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**NATO-OSCE Interaction in Peacekeeping:  
Experience and Prospects in Southeast Europe**

**FINAL REPORT**

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They said this mystery never shall cease:  
The priest promotes war, and the soldier peace.

*William Blake /Gnomic Verses/*

## **1. Introduction**

The history of mankind after the last World War was far from being peaceful despite the ambition of the peace architects to put "an end of the beginnings of all wars". Hundreds of violent conflicts and local wars were fought, and millions of people suffered from turbulence and unrest in the second half of the 20th century.

Peacekeeping operations have been initially developed by the UN in the late 1940-es, and thereafter have been exclusively referred to as one of the basic UN instruments for conflict prevention, conflict mitigation and conflict resolution. "Peacekeeping is a child of the Cold War, born of the United Nations' frustration at its inability to enforce the peace as envisaged in its Charter and its desire to do more to affect the course of international armed conflict than simply mediating and conciliating from a distance".<sup>1</sup> However, peacekeeping is not stipulated in the UN Charter, and has thus been conceptually based on construing the main postulates of the latter rather than following rigorous regulations. Praxis has been both a parent of the term and its filling.

It seems that as long as there are conflicts between states, communities or groups, there will be a need for peacekeepers in the broader meaning of the word, and despite its contradictory record, peacekeeping will stay high on the international agenda in the foreseeable future. Clearly, peacekeeping concepts and practices are not in a standstill, being moved forward by the changing international environment and the evolution of the organisations involved in peacekeeping activities. UN, which a decade ago was the only organisation with authority to mandate and conduct a peacekeeping operation, has been increasingly sharing responsibilities with others. The complexity of the

peacekeeping and peace-building operations in the Balkans has evoked a new pattern of co-operation between the UN and a number of regional actors, which has been found upon, but also delineated and pushed further their comparative advantages.

NATO and the OSCE, being regional security organisations with specific capacities and scope of action, participate in peace operations in Southeast Europe and have started from the late 1990-es to develop their own peacekeeping capabilities. The main thesis of this paper starts from the premises that in the new demanding environment UN lonely stance in peacekeeping would mean a "mission impossible", and that evolving NATO and OSCE have the capacity to successfully provide essential elements of a peacekeeping operation, meanwhile ensuring complementarity and mutual reinforcement of efforts, which is likewise projected on their self-identification. Further development of their interaction in terms of functional delineation would improve the overall mechanism of a peace operation where the two organisations are assigned certain roles: the military "muscle" of NATO, and the institution building, civil society assistance, human rights monitoring and police capabilities of the OSCE. There are practically little or no grounds for competition and duplication between NATO and the OSCE given their respective profiles in the current peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, which presupposes a "non-zero sum" game in the field.

The arguments for the thesis were sought in studying the conceptual sources of modern peace keeping, as well as the process of emerging and advancing of the ideas for involving NATO and the OSCE in peace operations. Evaluating the experience of the two active operations in Southeast Europe - in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, was an important part of the research. The comparative analysis of NATO and the OSCE involvement in BiH and Kosovo was rather useful in this respect and seemed productive for explaining the distinct evolution in terms of response to the situation, preparation and organisation of the two operations.

## **2. Peacekeeping on the post-Cold War Security Agenda**

### ***2.1. The UN paradigm***

Since its inception, the traditional UN peacekeeping has had at its core the principles of consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers and non-use of force in most circumstances.<sup>2</sup> Adherence to those principles has been the fundament of the peacekeeping operations, conducted by the UN exclusively on the basis of Chapter VI of the UN Charter - "Pacific settlement of disputes", until 1988. They have not been seriously contested afterwards either, but the high conditionality of their application and the need for consideration of a number of new factors have launched a debate on the issue whether to keep peacekeeping in the familiar parameters, or to stretch its limits, including by going into peace enforcement.

The evolution in nature and scope of the UN peacekeeping activities after 1988-1989 /more than 25 new missions/ reflected the major change in the international environment after the end of the Cold War. Factors like the growing capacity of the UN Security Council to agree on action with regard to certain conflicts, the optimism *vis-à-vis* the role of the UN in international security, the abrupt increase in the number of conflicts unleashed by falling apart of multinational states like the USSR and Yugoslavia, and the increased involvement of new states in peacekeeping missions, brought the first generation of peacekeeping to reconsideration.<sup>3</sup>

The unusual complexity has been another reason for this. Before 1988 the main job of peacekeepers - and generally manageable - was connected to monitoring cease-fire lines and interposing belligerents. The new types of intrastate conflicts, the lack of full consent and co-operation of the parties, the internal breakdown of law and order, the collapse of state structures and the targeting of civilians in such conflicts, have given birth to a second-generation of peacekeeping, relying much more upon the use of force, having broader and complex tasks, and carried out by multinational personnel. Although keeping up

to a certain degree of operational consent, some of the new missions go beyond Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and are authorised under Chapter VII - "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression", for having peace enforcement elements. There is a distinct shift of the consensual nature of peacekeeping towards a more "interventionist" one.

The repertoire of new peacekeeping /albeit the opposition of some scholars to accept the equivalence between peacekeeping and peace enforcement<sup>4/</sup> includes a number of new tasks: preparation, monitoring and conduct of elections; protection of population from threat or use of force; protection of "safe areas"; demilitarisation; demobilisation; disarmament of military and paramilitary forces; guarding surrendered weapons; mine clearance; humanitarian relief operations; military assistance; assistance in reconstruction of governmental and/or police functions, etc.<sup>5</sup>

UN peacekeeping has responded rapidly to the demands of the post-Cold War realities, and has grasped the opportunities for a change. But despite new opportunities, the new modes of peacekeeping activities pose new challenges. In practical terms, the most serious of them relate to insufficiency of adequate planning of the operation, training and skills of the personnel, low interoperability and coordination between the troops of peacekeepers, problems of the force cohesion and the chain of command, deficiency of clear rules of engagement and feasible exit strategies, financial overburdening, logistics, equipment. In other words - capacity and capabilities.

In the face of those challenges, co-operation with other international organisations has been increasingly occupying the UN agenda. Moreover, it has become a must, if the UN would like to live up to the its responsibility as a primary guardian of international peace. The need for partners and for increased effectiveness on the basis of comparative advantages of various other organisations in peacekeeping has been recognised in the early 1990-es, when the UN started to reflect on possible complementarity of international efforts. The report of B.B. Ghali /then Secretary General of the UN/ "*An Agenda for Peace*",

adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, for the first time put the co-operation of the UN with regional organisations in the peacekeeping context. Evoking Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on regional arrangements and their role in the maintenance of international peace and security, Ghali noted:

"In the past, regional arrangements were often created because of the absence of a universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occasion work at cross-purposes with the sense of solidarity required for the effectiveness of the world Organisation. But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII...

What is clear, however, is that regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilised in serving the functions covered in this report: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and co-operation with United Nations efforts could only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs."<sup>6</sup>

The *"Supplement to An Agenda for Peace"* from 3 January 1995 elaborated further on the forms of co-operation between the UN and regional organisations through consultations, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment and joint operations.

In the following period a great deal of work was done in the UN to bring to this co-operation conceptual clarity and documentary substance. The

presidential statements of the UNSC from 16 September (S/PRST/1998/28) and 30 November 1998 (S/PRST/1998/35), and Res.1197 from 18 September 1998 affirmed the role of the UN in setting general standards for peacekeeping and providing support for regional and sub-regional initiatives in conflict prevention and maintenance of peace.

These ideas evolved in a study named *"Co-operation between the United Nations and Regional Organisations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment"*, released in March 1999 by the Lessons Learned Unit, established under the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The paper suggested a set of principles to enhance co-operation between the UN and regional bodies, some of which are listed below:

- constancy of engagement by the UNSC;
- authorisation of regional organisations by the UNSC for conducting peacekeeping operations and dynamic co-operation among them;
- adequacy and clarity of mandates given by the peacekeeping operations;
- early and comprehensive consultation and effective information sharing between the UN and the respective regional organisations /both in the planning and the implementation phase/;
- development of a framework for co-operation, defining the responsibility of each entity in the mission area;
- making use of the comparative advantages of the various organisations and avoiding duplication and competition;
- assistance for capacity building and funding for peacekeeping efforts of the regional organisations on behalf of the UNSC;
- reaching a common understanding on basic doctrine, terminology and rules of engagement in peacekeeping operations;

- engagement with a long-term view to sustain peace after withdrawal of peacekeepers, incl. through strengthening civil society in countries in conflict.

The suggested mechanisms to implement the principles of effective co-operation include:

- channels for regular communication between the secretariats of the UN and the regional organisations;

- establishment of a planning cell with participation of all possible actors in the peacekeeping operation for the purpose of joint planning and information sharing;

- field level co-operation and coordination meetings of senior representatives of the organisations involved in the operation;

- signing of memoranda for understanding and exchange of liaison officers between the mission HQs of the organisations involved;

- possible establishment of a strategic planning group between the organisations in the mission area;

- organisations to identify the most qualified individuals to head their respective operations;

- UN lead in establishing the necessary financing mechanism to fund the operation;

- conducting of joint training of personnel;

- adequate arrangements for the protection of the personnel and the property in the mission area through sharing of security information and resources;

- creation of a joint civil-military consultative mechanism to coordinate action for humanitarian assistance;

- development of mechanisms like international conferences, "Groups of Friends", etc.;

- accept a common code of conduct for the personnel and a transparent mechanisms to address the local grievances arising from the actions of the international staff.

