kosovo one.

Today the enlargement of NATO is not perceived in Russia as a direct threat to her security. As it is laid down in Russia's "National Security Concept" the enlargement of military alliances can become a threat only if this enlargement is conducted at the expense of the security of Russia and her allies. This point is linked to two other points: weakening of existing mechanisms which guarantee international security, especially the weakening of the United Nations and of the OSCE and the danger of political, economical and military weakening of the influence of Russia in the world. It means that to some extent the enlargement will not provoke a serious conflict in NATO-Russia relations. For instance, Russia could "digest" the membership in NATO of Romania and Slovenia that would not make it less painful. However, any attempts to include the Baltic states and especially Ukraine in NATO would result in a major crisis between Russia and the West. As long as the Baltic states and Ukraine are NATO's potential members it will be very difficult to convince Russia that the alliance does not have ill intentions towards her. That is why even if NATO cannot change its open-door policy, it could declare, on the basis of the criteria for the membership⁶⁸ laid down by the alliance itself, that certain specific states could not become members for some time.

It is not difficult to understand the willingness of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to join NATO: apart from "historical memories", they are driven by the desire to become members of "the rich countries' club" as quickly as possible. The problem, however, lies in the fact that Central and Eastern

⁶⁸ The opponents of further enlargement "demand that the standards for and criteria of further enlargement should be subordinatd to the strategic goals 'so that the door is kept open but new members are admitted only when this step makes strategic sense and furthers NATO security interests'. New members would be admitted only when: a) admission directly supports NATO interests, strategy and security goals; b) NATO can effectively absorb and integrate new members and truly provide them with collective defence protection; c) candidates can 'produce security for NATO, not just consume it'; d) the cohesion of the alliance , its decision-making process and its military effectiveness in carrying out old and new missions are enhanced not diminished; and e) admission will meaningfully enhance Europe's stability rather than trigger instability". - Rotfeld A.D. Op.cit. - P.248.

European states, by pursuing their own aims undermine voluntarily or involuntarily the whole European balance, because they contribute to the isolation of Russia.

In part, Russia has to blame herself for the fact that the enlargement of NATO took place. It is worth to point out that the first wave of enlargement was in many ways stipulated by the constant uncertainty and unpredictability of Russia's internal and foreign policy, by its inability to keep and to put into practice signed agreements and treaties. Without forgetting the fact that the Russian government itself gave an excellent pretext for the enlargement.

Of course, the Russian government has to blame itself for the fact that NATO expansion became an issue in the first place. It was none other than President Boris Yeltsin who, in Warsaw (...) - after having one drink too many with Polish president Lech Walesa - announced that he had no objection to NATO membership for Poland and other Central European nations. Because Yeltsin's statement was an impromptu remark under the influence of alcohol rather than a carefully crafted official Russian position, the Foreign Ministry immediately backtracked and Moscow launched a full-scale peace offensive reminiscent of the Brezhnev era (mixed with occasional bullying). This only heightened the Central European's eagerness to seek protection through NATO and complicated any efforts by Washington, Bonn, or other European capitals to reject their aspirations without appearing to surrender to Russian blackmail.⁶⁹

This policy of the Russian government or rather the lack of a policy was maintained during the whole process of enlargement and at the end, because of the contradictory declarations and reactions of the Russian government it was not clear any more how seriously Russia's opposition to NATO's enlargement should be taken. At the same time, the Russian government continued to treat the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as some kind of "post-Soviet

⁶⁹ Simes D. *After The Collapse Russia Seeks its Place as a Great Power.* - New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999. - P.219.

constituency”, that only reinforced suspicions among these states about Russia’s continuing hegemonic intentions and aspirations in the region.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, this policy of “imperialistic nostalgia” is still present in the relationship between the Russian Federation and former Soviet republics. Russia, by setting “red lines” around the former Soviet Union, beyond which NATO enlargement is unacceptable, can only speed up the inclusion of the Baltic states and of Ukraine into the alliance.

In any case, Russia and NATO should start discussing the issue of enlargement now. And they should not discuss the enlargement as such but the differences, which this enlargement could provoke in Europe and in the field of international relations in general. This issue should be discussed in a concrete and transparent manner. Then Russia’s measures or counter-measures will not be perceived as confrontational. In addition, Russia in this case will not consider the problem of enlargement as contradictory to her interests and view the alliance as an enemy, which is winning. If the accents are placed in this way then there will be a possibility to create a completely different climate for bilateral relations and only then it will be possible to speak about “strategic partnership”.

However, there is still a long way to go in order to achieve this kind of relationship. A lot will depend on the direction in which Russia moves and on the ability of the Russian government to adopt a more realistic approach in the field of the country’s foreign policy. So far it has been based more on illusions and overambitions rather than on reason, starting from this completely unrealistic approach of the Russian government to make the OSCE the most important organization in Europe. Yet the OSCE was a security institution, which possessed few organizational attributes that stressed just broad principles and norms of

⁷⁰ “This distorted perception of sovereign states became particularly obvious during the debate regarding the eventual enlargement of NATO and its pre-accession programme ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PFP). Russian foreign policy constantly claimed a special role and status for Russia in its relations with the Alliance, which was supposed to emphasise the increased relevance of Russia in international security affairs when compared with the countries in the Central and Eastern European region”. - Mangott G. Russian Policies on Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview // European Security. - 1999. - Vol.8, Autumn. - P.48.

international relations but had no enforcement mechanism⁷¹. The organization did not have the necessary means, force and even the will to play a role of “peacekeeper” in all the conflicts, which constantly break out in the territory going from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Russia can regret that at the Istanbul Summit she did not succeed in upholding her conception of an hierarchical system of collective security. But the result is quite the opposite: Russia *finally* succeeded in rejecting a completely unrealistic conception, which did but contribute to isolate her on the international scene.⁷² It was also unrealistic for Russia to expect NATO to agree to transform itself, or subordinate itself in such a way as to give Russia a veto over questions, which directly engage the alliance’s members’ collective interests.

Today the Russian foreign policy is still based on illusions and overambitions. The new “National Security Concept”, published on the 14 of January 2000, says that the creation of a “multipolar” world order as opposed to a “unipolar world”, dominated by NATO and the USA, remains the highest priority of Russian foreign and security policy. “Multipolarity” means that Russia will try to develop a world order in which influence and power are spread among a variety of regional power groupings, one of which should be headed by Russia.⁷³ The “multipolarity” supposes an active foreign policy in all directions with the aim to maintain the geostrategic balances. This policy corresponds to Russia’s interests in general, but nevertheless, it contains some flaws. First of all, it does not reflect in full measure the new realities in the world. Secondly, it implies that Russia behaves as a global superpower while she still remains a weakening regional power. For instance, what did Russia gain, apart from consolidating her image of an unpredictable country, by having involved herself in the Kosovo crisis? Immediately after the beginning of air strikes, Russia withdrew her

⁷¹ Simon J., Kay S. *The New NATO // Europe Today*. - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999. - P.373.

⁷² Danilov D. *Integrating Europe and Russia: a new bipolarity or community of interests*. -Private communication.

⁷³ *Monitor: A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States*. - The Jamestown Foundation, 2000. - Vol.6, Issue 11, January 17.

military mission from Brussels, suspended her participation in the Founding Act and The Partnership for Peace, terminated talks on the establishment of NATO's military mission in Moscow and ordered the NATO information representative in Moscow to leave the country. The Ministry of Defence declared that it saw "no opportunity today to continue co-operation with NATO - the organization which committed an aggression, the organization which has destroyed the agreements reached in a persistent joint search, as well as ruined those constructive foundations on which this co-operation was beginning to form". NATO was called "an instrument of war, murder and aggression."⁷⁴ Then the tough rhetoric was replaced by quite conciliating policy, just the time to receive a promise from Western countries in Cologne of further support for the Russian economy, and after that came the Russian dash to Pristina, (to remind the world that Russia is still a great power?), which did not contribute towards improving the image of Russia, but had quite the opposite effect.⁷⁵ In such matters as trade and commerce, which are growing in importance for both national welfare and for security, she cannot play an important role with her share of global GNP being one to two percent. Russia has little capacity to project power, few allies and is no longer of decisive importance in managing regional disputes beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union. And even if in the post-soviet space she still continues to play a central role, in large part it is due to the fact that other states in this region are even weaker and remain highly dependent on Russia economically. Russia has the capacity to destabilise these states, the evidence of

⁷⁴ Antonenko O. - Op.cit. - P.131.

⁷⁵ In most of the Western newspapers, this Russian coup was called an "erratic" and "ambiguous" act. For instance, Alain Genestar said the following in right-of-centre *Le Journal du Dimanche*: "Was the victorious arrival in Pristina of the Russian tanks premeditated in Moscow or the result of a military initiative? Whatever the answer, the incident illustrates the dangerous unpredictability of the Russians and the complexity of the Balkan situation... The image of a Russian nation without a rudder and of Russian tanks entering Pristina are of great concern. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin wall, the World is far from having found a new equilibrium." The *Financial Times* analysed this situation as "Moving Russian peacekeeping troops into Pristina on Saturday morning...has undoubtedly revived concerns about Russia's reliability as an international partner and about who really is in charge in Moscow." (available at http://pdq2.usia.gov/scripts/cqcgi.exe/@..._VIEW=1&CQSUBMIT=View&CQRETURN=&CQPAGE=)

that can be seen in her activities in Transcaucasia.⁷⁶ It still has the capacity to organise some peacekeeping operations, but Russia is too weak and not trusted enough by its neighbours to stand at the centre of a reliable security structure, especially if this structure does not include Ukraine.

Russia would certainly profit more from a policy of co-operation with the West than from a policy of challenging the United States and its Allies. But the Russian diplomacy tried to use the idea of multipolarity for the consolidation of those states, that are not satisfied with the way the United States and its allies are exercising their leadership. That is why Cuba welcomed so enthusiastically the idea of Igor Ivanov, the minister of foreign affairs in Russia, of working together on the strategic conception of the world of the 21st century. However, Russia definitely risks losing time when she can still partly influence the building of the world order of the new century by pursuing such a policy. Besides, by trying to counterbalance the American leadership Russia can deteriorate in an irreparable way her bilateral relationship with the USA.

Taking into account the present weakness of the Russian Federation, the best conception of her foreign strategy would be “involvement à la carte”, proposed by some Russian scholars.⁷⁷ First of all, it means that Russia should defend only the interests of vital importance for the country. As to other matters she should take a line based on principles but not on confrontation.⁷⁸ Secondly, she should renounce the pursuit of the phantom idea of “Super-Power”. Thirdly, she should by all means try to avoid confrontation with the countries on which she depends for her economical development. Fourthly, the government should stop using tough rhetoric. The menaces used by the Russian political

⁷⁶ U.S. - Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century. Report of U.S. Working Group on U.S. - Russian Relations, Thomas Graham & Arnold Horelick (000201bf7df2\$ad609898@int-ws0156.hq.nato.int).

