

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
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**THE FRANCO/SPANISH POSITION TOWARD
A COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND
DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI), AND NATO
IMPLICATIONS.**

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The Franco/Spanish Position Toward a Common European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and NATO Implications.

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Summary

The project: “The Franco/Spanish Position Towards a Common European Security and Defense Identity, and NATO implications” can be summarized as follows.

Key Points

The end of the Cold War brought a new scenario full of expectations and hopes for the world peace. Ten years of post-Cold War demonstrated that the international reconciliation is still a remote ideal. At the dawn of the Twenty-first century, a new debate has emerged about the new security environment, from the donated unipolar world to a multipolar one, but with the US, still as the sole superpower, or *hyper-power* if preferred. However, what makes of this period a transition stage is that the European Union, China, Russia and India are claiming a new distribution of power, a *multipolar* system. This new situation requires a re-definition of *security*. Washington has already found one labeled as National Missile Defense (NMD). On the other hand, Europe, Russia and China hold a different vision on how to deal with the new post-Cold War security settings. I have considered convenient that the first part of this project should deal with this important subject in order to establish a solid base for the research.

Key Problems

The second part of the project deals with the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The historical and political study of the ESDI and CFSP is important because both are the pillars for the construction of the European Union (EU) as a global actor, and as a power which should be competing as an equal with the US. The economic union, symbolized by the Euro, is not the end, but the solid foundation required for the consolidation of this task.

The third part studies the politics of Paris and Madrid. One of the most interesting and difficult aspect of the project was the study of the approach of the two actors selected. These countries were selected because of their historical relationship and their different approach to this subject. Their involvement has suffered at different stages in which they sometimes acted

as allies with common goals and at other times, had divergent politics, especially regarding the other main actor studied, the US.

The last part of this research work is devoted to the study of the implications for NATO. How the direction of the European construction is being received by Washington and other NATO states, which are not part of the European Union.

Key findings

This study aims at understanding the direction that the ESDI and the CFSP are taking, rather than at predicting an outcome of such goals. In any case, it seems clear that there is still a long way to go, before the EU can act in the international arena as a singular global power. For the time being, the EU and the Western European Union (WEU) shall remain under the tutelage of NATO.

Although the long dependency of Europe on Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information (C4 + I) on Washington is persisting, the crucial steps have already been taken at the Amsterdam Treaty and the Councils of Cologne and Helsinki. A common goal has already been found. What is still lacking is the sacrifice of the freedom of decision making of the different member states.

The ESDI relies entirely on the European commitment. As Philip H. Gordon, the Director of the French Center in the Washington-based Brookings Institution, stressed: ***"If Europeans could muster the unity and military power that a true ESDI would imply, the responsibility and influence within the Alliance would follow whether the Americans liked it or not"***.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the NATO and the Academic Affairs Unit at NATO for this fellowship granted in 1999. During the course of this research, I had the possibility to travel between France, Spain and the US. In those places, I benefited always from formal or informal talks with the people who make headlines and those who do not but whose work is determinant.

Introduction

“Without America, Great Britain and France cannot sustain the political balance in Western Europe, Germany would be tempted by nationalism, Russia would lack a global interlocutor. And without Europe, America could turn, psychologically as well as geographically and geopolitically into an island off the shores of Eurasia.”¹

This research paper is divided into four parts, and it is intended to examine the concept of the European Security and Defense Identity (further referred as ESDI) from three different perceptions: France, Spain and the United States of America, as the NATO leading nation.² It also analyzes whether the ESDI and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are reachable goals or just an impossible aspiration.

The positions of France and Spain are divergent in the creation of a European Union capable to act as an international global power in all the fields, not only in the economical one. While France used to seek the Europeanization of NATO, some states consider it as Paris's desire to make Europe look more like France. On the other hand, and as most Europeans, Spain seems willing to accept the current status quo of an Alliance dominated by the Americans. But, at the same time, Aznar's government in Madrid doesn't want to stay behind the leading European countries in the new creation of a globally strong Europe.³ Finally, the last actor is the US, unwilling to share its influence on European affairs. As Philip H. Gordon ironically illustrated, ***“Sharing power in practice is harder than in theory. Sharing power when one holds most of the cards may be admirable trait, but it is not one found often in the history of international relations”.***

¹ Henry Kissinger. “Diplomacy” Touchstone, New York, 1995. P 822.

² There is no questioning on the paramount political and military role of Washington within the Atlantic Alliance, as in other parts of the globe where the coalitions are always led by the sole power. On this point, the literature is wide and long.

³ The Spanish government while participating in all major European defense programs and sharing of the 10% of the Action Rapid Force was the first European government to support publicly the American National Missile Defence.

The first part of the project is designed to present the new security environment in the world in general and in Europe in particular. After the end of the Cold War, the bipolarity which had dominated the world for over forty years suddenly presented a scenario full of hopes and expectations. The winner of such ideological confrontation was the West and its values. However, one country, the United States of America, not only accumulated all the credits for the victory, but also was proclaimed by the international community as the sole superpower. Suddenly, from a system dominated by the two main nuclear powers we shifted to another one, ruled by one single country. One decade later, this unipolar system is again in a transformation phase. Or at least, the debate over multipolarity replacing “American hegemonism”⁴ is visibly taking place.

Obviously, a new security environment is calling for a new security definition of the world problems. Clearly, the security architecture of Europe and NATO would undertake modifications adapted to the new scenery.

The second part is intended to define the meaning and history of the two concepts that are shaping the development of a new Europe, aside the economic integration, the European Security and Defense Identity and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (here after CFSP). Dr Javier Solana Madariaga, the former NATO Secretary General and current High Representative for the CFSP, noted that: ***“By developing a European Security and Defence policy, the EU will become a stronger partner for the US, more capable of dealing with the crisis affecting the security of the transatlantic community”***.⁵ At the same time, Chris Patten, the European Union (EU) commissioner for External Relations acknowledged that: ***“experience, and even common sense, tells us that it is much better to prevent conflict than to manage it, and deal with the consequences. It causes less disruption. It provokes less human suffering. And it is cheaper.”***⁶ Therefore, a European response through the ESDI and CFSP sounds like the answer to the main security problems Europeans are facing at the beginning of this new century, but that they are nothing except legacies from the XXth century unresolved problems.

⁴ The US foreign policy is often referred as American hegemonism by Russian and Chinese governments.

⁵ Cited in the Financial Times June 14 2001.

⁶ Commissioner Chris Patten’s remarks at Press Conference on 11 April 2000

Thirdly, the paper will examine the origin and the position of Paris and Madrid regarding the development of the ESDI⁷ and the links to other concepts such as the CFSP, or the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which are interconnected. As Lluís Maria Puig, the former Chairman of the WEU Assembly noted, ***“ESDI is a necessity, and there is no better alternative.”***⁸

What is obvious is that ESDI and CFSP have broader consequences for the international community, as the Spanish Defense Minister, Eduardo Serra observed: ***“The security in Europe, will not be only European security.”***⁹ For the US, ESDI poses some kind of a dilemma. On one hand, there is a desire to encourage a greater defense effort from European NATO members. On the other hand, Washington does not wish to see Europe operating independently. At this point, the divergent politics of France and Spain are playing an important role in the development of this goal and also shaping the American reaction toward it. In any case, what looks clear is that for the short to medium term, the European states need the support of the US to construct ESDI, and ESDI as currently proposed by US will lead to the permanent control by Washington of the European defense policy.

Finally, this dissertation analyzes the possible implications for the NATO and the US. The NATO, the US and the European allies are indissoluble parts of the same mechanism, as the Kosovo conflict recently illustrated. However, the main lessons learned were that even NATO is capable of acting in a conflict like that¹⁰:

- ***There is a clear disproportion between the burdens born by the US and its European allies with respect to financial resources, technological input and military commitments***
- ***The role of the US in Europe’s defence and security was once again a live issue.***
- ***Following the campaign in Kosovo there is a need to redefine the alliance’s mandate and establish whether in the light of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty it is still a***

⁷ NATO established the European Security and Defense Identity at the 1994 Summit in Brussels. However, the debate on a European defense policy between European states is much older.

⁸ Cited in *Revista Espanola de Defensa*. N 124 Junio 1998.

⁹ Cited in *Revista Espanola de Defensa*. N 112 Junio 1997

¹⁰ NATO's *raison d'être* and main goal was to protect Western Europe from the Soviet threat, not to intervene in small domestic conflicts.

*collective self-defense alliance or a Euro-Atlantic collective security system in status nascendi in this context, a debate is going on about the ESDI within the NATO and about the ESDP within the EU.*¹¹

The future of the European Union as its defense identity is the future of the Atlantic Alliance. As former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger stated: ***“The Alliance stood at the moment of its greatest opportunity and it would be ironic if it fell apart. The issue is whether Europe can find its identity by means other than opposition to the US and whether Europe can express its identity in cooperation with the US.”***¹²

In conclusion, the relationship between Europe and the US is based on finding common and shared interests and goals because the actors' behavior will depend on them and therefore the development of the transatlantic community.¹³ There is a long way to go, but the train has already left the station. The new European currency will play an important role as an exponent of a Union that can be a strong player. The ESDI and CFSP are the essential elements to complete the work.

¹¹ SIPRI YEAR BOOK 2000. Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security. Oxford University Press. 2000. P 185.

¹² Cited in the Financial Times May 16, 2001.

¹³ Felix Arteaga. “Las relaciones transatlánticas” Monografías del CESEDEN N 27 1998 p 23.

PART ONE. GLOBAL CONCEPTS.

1. The New Security Environment.

During the Cold War, the issue of European security was reduced to one fundamental parameter: a military threat of apocalyptic dimensions in a context of bipolarity.¹⁴ Now, the Cold War is over. However, for some analysts, the post-Cold War era is also gone. Therefore, what we are witnessing now is a new period in international relations, where the great powers such as the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China and the European Union want to see a more multipolar world, while the only superpower "understandably" wants to maintain the status quo, represented by a uni-polar system. The latest European armed conflict and the first one for the NATO as an active part has changed completely the panorama for the analysts and decision-making bodies. For George Friedman, ***"The Kosovo conflict was the catalyst. Russia and China saw NATO's direct intervention more as an action designated to increase US power and expand NATO's geopolitical reach than as a peacekeeping force."***¹⁵ The Europeans realized how far they are, in terms of technology, and how dependent from the other side of the Atlantic.

