

Strategic Interactions Between NATO, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and
Romania After 2000

A Report to the NATO Academic Forum
for 1998-2000

By

Laure Paquette, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Lakehead University
Thunder Bay, Ontario
Canada

30 June 2000

Executive Summary.....	3
Chapter 1. Introduction.....	5
Chapter 2. Analysis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.....	37
Chapter 3. The New Member: Poland.....	50
Chapter 4. The New Member: the Czech Republic.....	66
Chapter 5. The Aspiring Member: Romania.....	82
Chapter 6. Bulgaria.....	97

Executive Summary

NATO is newly aware of its increased status as a force for stability in a drastically altered Atlantic community. The number of its initiatives is on the increase just as a new political, economic and military Europe emerges. The Cold War's end has wrought as many changes as there are continuities in the security environment. Eastern and central European states, especially NATO and PfP members, enjoy an increasing importance to NATO, both as trading partners and as new participants in the civil society. While the literature on relations between NATO and the East Europeans is rather limited, the study of the overall posture of those states in the international system is almost non-existent, so that the consequences of their posture for NATO's renewed concept are unknown. The study of these countries' security posture and strategic interactions with Central European states in general promotes the renewed role of NATO. The study shows that the each of long-term relations with Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria is subordinated to the goal of entering the European Union, and that their different values will makes relations difficult. This will test NATO's new strategic concept to the limit. It also shows the importance of strategic thinking.

Chapter 1. Introduction

In March 1997, NATO invited to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to start negotiating membership. Their accession was the fourth time NATO has added new members since 1949: Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. Nine signatories to Partnership for Peace (PfP) have declared their intention to apply for membership: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

NATO does not have a profound understanding of these new partners, given the break in relations during the Cold War and the chaotic transitions towards democracy and the market economy today. NATO is newly aware of being a force for stability in a drastically altered Atlantic community. A new political, economic, diplomatic and military Europe is emerging, and this new Europe has as many changes as it has continuities. The economic importance of central Europe increases along with its increasing security problems. No rivalry, border dispute or ethnic conflict is likely to disappear soon: Europe will be tied to that powder kept for the foreseeable future. The inevitable changes to central European defence posture will be of great interest, even if a number of more important nations are casual about their concerns. A study of these countries' security posture in the medium and the long-term is an ideal vehicle for improving understanding of the new Europe.

This research report examines the national strategies of four central European states, and examine the broad interactions of each country with NATO and with each other. This is the environment in which NATO's initiatives have encountered the limitations of slow, painful transitions to democracy and the market economy.

I Objectives

This analysis proposes to enhance NATO's knowledge about and development of policies in Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria by investigating the new directions in national strategy. The analysis for this study uses the content of political culture of each state as an independent variable in explaining its choice of security posture. The working hypothesis is that states must make changes in defence policy, and perhaps even change overall posture, as a result of changing post-Cold War circumstances. If this is correct, then (1) the process is relatively lengthy; (2) it is propelled by domestic social malaise; and (3) it will be manifest not only in defence policy (although these changes are the earliest and the most easily observed).

The framework allows for explanations or predictions about national strategy on the basis of certain permanent social characteristics. It was developed for the purpose of determining the overall posture of a state in conditions of high uncertainty. For the purposes of this analysis, national values are defined as the accepted standards of historical or ideological origin as well as the national heritage cherished by the population as a whole. National strategy is defined as the comprehensive direction of all the elements of national power to attain national objectives, and to support and pursue the general goals provided by a nation's leaders.

The bulk of this report is therefore taken up by the determination of those two variables of the empirical hypothesis, national values and national strategy. The theory of causal relationship between the two variables has been explored in detail elsewhere, and is given here only in summary fashion.¹

Once the *type* of strategy is established, however, it becomes possible to identify the actual strategy various countries are using, and, of most interest to the policy- and decision-makers, to understand and make

predictions about its tactics. It is particularly useful in the case of strategic choices made by ethno federal states such as the former Czechoslovakia in multiple political arenas with shifting balance of power between sister republics.²

II Current Literature

The literature germane to this project can be divided into four categories: (1) articles about NATO; (2) articles about smaller NATO members (Greece, Turkey, Italy, Spain, Portugal, etc.); (3) articles about Central European new members (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary); and (4) second-tier applicants for NATO membership (Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Slovakia, etc.).

Since 1997, articles about NATO usually argue for or against enlargement. Detractors argue that the conceptual and operational underpinnings of enlargement are not properly developed yet³ or that NATO is unlikely to survive such massive political changes.⁴ Proponents include Richard Staar, David Calleo, David Haglund, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Art.⁵ Among countries hoping to become members, enlargement does not enjoy unanimous support: the rift between decision-making elites and the newly democratized peoples in Poland and the Czech Republic is both genuine and deep.⁶ US control of European foreign policy led to an eastern expansion rather than a negotiated reorientation of the Alliance goals which would favour the integration of European defence policy.⁷ Eastern expansion may move the Alliance toward genuine cooperative security,⁸ but detractors fear NATO may become more of an empire.⁹

The literature about central Europe is dominated by economic issues, not military ones. To most countries, EU membership is the real goal, with NATO membership a stepping stone, an argument detractors invoke.¹⁰ Central and

East European literature also includes articles about NATO-EU relations,¹¹ although the bulk of it analyses the Alliance's record at the fifty-year mark.¹²

The literature about the smaller member states is sparse, unless they were involved in a conflict, as were Turkey and Greece. The literature treats most peaceful NATO members like it does Portugal: articles periodically review the armed forces; defence papers are discussed when they come out, as are relations with the US; there are also articles on participation in peacekeeping.¹³ The literature on Italy and Spain is similar.¹⁴ Greece and Turkey, which have been at war, had their military analyzed.¹⁵ The bulk of the articles reexamine the situation on Cyprus.¹⁶

Because Poland started its reforms ten years before the rest of central Europe, it makes up the bulk of the more substantive literature about new NATO members. Most of the articles on Poland discuss the importance of security in foreign policy, and the importance of democratic civilian control to accession talks.¹⁷ These studies of Poland remain the only yardstick available for progress and prospects for second-tier applicants. Little enough is written about the second-tier applicants to NATO, unless they have been involved in some important event with a greater power. That is the case with Ukraine, which negotiated at length with Russia about nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet.¹⁸ Beyond the odd review article about US relations,¹⁹ there is a paucity of sources regarding Bulgaria,²⁰ Romania, Slovakia,²¹ Hungary and the Czech Republic.²²

Outside any of the above categories are heavily ideological articles decrying US involvement in Southern Europe.²³

III The Causal Relationship

The process of strategic decision-making underlying the relationship between culture and strategy owes a large debt to the work of Maoz, Snyder and Diesing, as the comparison of Figure 1 (an overview of the process) to Figures 2 and 3 shows quite clearly. The logic that gives rise to the whole process hinges on the interaction between not only national strategy and national values, but also their components.

Figure 1 Strategic Decision-Making





Figure 2 Interactions of National Values and National Strategy



Step 1 Treatment of Information -- Mechanism 1, Cognition

One of the most challenging tasks decision-makers face is the treatment of information. The state or government apparatus supports that treatment.

A. Information Gathering

Although it is true that the situation of states is increasingly complex, government bureaucracies play a part in overwhelming decision-makers with information. They gather more information than the decision-makers can realistically absorb, and by doing so contribute to misperceptions about crises. Moreover, a government bureaucracy is not always in a position to judge the validity, the accuracy or the significance of that information; or it might be biased in its reporting. The state perceives itself and its environment through a mechanism called cognition (Figure 3).

Figure 3 Cognition: Interaction Between Values and Strategy



treatment/information

heritage

↑

contributes

objectives

States gather raw information, i.e. information untouched and unadulterated by any processing. At this point, national values already come into play, but only to the extent that they shape how a state perceives itself and its environment. The state analyses the information using the standards that are, as already mentioned, a component of national values. This information can be of two types: either it is endogenous, i.e. the result of a state's internal operations, or it is exogenous, i.e. gleaned from the outside world. Endogenous information includes expectations formulated in previous rounds of decision-making, results of previous strategies or tactics, and conclusions drawn earlier on.²⁴ Exogenous information includes perceptions of outside threats or opportunities, actions of other states and actions of non-state actors in the international system.

B. Perceptions

Generally speaking, the perceptions of human beings are socially constructed.²⁵ That is even more true of collectively built perceptions, like a bureaucracy's. State perceptions are formed through the government's quick, acute and intuitive awareness of its environment, but understanding that information is not instant. Like a radio picking up soundwaves within its range, it may simply be passed along without any analysis.

Perceptions, like the state itself, are limited. Since the state can only pick up certain types of information, its perceptions are limited in

depth. States will pick up information on military activity or economic activity, but there are certain changes in its situation to which it may not be sensitive.²⁶ The limitation of a state's depth of perception is inevitable, and only becomes clear when some previously unperceived phenomenon becomes important.

A state's perceptions are also limited in terms of range. Every state operates within certain practical limits, because of limited time, money, or other resources. A state's gathering of information is just as limited as any other activity. Within those limits, however, the state is free. Its choices will reflect the priority that information gathering *in toto* has, but also the areas in which information is required. Those areas reflect what the state prizes just as much. For modern states and modern decision-makers, choices about range of information are difficult: there is increasing pressure on a state's resources because the state is being forced to deal with more and more complicated situations.

This is the first time that national standards come directly into action. Here the state uses cognitive standards to judge whether any particular bit of information is accurate, relevant or urgent. As available information proliferates and decisions complicate, cognitive standards become more and more important. ". . . [F]acts do not speak for themselves but are assessed through projections . . . two nations with very different backgrounds make highly diverse projections (that is, use quite different lenses)."²⁷

If national values shape the perceptions the state has, they also shape the institutions the state creates to reach goals and carry out its decisions. As the embodiment of cherished national values, those institutions are held in high regard. Therefore, those institutions are considered assets to be

promoted and protected. Since a state can focus its search for information, it can focus its attention on institutions, to detect threats against them and find opportunities to promote them. In that sense, national values also focus the state's attention on surveillance.²⁸ Surveillance can be affected by a variety of factors, but the most important limitation on its effectiveness is the scarcity of decision-makers' attention.²⁹ Given the pressure on them, it is always possible that they will miss a signal at some critical time. This obvious limitation, well beyond state control, raises the level of uncertainty considerably.

C. Information Processing

Processing starts as soon as information is available. The most important task is to identify threats to the state. The breadth of this task depends on how much information is needed. How much information is needed is determined by how powerful the state is in the international system. States are at the apex of power in the international system because and states are at the apex of power in the international system because they also have to ensure their own survival or be seen by its population to be doing so.³⁰ The quality and quantity of information required is proportional to that responsibility.

To be of use, the information has to be analysed. Some information is bound to be more important or more accurate than the rest, but to know that, the state has to organize it into digestible bits that are easily manipulated.

Once it is broken down, information can be compared with the state's expectations about its opponent's behaviour, the various scenarios for the future of the international system, or the responses from non-state actors to its operations.³¹ Once that information has been put through the mill, it becomes possible to draw conclusions.

The treatment of information might lead the state to make a decision, but it might not. If the state does make a decision, it might be a decision of tactical, not strategic, importance. If the national strategy is not changed, the information is not necessarily discarded. It can be stored and used at some later date. If the state does take some action, then it sets tangible objectives.

Step 2 Diagnosis -- Mechanism 2, Appreciation

This is what Maoz, Snyder and Diesing call "problem identification."³² This text uses diagnosis over problem identification because the definition of strategy specifically avoided making conflict the defining characteristic.

As experts in decision-making know, the framing of the question often determines the answer.³³ There are different kinds of threats and opportunities, just like there are different kinds of action. A threat is *strategic* when it puts the continued existence of the country or its values into doubt.³⁴ An opportunity is strategic when there is a chance to promote national values. The mechanism of appreciation shows how those threats and opportunities are assessed by a state. Appreciation has two parts - preferences and tastes. Appreciation works negatively if the process of decision-making respects a state's preferences and tastes, nothing happens. If it does not, then the state may find it difficult to implement the decision.

A. Preference

Students of decision-making often remark on leaders letting their predilections guide their decisions: preference is an analytical tool that expresses some of the non-rational components in the process. A preference is a state's inclination or bias when it comes to a particular decision in a

particular area. By making repeated observations of state decisions, it is possible for an analyst to identify the set of priorities from which the decision-makers are working. If those priorities are not respected, then the state may experience some sort of dissonance or disequilibrium. If it does, then "it will tend to change some aspects of its behaviour until this disequilibrium is reduced. When the inner disequilibrium is fully enough reduced,"³⁵ the decision-makers can move on. In the most extreme cases, implementation of an offending strategy can be prevented. Older states with documented decision-making histories eventually come to be known as having these recurring preferences. At some point, preferences become part of the state's heritage, and then they are called taste.


Preferences are shaped by national appreciative standards. The actual *production* of preferences is similar to the *application* of cognitive standards in the treatment of information. The endogenous information gathered in Step 1 also included information on preferences. Because there is so much information available, and because that information varies a good deal in terms of accuracy, it needs to be culled, or the state would waste precious time and energy analysing everything. The information had to be organized first, then broken down into digestible bits and analysed. At some point in the analysis, it becomes clear that the information is triggering reactions from the state as a whole, like organizational memories, collective fears or collective inclinations. Decision-makers, who feel the hegemony of national values as keenly as anybody else, share these collective reactions. The information produced by the reactions is processed along with other types of endogenous information. It is eventually compared with expectations of the state about its own reactions, and uses it to draw conclusions.³⁶ The state

decides whether this information confirms its existing priorities and whether to store the information, change the set of priorities, or take action.

B. Taste

When analysts conclude that leaders choose options consonant with their own values more often than not, those scholars are making indirect reference to tastes.³⁷ Taste is a disposition, rooted in the political culture of a state, that expresses itself as an intense propensity. Taste makes a subtle but significant difference in decision-making: it works to exclude from the agenda those options which offend a society *before* the better-known, more rational operations take place. Because it appears to be permanent, non-rational characteristic of a state, it is tempting to put taste in the same category as national character, or national style;³⁸ indeed the three phenomena are often confused in the literature. This is the point where the risk of stereotyping some cultures, present in any study of national values, is at its greatest. A national stereotype is a perception of a particular state by others; national values, standards or tastes, can only be inferred about a state from historical observation. Taste can even influence the entire political culture, if it is prominent enough, e.g. the French taste for symbolism.³⁹ Once it is in place, taste can eventually become an unreflective response. Appreciation as a whole is the basis for a state's strategic approach. (See Figure 4).

Figure 4 Appreciation: Interactions Between Values and Strategy
appreciation



taste

heritage

↑

contributes

approach

Step 3 Search for Options -- Mechanism 3, Evaluation, Part I

Now, the state has to set its objectives, so that it can consider various courses of actions that will reach them. Generally, objectives reflect the desires of the population if there are no immediate or intense threats to the state, a state's first aim being the protection of the national heritage. If it is not in jeopardy, the shorter-term objectives vary according to values and desires. Although objectives are not directly affected by national standards, various options developed to meet them are.

National standards are pivotal in the early rejection of unorthodox or "impossible" options: these options are judged to be either too different from the state's usual behaviour, or too unlikely to be successful. These sub-decisions in the process of considering options are made on the basis of appreciative standards. They are discounted so early that they never figure on the leaders' agenda, the winnowing being important because a state can only consider so many options at a time. The early selection of options may be unreflective or rigid, and it might eliminate from consideration some valid strategies.⁴⁰

The next sub-decision a state faces is whether or not it will use a strategy, as opposed to a plan, a policy, a program or just "muddling through."⁴¹ Strategic action has some very real advantages (flexibility, adaptability), but it requires a considerable investment of decision-makers' time and money. The decision about *not* using strategy can be unconscious or

inadvertent: a state may have varying degrees of skill in decision-making. But no matter what happens, it is always in the state's best interest to consider a broad range of options.

After a narrow first selection, decision-makers search far and wide for strategic options.⁴² Sources for these options include: the logical possibilities present in the actual situation;⁴³ successful past strategies;⁴⁴ individual ingenuity in office and biases or preconceived notions officials advocate or endorse.⁴⁵ The search for options occurs regardless of whether the process of decision-making is orderly (not all states use processes of decision-making that are clearly identified or determined). Even if a state is more of a firefighter than a strategist, unstated, unconscious or unadmitted national values can be at work.

Step 4 Estimation of Expected Outcomes -- Mechanism 3, Evaluation, Part II

When decisions are made in the present, they usually rely on some projections about the future. Those projections are based in part on imperfect information and analysis. Projections perforce reflect some guesswork and some biases introduced by the decision-makers's most basic assumptions about the world, including national values. National values come into play in two specific ways: (1) in judging which outcomes are acceptable at all; and (2) in judging which outcomes are the more desirable. Accepting outcomes is based on experience, while desiring outcomes is based on learning.

A. Experience

National standards develop early in the state's history and slowly evolve: they are the basis on which a state can analyze its experiences and build on its learning. Experience is the skill, wisdom, practice or knowledge

gained through direct observation or participation in events, particular activity or in affairs generally. The state uses experience to draw conclusions from previous decisions that are incorporated into the decision-making process.⁴⁶

Experience plays more or less the same role in evaluation as perceptions do in cognition. The difference is that experience uses information endogenous to the state, i.e. produced by the state's activities, rather than raw information, gleaned from the outside world. Endogenous information does not become available regularly: when it does, it is analysed. As it is being culled, only the information judged relevant is retained. Since there is more information than the state can handle, the uncertainty comes not just from lack of the right information, but from the lack of understanding properly what that information means. The information has to be organized into digestible bits and analysed for patterns and relationships. It can then be compared to the expectations formulated earlier.⁴⁷ Conclusions are drawn from the comparison: either they confirm the existing set of priorities implicit in national values, or they do not. The state then either stores the information, modifies its own grid or takes the decision to move to the next step.

B. Learning

Learning is a modification of a behavioural tendency by experience.⁴⁸ The phenomenon of learning has been observed in the international system: "National leaders who fail to adjust policies to changing circumstances will eventually be faced with ineffective policies and, perhaps, loss of personal authority and power."⁴⁹ But there are also obstacles to learning. Breslauer and Tetlock have identified a number of them, including a complex and

constantly changing international environment, the limitations of human beings as processors of information.⁵⁰ Philip Tetlock goes on to identify more general problems in dealing with state learning:


1. observers may confuse learning with adaptation, competition, or the random ebb and flow of events;
2. observers may falsely conclude that learning occurred because they underestimated what policy makers knew in the first place;
3. observers may allow their own political biases to colour their judgments.⁵¹

There are several distinct theories about state learning. Cognitive theorists suggest that learning entails increased differentiation and integration of mental structures (schemata). Political scientists usually adopt this approach, although they make a distinction between what states come to know and what they come to believe.⁵² The theory proposed here suggests that learning contributes endogenous information to the decision-making process. This information is internally consistent only to the extent that the state's population is itself consistent. It contributes to the creation of taste in the same way that processing information contributed to learning, i.e. incrementally. Learning also builds reflex responses. The conclusions drawn from various individual experiences accumulate. Some similarity of circumstances in the current situation triggers a link with the past. Conclusions drawn then are retrieved, as endogenous information. The relevance of the experience is determined, and that information is included in the ongoing decision-making process. State behaviour may be changed by learning or it may not. If it is, then learning is obvious; but that is not always the case. Previous conclusions may or may not be confirmed: either way that information could be retained.

Step 5 Assessment of Strategic Options

At this stage, the state looks at each option's material and nonmaterial costs and benefits.⁵³ There is no agreement in the literature about the number of options a state can seriously consider, but they do agree they are limited.⁵⁴

Figure 5 Evaluation: Interaction Between Values and Strategy



Step 6 Choice of Strategy

There have been sub-decisions to be made all through this process. Now the state must decide to either adopt a new strategy or revise the old one. The choice depends on the challenge facing the state.⁵⁵ There are a number of possibilities: (1) situations that are intolerable; (2) situations that deteriorate or become intolerable over the years; (3) long-standing intolerable situations that can finally be improved; or (4) " . . . a massive input of new information [that] breaks through the barrier of the image and makes a decision maker realize that his diagnosis and expectations were somehow radically wrong and must be corrected."⁵⁶ If the state opts for revisions, it will be through trial and error.⁵⁷ If it opts for a new strategy, it moves to the next step.

Step 7 Choice of Tactics

When decision-makers opt for strategy, their needs for information

become much more specific (they are not necessarily met). Options about tactics are limited only by a state's resources. Once selected, the state coordinates them, allocates resources, plans for their implementation and absorbs feedback.