The attention given to the enumerated principles and mechanisms here is justified by the fact that they are drawn from six case-studies, including the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of co-operation of the UN with regional and sub-regional organisations. In certain aspects they have been tested in the next Balkan operation of the UN in Kosovo. Indicative for the convergence of views and concepts was the parallel process of furthering the OSCE and NATO's conceptual approaches to co-operation among international organisations and institutions, especially in the context of the Kosovo crisis.

The report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, known as the *Brahimi Report* of 2000, defined the paradigm of institutionalised approach towards assessing the existing experience and developing new concepts in various aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace building at the turn of the century. It goes beyond the level of strategic and political analysis by addressing operational and organisational aspects of peacekeeping in the context of the new demands. The Report underpins the need for robust doctrine, realistic mandates, integrated approach on central and field level, capacity for information management and strategic analysis, improved mission guidance and leadership, unity of effort in planning, supporting and conducting a mission, training and development of rapid deployment capabilities. Among others, one idea is distinctly threading its way through the paper: the need for synergy and co-operation with regional organisations.

## ***2.2. The OSCE peacekeeping: conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation***

Like UN, the CSCE has faced the serious challenge of adapting its identity to the post-Cold War realities. It has been at the forefront of the positive change in the East-West relations since the mid-1970-es, structured as a forum

for dialogue and negotiations until the mid-1990-es, when it was officially transformed into an OSCE. A difficult process by itself, the transformation was also a creative one, as entirely new structures and mechanisms were developed and new functions were taken. The end of the ideological confrontation and the escalation in number and intensity of conflicts in the CSCE/OSCE area imposed a major shift in its agenda and preconditioned the focus on preventive diplomacy, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

*The Charter of Paris for a New Europe*, adopted by the CSCE in 1990, was a prompt and with a sense of the historical moment reaction to the disintegration of the bipolar system. It highlighted the positive change, rather than addressed the new risks and threats to security. Peacekeeping was, likewise, not a topic of discussion. However, the beginning of institutionalisation of the CSCE and the idea of "common efforts in the field of military security" were already a hint for the changing profile.

At its second meeting in January 1992, the CSCE Council made further steps in this direction with the *Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures*. Confronted by the arising armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, one of the main concerns of the CSCE was to improve its capabilities to engage in crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution. The idea of CSCE peacekeeping and a possible CSCE role in peacekeeping was for the first time put on the agenda. The debates over it continued until the Helsinki Summit meeting in December 1992. Some states supported traditional peacekeeping based on military participation within CSCE framework, while others insisted on developing limited CSCE capacity of middle-sized missions with a mandate to observe and monitor cease-fire, and calling upon NATO or WEU when larger operations with a military component are needed - an idea which prevailed in the debate, not in the last place because supported by the USA.<sup>7</sup>

CSCE relationship with international organisations was mentioned for the first time here as well. It was stated that the Council of Europe, ECE, NATO,

the WEU, and other European and transatlantic organisations "would be invited to make contributions on the basis of CSCE precedent and practice to specialised CSCE Meetings where they have relevant expertise". The document suggested that those organisations inform the CSCE Secretariat annually of their current work programme and of the facilities available for work relevant to the CSCE.

*The Helsinki Document "The Challenges of Change" /1992/* declared the CSCE a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, thus providing "an important link between European and global security", and intending "to work together closely with the UN especially in preventing and settling conflicts".<sup>8</sup> Its main area of engagement would be early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-finding and rapporteur missions and peacekeeping), and peaceful settlement of disputes.

The notion of "CSCE peacekeeping" was given an extensive conceptual filling in the Document. It was defined as an "important operational element of the overall capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management intended to complement the political process of dispute resolution".<sup>9</sup> The nature, the mandate, the scope and the parameters of CSCE peacekeeping were delimited. A CSCE peacekeeping operation "may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution". It may involve both civilian and military personnel, range from small-scale to large-scale, and assume a variety of forms including observer and monitor missions and larger deployments of forces. Its tasks may include supervision and help to maintain cease-fires, monitoring troop withdrawals, support for the maintenance of law and order, providing humanitarian and medical aid and assistance for refugees. It would be carried out in conformity with the UN Charter, draw upon the experience and expertise of the UN and step on the principles of non-enforcement, consent of the parties to the conflict and impartiality.

In terms of procedure, the initiating of a peacekeeping operation would depend on the request of one or more CSCE participating States to the Council of

Senior Officials /CSO/ or the Council of Ministers, which will decide by consensus on the type of peacekeeping activities and exercise overall political control and guidance of a peacekeeping operation. Certain favourable conditions would be required for the execution of the operation: establishment of an effective and durable cease-fire; agreement on the necessary Memoranda of Understanding with the parties concerned, and provision of guarantees for the safety at all times of personnel involved. The tools of peacekeeping would be the CSCE missions with a clear mandate and terms of reference. Participation, as well as personnel and financial contribution, would be open to all CSCE states. The overall operational guidance of a mission would be done by the Chairman-in-Office assisted by an ad hoc group established at the CPC, while the Head of Mission appointed would have operational command in the mission area. Special financial modalities for funding the CSCE peacekeeping activities were envisaged by introducing two scales of contribution to fairly distribute costs among all participating states.

Given the limited resources of the CSCE to address alone the entire spectrum of tasks of a peacekeeping operation, an intention was voiced to use the resources, the experience and expertise of other organisations such as the EC, NATO and the WEU. The decisions by the CSCE to seek the support of any such organisation would be made on a case-by-case basis after the necessary consultations. Communication with those organisations would go through the ad hoc group.

The *Helsinki Document 1992* gave an ambitious evidence of the CSCE intentions in the realm of peacekeeping. It outlined the two main areas of the CSCE/OSCE self-perception with regard to peacekeeping: development of certain capabilities to meet the requirements of peacekeeping, and improvement of co-operation with other organisations. For a long time CSCE peacekeeping was kept to the limits of conflict prevention and peacemaking. The Helsinki decisions served as the basis for the deployment of CSCE long-term missions in a number of troubled areas. However, the conceptual push given by the Helsinki Summit, seemed to have been fading.

The *Budapest Document 1994 "Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era"* - the final output of the CSCE before it became OSCE, reconfirmed the necessity for further enhancement of the CSCE's role and capabilities in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, incl. peacekeeping operations and missions. One more aspect was added to the CSCE/OSCE engagements - post-conflict rehabilitation and assisting with reconstruction.

After the end of the Bosnian war and the OSCE large involvement in the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the peacekeeping topic came up again. In parallel, the OSCE started to work on finding more distinct parameters for its role in the European security architecture. The second wave of discussions was launched by the *Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-first Century /1996/*. The latter revitalised the search for an adequate position of the OSCE among the new peacekeepers along the lines already set by Helsinki. The three-year work on the Charter for European Security was also a test for the intellectual and practical readiness of the OSCE to put in flesh its peacekeeping intentions.

Between the Lisbon /1996/ and the Istanbul Summit /1999/ the OSCE role in peacekeeping was broadly debated in the overall context of its role in conflict prevention. Three major views were delineated in the discussions. One of them asserted that the OSCE should not play a military role in peacekeeping operations, leaving it to the organisations, which have the necessary capabilities to conduct them. Avoiding duplication and using the proven OSCE capabilities in conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance were among the main arguments in favour. A second view insisted that the OSCE should enhance its capabilities for peacekeeping in various modes: performance of own peacekeeping operations, participation in UN-conducted operations and enlistment of other organisations and groups of states for OSCE peacekeeping operations. This presupposed designation of military units that can be deployed as OSCE peacekeeping contingents, which would include national military, police and civilian personnel, and also establishment of a single military command structure under the Permanent Council and the OSCE Secretariat. The

third and compromising view stepped upon the *Helsinki Document 1992* and favoured three categories of OSCE involvement in peacekeeping: participation in multifunctional peace operations based on the Organisation's comparative advantages; request for support from other organisations for conducting peacekeeping operations on behalf of the OSCE; and OSCE-led operations, when the Organisation itself would take on an operational responsibility for a military peacekeeping operation.<sup>10</sup>

The last view was finally the one to be given credit to by all participating states and introduced in the concept of the OSCE peacekeeping in the *Istanbul Charter for European Security /1999/*. It defined a more wide-ranging and, simultaneously, a largely conditional peacekeeping approach. Thus the OSCE could, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, resort to one of the possibilities: "decide to play a role in peacekeeping, including a leading role, when participating States judge it to be the most effective and appropriate organisation"; or, "decide to provide the mandate covering peacekeeping by others and seek the support of participating States as well as other organisations to provide resources and expertise".<sup>11</sup> The option for a military participation and respective responsibility was evidently avoided. The controversial experience from the Kosovo Verification Mission /KVM/ and the Kosovo air-campaign had, in fact, the same effect of highlighting the need for improving the division of labour and for further developing the comparative advantages of the OSCE. The latter were justly related to the rapid deployment of the OSCE civilian and police expertise as a precondition for effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The shift towards pragmatism was echoing the evolution of the OSCE activities and the extensive OSCE field presence in areas of crises and conflicts.