If the Clinton administration was marked by an indifference to geopolitical relations, focused mainly on economic affairs, and stabilizing substrategic regions such as in Asia, the Bush's team seems to have a predilection for strategic and geopolitical thinking derived from the Cold War, along with a relative aversion to substrategic involvements.¹⁶ Bush's central concern is to maintain the unipolar world in which the United States is the only superpower able to operate globally, thereby protecting the United States from the dangers of a new Cold War by ensuring that no other great power can emerge as a superpower. This is accomplished by maintaining forward geopolitical pressure on great powers"¹⁷ Of course, in this evaluation of

¹⁴ Victor-Yves Ghebali & Brigitte Sauerwein. *The European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and Perspectives*. UNIDIR, Geneva, 1995. P185

¹⁵ George Friedman "The End of the Post-Cold War Era" Stratfor. April 9 2001.

¹⁶ In opposition to the Democratic administration where the China specialists were numerous, the Republicans have opted for Soviet experts, like the new National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice.

¹⁷ George Friedman. *Ibidem*.

great powers that can challenge American preponderance, the EU is one more candidate.¹⁸

The European security environment has changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. German unification took place, Czechoslovakia split up, and on the ruins of the two totalitarian federations--the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia--20 new states were formed or re-emerged. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved, and new institutions, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP), were created. These developments have been accompanied by the spread of a system of common values across Europe.

The post-communist states are increasingly adhering to the principles of democracy and political pluralism, market economies and the rule of law. Their commitment to respect international standards in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms has paved the way for the admission of most of these states to the Council of Europe. Many of them also aspire to membership of both NATO and the European Union (EU). Since the Cold War, there has been a fundamental change in the character of the threats to peace and stability in Europe. Instead of emanating from conflicts between states, the most serious security risks emerging in post-cold war Europe stem from conflicts within states.

The most visible result is the emergence of a phenomenon called *globalization* and the confirmation of a new American unilateralism. The role of Washington has grown since the end of the ideological war that divided the world for most of half of the Twenty-century. NATO has not been an exception.

However, some voices have started to claim that the American unipolar-based system is also part of recent history. In the seventies, the US fought a war in Asia, Vietnam, with practically no help, and with voices against it in Europe and within America itself. In the 1990s, US President Bush Senior, demanded the authorization of the United Nations and was obliged to call for the help of numerous countries in order to fight a dictator, Saddam Hussein, who had just invaded a small neighbor. The dictator remains in the same place, and this time, President Bush Junior is obliged to make a world tour in order to obtain a good response for implementing his new defense

¹⁸ Even if the EU is regarded as a potential power that could challenge US interest, in opposition with the People's Republic which is seen as a competitor, and for some people a threat. The EU is, and will be also a partner.

doctrine, NMD, which ironically will be used to protect the American soil and American troops abroad from that country among others.

2. The Necessity for a New Security Definition

If NATO was successful for four decades, it was because of its politics of containment and dissuasion. The Atlantic Alliance also benefited the rationality of the analysts in the Kremlin, who understood the consequences of a direct conflict: the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). However, dissuasion now is not based on analyzing the benefits and costs of a potential attack. Now there are emotional forces, sometimes even irrational.¹⁹

Again, the war in Yugoslavia and the later conflict in Bosnia, showed how the sources of conflict are not among states, but within states. It is also important to remark how after the fall of the iron curtain, the menace for the world stability is now concentrated in a few states considered as "rogue"²⁰ Under these circumstances, the main concerns about security for the West are terrorism, with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD.

This new setting is taking place in a world dominated by only one country, the United States, in terms of hard power and also soft power.²¹ Washington will try to keep the current status quo, favorable to its interests. Some countries like the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, are trying to shift the situation. In the EU, some voices claim a new direction in the international relations arena, in other words a transformation of this unipolarity towards a new multipolarity. Declarations such as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he labels the US as the "hyper-power" with the "negative connotations that it carries for the American mentality", are a good exponent of the current situation.

In the security, as in other areas, the US is the leading force. With the new Republican administration, full of "cold war analysts", the Pentagon is taking the lead in the analysis for a new security definition of the world. The

¹⁹ Grupo de Estudios Estrategicos. GEES. "España en el nuevo entorno estrategico" Junio 1992.

²⁰ Under the United States terminology and evaluation, the rogue states are mainly North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya.

²¹ Joseph Nye Jr. defines hard power as the military means while the soft power could be divided into more economic, political, and social spheres.

result of those analyses has produced the NMD, which is the resurgence of an old concept based on the "Star Wars" as the Ronald Reagan program for protecting América was known. And, all this happens at the same time Europe is trying to develop its own definition of security. As the director of the WEU's Institute for Strategic Studies in Paris, Nicole Gnesotto, noticed: ***“America buys the idea of Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) if the Europeans do likewise with National Missile Defense (NMD).”***²²

In any case, Europe and the United States form the most important and the strongest alliance in the world. They share common values and a common history. The divergence is more connected with the way Americans or Europeans act than for what they act for. The first trip to Europe of George W. Bush, as a president of the US, is a good symptom. His agenda had as priority to search for a consensus among the Allies concerning the future implementation of the NMD in the US and at the same time offering the possibility to collaborate in such expensive defense project.

Once again, the position of the Europeans was dispersed. While the British government is always dealing to support Washington's initiatives, the French and the Germans, among others, show concern about what they consider a negative policy and response towards the new challenges. On the other hand, and despite the declarations and accords reached in the Amsterdam treaty or the Councils of Cologne and Helsinki, there is still a lack of homogeneity. The best example of the division inside the EU, can be found when the Spanish and the Italian governments welcomed the American idea, breaking the consensus once again in defense and foreign policy issues within the Union.

²² Nicole Gnesotto. “Transatlantic Debates” Newsletter N 29 April 2000. Institute for Strategic Studies. ISS WEU Paris.

3. The Future of the Current Security Architecture

The governments' policies need an institutional framework in order to accomplish their goals, which should be the same for all the EU members. Obviously, political cooperation is the best way to achieve it. The main tool should be found throughout the security institutions already established. As Simon Duke stated: ***“Institutions by themselves cannot provide the answers to Europe’s security challenges, but they can provide a framework for discussion and collaboration”***²³

The role of the European institutions in cooperation with the NATO will be determinant for the success not only for the unity of Europe in the defense and foreign policy domains but also for the world peace. As NATO already noted, in the post-Cold War period, *“the very principles of integration and cooperation now span across all of Europe. We have adapted our institutions accordingly, defining new missions and reaching out to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. But most importantly, the new realities have allowed NATO and the WEU together to turn the vision of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) into reality.”*²⁴

The basic institutional elements of the post-Cold War security system emerging in Europe are already in place (the Council of Europe, the European Union/WEU, NATO and the OSCE). However, these institutions were created under the framework of the old security system and do not work well in the new environment. They have often been conspicuously unequal to the urgent challenges of crisis management, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

The adaptation of existing institutions to the new security environment must be a gradual process. It is becoming clear that no single institution is likely to acquire competences to deal with all aspects of security. Therefore, the goal should be to promote sharing responsibilities and unanimity among institutions. Of course, there is always the problem and the risk of overlapping functions between institutions. However, this situation shouldn't be an obstacle, as it shouldn't have debilitating effects on the whole structure.

²³ Simon Duke. “The New European Security Disorder” Saint Martin press, New York. 1994. P 214

²⁴ NATO and WEU: Turning vision into reality NATO REVIEW WEBEDITION Vol. 46 - No. 2 Summer 1998 p. 3

Although the security architecture is being affected as a whole, there are two establishments that foster the main responsibility.

The first one is NATO, with no doubt the most important organization of this global security architecture.

Right now, a key challenge is how to enlarge NATO in a cooperative, non-confrontational way that does not foment new antagonisms and divisions.

A compromise needs to be reached with Russia reassure it that its interests are considered and that it remains an important international actor, especially in Europe and for the Europeans.

NATO is not only transforming itself internally, but also its image in the world. As Paul-Marie de la Gorce stated in the pages of *Le Monde Diplomatique*: ***“Instrument privilégié de prépondérance des Etats-Unis au sein du camp occidental, l’alliance a été préservée et la politique américaine a fait en sorte de la conserver tout en l’adaptant. Un pas de plus a été franchi avec la crise du Kosovo et la guerre de l’OTAN contre la Serbie, dont les Nations Unies sont totalement exclues.”***²⁵ This vision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not only shared by some of the Allies, but also by the public opinion of some of the European states. Of course, in Asia, and after the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, some states believe that NATO have been considered as the "world sheriff" under American control.

The transformation of the EU represents the second challenge for the security in the old continent.

The European Union has to assume greater responsibility for it and for Europe's security. In spite of the often-repeated assertion that the balance between military and non-military factors in European security has changed, the EU has not yet formulated a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). This should be decided by the Intergovernmental Conference and will require Britain, France and Germany to reconcile their competing visions of the future role of the EU in the European security system. The Western European Union (WEU) has taken concrete organizational steps to improve the performance of tasks identified in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration. However, further steps will be conditional on the decisions on a common foreign and security policy.

²⁵ Paul-Marie de la Gorce. “Comment l’OTAN a survécu à la guerre froide? L’Alliance atlantique, cadre de l’hégémonie américaine” *Le Monde Diplomatique* April 1999.

Since the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the European Union has engaged in building a capacity to play a role in crisis- management. This new dimension has been developed under the denomination ‘Common European Security and Defence Policy’ (CESDP). From the outset, the intention was to enhance the Union’s instruments for both military and civilian crisis management. Set up a military crisis management capability is all right for the EU. However, there is no justification why this should happen at the detriment of civilian and conflict prevention means. On the contrary, there are sufficient moral, political and economic reasons to put more efforts into conflict prevention and civilian instruments.