⁷⁷ Sergei Karaganov, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of foreign and security policy, is among these scholars.

⁷⁸ The current situation in the Russian Federation was very well described by an anonymous Russian diplomat interviewed in “*Commerzants daily*” in November 1998. To the question of a possible confrontation with the alliance, he replied that “Russia cannot shift to a position of confrontation with the alliance: It is hard to make threats and beat your chest when your stomach

establishment are no longer taken seriously; on the contrary they rather irritate and prevent any building of relationship based on partnership.⁷⁹

Nevertheless, even though the Russian policy needs some adaptation, in many ways this adaptation will depend on the attitude NATO and the West show towards Russia. The Russian government demonstrated its willingness to co-operate with Western and Euroatlantic institutions.⁸⁰ Unfortunately, today the West and NATO are ready to co-operate with Russia only at the level of declarations and build their relations with Russia more on words than on real actions. During his visit to Germany at the beginning of June Bill Clinton said that the European Union and United States had to act together to integrate Russia into the world community. "That means no doors can be sealed shut to Russia - not NATO's not the European Union's."⁸¹ However, it was stated publicly that NATO membership is not in Russia's future and nobody takes the possibility of Russia's joining the alliance seriously into consideration. In addition, NATO claims that the only reference to Russia in the new Strategic Concept is in the context of co-operation and partnership.⁸² Another declaration? If we read NATO's new strategic concept, the first sentence in the paragraph on security challenges and risks for the alliance, declares: "Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists". Only from *where* can this

hunts from a lack of food". - Lynch D. Walking the Tightrope: The Kosovo Conflict and Russia in European Security // European Security. - 1999. - Winter, Vol.8, № 4. - P.61.

⁷⁹ There are three other concepts or "schools": the first school, the school of "revenge", is advocating the building up of military might, the mobilisation of economy, support of Anti-Western countries (Iran, Iraq) and the rapprochement with China on an anti-Western basis. The second school, consisting mainly of former reformers and oligarchs, is for partial isolation. The third concept is the conception of voluntary subordination to the West. But for the moment it has no chance to be revitalised.

⁸⁰ On numerous occasions Vladimir Putin repeated that he wanted to make Russia "part of the West". At a Moscow conference on Middle East peace, he said that "Russia would like to be a stable, constructive and predictable partner in building new Europe". - Weekly Fax Bulletin. - The Jamestown Foundation. - 2000. - Vol.5, Issue 5, February 7.

⁸¹ The Times. - 2000. - June 3.

⁸² Speech made by U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow at Moscow State Institute of International Relations on October 28, 1999. (can be found at <http://usa.grmbl.com/s19991104f.htm>).

threat emerge, taking into account that there is a question of conventional aggression and not of nuclear one? The answer seems to be obvious. It shows that the most important element for building a co-operative relationship, - trust is not yet present. Instead of helping Russia to move in the right direction and to integrate herself into the world community, the West is now debating “whether Russia matters anymore”. By continuing this debate and by pursuing the policy of exclusion vis-à-vis Russia, the West can lose a unique opportunity to bring Russian civilisation closer to itself which is the only way to solve the West’s historic task of making Russia an ally rather than a rival.⁸³ Russia does matter and not only because of her huge nuclear arsenal, but also because of her no less huge cultural and intellectual potential. In any case, as Roland Dannreuther put it “it is better to have a co-operative Russia with you, than an obstructionist Russia against you”.⁸⁴ The West has to decide once and for all whether it needs Russia only at the level of declarations or also in practice. The West has to reconsider the criteria it uses not only in the relationship with Russia but also in the co-operation with her and to decide *why* it needs this co-operation: to control her or to help her to integrate into the “Great Europe”.

⁸³ Pushkov A A View From Russia // NATO enlargement: opinions and options. - Washington: National Defense University, Fort McNair, 1995. - P.136.

⁸⁴ Dannreuther R. Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations // *Survival*, Winter 1999-2000. - P.161.

Loredana Ghinea

Université Libre de Bruxelles

**NATO'S EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT PERSPECTIVES
IN ROMANIA: A CASE STUDY**

NATO's eastward enlargement made its first steps and apparently it didn't create any difficulties for the organization as a whole, for its role, structure or decision-making or for the members taken separately. This first priority is still over attentive surveillance in order to reduce to silence all critics about enlargement as diminishing the strength of the alliance. NATO's second major priority after Madrid was developing the cooperative relationship with those countries that were not invited to be in the first group of new members. The "Open Door" Policy and the date of 2002 are always recalled by these aspiring countries, which present different reasons for their acceptance.

The first enlargement created a precedent that reduces strategic purposes and increasingly emphasizes looser, less discriminating political standards. Any European state can be accepted if it has the credentials as an established democracy, with a market economy, civilian control of the military, a responsible foreign policy toward its neighbours, a credible Partnership for Peace (PFP) track record, NATO-compatible forces and a willingness to participate in NATO activities.

These standards deny NATO a strong logic for saying "no" in terms of security interests and inutility of a further enlargement. The NATO approach to its eastward extension needs a stronger strategic rationale⁸⁵. Most aspiring states naturally view membership as a step for their own security, economic, political and ideological interests. They expect a guarantee of intervention for their protection in case the security environment deteriorates, conscious of their own limits in terms of defence budgets and economic recovery. Given this protective shield and the enhanced collaboration, they expect also a revitalization of their economies through foreign investment and through the necessary financing in order to reach standardization. NATO membership would also be a political success in an ex-communist country because the secure path towards the benefits of the western way of life would be definitively established. The myths about new dividing lines within Europe, about a new Yalta would also vanish into thin air.

But if the enlargement is the answer, what is the question? The question would be: can Europe be stable? The last two years would cast a shadow of doubt and also a spotlight on the three roles that NATO should assume and preserve. First of all, NATO is a military alliance, which needs an enhanced capacity of handling future security challenges. For this, it should pursue two fundamental goals: first, to consolidate and continue its eastern enlargement by taking

⁸⁵ Binnendijk H., Kugler R.L. NATO After the First Tranche, A Strategic Rationale for Enlargement // Strategic Forum. - Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998. - № 149.

strategic steps in order to promote integration and stability and preventing competition and conflict in the Balkans; second, to configure NATO for pursuing a robust Southern strategy within Europe and beyond. NATO is also a political alliance of prosperous democracies that don't go to war against each other and so, political criteria for the candidates and the certainty that democracy and rule of law is a one-way street for them are justified pretensions. Another challenge must be scrutinized: the geographic, political environment of the aspiring countries, meaning Ukraine and mostly Russia and their current and future role in the region. One thing that NATO is not: a charity institution. Taking into consideration the alliance's missions of shaping a peacetime environment and the role that NATO is willing to concede to the European Union in terms of European integration as a single market, the economic factor should not be of great importance. Still the alliance cannot afford to see this factor reducing the effectiveness of the others and weakening the capacity of all members to speak with one voice. Some critics would say that, on the contrary, this possibility of economic backwardness and its effects (causing tensions and instability) could be avoided through enlargement.

For these reasons, a small number in NATO enlargement was and still is beautiful. For the first enlargement, three was beautiful for several reasons. First, if Romania and Slovenia were included, the Baltic issue would have been brought to the fore immediately, since those countries would have jumped closer to the top of the list for a second round, given their progress in meeting political and economic criteria. But as Yeltsin had mentioned to Clinton at Helsinki, moving NATO onto the territory of the former Soviet Union was an order of magnitude more serious for Russia than the move into Central Europe. So, a second round that included Slovenia and Romania could have postponed the question of former Soviet states even longer. Second, were Slovenia and Romania really ready to join? Slovenia met the political and economic criteria, but its military capabilities

were minimal given its small size. And Romania had only begun to consolidate political and economic reforms with its elections in the fall of 1996. So, it was better to make sure that the first round included only those countries that raised no doubts. But the most important reason small was beautiful is that it offered the greatest promise for a robust and continued open-door policy and that by keeping strategic candidates out for a while, these ones would justify new waves⁸⁶.

The paradox of enlargement, however, is that the first round only makes sense if NATO keeps Clinton's rationale of further extension. But while the logic of the process suggests continuing, the future rounds will be harder to achieve. Three contentious issues were finessed during the Senate debate of 1998:

- I. The reaction of Russia,
- II. The financial costs and
- III. The concerns about dilution⁸⁷.

With the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in Paris in 1997, it was difficult for critics to say that Russia found enlargement unacceptable; projected costs were much less than expected and those who feared that NATO would dilute were comfortable with the small number. Each of these issues becomes harder to finesse as NATO looks beyond the first round. While Slovenia and Romania are not particularly threatening to Russia, any second round puts the Baltic issue to the fore. The answer could be still the small number in order to reduce the provocative tone, to see the Russian evolution and to let them get use to the new role they can afford to assume in the region. More members mean more costs. But instability caused by rejection costs even more. Pushing the European Union to assume its due role could solve a certain part of the problem. Finally, those who fear the end of the alliance as a collective defence organization and its transformation into a collective security pact will want to see the effect of the

⁸⁶ Goldgeier J.M. Not Whether But When. The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. - Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999. - P.170.

⁸⁷ Ibidem. - P.172

three new members and also the fruits of standardization through the enhanced PFP, through the new "Membership Action Plan" and within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as political institution.

Starting with these general issues and challenges, I would like to make, all along this paper, the case of Romania's integration in NATO as it presents itself in the year 2000. Perspectives in the following years, on the possible criticisms and the implications it may have on its closest or farther neighbours.

The first chapter will illustrate the advantages that Romania can offer the alliance in political, diplomatic terms and in military, strategic terms. Concerning the stability in the Balkans (a valid preoccupation for NATO), Romania's relations with its surrounding countries and its implication in different regional structures could be of some relevance. As for the strategic interests of NATO, one could bring several arguments: its size and position in military and economic terms, the possible strategic axes (North-South and West-East) within the alliance and towards possible exterior threats.

The second chapter will deal with the issue of the different instruments for pre-accession, as: the Partnership for Peace, the Stability Pact and the actions and financing for the standardization. Their reason, utility and effectiveness will be analyzed.

The third chapter will be treating with the Romanian integration challenges. First of all, those which come with domestic matters (such as this year's elections and the economic situation), which will have a strong, effect on its selection as a sure candidate for the next round of enlargement. And secondly, those that come from abroad, namely: Ukraine, Russia whose attitudes will be scrutinized in their general position towards the region and any future NATO enlargement (the Baltic and Central Asia issues). Possible answers, at this moment, to the appeasement of their approach will also be envisaged.