The realistic self-perception of the OSCE and the "operationalised" approach to security produced the *Platform for Co-operative Security* /an integral part of the Charter/ as a basis for development of non-hierarchical co-operation with other international organisations, not in the last place in peacekeeping. This document legitimised the objective 1990-es' tendency of closer interaction of

various players in the different stages of the conflict cycle. Moreover, it positioned the OSCE in the dynamic interplay required by modern peacekeeping. This was also the bridge that brought the OSCE and NATO institutionally together in their new missions.

### ***2.3. Peace-support operations: NATO's transformation from a collective defence to a collective security alliance***

The end of the Cold War affected the status of NATO as a conservative collective defence alliance and urged its transformation on many tracks. *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, agreed at the London Summit in 1991, considered the major changes in the international environment with a view to their implication on NATO's objectives and security functions. The establishment of "just and lasting peaceful order in Europe" was set as a fundamental objective, pursued through dialogue, co-operation and maintenance of a collective defence capability. At this early stage two points in the concept indicated the emergence of a more flexible approach of NATO to crises-management and conflict prevention activities: the intention "to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management", and the readiness to participate in various activities, directed to preserving peace and stability at European and global level, including by providing forces for UN missions.<sup>12</sup>

The disintegration of former Yugoslavia, the direct involvement of NATO in several missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of the UN peacekeeping efforts - ceasefire monitoring, protection of humanitarian relief convoys, air monitoring operations, maritime enforcement actions, and the CSCE evolution were among the factors, that pushed the thinking of the Alliance towards a more concrete consideration of its possible peacekeeping role. The May 1992 ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee /DPC/ and the Nuclear Planning Group /NPG/ in Brussels suggested that NATO supported in

principle the conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms developed by the CSCE and, accordingly, provide resources and expertise for CSCE peacekeeping activities. The progress towards establishing NATO's new Reaction Forces, suited for rapid and selective employment, would make this prospect quite feasible.

The decision itself came from the NAC Ministerial meeting in Oslo /June 1992/. It stated that NATO was prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available resources and expertise. NAC and the NATO Military Authorities were tasked to work on the practical options and modalities for such a support. The issue was not one of creating capabilities, but of transforming the existing ones in conformity with the new demands.

Following the Oslo decision, in October 1992 SHAPE recognised the need for development of NATO peacekeeping doctrine, as well as practical measures to enhance NATO's peacekeeping capabilities. The work on the doctrine was concentrated at the peacekeeping cell at SHAPE, later expanded into office, and was based on targeted study of the existing documents on peacekeeping.<sup>13</sup> DPC in permanent session dealt with identifying specific measures in the areas of command and control, logistic support, infrastructure, and training and exercises for support of peacekeeping operations, so that they became a part of NATO's force planning process. The results were reported to NAC.<sup>14</sup>

In December 1992, the NAC Ministerial meeting in Brussels extended the political determination of NATO to support not only CSCE peacekeeping but also, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with NATO procedures, "peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security".<sup>15</sup> Contacts between the Secretaries General of NATO and UN were recommended in this context. The inclusion of the non-NATO CSCE participating states in the

preparation and the involvement in CSCE peacekeeping operations was envisaged as well.

Once the political push given, the practical work at various levels was intensified. In 1993 an Ad Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping /AHG/ was set up within the framework of the newly established North Atlantic Co-operation Council /NACC/. Its aim was to develop a common understanding of the political principles of and the tools for peacekeeping, and to share experience and develop common practical approaches and co-operation in support of peacekeeping under the responsibility of the UN or the OSCE.<sup>16</sup> Within the AHG functioned sub-groups, dealing with planning, training, communication, logistics and interoperability. The first report of the AHG, presented to the NACC Ministerial meeting in Athens /June 1993/, addressed a whole range of issues, laying down the fundament for further elaboration on the matter. In terms of general concept the report handled the tough problem of definitions stepping upon the relevant UN and CSCE documents. It also formulated the guidelines, the criteria /clear and precise mandate, consent of the parties to the conflict, transparency, impartiality and credibility/ and the operational principles of peacekeeping /command and co-ordination, use of force, safety of personnel, participation and financial considerations/. In more specific terms the AHG put down the principles of co-operation among NACC members and between NACC-UN-CSCE, as well as measures for practical co-operation in peacekeeping. The latter were further developed on the basis of experience in the peacekeeping operations in former Yugoslavia and compiled in a follow-up report of 1995 under the title "*Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations*".

In 1993 the Military Committee agreed upon a document named "*NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations*" /MC 327/, which was only approved in 1995. After the first years of the Alliance's involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994-1996, in October 1997 MC 327 was updated by adopting MC 327/I - *Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations*, to reflect NATO's experience from the field and to bring the PSO doctrine in line with that already developed by a number of national militaries /Sweden-UK, the

FINABEL group of nations - France, Italy, Netherlands, Allemagne, Belgium, Espagne and Luxembourg/. The most significant development in MC327/1 was the clear distinction of tasks assigned to military forces in cases of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.<sup>17</sup> Another revision *MC 327/2 - NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Operations*, came after the approval in 1999 of the *Alliance's New Strategic Concept* by the NAC Summit in Washington. The terminological evolution, as seen from the documents, followed the conceptual expanding of NATO's approach to conflict prevention and crisis management, of which peacekeeping was considered to be only an aspect.

At political level the process of continuous endorsement for NATO's support of UN and CSCE/OSCE peacekeeping missions kept pace. *The Brussels Summit Declaration* of 1994 reaffirmed this support together with the need for further adaptation of NATO's command and force structure to its requirements. The concept of Command Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations and to provide "separable but not separate military capabilities" to be employed by NATO or the WEU was endorsed.<sup>18</sup> Peacekeeping field exercises within the Partnership for Peace framework were proposed and started as of 1994.

*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* did not offer a conceptual overturn in this respect. It included conflict prevention and crisis management activities among the essential tasks of NATO aimed at enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and reiterated the commitment to support the UN and the OSCE in their peacekeeping efforts. With a scent of pride, there was a recollection of NATO's participation in the crisis response operations in the Balkans. However, there stayed mainly the Bosnian experience. The air campaign in Kosovo - a testimony for the inability of the international factor to efficiently "tame the shrew" with the traditional conflict prevention and crisis management tools, was at its height. Regardless of the shades of its overall assessment, it introduced *de facto* a new, highly interventionist approach to crisis management, and opened the floor for heated debates on the admissible delimitation between war fighting, peace enforcement and peacekeeping.

### **3. Meeting the ends: co-operation between NATO and the OSCE in peacekeeping**

#### ***3.1. The conceptual level***

The new approach to the co-operation between NATO and OSCE in the 1990-es was the indispensable prerequisite for any form of interaction in peacekeeping. It was more openly stated by NATO and somewhat cautiously handled by the OSCE for reasons, stemming from the large range of positions of its participating states. NATO's stance on the issue was announced in *the London Declaration of 1990* and the *Alliance's Strategic Concept of 1991*. The *Rome Declaration of the NATO Summit 1991 on Peace and Co-operation* paid tribute to the role of the broad membership and the common values of the CSCE process for the stability and democracy in Europe. As all NATO member-states had also been CSCE Participating states, the aforementioned documents reconfirmed their intention to be an active factor in the conceptual and institutional development of the CSCE, and a source of initiatives for its strengthening. NAC Ministerial and Summit meetings became the fora where the common position of the NATO states on major CSCE issues was voiced. Moreover, though not at a strictly organisational level, NATO was the organisation most involved in the CSCE/OSCE matters through its member states, especially in the first half of the 1990-es.

NACC and later the EAPC as NATO co-operative formats provided the practical interface of this co-operation. The process was facilitated by the CSCE/OSCE's own conceptual movement towards including such a co-operation among the instruments of the organisation in the course of work on the *Common and Comprehensive Security Model*. After lengthy discussions and already a considerable field experience, the *Platform for Co-operative Security*, which defined the parameters of the OSCE co-operation with other players in the Euro-Atlantic security, became an integral part of the *Charter for European Security*.

### ***3.2. The Headquarters level***

Notwithstanding, for a long time the co-operation between NATO and the OSCE was stretched unevenly between the higher political and the lower working levels of the two organisations, thus making the rapprochement between them a relative quantity. The first concrete step was the association of Sweden as Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE in 1993 with the work of the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping. The practice of involving the UN and the OSCE in the meetings and activities of the AHG was preserved and developed. Cross-representation at Ministerial and Summit meetings was established. In 1996 NATO and the OSCE started working together on the implementation of the *Dayton/Paris Peace Accords*, which marked the beginning of their co-operation *in situ*. Two years later they continued in Kosovo.