Fortunately, Europe is witnessing a benign security environment. However, and considering that Europe is the most peaceful continent in the world, it doesn’t mean that everything is done. As some analysts noted: ***“Since 1996, Europe has had the fewest armed conflicts on the world’s five continents/regions. The benign security environment does not mean that there are no disputes”***.²⁶

The Kosovo crisis, despite its apparent triumphant result paradoxically only accelerated a disturbing trend in U.S.-European relations – namely, the impulse in Europe to seek greater autonomy from the United States. The collapse of the Soviet threat, and America’s emergence as the "sole superpower," have led Europeans to seek to build the European Union (EU) in a counterweight to American dominance. Specific irritants in Atlantic relations – over trade, unilateral U.S. sanctions, Middle East policy, etc. – are familiar, but they are seriously exacerbated by the European response to this new structural change in the international system.²⁷ The reality for Europeans was embodied by the new NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, when he said that ***“the Kosovo action had shown Europe to be a “paper tiger”***.²⁸

Furthermore, it is important to stress the impact of the future expansion of the EU and the NATO. An expanded European Union will be another important element of the new European security architecture. Future expansion of the EU and WEU can be integral to strengthening security and stability in Europe, but there is a need for complementarity with the process of NATO enlargement. Divergence in WEU and NATO membership could

²⁶ BITS Policy Note 01.3 Addressing the CESDP's Civilian - Military Mismatch. By Clara Portela June 2001

²⁷ Peter W. Rodman. *Drifting Apart? Trends in U.S.-European Relations*. The Nixon Center, Washington, DC 1999

²⁸ Cited in Strategic Survival 1999/2000. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London. P 100.

lead to asymmetries in the security commitments of the two organizations and create "backdoor" security guarantees for non-NATO members.

Finally, it is be important to mention the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Security in Europe today means resolving conflicts, many of them centuries old, before they escalate into warfare as Bosnia has²⁹.

The functions as well as the structures of the OSCE, NATO, and the EU/WEU are entirely different, and it seems that they remain so. Each one will retain its separate authority, even as their roles complement each other. Prevention must be the first policy by developing the methods to identify and deal with future potential "Bosnias" by addressing the causes of conflict at an early stage. The task will not be easy.

²⁹ See for further information: The Role of the OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Graduate Institute of International Studies. Geneve. Via internet at http://www.stoessel.ch/bosnia/osce_bosnia_herzegovina.pdf

PART TWO. The European Security and Defense Identity and The Common Foreign Security Policy. Where are they coming from? Where are they going to?

The Transatlantic relations have given to ESDI the perfect framework for surviving the Cold War, build its identity and habituate the European states to collaborate in defense issues.³⁰ However, the meaning is not so clear, for Americans and Europeans. For Dr Philip H Gordon, *there is significant misunderstanding about ESDI on the two sides of the Atlantic. Whereas Europeans – and especially the French – have tended to interpret the ESDI as a genuine opportunity to enhance Europe's capacity to influence NATO and, if necessary, to act without it, Americans tend to take it less seriously. Europe's attempts to strengthen its military capability and organization are all well and good, and Americans do not object to the creation of a theoretical capacity within the Alliance for autonomous European operations.*³¹

What does ESDI mean?, what does CFSP implies? and what is the relationship between them? what is the precise nature of the crucial Franco-British defence ‘convergence’ which took place around St-Malo? How does that process, which is clearly both central to, and the principal motor of, the new European defence challenge, relate to the security ambitions and intentions of other key European Union countries – large, small and neutral? Can the ever more complex institutional nexus of the CESDP prove to be efficient and functional? What are the prospects for the emergence, in the realm of defence and security, of a core group of leading military powers acting, under some form of enhanced cooperation, in the name of the EU as a whole? How does all this affect those European nations, which are either non-EU NATO members or non-NATO EU accession candidates? Who is going to pay for the emerging CESDP?³² Many questions for few answers. The ESDI and the CFSP are still in an embryo period. Therefore, any solution to those queries is more or less science fiction.

³⁰ Felix Arteaga. “La identidad europea de seguridad y defensa. Politica Exterior. Madrid. 2000

³¹ Philip H Gordon. “The United States and the European Security and Defense Identity in the NATO. Les Notes de l’IFRI N 4 Serie Transatlantique. 1998.

³² Jolyon Howorth “European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge? Chaillot paper. N 43 ISS WEU Paris November 2000.

A brief History of an Idea.

The origin and of the debate of a common security in Europe could be dated from 1945 to 1954, the discussion was about transcending sovereign independence in national security, which had failed to contain Germany in the past and held little prospect of containing Germany or the Soviet Union in the future. The best solution was establishing a new and durable international security structures. The signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1948, although not involving any supranational organization, bound Germany's West European conquerors together in a military alliance of unprecedented duration. Meanwhile the ideas of Jean Monnet and others, which contributed to the development of the first European institutions among the Six in the economic domain, were taken up in the security sphere with the signing of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty in 1952. *Had this been implemented, it would have created a European army integrated at division level with a common uniform, a unified command structure, a unified armaments production and procurement system, and a mix of supranational and intergovernmental authorities mirroring the European Coal and Steel Community.*³³

In the fifties, after the failure of the French Assemblée Nationale to ratify the EDC treaty, and the subsequent signing of the Paris Agreements admitting West Germany to NATO, the idea of European cooperation and self-reliance in security was to all intents and purposes dormant. Although the practicalities of military integration proceeded apace within NATO as national governments and defence establishments became accustomed to shared responsibility for defence planning and intimate cooperation in the field, the leadership of the United States under Eisenhower was taken for granted on all sides, and the idea of European self-reliance had little resonance.

Thirdly, in the sixties, there was a new shift when Washington decided to change its policy conducting to convert and transform the “*young*” NATO, to its own interests, *coining the now hackneyed metaphor of the European pillar.*³⁴ The purpose of European cooperation in the American conception of this period was to ease the problems of extending deterrence. A larger

³³ Ian Gambles EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION IN THE 1990s Chaillot Paper 3 November 1991 Institute for Security Studies Western European Union.

³⁴ Ibidem

European conventional effort in NATO and a stronger European economic performance through the EEC promised to strengthen the West as a whole, increasing the effectiveness of deterrence below the nuclear threshold, while nuclear cooperation through the (abortive) Multilateral Force and its substitute, the Nuclear Planning Group, would help reassure the Europeans and discourage nuclear proliferation and national deterrents.

One decade after, the Harmel Report³⁵ signed in December 1967 had already conducted the Alliance on to a new and unanimous course of deterrence and détente. From that moment, the idea of burden-sharing, and the concept of building up the European voice in NATO affairs European cooperation and self-reliance in security acquired more strength. From the American turned the point to a more economic angle, considering Europe's rising GNP and their own economic difficulties, symbolize by the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system. On the other side, the European understood a declining of American puissance and reputation³⁶ after Vietnam and the crisis of American leadership from Watergate to the Carter presidency made their interest predominantly political. In each case, a more even balance within the Alliance was the aim.

In the eighties, a series of transatlantic clashes over security, beginning under President Carter with bitter arguments over the neutron bomb and over sanctions against the USSR after the invasion of Afghanistan, and continuing with barely a breathing space throughout the Reagan presidency, shifted the emphasis of the debate to the articulation of distinct European interests in the security sphere. The terrible trauma over both the installation and the removal of cruise and Pershing missiles, the deep European-American divergence of views over the so-called 'new Cold War', the shock of the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the radical proposals for nuclear disarmament discussed at the Reykjavik summit all convinced Europeans across the political spectrum that there were indeed separate continental interests. The Western European Union as a forum for the discussion of European security interests, woke up for a long sleep. The idea of talking about European security leaving the American aside started to be seem with concern from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

³⁵ The Harmel Report can be found via Internet at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/bt-a4.htm>

³⁶ The Vietnam War and the Watergate affairs had important implications for the American's image in Europe. The US reputation, especially among the public opinion of the Western allies decreased considerably.

The nineties, started with the collapse of the Soviet Union and as a consequence the ideological war that have divided the world for decades opened a new era, whose first episode was an unexpected war, the Gulf War. The first global conflict of the decade, finished quickly by a “*desert storm*” The US realized that they needed the rest of the international community and, the international community, especially, the Russians, Chinese and Europeans recognized how far technologically were from the US.

In Europe, the Amsterdam Treaty replaced the Maastrich Treaty and the idea of a European Union capable of playing a global power role was gaining credits within the Union and abroad. The euro was a real force that impelled the EU toward defense issues with strong commitments for the first time. The defense was seen as an extension of other elements of the real power, the own currency and the common policy.³⁷ The European Councils of Cologne, Helsinki, Lisbon, Santa Maria de Feira, and Niza closed the twenty-century with high expectative that now in the new millennium must be realities. The enlargement of the NATO and the EU will determine the successful or the failure of such policies.

³⁷ Revista Espanola de Defensa. “La hora de la defensa europea” N 136 12 june 1999.