Step 8 Implementation of Strategy⁵⁸

Implementation is itself a process at least as complex as decision-making. Although it certainly deserves detailed study, it is beyond the scope of the present book.

Step 9 Confirmation, Change or Adjustment of Tactics

Information gathered and analyzed at this stage feeds back to Step 3, Search for Options. The state only re-evaluates its position once it receives feedback. Both reevaluation and change require resources, which are always committed. There may also be some bureaucratic resistance to adjustments.

Step 10 Confirmation, Change or Adjustment of Strategy

This last step feeds back to Step 6, Choice of Strategy. As the state digests the latest information, it either confirms, adjusts, or abandons the whole strategy. If it abandons the strategy, then the state starts the decision-making process all over again. It is possible that it will reach the same conclusion over again: states have been known to repeat unsuccessful strategies as much as successful ones.⁵⁹

IV. The Method

The process of analysis can be broken into four steps. The first step involves the identification of a sea-change in national policies, usually a reliable indication of the last time a new strategy was introduced. Such

major shifts in direction are often accompanied by major social upheavals. Russia's, for instance, was easy to identify following the disintegration of the former USSR. Step 2 involves the identification of the new tactics introduced with the new grand strategy. These tactics are the most obvious manifestations of a new strategy. By tactics I refer to the means at a state's (or any actor in the political sphere's) disposal. This stage of the analysis looks for changes in the economic, military, diplomatic, and political spheres, and they also usually provide the material for identifying the values. Values are a key factor in determining the long-term compatibility of strategies, since my own previous research shows that they underpin the entire grand strategy. The identification of values also helps narrow the range of possibilities that must be considered.

For the purposes of this analysis, national values are defined as the accepted standards of historical or ideological origin as well as the national heritage cherished by the population as a whole. This analysis is best served by a classification adapted from Talcott Parsons' classification of social values: (1) self-orientation versus collectivity-orientation; and (2) materialism versus non-materialism.⁶⁰ The third step examines the declaratory policy or political rhetoric (official documents, speech, debates in the legislatures, etc.) in order to identify the goals of the national strategy.

A. Identifying Strategy

National strategy is defined as the comprehensive direction of all the elements of national power to attain national objectives, and to support and pursue the general goals provided by a nation's leaders. It can be identified by answering three questions.

(1) Is a Particular State Using Strategy? The trick here is to tell a

strategy apart from a plan, policy or program. Plans, policies and programs organize means to an end as much as a strategy does. But strategy is both an idea and an action, while plans, policies and programs are not. A state using strategy is much likelier to use slogans or strong images. A state using plans, policies and programs does not rely on slogans or strong images.

(2) Is the State Using a National Strategy? A strategy is national when it uses a broad spectrum of the means available to the state, and tries to achieve objectives important to the whole rather than to parts.⁶¹ In other words, the strategy must cut across several areas of state behaviour: economic, political, cultural, military, etc.

(3) What Strategy is the State Using? It is not easy to pick out the exact strategy a state is using from so many possibilities. The best way to proceed is to start by reducing the number of possibilities one has to consider, i.e. by identifying the type of strategy.

B. Identifying the Type of Strategy

André Beaufre's categories of strategy classify them according to their nature: direct strategy of action, direct strategy of persuasion, indirect strategy of action, indirect strategy of persuasion. The difference between strategy of action and strategy of persuasion is straightforward: the first involves physical engagement of the state's material resources, while the second involves threats, discourse, posturing -- all means and actions that require non-material resources. The difference between a direct strategy and an indirect one is not quite so obvious: a direct strategy is one that changes the opponent's direction or momentum itself; an indirect strategy changes the opponent's direction using an intermediary. Once the type of strategy is identified, then only those possibilities need be considered. The

next step is to identify the components of strategy, each by its own preferred source of information:

(1) goal, by analysis of official statements;⁶² (2) means or tactics, by direct observation; (3) style, by secondary analysis; and (4) core idea, by analysis of official statements, although this is not always possible.⁶³

The fourth step identifies the strategy itself, the identification of values having provided us with the type of strategy possible. It is possible that the strategy is made explicit in the declaratory policy of a state, but if not the strategy can be identified by its characteristics. Typically, a national strategy encompasses a number of spheres. It is also true that the best strategies are not made public or even explicit in sources available to the scholar. Also, some states like Canada or South Korea in the 1990s, have no particular strategy. They simply drift, rely on incremental policy- or decision-making, or crisis management.

C. Compatibility of States

A study is now necessary to develop the understanding of the small states and PFP countries's defence posture. The analytical framework used for this project is one that uses a general theory of strategy. A general theory of strategy allows scholars to explain or predict national strategies based on certain stable social characteristics. At this time, there is only one general theory of strategy, Jean-Paul Charnay's. Unfortunately, this theory is so abstract that it is difficult to use for the purposes of strategic analysis; in any event, it has been published only in French. I developed a methodology for strategic theory-building in my previous work, and used it to develop one pillar of a new general theory of strategy: the interactions between national values and national strategy. That particular section of the

theory has been tested against eight case studies (France, Russia, mainland China, Canada, the ROC, the ROK, the DPRK, the US). Among the possible applications for the theory are: the prediction of national strategies, the explanation of national strategies, understanding strategic decision-making, allowing decision-makers to tailor strategies to national values or interests. The small states and PFP Countries have necessarily redefined its place in the post-Cold War world. National values can be identified through the method developed in earlier work, using sociological data, while national strategy can be identified using content analysis of interviews.

Students of International Relations are usually reluctant to work with the idea of values, because they find them too subjective. National values can be determined by inferring from history, analysing attitudes, behaviour, or ideology, using psychological insights, studying institutional and ideological norms, analysing economic and social conditions or through content analysis of rituals, literature and films, linguistic analysis or analysis of cultural thought-systems. Historical analysis is the method of choice because it deflects traditional objections about political culture's subjectivity. Historical analysis identifies "patterns of action"⁶⁴ in state behaviour by inferring from historical events, in this case from series of decisions made by states in a particular area over time. The sounder the strategy and the more established the values, the more effective historical analysis is likely to be.

National strategy is identified by gathering evidence to answer three questions: (1) Is a particular state using strategy? Plans, policies and programs organize means to an end as much as a strategy does. But strategy is both an idea and an action, while plans, policies and programs are not. Also,

a state using strategy is much likelier to use slogans or strong images: plans, policies and programs do not. (2) Is the state using a national strategy? A strategy is national when it uses a broad spectrum of the means available to the state, and tries to achieve objectives important to the whole rather than to parts. In other words, the strategy must cut across several areas of state behaviour: economic, political, cultural, military, etc. (3)What strategy is the state using? Here, one identifies first the type, then the components of strategy being used.

In the case of Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic, research includes both documentary sources and interviews with opinion leaders and policy-makers. It will be conducted using (a) official sources: research bureaus within the ministries of defence, of foreign affairs, of national defence colleges and any government research institutes; (b) political sources: partisan thinkers or researchers, political parties' policy wing; and (c) academic sources. Because of the framework of analysis is original, it is not possible to rely exclusively on documentary sources. The organization, selection and inclusion of information in documents reflect prevailing patterns of thought, which may or may not include information crucial to this investigation. Direct sources are therefore essential. The principal investigator is experienced in the use and assessment of these direct sources.

D. Compatibility of National Strategies

With the end of the Cold War, the prospects for improved relations between the small states and PfP countries and NATO were good. This study proposes to examine the international posture of each state, or national strategy, as a function of their long-term social characteristics, or national

values, to see whether these postures are compatible, and therefore a support to future reunification, or incompatible, and therefore a drag on that prospect.

This project examines the strategic interactions between various larger NATO countries and small states and the PfP countries. It provides a number of significant insights into the stabilization of middle Europe. The study of strategic interaction focuses on the analysis, at both the global and the component level, of the national strategies of various countries. Two national strategies can interact in a number of ways: they can be neutral, identical, synergistic, cooperative, complementary, competitive or antithetical. Table 1 (Possibilities of Strategic Interactions) discusses each of these possibilities in which detail, which can occur in varying degrees of intensity.

Compatibility exists when the two strategies are either identical, neutral or cooperative, complementary or synergistic at the global and the component level. Some components' interactions are more important than others, just as compatibility of certain components is essential to the compatible interactions of strategies. Some components' interactions are more important than others, just as compatibility of certain components is essential to the compatible interactions of strategies. For instance, if the style not compatible, it is harder for strategies to be synergistic because it is harder to communicate with each other. Misunderstandings can spring up more easily, but still it is possible to work since addressing different populations. If the values are incompatible, however, then relations are quite likely to have conflict. It will also be more difficult to mobilize the population, in the case of liberal democracies at least, to accomplish the

strategy. For any proposals for reunification to be successful, therefore, the national strategies must at least be neutral and preferably mutually reinforcing. So far, the proposals for reunification have not been either.

Any of the components of strategy (goals, tactics, styles, core ideas) can interact, and any of these interactions can range among the possibilities outlined above. It is easy to envisage complementary interactions if one country's goals are direct, and the other indirect, if tactics are material on one side and non-material on the other, and so on. For other components, like the core idea, the components are so central or so basic to the nature of the strategy that any significant positive interaction necessitates the strategies being mutually known and mutually understood. Problems arise when this is not the case.

The type of interaction may change if the strategy of one state changes.

The type of interaction may also change if any of the components of the strategy change. Certain components change less frequently than others: values do not change frequently, but tactics can and do. The duration of various types of interactions, therefore, depends on the durability of the strategic components. At times the documentation is sketchy or the evidence contradictory, and the conclusions are more tentative.

Table 1: Possibilities for Strategic Interaction

possibility	description	example
neutrality	strategies do not affect each other	two countries completely isolated from each other
identity	2 strategies are identical	bloc or alliance strategy
synergy	when one national strategy reinforces the other	Franco-German proposal for joint brigade as nucleus for new EC armed forces

cooperation	deliberate, conscious common strategy addressing mutual concern	Canada-US joint surveillance of Far North
complementarity	2 strategies address different concerns but in harmony with each other	Japan and US position on North Korea nuclear issue
competition	two national strategies in a contest when combined success is impossible	PRC and ROC's policies of membership in UN
antithesis	two strategies in conflict	US and ex-USSR during early Cold War

Notes

I Introduction

NATO policy is set by the North Atlantic Council, made up of the nineteen member states, which can meet at the level of permanent representatives, ministers of foreign affairs, or heads of state and government. The council has effective political and decision-making authority at all levels. Ministerial meetings are held at least twice a year. Permanent representatives meet at least once a week. The Secretary General of NATO is chairman, and decisions are taken by common consent, not majority vote. The council is a forum for wide consultation between member governments on major issues, including political, military, economic and other questions.

The Council is supported by the Senior or regular Political Committee and the Military Committee.

The common security policy of the members is to safeguard peace through political solidarity and defence at the lowest level of military forces needed to deter all aggression. Cooperation in science and technology as well as environmental issues takes place in the NATO Science Committee. After the Warsaw Pact formally dissolved on July 1, 1991, NATO undertook a fundamental transformation of its structures and policies to meet its new challenges.

I. Independent Variables

A. Organization Value #1: A Surprise End to Narrow Self-Interest

During the Cold War, the allies were uncommonly united. NATO's actions were always clearly limited to members' interest. Since the end of the cold War, many decisions made have been outside the immediate interests of members.

Not only has the membership and the terms of reference expanded, but so has its definition of self-interest: it has moved from individualism to communitarianism.

At first, the Alliance was cautious. Even after the Soviet Union had announced substantial reductions in arms, in December 1988, NATO declined to abandon plans to upgrade or replace short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The Warsaw Pact took the lead by publishing a detailed analysis of its military strength in Europe for the first time in its history, in January 1989. Predictably, NATO figures for Pact strength differed sharply, and Warsaw Pact officials called the NATO figures tendentious and selective. Nonetheless, at the July 1989 Council of Europe, Gorbachev announced the USSR would allow Warsaw Pact members to determine their own political future and pressed NATO to reduce its nuclear arsenal. In January 1990, senior military leaders from NATO met with their Warsaw Pact counterparts to discuss lessening military tensions in Europe. In June 1991, the North Atlantic Council announced the Partnership for Peace with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe committing themselves to:

1. Organizing meetings of officials and experts on security policy issues, military strategy and doctrine, and other current topics.
2. Intensifying military contacts between senior NATO military authorities and their counterparts in central and East European states, and invitations to military training facilities for special familiarisation programs.
3. Including Central and East European experts in certain Alliance activities, including those relating to scientific and environmental programs and airspace management.
4. Gradually expanding NATO's information programs, support for discussion of security issues in a democratic context, invitations to parliamentary, education and media groups and delegations of young leaders to visit NATO headquarters.
5. Encouraging greater contacts between North Atlantic Assembly and various Parliaments.¹

The foregoing developments show the broadening of self-

interest, as do the decisions recounted below.

Meeting in Sicily in October 1991, NATO defence ministers announced that the alliance would destroy 700 of its 1400 nuclear warheads in Europe. In March 1993, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, established in 1992 as a forum where NATO members could meet with representatives from Eastern European countries and the former Soviet republics, met in Brussels. Members agreed on international mediation and possible NATO military involvement in the conflict in Azerbaijan. In Vienna, all NATO members plus Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine signed the Open Skies Treaty, allowing limited overflights of national territory by foreign reconnaissance aircraft. In April 1993, Secretary General Manfred Woerner announced NATO's willingness to enforce the UN ban on military flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first authorized use of force in a non-member state ever.²

At a January 1994 summit, NATO members established a plan for air strikes in the Bosnian war, subject to specific conditions. Among other conditions, the strikes had to be requested by UN commanders in Bosnia and approved by the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. NATO also announced plans to open the airport near Sarajevo for relief flights. A

number of air attacks enforcing various agreements followed. After a peace plan was signed in November 1995 in Dayton, NATO deployed 60 000 troops from the US, France, Britain and other countries to keep the peace, taking over from UN peacekeepers in Bosnia that December.

That same month, NATO's foreign ministers approved the inclusion of unnamed formerly Communist Eastern European nations in the Alliance. The ministers also offered Russia a special charter and increased military cooperation and pledged that NATO would not move nuclear weapons into Eastern Europe.

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov accepted the , but restated Russia's opposition to NATO expansion. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright formally proposed NATO expansion to the east in February 1997, along with steep conventional weapons reductions in Central and Eastern Europe, and a joint NATO-Russian peacekeeping unit.

In May 1997, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov reached an agreement on NATO expansion. NATO agreed to establish a special NATO-Russia council to discuss security issues. NATO also pledged not to establish nuclear storage sites in new member states. In July 1997, NATO formally invited former Warsaw Pact members Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to join.

An exhaustive discussion of the Kosovo crisis is beyond the scope of this report. However, the crisis indicates the shift in values of the Alliance.

B. Organization Value #2: Veering Toward Dialogue

The nature of all military alliances is clearly materialistic, especially when contrasted with the more symbolic role of the UN. In recent year, NATO embraced increasing numbers of non-force related activities i.e. dialogues. Even during the Cold War, the Alliance more positive relations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The Harmel Report, published in 1967, established defence and dialogue, including arms control, as the dual pillars of the Alliance's approach to security. Today, the alliance pursues security through collective defence, conflict resolution and dialogue on European security and arms control.

III The Dependent Variables: Strategic and Tactics

1. The Previous Strategy

The goal of NATO during the Cold War was to safeguard peace through political solidarity and collective defence. NATO still conducts an annual defence review to assess each country's contribution to the common defence in relation to their respective capabilities and constraints.

The initial formulation of NATO strategy was known as The

Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area. Developed between October 1949 and April 1950, it set out a strategy of large-scale operations for territorial defence. In the mid-1950s the strategy of massive retaliation was developed. It emphasised deterrence based on the threat that NATO would respond to any aggression against its member countries by every means at its disposal, specifically including nuclear weapons. Discussions of possible changes in this strategic approach began later in the 1950s and continued until 1967 when massive retaliation was replaced by flexible response. Flexible response concentrated on giving NATO the advantages of flexibility and of creating uncertainty in the minds of any potential aggressor about NATO's response to threats to its sovereignty or independence. The concept was designed to ensure that aggression of any kind would be perceived as involving unacceptable risks. The above strategies were enshrined in classified documents, which provided guidance to national governments and points of reference for military planning activities.

C. The New Strategy

With the end of the Cold War era, the political situation in Europe and the overall military situation were transformed. A new Strategic Concept evolved during the two years

following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Bearing little relation to previous concepts, it emphasised cooperation with former adversaries as opposed to confrontation. It maintained security as NATO's fundamental purpose but combined it with the obligation to work toward security for Europe as a whole. The 1991 Strategic Concept was also issued as a public document. In 1997, NATO leaders agreed that the Concept should be reexamined and updated to reflect the changes that had taken place in Europe since its adoption.

The risks to Allied security that remained were multifaceted and multidirectional, which made them hard to predict or assess. Risks were now more likely to come from instabilities due to economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes in Central and Eastern Europe.

B. The Prediction

The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfilment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future

and risks to the security of the Alliance remained.

This makes NATO an excellent case study for the validity of the theory outlined in Chapter 1. As the theory predicts, a communitarian organization will adopt an indirect strategy, and a non-materialist organization will take on a strategy of suasion. In the case of NATO, therefore, there will be an indirect strategy of suasion. As we study other countries, we will be able to determine the degree of compatibility with NATO's strategy.

D. Components of Strategy

1. The Goal

NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

To achieve its purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental tasks:

- (1) To provide part of a foundation for security in Europe, based on democracy and peaceful dispute resolution, in which no country could coerce any European nation through force.
- (2) To serve as a transatlantic forum on any issues that affect members' vital interests, including risks to security, and for co-ordination in fields of common concern.
- (3) To deter and defend the territory of any NATO member state.

(4) To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

2. The Style

Common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states support the indivisible security for all members. Without depriving members of sovereignty in defence, NATO's collective effort enhances their ability to realise their security objectives. This contributes to stability in Europe, and promotes cooperation between Alliance members and with others. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance has led to a broad approach to security, although the Alliance is purely defensive. Roles, responsibilities and risks are shared equitably, but not equally. NATO is first and always a nuclear alliance.

The new Strategic Concept of NATO included the following five principles:

- (1) effective engagement: the ability to engage effectively with appropriate assets in a number of different areas, including humanitarian assistance, force protection and high-intensity combat;
- (2) deployability and mobility: the ability to move forces efficiently and effectively;
- (3) sustainability and logistics: the ability to sustain engagements by delivering supplies and support equipment in a timely, organized manner, supporting prolonged operations through rotation of forces;
- (4) survivability: the ability to survive and operate in a wide range of environments, including chemical, biological, terrorist, or electronic attacks; and
- (5) command, control and communication: the ability to establish and maintain effective command and control arrangements and communications links, interoperable with

national systems and including a deployable capability for crisis response operations.

3. The Core Idea

The new NATO has become the central player in the creation of a new security order in Europe.³ Its core idea is to protect peace in a new Europe using three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy: dialogue, cooperation, and collective defence.

4. The Tactics

Military capability is what prevents coercion or intimidation, and to guarantees that aggression can never be perceived as possibly successful. It is a condition of successful dialogue and cooperation.

(a) collective defence

i)The role of the Armed forces

The primary role of Alliance military forces is still to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks, to maintain stability and balance in Europe and to preserve the peace.

In the event of military crises, the Alliance's forces complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security. For this reason, the forces must have a capability for measured and timely response, for deterring actions against any Ally, and for repelling any attack and restoring the territory of member states. The Alliance's military forces are at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind. The size,

readiness, availability, flexibility, mobility and deployment of the Alliance's forces are strictly defensive and adapt as needed to meet arms control agreements or transparency and complementarity with the ESDI. Collective defence arrangements make more efficient use of scarce defence resources.

(ii) Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

Strategic nuclear forces are the supreme guarantee. A credible nuclear posture requires widespread participation in nuclear planning, basing of nuclear forces, command, control and consultation arrangements, flexibility and survivability. Any use of nuclear weapons is made more remote by the efforts toward dialogue and cooperation. Sub-strategic forces based in Europe linking with strategic nuclear forces elsewhere consist only of dual capable aircraft supplemented by offshore systems. There are no surface vessels, attack submarines, nuclear artillery or ground-launched short range nuclear missiles.