The process received a further push from above. In November 2000 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson addressed the OSCE Permanent Council, recognising that NATO-OSCE relations were "a strategic imperative" and that both organisations "have moved closer together philosophically".<sup>19</sup> In May 2001 the OSCE Secretary General Jan Kubis was, in turn, invited to address the EAPC Meeting, confirming the necessity for "pragmatising" the general co-operative drift.

Although there is no official agreement for interaction in peacekeeping, a regular structured dialogue between the Secretariats of NATO and the OSCE has been established with the aim of developing joint crisis-management capability. The practice has emerged to hold regular staff talks several times a year, hosted alternatively by the two organisations. The work on establishing liaison officers to the headquarters of the organisations is underway.

*Ad-hoc* meetings between the two Secretaries General and other senior staff are held. The staff members are available for co-operative consultations on *ad-hoc* basis. A co-operation has been established between the NATO Situation Center and the OSCE Operation Center. In 2001 the OSCE for the first time went

beyond the observation and was actively represented at the CMX exercise, when the OSCE representatives worked together with the EAPC staff.

### ***3.3. The field level: peace operations in Southeast Europe***

The relationship between NATO and the OSCE has been largely driven by events in the field. Co-operation on the ground preceded by far the structured dialogue between the headquarters. It has pioneered in bridging the gap between the concept and the praxis, and has provided arguments for the necessity to develop and complement each organisation's peacekeeping capabilities.

#### ***3.3.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina: the great challenge***

As it is often expressively stated, Bosnia and Herzegovina /BiH/ was a source of many firsts for the international community<sup>20</sup> - the NATO's first engagement in military action, the first UN-NATO joint effort in peacekeeping, the first NATO-OSCE co-operative performance in the field, the first large scale "second generation" peace operation. With the entry into force of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH /GFAP/ on 20 December 1995, a major international presence deployed in the war-devastated country. Since the UN was reluctant to take the overall responsibility for conducting the Bosnian operation, the UN Security Council adopted on 15 December *Resolution 1031*, which authorised a number of international organisations to implement the different aspects of GFAP.

A multinational military implementation force /IFOR/ was established under unified command and control, composed of ground, air and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations. Its mandate was 12 months. In accordance with Annex 1 A of GFAP, IFOR was placed under the authority and was subject to the direction and political control of NAC through the NATO chain of command, and operated under NATO Rules of Engagement, including the robust use of force, when necessary for the accomplishment of its mission or for self-

protection.<sup>21</sup> The operation was code-named Joint Endeavour and was conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter /peace enforcement/.

IFOR was tasked to establish a durable cessation of hostilities and to ensure compliance with the provisions of GFAP, regulating the military aspects of the peace settlement: cease-fire; withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation; separation of forces; collection of heavy weapons into cantonment/barracks areas; demobilisation or relocation of forces; clearing of minefields. IFOR had to assist the safe withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to the IFOR. It was authorised to also maintain control of the airspace over BiH, to observe, monitor and inspect forces, facilities or activities, believed to have military capability, and to install lasting security and arms control measures. In addition to its main responsibilities, IFOR had to fulfil supporting tasks, related to the implementation of the civilian, humanitarian and economic aspects of GFAP, including the protection of civilian population.<sup>22</sup>

On 16 December 1995 NAC approved the Operational Plan /OPLAN 10405/ for IFOR. The deployment of the more than 60 000 troops began in the last decade of December 1995 and was completed in mid-February 1996. It involved troops, committed by both NATO and non-NATO countries, which participated in the operation on the same basis as forces from NATO member countries. Parts of UNPROFOR were integrated into IFOR. The primary funding responsibility for IFOR was borne by NATO and NATO members, while non-NATO countries provided funds for their specific national contributions.

In a month time the withdrawal of the forces of all parties from the zone of separation was completed. The transfer of territory between Bosnian entities took another two months. This first stage of the operation was positively assessed by NAC for creating the necessary secure environment for the implementation of the basic provisions of GFAP.

The withdrawal, demobilisation or cantonment of heavy weapons and forces by the parties was retarded by technical problems, but the degree of military co-operation provided by the parties to GFAP, indicated prospects for a

successful compliance. Despite certain difficulties and delays, de-mining operations and destruction of weapons were undertaken. One of the immediate effects of the implementation process was the termination of the sanctions against the parties.<sup>23</sup>

The IFOR activities and the implementation of the military aspects of GFAP were paralleled by the establishment of arms control and of confidence- and security-building measures /CSBMs/ under Annex 1-B of GFAP. The negotiations were held under the auspices of the OSCE and concluded with the *Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina* under Article II of Annex 1-B /Vienna, January 1996/ and the *Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control* under Article IV /Florence, June 1996/.

However, the military aspects of the peace process were only a part of the international effort, projected in BiH. They were indispensable in the initial phase, which provided the security framework for the civilian component whose work was targeted at the civil, political and economic reconstruction of the country. Annex 1-A envisaged a role for IFOR in support of the civilian aspects of GFAP. Nevertheless, there was certain reluctance of the military to drop into the so called "mission creep", which was a result of the traditional understanding of the role of the peacekeeper and had to be overcome in the course of the operation.<sup>24</sup> The multifaceted civil-military co-operation was still an emerging concept within NATO, for which the practice had not so far provided adequate substance. IFOR was, therefore, the first complex test for the Alliance's intention to perform as an instrument of security beyond its strictly military sense, and prove its ability to come to terms with its civilian counterparts. Moreover, the matter exceeded by far the issue of the internal evolution of NATO, as the implementation of the civilian aspects of GFAP was essential to IFOR's exit strategy and the peace process as a whole.<sup>25</sup>

IFOR rendered support for and had to work with a wide range of governmental and non- governmental agencies and organisations such as the Office of the High Representative /OHR/, IPTF, the OSCE, the ICRC, UNHCR.

Logistic support /emergency accommodation, medical treatment and evacuation, vehicle repair, transport assistance, security information and advice, etc./ and assistance in the investigation of war crimes, the review and revision of property laws, the infrastructure assessments and the compiling information as part of a countrywide database, the return of refugees and displaced persons and the maintenance of law and order, became a routine. IFOR repaired a vast number of roads, railways and bridges, and was involved in opening up airports to civilian traffic, restoring energy and water supplies, rebuilding schools and hospitals. IFOR units supported the OSCE in organising and conducting the nation-wide elections in the autumn of 1996 and assisted in the human rights monitoring in the OSCE field offices.

A team of qualified professionals in various fields was recruited by IFOR to become a part of a civil-military team, referred to as CIMIC /Civil-Military Co-operation/, which had to meet the requirements for support for the civilian component.<sup>26</sup> A CIMIC Campaign Plan, guiding the civil-military activities during the IFOR deployment, was adopted, and a staff section under the name CIMIC/Civil Affairs was created. CIMIC personnel participated in Joint Civil Commissions /JCCs/ at regional level and in CIMIC Centres at cantonal level to facilitate civil actions throughout BiH. Thus, in the initial deficiency of functioning civil institutions in the country and the slow deployment of the international civilian presence, IFOR responded to the growing public pressure to assume a greater role in implementing GFAP civilian tasks.<sup>27</sup>

The IFOR mandate expired on 20 December 1996. On 10 December the NAC Ministerial meeting issued a statement, announcing that NATO was prepared to extend its participation in BiH by organising and leading a Stabilisation Force /SFOR/. On 12 December 1996 the UN SC adopted *Resolution 1088*, which authorised the establishment of SFOR as the legal successor to IFOR. On 20 December 1996 SFOR was activated for a planned period of 18 months, its mission periodically extended without a change in the mandate. As suggested by its name, the main objective of SFOR was to stabilise the peace and to ensure secure environment for the work of Bosnian authorities

and the other international organisations by conducting the operations Joint Guard/Joint Forge.

SFOR had the same rules of engagement as IFOR. Its tasks were to consolidate IFOR's achievements, deter a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace, promote a climate for furthering the peace process and provide support to civilian organisations within its capabilities.<sup>28</sup> Its size was about half that of IFOR, being gradually restructured into a smaller and agile force, and reduced to approximately 18 000 at present.

SFOR continued along the lines of involvement, already set up by IFOR. However, its limited size as well as the advancement of the peace process imposed a more targeted approach to its engagements, which required broadening of the scope of tasks and projecting expertise in specific fields. SFOR monitored the activities and assisted the BiH armed forces in developing long term capability for de-mining through training, equipment donations and loans. Within the project Harvest it launched the collection and destruction of unregistered weapons and ordnance in private hands in BiH to ensure safety of the population and build confidence. SFOR's support for infrastructure reconstruction, refugee return, delivery of humanitarian aid, policing, investigation and detaining of war criminals was crucial.