1 The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

ESDI is not just a matter of European self-assertion. It has also become the prerequisite for a more mature transatlantic relationship with the North American allies. The end of the East-West conflict has underscored the need for Europe to become a full-fledged strategic partner of the United States in managing today's and tomorrow's security challenges. For Lluís Maria Puig: *“The formula of building a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO aims to reconcile greater European autonomy in security and defence matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic link”*³⁸

The essential elements of the ESDI formula endorsed by Alliance leaders in Madrid included:

- NATO's full support for the development of ESDI within NATO by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations;
- Providing for the support of WEU-led operations as an element of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept;
- Provision within the future new command structure for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations;
- Creation of forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU;
- Arrangements for the identification of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-led operations and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of such operations;
- Commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including through joint consultations;
- Strengthening of the institutional cooperation between the two organisations;
- Involving WEU in NATO's defence planning processes;

³⁸ Lluís Maria de Puig “The European Security and Defence Identity within. NATO” NATO REVIEW Web edition Vol. 46 - No. 2 Summer 1998 pp. 6-9

ESDI was unofficially ‘launched’ at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels in January 1994. It was initially conceived largely as a technical-military arrangement, which would allow the Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions through access to those NATO assets, and capabilities, which European member states did not possess. But it also had a transformative political dimension in that it posited a willingness on the part of NATO as an institution and on the part of the United States, as the foremost NATO member state, to countenance a greater security role for the EU. Ultimately, the political message of ESDI (that a clearer, bigger European role was both acceptable and desirable) acquired more importance than the technical-military arrangements designed essentially to provide access to NATO/US assets. NATO’s ‘green light’ to ESDI unleashed a political process, which eventually led to the St-Malo summit and on to Cologne, Helsinki and the CESDP.³⁹

The concept of a European security and defence identity within NATO can certainly will be developed further. No one can predict NATO's fate in the coming decades or at what rate a united Europe will develop a real foreign policy or a common security and defence policy. What it seems clear is that the enlargement of both institutions determines the future each.

At the same time, many think tanks and the decision making bodies are asking themselves how the WEU/EU will coordinate or fit with the NATO For Peter W Rodman the answer is: *We don't yet know.*⁴⁰

Squaring the strategic imperative of enlargement with the need to maintain institutional effectiveness is not the only challenge facing NATO and the EU after Helsinki. Another challenge is the impact of an emerging ESDI on the transatlantic relationship. Charles A Kupchan considers that “*From an American perspective a strong Europe is not just tolerable, but essential to preserving the Atlantic link.*”⁴¹

However, and considering that not many dispute that a more responsible Europe on security matters could be a net gain for the transatlantic alliance The official rationale, however, according to which a stronger Europe would

³⁹ Jolyon Howorth. Chaillot Paper 43.

⁴⁰ Peter Rodman. Testimony Before the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives. National Security Programs The Nixon Center. Wednesday, November 10, 1999

⁴¹ Charles A Kupchan “In Defense of European Defence: An American perspective” Survival Vol 42 N 2 Summer 2000. P 17.

automatically lead to a stronger transatlantic relationship, is overly simplistic.⁴²

2 The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

There are five fundamental objectives for CFSP (as modified slightly by the Amsterdam Treaty):⁴³

- *To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;*
- *To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;*
- *To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;*
- *To promote international cooperation;*
- *To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.*

⁴² Peter Schmidt. ESDI: "Separable but not separate"? NATOREVIEW Web edition Vol. 48 - No. 1 Spring - Summer 2000 p. 12-15. Head, European and Atlantic Security, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany

⁴³ European Union Commission External Relations. Via Internet at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm

How the Common Foreign and Security Policy 'Works

The arrangements for CFSP consist, roughly, of:

- The **European Council** (head of state and government and Commission President meeting, at least, once every half year to set priorities and give broad guidelines for EU policies, including CFSP);
- The **Council of Ministers** (EU Foreign Ministers and the Commission External Relations Commissioner meeting as the General Affairs Council at least once a month to decide on external relations issues, including CFSP policies)
- The **Committee of Permanent Representatives** (known as 'Coreper' - Ambassadors of EU Member States to the EU and the Commission Deputy Secretary General meeting once a week to prepare Council meetings and decisions, including those related to the General Affairs Council and CFSP)
- The **Political Committee** (Political Directors of EU Member States and the Commission meeting about twice a month to monitor international affairs and the implementation of CFSP decisions and to contribute to the definition of CFSP policies by submitting opinions to the General Affairs Council)
- **European Correspondents** of EU Member States and the Commission assist the Political Directors, coordinate daily CFSP business, and prepare the meetings of the Political Committee, and the CFSP points of the General Affairs Council and the European Council
- **CFSP Working Groups** composed of experts from EU Member States and the Commission meeting along geographical and horizontal lines to elaborate policy documents and options for the consideration of the Political Committee.

- **CFSP Counsellors** of EU Member States (based in the Permanent Representations) and the Commission examine horizontal problems concerning CFSP, in particular legal, institutional and financial aspects.

New CFSP bodies: the High Representative and the Policy Planning Unit⁴⁴

- ***High Representative***

The Amsterdam Treaty introduces the new office of a High Representative (HR) for CFSP. He or she will be the Council Secretary General. The HR "shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third countries" (Art 26). The HR will also "assist the Presidency" in the external representation of the EU and in the implementation of decisions in CFSP matters (art 18).

Mr Solana has been appointed as the first HR and is scheduled to take office on 18 October 1999.

- ***Policy Planning Unit***

In accordance with Declaration 6 annexed of the Final Act, a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) is established within the Council Secretariat and under the responsibility of the Council Secretary General (High Representative). It is to cooperate, as appropriate, with the Commission in order to ensure full coherence with EU trade and development policies. Its mandate includes monitoring, analysis and assessment of international developments and events, including early warning on potential crises. It also includes drafting, upon Council request or on its own initiative, of policy options, which may contain recommendations and strategies for presentation to the Council under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation. PPEWU staff will come from the Council Secretariat General, Member States, the Commission (one representative) and WEU.

⁴⁴ The source of the above informatiun is found Via internet at <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp>

New CFSP Policy Aspects

- ***Decision-making***

Unanimity is the general rule in CFSP but Amsterdam allows for a constructive abstention procedure by which a Member State abstaining in this way will not be obliged to apply a particular decision. Furthermore, by derogation from the general rule of unanimity, the Council acts by qualified majority when a) adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy, and b) when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position.

The scope for qualified majority decisions is restricted, however, by the fact that no such vote will be taken if a Member State declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority. In such a situation the Council can, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity. Furthermore, qualified majority voting does not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.

- ***Common Strategies (new CFSP instrument)***

The Amsterdam Treaty introduces the concept of Common Strategies. These have to be adopted at the level of the European Council which, as the Treaty explains, "shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common".

The approach followed by the Council/Coreper indicates that Common Strategies are not just regarded as CFSP instruments but as a means to ensure consistency of EU external policies as a whole. As a consequence a Common Strategy may cover First (and Third) Pillar issues along with CFSP matters and combine EU/EC and Member States national means.

As the Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring the consistency of EU external relations, the latter has an important role to play in the elaboration and implementation of Common Strategies.

The role of the Council is to recommend strategies to the European Council and to implement these, in their CFSP aspects, "in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions". Once a Common Strategy has been adopted, qualified majority shall adopt Joint Actions and Common Positions, and other decisions based on a Common Strategy,, unless a

Member State opposes for an "important and stated reason of national policy".

The Vienna European Council endorsed the recommendation of the Council and asked the latter to elaborate Common Strategies on Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean (with particular reference to the Barcelona process and the Middle East Peace Process) and the Western Balkans. Russia has been dealt with first and a the Common Strategy on Russia was adopted by the Cologne European Council in June.

3 What Future for both.

There are two important criteria for forming an opinion about the future of ESDI and the CFSP. The first one is considering their development within the EU. The second one is in relation with the NATO

Stephen Larrabee has seen three quandaries for judging them⁴⁵:

- Does it strengthen overall security in Europe?
- Does it help build a stronger and healthier transatlantic relationship?
- Does it strengthen NATO's ability to deal more effectively with crises in Europe and beyond its borders?

On the other hand, Jolyon Howorth⁴⁶ follows more or less the same line when He asks himself if:

- Can an alliance such as NATO function effectively, or indeed at all, with two pillars? Or is hegemony unavoidable?
- Can the US accept that the corollary of burden sharing is balance in command? Or must Washington demand, as the price of commitment, exclusivity of leadership?
- Is there anything approaching unity of vision among Europe's leaders as to the size and ultimate function of the proposed EU force? Or will one polarized vision constantly counterbalance- and thereby nullify another?
- Perhaps and most importantly, will Europe's taxpayers consider the price of autonomy worth paying? Or do they actually prefer the comforts of a US protectorate?

⁴⁵ F. Stephen Larrabee The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and American Interests Rand Corporation March 2000

⁴⁶ Jolyon Howorth. "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative. Survival. Vol 42 N 2 Summer 2000.

Obviously, the answer of all those questions could certainly clarify the future of the ESDI, the CFSP and the NATO itself. But those answer are still unknown. To understand the present is already a difficult task

For ESDI the present means to deal with the low end of the military spectrum -- the so-called “Petersburg tasks,” which involve peacekeeping, humanitarian rescue, etc. But many of the crises in Europe, such as Kosovo, require more than peacekeeping. They require capabilities to conduct war-fighting operations. Thus, there is a danger that we could end up with a two-tier alliance -- one in which the U.S. and perhaps a few European allies are able to conduct high-intensity operations while the rest of the allies focus on the low end of the military spectrum. This would not strengthen the Alliance, but weaken it.

The link between NATO and the EU needs to be more clearly defined. At Helsinki, it was decided that the EU would act only “when NATO as a whole is not involved.” But there needs to be adequate transparency in decision-making. The French, however, have been resisting establishing any clear link between EU and NATO. In a speech in Strasbourg in October, President Chirac dismissed such links as “premature” Americans have always been ambivalent towards European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and they remain so even after the Alliance's most recent reforms.

