

MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY CONCERNS

AND

NATO'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The drastic changes that the world has undergone since the end of the Cold War brought about a challenge to the importance of the nation-state as a significant actor of international politics. The decision makers began to realize that it is no longer in the capacity of a single state to encounter the threats of this system. They began to recognize the importance of cooperation, and furthermore in many policy areas they saw the 'regional integration' as an inevitable means. The general tendency in the international politics shifted towards the prevention of threats and management of conflicts through the use of regional orders. This has been the case in the Mediterranean basin, which is a region characterized by inter-state and intra-state conflicts, and many other sources of instability.

Throughout the Cold War, the Mediterranean region was regarded as the southern flank of Europe. With the dissolution of the Communist bloc, the emphasis has shifted from the centre of the continent to the periphery, both east and south. Thus, the Mediterranean has acquired a strategic importance since the end of the Cold War. The geographical proximity between Europe and the Mediterranean, which is an important factor that links the security and stability of the two regions, is one of the essential elements that made the region strategically important. The geographical proximity of Europe and the Mediterranean has created a sense of interdependence and this necessitates dialogue and practical cooperation.

Today, the Mediterranean region has been characterized by a number of small regions, however from an historical perspective it has been a dynamic region through which

commercial activities, exchange of knowledge, ideas, peoples, technologies and values were realized.¹ One of the biggest writers on Mediterranean, Fernand Braudel argued that:

‘Today in 1972, six years after the second French edition, I think I can say that two major truths have remained unchallenged. The first is the unity and coherence of the Mediterranean. I retain the conviction that the Turkish Mediterranean lived and breathed with the same rhythms as the Christian, that the whole sea shared a common destiny, a heavy one indeed, with identical problems and general trends if not identical consequences.’²

Although as Braudel argues Mediterranean Sea is a source of unity and coherence, the world of Mediterranean has always been divided by great antagonisms: East-West (Byzantine vs. Roman), North-South (Christian vs. Muslim, rich vs. poor, colonial vs. colonized) and by the oppositions between the three continent: Europe, Asia and Africa.³ However, these great antagonisms don’t prevent the two rims to share some commonalities stemming from their past: common space, common concerns and a common heritage.⁴

The Mediterranean has been and continues to be a major avenue for traffic, east-west and north-south. The insecurity and instability in one of these sectors has the potential to threaten the stability of the greater Mediterranean region as a whole.⁵ It is indeed one of the major dividing lines of the world among different political, demographic, economic and cultural subsystems, languages, forms of expression and religions. That is why it is more than necessary to formulate a region-wide security cooperation framework in order to prevent any kind of instability and threat to security in the Mediterranean.

¹ Matthew Nimetz, ‘Mediterranean Security after the Cold War,’ *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 8, no.2, (Spring 1997), p. 27.

² Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the Age of Philip II*, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, p. 14.

³ Comite 5 de la 49eme Session Nationale, ‘L’Union Europeenne et la Mediterranee: perceptions, dynamiques et strategies,’ *Le Dossier D’Athena*, No. 4, (1997), p. 75.

⁴ Javier Solana, ‘NATO and the Mediterranean,’ *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No.2, (Spring 1997), p. 13.

⁵ Nimetz, (note 1), p. 21.

New challenges and risks compel us to undertake new approaches and initiatives in the Mediterranean region. Today's security has a multidimensional character; it is not only concerned for politico-military threats, but also for threats emanating from socio-economic, cultural and even environmental factors. This necessitates a comprehensive approach to security, such as the development of a region-wide multilateral dialogue and the implementation of confidence-building measures in a progressive way. Unfortunately, most of the efforts to bring peace and cooperation to the Mediterranean failed to go beyond the exchange of information to the implementation of confidence and peace-building measures in the region.

It is clear that there is a necessity to develop a gradual and realist approach regarding the problems of the Mediterranean security, by taking into consideration the political realities of the region. Today the Mediterranean faces a number of challenges and problems varying from the escalation of extremism and nationalism to arms trade, socio-economic constraints, pollution, and disregard of international law.⁶ Despite having great political and cultural differences, countries of the Mediterranean basin have an increasing desire for cooperation. But in a region, which is divided by the existence of many low-intensity conflicts, only a unique model of cooperation can be maintained. The security issues of the Mediterranean region have a specificity, which makes the implementation of any kind of conflict-prevention or crisis-management scheme impossible. We need to develop new models of conflict-prevention and crisis-management addressing the realities and specificity of the Mediterranean.