The London Peace Implementation Conference of 8-9 December 1995 set up the framework for the implementation of the civilian aspects of GFAP. The High Representative Carl Bildt was charged with monitoring and overall coordination of the activities of the international organisations and agencies involved in the civilian implementation. The OSCE has been one of those entrusted with creating environment and building institutions essential for the BiH statehood. The OSCE Mission to BiH was established on 8 December 1995 at the fifth meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council with 233 staff members, being then the biggest OSCE field mission. It was tasked with supervising the preparation and conduct of free and fair elections and monitoring the human rights situation. Later on it was also involved in facilitating the monitoring of

arms control and confidence- and security-building arrangements. The Missions developed a network of regional centres and field offices, staffed with highly-qualified professionals from a wide variety of backgrounds, and working in the areas of democratisation, elections, human rights, media affairs and regional stabilisation.<sup>29</sup>

Preparing the elections in terms of conditions /political and media environment/, rules and regulations /criteria for voter eligibility, procedures for registration of parties, coalitions and candidates, polling process, counting of votes/, registration of all the voters, and full and comprehensive international supervision of voter registration centres and polling stations, was the main and immediate responsibility of the OSCE. The Head of the OSCE Mission took the chairmanship of the Provisional Election Commission. With the successful passage of the Election Law in 2001, the Mission has prepared the handing-over of the responsibility and ownership of the elections process to the authorities of BiH. Since 1996 the OSCE has several times conducted general and municipal elections, which largely contributed to the post-war rehabilitation and the democratisation of the country.

Through its field offices the Mission reports on human rights violations, monitors the human rights situation in general, assists in establishing contacts between local human rights organisations and the development of inter-ethnic contacts and dialogue. Human rights aspects of cases involving property issues, illegal evictions and the return of displaced persons, the rule of law and illegal detention have been addressed as well. Since its inception, the Mission has been the only international organisation receiving and processing property claims in the field. At certain point of time its efforts were concentrated on property law implementation, and it contributed greatly to the passage of property legislation in BiH and to judicial reform in 1998.<sup>30</sup>

As from the autumn of 1996 the OSCE Mission included in its activities promotion of the development of civil society, establishment of democratic institutions and representative government, democracy-building through concrete

programmes and projects, and media development. These goals were pursued through an integrated approach to the four main sectors: civil society, political parties, governance and rule of law.

Another important aspect of the OSCE engagement in BiH - the regional stabilisation, stemmed from its experience in negotiating and implementing confidence and security building measures /CSBMs/ between its participating states. Under Annex 1-B of the GFAP, the OSCE was tasked with holding negotiations between the Republic of BiH, the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska to agree upon measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict, drawing fully upon the OSCE 1994 Vienna Document on CSBMs. Such agreements on CSBMs in BiH and on measures for sub-regional arms control between BiH, Croatia and FRY /Article II and Article IV of Annex 1-B/ were concluded in January and June 1996 respectively. Their implementation brought notable results in armaments reduction, acceleration of military co-operation with effective inspection regime and routine exchange of information on military forces, and attaining balanced and stable force levels consistent with the defence needs of the Parties. Furthermore, in 2000-2001 the Mission worked on the improvement of democratic parliamentary control of the armed forces, on defence budget reductions and transparency, on restructuring of the Entity Armed Forces, and improvement of the command and control organisation at the State level. It participated in the analysis of exchanges of military information and notifications between the armed forces, and sponsored seminars and workshops on confidence and security building issues.<sup>31</sup>

The involvement of the numerous international organisations in BiH was not only unprecedented in range, but also inexperienced in interaction and coherence of efforts. Therefore, the "test and try" principle was among its most frequent resorts. As mentioned above, civil-military co-operation provided the conceptual frame. It should be fairly noted, that the thinking in this direction started as early as the operation itself. In its first meeting in Sarajevo in January 1996, the OSCE Troika discussed with IFOR commanding officers plans for co-

operation between the military and the civil implementation organisations in BiH. However, developments on the ground were the most powerful organising factor, shaping the specific forms of interaction.

At the headquarters level in BiH the NATO-OSCE co-operation has usually been a part of larger mechanisms regulating the interrelations between the major international players in BiH. The "Principals" of OHR, the OSCE Mission, SFOR, UNHCR, UNMiBH and IPTF meet on a weekly basis for an exchange of information and policy co-ordination. Senior staff members regularly participate in the Inter-Agency Planning Group /IAPG/ to prepare issues for consideration by the principals. Working relationship through regular meetings and electronic correspondence on a daily basis is maintained at the headquarters and field levels.

The co-operation on security and defence issues is manifold. Together with the OHR and UNMiBH, the OSCE and SFOR participate in the Common Security Policy Working Group, in which military issues are discussed and co-ordinated. The OSCE Mission's Joint Operations Centre /JOC/ co-operates with SFOR on security matters through full- or part-time assigned liaison officers for co-ordination and information exchange purposes. The OSCE's emergency action plan is co-ordinated with the SFOR's plan.

Close co-operation has been established between the OSCE Mission, SFOR, NATO Headquarters in Brussels and the OHR in the activities, aimed at reducing and restructuring the armed forces and in developing a common defence and security policy. In 2000, in view of the planned downsizing of SFOR, the OSCE Mission even started to consider the possibility of assuming certain responsibilities and duties from SFOR, such as the professionalisation of entity armed forces. The Mission and SFOR are co-chairs of the Steering Board for the Restructuring of the Entity Armed Forces, and participate in the Standing Committee on Military Matters. The OSCE Mission and SFOR has worked together on the DARE program for computer data exchange. Aerial observation flights in BiH under Article II of Annex 1-B are conducted in collaboration

between the OSCE Mission, the NATO Air Operational Co-ordination Centre and SFOR.<sup>32</sup>

In the progressing recovery of the country CIMIC importance as a vital link between the efforts of civilians and SFOR in areas like infrastructures, humanitarian aid, economy and market, telecommunications and civil engineering, culture and education, administration and public affairs, has grown. Its objective has been to gradually transfer authority to local institutions. The CIMIC is charged with the support for civil projects in a military context. Its working structure is the Combined Joint Civil Military Co-operation Task Force /CJCMTF/, where the OHR, UNHCR, OSCE, World Bank and IFTF are represented. There are also CIMIC representatives and co-ordinating officers at all levels of SFOR.<sup>33</sup>

SFOR has closely supported the civilian implementation of the establishment of joint institutions, promotion of the media reform and ensuring fair elections. Its direct support for the OSCE managed election process covered mine awareness training for election observers, production of maps, assistance in communications and transportation, protection to election supervisors, international observers and core election staff, logistic support. SFOR liaison teams were deployed to the OSCE HQ JOC and to the OSCE regional centres and field offices to ensure connection with SFOR formations in the field and at headquarters. Everyday meetings in the OSCE HQ JOC were held and contacts through the SFOR HQ Election Cell were maintained.<sup>34</sup>

### ***3.3.2. Kosovo: were the lessons learned?***

While the first lessons from the peacekeeping and peace building in BiH had been summed up, another Balkan conflict stirred up the European security agenda. From the end of 1997 the escalating ethnic tensions in Kosovo triggered concerns in the international community about possible repetition of the Bosnian war. As the armed incidents and the violence opened the prospects of an impending humanitarian catastrophe in the province, various options were

considered to mitigate the crisis and prevent its entering into a conflict phase. The UNSC adopted *Resolution 1160 (1998)* on the imposition of an arms embargo against FRY. The OSCE called upon Belgrade to accept the immediate return of the missions of long duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. NATO started to develop full range of options for operations that might become necessary to reinforce or facilitate efforts towards a solution.

The sharpening of the crisis generated *Resolution 1199 (1998)* of the UNSC, demanding immediate end of hostilities and cease-fire in Kosovo, as well as measures to achieve a political solution. On 15 October 1998 the PC declared the OSCE preparedness to embark on verification duties in Kosovo, though still without planned involvement.<sup>35</sup> An agreement between NATO and FRY was signed the same day for the establishment of an air surveillance system under the name of NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo /code-named Operation Eagle Eye/, which should complement the ground verification to be established by the OSCE.<sup>36</sup> On 16 October was signed the agreement between OSCE and FRY for the establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission /KVM/.<sup>37</sup>

The two verification missions, entrusted with crisis management and peacemaking functions, provided the main international presence in Kosovo. They came as more or less tested instruments, drawing upon their own pre- and after-Dayton experience. This was the first time when NATO and the OSCE acted together in the field as major partners with almost completely new tasks. Although the overall planning of their missions went in haste and under enormous pressure on separate tracks in the headquarters in Brussels and Vienna, there had been a much larger degree of harmonisation of the political action, resulting in cohesion of effort. In the preparatory stage /November 1998/ several meetings were held in Brussels and Vienna between the KVM Support Group of the OSCE Secretariat and representatives of NATO HQ and SHAPE to discuss the issues of KVM security, the extraction plan, the verification levels, the logistics and the communications. Letters between the Secretaries General of NATO and the OSCE were exchanged on the future areas of co-ordination,

which formalised and marked unprecedented parameters of the co-operation between the two organisations.