We need to ensure that ESDI does not lead to a duplication of capabilities. In theory, there is a possibility that the European allies could develop separate capabilities that enabled them to act without drawing on U.S. assets. However, given the decline in European defense budgets, it is unlikely that Europeans will have the money to create such capabilities. Thus they will be dependent on U.S. assets for some time to come. This gives the U.S. some leverage and influence over how these assets are used in a crisis. There is a need to ensure that ESDI evolves in a way that does not discriminate against members of the Alliance who are not –members of the EU, such as Turkey, Norway, Iceland and the new Central European members of NATO. They need to be consulted and brought into the decision-making process. In any case, and as Philip H Gordon stated *“Americans seem to interpret the purpose of ESDI literally – it is about the creation of an “identity” (not a “capability”), meant more to give the Europeans a feeling of unity and responsibility than the actual ability to act.* Javier Solana, The new the High Representative for the CFSP, that has the backing from Washington,

“may act as a catalyst for an effective CESDP and a more consistent external policy of the whole Union”⁴⁷ Still many believe that the construction of the CFSP is seen by worry by the United States and with incredulity by Russia.⁴⁸

In conclusion, the tasks are enormous and it looks that day-by-day are increasing. As for example the gradual 'inclusion' of WEU assets in the EU which was recently approved and that ***may therefore still prove as laborious as the making of a comprehensive CFSP.***⁴⁹

ESDI is a common objective but it is not defined, on the contrary it shows more the disagreement in its political content. The debate will have a double dimension: the European and the American. For Rafael Estrella, this is the key of the problem, because it is among the European where the limitations and difficulties are found.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Antonio Missiroli CFSP, Defence and Flexibility Chailot paper 38 Institute for Security Studies Western European Union February 2000

⁴⁸ El Pais. 20 November 2000.

⁴⁹ Nicole Gnesotto. CFSP from theory to practice. Newsletter N 27 October 1999. Institute of Strategic Studies. WEU Paris

⁵⁰ Rafael Estrella Hacia una Identidad de Defensa Europea compatible y dentro de la OTAN CIDOB n 38-39 Afers Internationals. 1997

PART THREE. The Perspectives from Paris and Madrid.

The French sociologist Alain Touraine defines very clearly the position of France and Spain in the new Europe when he said that ***“Europe has not been constituted as a State, nor as a society, not even as a nation. The role France and Spain more recently of Spain are determinant. France often accused of being nationalist and close is the country that has more contributed to the European creation. Regarding Spain, the argument is easier because every Spanish citizen knows that the modernization of his country is identified with the European construction, and with the role that Spain plays on it.”***⁵¹

For decades, the question of European defence had suffered a duality. In one side it has been a necessary condition for the development of the European construction. And at the same time it has been an obstacle to political deepening of the European Union. For Nicole Gnesotto, ***“It was a condition because only the possession of a minimum of military means would ensure the credibility and effectiveness of any international action by the Union, something that, in French rhetoric, was often epitomised as a demand for a Europe puissance. It was an obstacle since political divergences between member states on the Union’s very legitimacy in defence matters were structural, permanent and irreconcilable”***⁵² In both camps, the role of Paris and Madrid must be studied.

1 The French Way.

The French contribution to the Western security can be dated to 1947 with the Treaty of, with the treaty of Western European Union in 1948 and as a founder member of NATO.⁵³ For the Spanish security specialist, Felix Arteaga, France is a great military with global security commitments. In addition it has a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, it is a autonomous nuclear power and has a strong military industry. However,

⁵¹ El Pais. Alain Touraine. 18 March 2001

⁵² Nicole Gnesotto in the Introduction of Institute for Security Studies Western European Union. Chaillot Paper 42 European Defence: making it work François Heisbourg (editor) September 2000

⁵³ Cuadernos de Estrategia N 6 Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos. December 1988. “Estrategia regional en el Mediterraneo”

maybe, its major peculiarity is the high degree of identification between the society and its armed forces.

The French commitment to the European security is remarkable but also its contribution to the NATO. French air forces represents the second biggest air force, totaling (11%), at the same time is the third naval force with a (6,5%) and the fourth army with (6,2.)⁵⁴ For all this French involvement in European and transatlantic affairs have always been extremely important.

However, French presence in European affairs has been problematic. As Dominique Moisi explained: ***“The less confident France is, the more difficult it is to deal with. On the eve of the 21st century, France faces four major challenges, which are together the source of its melancholy. The first is globalization, which is often blamed for the erosion of France’s cultural and its depressingly high levels of unemployment. The second is the unipolar nature of the international system, in which the United States leads and a once-proud France is grudgingly forced to follow. The third of the merger of Europe, which threatens to drown out France’s voice. The fourth, and by far the toughest, challenge is France itself. The nation must overcome its economic, social, political, moral and cultural shortcomings”***⁵⁵

Now at the beginning of the new century, Paris can loses what has beeb gaining for decades, because *“France influence in the European Union shows signs of waning and is likely to diminish further”*⁵⁶ Maybe, the NMD initiative represents the perfect excuse for Paris for taking the European banner against the American idea in the defense arena.⁵⁷

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its Web page clearly stated its government position ***“France, as a founding member of the European Communities, has always championed the idea of a political Europe not limited to economics and trade, important though they may be, projecting its image throughout the world. Europe needs a common foreign policy commensurate with its economic and commercial importance, its cultural influence and the development assistance that it provides to many countries. In this way Europe will help to strengthen peace in a multi-***

⁵⁴ Felix Arteaga. Las reformas en al politica de defensa francesa. Un primer balance. Grupo de estudios estrategicos. Febrero de 1999.

⁵⁵ Dominique Moisi. The Trouble with France. Foreign Affairs. May/June 1998. P 94-94

⁵⁶ Charles Grant. “France on the sidelines” Financial Times. 25 May 2001.

⁵⁷ Cited in El Pais “Chirac juzga extremadamente peligroso el escudo antimissiles” 14 June 2001

polar world which respects differences".⁵⁸ The reference to its American ally is more than evident.

From the last socialist president, Franoise Mitterrand, the European integration using the euro and the force of the economic integration has been a constant in order to retain as much influence and power as possible. However, as Sophie Meunier noted "*the world has changed. The new American hegemony which French leaders call "hyperpower"-has overwhelmed the Gaullist-Mitterrand approach.*"⁵⁹

From the end of the 1940s France as considered itself as the source o inspiration for the integration process in Europe, and they are right. Now from the 1980s and with the arrival of Franoise Mitterrand, he became, has the most *gaullien* of France's leaders since de Gaulle. His European policy derived from a genuine "great ambition" for France, in which European integration and security are parts of an overall design.⁶⁰

As Ronald Tierski noticed "The French are still French, and French foreign and security policies are still capable of unpleasantly surprising even France's closest allies". Maybe as consequence of some contradictory aptitudes, France is losing influence in the European discourse, and overall, it has already lost the leading role in the security and defense matters.

In any case, as Guillaume Parmentier wrote, "*France, and to some extend Spain and Belgium, hope to create a veritable international power. And this conception has to come be known as the Europe-puissance.*"⁶¹

In the new security environment the two major French policy goals can be classified following Robert P Grant⁶² approach as indicated:

1. The development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) through the European Union (UE)

⁵⁸ La politique etrangere et de securite commune. Via Internet at: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/europe/pesc/presentation.html>

⁵⁹ Shopie Meunier The French Exception. Foreign Affairs, July/August 2000 v 79 n 4 p 106

⁶⁰ Ronald "Tierski The Mediterrand Legacy and the Future of French Security policy" McNair Paper 43 1995 Institute for National Strategic Studies.

⁶¹ Guillaume Parmentier. Europe as a Great Power? A View from France. Approaching the Northern Dimension of the CFSP. Ulkopoliittinen Instottutti. 1998 Pp 137-140

⁶² Robert P. Grant Frances's New Relationship with NATO. Survival vol 38 n 1 Spring 1996 pp 58-80

2. The strengthening the European pillar if the Atlantic Alliance through the Western European Union (WEU)

The rapprochement with the alliance was a new shift. When France first started coming closer to NATO under Defense Minister Pierre Joxe during 1992-1993, and especially after the December 1995 announcement by Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette that France would re-join NATO's Military Committee after a boycott of nearly thirty years, American officials and analysts tried to interpret the French motivation. Had France now “seen the light” and accepted that US-led NATO was the most important security organization in Europe, or was France just pursuing old goals by new means, using a “Trojan Horse” strategy to change NATO from within rather than provide an alternative to it from without?

Concerning this point the reasons for France’s rapprochement with the Alliance can be related to the fact that

As one American called it, “*the unraveling of the French plan for Europe*”⁶³ Europe’s failure to do more than contain the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the extremely difficulties in obtaining ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in France, and the sharp decline in military spending and manpower in virtually all NATO countries, combined to frustrate French hopes that there would be relatively rapid significant progress on ESDI.

The French drew three conclusions from setbacks to their European aspirations.

1. First the US and NATO appeared increasingly necessary not only to maintain Western Europe’s collective defense capabilities, but also to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War crises that France initially believed Europe could handle by its own. Thus Paris began to realize that dealing with Europe’s new security needs and establishing France as an important actor on the new security agenda meant more rather than less engagement with the US and NATO

⁶³ Ibidem

2. Second development was the US reticence to become fully engage in efforts to resolve the Bosnian conflict.
3. Thirdly, the new Clinton administration come to power in Washington which had a more favor posture toward ESDI

Finally, France rapprochement was accelerated following the election in early 1993, of a conservative-centrist coalition majority. In contrast to Mitterand, the leaders of the new French government desired greater openness in French_NATO relations and demonstrated a willingness to shed at least some of the caution that had characterized the president's approach to the issue. In the words of Alain Juppe “ *the time has passed for an attitude of haughty reserve towards [the Alliance]*”

The Director of the French Center at the Brooking Institution found the next conclusion regarding France's new interest in NATO.⁶⁴

- German unification (which disrupted the balance among Europe's leading powers and suggested France might no longer be the continent's military leader)
- The lessons of the Gulf War (which showed the value of NATO interoperability even for out-of-area operations and confirmed the effectiveness of American military power)
- The lessons of Bosnia (which again demonstrated NATO's effectiveness as a means both for organizing military deployments and credibly threatening force)
- And finally the realization that, even if an ESDI outside of NATO might still be desirable from a French point of view, the rest of the Europeans were as unlikely as ever to support it, and France clearly did not have the resources to do so alone

All of this led France to seek accommodation with NATO and the United States, and the French government apparently believed it could re-integrate

⁶⁴ Philip H Gordon. “The United States and the European Security and Defense Identity in the NATO. Les Notes de l’IFRI N 4 Serie Transatlantique. 1998.

with NATO without sacrificing the level of European autonomy and visibility Paris believed necessary and appropriate.