The conclusions will still prefer a small number and the "wait and see" tactics as NATO vision and will advise for an enhanced regional cooperation and economic improvement in order to appease political disillusion. The "Open-Door" Policy remains valid within a valid laps of time (even if as legs under a question mark for the next American administration) because the Balkans are not a very easy region to deal with.

CHAPTER I. - Romania's Case_

It's not easy for an ex-communist country to recover. The political, economic and civilian situation stumbles. And victimization has two sides. The West may feel responsible for Yalta partition and may help you in your efforts; success comes more or less rapidly. On the other hand, you may start to believe that the West has to feel responsible and expect it to do everything for you. If it does it, some could profit. But a significant percentage of people who is confronted with only partial market laws attached to old structures and lack seeing the benefits of democracy and liberal economy will be drawn to nationalism. If the West doesn't do it for you, (by all means, even a war, some cynical people might think, because they must help reconstruct), a significant percentage turns to nationalism anyway. Multiethnic societies and globalized economies and values render one country's turbulence as instability for a whole continent. This is why the most powerful argument for a secure Europe is "a unified, democratic and peaceful Europe"⁸⁸.

NATO has evolved from its passive role of reactive defence organization to one, which is actively providing and keeping security all around Europe. Questions about "out of area", even if not regulated by international law, are no longer possible. Negative interdependence within instability makes political

⁸⁸ Clinton's administration rationale through speeches.

speeches about integration a necessity. As Lord Robertson⁸⁹ affirmed, "first of all, NATO has to continue to fully play its role in the stabilization of the Balkans process. We have to make sure that the future of this region doesn't keep trapped by the past"⁹⁰.

First of all, a quite recent past: waiting for Western salvation and, at the same time, blaming the West for its cynical choice of keeping a cold peace at the price of Eastern Europe's destruction. These mixed feelings still persist and deception could transform them into rejection. A rejection of the West that still keeps them away of its protective embrace or worse creates a myth of cynical profit.

Second of all, a distanced past: that of mixed ethnic entities and more or less artificial dividing or unifying lines. The "powder barrel" of the Balkans could be changed to "dust", some say, through its integration in the collective defence system. Critics argue that this one will add problems to NATO and not solve them because, as a military alliance, peaceful and consensual solution of internal or interregional disputes could hardly be reached.

In order to avoid this, NATO needs enlargement to the East. But, at the same time, it needs members that are strategically stable and offer, through their clarified and peaceful relations with the neighbours, stability, a possibility of diplomatic mediatorship and also direct and easy access to the other members and resources in case of emergency.

On these terms, the Romanian case could be defended easily. First of all, its bilateral and trilateral treaties with almost all its neighbours and its implication in different regional structures dealing with collaboration, crisis prevention and economic development in the Balkans could be of great importance concerning elimination of the territorial pretensions issue, legal and political bindings

⁸⁹ Secretary General of NATO and President of the North Atlantic Council.

⁹⁰ Robertson G. NATO In the New Millennium // NATO's Review. - 1999. - Winter, № 4.

between states and basis for all negotiations and solution of ethnic minorities' issues.

In this context, the treaty signed in 1992 regulates relations with Bulgaria. It offers mainly a remarkable potential of cooperation in the infrastructure field. The two countries have, for instance, recently resolved a 10-year dispute over a second Danube bridge that will further link both countries to major European transport corridors.

With regard to Hungary, the so-called "traditional enemy" of Romania concerning Transylvania, a reconciliation of the same order of magnitude as the Franco-German one was reached in September 1996 through a treaty. A high degree of sensibility still exists, not so much concerning the very low probability of territorial pretensions but mostly concerning the Hungarian minority (a majority in two districts of Transylvania) as possibly demanding autonomy. This threat could increase in the eyes of a certain nationalist percentage of the Romanian population as economic differences between the Western region and the rest become more evident, or the Hungarians Party associated to the coalition at present in power sustains demands of a state Hungarian university. The Kosovo war didn't calm the spirits in any way, on the contrary because a similar solution would not favor Romania's integrity (as many love to call it). Further dividing lines created by NATO, when nationalists could claim Hungarian support for the Hungarian minority territorial autonomy in Transylvania, would do no good for a still fragile cooperation between states.

As regards Ukraine, the treaty signed in 1997 formally condemns all former documents (namely the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement on Bessarabia annexation to the Soviet Union) that could have prejudiced both peoples. Two issues remained unresolved by the treaty (the delimitation of the continental platform of the Black Sea territorial waters and the Serpent Island property) could

easily be solved through a decision of the International Court of Justice, which both countries have agreed to.

The Republic of Moldova is a special case as it is being considered even today as a part of Romania through its history, language and culture. A recent treaty (signed in April 2000 but still not ratified) spell out the fact that we are talking about two states that are developing excellent relations and no territorial claims are possible between them.

Concerning the "Yugoslav area" (Serbia as neighbour), the situation is more delicate. Serbia is the only neighbour with whom Romania has never been to war. So, Romanian foreign policy tries to keep equilibrium between its commitment towards the "international community" (NATO oblige...) and its good relations, most of all future relations, with this country. At the same time, this position could be of some help for NATO in seeing Romania as a possible mediator in any eventual conflict situation and as a valid and friendly (for the Serbs of a future regime) partner of any cooperation.

Once NATO criterion being fulfilled (good and stable relations with neighbours), Romania could also be considered as providing stability in the region through its activities within different regional structures. The trilateral agreements could be a restrained but effective forum of conducting projects of sectorial cooperation in economic, infrastructural, transborder and organized crime and corruption domains. There are five trilateral structures:

1. Poland-Romania-Ukraine (the accent is put on the reinforcement of security, on the facilitation of Ukrainian *rapprochement* to the West through the creation of an "axis Bucharest-Kyiv-Warsaw", namely through the construction of a highway linking the three capitals);
2. Austria-Hungary-Romania;
3. Moldova-Romania-Ukraine;
4. Bulgaria-Romania-Turkey;

5. Bulgaria-Greece-Romania.

At present, five sub-regional structures group different countries in the region with more or less different purposes of cooperation.

1) The South-East European Cooperation (SEE): Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, FYROM, Turkey, Romania, FRY. Being in fact a specifically balkanic structure, SEE tries to rebuild the Balkans mainly through a consolidation of economic and political relations;

2) The Central-European Initiative (CEI): Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Important for its pragmatic goal, the CEI has the ambition to facilitate the transition of the Central and East-European Countries through cooperation in investments of small and medium enterprises, through the creation of a network of "Commerce Bureaus" and through comparative studies of national legislation in view of their future standardization;

3) The South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI): Albania, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Macedonia, Romania - hosting SECI Regional Centre, Slovenia and Turkey. Having the financial support of the United States, Switzerland, Italy and Austria and the logistic support of OSCE, this structure works for the creation of a banking consortium, of an interconnection between different units providing and distributing natural gas, agencies dealing with environmental problems and with means of border surveillance and protection;

4) The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA): Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania (1997), Slovakia and Slovenia - an economic instrument in order to facilitate integration in the European Union;

5) The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC): Owing to its suitable geographical location, the region could be integrated with relative ease into the markets of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. The BSEC train, the private sector as its engine and the creativity and dynamism of private entrepreneurship

as its fuel, left the station in 1991. The wagons of the train were Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. On 10 December 1992 Poland, and on 17 June 1993 Tunisia joined the BSEC train as observers. Egypt, Israel, the Slovak Republic and two members of the European Union, Italy and Austria later followed these countries. The scope of cooperation encompasses a wide variety of areas notably transport and communications, infrastructure, exchange of economic and commercial information and statistical data, standardization and certification, energy, mining and the processing of raw materials, tourism, agriculture and agro-industry, veterinary and sanitary protection, health care and pharmaceuticals, environment, science and technology. This wide scope is not limited only to technical issues. Establishing codes of conduct, adopting a grass roots approach to promote the BSEC, taking measures against drug trafficking and terrorism, which hinder trade and economic interaction, as well as increasing cultural and social interaction are other examples of cooperation areas within the scope of the BSEC.

These treaties and regional structures through their political and economic levers place Romania in a framework of interconnections hard to ignore or to displace because of their essential benefits for economies in transition. Benefits may push aside some confrontational issues. With sustained support from the Western structures and a political guarantee about a secure and united Europe, this region seems "doomed" to cooperation.

Besides the cooperation that makes a state sensitive to international trends, for building a security infrastructure through its enlargement process, an alliance has to pay attention to strategic environment in order to secure its possible interventions or even better to deter its possible enemies. Most Eastern European countries still see Russia as an expansionist power that tries, maybe with more modern arms (some economic dependencies), to exercise a certain influence. Or, they understand the declared unified Europe as a block as advised by the realist

conception of "facing" an enemy. In this view, the advantages that Romania could offer NATO are presented below.

First of all, the decision taken in 1997 to enlarge only to three countries had its risks. These risks stem from the fact that Hungary does not border on any other NATO country; it is cut off from them by Slovakia to the north, Austria to the west and Slovenia and Croatia to the south. This is why after proceeding with enlargement based on political priorities, strategic and security problems should find their answer into a southern rationale. Several strategic axes could be drawn⁹¹.

So, on the West-East ax, the inclusion of Romania and Slovenia would have a particular importance by adding the missing pieces of the puzzle and ensuring a strategic corridor between the Black Sea and the Adriatic. The argument could go on: Romania is also the farthest point at the East that Ukraine and Russia could accept without too much trouble. As being, at the same time, the second biggest country in Central Europe and the first on the southern flank of NATO, in terms of size and potential, Romania could be an essential ring in closing the circle around an insecure area of territorial and ethnic disputes.

On the North-South axis, the inclusion of Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria would create a direct connection not only with the present NATO members (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Greece and Turkey), but also between three seas: the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. A powerful frontline, taking into consideration the possibility of ensuring a maritime junction with NATO forces, would be put into place. At the same time, this axis could have a particular significance for the consolidation of an independent Ukraine.

Linked to this axis, the southern flank of NATO⁹² can and has to be consolidated by the new candidates as proposed already in 1997 by France and

⁹¹ Severin A. Romania's Integration Into EU and NATO // *Studia Diplomatica*. - 1997. - № 2. - P.17-30.

⁹² France, Italy, Turkey, Greece.