With the formal decision of the OSCE PC from 25 October, the KVM started to quickly deploy on the ground. The process took some two-and-a half months and ended with deployment of 1400 international staff with 400 vehicles and technical equipment, established throughout the province. This was numerically the largest operation ever mounted by the OSCE. By the end of February 1999 KVM managed to fulfil part of its original mandate: to verify the maintenance of cease-fire; follow the movement of FRY forces into, out of and within Kosovo; report on communication blockages, border control activities, local policing and abusive action by military or police personnel; facilitate the return of displaced persons and the delivery of humanitarian assistance; liaison with the FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities to ensure ICRC access to detained persons.<sup>38</sup> This was done in an environment of sporadic KLA attacks on the FRY police and retaliation operations using disproportionate degree of force, resulting in displacement of population and extreme political polarisation.

The close contact between NAC and the US envoy R. Holbrooke, who was negotiating an agreement with Belgrade on cease-fire and end of repression, as well as previous experience from BiH allowed for high situation awareness and timely planning for possible NATO support for UN or OSCE monitoring activities. Preventive deployments in Albania and Macedonia were considered as well. NATO aircraft began verification flights over Kosovo immediately after the agreement of 15 October. In line with the general understanding for NATO support for KVM, in December 1998 the NATO Extraction Force was deployed in Macedonia /operation Joint Guarantor/ to ensure immediate extraction of the KVM verifiers in case of emergency. For the few months of activities, the co-operation between KVM and the NATO Air Verification Mission took various forms: data exchange, based on the same data collection formats to allow further computer processing; verification of FRY compliance with the UNSC Resolutions 1199, including mutual advice between KVM and NATO on the priorities for the ground and air verification; building safe communication lines

between KVM and NATO in Kosovo and in Skopje. At the background of the existing experience, their interaction had found new dimensions in the crisis management in Kosovo.

After the Racak massacre and the declaring of Amb. Walker *persona non grata* by the FRY authorities in mid-January 1999, the deterioration of the security situation eroded KVM's ability to perform its tasks and on 20 March 1999 KVM was withdrawn from Kosovo. Most of its staff was repatriated. The remainder of 329 people continued to operate in Albania and in Skopje, assisting the UNHCR with the Kosovo Albanian refugee crisis. Meanwhile, at the prospect of the futility of international efforts for ensuring compliance of FRY with the October 1998 agreement, NAC decided that NATO SG might authorise air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory. On 24 March NATO started its 77 days air bombing campaign against FRY.

With the signature on 9 June 1999 of the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO/KFOR and FRY, providing withdrawal of Yugoslav/Serbian forces from Kosovo and re-affirming FRY-Serbian commitments to the peace plan presented by President Martti Ahtisaari and Mr. Viktor Chernomyrdin, came the end of the NATO air campaign and the adoption of UNSCR 1244 on 10 June. NATO-OSCE interaction in Kosovo entered the stage of post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building. To a certain extent this was a familiar task for both of them. Their operations were running in parallel in BiH. The peace building effort in Kosovo was in a sense an upgrade of their interaction.

During the air campaign against FRY, the international community was working intensely on its strategy towards the post-war regulation in Kosovo. The main actors, involved in BiH, were planning their future involvement in Kosovo. The series of brainstorming exercises, workshops, seminars and conferences on the lessons learned from BiH pushed the general thinking in one direction - to avoid, as the SRSG for BiH Gen.Klein put it, "the tempo centric" approach, to place the effort in a long-term perspective, to put the international presence under

the consolidated responsibility of the UN, and to rapidly deploy and activate civil implementation presence.

Thus, the *UNSC Resolution 1244* set the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo /UNMIK/ as an unprecedented operation, which incorporated four "pillars" and the activities of three non-UN organisations under the jurisdiction of the UN. UNMIK consists of four components: humanitarian affairs /under UNHCR/<sup>39</sup>, interim civil administration /under UN/, democratisation and institution building /under the OSCE/, and reconstruction and economic development /under the EU/, all presided by the SRSG. International military presence /KFOR/, led by NATO, provides the security environment for carrying out the civilian aspects of the operation. The authority of both civil and military presence comes from the UNSC.

For the OSCE taking over the third pillar was a logical outcome of its specific expertise and its similar involvement in BiH and elsewhere. The planning and the preparations for the new Mission was entrusted to the Task Force for Kosovo, established after the dissolution of KVM on 8 June 1999. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo /OMIK/ was formally established on 1 July 1999 as a distinct component within the overall framework of UNMIK.<sup>40</sup>

Following its mandate, OMIK has concentrated its work on two major areas: democratic governance /including development of civil society, NGOs, political parties and local media; organisation and supervision of elections; human resources capacity-building, training of a new Kosovo police service, judicial personnel and civil administrators at various levels; monitoring/ and promotion of respect for human rights and the rule of law. OMIK has its headquarters in Pristina with 5 Regional Centres and 14 Field Offices. Its activities are organised by the five departments for Police Training and Education, Democratisation, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Media Affairs and Elections. Several months after its establishment, OMIK has reached the number of 2000 international staff, which makes it the largest operating OSCE mission.

Starting with the immediate priority of the "war" aftermath, OMIK has addressed the capacity-building demands of the Kosovo institutions. This has been a task closely linked to OMIK's responsibility for the support and development of Kosovo's civil administration, political parties and civil society. In December 1999 the Mission took the lead of one of the 20 administrative departments created under the Agreement on the Joint Interim Administrative Structure /JIAS/ - namely, the one for democratic governance and civil society.

The Kosovo Police Service School /KPSS/, established by OMIK, has targeted the training of police officers at crime investigation, democratic policing, legal affairs, police patrol duties, firearms training, and traffic control. The Kosovo Judicial Institute, which became fully operational in the end of 2000, has taken responsibility for the training and education of judges and prosecutors. OMIK's programmes have offered training of municipal staff in law, economics, public finance, personnel management and conflict resolution to ensure participation by the people of Kosovo at all levels of the administration. Training for journalists and editors has been provided as well.

However, the highlights of OMIK's engagement to the progress towards self-government in Kosovo were given by the organisation of municipal elections in October 2000 and of Kosovo-wide elections in November 2001. OMIK organised and managed the whole election process including civil and voters' registration, fixing the rules for the election campaign and the registration of candidates. This was the top of the iceberg, since OMIK had created conditions for setting up the groundwork of the party system in the province and the non-political structures such as citizens' groups and local NGOs. Political parties were taught to elaborate platforms, focusing on specific issues, to meet the demands for transparency, and financial and programmatic accountability, to follow electoral codes of conduct and media rules, to hold rallies and manifest moderate political behaviour, etc. Under OMIK guidance a proper media landscape, marked by steady and unbiased flow of information, was ensured for the election campaigns. OMIK prepared media regulations, licensed broadcasters, provided

consulting assistance and technical, logistical and programming support to media outlets, including through the established media fund. In short, the Mission has managed "to de-link the technical from the political in the electoral preparations", keeping high the profile of its expertise.<sup>41</sup>

Within the UNMIK structure OMIK has been the lead agency responsible for monitoring human rights and assisting in building local capacity for undertaking human rights advocacy. OSCE Human Rights presence has been established throughout Kosovo, which has worked closely with a number of other international factors, including KFOR. The human rights officials have been involved in reporting on human rights violations, monitoring the legal system and the responses of the relevant police services and security forces, addressing issues of property rights, assisting in combating the trafficking in persons, developing concrete measures for improving the living and working conditions of ethnic minorities. Their activities have been coupled with OMIK's logistical and material support to the courts, contribution to the revision of legislation, development of democratic institutions in support of the rule of law and the administration of justice.

Certainly, the civilian component of the Kosovo peace operation would not have been able to unfold unless the security conditions allowed for it. KFOR entered Kosovo 3 days after the signature of the Military Technical Agreement. Its planning was done while NATO and the OSCE verification missions were completing their tasks and the diplomatic negotiations at Rambouillet and in Paris were still underway. The finalisation of plans was bound to the terms of possible peace agreement or cease-fire. NATO planning envisaged even a case of putting a force together to fight its way in Kosovo, before the ground campaign was ruled out by the option of an air campaign.<sup>42</sup> So, the deployment of KFOR went along the plans and as quickly as possible to gradually reach the number of 50 000 in the year 2000 /currently downsized to around 41 000/. KFOR was put under a unified command and control, and NATO rules of engagement. In the deployment phase all its tasks went through SHAPE and SACEUR. The

Commander of KFOR was vested with full authority regarding the implementation of the Military Technical Agreement and the activities of KFOR troops.<sup>43</sup>

KFOR responsibilities, as set out by UNSCR 1244, are to prevent the return of the Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces and the resurgence of hostilities, to demilitarise the KLA, to improve the overall security situation, to support and co-operate with UNMIK, and to provide humanitarian aid within its capabilities. By the latest assessments a bulk of them have been so far successfully fulfilled.

KFOR troops have been involved in demining activities and clearing unexploded ordnance in populated areas and basic routes. An important aspect of those activities is the mine awareness campaign in the media and the schools. They conduct everyday patrols, guard key sites and facilities, and operate on numerous checkpoints. After the initial massive return of the Kosovo Albanians in the second half of 1999, KFOR has been heavily engaged in the protection of Serbian and other minority population, whose return has been a vital prerequisite for the development of provisional institutions for democratic self-government of Kosovo.