France feels important opposing the American initiatives, but only if it doesn't jeopardize the whole Alliance. At the same time it doesn't want to be relegated from the main decision,⁶⁵ *"Even the French are being careful to avoid open challenges to US leadership in Europe on political and defense issues"*⁶⁶ and it looks like this "game" will continue.

In any case, France is a key actor in European security. It is a substantial, independent nuclear power. Because of its multifaceted special relationship with Germany, as well as its growing dealings in defense matters with Britain, France is today at the center of European political ties and peacekeeping enterprises, as well as part of the plans for a European Union (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). France's agreement is also vital to NATO's post-Cold War evolution, which includes the determination of the relationships between the United States and Europe; between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU); between NATO and the WEU, and the "Partnership for Peace" states; and among NATO, the OSCE, and the United Nations.

France will play, as it has for four decades, a complex role in Atlantic security structures, and therefore in American security interests in Europe.

Regarding the French position toward Washington, the American scholar consider that: *"the latest example of French obstreperousness has been the growing tendency of France's leaders to criticize American unilateralism and call for a more multipolar world, in which a strong Europe provides a counterweight to the United States. Statements such as the recent one of Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, that France "cannot accept a politically unipolar world, nor a culturally uniform world, nor the unilateralism of a single hyperpower".*⁶⁷

In conclusion, a unified Europe remains a key French objective—this was most recently made clear in Chirac's June 2000 Bundestag speech, in which the French president called for a "pioneering group" of EU countries to steer

⁶⁵ Manuel Coma. Mr Pesc y el Futuro de la seguridad europea. Grupo de Estudios Estrategicos.1999. Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos. via internet at <http://www.gees.org/publicaciones/letra/le11.html>

⁶⁶ Jim Hoagland. "The Old World of Europe is Entering a New Era" International Herald Tribune. 28 December 1998.

⁶⁷ Philip H Gordon. The Frenchposition. The National interest Fall 2000. Via Internet at http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/gordon/2000fall_NI.htm

the union after its enlargement, and encouraged Germany, alongside France, to think and act like a great power”⁶⁸

What it looks clear is that Franco-American relationship is based in solid foundations. For most French people, both states are ancient allies. ***“The French have never forgotten the gratitude owed to the United States for its help in smashing the yoke of nazism and escaping the chains of communism. This majority viewpoint has sustained France as one of the most redoubtable allies of the United States during the defining crises of the Cold War, such as the Euro-missile crisis.”***⁶⁹ Some realists on the old continent as Jean-Marie Soutou, former secretary general of the Quai d’Orsay, have observed, ***“Europe tends to gets the US partner that it deserves”***⁷⁰

The relationship between Paris and Washington will produce the main points of friction between both sides.

The United States, in theory, will welcome a European defense identity. However, in practice, the new elected administration might have a natural tendency to consider the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European defense policy as a zero-sum game, fearing that any European move would detract from the cohesion of the alliance. The United States does not openly acknowledge that, to them, cohesion means “one, and only one, center of decision.” Thus, quite a large gap exists between theory and practice. The closer we get to implementation of a Euro-defense, the stronger the misgivings of the United States. Just as de Gaulle was once famous for saying “non” to Washington, Washington has essentially defined three “non’s” that, in its view, should shape this major step in European integration: nondecoupling of Europe from NATO, nonduplication of forces, and nondiscrimination against NATO countries that are not members of the (EU).⁷¹

⁶⁸ Ibidem

⁶⁹ Pascal Boniface. “The Specter of Unilateralism” Washington Quarterly Summer 2001. p 156

⁷⁰ Cited in Peter Ludlow. “Wanted: A Global Partner” The Washington Quarterly Summer 2001. P 171

⁷¹ Ibidem P 160

The Spanish Commitment

At the beginning of the new millennium, Spain's domestic and international situation is far away from the old conception based on the assumption that ***"Spain has influence, but no power"*** and that ***"A medium European power that for nearly one hundred years has chosen not to play a moderately assertive role in international security affairs"***.⁷² Now, as the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Josep Pique has recently stated: ***"Spain is in the best international situation since the XVI century"***

Spain is now a modern medium power state. However, whose main assets still rest in the fact that Spain is the key and the bridge of two continents and two oceans.

The dramatic changes that have transformed the isolated country of the 1960s and 1970s can be summarized into two different dimensions. The first one is related to the domestic environment. The second one is connected with the political miracle of passing from a four decade military dictatorship to a stable and healthy democracy. In this process, the economic miracle was the key that permitted the definitive process of democratization.⁷³

In contrast with France, the Spanish has always considered Moscow too far away to worry about in any serious way. Increased security for Ceuta and Melilla, the impending return of Gibraltar, a desire for more sway in North Africa, and the control of the vital lanes of communications can be considered as the main are defense and foreign goals for the government in Madrid.

The geographic situation of the Iberian Peninsula makes the maritime interest a vital goal. Spain' geographic and strategic situation, with a coastline of 3,200 kilometers and 92% of all its foreign trade routed by sea make the country actively concerned about the sea and air lanes of communications. At the same time, North Africa in general and the Maghreb in particular represent a series of additional threats to Spanish security.⁷⁴

⁷² Cited in Jeffrey Simon. "European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989" The National Defense University Press. Washington D.C. 1991. P 574.

⁷³ Francis Fukuyama in his book "The end of History and the last man" explains perfectly the case of the Spanish transformation among other with similar characteristics.

⁷⁴ Juan de Luis "Spanish Views on the Future of West European Security and Defence Cooperation" in Peter Schmidt "In the Midst of Change: On the Development of West European Security and Defence Cooperation. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1992. Pp 114-133.

Obviously, the security conception and the foreign policy goals differ greatly between Madrid and Paris. These planning are obviously reflected in the role that both states play in the construction of the EDSI and CFSP. As well as the bilateral relationship that they have with the main ally in the Atlantic association, Washington.

Returning to the process of transformation of Spain, it is important to stress the element of democratization. The Democracy triggered a new period in Spanish foreign and security policy. A three stages process can be presented:⁷⁵

1. In the 1970s limited Spanish presence in the international arena was subordinated to the domestic debate about setting up a constitutional framework to ensure democracy. The first priority was to attain a consensus regarding matters of internal politics. In 1981 UCD government applied for membership in the Atlantic Alliance.
2. In the early 1980s Spain's foreign and security policy evolved into a second phase which can be divided in two stages:
 - 1982-1986, in which foreign policy and security guidelines were issued and
 - 1986-1989, the consolidation of these guidelines. These two stages are summarized in the "Decalogue" October 23, 1984 a ten-point programme entitled "Policy of Peace and Security".
 1. Continued membership in the Alliance
 2. Refusal to participate in NATO's integrated military structure
 3. The progressive reduction of US military presence in Spain
 4. Closer Spanish-European relations through membership in the WEU
 5. Continued development of a network of bilateral defence agreements with West European countries

⁷⁵ Ibidem

6. The Advancement of a solution for the problem of Gibraltar
7. The adherence to the Treaty of Nuclear Non Proliferation
8. Closer Spanish-United Nations relations through proposal on disarmament and denuclearization
9. The non-nuclearization of Spain
10. The formulation of a Joint Strategic Plan.

3 The third phase started in from 1989 brought Spain to participate fully in the international environment to which it belongs and in which it exercises influence.

Spain formally joined NATO on May 30, 1982, and on March 12, 1986 a referendum approved the continued membership of Spain in the Atlantic Alliance. Narcís Serra, the socialist Minister of Defense from 1982 to 1991 after leaving office reported that himself and the President at the time, Felipe had clearly in mind, even before taking power that Spain could not withdraw from NATO⁷⁶

However, an after the new elected socialist party entered in the government, the decision to frozen the integration process into NATO military structure was due to three reasons: the public opinion in Spain, the necessity to transfor the Armed forces to avoid to repeat the Turkis example and the position of U.K, France and Portugal, that they were not willing to recognize the position in the international forum the Spanish government believed that merited. The Defense Minister, Serra lately acknowledge that without joining the NATO, Spain could not ever been admitited to the European Community. His predecessor in the post, Julián García Vargas, resumed the Spanish position during his mandate as minister: «*Estar en todo, aprovechar cada oportunidad y recuperar el tiempo perdido*».⁷⁷

The anti American rhetoric position of the socialist government was accompanied with an increase involvement in the Alliance. As Peter Schmidt noted “*Spain has along tradition regarding national defence in combination with a rather critical view of America’s security and defence*”

⁷⁶ Felipe Sahagun. El Mundo. 19 July 1999.

⁷⁷ Ibidem

policy, making it impossible for Spain to join fully the military structure of NATO⁷⁸

Overall, Spanish geostrategic performance in this century has been unremarkable. The crises, as the 1898 with the loss of the last territories of "ultramar". The Spanish civil war and the isolation from Europe under a dictatorship completed the circle. Now, Spain is taking inventory and finding out that the second tier is quite good, and that Spain has, like Britain, a basket of options in and out of Europe.

As the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger noted "The American contribution to the Spanish evolution during the 1970s was one of the most important achievements of our foreign policy"⁷⁹. ***In reality, The US was always willing to support discretely the Spanish evolution, as long it didn't affect the Spanish contribution to Western security system. As one of the most important scholar on Spanish foreign policy, Charles Powell, noted "When they [the US] had to opt between the geostrategic interests and give facilities to the political change, they didn't doubt for the former"***⁸⁰, As the American support to Morocco during the crisis over the Sahara between Rabat and Madrid shown.

In the nineties, the Spanish government faced a new strategic dilemma: Should the relationship with the United States be shaped through each country's participation in European fora and multilateral mechanisms, or should Spain strive to preserve a separate, visible, and vigorous bilateral relationship to help assure some measure of geopolitical autonomy from Europe? For Geoffrey B Demarest, ***"Spain's foreign policy toward Europe has been to maintain flexibility and balance through active participation in NATO, the several forums of the European Union, and a growing network of interrelated, multinational, security institutions."***⁸¹

However, at this point it is important to clarify that currently, it is impossible to separate the European security from the transatlantic one. One of the reasons strive on the reality that the menaces and dangers for Europe are the shared by the United States. Secondly, ***"we will never recognized publicly the real importance of the transatlantic link for the European security"***⁸²

⁷⁸ Ibidem

⁷⁹ Charles T. Powell. La dimensión exterior de la transición española. CIBOD REVISTA DE AFERS INTERNATIONALS. N 26 1993.