(b) Dialogue and Cooperation

The Alliance has been restructured in order to participate in European cooperative security structures. Its political and military structures are now adapted to peacekeeping and crisis management in cooperation with non-member countries and international organisations. The Allies support the CSCE process and its institutions. The Allies recognize that other bodies, including the EU, the Western European Union (WEU) and the UN may also have an important role to play. Through initiatives such as the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the establishment of a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), member countries opened up to new forms of partnership and cooperation with other

countries.

i) European Security and Defence Identity

NATO supports the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the Combined joint Task Force (CJTFs) as part of adapting NATO to the new Europe. The Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in December 1991 identified the WEU as a way to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. The WEU's job is to elaborate and implement defence-related decisions and actions of the European Union. The Alliance makes collective NATO assets available for WEU operations undertaken under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) develop separable but not separate multinational capabilities which could be deployed either by NATO or the WEU.

ii) Euro-Atlantic Peace Council

When NATO and Partner countries met to inaugurate the EAPC in June 1997, NATO and Russia had just signed a historic agreement on their future relations, and the NATO-Ukraine Charter was initialled. The EAPC builds on political and military cooperation established under the NACC and the PfP. It provides a forum for consultation on political and security matters with the countries of central and eastern Europe, including former Soviet republics. The EAPC Council meets monthly at the ambassadorial level, and twice a year at the ministerial level. All former NACC members and PfP countries are members.

Other OSCE participating states may also become members by joining the PfP. Member Countries include the 19 NATO members plus Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine.

iii) Partnership for Peace

In January 1994, NATO invited NACC and other OSCE countries to join a Partnership for Peace (PfP). This partnership was designed to forge working partnerships between the Alliance and participating states. Practical cooperation expands political and military cooperation and strengthening security relationships, leading to greater stability and fewer risks. Cooperation within PfP helps transparency in national defence planning and budgets, and supports the democratic control of defence forces. Participating countries contribute to UN or OSCE operations and engage in joint peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations and other areas. The PfP made the creation of the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to enforce the Bosnian peace agreement much easier. Fifteen PfP countries are also participating in the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The Partnership Coordination Cell plans PfP military exercises. The 26 PfP Countries are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

iv) Mediterranean Dialogue

In 1994, NATO initiated a dialogue with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, with Algeria becoming a participant in March 2000. The Dialogue supports good relations and better mutual understanding throughout the Mediterranean, as well as promoting regional security and stability, based on the Alliance's recognition that security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.

v) Dialogue with Russia

On 27 May 1997, NATO and Russia signed the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation."

In addition to agreeing on principles and designating specific areas for political and military cooperation, the Founding Act establishes the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, an organ for consultation, cooperation and consensus-building.

vi) Organization for Security and Confidence in Europe

Formerly known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the OSCE has the status of a "Regional Organisation" under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. All the countries of Europe plus Canada and the US come under a common broad concept of security, including human rights and freedoms, democracy and the rule of law.

The OSCE has promoted dialogue and cooperation between its members and introduced confidence and security-building measures in military affairs. The 1992 Helsinki Summit expanded its role in peacekeeping, early warning and crisis management, which in turn led to close relations with NATO and other international organisations. OSCE-NATO relations are generally informal and *ad hoc*. The NATO Secretary General has participated in OSCE ministerial and Summit Meetings and NATO officials have contributed to OSCE seminars on peacekeeping, early warning and conflict prevention. The OSCE Chairman in Office routinely attends the North Atlantic Council, the Political Committee and other NATO bodies. In addition to their cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO and the OSCE have been working together since October 1998, to try to prevent further escalation of the conflict between Serbian military and ethnic Albanian forces in Kosovo.

V. Conclusion

NATO's Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance. It is based on dialogue, cooperation and reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. The flexible strategy can reflect further developments in the environment. It is the basis for the development of defence policy, operational concepts, conventional and nuclear force posture and collective defence planning arrangements.

Table 2: The Strategy of NATO

Values	communitarianism, non-materialism
Strategy	indirect strategy of suasion
Goal	security of Europe
Tactics	cooperation and dialogue: ESDI, EAPC, PFP, Mediterranean dialogue, dialogues with x-USSR collective defence: conventional forces, nuclear forces
Style	defensive, indivisible, equitable

As we shall see, both the new members and the aspiring member countries from central Europe will have values antithetical to NATO's. Materialism and individualism are not surprising given the state of the economies of the former Warsaw Pact countries after fifty years of enforced ideology. However, these values lead to national strategies with significant consequences for the mid- and long-term. The first country to be explored is Poland.

Notes

Chapter 3. The New Member: Poland

Poland is the trigger which led to the chain reaction ultimately affecting all of Eastern Europe.¹

I. Independent Variables

A. National Value #1: Democratization and the Rise of Individualism

As communism was taking its last bow, Poland was going through a complicated process of recomposition. Three myths disappeared: (1) the notion of a united society; (2) reverence, positive or negative, for the Polish state, and (3) the romantic idea of a resurgent Polish nation.² The post-communist media, which both reflected political turbulence and contributed to it by encouraging pluralism yet remaining partisan.³ Similarly, the development of political opposition outside the cluster around the Solidarity bloc was a sign of a successful transition to liberal democracy and a sign of a return to individualism. The first step in the rise of democracy and individualism was the fall of Communism. The fall of Communism is inextricably linked to the rise of Solidarity, the trade union headed by Lech Walesa, starting in 1989.

In January 1989, after a bitter debate over Solidarity, the Communist Party Central Committee approved trade union pluralism, although the legalization included a prohibition on public demonstrations. Solidarity then agreed to talk restoring its legal status. In February, direct talks between the government, the Roman Catholic church and the opposition, including Solidarity, led to an agreement where Solidarity would receive 40% of the seats in Parliament. In March 1989, the government and Solidarity agreed to hold free open elections for the Senate, to have more open representation in the current 460-member Parliament, and for the President to have more legal powers.

The 1989 Parliamentary session opened with Solidarity as the official opposition. Communist candidate General Jaruzelski barely managed to get elected President, and then only with Walesa's support. After severe economic problems, Jaruzelski was replaced by Prime Minister Rakowski, who ended meat rationing and lift the freeze on food prices.

Starting in August 1989, Solidarity held a series of work stoppages to protest the Communist Party's unwillingness to enact political and economic changes. A joint session of Solidarity, the Peasant Party and the Democratic Party proposed that Walesa form Poland's next government. When Walesa refused again, Jaruzelski nominated Tadeusz Mazowiecki, another high-level Solidarity leader, to the prime ministership. After receiving a phone call from Soviet President Gorbachev (perhaps the last Soviet intervention in Polish politics?), Communist leaders dropped their demands for greater representation in the government. Parliament then confirmed the first non-Communist Prime Minister in Poland since World War II, with a Cabinet of four Communist and twenty-two Solidarity ministers.

The pace towards freely elected leadership then accelerated. In January 1990, the Communist Party dissolved itself because it could not regain the public's confidence. In May 1990, the first free elections since World War II, for local community councils. In July 1990, local political committees refused Prime Minister Mazowiecki's request to federate and stayed under Walesa's leadership. Mazowiecki then dismissed five prominent Communist members of his Cabinet, saying that Poland would soon hold completely free elections for both Parliament and President. President Jaruzelski gave up his office to a freely elected successor. In November 1990, Lech Walesa was elected as President, with Jan Krzyztof Bielecki, a little-known economist, as

Prime Minister. In March 1991, President Lech Walesa urged Parliament to dissolve and hold immediate free elections, since it was still dominated by former Communists.

In June 1991, President Walesa asked Parliament to reform economic laws by decree for one year, since Parliament had failed to pass 24 pieces of economic reform legislation in the last 6 months alone, but Parliament refused, criticizing the government's economic policies and refusing to approve the government's spending cuts.

Then came the rise of the former Communists. The Fall 1991 elections for the lower house gave each of the Democratic Union and the former Communist Democratic Left Alliance 4 seats, the highest proportion of any of the 25 parties participating. By 1992, when the six-party coalition government of Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka lost a no-confidence motion over fiscal austerity, it was the 4th government to collapse since 1989. The September 1993 parliamentary elections saw the Democratic Left Alliance, the successor to the Polish Communist Party winning 171 seats in the 460-seat lower house, with 20.4% of the vote. The Polish Peasants Party, another former Communist party, won 132 seats, with 15.4% of the vote. The ex-Communists' electoral victory shocked the population, with its deeply rooted Catholic heritage and strong resistance to Communism.⁴ In August 1994, the new Internal Affairs Minister Marin Zacharski, a spy sentenced to life in prison in the US in 1981 and later exchanged for Western agents, resigned after President Lech Walesa rejected his appointment, all but one senior official at the intelligence services are holdovers from the Communist regime. After that, lustration, the investigation of a politician's activities during the Communist regimes, gained ground in Polish politics.⁵ In November 1995, Lech Walesa lost the

presidential election to Aleksander Kwasniewski, a former Communist official.

In the September 1997 parliamentary elections, the Solidarity coalition won 32.8% of the vote and Jerzy Buzek, a former underground organizer for the anti-Communist Solidarity movement who headed the coalition, became Prime Minister. That fall, the cohabitation regime between the former Communists and the former opposition began. Decision-making became even more of a seesaw. In June 1998, the Sejm passed a bill to reduce the number of provinces from 49 to first twelve, then fifteen, then sixteen. In September 1998, Poland brought its criminal law and court procedures into line with EU standards by abolishing the death penalty. The political landscape remains highly unstable and the current difficulties of reform and troubles with ruling right-of-centre coalition may reinforce radicalism and ideological antagonism, although within a strengthening democratic institutions and commitment to the rule of law.⁶

B. National Value #2: Rejecting Ideology in Favour of the Market

Economic development has been both a cause and a characteristic of the changes in Poland, and the significance of economic reforms is the most obvious manifestation of this materialism.⁷

In July 1989, the G-7 -- the seven major industrial democracies -- provided emergency financial and food aid to both Poland and Hungary, and General Jaruzelski asked for \$US 3 billion in aid and debt restructuring. In November 1989, West Germany gave Poland \$US 2.2 billion in financial assistance. In December 1989, the government proposed an austerity package designed to reduce inflation and create a market-oriented economy, a prerequisite for an aid package sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government also proposed to overhaul the nation's economy. In

October 1989, Parliament passed a bill to offer compensation to workers for Poland's worsening inflation.

In January 1990, as part of its economic recovery program, the government announced sharp increases in the price of basic services like heating and electricity. Later that winter, the lower house of Parliament approved a plan to give every citizen a share in state-owned companies that were privatized, reserving 20% of the shares for workers. In early 1991, the government announced IMF loans of more than \$US 2 billion over 3 years. In December 1992, in Silesia, hundreds of thousands of the region's nearly 300 000 coal miners struck to protest low wages, a plan to reorganize the industry, and 180 000 job cuts.

In March 1993, the Sejm rejected the government's economic plan to ease the shock treatment of free-market reforms. IMF officials had warned that the plan, which called for increased government spending and gradual expansion of the money supply, would spark inflation and slow reforms. However, the government passed a plan to privatize 600 state-owned enterprises in May 1993. As late as 1993, however, more than half of the workers were still not employed in the private sector.

In September 1994, Western creditor banks agreed to reduce Poland's commercial debt of \$US 14 billion by \$6.5 billion -- Poland had defaulted on housing and other consumer-oriented loans taken out in the 1970s by the Communist regime. The 1998 budget anticipated a \$US 1.3 billion deficit, 1.5 % of GDP, with a growth rate of 5.6%. The government also sought exemptions from a number of EU regulations during forthcoming negotiations on Poland's proposed accession, to retain controls on the flow of capital, labour and services. Miners at the flagship copper mine in Poland (the largest in the

country, producing 3.5% of the world's copper, floated on the Warsaw stock exchange) went on strike for ten days in April 1998, until management agreed to reconsider the transfer of several thousand jobs to less well-paid subsidiaries.

Poland's share of the EU reconstruction program was cut by \$US 30 million in May 1998 because the projects submitted were not appropriate. In June and July 1998, Warsaw was brought to a standstill by farmers clashing with police during protests over tariffs on imported food, increased state subsidies, and higher spending on agriculture. In the summer of 1998, the government announced plans to reform several industries: the steel industry workforce would be cut by more than half, coal mining jobs would be cut by 110 000. Restructuring the transport sector proved also contentious, with the Transport Minister resigning in November 1998 because trade unions were preventing privatization of the Polish State Railways at a cost of 60 000 jobs. A wave of strikes and protests by farmers, coal miners, metallurgical workers and teachers caused disruption across Poland throughout December 1998 and January 1999. The industrial unrest lasted into February 1999, with farmers and health workers continuing to protest. Sweeping health care reforms in 1999 resulted in the resignation of 1500 of the 2700 anaesthetists, so that only emergency operations were performed. In September 1999, about 30 0000 farmers and workers marched through Warsaw to demand that the government provide better wages and job security.

This economic shock therapy has resulted in membership in the premier clubs of western Europe: the EU and NATO.⁸ Polish leaders were just starting to realize that economic processes ". . . though, in essence, "charitable" in the sphere of commerce, production, dissemination of modern technologies or

capital transfers - cause negative side-effects that may lead to social problems. "9

II. The Dependent Variable: National Strategy

A. The Previous Strategy

At the end of the World War II, a procommunist group became the provisional government. Formerly German territories, about one third of modern Poland's total area, came under Polish sovereignty, the border with the USSR shifted westward, and there were major population resettlements. Non-Communist political groups suffered severe intimidation during national elections in January 1947, and Communists claimed an overwhelming victory. The People's Republic was established in February 1947, led by Wladyslaw Gomulka. Gomulka was reluctant to implement certain aspects of Soviet economic policies, such as the collectivisation of agriculture. Dismissed in 1948, he was replaced by the Polish United Workers' Party, which gained strict control over public life. In 1956 mass demonstrations by industrial workers about food shortages were repressed by the security forces, but Gomulka returned to office. Poland enjoyed stability thereafter, and limited economic reforms were introduced, with little success: a sharp rise in food prices in December 1970 led to strikes and demonstrations. Many demonstrators were killed or injured in violent clashes with police or army, and Gomulka was forced to resign. Succeeded by Edward Gierek, further attempts to introduce economic reforms and raise living standards largely failed and more strikes in 1976 forced the postponement of planned prices rises. The overall picture, therefore, is one of conformity to the Communist model with the state remaining authoritarian.

B. The Prediction

Polish society now espouses both individualism and materialism, which indicates a direct strategy of action. The strategy Poland has adopted is one of integration with Western Europe, and a redefining of Eastern Europe as starting at Poland's westernmost border.

C. Components of Strategy

1. The Goal

The goals of the national strategy of Poland are threefold: the consolidation of state security and national independence, the economic and the social development of the country, and the development of a suitable position for Poland in the world.¹⁰ The national strategy guarantees the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Poland, protects the democratic Constitution and the rights, freedoms and safety of citizens, promotes prosperity, preserves national heritage and the national identity, and builds a permanent, just and peaceful order in Europe and the world based on the values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and solidarity. These objectives of defence and foreign policy are tasks for "the whole state and the whole nation."¹¹

2. The Style

Polish national strategy is comprehensive, lawful, principled, and guided by the values of the Polish people. Security takes into account the significance of diverse political, military, economic, social, environmental, and energy-related factors. It conforms to the Constitution, the United Nations Charter, the OSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty, European and international treaties and conventions and international law. Use of force in the international arena is restricted exclusively to self-defence.

3. The Tactics

(a) the Cornerstone of National Security

The Soviet Union withdrew its remaining 45 000 troops from Poland in 1992. In August 1993, Yeltsin and Walesa issued a joint communique in which Yeltsin stated his understanding of Poland's desire to join NATO (although the Defence Minister of Russia, Andrei Kozyrev, said Polish membership would anger Russian nationalists). The protocol scheduling Poland's accession to NATO was signed in December 1997 and set for April 1999. *The Tenets of Polish Security Policy* (1992) and *The Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland* (1992) provide the conceptual basis for a comprehensive reform of defence.

i) Membership in NATO

Membership in NATO was sought to guarantee a sense of security and confidence in the future when faced with mounting challenges. Cohabitation, which began in 1997, did not modify the policies of Poland with respect to the EU or NATO, although some specific positions did diverge. Through this membership, the government sought " . . . to ensure for Poland the highest standard of security. Without it, all our other achievements and striving would have been burdened with the risk of impermanence, they would have been threatened with the spectre of instability or regression."¹² With the enlarged NATO, Poland changed its situation from a twilight zone of minor security and stability to a position of membership in a stable system of cooperation of its own choice.

ii) Polish Armed Forces

The reformed armed forces now plan to organize according to European standards, to prepare for operational cooperation with NATO and international peacekeeping operations, to work with the most recent military technology, to

develop innovative training doctrine, to increase the professionalism of troops, and to cooperate closely with extra-military systems. The Polish Armed Forces have already adopted new principles of defence policy and strategy, restructured themselves in depth, developed many revised operational standards, including implementing democratic control over the armed forces.

Although the numbers do not reflect the depth of the changes made to the armed forces, they are substantial. In September 1996, the Polish Armed Forces include 41 000 officers, 28 000 warrant officers, 16 000 noncommissioned officers for total professional cadres of 86 000. Conscripts numbered 147 000, for a total of 233 200, just under the CFE limit of 234 000.

The reform of the defence system and the restructuring of the armed forces was one of the principal challenges that Poland faced after the fall of Communism in 1989.

Overcoming the legacies of the Warsaw Pact was one of the most important changes necessary to join NATO. Conceptual foundations were laid for adapting the defence system and the national strategy to the new Europe. Hundreds of logistical and administrative units were abolished, and surviving units were redistributed, with 45% of forces in the west, 30% in central Poland and 25% in the east, with a new Military District created for Krakow. The armed services commands are now similar to NATO's. The army has moved from regiment-based to brigade-based divisions. The air force is composed of two air defence corps and one air corps. Work continued on establishing an integrated civilian-military system of airspace management and infrastructure so it is compatible with NATO.

iii) civilian tactics

Projection of Stability. The government seeks to ensure the best conditions possible for the country's development because democratic, affluent states with a high level of prosperity and education are less inclined toward international aggression than dictatorships plagued by economic difficulties. Poland plans to contribute to the stability in Euro-Asia by sharing its positive experience of reform with other countries. Poland also plans to extend bilateral cooperation and international institutions. **Diplomacy** through NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the UN will build European co-operative security and consolidate arms-control regimes. **Export controls** prevent the stability-threatening transfer of nuclear and conventional arms and technologies. In the 1990s, Poland gained membership in all export control regimes and non-proliferation organisations and began controlling trade in arms and dual-purpose goods. It must next control the transfer of mass destruction technology and the arms build-ups in certain regions. However, Poland's position is that *participation in such projects cannot obstruct the pursuit of Poland's economic interests connected with the development of trade and industrial production.* **Intelligence** gathering and analysis on international political and economic relations and the relaying of this information to competent state institutions is crucial to Poland's security interests. Special services help combat threats to the security of the state only *within binding laws.*

(b) Foreign Policy

The three great goals of Polish foreign policy are integration with the European Union, establishing Poland's place in the region and promoting Polish economic interests. Foreign policy suffered between 1992 and 1997 from

institutional fragmentation within a presidential-Foreign Office-parliament triangular framework. The 1997 Constitution clarified the process of decision making and coordination by weakening the President's formal powers and strengthening those of the Prime Minister. The lower house of the Sejm remains important in producing political consensus and diffusing information. The production of a specially trained and non-politically recruited Foreign Office is likely to take time.¹³

i) Integration with the European Union

The Polish government's position is that the European security system can be guaranteed only by transparency between NATO and the European Union. Negotiations with the EU on membership began in 1998, but have not progressed quickly, slowed by internal divisions. Majority opinion is still in favour of membership, despite increased scepticism, with the exception of farmers and nationalists.¹⁴ The German-Polish relationship after 1989 is a model for an intensifying European integration.¹⁵ German Chancellor Kohl emphasized his support for Polish membership in the EU and NATO on a visit to southwest Poland in June 1998, a year marked by a convergence of foreign policy and common interests.¹⁶

ii) A Place in the Region and World

Poland's position on peacekeeping is that it be temporary, laying the groundwork for resolving conflicts by political methods. Poland is a long-standing - and sometimes leading - personnel provider for operations.

Relations with Belarus are particularly important since it is unstable politically and economically. Belarus has regressed on its road to democratization, having failed to build a civil society, regulate internal crises according to international legal standards, achieve economic stability and having reversed some market reforms. It has become a source of political and social tension in the entire region.¹⁷ In February 1998, Poland imposed tighter restrictions on its eastern border, leading to a sharp deterioration in relations, and matters remain strained to this day..