Most of previous initiatives to bring stability and peace to the Mediterranean have failed to make an accurate assessment of the Mediterranean realities and participants didn't formulate a clearly defined set of common principles and rules. That is why we still don't

⁶ Habib Ben Yahia, 'Security and Stability in the Mediterranean: Regional and International Changes,' *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (Winter 1993), p. 3.

have a comprehensive framework of cooperation encompassing the needs of the two shores. It is obvious that there is a need for comprehensive security analysis. Many of the analyses conducted so far relied on hard security issues, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking and terrorism. They failed to address threats emanating from the socio-economic and cultural differences.

Above all, there is a great psychological barrier to the establishment of a region-wide scheme of cooperation in the Mediterranean. Any initiative should take into account this psychological barrier. There is a continuous mutual distrust and suspicion between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean states. Many of the initiatives to bring security and stability to the region perceived by the southern Mediterranean states as suitable mechanisms to preserve the hierarchy between Europe and the southern Mediterranean states.⁷ Although as Braudel and former Secretary General of NATO Javier Solana argue that the Mediterranean is a source of unity and coherence, and commonalities stemming from the past dominate the Mediterranean, the region is also characterized by the existence of heterogeneity in the perception of threats to security, suspicion and lack of common objectives.

The term 'Mediterranean security' is usually analysed from a European point of view. It is identified with challenges to the European continent that are originating from the southern Mediterranean. Such as the immigration, Islamic fundamentalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, existence of authoritarian regimes, low-intensity conflicts between the southern Mediterranean countries, and the possibility of them to have a negative influence on the stability of Europe. Therefore, security perceptions of the two rims diverge significantly.⁸

⁷ Stephen Blank, 'The Mediterranean and Its Security Agenda,' *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (Winter 2000), pp. 30-31.

⁸ Lia Brynjar, 'Security Challenges in Europe's Mediterranean Periphery- Perspectives and Policy Dilemmas,' *European Security*, Vol. 8, No. 4, (Winter 1999), p. 29.

The Mediterranean region is composed of many sub-regions with their own specific security concerns. The diversity of these sub-regional concerns and the lack of any inter-relation between these sub-regions to formulate a common security approach mark the biggest challenge to a region-wide cooperation scheme.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the factor, or factors, that prevents the building of a comprehensive security framework. The work will try to formulate sources of insecurity and instability from the perspectives of the two rims. Therefore, the first chapter will focus on the general problems in the Mediterranean basin within the framework of the post-Cold war regional dynamics and by giving equal weight to the perceptions of the two rims. The first part of this chapter will focus on the southern European perspective and the second part will be devoted to southern Mediterranean security perception.

The next chapter will be devoted to NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. The basic principles of the dialogue will be revised and starting from these principles how effective can NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue be in establishing new and cooperative security relationships across the Mediterranean region will be analysed.

The paper will argue that the major handicap of the Mediterranean region is the lack of a common regional identity. The countries of the two shores have divergent concerns on the Mediterranean security, and have continuous mutual distrust and suspicion of each other. Unless the Mediterranean Dialogue achieves to establish an understanding and esteem among the 'equal partners' of the two shores by eliminating all kinds of psychological barriers, it will not be possible to create a Mediterranean community. Shortly, it seems that unless the psychological deficit is overcome, the prospect for the region to promote a Mediterranean community seems to remain low as a percentage.

CHAPTER 2

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

2.1. GENERAL PROBLEMS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN

A security analysis of the entire Mediterranean region is an extremely difficult task. Because the geographical area that is in question is a vast one, which encompasses three sub-regional groupings and nineteen states: Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta), the Mashreq (Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority) and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya).⁹ This means that although these states share a common sea, there is not just one Mediterranean which makes the threat perceptions unique, rather the nature of problems show great differences to the south and to the north. The countries of the northern shore are economically prosperous, politically stable and part of the European integration process, whereas the southern Mediterranean experiences a decline in living standards, increasing birth rates and political instability.¹⁰ These differences are not the only source, which makes the establishment of a region-wide cooperation framework difficult. The Mediterranean is also a region where the only remaining curtain of the world continues to be a reality: 'The curtain of

⁹ Dimitris K. Xenakis, 'Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System,' *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (Winter 2000), p. 77.