⁸⁰ Ibidem

⁸¹ Geoffrey B. Demarest Spain's Military-Strategic Outlook From *Parameters*, Winter 1996-97, pp. 26-38.

⁸² Eduardo Serra La visión española de la seguridad europea para el próximo milenio. "La seguridad europea : diálogos para el siglo XXI" Revista CIDOB d 'Afers Internacionals no. 38-39/1997:

In this new environment, Spain has found itself completely integrated in the main alliances and international organizations. After decades of isolationism, this is a great breakthrough for the Spanish foreign policy and defense commitment.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the Spanish participation under the WEU flag in the Gulf War in 1991 and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Spain has kept a position in accordance with the post Cold War period. What does it mean? First of all, the objectives of Madrid, in contrast with the Cold War period are determined by its own factors, historical and geographic (the Mediterranean dimension). Secondly, because its security conception now includes the traditional military instruments with new tools based on economic cooperation. Third, and last, because Spain with the signature of the Maastricht agreement first and the Amsterdam later expresses its resolute commitment with the ESDI and CFSP.⁸³

At the same time, it is essential to consider the resolute commitment Spain has acquired with Washington. At this point, the new government in Madrid is trying to impel its relationship with the new Republican administration in Washington in order to give this relationship the same importance that the privileges European associates, with the exception of United Kingdom,⁸⁴

What Spain is searching is to gain a position of the same level than France, Germany and Italy.

The first European tour of President Bush has chosen Madrid as departure. It was a designed move that shows the new position of Spain. As the American leader said: "Spain is one of the most reliable allies for the US"⁸⁵

In Paris, the response was different.⁸⁶ The Franco/ Spanish paths in the European construction seem to take different ways where some times the election presented seem to be or a Europe that we don't know or a US that we know.

⁸³ Esther Barbé. La política española de seguridad en la Nueva Europa: Dimensión mediterránea e instrumentos europeos. *Cidob Afers internacional* n 26 1993

⁸⁴ Josep Pique. España y Estados Unidos aliados preferentes. ABC el 10 de junio de 2001

⁸⁵ El País 13 June 2001

⁸⁶ The French newspaper noted that the American President decided to start his tour in Spain, because, Madrid was a more amenable government to US interests.

PART FOUR. The implications for NATO

1. The American Position

The ESDI and the CFSP are already a reality, as it is approved by the EU members states and signed in the Amsterdam Treaty.

“Western Europe remains the most important economic, political and security partner. What the United States needs in Western Europe is, at best, a strong and equal partner and ally, at worst, a region no less stable than it is now”⁸⁷

“We are equally confident that European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) will in the long run be good for us as well as for you. As Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbot has said, “We’re not against it, we’re not ambivalent, we’re not anxious, we are for it. We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged on its own, through the European Union. Period, end of debate.”⁸⁸

*“When Europe start walking, the American got alarmed, because they do not trust European”*⁸⁹

“Americans strongly doubt that Europe will put the money to pay for an independent force, such talk of a force independent of NATO will never amount to more than talk. Therefore, Washington will withdraw its objection and smiling wish them well-provided they don’t use NATO equipment or endanger US troops.”⁹⁰

“Some in the administration still oppose the European security and defense policy on the grounds that it could undermine American domination of NATO”⁹¹ At this point, other in Washington still recognize that “ Mr Bush needs to listen carefully to the concerns of European leaders on these and

⁸⁷ Robert A Levine. “Western Europe. 1979-2009 A View from the United States. Rand Corp.1998 Summary.

⁸⁸ Richard L. Morningstar “La relation entre l’Europe et les États-Unis : enjeux et perspectives” Séminaire transatlantique à l’Ifri, 20 avril 2000.

⁸⁹ Alejandro Munoz Alonso. Vice-president of the Spanish Center for International Relations and senator of PP, Spain, cited in El Mundo 7 March 2001.

⁹⁰ William Safire. Tour Program: Much Trans-Atlantic Ado About not Much. International Herald Tribune. 15, June 2001.

⁹¹ Philip H Gordon. How Bush Could Help Europe to Change its Mind” International Herlad Tribune. June 12 2001.

other issues and recognize that American leadership is most effective when exercised in concert with Europe, not in opposition to it”⁹²

The most critical challenge to European security could be categorized into three⁹³:

- First, sustaining the US political and military engagement in Europe. US involvement gives NATO credibility. But at the same time, it prevents Europeans to assume greater and costly responsibilities.
- Promotion of stability in the region between Germany and Russia. Security competition between them has historically led to war in Europe.
- The management of regional crises as the case of Yugoslavia.

“The American leadership is today a necessity, as it was in 1949. The crisis of Bosnia and Kosovo are clear examples. However, the circumstances during the decade of the 1940s were not the same. For the Europe of the Euro, the relationship with the US represents a humiliation. On the other hand, after fifty years of existence, the Alliance presents a very positive balance. However, only its capacity for adaptation to the new strategic environments will guarantee its future. Everybody knows how easy it is to dilapidate the best of the heritages”.⁹⁴

While this new European and global security environment clearly makes it necessary for the European Union to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy, including all necessary institutional and military capabilities to translate policy into effective action, we should also not forget those areas where the traditional transatlantic link remains essential.

This is so for four principal reasons. The first is related to the internal politics and cohesion of the European Union itself. While all EU members agree that the CFSP needs to be made a reality, a majority of members also

⁹² The New York Times. Tested by Europe. June 13, 2001.

⁹³ Sean Kay. “NATO and the Future of European Security” Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, USA, 1998. P 2-3

⁹⁴ Florentino Portero. “El vinculo Atlantico” ABC 25 April 1999.

continue to retain a strong belief in the importance of a continued strong defence relationship between Europe and the United States. These members will oppose any CFSP and EDP that could be seen as endangering the foundations of the transatlantic link.

The second major reason for the continued importance of the transatlantic relationship is strictly strategic, based on European long term interests and realities. This is linked to the fact that Europe continues to depend on the United States in two vital strategic areas:

- deterrence and/or defence against direct nuclear or large-scale military threats to Europe. This may not be a major concern in the short term but uncertainty over the evolution of the former Soviet Union clouds longer-term prospects. The clear signals given by Russia's leadership, as during President Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in 1999, should remind us of the fact that the Russian Federation still retains the world's second largest operational nuclear arsenal.
- the conduct of large-scale high-intensity warfare in far-flung but strategically and economically important areas (the Gulf, East Asia). In this, the EU continues to depend on the United States, and in none of these regions does it look as if the EU could develop an independent capability within the foreseeable future.

Thirdly, the entire history of crises in the Balkans since 1992 has shown that the need for conducting high-intensity warfare, even against a very limited opponent, can at times be essential for effective crisis management. Here, the American contribution has been essential, and will remain so for a number of years, during EDP's transitional phase.

The last reason involves the special relationship with the United States which the transatlantic link has provided Western Europe. While the NATO relationship has involved noticeable friction, it has also given Europe considerable influence over the United States. In the new global security environment the United States remains the only world superpower, and it would be not only a waste but possibly even dangerous for Europe to lose this special link unnecessarily.

The key point with all these arguments is that developing the CFSP and EDP is not a zero-sum game, and must not be allowed to turn into one gratuitously.⁹⁵

The challenge we face is to build a security system for Europe that will:⁹⁶

- Maintain U.S. engagement.
- Respond to growing European integration.
- Make the newly free nations part of the European security system.
- Ensure that Russia will play a constructive role commensurate with its importance and weight in European affairs. In all these aspects, NATO takes a central part.

“Our common adversary has vanished, but we know that our common dangers have not -- and surely our common interests survive”⁹⁷

“Indivisibility: there can be no severance of the linkage between NATO and ESDI. It must be Improvement, and that means improvement in capabilities which we don’t have today”⁹⁸

“The Saint Malo declaration posed a serious dilemma for the Americans. The United States has always supported stronger defense cooperation, although some believed that this was only because such cooperation was never more than a vague, unformulated notion”⁹⁹

“Unless Europe and the United States create a true partnership based on European military strength, we can expect these sorts of disputes to

⁹⁵ François Heisbourg (editor) *European Defence: making it work* Chaillot Paper 42 September 2000 Institute for Security Studies Western European Union.

⁹⁶ Walter B. Slocombe, U.S. Hopes for NATO's European Security Role. Prepared remarks of undersecretary of defense for policy, to the Atlantic Council on European Security, Washington, June 14, 1996

⁹⁷ Ibidem.

⁹⁸ Remarks as Delivered By Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen on "European Security and Defense Identity," Hotel Bayerischer Hof, Munich, Germany, Saturday, February 5, 2000

⁹⁹ Ibidem

continue. America will not yield control over military operations or forces while it provides the bulk of the capability and assumes the major risks. Europeans will continue to grouse about the U.S. tendency to see every crisis in military terms and to veer toward military responses”¹⁰⁰

“La réussite de la défense européenne constitue le meilleur garant de la survie de l’OTAN à long terme. En outre, la défense européenne n’est pas anti-américaine mais pro-européenne. Ce processus est non seulement crucial pour la sécurité européenne et de solides relations transatlantiques, mais il contribue aussi à la sécurité et à la stabilité au sens large du terme”¹⁰¹

The Key point for the NATO were resumed¹⁰²

- The end of the cold war invalidated NATO’s original mandate and raised questions about the need for a military alliance focusing on territorial defense.
- The alliance responded by embarking on peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and enlarging to include former Warsaw Pact countries.
- New U.S. proposals would expand the scope of NATO’s operations, even while relations with Russia founder.