Relations with Russia. The tone has also become more tense with Russia.¹⁸ In December 1997, the Polish government confirmed that it would seek a peaceful solution to the conflict in Dnestr, when Foreign Minister became acting chair of the OSCE in January 1998. Also, responsibility for the massacre of 4000 Polish army officers in the Katyn Forest in 1943. Responsibility for the massacre has been a point of contention between Poland and the Soviet Union since World War II.

Regional Cooperation. Poland reinforces regional cooperation trends, particularly within the framework of the Visegrad Group and the Council of Baltic Sea States. Poland also pledged support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Lithuania and Slovakia.

Participation in the OSCE. Poland supports all initiatives in the realm of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, security measures, democratic institutions and civil societies. Poland also served as OSCE chairman in 1998.

Arms Control and Disarmament. The government supports, *inter alia*, strengthening stability and transparency via the CFE Treaty, reducing nuclear

arms pursuant to the START Treaties, concluding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as nuclear-free states to the NPT and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Poland cooperates with any state interested in strengthening security and stability in regional and sub-regional projects serving to strengthen security, especially in the Baltic Sea basin and in Central and Eastern Europe.

iii) Polish Economic Interests

Poland recognizes as threats to its security threats to economic potential, macroeconomic and financial stability, resources earmarked for defence, and capacity for defence industry. Because the stability and predictability of the economic environment directly influences Poland's security, it supports economic transformation and democratic political change in the region. Ensuring the security of power supplies requires diversification and protection of sources and transport routes of the country's imported fuels, as well as long-term deliveries of fuels. Poland will shortly be creating a storage capacity for liquid fuels and natural gas at a level determined by norms binding in the European Union.

V. Conclusion

For the first time in several hundred years no external threat hangs over Poland. Poland's security, to many previous generations of Poles an unattainable dream, calls for constant vigilance. This vigilance will also have to be unrelenting for Poland to become a builder, not just a consumer, of security in the 21st century.

Table 3: The National Strategy of Poland

--	--

Values	individualism, materialism
Strategy	direct strategy of action
Goals	state security and independence, economic and social development, 'worthy' position in the world
Tactics	National Security: NATO membership, reform of armed forces, civilian initiatives Foreign Policy: EU membership, place in region/ world
Style	comprehensive, lawful, principled, ideally only using force for self-defence

Notes

Chapter 4. The New Member: the Czech Republic

1. Introduction

Czech Bohemia, Czech Moravia and part of Silesia make up the Czech Republic. Its neighbours are Poland to the north, Germany to the northwest and west, Austria to the south and Slovakia to the east. The language is Czech, with a significant Slovak minority and smaller Polish, German, Silesian, Romany and Hungarian groups. Most of the population is Christian, with 43% being Catholics.

A people's republic was established on June 9, 1948, and the country aligned itself with the Soviet-led Eastern bloc, joining both the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact. It was rigidly Stalinist in the 1950s. In January 1968, Alexander Dubcek became party secretary, encouraging more genuine elections, greater freedom of expression and greater separation of party and state. The eastern European bloc saw this as endangering their unity, and in August 1968, a Warsaw Pact force of 600 000 invaded. A severe purge of the party membership followed Dubcek's replacement, and only twenty years later did a moderate take charge again. Secretary Jakes' program of reforms was extremely moderate and repression continued. The Charter 77, a group of dissident intellectuals, former politicians and others campaigning for civil and political rights, played a leading

role in antigovernment demonstrations for years, but ignited the Velvet Revolution in 1998.

II. Experimental Variables

The Velvet Revolution was a time of great change in national values, "...a period of a comeback of our country and people to their historical roots of Europeanism, values of democracy and to the ways leading to modern economy."¹ These values are individualism and materialism.

A. National Value #1: Individualism and the Return of Liberal Democracy

information on the national strategy and national values is comparatively limited for the Czech Republic. The events of the revolution and the restoration of democracy are indications of the move to individualism. In November 1988, former Communist leader Alexander Dubcek took his first trip to the west since 1968. Speaking in Italy, he defended the Prague Spring of 1968 as an attempt to promote "socialism with a human face." In February 1989, the dissident playwright Vaclav Havel and seven others were convicted of inciting a riot in Prague the previous month and received sentences ranging from fines to twelve months in jail. In March, police beat rioting protesters after a speech (ironically, about nonviolent demonstration) by Charter 77 leader Milan Machovec. In October

1989, the government rounded up prominent dissidents on the eve of the 71st anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia's democratic government. A march staged by 10 000 supporters turned violent as riot police broke up the demonstration.

The month of November 1989 proved decisive. A demonstration of 15 000 people in Prague's Wenceslas Square ended when riot police attacked the crowd. For the next three days, police forcefully broke up protests in Prague calling for the ousting of Communist party General Secretary Milos Jakes. A crowd of more than 200 000 filled Wenceslas Square but dispersed when it was confronted by heavily armed troops.

Dubcek then addressed a crowd of 70 000 in Bratislava and said that he supported the growing protest movement.

(Alexander Dubcek had been in internal exile in Bratislava since his ousting as Secretary General in 1968 by Warsaw Pact forces.) In his first speech in Prague since 1968, Dubcek told 350 000 protesters that today's problems were caused by the invasion of 1968. Shortly thereafter, the 13-member Politburo resigned, and the Central Committee appointed a new 9-member Politburo that included 6 former members, Karel Urbanek replacing Jakes as General Secretary. The size of the demonstrations in Prague then swelled to between 500 000 and 800 000 people. Three more members of the Politburo were

dropped in a concession to the opposition after yet another shakeup. Millions of workers held a two-hour general strike to show solidarity for the democratic reform movement. After a meeting between the Prime Minister, Ladislav Adamec, and opposition representative Vaclav Havel, the Communist Party agreed to a coalition government and to relinquish its leading role in society. Parliament deleted from the Constitution the guarantee of a leading role for the Communist Party. In December 1989, the Czechoslovak Communist Party Politburo said the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact force was unjustified. The main opposition group, the Civic Forum, rejected a proposed cabinet that included sixteen Communist and five non-Communist ministers. More than 200 000 protesters jammed Wenceslas Square in Prague to voice their disapproval of the government on December 3. Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, who had threatened to resign unless his cabinet was provided with adequate conditions for its work, was replaced within 24 hours by Deputy Prime Minister Marian Calfa. He swore in a new Cabinet of 11 non-Communists and 10 Communists, the first not dominated by Communists in 41 years, while President Gustav Husak resigned.

The Defence Ministry announced it would dismantle the nation's fortified border with West Germany. Parliament

overwhelmingly approved a reform program advocating free elections and a market economy in Czechoslovakia. It then unanimously (and euphorically) elected Dubcek as its chairman and Vaclav Havel as President, the first non-Communist President in Czechoslovakia since 1948.

The rise of individualism did not end with the accession of Vaclav Havel: there is no stronger evidence of individualism in the continued and vigorous opposition to the great leader of the Velvet Revolution through his years in office. In October 1990, the Civic Forum chose Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus as its first chairman, rejecting President Vaclav Havel's choice for the position. Havel also replaced the Defence Minister, Miroslav Vacek, with Deputy prime Minister Lubos Dobrovsky. The rise of individualism had its costs, in terms of national unity. The Slovak question remained the main the dominant topic of political debate during 1991 and 1992. A widening division appeared between the more moderate Slovak movements, some of which advocated the preservation for the federation in a looser form, and a minority of more radical parties campaigning for full independence. In early March 1991 the Slovak Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, announced the creation of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (MDS) in support of greater autonomy.

The individualising forces of democracy were felt in wider and wider circles. Public disagreement over the direction of communist politics and economic management led to a split within Civic Forum, with the Civic democratic Party (more conservative) and the Civic Movement (more liberal) emerging in February 1991. In March 1991, all political forces managed to reach an agreement on the framework of a new federal Constitution. This Constitution stated that the country would be a federative state of two 'sovereign and equal republics'. But later in 1991, the debate had reached an impasse over the status of the two republics within any future federation. Havel opposed a referendum on the possible of division, but the June 1992 legislative election proved to be decisive in the dismantling of Czechoslovakia. The transitional government was appointed in early July amid growing recognition that a separation preferable to the compromise favoured by most Slovak parties. Events in June and July 1992 made the emergence of two new states inevitable, although initially it was agreed that they would continue to share some federal infrastructure. A treaty of good-neighbourliness and friendship was signed in December 1992 and at midnight on 31 December all federal structures were dissolved, effected in an entirely peaceful fashion. Both republics were quickly recognized by other

states. In late 1993 relations were troubled by disagreements over former Czechoslovak assets and property still to be divided. There was renewed political controversy in 1995, about the lustration or screening law applicable to aspiring politicians.

Meanwhile the Czech Republic created an upper and lower chamber of Parliament. In June 1996, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus's centre-right coalition lost its parliamentary majority in elections, and a new coalition cabinet was formed. In June 1997, the government barely survived a parliamentary confidence vote. In November 1997, ethnic tensions rose over the 1000 Roma (Gypsies) fleeing to Britain, claiming employment discrimination and fearing attacks by racists. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus resigned after a scandal over a secret slush fund held by his party in a Swiss bank.

Considerable economic problems created pressure for change in 1997. As coalition leaders failed to agree on solutions to political and economic problems in early November 1997, at least 60 000 trade union members demonstrated in Prague. By January 1998, the party system was becoming more consolidated.

The main cleavage is the traditional left-right stance on economic issues, but the politicians were unable to overcome their personal grievances and cooperate.² Stable governments were

increasingly difficult to build, even as the democratic system is becoming more developed. When President Havel was sworn in for his second and final term in February 1998, the lower house of the legislature voted to approve a constitutional amendment to reduce its current term from four years to two. The Deputy Prime Minister and Environment Minister resigned following a scandal concerning secret anonymous donations made to their party by Czech companies. The opposition Social Democratic Party withdrew its demand for a referendum on entry to NATO and recommended membership to its deputies. The Senate also agreed to revoke racist legislation restricting the nomadic life style of the Romany people.

In May 1998, an unauthorized, extreme-right protest march in Prague culminated in attacks against police and looting in the city centre, over racist, anti-Romany statements made by politicians. Racial intolerance escalated to the point where town councillors allocated money to build a Romany ghetto. Government ministers eventually vetoed the racist barriers.

Social malaise, pessimism and disillusionment dominated the 1998 legislative elections. Despite the party's involvement in scandal, despite the loss of public money and the decline of the country's financial reputation, the ruling Civic Democratic Party finished only second behind the Social Democrats. The ultra-right parties failed to translate recent increases in racial intolerance into votes.

January 1999 saw a parliamentary commission investigating a bribery scandal during privatization of state companies in 1995. In December 1999, 50 000 protesters in Prague Square demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Milos Zeman and parliament speaker Vaclav Klaus, blaming them for the political and economic problems that jeopardized the country's entry into the

EU. Similar demonstrations sprang up in more than twenty cities around the country.

B. National Value #2: Materialism and The Search for Affluence

The fall of communism in 1989 opened the road for economic reform and the reintroduction of a market economy. The swerve towards the market economy, sometimes at great social cost, is the quintessential evidence of a change towards materialism. Of all the post-communist states of Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic is considered to have undertaken the transition with the greatest success.

In a televised speech on January 1, 1990, President Vaclav Havel said that Czechoslovakia was suffering a severe economic and environmental crisis.

The government then devaluated its currency sharply, liberalized prices and foreign trade, introduced a convertible currency, privatized programs and reformed fiscal and monetary policy. The Czech koruna was pegged to the Deutschmark and the US dollar in 1993.

After secession from Slovakia, the 1992 government's stated priorities remained largely unchanged: the pursuit of economic reforms, including large scale privatization, and the fight against organized crime. The country's program of rapid privatization, price and currency stabilization and low unemployment won strong popular support for the reforms from 1992 through 1995. Economic reforms, coupled with the country's political stability, attracted foreign investment.

Table 4: Foreign Investments By Sector, 1990-1997

Sector	(\$US million)
<i>consumer goods + tobacco</i>	926,4

<i>transport and communications</i>	1,330
<i>transportation equipment</i>	900,7
<i>services</i>	580,8
<i>petrochemicals</i>	528,1
<i>financial</i>	528,0
<i>other</i>	1,664.1
Total	6,458.5

Source: Czech Ministry of Finance, <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000

Table 5 Foreign Investment by Country, 1997:

Country	\$US millions
Germany	1,797.3
USA	945.0
France	468.3
Austria	457.1
Switzerland	731.4
Netherlands	953.7
Others	1,105.7
Total	6,458.5

Source: Czech Ministry of Finance, <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.

Confidence within the country was so high millions of Czechs participated in the coupon privatization scheme, where citizens purchased inexpensive coupons of privatization points which they could exchange for

shares in companies. The noticeable decline in GDP slowed in 1991 and stabilized by 1993. Between 1993 and 1996 GDP growth was rapid, and in 2000 stood at 95% of the 1990 GDP. The Czech government even repaid all its loans to the International Monetary Fund two years ahead of time, in the summer of 1994.

However, there were considerable other problems starting in 1996. Economic growth slowed, and the first budgetary deficit since the transition to a market economy was recorded, largely owing to a mounting trade deficit. Eleven banks failed in 1996, the first since economic reforms, and a number of senior bankers were charged with fraud and embezzlement in 1997. Privatization of the largest banks was delayed when a bomb exploded in protest in Prague.

Economic performance deteriorated, as did investor confidence, because of embezzlement of investment funds. The national debt reached \$US 5,576 million or 12% of GDP by the middle of 1997. Economic growth in 1997 slowed to 1.5% and the economy contracted by .9% in the first quarter of 1998, as consumption decreased due to inflation. The long-term decline of industrial production was expected during the transition, given the decrease of unnecessary products and heavy industry. The economy slower after the loss of Slovak markets, to say nothing of the slowdown in Western Europe itself. New owners slow or too inexperienced to take control harmed privatized industry. However, from 1995, industrial production began to increase and, reaching 83% of the 1990 output levels by the end of 1997. Industrial output grew by 7.1% in the first two quarters of 1998.

In April 1997 the government took measures to cut public spending,

reduce imports and regulate the capital market. The next month, the Ministers for Industry and Trade, Finance and the Interior all resigned. The Prime Minister Klaus presented a program for stabilization and recovery, but following a series of speculative attacks on the koruna, he introduced a floating exchange rate and further cut public expenditure. By the end of 1997, the narrowing of the trade deficit and increased industrial output was largely attributed to the depreciation of the koruna. Hope that financial crime could be tackled and the economy stabilized led to the appointment of the otherwise little-known former head of the Czech National Bank as prime minister.

The trade balance deficit peaked in 1996 at \$US 5.8 billion, and then gradually decreased. Foreign trade has restructured considerably since 1990: trade with industrialized, market economies represents 70% of the total, while transition economies represent only 25%. The Czech Republic has imported more than it exported, probably an inevitable part of the economic transition. The Czech government announced a 7-point package of incentives designed to bring itself into line with Poland and Hungary for investment.

II. The National Strategy

A. The Previous Strategy

After the Prague Spring, both General Secretaries of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia stated their commitment to moderate reforms without proposing any more liberal policies. The Roman Catholic Church and dissident groups continued, including against intellectuals of Charter 77. The previous strategy of Czechoslovakia therefore seems to have been one of adopting a Soviet-style, Soviet-dominated system.

B. The Prediction

An individualist, materialist state can be expected to select a direct strategy of action.

C. Components of Strategy

1. The Goal

The definition of current security risks is comprehensive and diverse. Globalization means that local problems become significant to other countries or regions. Hence the collapse of the economy leading to unemployment, water and food shortages, and population migration are seen just as threatening as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, organized crime, or religious fundamentalism. New risks include drug-trafficking, natural disasters or computer hacking.³ To all of this, " There is no alternative . . . to the collective defence for the country with the geographical position and economical capabilities of the Czech Republic."⁴

2. The tactics

Most of the tactics fall either into the category of foreign relations or the policy of NATO membership.

(a) foreign policy

In April 1990, after a forty-year lapse, Czechoslovakia restores diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and Pope John Paul II visited Prague, his first visit to an East European country other than his native Poland. In

September 1990, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union agreed to conduct their trade in convertible currency, the first accord of this kind between members of the former Soviet bloc.

In June 1991, Lieutenant General Rudolf Duchacek of the Czechoslovak army and Lieutenant General Eduard Vorobyov, commander of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, signed a protocol in Prague formally ending the Soviet occupation of the country. In January 1992 Havel proposed that the CSCE take on a broader role and responsibilities for peace and security in Europe. In February 1991, Prime Minister Antall of Hungary, President Havel of Czechoslovakia and President Walesa of Poland sign a mutual political cooperation accord.

(i) Relations with Slovakia

In December 1990, President Vaclav Havel asks Parliament for temporary special powers to prevent the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Leaders in Slovakia threatened to disregard the authority of the federal government if Parliament did not approve a measure that gives the Czech and Slovak regional regions greater autonomy. Parliament approved and enacted legislation that outlines the authority of the Czech and Slovak regional governments, giving the power over foreign policy, minority nationality questions, defence and the economy to the federal government. At the August 1992 talks in Brno on future relations between Slovakia and the Czechs, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar told reporters that the Czechoslovak federation would cease to exist by January 1, 1993. The Czech and Slovak republics subsequently agreed to a customs union and said they would divide the armed forces and maintain a joint currency. An important focus of foreign policy remained to maintain close

relations with Slovakia and other neighbouring eastern European states.

(ii) European Union

The Czech Republic was one of a number of central and eastern European states invited to begin negotiations in March 1998 on possible entry to the EU. The Czech government had emphasized the importance of close ties with eastern European states, especially Germany, its most important trading partner. The Czech public associated EU membership with a general misconception of the EU, competing visions of the future of the country and social, economic fears as well as fears about the partial loss of sovereignty. The domestic political parties could even be classed as pro-European, anti-European and euro-sceptical.⁵

(iii) Germany

In February 1992, President Havel and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl sign a treaty of friendship and 'neighbourly relations' in Prague. With the signing, Germany was pledged to support Czechoslovakia's entry into the EC. The treaty did not address compensation for Germans whose property in Czechoslovakia was confiscated when they were expelled from the country after World War II or Czechoslovakia's claims against Germany for damages incurred during the war. A joint declaration where Germany admitted it was to blame for the Nazi occupation and the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1939 was signed in December 1996, and the Czech apologized for the abuses of human rights committed during the deportation of ethnic Germans in 1945-6. Neither side could make claims, although a joint fund was established in January 1998 to finance projects benefiting the victims.

(b) Military Affairs

"Our effort to create certainties of a safety for the future has been of an extraordinary importance."⁶ The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (ACR) are now central to this certainty. The ACR, supported by the general public, "will be a reliable guarantee of the security of the state and a worthy partner within NATO."⁷ Among the measures taken in order to meet the requirements of NATO membership area;

- harmonizing recruiting legislation with those prevailing in the other member states of NATO;
- recruiting the right people for this participation;
- preparing domestic structures for the membership;
- adopting a new model of national security system based on the National Security Council as an advisory body to the government;
- adopting a new security strategy;
- restructuring the armed forces; and developing host nation capability.⁸

The attitudes of the Czech population toward accession to NATO changed between 1993 and 1998, and political, social and economic risks are now more broadly perceived.⁹ However, the entry of Czech Republic in March 1999 posed the problem of the reliability of intelligence and defence, just as many scandals were tarnishing the principal political leaders. In January 1999, the Czech counter-intelligence chief was dismissed for endangering the security of the state -- mistakes that could not be made public for reasons of national security. A UK diplomat was publicly named as the head of the Prague station of MI6, a serious blow to the reputation of the BISS (Czech Security Intelligence Service). In the Czech republic as in other transition states, it proved difficult to fight corruption and organized crime because the old cadres, with their links to Russia, are still in place. The coming to power of governments of the centre-right has not improved the situation.¹⁰

The problems faced by the Czech political leadership as it charted its

way through military reform and constructive participation in European security systems were considerable, and alliance integration will likely be difficult and time-consuming processes.¹¹ Accession to NATO has been associated with the preparation of appropriate legislative framework, the preparation of basic defence policy documents and the development of the armed forces and their active participation in peace operations.¹²

In 2000, the Czech armed forces will be adopting a process of defence planning that is standard within the Alliance. This process will define the future structure of the Armed Forces, introduce new defence legislation, update equipment, and improve social conditions for military professionals and conscripts.¹³

The ACR is fulfilling 52 Target Force Goals agreed on with NATO.¹⁴ The ACR development concept gives priority to personnel issues, given the current outflow of highly qualified and perspective personnel. While the Army of the Czech Republic cannot compete with the salaries of the flourishing private sector, it tries to stress the other advantages to military service: job security, housing, a newly developed preventive health care program, recreation for family members, and even education abroad.¹⁵

Table 6: The National Strategy of the Czech Republic

Values	individualism, materialism
Goals	security against unemployment, water/food shortages, population migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, religious fundamentalism, drug-trafficking, natural disasters, computer hacking
Tactics	foreign policy: Slovak relations, German relations, EU membership

	military affairs: NATO membership, reform of the ACR
Style	comprehensive and diverse

Notes

Chapter 5. The Aspiring Member: Romania

1. Introduction

Ukraine borders the former Socialist Republic of Romania to the north and east, Moldova to the northwest, Hungary to the northwest, Yugoslavia to the southwest and Bulgaria to the south. The Black Sea washes the southeast coast. The official language is Romanian with minority groups speaking Hungarian, German and other languages. Most inhabitants are Christians, with 84% professing Romanian Orthodox Catholicism. Formerly Part of Turkey's Ottoman Empire, Romania became an independent kingdom in 1881. It was an ally of Nazi Germany under the dictatorship of the fascist Iron Guard movement, and when the pro-German regime was overthrown, Soviet forces entered the country.