¹⁰ Solana, (note 4), p. 12.

prejudice and misperception that continues to divide the Mediterranean along a North-South axis'.¹¹

2.1.1. The Difference In Economic Development

The two shores of the Mediterranean have completely different records of economic development. The northern Mediterranean states are composed of prosperous industrial economies, which are interdependent with other developed European nations within the framework of the European integration process.

However, the southern Mediterranean states' economies rely heavily on labour intensive industries, especially agriculture and tourism. There is also a clear gap between the exporters of natural resources, such as gas and oil, and the remaining southern Mediterranean countries. The resources of the southern Mediterranean countries provide approximately 40% of the oil and natural gas needs of Europe. The Maghreb countries for example are specialized in the production and exportation of certain goods: Algeria exports hydrocarbon, Tunisia textile and olive oil, and Morocco exports phosphates, sea products and services. The price instability in the world market and the polarized demand make them dependent on the European market.

Italy imports 30 % of its oil imports from Libya and 32 % of its natural gas from Algeria. France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom are among the major oil importers from Libya. Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain are the main export destination of Algerian natural gas. As these figures show, Europe is the major trading partner of the Maghrebi states.¹² European dependency on Maghrebi natural resources is expected to increase in the near future. Trans-Mediterranean (Transmed) natural gas pipeline of 2,512 km

¹¹ Stephen C. Calleya, 'Cross-Cultural Currents in the Mediterranean: What Prospects?' *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (Summer 1998), p.47.

¹² Nicola de Santis, 'The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative,' *NATO Review*, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Spring 1998), p. 33.

long, which links Algeria to Italy, via Tunisia and Sicily, has been completed in 1995. The construction of Maghreb-Europe Gas pipeline project that links Algeria and Spain via Morocco and the pipeline, which will carry natural gas from Libyan offshore fields to Sicily and Italy are still in construction, and are expected to be fully operative by the year 2002.¹³ Huge energy resources and the fact that it becomes a network of energy infrastructure enabled the Mediterranean to gradually acquire great importance vis-à-vis Europe and the West. All these projects prove that in future Europe, and especially southern Europe, will be more dependent on North African energy resources. When we look from this commercial point of view, we can see that southern countries of the Mediterranean, especially the Maghreb countries, are already engaged in a process of integration with the countries of the northern shore, but they don't have the ability to affect the economic decision-making process, which makes them vulnerable to any sorts of economic fluctuations.

Trade and economic relations between the Arab states remained fairly limited because they have competitive economies, rather than being complementary. As stated above, most of them rely on labour-intensive industries. In addition to their economies being competitive, there is no infrastructure to operate a well-established inter-Arab trade. Another factor, which affects negatively the economies of the southern Mediterranean states, is the existence of special trade links with the former colonial powers. In addition to the above-stated factors, the adoption of command economy and the exclusion from the international competition are contributing factors to their economic backwardness.¹⁴

They face huge social problems due to the economic deficiencies coupled with rising unemployment in close parallel to the population explosion. These countries have also

¹³ Lia, (note 8) p. 43.

¹⁴ Phebe Marr, 'Swords into Plowshares: The Middle East Economic Challenge,' *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 2, (Spring 1997), p. 181.

enormous foreign debt obligations whose destination is mainly Western Europe.¹⁵ Europe is the economic hegemon in the Mediterranean area. Most of the Maghreb and Mashreq countries have close trade links with the EU member states.