Italy. In the medium and long term, the threats that NATO will have to face won't come essentially from Russia but from its problems in Caucasus, Central Asia and from Middle East, Gulf area. "We recognize that the future of NATO and that the future security challenges in Europe are likely to arise in the south"⁹³. Issues such as Cyprus, the Kurdish problem, arms proliferation and trafficking, Islamic fundamentalism, criminality and drugs give Romania both the possibility and capacity to appease possible conflicts and to join easily and complete NATO forces in the different hotspots of the East. And this, through relations with different countries having some contentious with one each other and through the Black Sea, taking into account the fact that, for example, US seek to sustain and increase stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region by encouraging Greek-Turkish dialogue⁹⁴.

The Black Sea and Romania are interesting also for the relation between energy and security by the possible link that it offers from the Caspian Sea to Western Europe through the Danube and through its national capacity for refining. Countries of the Southern Caucasus need to exploit their comparative advantages to promote their common welfare and transform the region from a zone of risk into one of opportunity. The region providing invaluable links with the Black Sea countries to its west, Russia to its north, Central Asia to its east, and Turkey and Iran to the south could profit from an extended security area. Against a background of growing economic opportunities, it will be extremely important over the next few years for stabilization and structural reform policies to be implemented and this should be supported by investment and assistance from abroad. Alongside other international organizations - such as the United Nations (UN), the OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe - and without duplicating their efforts, NATO will continue to support the Southern Caucasian

⁹³ National Security Advisor Sandy Berger. - Press Briefing: NATO Enlargement, Washington D.C., July 2, 1997.

countries in their efforts to enhance political stability and in this way improve their prospects for economic development⁹⁵.

These strategic axes reveal their importance and their possible practical efficiency in the light of the above mentioned trilateral and sub-regional structures, which could make Romania the contact piece between different and controversial points of the map.

CHAPTER II. - Instruments for Pre-accession

The strategic axis presented above might not impress many decision-makers, taking into account that Romania has not moved an inch so far. Arguments can explain this attitude: Russia is no longer the power capable of claiming or even threatening countries of Eastern Europe, there is enough cover for any incident on the southern flank with Turkish basis and its oil transport corridor and, most of all, NATO is being served. Served, first of all, because of Eastern Europe's ideological and political commitment to the West; secondly, because of its pragmatic commitment to the West through economic dependency and through different military, diplomatic and stabilization structures.

The development of the PFP as the focus of America's NATO policy in the fall of 1993 was the result of a typical transition situation when powers calculate the reaction between one's own interests and the degree of acceptance of the other. First, the partnership left the future course of NATO's formal expansion ambiguous, thus enabling both supporters and opponents of enlargement to support it; even president Yeltsin said enthusiastically: 'Tell Bill that I am thrilled by this brilliant stroke'⁹⁶. Apart from this policy of "wait and see", the

⁹⁴ Policy Priorities for FY 2000-2001. *Europe, Bureau of European Affairs, Statement by Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman.* Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001. - Released by the Office of the Secretary of State, Resources, Plans and Policy, U.S. Department of State, March 15, 2000.

⁹⁵ De Witte P. Fostering stability and security in the Southern Caucasus. - NATO Webediton. - 1998. - Spring, Vol.47, № 1. - P.14-16.

⁹⁶ Goldgeier J.M. Op.cit. - P.59

implementation of the PFP offered the possibility of a “yes” to the Pentagon officials arguing about the difficulty of enlargement due to the need for new members to reach NATO standards. That way "security consumers" could become "security contributors and providers". The NATO study scaled back expectations: "An important element in new members' military contribution will be a commitment in good faith to pursue the objectives of standardization which are essential to Alliance strategy and operational effectiveness. There are at present over 1200 agreements and publications that new members should undertake to comply with"⁹⁷. So, PFP plays an important role both to help prepare possible members for the benefits and responsibilities of eventual membership and as a means to strengthen relations with partner countries, which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or not at all.

Concerning Romania, a great part of its efforts were devoted to participation in multinational peace keeping initiatives in South and Central Europe (Romania-Hungarian battalion, Central European Cooperation, the Multinational Peace Force - South-eastern Europe/MPFSEE) or originating in the opposite part of Europe (the Danish initiative - SHRIBRIG). Its participation in Angola, Iraq, at the PREDEP and Poznan actions, in SFOR, its involvement in the post-UNPREDEP security arrangements in FYRO Macedonia, 152 common actions with NATO (of which 63 were of formation and training: "STRONG RESOLVE '98", a large-scale exercise, CMX'98 conducted with the purpose of practicing NATO mechanisms, measures and procedures in crisis management⁹⁸), its naval actions in the Black Sea (bilateral: Romanian-American Tango-Charlie or multinational: Sea Breeze-97 in Crimea with ships from Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey and the U.S.), etc. Romania's participation in non-proliferation and arms control arrangements: Romania is also a founding member of the

⁹⁷ Ibidem. - P.95.

⁹⁸ Romanian Defense News: Multinational Military Exercise // Romania Today. -1998. -March.

Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies as well as member of Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and other non-proliferation and control arrangements; Romania has also signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Military-to-military programmes go in the sense of an enhanced interoperability (Romania has the higher number of joint actions in MIL-TO-MIL compared to any other NATO partner; Romania is one of the few NATO candidates that have accomplished the full cycle of land, naval and air exercises with the US and the allies⁹⁹). There are clear benefits for the Romanian military capabilities and formation, which exclude a rejection of its orientation and of its support and availability for any NATO action. This military argument comes together with the political one when it comes to decision concerning Romania's position towards a crisis situation. See its embargo and open-sky decision for the air forces of the alliance in the Kosovo conflict in a domestic atmosphere of mixed feelings about Romanian economic losses and foreign policy towards a non-confrontational neighbour. Generally, any NATO appreciation of the progress in criteria to be fulfilled by Romania for its admission highly takes into account the military cooperation and level of performance: "I have no knowledge of any other historic precedent or country to have ever acted on this scale"¹⁰⁰. The "waiting room" was transformed into "get ready room". Still the military has to wait for a political signal. And from this point of view, some surely think, as Senator Lugar in 1994, that "PFP" stands for "policy for postponement". If PFP accompanied by a strategic partnership with US and by the most recent "Membership Action Plan", favors Romania mostly, stabilization processes within an insecure region do it even more.

⁹⁹ Romania's Military Assets for the Alliance // Romania Today. - 1997. - June, № 11.

¹⁰⁰ Perry W. US Military Builds Alliances across Europe // Washington Post. - 1998. -December 14.

Peace and stability demand an economic revitalization and vice versa. Here comes the Stability Pact with its Round Tables on democratization, civil societies, economic development and internal and external security issues. 29 participants (European states, Russia, US, the European Commission, the president of the OSCE, the Council of Europe), 11 "facilitators" and 5 regional initiatives (Canada, Japan, UN, UNHCR, NATO, OECD, WEO, IMF, WB, EBI, EBRD, Royaumont Process, BSEC, CEI, SECI, SEECP - Romania is the Chairman in Office-1999) join projects and initiatives to promote security. At the March 2000 Regional Funding Conference, the countries of southeast Europe reported on progress toward implementing their reform commitments and set forth concrete benchmarks for further reform:

-to promote a healthy investment climate:

-infrastructure projects linking the transport corridors;

-adoption of a "investment compact" favoring private enterprise;

-increasing trade through a Working Group assisted by the US Agency for International Development (USAID);

-developing regional strategies by the major international financial institutions;

-fighting corruption (Romania hosted a regional conference on March 30-31, 2000);

-to promote democratization, human rights and refugee returns:

-examining the teaching of history;

-promoting free and independent media;

-developing an active civil society;

-building regional security cooperation:

-controlling small arms and light weapons;

-implementing weapons of mass destruction commitments (Romania is part of all);

- controlling arms exports;
- retraining of retired military officers (Romania and Bulgaria benefit from a joint venture between NATO and the World Bank);
- promoting regional cooperation¹⁰¹.

The Stability Pact found a strong support in the US. For 2000, the overall amount of US assistance available to the region is \$624 million, which includes bilateral programmes with southeast European countries and regional initiatives. "Southeast Europe Trade Preference Act", Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a EBRD Trust Fund, the Global Technology Network-Balkans (connecting companies seeking local trade partners), continued support for SECI, bolstering regional security cooperation (through: participation in the Southeastern Europe Defence Ministerial Process bringing together US, Greece, Italy, Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Romania and Slovenia)¹⁰² manifest American interest in a region where economic differences, political deviations and criminal acts must be eliminated through strong links and collective initiatives.

Concerning Romania, the Department of State considers it helpful to continue with its assistance funds. SEED (Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States) funds (\$35 million) will assist Romania combat cross border crime and foster regional linkages. US Foreign Military Financing (FY 2000 estimate: \$6 million; FY 2001 request: \$11 million) includes a programme under which the US Marine Corps is helping Romania develop a modern non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps on NATO-interoperable standards. It also supports implementation of a reform plan adopted in 1999 that will downsize and professionalize the Romanian military. FMF also pays for equipment for Romania's Rapid Reaction Force to improve its ability to participate in NATO

¹⁰¹ Achievements of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. - Fact Sheet released by the Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, Washington DC, April 6, 2000.

peacekeeping efforts ("The more there is standardization of military and defence systems that use standards that the US and NATO allies use, that would benefit US military contractors"¹⁰³, example: Lockheed-Martin, General Electric, Bell Helicopters - Textron, McDonnell Douglas). It also helps Romania purchase NATO-interoperable communications equipment. The International Military Education and Training programme will continue to offer the new generation of the Romanian military a professional military education (example: defence resources management). Romania will continue to be eligible to receive grant Excess Defence Articles¹⁰⁴.

These instruments of pre-accession show that the standardization process goes quite well and the political will in following NATO decisions and actions are there. So, many could think: everything proves that they (Romania) are with NATO by complying and pleasing it anyway; why bother to integrate them and make the decision-making process more difficult? On the other hand, one might argue: we (the Allies) pay for their standardization and they are still not legally and surely bound to us.

To these two opposite views are two complementary rising issues. First of all, with a NATO policy of postponement, how long can Romania go on with aligning itself with the alliance's decisions in the Balkans? We assist at a fragile swinging movement between a West imposing itself as a reference in terms of normality and progress and an identity fear reflected by the political elites, which feel marginalized in their "balkanic" environment and are fed up with the same speeches about integration. Secondly, as Biden said: "the North Atlantic alliance

¹⁰² US Support for Southeast European Stabilization. - Fact Sheet released by the Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, Washington DC, April 6, 2000.

¹⁰³ Raytheon spokesman Barry French // Goldgeier J.M. Op.cit. - P.135.

¹⁰⁴ Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001. - Released by the Office of the Secretary of State, Resources, Plans and Policy, Bureau of European Affairs, Statement by Assistant Secretary M.Grossman, US Department of State, March 15, 2000.

is a partnership, not an American charity enterprise"¹⁰⁵, reaffirmed by James Rosapepe, US ambassador in Romania: "We are talking about NATO and not about Paradise. Only the countries presenting convenient economic growth can ensure their contribution part to NATO defence without affecting their population"¹⁰⁶. The two issues are linked and lead us to the next chapter concentrating on the challenges facing the decision for a second wave of enlargement.