The Romania People's Republic was proclaimed in 1947. In 1952, the country adopted a Constitution similar to the Soviet model.

Georghiu-Dej became the unchallenged leader, implementing large-scale plans for industrialization of the country, despite the Soviet preference for agricultural goods. Ceausescu succeeded Georghiu-Dej in 1954, and continued his predecessor's relatively independent foreign policy. His use of foreign loans for investment in industry and infrastructure led to serious indebtedness, and by the early 1980s Romania was

experiencing severe economic problems. Ceausescu managed to maintain power by making frequent personnel changes in the party leadership and government. In October 1985, the country's long-running production difficulties in the energy sector led to an unprecedented crisis and a declaration of a state of emergency in the electric power industry.

Under the 1991 Constitution, the Parliament has a 343-seat Chamber of Deputies, the lower house, and a 143-seat Senate or upper house. Parliamentary representatives are elected by proportional representation every four years. The President of the Republic serves at most two 4-year terms and is elected directly. He appoints the Prime Minister, who in turn appoints the Council of Ministers.

II. Experimental Variables

Information about the Romanian national strategy is limited. The fall of the Ceausescu regime was followed by a strong nationalist mobilization. The population witnessed these revolutionary events on television, and new rituals and myths overrode the old ones, but only the social order was changed.¹ These awkward realities, as well as the institutionalization of the Romanian parliament since 1990, have been analyzed using political culture by Roper and

Crowther.²

A. National Value #1: The Rise of Individualism in the Sandpaper Revolution

In November 1989, President Nicolae Ceausescu told the Communist Party congress that Romania would continue to follow orthodox Communist policies. But in December 1989, President Nicolae Ceausescu criticized the Romanian Communist party and asked for improved consumer services. In Timisoara, security forces used water cannons, tear gas and gunfire, killing at least 2000, in a clash with thousands of demonstrators protesting the deportation of a dissident clergyman. Ceausescu blamed fascist elements for instigating the revolt and declared a state of emergency. Violent protests followed, with government troops again firing on demonstrators. In Timisoara, soldiers had joined the growing protest movement and army units fought with police. Army units joined protesters in Bucharest the following week, and forced Ceausescu from power. Fighting between the army and pro-Ceausescu security forces was heavy as the new government, the Council of National Salvation, arrested former government officials and took control of state-run television. Ceausescu and his wife fled as Romanian television reported finding mass graves in Timisoara, where security

forces buried as many as 4 000 protesters. The new government captured the Ceausescu and, after a secret trial, executed them by firing squad on Christmas Day. Ion Iliescu was named interim President by the new government, and over seventeen countries immediately recognized the government. Pro-Ceausescu forces began to surrender, and the government started easing authoritarian restrictions on such things as abortion and the registration of typewriters (!). The Communist Party then dissolved itself.

As special military courts started trying members of Ceausescu's security forces for shooting civilians, various political parties debated the best date for national election, eventually scheduled for April 1990. The Council of National Salvation outlawed the Communist Party and held a referendum on the death penalty. In March 1990, demonstrators in Bucharest and Timisoara protested the continued domination of Communists and the Securitate in the new government. Ethnic tensions began to emerge, with 2 000 nationalists attacking 5 000 ethnic Hungarian protesters in Transylvania, eventually having to be separated by government tanks and troops.

In May 1990, anti-government protesters walked out of a meeting with President Iliescu and asked for his resignation.

In the first free national elections in decades, the National Salvation Front (or NSF, composed of former Communists) won by a wide margin, a victory greeted by anti-government protests. In June, troops again shot anti-government demonstrators, killing at least four people, after protesters set fire to police headquarters and raided the state television offices. Thousands of miners from northern Romania travelled to Bucharest and attacked anti-government demonstrators, after President Iliescu asked them to rescue the country from a 'fascist rebellion.' The House of Deputies, where the National Salvation Front held a majority, voted to use force to end demonstrations.

In July, again in Timisoara, more than 10 000 protesters demanded the release of dissidents and the resignation of President Iliescu. For five nights in August, antigovernment demonstrators protesting Communist elements in the government clashed with police in Bucharest, the largest anti-government rallies since December 1989. In December 1990, more than 10 000 workers staged a three-day anti-government strike because of slow reforms. The anniversary of Ceausescu's overthrow saw massive rallies commemorating the people killed by security forces and a visit from King Michael, Romania's deposed monarch. In October 1992, President Iliescu won reelection and appointed

Nicolae Vacaroiu, a departmental head in the Economy Ministry under the previous government, as prime minister.

At the fifth anniversary of Ceausescu's overthrow in 1994, more than 15 000 demonstrators marched on Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu's offices in Bucharest, calling for the resignation of President Iliescu and the return of King Michael. In November 1996, Centrist Democratic Convention candidate Emil Constantinescu won the presidency with more than 53% of the vote.

Following extensive negotiations, a new coalition agreement was signed in February 1998 designed to stabilize the political situation and accelerate the economic reform program. A new cabinet was formed, including members of the centre-right coalition which had won the November 1996 general election. A quarter of a million health workers withdrew from the work place in February 1998, in order to get better salaries. Several government officials and foreign diplomats accredited in Bucharest were implicated in the smuggling of contraband cigarettes in May 1998. Homosexuality was decriminalized following repeated criticism of existing legislation by international human rights organizations.

The Minister of Health resigned in June 1998 after it was made public that he had been a Securitate informant, but by July 1998, the rest of the cabinet was cleared of links. That September, the Finance Minister was dismissed after he opposed Cabinet amendments to the budget which cut the army's funding by 3%. In October, the Privatization Minister resigned just before the US credit agency Standard and Poor's downgraded Romania's credit rating. The Prime Minister had often complained that privatization was moving too slowly. Romania's Alternative Party left the ruling coalition because the

country's economy was worsening and reforms were delayed, as did the ethnic Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania over the demand for a Hungarian language state university. In November 1998, the leaders of the ruling coalition parties agreed on a formula to restructure the government. The number of ministries was reduced from twenty-three to seventeen, with four new departments to report directly to the Prime Minister to increase the pace of reforms. Reforms have so far failed to win the confidence of investors and capital markets.

In April 1993, after forty-five years of exile in Switzerland, King Michael celebrated Romanian Orthodox Easter in Suceava. In October 1994, President Iliescu said King Michael's 'hope to return as king' was a threat to the constitutional order. As a result, the king was denied an entry visa in October but the government restored his citizenship and he returned in February 1997.

B. National Value #2 Materialism for an Economy in Disarray

The economic problems of Romania led to unrest and eventually the political revolution that was a feature of Christmas 1989. In October 1985, the long running production difficulties of the country's energy sector culminated in an unprecedented crisis and the declaration of a state of emergency in the electric power industry. Shortages of fuel and power led to strict energy rationing in early 1987. The situation was exacerbated by adverse weather conditions, and public discontent became evident: anti-government leaflets circulated and a number of strikes protested the food shortages and delays in payment of wages were organized in provincial factories. In March 1987, it was reported that certain vital factories and

mines were placed under military supervision to forestall the threat of further labour unrest. In his May 1987 visit to Bucharest, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised the desirability of economic reforms, a view he reiterated during Ceausescu's return visit to the USSR in October 1988. In November thousands of people marched through the city of Brasov and even stormed the local Romanian Communist Party (RCP) headquarters, over the decline in living standards and in working conditions. There were similar protests in Timisoara and other cities in December. President Ceausescu announced improvements in food supplies and increases in wages, but continued to oppose any reform of the economic system.

In March 1989, there was an open letter to the President from six retired Romanian Communist party (RCP) officials accusing him of disregard for the Constitution, economic mismanagement, and discrimination using the rural urbanization program imposed on the ethnic Hungarians. The unrest spread (and a variety of other political events occurred, described above) until Ceausescu was captured while attempting to flee and was executed after a summary trial.

In October 1990, Prime Minister Petre Roman introduced laws to accelerate Romania's transition to a market economy. The new rules privatized state-owned enterprises and allowed free-market prices for nonessential goods.

In November 1990, for a week, demonstrators throughout the country protested price increases on consumer goods. The increases were the result of the government's decision to lift price controls on November 1. Economic discontent remained the focus of the politics of the country to this day.

III. The Independent Variable: National Strategy

A. The Previous Strategy

Romania was a member of the Warsaw Pact until the organization's dissolution in 1991. However, Romania did not participate in military exercises, nor did it allow Warsaw Pact troops on its soil. With the values being individualism and materialism, Romania should choose a direct strategy of action.

B. Components of Strategy

1. The Goal

The goal of the successive governments since the end of the Ceasescu regime has been to develop the market economy in Romania.

2. The Style

During the communist era, numerous social and political constraints limited civic engagement in communities throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Such lingering effects have slowed the process of democratization in Romania, where people discuss politics less, engage in interactive forms of political participation at lower rates and know less about their neighbours than similarly situated communities in the US. They also fail to link the interests of people in the community to broader political judgments.³ A study of elite attitudes carried out in 1998 showed that Romanians intellectuals held a neo-traditionalist discourse whereas the Magyar or Hungarian Romanians held a conservative, historicizing discourse, when looking beyond the official statements.⁴ Moreover, Leninist and byzantine traditions have coalesced in uniquely cynical and manipulative formation of authoritarian mentalities and practices in Romania, which may explain why the Romania path is a different one.⁵

3. The tactics

(a) Economic affairs

After Ceausescu's overthrow, a complete restructuring of the economy was planned, with emphasis on the market forces and private ownership. In late 1991, a unified exchange rate was introduced and the internal convertibility of the currency, the lei, was established. Foreign businesses were initially reluctant to invest in the country. In early 1993, the government announced a four-year economic reform program supported by the IMF. This plan included progressive elimination of price subsidies for staple goods and services, removal of controls on interest and exchange rates, trade liberalization, accelerated privatization and reduction in inflation.

Under the government's decollectivization program, 46% of the agricultural land was returned to original owners by early 1994. By 1995, 80% of the farmland had been privatized, but the agricultural GDP declined by an annual average of 1.4%. Industry in 1995 accounted for 42.5% of GDP and declined by an average of 2.1% between 1990-95. Manufacturing, a sector employing one-quarter of the labour force, was hampered by shortages of electricity and raw materials, and output increased by 3.3% between 1980 and 1990, but declined by 18.7% in 1990 and continued to fall through 1993. Recovery began in 1994-95.

Romania had a trade deficit of US\$2.4 billion, with both the principal source of imports and market for exports being Germany and Italy. The overall budget deficit for 1994 was 2.9% of GDP, with an external debt of US\$8.3 billion. The cost of servicing the debt was 13% of the income from exports of goods and services. The government implemented a price liberalization program

which led to an average annual rate of inflation of 117% from 1991 to 1996. It was 256% in 1993, and 155% in 1997, with unemployment rates of 8-9%. The Finance Minister was dismissed because reforms were too slow and were not meeting the requirements for World Bank credits.

By late 1995, the situation appeared to have improved, despite austerity measures leading to considerable unrest. But in 1996 the economic performance deteriorated, with an increase in inflation, current account deficit and import expenditure as a result of currency devaluation. During the first half of 1997 the IMF and the World Bank achieved some economic reform, reducing the current account deficit and liberalizing most state controlled prices.

In 1996, the GNP was estimated at \$US 36.2 billion, having increased at an average 0.1% annually. Over the same period the population decreased by an average 0.4%. The GDP increased by an average of 0.5% annually during 1980-90, but there was no appreciable increase from 1990 to 1996. In 1996 it grew by 4.5% but declined by 6.65% in 1997.

From mid-1997, though, increasing prices and plans for closure of unprofitable state-owned enterprises provoked social and labour unrest. By September 1997, though, there were over 40 000 state enterprises remaining to be sold. Disputes within the ruling coalition of political parties contributed the slowing pace of reform, and inflation had by the end of the year increase dramatically. Real GDP had declined by 7%. Escalating political instability stalled economic reform and delayed the budget in 1998. The Vasil government promised to encourage foreign investment in April 1998.

In December 1998, the legislature approved the government restructuring plan, and the first state-owned bank in Romania was privatized. The January

1999 strike by coal miners in Jiu escalated into Romania's worst incidence of civil disorder since protesting miners caused the fall of the government in September 1991. The Interior Minister was forced to resign amid accusations of incompetence. The leader of the miners, having been sentenced to eighteen years in prison for his role in the riots, began a protest march on Bucharest with 2000 supporters on February 16, 1999. Four people died in the protest's clashes with police.

In January 2000, the government restarted talks with the IMF about conditions attached to the second instalment of their slice of their standby credit agreement. Prime Minister Mugur Isarescu announced a major financial reform program to satisfy the stringent conditions and revive the struggling economy, cutting public expenditure and overhauling the tax system. Analysts agreed that unless Romania received financial assistance it would face difficulties in meeting external obligations. While there has been progress, obstacles to liberalizing the economy, foreign policy and politics are considerable when dismantling an economic and social system inherited from Communist.⁶

A leaked banking scandal threw Romanian investors into panic, resulting in the collapse of a national investment fund. The information leak - apparently politically motivated - was the first in a string of events aimed at weakening the current government. The scandal combined with success at the polls in recent elections strengthened the hand of the formerly Communist Social Democrats. Supporters of the ruling Christian Democratic Party largely boycotted local elections on May 4 and, along with low voter turnout, helped throw the elections to the Social Democrats. In November, the country will

hold parliamentary and presidential elections. The public's awareness of the corruption surrounding the banking sector suggests an imminent collapse of the Romanian administration. If the Social Democrats can continue to expose government corruption while influencing voters at the municipal level, they may be able to manipulate mass sentiment enough to position themselves for a win in November.

Poverty took its toll on national well-being. The health figures for this period were not reassuring: owing to persistent shortages of food, many Romanians were believed to be suffering from malnutrition. International attention focussed on the orphanages of large numbers of unwanted and neglected children, many of whom suffer from AIDS, hepatitis and other serious illnesses.

(b) Ethnic Policy and the Extreme Right

In September 1992, in Bucharest, Germany and Romania signed a pact in which Romania agreed to accept back all its citizens who were there illegally.

About 50 000 Romanians in Germany were affected, most of them Romany (i.e. Gypsies). Germany contributed \$US 20 million to fund the deportations and job training in Romania for the returnees. In May 1993, Romany leaders from fourteen countries and government representatives from eleven countries met to address human rights and other issues that affect Romany communities. After more than thirty murders of Romany in Romania and the former Czechoslovakia, and after economic instability increased in the region, tens of thousands fled to wealthier nations.

The Social Democracy Party of Romania announced in November 1998 that it would boycott the legislature until the ruling coalition had pledged to

respect the opposition's right to express its views in the legislature. The Senate had refused to discuss a motion against President Constatinescu about alleged abuses and illegal actions. Extreme right parties announced in November 1998 that they were merging.

(c) Political Instability

The Ciorbea government got notable results in economic stabilization and normalization of relations with neighbouring countries. But the chances of furthering the reconstruction of the country were lost by instability. The crisis in the governing coalition, because of differing views by various parties, the lack of political and technical experience and the rivalries for power, put these gains at risk. In 1997 and 1998, the political crises became institutional, where the new government found itself with the same heavy problems faced by its predecessors.⁷ In March 1998, Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea resigned, then eighteen months later Prime Minister Vasile was dismissed because they could not control the five-party ruling coalition and have the government function properly. Ten government ministers resigned from their posts during the same period.

(d) Military Affairs

Military service is compulsory in Romania, lasting 12 months in the army and air force and 18 months in the navy. In August 1997, active forces totalled 226 950, including 127 000 conscripts, with the army at 129 000 (90 000 of them conscripts), navy at 17 000 and air force at 47 000. There were also 22 0000 border guards, a gendarmerie of 10 0000 and a security guard of 47 000, all of which are under the control of the Minister of the Interior. The 1997 budget allocated 5.5 billion lei to defence.

The Romanian state no longer realized its claims to sovereignty on the basis of historical territoriality and became oriented to transborder as well as territorial constituencies. Globalization has stimulated greater involvement of transworld and regional agencies in governance. This rise of supraterritoriality has also encouraged some devolution and some privatization of regulatory authority in Romania, posing substantial challenges for democracy.⁸

In January 1994, Romania became the first former Warsaw pact state to join NATO's Partnership for Peace program. In August 1995 Romania peacekeeping troops were dispatched to Angola as the first Romanian forces to participate in an international UN military operation. The victory of pro-European forces in the 1996 elections brought to an end the post-communist regime.

After the 1996 victory, The new government embarked on a policy of reconciliation with Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and concentrated its efforts on its bid to join NATO.⁹ There was no popular backlash when NATO accepted Hungary's application but declined Romania in July 1997.¹⁰ However, enthusiasm for post-nationalist initiatives waned. In all probability, NATO will not start enlargement negotiations with Romania in 2002. Early entry into NATO would do little to solve the basic structural difficulties in Romania, which have little to do with the West and its supposedly failed promises. Rather, the current government will probably not survive the 2000 elections and for the next government the economic reforms will matter far more than the issue of NATO enlargement.¹¹

Table 7: The National Strategy of Romania

Values	individualism, materialism
Goals	economic development
Tactics	economic policy, ethnic policy, military affairs, efforts for stability
Style	historical, elitist

Notes

1. Introduction

Bulgaria lies in the eastern Balkans, bounded by Romania to the north, by Turkey and Greece to the south, by Yugoslavia to the west and by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the southwest. The Black Sea washes its east coast. The majority of its 8.4 million people are Christian, most of them Bulgarian Orthodox, although there is a substantial minority of Muslims. The official language is Bulgarian, with Turkish and Macedonian minorities.

Legislative power is held by the unicameral National Assembly, comprising 240 members elected for four years by universal adult suffrage. The president of the republic is head of state, and he is elected directly by the voters for five years. The President is also Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Council of Ministers is the highest level of state administration and is elected by the National Assembly. Bulgaria is divided into nine regions for territorial administration.

II. Independent Variables

A. National Value #1: the Individualism of a Fledgling Democracy.

The transition to democracy was hampered by individualism

so intense political parties and governments failed to be cohesive. The first signs of major changes was the creation of a nine-party coalition by Bulgaria's leading opposition groups, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The Communist Party purged the Politburo, and General Secretary Petar Mladenov advocated the Communist monopoly on power, the adoption of a multiparty system, constitutional reform and open elections.

In January 1990, government officials met with the UDF to discuss free elections, amid widespread violence between Bulgaria's Slavic majority and its minority ethnic Turks. Thousands of Slavs in Sofia and three other cities protested new laws granting Turks religious and cultural freedom. Parliament abrogated the Communist Party's constitutional monopoly of power. Former Communist party General Secretary Todor Zhivkov was charged with inciting ethnic hostilities and corruption.