The substantial economic difference between the two shores of the Mediterranean can best be explained by the comparison of per capita Gross Domestic Product-based on purchasing power parity- for 1992 between the three major North African countries and three Mediterranean EU countries:

Morocco	\$ 2, 777	Spain	\$ 12, 986
Algeria	\$ 3, 076	France	\$ 18, 232
Egypt	\$ 2, 274	Italy	\$ 16, 724 ¹⁶

2.1.2. Islamic Fundamentalism

The major challenge to the creation of a Mediterranean community is the perception of political Islam by the European countries as the biggest ever threat to the existing political system in Western Europe. The European states don't only fear from the expression of Islam in the form of use of power but they also fear that once in power, even democratically, Islamic governments could take advantage of their position to abolish the entire system of democracy.¹⁷ Because in the North, the political elite and the public opinion have developed an understanding that Islam and democracy are the two concepts, which can never be compatible. In essence, not only Islamic fundamentalism but all sorts of religious fundamentalism may pose threat to stability, since it weaken democracy and the creation of a

¹⁵ Rapporteur De Lipkowski, 'Security in the Mediterranean,' *Report Submitted on Behalf of the Political Committee, Assembly of the WEU*, 4 November 1996, Document 1543, p.15.

¹⁶ Nimetz, (note 1), pp. 24-25.

¹⁷ De Lipkowski, (note 15), p.17.

more open, liberal and secular environment. The Islamization of the southern society and politics is considered to be the most dangerous development that the Mediterranean region may witness in the near future.

Islamic fundamentalism is perceived to be the 'bete noir', the biggest ever challenge, of the Western culture and civilization after the collapse of the Communist bloc. Some believe that Islam is a threat to Western type institutions, values and norms.¹⁸

While the northern perception of Islam is such, Islamic governments are gaining support throughout the region. Political Islam is continuing to be an increasingly significant force in the nation-state building process in the region and it is reflected in foreign and security policy orientations of the regional states. However, in most southern Mediterranean countries populations are loyal to more traditional forms of Islam, which do not pose threat for Western societies, culture and civilization.

2.1.3. Terrorism, Organized Crime And Drug Trafficking

Mediterranean is a region, which suffers from the terrorist activities and organized crime. There exist some rogue states in the Mediterranean, which are sponsoring terrorism in their struggle to become a regional power. Europe and the United States apply completely different approaches with regard to the terrorist states. While the United States explicitly announces the names of the countries, which sponsor terrorism, Europe prefers to impose certain sanctions of economic nature.¹⁹ The fight against terrorism, and organized crime requires the existence of a structured international cooperation, and the ability to formulate common policies. However, Mediterranean is far from achieving such coherence in this field.

¹⁸ Phebe Marr, 'The Islamic Revival. Security Issues,' *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1992, p. 38.

¹⁹ De Lipkowski, (note 15), p. 19.

Terrorism constitutes yet another source of friction in the Mediterranean. Syria and Libya are the two Mediterranean states, which are cited in the American list of state-sponsored terrorism. These states considered to be terrorist states and left out of any multilateral initiative to bring stability and peace to the region. The existence of these states in the Mediterranean constitutes an important factor for instability. However, the exclusion of these Arab states from the multilateral cooperation frameworks leads the other participant Arab states to feel uncomfortable. They feel as if they betrayed their Arab friends. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue do not involve Algeria, Lebanon, Syria and Libya, which may not be characterised as Western-looking, moderate and constructive states of the southern Mediterranean. The absence of these states is considered to be unacceptable for the other Arab states, which are part of the dialogue. This absence is further complicated when Israel is part of this initiative, it is perceived to be a dramatic breach to Arab solidarity.²⁰

According to the Geopolitical Drug Observatory (GDO) in Paris, Morocco, Tunisia and the couple Syria-Lebanon are the four countries in the Middle East and North Africa that are engaged in the production and transfer of drugs. According to the GDO, Morocco is fourth in the world in the exportation of poppy, and the main destination of Moroccan poppy export is France and Spain. The drug trafficking towards Europe was realized through the North African illegal immigrants. This double traffic that of drug and illegal immigrants became one of the major concerns of the European states. In time, the link between drug trafficking and the mafia and money laundering became apparent. This is conceived as an important security challenge to the European social order.