One of the core functions of KFOR has been related to the confiscation of weapons, ammunition and explosives, and destruction of weapons. They have been involved in the demilitarisation and transformation of KLA, and the building of the Kosovo Protection Corps. As a part of their mandate, KFOR troops control Kosovo internal boundaries and external borders to prevent illicit trafficking in arms and people, and crossings of extremists and insurgents.

KFOR has been involved in a large array of reconstruction and humanitarian projects. Its troops have reconstructed and repaired roads, bridges, school buildings, public facilities and infrastructure. They have provided humanitarian assistance to international organisations and NGOs throughout

Kosovo. Support has been given to UNMIK at all levels of the civil administration. KFOR personnel serve as liaisons with the staff of UNMIK.

KFOR supported the OMIK-led election process in 2000 and 2001. They were part of the efforts to convince non-Albanians to register, present their candidates and vote in the elections.

After BiH, Kosovo has proved to be "the biggest test case" in Europe for the ability of the international actors to interact and co-ordinate efforts fulfilling their respective mandates within a complex operation. Clearly, co-operation has become vital in view of the implementation of any task in the field. Both a challenge and a must for all the organisations involved, it has comprised the planning and the implementation phase of their engagement.

Civil-military co-operation has again become the common denominator of the OSCE /OMIK/ - NATO /KFOR/ interaction. OMIK and KFOR participate in the inter-pillar Joint Planning Committee in Kosovo, which plans and co-ordinates the four pillar activities.

At the headquarters level the KFOR Commander and the Head of OMIK meet and interact on a regular basis through participation in the meetings of the operation's main policy and decision making bodies in the field: the inter-pillar Executive Committee, the Interim Administrative Council /IAC/ and the Kosovo Transitional Council /KTC/. KFOR Commander has an observer status there, since formally KFOR is not incorporated in the UNMIK structure and does not form a separate pillar. This is not, however, to undermine KFOR's active role in the work of those bodies.<sup>44</sup>

Every day working co-operation and exchange of information go through the KFOR liaison office within OMIK, which consists of two officers tasked with providing a close link between the headquarters of the two missions. The OMIK regional centres and field offices regularly interact with KFOR at brigade and battalion level by exchanging information and recommendations.

Co-operation in specific areas has been established as well at expert level. The Bosnian experience in election organisation and observation was studied well in advance, as HQ KFOR team met with HQ SFOR and the OSCE Election Cell in Sarajevo.<sup>45</sup> The Bosnian model of involvement of the NATO-led forces in the OSCE-led election process was closely followed. Like in BiH, KFOR supported OMIK in meeting the security requirements for the municipal and the Kosovo-wide elections in 2000 and 2001. KFOR and the UNMIK Police were represented in the Joint Elections Operation Cell /JEOC/ and its regional and central-level structures, which were chaired by OMIK. They provided daily security force escorts for ethnic community registration during the elections preparations period. Together with the Municipal Election Commissions, OMIK, KFOR and UNMIK Police reviewed the polling sites and identified alternative sites to avoid long queues and facilitate the smooth conduct of the elections. Protection of election supervisors and election staff, assistance in communications and transportation, and logistic support were provided by KFOR. In the post-election period UNMIK, OMIK and KFOR set up help desks at the local level to provide assistance and advise municipalities on transitional issues regarding the implementation of the electoral results.

Minority and refugee return issues have been another area, where OMIK and KFOR have interacted. This interaction was particularly intensive in the first year of their deployment in the framework of the weekly meetings of the Task Force on Minorities and the Joint Committee for Returns. Mutual briefings were given at these meetings on human rights matters and problems of minority communities for KFOR and on security matters for OMIK. In addition, KFOR has been tasked with ensuring the protection and security of the returnees.

OMIK and KFOR have been involved in managing the frequency spectrum in Kosovo, in rebuilding the transmission network and in establishing the frequency plan and its implementation. After the frequency change in November 2000, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between OMIK, KFOR and UNMIK for handing over the management of the broadcast band to OMIK. KFOR and OMIK co-operated in the establishment of a broadcast

frequency plan and the re-establishment of the Kosovo Terrestrial Transmission Network.<sup>46</sup>

#### **4. Conclusions**

In the concept and the practices of peacekeeping the operations in BiH and Kosovo present a sequence not only in time, but also in substance. For the international community, and for NATO and the OSCE in particular, the experience from BiH has cumulated a series of lessons that have served the mandating, the planning and the conduct of the Kosovo operation. BiH has set up a pattern of peacekeeping, which has been modified and improved but not fundamentally reconsidered in Kosovo. The basic parameters of civil-military co-operation, lying at the core of the OSCE-NATO interaction on the ground, have been established in BiH and extended in Kosovo.

Certainly, the international effort in BiH has brought a number of innovations in the theory and practice of peacekeeping but it is the shortfalls that could shape the perception of failure despite the undeniable achievements. When the implementation of GFAP started with a clear division of responsibilities between the Peace Implementation Council /PIC/-OHR and NAC, the absence of formal mechanism to synchronise civil and military aspects had ramifications across all areas of activities. As the UN was unwilling to take the lead in the operation, the involvement of each organisation in BiH has preserved a high degree of autonomy despite the overarching authority of OHR. The structural amorphism of the whole operation affected both the planning phase and the decision- and policy-making process, which have been fragmented by the internal procedures of the various international actors. Some of their implications were overcome in the trials of the field, while others remained. It is indicative in this respect that in the second half of 2001 the principal international organisations operating in BiH agreed to embark on a joint strategic review of their involvement on the ground with a view to streamlining their activities and achieving greater efficiency.

There was a significant delay of the civil deployment in BiH, which started after the military deployment and could not thus fulfil a number of tasks related to the immediate post-war reconstruction. The different pace of assuming responsibilities by the various organisations and agencies had resulted in a “mission extension” from the civilian to the military sector of the operation.<sup>47</sup> Certain duplication of efforts, especially in the beginning, confusion of aims and “turf battles” could not be avoided. The "first time" factor also worked. The inherent need to find *modus operandi* for the civil-military co-operation bred structures that were not always workable. The fact that two of the main organisations engaged - NATO and the OSCE - had been still reconsidering their role and functions in the European security also mattered.

One of the key lessons from BiH has been the huge importance of the mandating process, and the need to put together the civil and the military “tops” by having a unified mission structure and by appointing one individual in charge of the whole operation. This has been done to a certain extent in Kosovo by establishing a single chain of command for civilian implementation and placing all the civilian activities under one single authority – the SRSG who is also a head of UNMIK. Eventually, such a consolidated structure could achieve a more efficient co-ordination and interaction with its military counterpart NATO. In terms of mandating, UNMIK presents an ideal case of co-operation between the UN and regional organisations, between civilian and military components of a peace operation.

Another aspect has been the general division of the planning process between the main actors, each projecting its own capabilities in the field with insufficient co-ordination and awareness of the activities of the others. Events in BiH and partly in Kosovo demonstrated the sheer necessity to plan in parallel the civil and military involvement, and to have a status of readiness for simultaneous and rapid deployment reasonably in advance.

The involvement of many organisations in BiH with separate planning and close competencies has inevitably lead to overlapping. However, the latter

affected mainly the components of the civilian segment of the operation rather than the relationship between the civilian and military element. Duplication occurred mainly in the activities of the OSCE, the UN and its institutions, and OHR-structures in BiH. The very nature of the engagement of NATO and the OSCE in BiH has ruled out competition and overlapping of their activities. The same is valid for their involvement in Kosovo, where they have assumed similar and already tested responsibilities within a slightly different organisational framework.

The uncommon tasks initially taken by the international military component in BiH had been by definition assigned to the civilian component. Nevertheless, the so called “mission creep” of IFOR/SFOR has played a positive role in overcoming detachment and suspicion between the military and civilian element, and has boosted the capabilities of NATO in fulfilling certain civil-military tasks in addition to carrying out its core functions of collective defence. This experience has facilitated the planning and has improved the functional delineation of KFOR in Kosovo as well.

It seems, however, that apart from the inherent complementarity between NATO and the OSCE, there is still a room for improving their co-operation at various organisational levels starting from the political leadership down to the Secretariats' departments in an effort to close the gap between the conceptual and the practical level of their interaction in peacekeeping. NATO's readiness to support UN and OSCE peacekeeping needs to be formalised, possibly through an agreement for co-operation or some other form of engagement.

The interlocking involvement in peace operations would require an institutionalised relationship between NATO and the OSCE not only within CIMIC structures on the ground in BiH and Kosovo but also at the headquarters' level. Since the year 2000 this process has been on track but it should go further towards improving the interface of NATO and OSCE peacekeeping activities. Possible steps could include: establishment on a permanent basis of joint working groups or expert cells to develop relevant strategies for co-operation /incl. the

peace operation's planning phase, the interim assessment of progress and the potential closure of the operation/; elaboration of common criteria for participation in peace operations; joint training on peacekeeping for NATO and OSCE eligible personnel; organisation of seminars and workshops; joint NATO-OSCE peacekeeping exercises; creation of a data-base of the experience in NATO-OSCE interaction, etc.