In June 1990, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the former Communist party, won 48% of the vote in parliamentary elections, with the opposition UDF taking 34%. The Bulgarian Communist Party retained office in the immediate aftermath of the change in regime and was never able to break with its legacy. It also retained public affection and that allowed it

to win votes in difficult economic circumstances. As the BSP recognized the need for firm measures, reinforced by pressure from external economic agencies like the IMF and combined with an unwillingness or inability to implement these measures, it fell into disarray, and changed its leadership in December 1996, only to lose the April 1997 elections and later split.¹ More than 50 000 anti-Communist demonstrators rallied in Sofia, and opposition leaders vowed to fight former Communists and refused to form a coalition government with them. In July 1990, President Petar Mladenov resigned after ordering tanks to suppress the December protests. Intellectuals in Sofia demonstrated until their demands were met. Bulgaria's first freely elected Parliament in forty years convened, with Zhivkov agreeing to answer charges before it. In August 1990, Parliament elected Zhelyu Zhelev, the UDF leader, as President. Fifteen thousand rioters stormed the Socialist party headquarters and set fire to the building to protest continued Communist influence.

In November 1990, 70 000 protesters, angered by food shortages and rationing, demanded Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov's resignation. Police then clashed with about 200 000 anti-government protesters as Parliament debated an economic austerity budget. After the Socialist government won a confidence vote, more than 30 000 progovernment demonstrators rallied. Tens of thousands of workers across the country struck in an attempt to force the government to resign. After the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, the largest labour organization in the country, joined the strike, Lukanov resigned.

In December 1990, Parliament chooses Dimitar Popov, a politically

independent judge who helped organize the first elections, as Prime Minister.

Parliament approved a multiparty government, retaining former Communists in 8 out of 18 portfolios. In November 1991, Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov appointed Bulgaria's first non-Communist Cabinet in forty-seven years.

In January 1992, Velko Valkanov of the Socialist Party won the first freely elected direct presidential elections in Bulgaria.

In December 1996, Prime Minister Videnov and his entire cabinet resigned en masse, after being widely blamed for two years of economic hardship. In January 1997, thousands of protesters gathered in front of Socialist Party headquarters in Sofia, demanding that the party give up power and schedule early elections. Protesters trapped 100 Socialist legislators inside the parliament building in Sofia to force new elections, but police rescued them the next day. Then Ivan Kostov, leader of the UDF, called for a nationwide strike. President Zhelev supported the protests. Elections were called, in which the UDF coalition won a resounding victory. Four liberal parties, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the New Choice Liberal Alliance, the Liberal Democratic Alternative and the Free Radical Democratic party, joined to establish the Liberal Democratic Alliance. The Bulgarian Social Democratic Party and the United Labour Bloc created a new alliance, the Social Democracy Union (SDU) in December 1998. The legislature abolished the death penalty, a necessary step to enter the European Union.

In January 1997, nationwide daily anti-government demonstrations and strikes got under way. The governing Socialist Party abandoned its attempt to form a new government and agreed to hold general elections by April 20, 1997. The BSP convened on February 2-3 and approved a new cabinet headed by Interior

Minister Nikolay Dobrev. Around half the members, including the Finance minister, had held portfolios in the previous administration. In February 1997 the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party allowed President Stoyanov to call a general election in April and appoint a new interim Cabinet. The BSP blocked an effort by the UDF to implement a financial package, including amendments to the budget, the central bank-law and profits-tax legislation, to pave the way for the introduction of a currency board system.

On April 19, 1997, the democratic opposition in Bulgaria won an unprecedented victory in the parliamentary elections. It had taken Bulgaria seven years to resign itself to radical reforms, and five years of purgatory for the UDF to overcome the failure of the Dimitrov government. The 1997 UDF has little to do with the vehement and quarrelsome coalition it was before Kostov became leader having devoted considerable resources to the development of a coherent style and a homogenisation of the platform.²

Five to seven years after the collapse of communism, there was severe internal criticism of the implementation of reforms and deep distrusts of politicians and officials whose behaviour was seen as worse than in the communist era. Yet, on balance the majority also supported the principles of the market economy, privatization, restitution of property, democratization and the multiparty system.³

In January 1998, at least 30 000 people were demonstrating in Sofia against the government. Stoyanov was sworn in as president and immediately called for new parliamentary elections. Socialist Party leaders said that they would form a new government with former Interior Minister Nikolai Dobrev as leader, but that they were willing to hold elections in the

fall, a year early. The elections were observed by a team from the Council of Europe, whose leader declared that the contest had been free and fair.

B. National Value #2: Materialism -- an Ill-Managed Transition to the Market System

Between 1989 and 1998, despite the continuity of political and economic elites, some revolutionary changes occurred. Power had been shifting away from the politicians towards the economic specialists, who had a vested interest in maintaining a strong state sector. However, the Bulgarian economy entered a severe decline in the late 1980s. Output in most of the economic sectors was sharply reduced and there was a sharp rise in unemployment and inflation. Market reforms started out on the wrong foot, and the economy is now regarded as that of a developing nation.

In an effort to prevent total economic collapse, the government introduced an extensive program of privatization and restructuring of the banking system, under a planned transition to a market economy starting in 1990. In 1991, Bulgaria adopted austerity measures to meet the conditions for IMF loans. These structural reforms, however, were impeded by the political dissension described earlier.

In June 1991, at a ceremony in Budapest, representatives of the 9 member countries -- Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam -- signed an agreement formally dissolving the CMEA. In August 1991, more than 21 000 miners went on strike, demanding that the governments improve working conditions, raise salaries, and not close mines in the area. In September 1992, Todor Zhivkov, the Communist leader of the country from 1962 to 1989, was convicted of embezzling \$US 24

million and sentenced to seven years in prison. That October, the non-Communist government led by Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov resigned after losing a no-confidence vote in Parliament, over the country's failing economy and arm sales to warring parties in Yugoslavia.

The economic picture continued to deteriorate seriously. By 1995, Bulgaria recorded a trade surplus of US\$121 million, but a deficit of US\$25.6 million on balance of payments. In 1996, that trade deficit grew by 2000%.⁴ Bulgaria's overall budget deficit ballooned to 46.17 billion leva by 1995, with an external debt of US\$10.9 billion. The cost of the debt-servicing was 19% of revenue. The annual rate of inflation averaged 106% between 1990 and 1995, was 123% in 1996, with 12.5% unemployment.

On his first day in office, February 13, 1996, Prime Minister Sofianski appointed himself head of a new special working council to stabilise the economy. This council's mandate was to negotiate with other states and international financial institutions to get basic foods for Bulgarians and to stabilise the balance of payments. An IMF mission agreed on March 17, 1996 to US\$ 658 million assistance, the Bulgarian economy having virtually collapsed.

The package included the establishment of a currency control board system in June, which the government secured by accelerating the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and banks. Prime Minister Sofianski also bravely presented on national television the stabilisation program which cut as many as 58 000 jobs. Wages would be increased by 70% on April 1, 1997, and all prices would be freed from control apart from temporary subsidies on some staples like bread and milk. The IMF package also included the liberalisation of trade and prices, the removal of obstacles facing foreign investors and the

liquidation of unviable companies.

In May 1996, the government was forced to take emergency measures after the currency collapsed on the heels of declining foreign-exchange and gold reserves: these include reforms in banking and privatization, and closure of unprofitable state-owned companies. Widespread hardship was exacerbated by shortages of grain and energy. The IMF nonetheless suspended the disbursement of funds in 1996. The government then increased central interest rates to 300% after a run on currency and bank deposits. The move failed and the lev declined sharply again. In his first act as Prime Minister, on May 21, 1997, Ivan Kostov demanded the resignation of the president of the State Savings Bank. This bank, used by most Bulgarians for their savings, had been issuing bad loans to companies with links to the Bulgarian Socialist Party and failing to protect the interests of savers. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced new loans for \$300 million US.

In June 1997, the National Assembly passed various pieces of legislation paving the way for the IMF-backed economic policies. The currency board system prevented the government from borrowing from the Bulgarian National Bank to finance budget deficits, and accelerated the modernisation and stabilisation of the economy in preparation for eventual EU membership. It also stopped the BNB from refinancing commercial banks with bad debts. In July 1997, the government eased trade of mass privatisation shares and allowed the immediate sale of enterprises with capitalization exceeding \$US20 million.

In September 1997, the World Bank announced that the US\$1 billion paid out to Bulgarian banks during 1996-97 had been returned to the banking system

since the currency board started, two months before. This success was attributed in part to a rapid decline in the rate of inflation, and increased competitiveness in foreign markets. In November 1997, the National Assembly approved a law for the return of all property confiscated by the Communists. The 1998 budget accelerated privatization with 80% of publicly owned enterprises, while projecting an inflation rate of 35%.

In July 1998, Bulgaria joined the central European Free Trade Agreement, a first step toward accession to the EU, hoping to increase the total trade volume by 30%. The government also privatised 21 companies in the defence industry. The Japanese government agreed in September to US\$120 million loans, repayable over 30 years, to modernize the port trading the most with Central Asia. The lev was pegged to the Euro from January 1999 on, after being pegged to the Deutschmark since mid-1997.

III. Dependent Variable: The National Strategy

A. The Previous Strategy

Soviet troops occupied Bulgaria in 1944. The left-wing alliance seized power with help from the USSR. The first postwar election elected the Bulgarian Communist Party to a majority in the national assembly. All opposition parties were abolished and a new Constitution, based on the Soviet model, was adopted in 1947. Bulgaria was then designated a People's Republic.

Todor Zhivkov was the fourth Communist party leader in a row to rule Bulgaria, taking office in 1954. After an anti-Communist conspiracy was

discovered by Soviet intelligence, a new Constitution was adopted in 1971, and Zhivkov, who had enjoyed the title of Prime Minister, became President, restyled General Secretary in 1981. The people had to wait to 1988 to see the nomination of non-Communist candidates. The same year, several prominent proponents of the Soviet-style program of reform were dismissed. The previous strategy was therefore one of Soviet style state and policies.

B. The Prediction

A materialist, individualist nation is going to choose a direct strategy of action.

C. The New Strategy

The strategy is now one of national salvation, with annual plans called Bulgaria 2000, Bulgaria 2001, and so on.

D. Components of Strategy

1. The Goal

The *Narodno Sobranie* (National Assembly), passed a declaration of national consensus in May 1997, which supported the following:

- Bulgaria's agreements with the international financial institutions including the introduction of the currency board;
- a redistribution of the social burden;
- accelerated and real restoration of ownership of agricultural land and its real utilisation;
- a struggle against organised crime and corruption;
- declassifying personal police files of politicians, court officials and administrators;
- full-fledged membership of the EU and all specific efforts to this end, as well as membership of NATO.

Following the 1997 formation of a UDF government, the priorities did not change: the implementation of IMF reforms, the accelerated return of

agricultural land to rightful owners and Bulgarian accession to the EU and NATO.

2. The Style

Foreign policy, the policy of national security and domestic policy are all closely interwoven. Europe represents both the civilizational identity and the political future of Bulgaria. A successful foreign policy depends on the united will and effort of the nation.

3. The Core Idea

The National Salvation program, and its successors Bulgaria 2000 and Bulgaria 2001, were launched in May 1997. The program reflected a real desire for dialogue and openness, and for normalized relations between the executive and the National Assembly.⁵ The economic reforms and policies for the stabilisation of the currency were designed to benefit the country even if privatisation was slowed by lack of political consensus. The government worked toward a harmonisation of legislation in a perspective of adhering to both the European Union and NATO.⁶

4. The Tactics

(a) Foreign Policy

The way in which foreign policy is decided is one of the factors considered for admission to NATO and the EU. Foreign policy is developed by close cooperation and unanimous decision-making by the President of the Republic, the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers, under conditions of transparency and with the full participation of the civil society. Bulgaria's foreign policy is meant to secure favourable international

conditions for creating a modern market economy and a developed democracy. Foreign policy plays a central role in establishing reliable outside security guarantees and stimulating real reforms at minimum expense.

The foreign policy includes accelerated preparation to join NATO, various initiatives to join the EU, a regional policy, the protection of Bulgarians abroad, broadening relations with Western countries to stimulate trade and investment, bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet states if they can help entering NATO and the EU, broader economic relations with the Middle East, Far East, Latin America and Africa, participation in international organizations, and the reform of the diplomatic service. Bulgaria also sought membership in the IMF, the International Bank for Economic Cooperation, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Group, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRI), and even the *Organisation internationale de la francophonie*.

i) Membership in the European Union

The National Salvation program adopted in May 1997 by the National Assembly allowed Bulgaria to begin its preparations for entering into the European Union. The program to accede **to the EU includes:**

- **developing a national strategy for membership negotiations;**
- **meeting the political standards of Europe in the democratic reforms in Bulgaria;**
- **bringing the national legislation and administration into line with European legislation and administrative accountability;**
- **bringing Bulgarian trade policy into line with European Union trade policy;**
- **preparing the Bulgarian economy to meet the challenges of the European market;**
- participating in the EU dialogue about a common foreign and security policy;
- negotiating better or abolishing visa regimes for Bulgarian citizens for

- the EU;
- developing a pro-EU education and information campaign;
- participating in the scientific, technological and training programs of the EU; and
- improving the regional infrastructure and economic integration of South Eastern Europe.

Despite the Bulgarian efforts, however, the European Commission concluded that it is not yet ready to confront European economic competition. Political stability since April 1997 has consolidated public support to entry in the European Union.⁷

ii) Relations Within the Region

Diplomatic relations with several Western nations were reestablished in 1990 and 1991, and in mid-1992 Bulgaria became a member of the Council of Europe. Bulgaria's establishment of formal relations with the ex-Yugoslav republic of Macedonia in January 1992 promoted some harsh reactions from the Greek government. Relations with Greece appeared to improve, however, after the visit of the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Athens in May 1992.

In June 1992, Bulgaria, together with six former Soviet republics and four other countries, established the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Group, an economic zone complementary to the EU. In October 1992, Bulgaria joined the World Trade Organization. In November 1993, Macedonia expressed its desire to establish full diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, and in the following month Bulgaria announced that it was to open an embassy in Skopje and relax border procedures between the two countries. In May 1994, Bulgaria became the WEU's associate partner.

Relations with Russia improved in 1992, following the signing of cooperation agreements, and the visit of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, to Sofia in August. Reciprocal visits by the premiers of Bulgaria and Russia in

1995 further improved relations between the two countries. In late 1996 a Russian and Bulgarian parliamentarians established a joint forum for the discussion of issues of mutual interest.

Relations with neighbouring Turkey have strained intermittently since the mid-80s, when the Zhivkov regime began a campaign of forced assimilation of Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority, about 10% of the total population of Bulgaria. Ethnic Turks were forced to adopt Slavic names prior to the December 1985 census, and were banned from practising Islamic religious rites.

In 1986 the Bulgarian Government denied that more than 250 ethnic Turks had been arrested or imprisoned for refusing to accept new identity cards, or that many more ethnic Turks had been forced to resettle. In February 1988, Bulgaria and Turkey signed a protocol to further bilateral economic and social relations, but relations deteriorated when the Bulgarian army violently suppressed Turkish demonstrations against continued assimilation a year later.

In June 1989, more than 80 000 ethnic Turks were expelled from Bulgaria, although the Bulgarian authorities claimed that the Turks had chosen to settle in Turkey after passport regulations were relaxed. In response, the Turkish government opened the borders and declared its commitment to accepting all ethnic Turks as refugees from Bulgaria, and by mid-August an estimated 310 000 Bulgarian Turks had crossed into Turkey. In late August the alarmed Turkish closed the border, and more than 100 000 Bulgarian Turks, disillusioned with the conditions in Turkey, began to return. The Turkish Government repeatedly sought discussions with the Bulgarian government, under the auspices of the UN High commissioner for Refugees, to establish Bulgarian Turks's rights and to develop a clear immigration policy. In January 1990, anti-Turkish

demonstrations were held in the Kurdshali district of southern Bulgaria, in protest to the government's declared intention to restore civil and religious rights to the ethnic Turkish minority. Despite continuing demonstrations by Bulgarian nationalists, legislation permitted ethnic Turks and Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarian Muslims) to use their original Islamic names. Nonetheless, inter-ethnic disturbances continued, particularly in the Kurdshali region during 1990. By 1991 the government decreed that Turkish be taught as an optional subject four times weekly in the regions concerned, following which the ethnic Turkish political party ended a boycott on school attendance. Friendly relations between Bulgaria and Turkey were restored by late 1991. By 1993 ethnic tensions had generally been contained in Bulgaria, although there were reports of some disturbances between ethnic Turks and ethnic Bulgarian Muslims in the south of Bulgaria in September.

Macedonians represent another minority in Bulgaria. Bulgaria denies the existence of a separate Macedonian identity and argues that the establishment of the Macedonian nation undermines its national unity. After the collapse of the Federative Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and the consequent independence of the Macedonian state in 1991, Bulgaria renewed its questions about the legitimacy of Macedonian nationhood, although it formally recognized the Republic of Macedonia. None of the fundamental tensions over the Macedonian question have been fully resolved, and the issue remains both important and explosive in Sofia politics.⁸ The Prime Ministers of Bulgaria and Macedonia signed a declaration in February 1999 that stated that neither country had a claim on the territory of the other. NATO's bombing campaign in Kosovo had severe political, economic and psychological consequences for both Bulgaria and Macedonia, leading to rapprochement over stabilization of the

Balkans.⁹

In January 2000, the prime ministers of six countries bordering Yugoslavia joined Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan Kostov for a summit. The heads of Bulgaria, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia, Hungary, Macedonia and Romania agreed that the economic sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia were having grave effects on the regional economy, but that these punitive measures were both necessary and important political tool.¹⁰

(b) military affairs

Military service is compulsory for men in Bulgaria, and it lasts for eighteen months. The total strength of the armed forces is about 101 000, including 49 000 conscripts with 50 000 in the army, 19000 in the air force, a navy of about 6 000, 22 000 centrally controlled staff and about 3 000 Ministry of Defence staff. Paramilitary forces include about 12 000 border guards, 18 000 railway and construction troops and 4 0000 security police. Defence expenditures in 1995 were estimated at 24 000 million leva or about 6.3% of total government expenditure. It has been a member of the Partnership for Peace program of military cooperation since February 1994.

i) Reform of the Armed Forces

In 1997, the Bulgarian President dismissed the armed forces' chief of staff, Col. Gen. Totomiro, and replaced him with a 'modern European' thinker, Col. Gen. Mikho Mikhov. Mikhov then outlined the plan for reform of the armed forces: (1) the conscript army would be replaced with a professional one; (2) the armed forces would offer professional soldiers three year contracts in September 1997; and (3) personnel would be reduced 10%. The reforms must also allow the Bulgarian army to remain viable and to discharge its Constitution-sanctioned duties under severe financial constraints. Personnel, structure

and organization changes reduced numbers but increased efficiency and compatibility with NATO.

The development of civilian control of the armed forces is one of the main principles of NATO governance. The Bulgarian government has adopted a number of measures, including:

- making the budget of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) public;
- using the MOD budgetary system for civilian control of military spending;
- bringing the ratio between administrators and servicemen into line with the NATO armed forces;
- defining the joint civilian and military management of the armed forces;
- using military education and career development to train staff to NATO standards and roles;
- restructuring economic activity in the Ministry of Defence;
- ensuring that maintenance, manufacturing and development in the Ministry of Defence will meet NATO specifications;
- shifting procurement to a bid system;
- having all personnel fight misuse and corruption; and
- privatizing some military production.

A plan for the Bulgarian army's organization and structure in 1997-2010 was drawn up and the Programme for the Recovery, Modernisation and Rearming of the Bulgarian Army up to 2015 was updated in conformity with that plan. The Government approved amendments to the Law on Defence and Armed Forces in support of reform. The government's resolve for reform is intense: in March 1998, the President dismissed another high-ranking officer for his severe criticism of the government decision to reduce the size of the armed forces, remarks which were supported by a large number of military officers.

ii) Program to Accede to NATO

In February 1996, Prime Minister Sofianski announced his intention to apply for full NATO membership, the first time that the Bulgarian government spoke unequivocally in favour of NATO membership. In October 1997, Presidents Stoyanov of Bulgaria, Constantinescu of Romania and Demirel of Turkey pledged

closer cooperation in the battle against organised crime and advocated Bulgarian and Romanian accession to NATO to promote security and stability.