Chapter III. - Romania's Integration Challenges

NATO is an alliance of democracies that don't fight each other. What about European ex-communist states that are still passing through the transition period? There are two possible ways after 10 years of struggle: 1. Integrate them and determine, *volens nolens* (through more or less diplomatic means - the in-house crisis solution), a western path or; 2. Wait for them to mature.

Politically, the first way is confirmed by diplomatic statements: "it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should support efforts by Romania to integrate into pan-European and trans-Atlantic institutions and should view such integration as an important factor in consolidating democratic government in Romania"¹⁰⁷. Non-integration would not be a failure in itself (Romania benefits from its Strategic Partnership with US) and would give Romanian leaders the opportunity to concentrate on Real Politik ("rethink the status of the Balkans"¹⁰⁸ and enhance the role of regional cooperation and integration). But, concerning the Romanian people, a proven failure would push towards a "nationalistic self-

¹⁰⁵ NATO Enlargement after Madrid // Congressional Record. Proceedings and debates of the 105th Congress, Senate. - First session. - July 31, 1997.

¹⁰⁶ Observatorul Militar. - 1998. - June 2-8.

¹⁰⁷ Gilman B.A. Support for Romania // H. Con. Res. 169, Extension of Remarks in the House of Representatives - August 2, 1999.

¹⁰⁸ A.Plesu, Ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs

defence reflex, towards frustrated rebellions"¹⁰⁹. Decrease in support for NATO went from 85% to less than 50% in 1999, an increasing support for the former president's party (qualified as neo-communist and as having some reticence regarding western advice, requests or imposed measures in view of European or Euro-Atlantic integration) should be of some concern. Of course, these political signs are determined by the economic "performance". However, they are extended to the western integration issue because of a West seen as incarnated by a demanding liberal, "enterprise-closing" IMF. Statements as "we are better without them" or "they are trying to ruin us" and in-self retreat are often noticed in a country where agricultural and hard industry sectors are still predominant and poorly profitable.

The second way of waiting for them to mature is used in practical postponement. And it is understandable too. The West perceives 2000 Romanian legislative and presidential elections as a proving milestone for democracy implementation. Taking into account that Russia or other far-eastern or southern countries are not a declaratory or practical threat to the alliance, can NATO take the risk to bring political instability in? Counter-arguments may appear:

1. was accepting Poland in a mistake? They have also had a switch from liberal to neo-communist leadership; a political crisis is now taking place – does it make the Alliance less unstable?

2. what about Italian political instability? Can the Cold War justify such a judgment discrepancy, especially when peace and the victory of democracy and liberal market can make dialogue and cooperation easier?

3. does NATO need deviant thinking, such as: they need us to be unstable, because they need war (a second way of going out of area beside enlargement), because "NATO has to go out of area or go out of business"¹¹⁰?

¹⁰⁹ Durandin C. La Roumanie, l'OTAN: le piège? // La Revue internationale et strategique. - 1999. - March 20.

¹¹⁰ Asmus R., Larabee F.S., Kugler R. Building a New NATO // Foreign Affairs, 1992. - № 3.

Besides the political field, another problematic issue for Romanian integration is the economic one that has a fundamental effect on internal political elite and its low competence in dealing with a destroyed ex-communist economic structure. According to data published in some Romanian journals, in 1999, industrial production decreased by 8% after a collapse of 23% in 1997 and 1998; for metallurgy (by 36%) and refined products (by 23%), in the equipment area (by 22%). Inflation reaches 55% and unemployment 11.5%¹¹¹. European Commission Report in 1999 shows very somber data. Romania lacks a well-defined economic strategy and consensus inside the coalition in power over the orientation for reforms is fragile. Macroeconomic stabilization is not yet completed. The main risks come from a high level of exterior disequilibria, inflation. High levels of debt and payments postponement from public enterprises became a major obstacle for privatization and lead to hesitations from possible foreign investors. Financing of the economy became problematic. So, it was no great surprise that the European Commission reported: "Romania has done little progress in setting a viable market economy and its capacity to deal with competition pressure and market forces has decreased"¹¹².

Living in a country where a Western-oriented and "Western-obedient" political coalition has not succeeded in providing either "*panem*" or "*circenses*" (the psychological success of being accepted at least within the Euro-Atlantic structure), Romanian people feel cheated. The majority only heard about "capitalist" benefits without knowing them and this leads to a rejection of them or at least of the means to reach them.

What should NATO do? It obviously has not the means to save an entire economy, being mostly a military, security and a political alliance. For a viable role into NATO which has to be able to act in any moment and to use the most

¹¹¹ Chiriac B. Isarescu With a Foot In Bucharest And With the Other In Brussels // Adevarul. - 2000. - February 4.

¹¹² Rapport Regulier 1999 de la Commission sur les progrès réalisés par La Roumanie sur la voie de l'adhésion.

appropriate ways (as place and capabilities), a member's economy should deal with any request in armed forces and equipment. Does an economy in recession fulfill these demands or does it need even more efforts from the other allies, sometimes even impeding an effective action? This preoccupation is reflected by repeated American statements ("It is the sense of the Congress that the Government of Romania should accelerate necessary economic reforms") and enhanced military financing as seen above. The answer might have been given by the American vision of European unification and prosperity: "We Americans have made no secret of our hope that the enlargement of NATO will contribute to the conditions for the enlargement of the EU. This is not just a matter of NATO setting an example. It's a matter of NATO creating an environment, which, because it is more stable and peaceful, will be conducive to the EU's expansion eastward. Many of Europe's new democracies are well on their way to meeting the economic conditions for EU membership. But EU governments and western investors must also be confident about the long-term, deep-seated security of the region. And that's what NATO is all about"¹¹³. So, the sharing of the tasks, security-NATO economics-EU, could have fulfilled the often-mentioned "equitable burdensharing of enlargement"¹¹⁴.

But the decision to enlarge NATO eastward, and especially to create second-phase candidates, has produced a new challenge, i.e. the differentiation of candidates. What will happen if expansion is not parallel because NATO is ahead of the EU considered as "the central building block of the strategy"¹¹⁵? Two consequences are foreseeable. First, as Martin Walker wrote in the *Guardian* before the Madrid decision, "without EU membership, the NATO members of eastern Europe face a fate as grimly impoverished and second-rate as that of

¹¹³ Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State. The United States and Romania: A Strategic Partnership. - Address at Bucharest University, Romania, March 19, 1998.

¹¹⁴ NATO Enlargement after Madrid // Congressional Record. Proceedings and debates of the 105th Congress, Senate. - First session, July 31, 1997.

¹¹⁵ R.Asmus, F.S.Larabee, R.Kugler. Op.cit.

Turkey". The second consequence, which stems from the first, relates to the Phase II candidate states, which would be relegated to the waiting room, their voices ignored and their chances of development significantly diminished, despite the assurances given at Madrid¹¹⁶. This happened to Romania whose economic situation depreciated roughly after 1997 even if it is not due to NATO postponement. This status is being corrected by the EU's decision to start negotiations with all candidates, a decision which is both political and economic. No disillusion, but pressure. EU has different means of intervention of which the best is the National Programme of development for the mid-term demanded by the Commission. This programme will ensure the expertise and the finance - the programmes will be under high surveillance and assistance of EU's experts.

On the other hand, what will it happen if NATO envisages a parallel process of security with the EU, taking into consideration that its political requests were fulfilled through the expansion to the three countries (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary), due to domestic and ideological pressure, and with the "open-door" policy? You just forget about candidate countries, because if you are satisfied, you think that they will be too even with a pale version of what you have promised.

External challenges

These challenges are due, in the first place, to Romania's location near the successors of the former Soviet super-power - Russia and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine. Secondly, the next wave of NATO enlargement will bring to the front the Baltic States issues, which, supposedly, overstep the "red line" traced by Russia as acceptable in terms of its own security.

Ukraine: A buffer or a bridge?

¹¹⁶ Kirschbaum S.J. Phase II Candidates: A Political or Strategic Solution? // The Future of NATO - Enlargement, Russia and European Security / Ed. by Ch.Ph.David and J.Lévesque. - Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999.

"The process of NATO's eastward expansion will not contradict Ukraine's strategic goals"¹¹⁷. The Ukrainian leadership had always stressed that any expansion of NATO had to take into account Russia's opinions. In other words, Ukraine is not opposed to the evolutionary expansion of NATO, providing attempts are made to ensure that relations with Russia and Ukraine are not harmed. With Kuchma as president, Ukrainian views about NATO moved away from Kravchuk's romantic endorsement towards a more cautious, pragmatic line closely resembling in many ways that of Russia. "Ukraine has a non-bloc status and does not intend to join either the CIS countries' military alliance or NATO"¹¹⁸. Stress upon and desire to obtain international support for a "Nuclear-Free Zone" in Central-Eastern Europe, opposition to joining the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, membership of Partnership for Peace (participation at Sea-Breeze '97), regional summit between Ukrainian and Balts showing their common purpose and strategic agenda, NATO-Ukraine Charter which leaves a future door open are linking Ukraine to NATO and express its preoccupation to have an escape concerning its future security. At the same time, it can use its "Russia card" by its support to any improved relations between NATO and Russia: Russia entitled to a "special relationship with NATO", including mandatory consultations between these two and more active participation by Moscow in PFP. The role of "buffer zone" or more diplomatically, the "bridge" was recognized, first, by Poland and then by Hungary needing an independent and strong Ukraine in order to protect them from Russia which they still perceive as potentially offensive to their concern.

However, President Kuchma affirmed, on a visit to Riga, that Ukraine has "joined neither one side nor the other. But I understand that it is nonsense today

¹¹⁷ Pirozhkov S., Chumak V. Ukraine and NATO // Ukrainian Review. - 1995. - № 42/3.

¹¹⁸ Defence Minister Valeriy Shmarov's declaration.

for Ukraine to be non-aligned". So, cooperation (not integration) with the Commonwealth of Independent States remains purely within the area of economic issues. On the other hand, "Europe" continues to be the ultimate goal, which Ukraine is trying to join. As "joining the Alliance might be our strategic wish for the future, but not now"¹¹⁹, while benefiting from a "special partnership", Ukrainian strategic goals are to obtain membership of the EU and in the Central European Free Trade Area. Even if its relations with the EU are far less advanced than those with NATO, the preconditions, which have to be met by applicants for membership in NATO, are less severe. And this is the case because the EU perceive CIS countries as, in effect, ineligible for membership because they are not part of "Europe" and their socio-economic problems are so great. So, the "NATO and EU card" is important as instrument in balancing between security and economic arrangements towards Western structures and Moscow.