The current state of play points at the necessity to enhance also the co-operation at the level of field missions. This dimension needs to be further developed on a case-by-case basis and to be closely bound to the co-operation at the headquarters' level.

The experience from BiH and Kosovo demonstrates that the optimum NATO-OSCE interaction in peacekeeping should be regarded in the overall context of the co-operation between the international actors involved in a peace operation. The general flow of thinking is that the UN remains for the time being the organisation with highest credibility when it comes to authorising peace operations, although it does not always have at its disposal the necessary capabilities to carry out such an operation. Therefore, it has resorted to subcontracting some of those operations to other organisations by mandating them with the accomplishment of certain tasks. This seems to be the trend of the foreseeable future, given the limits of the UN to cope alone with the complexity of contemporary peacekeeping.

In order to avoid the risks of a regional organisation becoming a "vehicle of a new hegemony, or that its intervention might make it a party to the conflict rather than a means to its resolution"<sup>48</sup>, the UN should remain the highest authority, especially in cases of peace enforcement and coercive use of force. Thus the capacity and expertise of the regional organisations to maintain peace and security in their respective areas would be made use of and reinforced with the UN profound expertise in peacekeeping.

It is indicative, that UN is seriously considering the possibility to make its expertise available for peace operations, when conducted by regional

organisations as NATO, the OSCE and the EU. The creation of a joint peacekeeping doctrine, compatible with the UN Charter and the international law, and shared by the main international actors in the field of security could provide the conceptual basis for the second generation multidimensional peacekeeping. At any rate, the success of the interplay within a peace operation would depend on the degree of comprehensiveness of the approach towards the specific peacekeeping case, the vision of the perspective and the desired end-state, which would precondition a feasible exit strategy. The recent focus of NATO, the OSCE and other international organisations on the development of a regional approach to Southeast Europe would be a step in this direction.

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<sup>1</sup> Trevor Findley. *The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping*. - In: Challenges for the New Peacekeepers (SIPRI Research Report No. 12), Ed. by Trevor Findley, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.1.

<sup>2</sup> Adam Roberts. *The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping*. - In: Survival, vol.36, no.3, Autumn 1994, p.94-95.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.96; T.Findley, *Op.cit.*, p.2-13.

<sup>4</sup> See Charles Dobbie. *A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping*. - In: Survival, vol.36, no.3, Autumn 1994, p. 121-147.

<sup>5</sup> Adam Roberts. *Op.cit.*, p.97; T.Findley, *Op.cit.*, p.17-18.

<sup>6</sup> B.B. Ghali. *An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*. A/7/277-S/24111, 17 June 1994, para 63-64.

<sup>7</sup> Jerzy M. Nowak. *The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe*. - In: Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, p.128-129.

<sup>8</sup> CSCE Helsinki Document "The Challenges of Change", Helsinki Summit Declaration, par. 25.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., Helsinki Decisions. Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, par. 17.

<sup>10</sup> Seventh Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Oslo, December 1998. *Chairman-in-Office's Progress Report on the Work in 1998 on a Document-Charter on European Security*, p.53. - <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/mcs/7oslo98e.htm>

<sup>11</sup> *Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 1999*, par. 46.

<sup>12</sup> *The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8 November 1991*, para 29, 40-42.

<sup>13</sup> Steven R. Rader. *NATO*. - In: Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, p.152-153.

<sup>14</sup> *Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Session of the Defence Planning Committee, Brussels, 10-11 December 1992*, par.4.

<sup>15</sup> *Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, Brussels, 17 December 1992*, par.4.

<sup>16</sup> *Report to the Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping, Athens, 11 June 1993*.

<sup>17</sup> Lt.Col. Wilkinson. *Sharpening the Weapons for Peace: The Development of a Common Military Doctrine for Peace Support Operations*. - ISIS Briefing Paper No 18, April 1998 - <http://www.isis-europe.org/isiseu/english/no18.html>

<sup>18</sup> *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of NAC, Brussels, 11 January 1994*, para 8-9.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001102a.htm>

<sup>20</sup> See David Lightburn, *Lessons Learned*. - In: NATO Review, vol.49, no.2, Summer 2001, p.12.

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- <sup>21</sup> *Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events*. - In: *Lessons from Bosnia: the IFOR Experience*. Ed. Larry Wentz. <http://www.dodccrp.org/bosappb.htm>.
- <sup>22</sup> *General Framework Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Annex 1 A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement.
- <sup>23</sup> For more details see Larry K. Wentz. *Bosnia - Setting the Stage*. - In: *Lessons from Bosnia*, <http://www.dodccrp.org/bosch02.htm>.
- <sup>24</sup> Espen B. Eide. *Peacekeeping Past and Present*. - In: *NATO Review*, Summer 2001, p. 7.
- <sup>25</sup> James J. Landon. *CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation*. - In: *Lessons from Bosnia*, <http://www.dodccrp.org/bosch5.htm>.
- <sup>26</sup> Larry K. Wentz. *Bosnia - Setting the Stage*. - In: *Lessons from Bosnia*, <http://www.dodccrp.org/bosch02.htm>; IFOR bulletins 1996.
- <sup>27</sup> James J. Landon. *CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation*. - In: *Lessons from Bosnia*, <http://www.dodccrp.org/bosch5.htm>.
- <sup>28</sup> Larry K. Wentz. *Bosnia - Setting the Stage*. - In: *Lessons from Bosnia*, <http://www.dodccrp.org/bosch02.htm>.
- <sup>29</sup> <http://www.oscebih.org/missionoverview/overview.htm>
- <sup>30</sup> *Annual Report 1998 on OSCE Activities /1 December 1997 - 30 November 1998/*
- <sup>31</sup> *Annual Report 2000 on OSCE Activities /1 November 1999 - 31 October 2000/; Annual Report 2001 on OSCE Activities /1 November 2000 - 31 October 2001/*
- <sup>32</sup> *Annual Report 2000 on Interaction Between Organizations and Institutions in the OSCE Area /1 November 1999 - 31 October 2000/; Annual Report 2001 on Interaction Between Organizations and Institutions in the OSCE Area /1 November 2000 - 31 October 2001/*
- <sup>33</sup> Sgt. Gilles Bergner. *A Presentation of CIMIC*. - In: SFOR Informer N 31, March 11, 1998
- <sup>34</sup> Maj. Juan A. Pina. *The SFOR HQ Election Cell*. - In: SFOR Informer N 5, April 12, 2000; Maj. Juan A. Pina. *OSCE HQ JOCL*. - In: SFOR Informer N 5, April 12, 2000; Capt. Luis Barber. *OSCE Support to Elections in BiH*. - In: SFOR Informer N 101, November 22, 2000.
- <sup>35</sup> *Permanent Council Decision N 259, 15 October 1998*. PC.DEC/259; UNSC, S/1998/959, Annex.
- <sup>36</sup> *Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement between NATO and FRY*, UNSC, S/1998/991, Annex.
- <sup>37</sup> *Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission*. <http://www.osce.org/news/agreekos.htm>
- <sup>38</sup> *Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities /1 December 1998 - 31 October 1999/; Contribution by Amb. William Walker to the Seminar "Co-operation among International Organisations and Institutions: Experience and Prospects in South Eastern Europe" /Sofia, May 17-19, 1999/.*
- <sup>39</sup> Until July 2000, UNHCR constituted the first pillar of UNMIK, but as the period of emergency assistance was considered to have come to an end, this pillar no longer exists.
- <sup>40</sup> *Permanent Council Decision N 305, 1 July 1999*. PC.DEC/305.
- <sup>41</sup> Daan Everts. *Review of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo's Activities 1999 - 2001*. - <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/overview>; *Annual Report 2000 on OSCE Activities /1 November 1999 - 31 October 2000/; Annual Report 2001 on OSCE Activities /1 November 2000 - 31 October 2001/.*
- <sup>42</sup> *Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis*. Chapter 8. Ground Operations - Conduct and Lessons. - <http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/lessons/chapter8.htm>
- <sup>43</sup> *Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force /KFOR/ and the Government of FRY and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999.*
- <sup>44</sup> *Annual Report 2000 on Interaction Between Organisations and Institutions in the OSCE Area /1 November 1999 - 31 October 2000/; Annual Report 2001 on Interaction Between Organisations and Institutions in the OSCE Area /1 November 2000 - 31 October 2001/.*
- <sup>45</sup> Capt. Luis Barber. *SFOR-KFOR Supporting Elections*. - In: SFOR Informer N 94, August 16, 2000.
- <sup>46</sup> *Annual Report 2001 on Interaction Between Organisations and Institutions in the OSCE Area /1 November 2000 - 31 October 2001/.*
- <sup>47</sup> Larry K. Wentz. *Bosnia - Setting the Stage*. - In: *Lessons from Bosnia*, <http://www.dodccrp.org/bosch02.htm>.
- <sup>48</sup> This concern amongst others was voiced by Shashi Tharoor in his article *United Nations Peacekeeping in Europe*. - In: *Survival*, vol.37, no.2, Summer 1995, p. 128.

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