The government has charged the armed forces with:

- enhancing individual dialogue with NATO;
- accelerating the application of the NATO standards in security and defence policy;
- improving the operational compatibility of the armed forces of Bulgaria and NATO;
- developing a security concept and a military doctrine consistent with NATO;
- participating in peacekeeping operations for the UN, the OSCE, the Western European Union (WEU), and the EU;
- developing mutual agreements for military, military-technical and military-industrial cooperation with NATO or NATO applicants; and
- lobbying in favour of the application to NATO among member countries, using the usual diplomatic methods and the communities of Bulgarians abroad.

iii) Regional Security and Stability

The Bulgarian policy of regional security and stability is an instrument of the contemporary preventive diplomacy. Bulgaria contributes to prevention of tensions, crisis and conflicts in South Eastern Europe with the development, implementation and actualization of bilateral and multilateral regional measures and the enforced demilitarization of boundary regions. Bulgaria advocates an Information Behaviour Code for governments in the region, as well as regional programs to fight against organized crime and international terrorism. Bulgaria also supports measures favouring economic development, including investment in infrastructure, transcontinental transport and communication channels in the region, and oil and gas pipelines from Asia through Europe passing through Bulgaria.

In February 1993, government forces on the Danube River detained a

Greek-owned ship, the *Adventure*, carrying 5000 tons of steel from Serbia and suspected of violating the total economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia by the UN last May 1992. Earlier the same month, the government signed its first cooperation agreement with Albania since the end of the cold war. It pledged, along with Greece, to help contain the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April 1999, Bulgaria granted NATO airplanes access to Bulgarian air territory, although it did not consider itself to be at war with Yugoslavia.

(c) Fight Against Crime

In October 1997, President Stoyanov hosted a summit meeting in Varna attended by Constantinescu of Romania and Demirel of Turkey. They issued a joint declaration pledging closer cooperation in the battle against organised crime in the region. At the meeting with US President Clinton in Washington in February 1998, President Stoyanov undertook to support the US initiative to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes in southeastern Europe, including the discouragement of organised crime.

Table 8: The National Strategy of Bulgaria

Values	individualism, materialism
Strategy	National Salvation, Bulgaria 2000, Bulgaria 2001
Goals	agreements with international financial institutions; redistribution of social burden; restoration of land ownership; struggle against organised crime and corruption;

	declassifying personal police files of politicians and public servants; membership in NATO and EU
Tactics	foreign policy: EU membership, regional stability, fight against crime defence: armed forces reform, NATO membership
Style	interwoven foreign/defence/domestic policies; European civilizational identity; national mobilization

Notes

NATO's expanded role and mandate now includes the political and the economic. Accordingly, this study has examined the political and economic dimensions of national strategy of all the participants involved. This allows for an analysis of the strategic interactions between each country and NATO, as well as interactions between each of the countries.

I. Summary Tables

NATO has adopted a communitarian value while the states studied here have all become more individualist. This communitarianism is reflected in the decision to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Genuine integration, to say nothing of interoperability, will take at least a decade and relations will be uneasy for the foreseeable future.

Table 9: NATO-Poland Strategic Interactions

Components	NATO	Poland	Interaction
Values	communitarianism, non-materialism	individualism, materialism	antithetical
Goals	security of Europe	consolidation of state security and independence, optimal economic and social development, worthy political and social position in world	synergistic
Tactics	cooperation, dialogue, collective defence	National security foreign policy, economic interest	mixed; see below
Style	defensive, indivisible, equitable	comprehensive, lawful, principled, ideally defensive	compatible

Table 10: NATO-Czech Strategic Interactions

Components	NATO	Czech Republic	Interaction
Values	communitarianism, non-materialism	individualism, materialism	antithetical
Goals	security of Europe	comprehensive security	complementary
Tactics	cooperation, dialogue, collective defence	foreign policy: Slovak relations, Visegrad group, German relations, EU membership military affairs: NATO membership, reform of the ACR	complementary
Style	defensive, indivisible, equitable	comprehensive and diverse	neutral

Table 11: NATO-Romania Strategic Interactions

Components	NATO	Romania	Interaction
Values	communitarianism, non-materialism	individualism, materialism	antithetical
Goals	security of Europe	economic development	neutral
Tactics	cooperation, dialogue, collective defence	economic policy, ethnic policy, military affairs, efforts for stability	complementary
Style	defensive, indivisible, equitable	historical, elitist	antithetical

Table 12: NATO-Bulgaria Strategic Interactions

Components	NATO	Bulgaria	Interaction
Values	communitarianism , non- materialism	individualism, materialism	antithetical
Strategy		National Salvation; Bulgaria 2001	neutral
Core Idea	--		--
Goals	security of Europe	agreements with international financial institutions; redistribution of social burden; restoration of land ownership; struggle against organised crime and corruption; declassifying personal police files of politicians and public servants; membership in NATO and EU	synergistic
Tactics	cooperation, dialogue, collective defence	foreign policy: EU membership, regional stability, fight against crime defence: armed forces reform, NATO membership	mixed; see below
Style	defensive, indivisible, equitable	interwoven foreign/ defence/domestic policies; European civilizational identity; national mobilization	compatible

Table 13: Polish-Czech Strategic Interactions

Components	Poland	Czech Republic	Interaction
Values	individualism, materialism	individualism materialism	identical
Strategy	integration with the west	--	--
Goals	consolidation of state security and independence, optimal economic and social development, worthy political and social position in world	comprehensive security	complementary
Tactics	National security foreign policy, economic interest	foreign policy: Slovak relations, Visegrad group, German relations, EU membership military affairs: NATO membership, reform of the ACR	complementary
Style	comprehensive, lawful, principled, ideally defensive	comprehensive and diverse	complementary

Table 14: Poland-Romania Strategic Interactions

Components	Poland	Romania	Interaction
Values	individualism, materialism	individualism, materialism	identical
Strategy	integration with the west	--	--
Goals	consolidation of state security and independence, optimal economic and social development, worthy political and social position in world	economic development	complementary, partially identical
Tactics	national security foreign policy, economic interest	economic policy, ethnic policy, military affairs, efforts for stability	complementary
Style	comprehensive, lawful, principled, ideally defensive	historical, elitist	antithetical

Table 15: Poland-Bulgaria Strategic Interactions

Components	Poland	Bulgaria	Interaction
Values	individualism, materialism	individualism, materialism	identical
Strategy	integration with the west	National Salvation; Bulgaria 2001	complementary
Goals	consolidation of state security and independence, optimal economic and social development, worthy political and social position in world	agreements with international financial institutions; redistribution of social burden; restored land ownership; fight organised crime, corruption; declassifying police files of politicians, public servants; membership in NATO and EU	complementary
Tactics	National security foreign policy, economic interest	foreign policy: EU membership, regional stability, fight against crime defence: armed forces reform, NATO membership	complementary
Style	comprehensive, lawful, principled, ideally defensive	interwoven foreign/ defence/domestic policies; European civilizational identity; national mobilization	complementary

Table 16: Czech-Romanian Strategic Interactions

Components	Czech Republic	Romania	Interaction
Values	individualism, materialism	individualism, materialism	identical
Goals	comprehensive security	economic development	neutral
Tactics	<p>foreign policy: Slovak relations, Visegrad group, German relations, EU membership</p> <p>military affairs: NATO membership, reform of the ACR</p>	economic policy, ethnic policy, military affairs, efforts for stability	neutral
Style	comprehensive and diverse	historical, elitist	antithetical

Table 17: Czech-Bulgarian Strategic Interactions

Components	Czech Republic	Bulgaria	Interaction
Values	individualism materialism	individualism, materialism	identical
Strategy	--	National Salvation, Bulgaria 2001	--
Goals	comprehensive security	agreements with international financial institutions; redistribution of social burden; restored land ownership; fight organised crime, corruption; declassifying police files of politicians and public servants; membership in NATO and EU	complementary
Tactics	foreign policy: Slovak relations, Visegrad group, German relations, EU membership military affairs: NATO membership, reform of the ACR	foreign policy: EU membership, regional stability, fight against crime defence: armed forces reform, NATO membership	complementary
Style	comprehensive and diverse	interwoven foreign/ defence/domestic policies; European civilizational identity; national mobilization	complementary

Table 18: Romanian-Bulgarian Strategic Interactions

Components	Romania	Bulgaria	Interaction
Values	individualism, materialism	individualism, materialism	identical
Strategy	--	National Salvation; Bulgaria 2001	--
Goals	economic development	agreements with international financial institutions; redistribution of social burden; restored land ownership; fight organised crime, corruption; declassifying police files of politicians and public servants; membership in NATO and EU	complementary
Tactics	economic policy, ethnic policy, military affairs, efforts for stability	foreign policy: EU membership, regional stability, fight against crime defence: armed forces reform, NATO membership	complementary
Style	historical, elitist	interwoven foreign/ defence/domestic policies; European civilizational identity; national mobilization	antithetical

II. Some Limitations of the Method

The development of any new theory (or part of a theory) is always speculative, and this theory is certainly no exception. Disproving theories, after all, is the very stuff of science: no theory ever lasts forever. This book ends, therefore, where theory of International Relations often begins, with a discussion of its own strengths and weaknesses. Having given a summary of the findings of the study, this closing discusses some implications of the study on a theoretical level.

This report has identified national values as the unknown half of the strategic equation. It argued in favor of the importance of national interest as an analytical concept, but it also declined to discuss the relationship between national values and national interest until more was known about national values. This exploration having taken place, it is now clear that it does not answer all the questions: a full study of the relationship could do that. Reconciling national interest and national values goes beyond International relations, it being "one of the central problems of all human experience and philosophical speculation."¹ The immediate problem is the tendency of the literature to confuse the two, for definitional reasons outlined in Chapter 1.

Having studied values in relation to strategy, however, it is clear there is another source for the trouble. Strategy is a difficult concept because it is both an idea and an action, tangible and intangible. National values share this tangibility and intangibility, as does national interests. The national interest is in most circumstances a set of national goals based on the state's ideal of welfare, as well as consideration for the

practicalities of the situation. The solution to this problem probably lies in a fuller understanding of circumstances in the phenomena of strategy, values and interest. The traditional triangle of strategic theory, therefore, needs to be expanded.

In essence, the theory is compatible with the existing scholarship about national interest. Although existing literature provides the basis for understanding this four-way relationship, it needs to match the theory's detail and degrees of abstraction before any more questions are to be answered. It is also possible that the theory will be found to be overly simplified by experts in areas I judged to be, if not peripheral, then certainly less central. If values and strategy are at the heart of the theory, then states, political will, national goals, and even national interest is less central. The empirical hypotheses are not exact predictions for several reasons. First, strategy is a tool for macro-analysis: it has the advantage of helping to analyze complex situations in the long term, but it has the disadvantage of not being worth the trouble in the short term, because it requires too much time and information. Until the theory is refined, it will be unsuccessful in predicting the outcome of a single decision. It cannot determine, explain or predict tactics.

In addition, the theory begs four questions.

Does the theory replace a simple and acceptable explanation, with a complicated one? That is one of theory's most common failings. Why takes the trouble of establishing a complex causal relationship when the dictum that circumstances dictate a state's strategy is commonly accepted? To do so implies that the relationship between national values and state behavior is

important enough to warrant the exploration, a question of judgment on the scholar's part. In that case, the more obvious the cases study, the better: it can only serve its purpose as an illustration better.

Is the state being personalized? This book is definitely biased in favor of people being at the motor of history. Because each step of theory-building builds on the previous, implications from this assumption naturally appear throughout the theory. These implications do not reach the state however: its functions and characteristics were specified right from the start, and are distinct from society, population and leaders.

What are the chances of this theory being policy-relevant? To gain acceptance with decision-makers, the theory has to clear several hurdles. It must avoid most of the traditional criticism of strategic studies, which it does.² For instance, strategists have behaved in a manner incompatible with the integrity of scholarship in that they have advised official agencies on a paid and privileged basis. There is not basis for a critique of a book along these lines.³ Another complaint is that strategists transcend the bounds of scholarship in that they advocate particular policies. However, it is difficult to imagine anyone accusing a theory as abstract as this one of being too political. Third, strategists ignore ethical questions. Professional strategists are usually more concerned with attaining objectives than with questions of right and wrong, and the theorists who assist them inevitably do the same. This theory could be putting all ethical issues on the same footing. On the other hand, it does emphasize them by placing philosophical issues at the center of decision-making, which other strategic theorists or specialists of decision-making do not. Fourth, strategists are fascinated by violence. My decision to approach the problem theoretically was motivated by

the desire to liberate strategy from its historical association not only with violence but also with conflict. Sixth, strategists ignore public opinion. This theory actually tries to liberate strategy not only from the battlefield, but from any association with violence. It also provides decision-makers with the means to consider how one strategic option or another will sit with public opinion, through the mechanism of appreciation, among others. Finally, strategists indulge in a differential morality in their appraisal of the behavior of states. This charge is not within the parameters of this study, since morality is an individual matter.

In addition, the theory has to be readily accessible to decision-makers. The plain fact of the matter is that unless decision-makers are convinced that the method is worth the time and effort, they are unlikely to go to much trouble. The method proposed here requires rigorous logic, but no calculus. The most strict requirement is the use of a new vocabulary. It is possible, however, that decision-makers resist this theory because of its implications. Leaders may wish to believe something else than the list of assumptions and conditions about the world. They may not wish to acknowledge their values, if they are different from what they profess publicly. Decision-makers may not want to foresee the consequences of their actions quite so clearly. If decision-makers are also elected leaders, they may find that insoluble problems are not popular with the electorate.

Is this book a trickle of content in a canyon of notes?

Because so many issues needed to be clarified, it is inevitable that this book creates that first impression. The theoretical support is substantial, and this is the second regional study using this framework,

although it is the first including a regional organization. This impression is probably inevitable, given the fact that this is the opening of a new chapter in strategic theory. A new method had to be developed in enough detail for other scholars to use it. All the methodological and theoretical problems also had to be solved up front and once and for all. That happens only once, but it has to happen at the start. As the general theory of strategy is developed, the impression of top-heaviness and excessively throat-clearing will fade.

So I argue that the theory is general enough and powerful enough to be applied to other cases and other actors. The only requirement is that the actor always be capable of cognition, evaluation and appreciation of information. To test this particular theory further, one could proceed empirically or theoretically. Empirical studies require generating predictions and investigating them. Theoretical studies require variations on conditions and assumptions, or using other propositions to contradict the findings of the current study.

One final thought: above and beyond these more immediate studies are applications of the template to non-state actors, particularly minorities. A sage once said that the problem of all strategy of minorities is the problem of waiting for circumstances to improve.⁴ If the possibilities that this theory offers are realized, perhaps minorities can play something else but a waiting game.

Notes

1. Laure Paquette, *National Strategy and National Values*, Ph.D. diss., Queen's University, 1992.

2. Carol Skalnik Leff, "Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: the Breakup of the Communist Federations," *World Politics* 51:2 (January 1999), 205-235.

3. Sean Kay, "The 'New NATO' and the Enlargement Process," *European Security* 6:4 (Winter 1997), 1-16. Joseph Leggold argues that NATO's success in carrying out multilateral peace operations is critical to NATO's future; see "NATO's Post-Cold War collective Action Problem," *International Security* 23:1 (Summer 1998), 78-106. See Also Tom Lansford, "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security After the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22:1 (March 1999), 1-28; Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, "Open NATO's Door Carefully," *Washington Quarterly* 22:2 (Spring 1999), 125-128.

4. John Woodliffe, "The Evolution of New NATO for a New Europe," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 47:1 (Jan 1998), 174-192.

5. Richard Staar, "Why NATO Should Expand," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 9:3 (Summer 1998), 25-33; David Calleo, "NATO Enlargement as a Problem for Security in Europe," *Aussenpolitik* 49:1 (1998), 27-31; David Haglund, "Les conséquences de l'élargissement de l'OTAN sur la sécurité européenne," *Revue internationale et stratégique* 32 (Win 1998-99), 66-76; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "NATO: The Dilemmas of Expansion," *National Interest* 53 (Fall 98), 13-17; Robert Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 113:3 (Fall 1998), 383-403; Andrew Cottey, "Central Europe Transformed: Security and Cooperation on NATO's New Frontier," *Contemporary Security Policy* 20:2 (August 1999), 1-30; Stephen J. Blank, "NATO Enlargement Between Rhetoric and Realism," *International Politics* 36:1 (March 1999), 67-88.

6. Georgeta Pourchot, "NATO Enlargement and Democracy in Eastern Europe," *European Security* 6:4 (winter 1997), 157-174.

7. Matteo Stochetti, "Flexibility or Hegemony? The Political Foundations of the European Security System and NATO's Eastward Enlargement," *Teoria politica* 14:1 (March 1998), 18-39.

8. Eric Bergbusch, "NATO Enlargement: Should Canada Leave NATO?", *International Journal* 53:1 (Winter 1997-98), 147-168.

9. Gabriel Robin, "Cinquante ans apr s, Alliance r nov e ou empire naissant?" *Revue internationale et strat gique* 32 (Winter 1998-99), 54-58. See also Lars Skalnes, "From the Outside In, Form the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International Relations Theory," *Security Studies* 7:4 (Summer 1998), 44-87.

10. Karl-Heinz Kamp, "NATO Entrapped: Debating the Next Enlargement," *Survival* 40 (Autumn 1998), 170-86; Robert J. Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 113 (1998), 383ss.

11. Guido Lenzi, "Les relations entre l'OTAN, l'UEO et l'Union Europ enne aujourd'hui," *Revue internationale et strat gique* 32 (Winter 1998), 77-83.

12. Daniel N. Nelson and Thomas S. Szayna, "NATO's Metamorphosis and its New Members," *Problems of Post-Communism* 45 (Jl/Ag 1998): 32-43; "NATO's 50th Anniversary: Broadening and Redefining Transatlantic Partnership," *Congressional Digest* 78:4 (1999), 97-128; Bruno Tertrais, "L'OTAN existera-telle encore en 2009?", *Revue internationale et strat gique* 32 (Winter 1998), 121-129; Bertrand Delanoe, "Quelle OTAN pour quelle d fense europ enne?," *Revue internationale et strat gique* 32 (Winter 1998), 39-45; Johanna Granville, "The Many Paradoxes of NATO Enlargement," *Current History* 98: 627 (1999), 165-170; Guelner Abeyt, "NATO's New Missions," *Perceptions* 4:1 (March/May 1999), 65-75; Tomas Valasek, "NATO at 50," *Foreign Policy in Focus* 4:11 (March 1999).

13. For branch reviews, Antonio Barrento, "The Portuguese Army," *NATO's Sixteen Nations* (Sp. 1998); Manuel Santos, "The Portuguese Air Force," *NATO's Sixteen Nations* (1998); Nuno Matias, "The Portuguese Navy 500 Years After Vasco da Gama," *NATO's Sixteen Nations* (1998); about the defence paper, Eduardo Pereira, "Debate and Consensus-Approval of Security and Defence Policy," *NATO's Sixteen Nations* (Sp. 1998); 1998); for a review of the relations with the US, see Nuno Filipe Brito, "Para a acta: o Acordo de cooperacao e Defesa Entre Portugal E os Estados Unidos Da America," *Politica Internacional* (Lisbon) 1 (1995), 135-57; for an overview of participation in

peacekeeping, see Antonio Ribeiro, "Portuguese Participation in Peacekeeping operations," *NATO's Sixteen Nations* (Sp. 1998).

14. On Italy, Fillippo Andreatta and Christopher Hill. "Eternally in Transition," *International Spectator* 30 (April/June 1995); Ren Moine and Laurent Dhome, "L'industrie de défense en Italie," *L'Armement* (May 1993), 126-38; Giuseppe Cucchi, "Italie: une nouvelle politique et un nouveau modèle de défense," *Défense Nationale* 48(Aug. 1992), 75-90 and "La défense, instrument de la politique étrangère italienne dans la période post-bipolaire," *Revue française d'administration publique* 77(Jan 96), 93-99, Matteo Stochetti, "L'attore mancante: I problemi della politica per la sicurezza in Italia," *Teoria politica* 12:3 (1996), 149-167; Carlo Jean, "L'Italia e la difesa comune europea," *Affari esteri* 110 (Apr 96), 296-308; Francesco Paolo Fulci, "L'Italia e il consiglio di Sicurezza della Nazioni Unite," *Affari esteri* 118, (Spring 98), 320-33. On Spain, Bernard Labatut, "Les politiques méditerranéennes de l'Espagne: la recherche d'un équilibre entre l'impératif de la sécurité et l'éthique de l'interdépendance," *Études internationales* 26 (1995), 315-27; Maritheresa Frain, "A Peninsula Iberica e a Europa: uma convergencia políticas de defesa espanhola e portuguesa no pós-Guerra," *Política Internacional* (Lisbon) 3(1997), 249-82; Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, "La defensa se defiende en las Cortes," *Política Exterior* 56 (March 1997), 73-85; Klaus Wolf-Casado, Klaus. "Spain's Defence Industry," *Defence* (London) 21 (Nov 1990), 721ss.