Russia

If NATO enlargement is not a problem for Ukraine but a step forward towards closer ties between the new members and itself, for Russia, apparently, it is a hotspot. Why apparently? Because Russian officials recognize in private conversations, that their anti-NATO speech has two objectives which are not to impede enlargement in general. For domestic politics, Russian government finds in the struggle against NATO the patriotic voice of "mother Russia". On the international area, it is the best tactic to make the best deal possible as a condition to remain calm and accept the enlargement. "Russia had never opposed the expansion of NATO per se; it simply objected to the growth of the old, unreconstructed NATO into an arbiter of European security (as illustrated in Bosnia) without Russian participation"¹²⁰. In December 1997, even Primakov,

¹¹⁹ Horbulin V., Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council // Intelnews. - 1997. - February 4.

¹²⁰ Simes D. - Op.cit. - P.220.

during an interview, confirmed, that "NATO expansion plans were not uppermost in our mind".

But if Russia is not preoccupied by Romanian or Bulgarian desire to integrate NATO, it is not the same when it comes to the Baltic States or, in a different manner, Ukraine. Two interrelated objectives mark Russian foreign policy: consolidating its role within what it calls "its sphere of influence" (the former Soviet Republics) and fulfilling its economic interests.

First of all, their attitude towards NATO enlargement can be explained by the fact that Russia is aware of its reduced role on the international scene and wants to keep at least a regional capacity to ensure its security possibly threatened to the East. To face China for example, Russia would need resources, its "imperial territory" and no precedents of acceptance. The Baltic States are important for the Russian trade of hydrocarbures because of their high degree of dependency on its exports: Estonia (\$39.3 millions for oil, \$121.6 millions for oil products, 0.731 billions of m³ of gas), Latvia (\$18.1 millions for oil, \$166.3 millions for oil products, 1.600 billions of m³ of gas), Lithuania (\$433.9 millions for oil, \$49 millions for oil products, 2.229 billions of m³ of gas)¹²¹. Baltic States' orientation towards NATO is impeding first of all on the Russian transit of hydrocarbures because they use the Baltic States' ports: their share of capitation of Russian commercial maritime traffic increased from 35% in 1990 to 45% in 1997. Secondly, the three countries, in order to reduce their dependency, make efforts to look for other sources, such as Norway, Central Asia, even Iran for their own use or for transit taxes. The "Baltic Ring" (Swedish proposal connecting Nordic countries with Germany, Poland and Baltic States), the "Power Bridge" (American consortium linking Lithuania and Poland), the "Nordic Gas Grid" (EU project), Finish and Swedish financing are opportunities that they don't want to miss and that Russia fear.

¹²¹ Bayou C. Les interdépendances énergétiques de la rive orientale de la Baltique // Le Courier des pays de l'Est - L'espace balte en construction. - 2000. - March, № 1003.

If the Baltic States become part of NATO, the problem of territorial claims will be brought to the fore. Delimitation of land border and exclusive economic zones in the Baltic Sea and the main issue of Kaliningrad between Russia and Lithuania. 2000 km² in Pskov that Estonia has and could claim from Russia. Recently resolved but possibly emerging contentious between Latvia and Russia.

Acceptance concerning the Baltic States' integration into the North Atlantic Alliance would be a precedent of penetration into an area that Russia considers to be its "vital space". This brings us to a second major point of our analysis concerning Russia's reaction to NATO's eastward enlargement.

We have to take into account the fact that the next enlargement wave will include one or all of the Baltic States and, if not, will bring the issue even more present during the discussions between western structures and Russia. It is about the strategic interests of Russia being considered as threatened. So, after the first "*cordon sanitaire*" (Central Europe), a second line of encirclement is seen in the future NATO axis linking the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea¹²². We are talking about encirclement because Russia fears increasing Western (notably NATO) economic and military presence in Caucasus and Central Asia. The US placed peacekeeping units in these regions, especially Central Asia – Centrasbat -, where they are organizing several military exercises. And these activities are even more troubling for Russia as they are being added to US increasing influence around the Caspian Sea and its oil. Russia sees one NATO member, Turkey, as pursuing an explicit policy of extending its influence at the expense of Russia. The US is seen as supporting Turkey, in particular by utilizing the PFP programme to wean the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia away from their close relations with Russia and their commitments to the CIS (AND the war in Chechnya doesn't appease Russian fears of several secessions). So, the perception that NATO's tactic includes a deliberate policy to weaken or even supplant

¹²² Romer J.-Ch. Géopolitique de la Russie. - Paris: Economica, 1999. - P.96-98.

Russian influence in its immediate neighbouring region is more preoccupying than any other possible role that it could still play on the international scene. And this perception cannot be easily eliminated because Russia doesn't trust NATO. Cumulative effect of "broken promises" concerning unifying Germany, PFP replacing any other enlargement, NATO's intervention in Kosovo by avoiding the Security Council is more than a former superpower aware of its weakness can endure.

But, at the same time, Russian leaders must be aware that they cannot afford to alienate the West to the extent that would jeopardize Western economic and political support: "Mr.Putin is a pragmatic person"¹²³. A deep dependency on Western credits and grants cannot be avoided when it supports regime stability and survival. Long-term geopolitical and strategic reasons suggest that relations with countries such as China, Iran and India are not an effective alternative to partnership with the West. Such relations don't cover the threats that are coming exactly from the east and south. Russia has similar concerns as the West about the perceived threat of Islamist terrorism, of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and of the hegemonic challenges of a rising China. If one of these issues comes to the fore, Russia must join the West for its own survival. "As one Russian commentator has noted, the basic problem with the turn to the east is that 'there is nowhere in the East for Russia to turn to'¹²⁴. In addition, the strategic value for China, India or even Iran of an anti-Western alliance with Russia is much less of a priority than improving or recreating a more constructive relationship with the West."¹²⁵

¹²³ Arbatov A. Russia and Russian-US Relations after the Duma Elections // The Atlantic Council of the United States. - 2000. - January 7.

¹²⁴ Pushkov A. National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy // International Affairs. -1996. - №2.

¹²⁵ Dannreuther R. Escaping Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations // Survival. -1999-2000. - № 41-4.

So, how can the West construct a more productive and less confrontational political and security relationship with Moscow?

First of all, economically favorable, EU can have a role in bringing Russia closer to perceive a non-threatening West. This challenge started with the Common Strategy to which the Russian government responded positively. The centrepiece of the strategy remains the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The EU is Russia's largest trading partner: some 20% of EU gas supplies and 16% of its oil comes from Russia, accounting for about half of its hard-currency earnings. Linked to the economic part (as being sometimes a means for conviction), the Common Strategy introduced some innovations. One initiative includes consideration of a permanent EU-Russia mechanism for political and security dialogue where a critical role would be played by the High Representative for the CFSP. EU intervention can be an alternative to the inherently more confrontational NATO-Russia and US-Russia frameworks for security cooperation. At the same time it gives Russia an institutional mechanism to be consulted on European security issues.

Secondly, a more active and prominent role for other regional and international institutions has to give Russia a diplomatic engagement and, paradoxically, at the same time an escape (for domestic justification reasons and need for recognized greatness or, at least, role) in front of NATO's practical moves. A debate has started on the subject of which institution has to play the role of giving Russia a credible voice or at least the perception of it. A suggestion may be advanced: the more the better. First of all, an agreed Western approach towards Russia must be reached within NATO, EU and G-8. Intergovernmental organizations can be effective in exposing their interests and support Russia's engagement. Thirdly, OSCE can still be (as always) attractive to Russia, as it is not stigmatized by the East-West fronts. The Helsinki principles are also a means to claim some political deviances: impartial monitoring of elections, attention to

the humanitarian aspects, conflict warning, prevention and reporting. Finally, bilateral relations will continue to play an important role in linking Russia to the Western countries. Importance increases with the number and you have, at least, the satisfaction of being listened to, and diplomatically protected from harsh decisions (because you get something in return) and being part of the decision-making club.

Conclusions

Questions are still being asked about NATO's eastward enlargement: not whether, but when and who. Left for the second wave as favorite and justification of it, Romania has to face the fact that, strategically and economically, NATO has no reason to enlarge in the near future. No viable threat is perceived from the East, it still can control the south, eventual assistance will be granted anyway and, economically speaking, pushing and waiting for EU to enlarge appears a more logical alternative.

But NATO has both a political duty and responsibility. It has to respect the date for the next enlargement (2002) in order to keep its credibility and responsibility for a non-divided and stable Europe.

First of all, 2002 is a satisfying date. Concerning Romania, prevention of an eventual political crisis, of a come back of the former (1990-1996) leading party, more restrained towards Western and liberal reform orientation cannot be accomplished anymore by a psychological NATO integration during this Romanian electoral year. So, time will be given to Romania's leaders to orientate its foreign policy and to continue economic reforms. Time will be given also to the United States, also in an electoral year, to canalize their priorities and their pace and effort in dealing with European security problems.

Secondly, dividing lines have to be avoided through a continued enlargement policy. Several scenarios can be imagined. The first one in conformity with strategic and political thinking: Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria would fill the gap on the West-East and North-South axis and would permit the Baltic issue to mature and Russia to calm down. The problem is that perspectives in 2000 are not economically brilliant for Romania and Bulgaria and, on the other hand, the Baltic countries are quite important in NATO's eyes. A second scenario would take Slovenia and Slovakia in order to create a link between NATO and its three new members and one Baltic country, most probably, Lithuania. In this case however, Romania and Bulgaria would feel betrayed and disillusion and nationalistic attitude could lead to stalling in reforms and to political instability. Russia will also protest because it will not have been diplomatically calmed down through institutional and enhanced cooperation instruments.

So, small would still be a beautiful number and the first scenario would still be the most acceptable, even if the year 2000 appears quite somber regarding Romania. There is still time to recover. There is even a greater chance if the EU takes this opportunity to come forward to promote a more authoritative role in the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and heal the eventual divisions, economical or political. For NATO, it is important to "find solutions satisfactory to all Allies for the necessary involvement of the non-EU European Allies in the structures which the EU is setting up to ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation"¹²⁶. As to Russia, it "will be more likely to pursue the good-neighbour option if a larger, more secure Europe promptly fills the potentially destabilizing geopolitical no man's land between Russia and the European Union"¹²⁷.

¹²⁶ Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Florence on 24 May 2000.

¹²⁷ Brzezinski Z. Normandy Evasion // Washington Post. - 1994. - May 3.