The former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright in the New York Times stated how “the key question lays on how the Bush administration can or cannot collaborate with our European allies and to what extent”¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Common Interests, Common responsibilities. How a military Strong Europe could help build a true partnership. Rand review. Spring 1999 via Internet at <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.spring.99/>

¹⁰¹ PARIS TRANSATLANTIC FORUM / FORUM TRANSATLANTIQUE DE PARIS
European defense - European and American perceptions La défense européenne - perceptions croisées européennes et américaines Edited by/Sous la direction de Julian Lindley-French .July 2000

¹⁰² Tomás Valásek, NATO at 50 Center for Defense Information FOREIGN POLICY Volume 4, Number 11 March 1999

¹⁰³ Madeleine Albright. Reprinted as “La necesidad de una cooperación con Europa” in El Mundo June 12 2001.

- **Conclusions**

“The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) has long been one of the myriad acronyms that only a few experts recognized and even fewer truly cared about. Today, however, many believe that the concept of a unified European defense is finally becoming a reality”¹⁰⁴

Europe’s first priority must be the success of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In the next century, Europe can only become a global economic player—and be taken seriously by Washington—if it becomes economically efficient and competitive.

The second priority for Europe in its quest to become a global player is the successful restructuring and consolidation of its defense and aerospace industries, which will narrow the technological gap between Europe and the United States.

Europe’s third priority must be embracing ESDI with the kind of vigor seen in Britain, which has gone from being ESDI brakeman to being its engine.

“When scratched at all, many of the leading Eurofederalists of my acquaintance profess some resentment at the subordination of Europe during the Cold War and have a somewhat mystical concept of the early re-emergence of European leadership in the world. In my opinion, Europe possesses neither the geopolitical strength nor the political maturity to exercise any such role. The main home for such sentiments remains France, where they are espoused by both pro- and anti-European forces. Thus, François Mitterrand is recorded by Georges-Marc Benamou in *Le Dernier Mitterrand* as saying "France does not know it, but we are at war with America”¹⁰⁵

The likely scenario for Europe is that it will remain unsettled. It will have shed some of its parochialism and will be more--though uneasily--attuned to global trends. Its experiment with a variety of institutional responses will continue, but will satisfy only in part. Yet a secure, stable, and prosperous Europe will remain vital to American interests and require a continued, albeit modified, American role in Europe. NATO and the EU will both be

¹⁰⁴ Margarita Mathiopoulos and István Gyarmati “Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European” Defense The Washington Quarterly. Autumn 1999.

¹⁰⁵ Conrad M. Black Chairman and CEO, Hollinger International Inc. The European Union, Britain and the United States: Which Way to Go? An Address to The Nixon Center, April 11, 2000. Via Internet at http://nixoncenter.org/publications/Perspectives/4_2000ConradBlack.htm

enlarged, and NATO will remain the key institution linking the United States to European security.

The structure of Europe will differ significantly in the next decade. Currently, the focus is on enlargement of the two key institutions that shape Europe--the EU and NATO. In this decade, Europe has tackled its agenda with familiar sets of members; 12 for the EU (15 since the recent accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the EU as full members), and 16 for NATO. However, the next decade will see a very different pattern. Both the EU and NATO will be operating with a considerably larger membership. Projections vary, from 2526 for the EU and 2324 for NATO (Larrabee) to a more tentative, smaller number (Van Heuven). Would-be members striving to secure various degrees of representation and influence will surround both organizations. The United States will thus operate on a larger and more complex organizational terrain.¹⁰⁶

Perhaps the most fundamental question will be whether the EU members will be able to fulfill their commitment to develop new military capabilities. But whether you do so will determine, in large part, the success or failure of European defense, and will determine the U.S.-EU and EU-NATO relationships in this area.

“One does not exist politically without an autonomous capacity to defend oneself, even when there is no imminent threat on the horizon. It is not possible to be a major player on the international stage without the military backing required to make one's positions credible and respected”¹⁰⁷

Bosnia, and later Kosovo, thus became the misshapen mirror that reflected European security and defence. The transformations that have occurred in the Atlantic Alliance, and that have led to talk of "a new NATO", have also undoubtedly helped to achieve progress in configuring the Europe of defence. On the other hand, they have also given rise to the problem of relations between the "European pillar" and the Alliance, a problem that is still to be fully resolved.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Rand Corporation. Issue Paper National Defense Research Institute.

Europe and America How Will the United States Adjust to the New Partnership? *Marten van Heuven and Gregory F. Treverton* 1998

¹⁰⁷ Alejandro Muñoz-Alonso. A political view of common European defence” Chairman Defence Commission Congreso de los Diputados. Lecture CESEDEN January 25 2000. Cited in the Grupo de Estudios Estrategicos Web page.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

The greatest obstacle to an effective European security policy, in any case, has been not an inability to decide, but rather a lack of means to act.¹⁰⁹

- U.S. and European countries should delegate conflict prevention and reconstruction duties to the OSCE and should build on its expertise.
- NATO should seek mandates from either the UN or the OSCE for all missions other than defense of its territory.
- Washington should support French and British attempts to create a viable European defense organization.

Now, with a new administration in Washington a new uncertainty is added.

It seems that President Bush jr wants that the European allies finally make a serious promise in defense spending, however, he doesn't like the idea that this commitment has to be supported by structures outside of the NATO.

The misunderstanding toward the current dynamics in the EU and the creation of a new CFSP is obvious. The new American administration has already affirmed that they only will support the policies that will strength NATO and CFSP, and as Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, already noted, "it could weakening the NATO in its commitment to assure a capable collective defense."¹¹⁰

El temor último, no obstante, no es una disminución de las capacidades militares aliadas, sino la perspectiva de que la UE, una vez que cuente con los mecanismos de decisión apropiados y con una fuerza de intervención, se constituya en un competidor político global de los Estados Unidos. Lo que está en juego, por tanto, es el proyecto político de la UE, algo a lo que los europeos están comprometidos de lleno.¹¹¹

“The end of the Cold War ended America and Europe’s existential interdependence. Into the vacuum surged two largely complementary but sometimes conflicting phenomena: American “hyper-power” and a new European identity forged by economic, political and security integration. As

¹⁰⁹ Philip H Gordon Their own army? *Foreign Affairs*; v 79 n 4 Jul/Aug 2000

¹¹⁰ Grupo de Estudios Estrategicos. Bush Europa y Espana. 2 February 2000

¹¹¹ Ibidem

a result, Americans and Europeans focus less on our common values and interests and fixate more on our differences such as¹¹²:

- National Missile Defense
- The EU Rapid Reaction Force
- American troops in the Balkans
- Dealing with States of Concern

No defence without a CFSP: all the armies in the world and all conceivable institutional arrangements would be of dubious effectiveness in the absence of a true common foreign policy that allowed them to be used. A United Kingdom that is more European, a France that is less anti-American, a Germany that is more sensitive to the very notion of national responsibility, and the evolving views in all countries of neutrality or the Union's role in the world, present for the first time the opportunity for major compromises on the European Union's political configuration.¹¹³

The United States will remain suspicious of a French neo-Gaullist desire to differentiate European policies from those of the U.S.

Americans hope the governments of the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and other EU countries will help ensure that EU policies do not develop along neo-Gaullist lines;

The U.S.-European defense relationship is likely to be challenging and frustrating and even a source of possible fractures. This is largely because "the United States will for an extended period likely face a Europe whose foreign and defense policy proclamations are more developed than its ability to act."¹¹⁴

"Some republicans in Washington consider that the European (the French) have a hidden agenda against the NATO, and of course with the development of the ESDI. The US continue to be the indispensable power, Bush knows it and also the European"¹¹⁵ The Alliance, as stated in the Report to the US Congress, "Continues to serve as an irreplaceable

¹¹² Antony Blinken. The United States, France, and Europe at the Outset of the New Administration. U.S.-France Analysis, March 2001 Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs and Center for Strategic and International Studies.

¹¹³ Nicole Gnesotto. European defence: 2000 and beyond. Newsletter N 29 January 2000 Institute of Strategic Studies. WEU Paris.

¹¹⁴ Louis R. Golino, U.S. View on EU Defense Plan Assessed; Americans have Mixed Feelings. May 14, 2000. GlobalBeat Via internet at <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/emu/Golino051400.html>

¹¹⁵ Andres Ortega. El Pais. 11 June 2001

mechanism for the exercise of US leadership in the international security affairs and for the projection of American power and influence across the Atlantic and beyond.¹¹⁶

“The Alliance has also to adapt itself to the ESDI, that is in evolution. The security of the Europe and the NATO are not parallel anymore. The war in Kosovo shown the European deficiencies of their armies... A Europe with bigger capacity will mean a ally and a partner with bigger capacity for the US.¹¹⁷

“U.S. interest in European security did not end with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Today the United States is working closely through NATO to forge the Europe that our grandfathers and fathers fought for in two world wars - a Europe whole, free and at peace.”¹¹⁸

Europe and America are partners today. They will continue to be partners tomorrow and the day after - strong partners. Not because of the inertia of common history but because of common interests and, indeed, common values¹¹⁹

The United States in particular should welcome its implementation in the military sphere. Legitimate American concerns about European nations' low defense spending-Germany's above all-are likely to be met effectively in the EU context, which gives a "European" legitimacy for the first time to upward pressures on military budgets. By doing it "their way", rather than going through a NATO process that has proved ineffective in this respect, the Europeans are more likely to improve their military capabilities to the benefit of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole.¹²⁰

It also gives Europeans, and their American ally, a guarantee against a resurgence of US isolationism and unilateralism.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ US Department of Defense. Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense. March 1999.

¹¹⁷ Madeleine Albright. “La necesidad de una cooperación with Europa” El Mundo 12 June 2001.

¹¹⁸ Condoleezza Rice. America and Europe, Partners Tomorrow and the Day After. The International Herald Tribune. June 12 2001.

¹¹⁹ Ibidem

¹²⁰ Guillaume Parmentier. After Nice: The Discreet Emergence of a Military Partner for the United States. Brookings Institution., April 2001 Via Internet <http://www.brook.edu/fp/cusf/analysis/afternice.htm#bio>

¹²¹ Ibidem.