15. For Turkey, Peter Thompson, "United States-Turkey Military Relations: Treaties and Implications," *Kurdish Studies* 9 (1996), 1-2; Haluk Bayulken, "Turquie: une importance renouvelée dans une région trouble," *La Revue Administrative* (Paris) 46:611 (1993); Duygu Basoglu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation," *Comparative Strategy* 14:2 (Apr 1995), 149-172. Sezer, 1995; Ben Lombardi, "Turkey - The Return of the Reluctant Generals?" *Political Science Quarterly* 112:2 (Summer 97), 191-215. Ilter Turan, "The Military in Turkish Politics," *Mediterranean Politics* 2:2 (Fall 97), 123-135; Ali Karaosmanoglu, "NATO Enlargement and the South," *Security Dialogue* 30:2 (June 1999), 213-224. For Greece, Neovi Karakatsanis, "Do Attitudes Matter? The Military and Democratic Consolidation in Greece," *Armed Forces and Society* 24 (Winter 1997), 289-313; Ioannis

Varvitsiotis, "The Defence of Greece," *NATO's Sixteen Nations* 37:5 (1992), 11-14, outside of NATO's own annual reviews (*NATO's Sixteen Nations*, various years).

16. Nicholas Antonakis, "Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in Greece 1960-1990," *Journal of Peace Research* 34 (1997); Christos G. Kollias, "The Greek-Turkish Conflict and Greek Military Expenditure, 1960-1992," *Journal of Peace Research* 33 (1996), and "Greek Extended Deterrence: The Effects of the Cyprus Problem on Greek Defence Expenditure 1970-90," *Cyprus Review* 5 (Fall 1993): 88-94; George M. Georgious et al. "Modelling Greek-Turkish Rivalry: An Empirical Investigation of Defence Spending Dynamics," *Journal of Peace Research* 33:2 (May 1996), 229-239; and Christopher Tuck, "Greece, Turkey and Arms Control," *Defence Analysis* 12:1 (April 1996), 23-32.

17. Andrezej Korbonski, "The Polish Military at a Time of Change," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3 (1994), 21-29; Prystrom, Janusz. "Questions of Security in Poland's Foreign Policy," *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy* 1993-94: 43-52; Wieslaw Kurzyca, "Implementation of CFE: Implications for Poland's Security," *Polish Journal of International Affairs* 3:4 (Fall 1994), 33-46. On civilian control, Pamela Waldron-Moore, "Eastern Europe at the crossroads of Democratic Transition," *Comparative Political Studies* 32:1 (Fall 1999), 32-62; Chris C. Demchak, "Modernizing Military Organizations and Political Control in Central Europe," *Journal of Public Policy* 15:2 (May 1995), 111-152; Anieska Gogolewska, "Civilian control of the Army and Post-1989 Changes in Polish Legislation," *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 5:1 (Winter 1996), 61-82; Elizabeth P. Coughlan, "Democratizing Civilian Control: the Polish Case," *Armed Forces and Society* 24:4 (Summer 98), 519-33. On preparations in general, see Aleksander Kwasniewski, "Poland in NATO: Opportunities and challenges," *NATO Review* 45 (S/O 1997), 4-7; Dario Tosi, "L' evolution de la politique de d fense de l'environnement en Pologne: conditions, solutions envisag es et contraintes," *Revue des Pays de l'Est* 31:2 (1990), 47-91; Longin Pastusiak, "Poland on her Way to NATO," *European Security* 7:2 (Summer 1998), 54-62.

18. Savita Pande, Ukraine's "Non-Nuclear" Option and the NPT," *Strategic Analysis* 17:2 (May 1994), 233-249; Swaran Singh, "Ukraine: an Acid Test for US Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Policy," *Strategic Analysis* 16:10 (Jan 94), 1307-1322; David T. Twining, "The US-Russian-Ukrainian Nuclear Agreement: What Lies Ahead?" *Defence Analysis* 10:2 (August 1994): 141-155.

19. Oleg Strelak, "Independent Ukraine: the Search for Security," *International Spectator* 30:1 (Jan-March 1995), 51-78; Susan L. Clark, "Security Issues and the Eastern Slavic States," *The World Today* 49:10 (October 1993), 189-193; Jason Ellis, "The 'Ukrainian Dilemma' and U.S. Foreign Policy," *European Security* 3:2 (Summer 1994), 251-280.

20. Nadezda Michajlova, "Priorit ten der Aussenpolitik Bulgariens," *S dosteuropea Mitteilungen* 38:2 (!998), 83-89; Galina Chuleva and Jim Derleth. "The Bulgarian National Security-Making Apparatus 1970-1994," *European Security* 3:4 (Winter 1994), 775-789; Valeri Rachev, "Combining Political and Military Considerations in Assessing Military Conflicts [in Bulgaria]," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 9:1 (March 1996), 45-54; Nikolay Slatinski, "Bulgarian Security and Prospects for Reform," *NATO Review* 43 (March 1995), 28-32; Veneta Monceva, "Bulgarien: die neuen Wege der veraenderten Siche," *Suedosteuropa* (Munich) 42 : 11/12 (1993), 661ss; Jewgenij Alexandrow, "Ein neues Bulgarien im neuen Europa," *Europa Archiv* 45: 25 (1990), 615-622., although Stephane Lefebvre does a good survey of changes for 1992-94 and Johnson surveys the changes in military relations (1994). See Stephane Lefebvre, "A Primer on Bulgarian Security and Defence Issues," *Defence Analysis* 10:3 (Dec 1994), 243-266 and M. Mae Johnson, "Civil-military relations and Military Reforms in Bulgaria," *European Security* 4:3 (Fall 95), 488-518; Kjell Engelbret, "Bulgaria's Evolving Defence Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3 (1994), 19.

21. Daniel N. Nelson, "Romanian Security," *Revue roumaine d' tudes internationales* 125-126 (May 1993), 185-209; Ivo Samson, "Transformation and Structural Change in Central Eastern Europe: Slovakia's Adjustment to New Security Challenges," *Revue d'int gration europ enne* 20:2-3 (Winter 97), 187-200; Roxana Iorga, "Romanian Perspectives on Security Risks," *International Spectator* 29:4 ((Oct 1994), 81-105.

22. Ferenc Gazdag and Zsolt Pataki, "La politique trang re et de s curit de la R publique de Hongrie," *D fense nationale* 53: (March 97), 97-111; W. B. Ibbetson, "Hungarian Defence Forces:

New Challenge," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal* 124 (94); Lajos Keresztes, "The Role for the Hungarian Army in Transformation of Defence and Security Policy of the Social-Liberal Government," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal* 126 (96). For the Czech Republic, see Roman Blasek, "Perception of Security Risks by the Population of the Czech Republic," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 11:3 (September 1998), 89-96; Stefan Sarvas, "Attitudes of the Czech Public Toward National Security, the Military and NATO Membership," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 11:3 (September 1998), 56-88..

23. Radovan Vukadinovic, "American interests in the South Europe," *Croatian International Relations Review* 5:14 (Jan/Mar 99), 11-14.

24. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 332.

25. As numerous social and cultural theorists agree. Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination." *International Organization*, 46:1 (Winter 1992), 21.

26. Changes in the earth's atmosphere is a good example of this phenomenon. The trends towards global warming and the implications for weather and agriculture have been available since the mid-1970s at least. Yet states did not immediately pick out information as significant until years later.

27. Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, *Defending America's Security* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 23.

28. On of the conclusions possible, based on John Steinbruner's paradigm, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 47-87.

29. Who would have though that the 1972 shift of anchovy banks off the coast of Chile would be part of a set of circumstances that would eventually set off a world-wide round of inflation?

30. Zeev Maoz, *op. cit.*, 36-37.

31. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.

32. Zeev Maoz, *op. cit.*, 36-37; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.

33. The countries of Western Europe and North America provide a perfect example of that. Throughout the 1960 and 1970s, those countries greatly increased the proportion of GNP spent on providing health and welfare services. That group of states happens to be relatively similar, in terms of their political and economic systems, and their degree of development. When the budgetary crunch came, however, the question was asked in a broad variety of ways: what is a problem of inefficiency of the market system, was the state taking on a role as a capital force, was it taking on too much of a role as a capital force, etc. (Jeanne Kirk Laux and Maureen Molot, *State Capitalism: Public Enterprise in Canada*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), *passim*). The proposed solutions, which were to prove ineffective, largely reflected the parameters of the questions asked in the first place. Threats and opportunities are, as we have already seen, value-defined. After all, what the state protects or promotes is a function of what it prizes.

34. Colin Gray, *Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982); Ray S. Cline, *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991).

35. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978), 91.

36. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.

37. Zeev Maoz, *op. cit.*, 72.

38. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.

39. Dorothy Pickles, "Political Imperatives and Dilemmas of French Defence Policies," *West European Politics* 1:3 (Oct 1978), 115-143,121.

40. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.

41. Charles Lindblom, *op. cit.*, 79.

-
42. Zeev Maoz, *op. cit.*, 32-40.
43. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.
44. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.
45. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.
46. Here a methodological observation is in order. It is significant that experience is a factor in the drawing of conclusions, an operation carried out by the mechanism of evaluation. Although this theory presents each mechanism as coming into play at different steps of the decision-making process, in fact each of them come into play repeatedly throughout the entire theory. The representation here is simplified (Zeev Maoz, *op. cit.*, 32-40).
47. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.
48. Hadley Cantril's research emphasizes the importance of understanding the frame of mind of the people with whom government must deal at home and abroad. Peter Haas infers learning from policy change: policy evolves not just because circumstances do, but because states will draw lessons and conclusions from their experiences. See the special issue of *International Organization* 46:1 (Winter 1992), Peter Haas, ed.
49. George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock.
"Introduction," chapter in *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (ed.) (San Francisco: Westview, 1991), 3.
50. George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, "Introduction," in *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (San Francisco: Westview, 1991), 4.
51. Philip E. Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept," chapter in *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, ed. (San Francisco: Westview, 1991), 44.
52. George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, *op. cit.*, 8 and 9.
53. Zeev Maoz, *op. cit.*, 32-40.

-
54. According to Snyder and Diesing, the best alternative is necessarily selected from an infinite set of possibilities. Amitai Etzioni is a proponent of mixed scanning, where the best alternative is chosen by scanning two or three alternatives and carefully comparing them. (Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347)
55. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.
56. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 397.
57. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.
58. Zeev Maoz, *op. cit.*, 32-40.
59. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *op. cit.*, 333-347.
60. Talcott Parsons' classification in R.F. Bales, Edward Shils and Talcott Parsons, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1953), *passim*; Michael Sullivan, *Measuring Global Values* (New York: Greenwood, s.d.), *passim*.
61. Ray S. Cline, *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 2.
62. Although he calls it aims; F.B. Ali, "The Principles of War", *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution for Defence Studies* 108 (May 1963), 159-165.
63. "The entirety of traditional practices and habits of thinking which, in a society, governs the organization and the use of the military forces in the pursuit of political objectives." Author's translation, as quoted by Bruno Colson, "La culture stratégique américaine", *Stratégique* 8 (1988), 15-82, 33. The original reads: "l'ensemble des pratiques traditionnelles et des habitudes de pensée qui, dans une société, gouvernent l'organisation et l'emploi de la force militaire au service d'objectifs politiques."
64. Julian Lider, *op. cit.*
1. *Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*, Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, Copenhagen 6-7 1991, <http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/bt-pfp.html>.

2.NATO Washington Summit - Fact Sheet on Defence Capabilities Initiative, <http://www.fas.org/man/natodocs/99042408.html>.

3.Eva Feldmann and Sven Bernhard Gareis, "Poland's Role in NATO: The Significance of Foreign Assistance for the Stabilization of Eastern Europe," *Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenschaft* 8:3 (1998), 983-1003, *passim*.

1.Andrezj Korbonski, "East Central Europe on the Eve of the Changeover: the Case of Poland," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 32:2 (June 1999), 139-153, 139.

2.Marcin Frybes and Patrick Michel, "La 'transition' polonaise," *Revue Internationale de Politique Compar e* 3:1 (April 1996), 69-84.

3. Frances Millard, "Democratization and the Media in Poland 1989-1997," *Democratization* 5:2 (Summer 1998), 85-105.

4.Aleksander Smolar, "Poland's Emerging Party System," *Journal of Democracy* 9:2 (April 1998), 122-133, 127.

5.Barbara A. Misztal, "How Not To Deal With The Past: Lustration in Poland," *Archives europ ennes de sociologie* 40:1 (1999), 31-55.

6.Aleksander Smolar, "Poland's Emerging Party System," *Journal of Democracy* 9:2 (April 1998), 122-133, 127.

7. Frances Millard, "Democratization and the Media in Poland 1989-1997," *Democratization* 5:2 (Summer 1998), 85-105.

8.Elizabeth Pond, "Miracle on the Vistula," *Washington Quarterly* 21:3 (Summer 1998), 209-230.

9.Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Government Statement on Directions of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Poland*, 78th Session of Parliament, May 9th, 2000, Warsaw; <Http://www.msp.pl>, June 5, 2000.

10.Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Government Statement on Directions of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Poland*, 78th Session of Parliament, May 9th, 2000, Warsaw; <Http://www.msp.pl>, June 5, 2000.

11. Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Government Statement on Directions of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Poland*, 78th Session of Parliament, May 9th, 2000, Warsaw; [Http://www.msp.pl](http://www.msp.pl), June 5, 2000.

12. Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Government Statement on Directions of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Poland*, 78th Session of Parliament, May 9th, 2000, Warsaw; [Http://www.msp.pl](http://www.msp.pl), June 5, 2000.

13. George Sanford, "Parliamentary control and the constitutional Definition of Foreign Policy-Making in Democratic Poland," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51:5 (July 1999), 769-797.

14. Jakob Juchler, "Poland's Attitude Towards the EU. Progress Despite Tensions and Growing Skepticism," *Osteuropa* 49:5 (May 1999), 486-492.

15. Eva Feldmann and Sven Bernhard Gareis, "Poland's Role in NATO: The Significance of Foreign Assistance for the Stabilization of Eastern Europe," *Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenschaft* 8:3 (1998), 983-1003, *passim*.

16. Jerzy Kranz, "Poland and Germany," *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 7:1 (1998), 5-28.

17. Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Government Statement on Directions of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Poland*, 78th Session of Parliament, May 9th, 2000, Warsaw; [Http://www.msp.pl](http://www.msp.pl), June 5, 2000.

18. Stefan Garsztecki, "Foreign Policy of the Polish Government. Continuity in Europe's Direction," *Osteuropa* 48:11-12 (November-December 1998), 1149-1158, *passim*.

1. Vclav HAVEL, President of the Czech Republic, <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.

2. Steven Saxonberg, "A New Phase in Czech Politics," *Journal of Democracy* 10:1 (January 1999), 96-111.

3. Message to the troops, Lieutenant General Jiri SEDIVY, Chief of the General Staff, Army of the Czech Republic (ACR), <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.

-
4. Message to the troops, Lieutenant General Jiri SEDIVY, Chief of the General Staff, Army of the Czech Republic (ACR), <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.
5. Laure Neumayer, "Opinions publiques et partis politique face l'intégration européenne en Hongrie, Pologne et République tchèque," *Revue d'études comparatives East-Ouest* 30:1 (March 1999), 139-164.
6. Vclav HAVEL, President of the Czech Republic, <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.
7. Vclav HAVEL, President of the Czech Republic, <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.
8. Speech by the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Milos Zeman, Průliha 16 March 1999; <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.
9. Roman Blasek, "Perception of Security Risks by the Population of the Czech Republic," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 11:3 (September 1998), 89-96.
10. Hans-Joachim Hoppe, "Secret Services and Security Agencies in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary: Reform Efforts and Shortcomings in the New Members of NATO," *Osteuropa* 49:9 (September 1999), 893-907.
11. Stefan Sarvas, "Attitudes of the Czech Public Toward National Security, the Military, and NATO Membership," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 11:3 (September 1998), 56-88, 86.
12. Rene Nastoupil, "Current Czech Defence Policy," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 12:2 (June 1999), 110-122.
13. Vladimir Vetchy, Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic, message to the Czech Army, <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.
14. Message to the troops, Lieutenant General Jiri SEDIVY, Chief of the General Staff, Army of the Czech Republic (ACR), <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.
15. Message to the troops, Lieutenant General Jiri SEDIVY, Chief of the General Staff, Army of the Czech Republic (ACR), <http://www.czech.cz>, June 2000.

-
1. Anneli Ute Gabanyi, "Romania: the Staged Revolution," *Sudost-Europa* 47:3-4 (1998), 163-183.
 2. Steven D. Roper and William Crowther, "The Institutionalization of the Romanian Parliament: A Case Study of the State-Building Process in Eastern Europe," *Southeastern Political Review* 26:2 (June 1998), 401-426.
 3. Jeffery Mondak and Adam Gearing, "Civic Engagement in a Post-Communist State," *Political Psychology* 19:3 (September 1998), 615-637.
 4. Antonela Capelle-Pogacean, "Les repr sentations de la nation chez les intellectuels hongrois, magyars de Roumanie et roumains apr s 1989," *Revue D' tudes Comparatives Est-Ouest* 29:1 (March 1998), 5-33.
 5. Vladimir Rismaneanu, "Understanding National Stalinism: Reflections on Ceausescu's Socialism," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 32:2 (June 1999), 155-173.
 6. Tom Gallagher, "Romania's Desire to be Normal," *Contemporary Politics* 4:2 (June 1998), 111-125, *passim*.
 7. Anneli Ute Gabanyi, "Roumania: Government Policy in Times of Crisis," *Sudost-Europa* 47:9 (1998), 393-420.
 8. Jan Art Scholte, "Globalization, Governance and Democracy in Post-Communist Romania," *Democratization* 5:4 (Winter 1998), 52-77, 55.
 9. Tom G. Gallagher, "The West and the Challenge to Ethnic Politics in Romania," *Security Dialogue* 30:3 (September 1999), 293-304, 293-4.
 10. Tom G. Gallagher, "The West and the Challenge to Ethnic Politics in Romania," *Security Dialogue* 30:3 (September 1999), 293-304, 293-4.
 11. Michael Mihalka, "Enlargement Deferred. More Political Instability for Romania? A Rejoinder." *Security Dialogue* 30:4 (December 1999), 497-502, *passim*.
 1. Berhanu Kassayie, "The Evolution of Social Democracy in

Reforming Bulgaria," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 14:3 (September 1998), 109-125, *passim*.

2. Nadege Ragaru, "L'Union des Forces Démocratiques en campagne ou la lente consolidation d'un parti politique en régime postcommuniste," *Balkanologie* 2:1 (July 1998), 83-107, *passim*.

3. Ase Godeland, Tatyana Koshechkina and William L. Miller, "In theory Correct, But In Practice...": Public Attitudes To Really Existing Democracy in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 14:3 (September 1998), 1-23, 4-5.

4. "Bulgaria", *Europa World Yearbook* (London: Europa, 1999), 722.

5. Nadezda Michajlova, "Les priorités de la politique extérieure bulgare," *Sudoeseuropa Mitteilungen* 38:2 (1998), 83-89.

6. Magdalena Venkova-Wolff, "Bulgaria: the Only and Last Chance," *Europäische Rundschau* 26:4 (Fall 1998), 25-33, 29.

7. Johanna Deimel, "Bulgaria in the Second Row as A Candidate Country in the Negotiations About the EU's Eastward Enlargement Prospects," *Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen* 38:2 (1998), 90-104, 90ss.

8. Milena Mahon, "The Macedonian Question in Bulgaria," *Nations and Nationalism* 4:3 (July 1998), 387-407, 395.

9. Johanna Deimel, "Bulgaria and Macedonia - Signs of Rapprochement," *Europäische Rundschau* 27:2 (Spring 1999), 53-61, *passim*.

10. Johanna Deimel, "Bulgaria and Macedonia - Signs of Rapprochement," *Europäische Rundschau* 27:2 (Spring 1999), 53-61, *passim*.

1. Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations? The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), i.

-
2. Colin Gray, *Strategic Studies / A Critical Assessment* (Westport: Greenwood, 1982), 158.
 3. As Lucien Poirier puts it, "*Je ne me fais pas d'illusion: notre travail, n'intresse personne.*" Interview with author, Paris, February 1992, personal notes.
 4. M. Court s, interview with author, Montpellier, February 1992, personal notes.