Nicolas Dervaux

Universite Libre de Bruxelles

**THE END OF THE “GREY ZONE”?
WESTERN STRATEGIES FOR UKRAINE IN THE FIELD
OF A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

This article will treat - in a rather uneven way - a “dual problem”, namely how NATO as supranational entity envisages the membership of Ukraine in its structures but also, in a more forward-looking way this time, how we could imagine, in approximately short term, the possible creation of a new architecture of European security: would it be possible to build it on an existing structures, as the OSCE, the UEO or on the theoretical sketches of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy? Or could we imagine a completely unpublished and original plan in which Ukraine would play a strategic role?

1. Which Ukraine is for NATO? Analysis of a partnership.

“Why is the Charter signed with NATO in Madrid so important for Ukraine?”. This interrogation was evoked on many occasions in the Eastern and Western academic sphere. Indeed, if we look at the political science publications of the last five years, we can find plethora of excellent articles digressing on the subjects of the strategic, political, economic and sociological utility of a possible membership of Ukraine in the Atlantic Alliance. The originality of our thesis here is to reverse the question, as Taras Kuzio did it, namely “Why is the Charter signed with Ukraine so important for NATO?”. It is true Ukraine possesses so much from a strategic point of view by its geographic position - in the confines of Eastern Europe, Russia and her satellites, and, to the certain extent, Turkey, as well as by its historical past connected with the Soviet Union and to the Warsaw Pact. This chapter will try to make a non-exhaustive inventory of the advantages of this country in front of the future challenges for the Atlantic Alliance in this new world configuration.

“Ukraine appearance one the map of Europe is comparable in geopolitical significance with the integration of Germany into the emerging European community in the 1990's. This merger of Germany into Europe has predominant power to the West. Ukraine emergence has comparable effect in the East, thereby altering the geopolitical configuration of Europe as a whole. The rearrangement is directly relevant to the intended (...)”¹²⁸. This comparison chosen by Zbigniew Brzezinski justifies objectively a geographic, historic, military, economic and demographic reality.

As we evoked it briefly in introduction, Ukraine is at the crossroads of three geo-strategic entities: Russia to the North and to the East, the Black Sea and Turkey to the South and Eastern Europe with Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland to the West. Let us speculate on the implications stemming from this

¹²⁸ Brzezinski Z. *Ukraine's Critical Role in the Post-Soviet Space // Ukraine in the World : Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independant State / Ed. by Lubomyr A. Hajda. - Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. - 1998. - P.4*

exceptional geographic situation: first, the Russian link. It is not necessary to dwell on this data for a long time, which appears as a truism. Indeed, Ukraine has been an integral part of the Soviet Union since the Androussovo's Treaty (1667) until its collapse in 1991. Wheat loft of the Soviet Empire, Ukraine, in addition to this role, was of great military importance due to the Crimea, the big Soviet naval base. Moreover, among the Ukrainian population, these common roots are profoundly anchored in the consciences, and it in spite of the human disasters of the Stalin's era and the atrocities of the great famine of 1930-1933 during which « the only ones to eat in their famine were the communists and the man-eaters »¹²⁹. If we look at the 1998 public opinion polls, it will be clear that more than 40% of the population remains very close of the “Russian brother”, and this figure doubles near the Eastern regions borders with its sufficient amount of Russian population. This dependence is not only of ideological or traditionalist character but raises also from the economic reality. Indeed, half of the trade flows are between these two countries.

In addition to this dominating Russian geographic and historic link, the European factor is becoming more and more real in Ukraine. If we go back to the recent history, the international recognition of independent Ukraine was accelerated by the promptitude of the Central European nations to recognize explicitly Ukraine as a fully sovereign entity dissociated from Russia. Implicitly, this reasoning must be filled out and cut of its factuality: indeed, as Stephen Burant stresses, “many Western opinion-makers and policymakers even questioned whether Ukrainians were a people different from the Russians”¹³⁰.

This normal interrogation obliged Kyiv to persuade the other governments of this difference, which seemed artificial to the part of the European and American specialists. It is the countries of Central Europe which persuaded the

¹²⁹ Laroussilhe O. de. L'Ukraine. - Paris: PUF, 1998. - P.62.

¹³⁰ Burant S.R. Ukraine and East Central Europe // Ukraine in the World. - P.45.

international opinion that “an independent Ukraine was a *sine qua non* for their own independence from Moscow”¹³¹. In other words, one condition of the independence of the Ukrainian nation is the effective independence of its State. Nevertheless, the question of identity becomes crucial. According to Burant, “Central Europe appeared to represent a way out of Ukraine’s isolation”¹³². This thesis is not very recent. Already in 1990 - before the independence, Anatolii Zlenko, then Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Ukraine, already evoked in these terms the privileged links between Poland and his country: “*a common history existing a thousand years and a deep cultural, linguistic and ideological closeness have linked us with neighbouring Poland*”¹³³.

Nevertheless, the policy introduced by Leonid Kuchma after his election as President of Ukraine in 1994 may be characterized as a “quick evolution”. Indeed, since October 1994, he has been building the relations between his country and its neighbours in Central Europe within three briefly summarized orientations: in the first place, the stake in work of the Trilateral Agreement signed on January, 14 of the same year by its predecessor, secondly the acceleration of the political and economic reforms towards the market economy and, finally, the intensification of the political cooperation within the European institutions like the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), for example.

Finally, let’s speak about Turkey and, more widely, about the Black Sea region. If look at the map, we will notice that Ukraine does not have a ground border with Turkey. Nevertheless, these two countries are close: they are close geographically because it is easy to cross the Black Sea to reach the Turkish shore; close economically because business relations between two countries are

¹³¹ Ibidem. - P.45

¹³² Ibidem. - P.46

¹³³ Zlenko A. The Ukraine, the UN and World Diplomacy // International Affairs. - 1990. - № 5; quoted by Burant S.R. Op.Cit. - P.45

growing, and Simferopol (capital of the Crimea) is becoming one of the poles of trade of the new axis Istanbul-Simferopol; close ethnically as 10% of the population of the Crimea are Tatars. Let's not forget also about the Ottoman domination in the region from 1475 to 1783. In conclusion, Ukraine represents effectively, from the geographic point of view, a crossroads of three different poles.

Having gained the independence quite suddenly, Ukraine had to create its own army to assure its security and sovereignty. It was necessary to restructure 750,000 people stemming from rows of the Soviet Army, the biggest national contingent, provided by very limited financial and logistic support. Contrary to what one would have been able to be afraid of, this alteration was made without great clashes, and it is in spite of the impressive number of dismissals: indeed, Ukrainian Army (UAF) with a contingent of 386,000 people suffered almost a half reduction compared to the year 1991. Despite these massive dismissals, Ukraine remains one of the most important countries in Central and Eastern Europe in terms of its military and defensive potential: indeed, Ukraine is the ninth world producer of conventional weapons. Besides, Ukraine is allocating 3.7 % of its GNP to the military purposes now compared to 0.5 % of the GNP in 1993.

In spite of the above data which seem to be indicative of a modern and rich army, we have to criticize some visible facts. First, even though the part of the GNP allocated to the military purposes increases, it amounts only to \$15 per annum per capita, that seems derisive compared to Russia (\$115) or France, the country approximately similar in area and number of population (\$674). This distortion is the result of a sudden fall of the exchange rate of National currency, as well as of practically permanent inflation. The balance is scarcely satisfactory - unmotivated and badly equipped army. This way, the assistance of NATO in the military sphere is necessary and wished: the NATO countries can offer support

and assistance that will promote rapid modernization of Ukraine militarily without posing express threats to the UAF institutional autonomy, and Ukrainian civilian and military leaders are keenly aware of the benefits of such cooperation.

Neither NATO on the one hand, nor the United States on the other hand, didn't escape the necessity of such partnership. Indeed, in 1990 the administration of George Bush emphasized on the potential danger for the European and world security if the Ukrainian nuclear potential fell into the hands either of a changeable army, or of a terrorist or paramilitary groups. This nuclear dimension in view of its dangerous character was one of the main components of the Ukrainian strategy of NATO and the United States. The US supported the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe justifying its growing interest to the young nuclear-free nation that was Ukraine.

Since January 1992, after the Minsk's Statement on the creation of the C.I.S. (on December 8, 1991) , Washington has been considering a progressive integration of Kyiv to the NATO structures as a tool of a better control over its armaments, and as a guarantee that stabilized Ukraine, integrated into the Western defence structures would entail military and strategic decline of Russia, deprived by that of the most important ally within her "Rimland". This state of mind can be summarized to posteriori by the following statement of Michael Mandelbaum, professor at Johns Hopkins University and director of the "American Foreign Policy": *"So long as it [Ukraine] remains independent, it is a buffer between Russia and the rest of Europe. More important, an independent Ukraine is the best guarantee that Russia will remain a peaceful nation-state. Conflict between the two would have adverse repercussions to the West. And if Moscow absorbed Ukraine or attempted to do so, Russia would again become a multinational empire, harboring a large, resentful subject nation with poor prospects for construction of a stable democratic system"*¹³⁴.

¹³⁴ [Mandelbaum](#) MANDELBAUM, «Preserving the New Peace. The Case Against NATO Expansion», // Foreign Affairs, 1995. - May-June, 1995, Vol.74, n.№ 2. - Ppp.10-11.

In practice, the relations USA -Ukraine-NATO from the very beginning have been developing around the question of the denuclearization of Ukraine. The question was rather tough because Western countries conditioned their financial help by a rigorous plan of destruction of all ogives present on the Ukrainian territory. The first phase of this denuclearization was officially launched on May 15, 1992 by the Tashkent Statement, in which Ukraine declared putting into practice the capacities of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signed on November 19, 1990.

The second phase of this process began in 1992 with the signature of the Lisbon Protocol in spring and ended with the accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. This joint strategy could not exclude the fact that Ukraine-Russia relations seemed to be variable. The reasons were numerous but discords related to the Black Sea Fleet and status of the Crimea, more exactly - of Sevastopol, the city with Russian majority and a strategic city for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, could be considered as the most likely.

The economic situation of Ukraine remains one of the dark points of its balance. Indeed, the picture that one could draw up this day is rather gloomy. We shall not make a detailed analysis of the various aspects here but we'll try to show that it is the economic and commercial sphere where the strong Ukraine's dependence on Russia is still lying. We can support this thesis turning to the structure of Ukraine's energy supply: the country consumes 30 million tons of petroleum annually while it produces only 4 million. In the same way, Ukraine uses 100 million m³ of natural gas a year while she extracts only 18 million. In other words, Ukraine needs cruelly energy supplies from the outside, and Russia is the necessary counterpart.

As Oles Smolansky puts it, *“in line with the pattern established during the late Soviet Period, Russia has been supplying [...] some 90 % of Ukraine's*

annual oil and 60 % of its gas requirements”¹³⁵. It is so evident that the dependence of Ukraine on Russia is based less on military necessities than on energetic realities. NATO and the United States understood very quickly that the increasing independence from Russia inevitably had to be accompanied by alternative solutions regarding the energy supply. In 1992, a discreet dialogue started on that issue between Ukraine and some countries of the Persian Gulf, and Iran, in particular. These negotiations have led to the first Iran-Ukraine Agreement on energy supply in February, 1992. Iran committed itself to furnish annually to Kyiv 4 million tons of oil - the equivalent of Ukraine’s domestic output - and 3 millions of m³ of natural gas. But, in addition to the financial difficulties caused by the deterioration of the exchange rate of national currency, Ukraine had to face the problem of how to bring these new resources. In fact, several solutions were studied, and in the first place was the construction of the oil terminal Pivdennyi near Odessa; but the project was suspended because of its high cost (\$1.3 billion), as well as some ecological tensions it entailed. The second solution was the construction of pipelines allowing a continuous and relatively safe transporting of the energy resources coming from the external sources. Several projects have been advanced:

1. Pipeline (petroleum and gas) Iran - Azerbaijan - Russia - Ukraine;
2. Pipeline (gas) Turkmenistan - Iran - Turkey - Europe;
3. Pipeline (petroleum) Kuwait - Turkey - Ukraine;
4. Pipeline (petroleum) Azerbaijan - Georgia - Ukraine.

None of the above is materialized this day. Moscow opposed strongly to the construction of these pipelines, which could damage the energy dependence of Ukraine, and several regions of the Caspian Sea. As we saw briefly here,

¹³⁵ Smolansky OMOLANSKY, «Ukraine and the Fuel Problem : Recent Developments», // The Ukrainian Quarterly, 1996, Vol.52, n°2-3, summer-fall 1996, Pp.143.

energy remains one of the major factors of Ukraine's attitude towards Russia. An effective policy aiming at political and economic stabilization of Ukraine (according to the World Bank, 90% of the Ukrainian population place themselves below the poverty line) must necessarily take into account this data.

2. What partnership between NATO and Ukraine?

Before turning to the Distinctive Charter as itself, it is useful to recall briefly the evolution of partnership between the Atlantic Alliance and Kyiv by trying to find its both constant, and temporary peculiarities. However, we have to distinguish two dichotomous periods, but - we shall see it - they do not affect negatively each other.

The first period - which we can call "NATO-optimistic" - is from the declaration of Ukraine's independence in 1991 to the election of Leonid Kravchuk. From the analysis of speeches and acts of the time, a will of the President to bring the country to the era of partnership with the West becomes clear. Indeed, the membership in the European structures and international political institutions could have allowed Ukraine to benefit from foreign assistance in the reconstruction of the economic and political relations with "Great Russian brother", certainly ill but always alive.

Besides, the Ukrainian Armed Forces scarcely could defend the new sovereign state without external help. This "transatlantic" optimism dealt not with the awareness of the Western states of the strategic importance of Ukraine as a key regional actor, but rather with the fleeting course events, not clear enough even for some statesmen. Indeed, wasn't it President Bush who, during his visit to Kyiv in July, 1991 was convincing the audience in Verkhovna Rada that Ukraine had to remain connected to the Soviet Union, and that persisted in it in October, 1991 crying out that the independence of Ukraine was not a desirable

thing? Naturally, this position changed quickly but what is to be stressed, here is the clear-sightedness of the Ukrainian camp, which perceived very strongly the strategic importance of the country's membership to the Western political structures.

Nevertheless, in front of this optimism on both sides, it is advisable to recall that a considerable part of the Ukrainian *nomenklatura* saw with a bad eye a too frank approach towards the West, being afraid of a violent reaction of Moscow. Nevertheless, the partnership process launched in 1992 and the participation of Ukraine in the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council the newly independent country to become more familiar with the functioning of the Alliance. The final political act of Kravchuk as President was, in that respect, the signature of the Partnership for Peace Programme (PFP) on February 8, 1994. This was all the more symbolic because Ukraine was the first country of Eastern Europe to join this programme.

The appearance of Leonid Kuchma in 1994 started a period of doubts regarding the question of partnership, given the fact that the new Head of State - and former director of a military plant - was running his campaign calling for a new approach to Russia. This new neutrality must be deciphered in two aspects. First, it is advisable not to forget the political context, within which this idea was launched. It is clear that the Ukrainian public opinion, especially in Eastern regions, was basically against the attachment to NATO. Nevertheless, the process did not stop for two reasons: first of all, membership in NATO was based on easier criteria. And besides, the United States conditioned their help to Ukraine by partnership with the NATO structures - in different forms.

As we see it, NATO-Ukraine "wedding" demonstrates rather rational choice than a choice of passion. Nevertheless, the Charter of July, 1997 remains the key moment of this partnership as it presents a synthesis of anticipated and evoked realities this article deals with. The main dimension put in motto is

obviously the promotion of the security in Europe. This postulate brings two reflections: first, it clarifies the reference to the well-known Article 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949: *“The Members agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or in North America shall be considered as an attack against them all”* In other words, to attack one is to attack all.

But we cannot isolate this postulate from the fact that there is a dichotomy between previous role of NATO during the Cold War period and the new role of the Organization on the eve of the XXI century. The Article 4 of the Charter is a very good example of this fact: it stipulates that *“Ukraine welcomes NATO’s continuing and active adaptation to meet the changing circumstances of Euro-Atlantic Security, and its role, in cooperation with other international organizations such as the OSCE, the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union in promoting Euro-Atlantic security and fostering a general climate of trust and confidence in Europe”*.

As many others, this part of the Charter can be analyzed by means of a “dual reading”. If one places himself behind the Western prism, it is clear that this article tries to justify the institutional reforms but as connected to the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance wanted by the Clinton Administration and repeated in Washington last year. Besides, it is rather interesting to indicate that, unlike the European Union, the reform of NATO avoided the major conflict of the ambitious phase of institutional reform associated with redefining the strategies as well as a process the extension Eastwards.

In other words, the Atlantic Alliance sees in reforms a new justification of its existence and it excepts the former plans. This pro-activity, set against a certain inherent passivity in its defensive role stemming from the Treaty of Washington of 1949, can not be isolated from what we mentioned above, namely that the membership of new members places it upstream the internal reform of the

new member, unlike the procedures of membership in the institutes of the European Union.

On the other hand, if we take the Ukrainian stand, the Article 4 of the aforementioned Charter brings this graduality (strengthened also by the Article 12) wanted by Kuchma administration. Besides, the stake in the cooperation between European defence institutions and the Atlantic Alliance is not to displease Ukraine interested in a simple bilateral agreement but rather tempted by a broader partnership at the European level; all the more she tries to protect her economic links with Russia that envisages a certain neutrality of Kyiv towards the former Western enemy. Ukraine seems to be attracted by Europe for which it could be, like Turkey, a bridge between two civilizations, but possible membership in NATO is remaining as necessary constraint. Paradoxically, this reasoning turns out to be shaky because this membership is not automatic. Indeed, it is subject to three essential and inextricable factors: first of all, Ukraine must wait for the end of the deep ideological reform within the Alliance taking place nowadays.

On the level of the mechanisms of cooperation *stricto sensu*, we could integrate them into a double reference, namely the intensification of the cooperation in military matters and around the concept of nuclear free zone and in the promotion of democracy and free market economy. The spinal column of this partnership is established by the participation of Ukraine in the EAPC and especially by the membership in the PFP which is considered by all as a “happy initiative”, as President Clinton called it during his visit to Kyiv in June, 2000.

In practice, the Charter organizes institutionally and in a more procedural way the mechanisms of NATO-Ukraine cooperation. First, it defines the subjects for discussion, which are classified in three categories:

- * the questions of public interest;
- * the common subjects, which are able to be the object of seminars;

* the subjects to deal as possible.

It is interesting to notice that the security and nuclear priority is highlighted compared to the economic and political dimension which are placed somewhere in the background here. It marks an important difference between the Western interests centred on the subjects put in the foreground (nuclear free zone, regional stability, intensification of security in Europe around a stable Ukraine) and the Ukrainian motivations (economic and political development, intensification of the multilateral dialogue, conversion of the defence industry).

The last point to look at concerns the procedures put in work to insure in the facts this cooperation. To schematize, we can summarize them in a triptych, which would be the evolutionary institutional-dynamic abundance put into dialogue. Institutional abundance because the Article 11 explicitly highlights all the mechanisms of cooperations on the bilateral level.

The evolutionary dynamics is formulated by the Article 12: *“NATO and Ukraine consider their relationship as an evolving, dynamic process. To ensure that they are developing their relationship and implementing the provisions of this Charter to the fullest extent possible, the North Atlantic Council will periodically meet with Ukraine as the NATO-Ukraine Commission, as a rule not less than twice a year. The NATO-Ukraine Commission will not duplicate the functions of other mechanisms described in this Charter, but instead would meet to assess broadly the implementation of the relationship, survey planning for the future, and suggest ways to improve or further develop cooperation between NATO and Ukraine”*.

Finally, the dialogue is established by the Article 13 which stipulates that *“NATO and Ukraine will encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Verkhovna Rada”*.

In conclusion, some forward-looking remarks could be made. In the first place, the Charter takes into account at the same time such factors as the end of

the process of elaboration of the relations between Ukraine and NATO, and the beginning of a much deeper institutionalized partnership around the postulate that stable Ukraine can serve as an engine of the regional security. In addition to it, three crossed readings should be made of this Charter, namely the concept of independence, creating an inverse proportionality between the intensity of the relations Ukraine-Russia and the “degree of independence” of Ukraine.

The second reading would centre on the report as to the Ukrainian regime. According to the Charter, the intensification of the democracy by free and regular elections as well as by the existence of democratic institutions constitutes one of the bases of deepening of the relations between Kyiv and Brussels around a new plan of European security.

Finally, the third reading will be done through the prism of stability: it shows that the basis of Western reasoning lies in the fact that a stable country allows to decrease the potentiality in regional confusions.

Two inescapable consequences ensue from it. First, as the Charter says, as well as some previous pages of this article, there is a real necessity to attach more economic approach to the partnership. This dimension begins to be an object of detailed researches.

Finally, the Charter allows to make, although with a certain imbalance, the synthesis of the short- and long-term strategic objectives in of each of the parts, i.e. the political, ideological and economic dimension of Ukraine, and the strategic and military needs of the Atlantic Alliance.

Nevertheless, some questions remain. Will NATO be able to insure an effective management of this new architecture? Will the internal reform be a booster of the deep revision of management? Which security architecture for which Europe?