Nevertheless, the Mediterranean countries pronounce the need for closer cooperation in this field, taking into consideration the international character of such networks. It is

²⁰ Stephen Larrabee, Jerold Green, and Michael Zanini, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative*, Santa Monica: Rand, 1998, pp. 57-58.

believed that close cooperation is the only way for the Mediterranean to identify, define and resolve the security problems of the region.²¹

2.1.4. The Increasing Military Expenditures Of The Regional States And Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction

The difference of approach, which shapes the nature of regional relations in the Mediterranean, is also inherent in the political culture on defence matters. While in the North, reduction in defence spending and arms control measures ranging from nuclear disarmament to conventional stability is becoming part of the prevailing political culture, in the South proliferation of arms, both conventional and nuclear, remains to be the dominant tendency due to the existence of some low-intensity conflicts.

In southern Mediterranean, the military is an important factor in the state-building process and it keeps its importance after the establishment of democratically elected governments. The modernization of the military in the southern Mediterranean states is the essential element of national independence and a means for asserting national sovereignty.²² Therefore, the two shores of the Mediterranean have completely different approaches with regard to defence issues. Northern littoral states are trying to establish strong international cooperation to downgrade the existing arms systems. However, southern littoral states are continuously trying to upgrade their military capabilities.

Israel has acquired Jericho 2 missiles, which has a range of 1,500 km, Syria, Libya and Egypt dispose Scud missiles with short range, and Iran has a substantial chemical-weapon's capability and an active long-range missile development programme. Egypt has

²¹ 'Morocco's Approach to Security and Defense in the Mediterranean,' Briefing giving by Divisional General Abdelhak El Kadiri of the Permanent Secretariat of the Higher National Defense Council on 29 October 1996.

²² Ellen Laipson, 'Thinking about the Mediterranean,' *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Winter 1990), pp. 55-56.

active chemical weapons and long-range ballistic missile development programme. Both Libya and Syria have chemical weapons and Algeria has been pushing ahead with development of a nuclear infrastructure.²³ These show that at present the most pressing weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation risks are ‘South-South’ than ‘North-South.’²⁴ Because in the strategic security understanding of the southern Mediterranean states the acquisition of such weapons is a reflection of regional weight, prestige and power.

Some southern Mediterranean states perceive the existence of WMD and ballistic missile capabilities as the vital condition of being a regional power and a reflection of prestige. The existence of these nuclear and conventional arsenals and the potential for direct military confrontation between, especially southern Mediterranean states are the two major military concerns of the region. There are major risks of conventional clashes over territory or resources.

Even more threatening is the number of regional conflicts in which chemical weapons are actually used. Egypt used chemical weapons in the Yemeni Civil War in 1963-69, Libya used in the war against Chad in 1987 and both sides used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.²⁵ These examples signal the possibility that if the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to increase in the same speed, the danger of the Mediterranean to become the most insecure region in Europe’s periphery will increase.

2.1.5. Demographic Imbalance

²³ Philippe Renoux, ‘La Securite en Mediterranee: aspects politiques, militaires et industriels,’ *Le Dossier D’Athena*, No.4, (1997), p. 43.

²⁴ Lia, (note 8), p. 36.

²⁵ For details see Table No: 1 on Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean.

There is a drastic imbalance between the two shores in terms of demographic figures, both in terms of population and in terms of age.²⁶ The southern Mediterranean countries are in the midst of their demographic transition. The North African population is expected to reach 260 million by the year 2025. Whereas the total population of all EU members is expected to be roughly 300 million not long after the end of the century. Besides, 45% of the young generation under the age of 15 are in the southern Mediterranean, whereas this percentage is only 25% in the north. The steady and sharp decline of the mortality rates in the southern Mediterranean countries weren't matched by a similar kind of reduction in the fertility. As it can be understood from the figures, European nations are aging and decreasing in population.²⁷ This huge population growth has the potential to increase the already existing heavy burden of the Mediterranean cities, by furthering the problems of urbanization, scarcity of resources and many other problems of social nature.

This demographic imbalance, coupled with the stagnant economies and rapidly increasing unemployment of the southern Mediterranean states creates migratory pressures towards the northern Mediterranean. It seems that unless the equally advantageous economic, social and cultural conditions of the North is realized in the South, migration would continue to be one of the major concern in the Mediterranean area. There are approximately six million immigrants from especially the North African states, who are residing in European countries of mainly France, Germany, Italy and Spain.²⁸

Migration has also a psychological dimension, which had worrisome consequences in the past. Many in the destination countries of this migratory flux, in this case southern

²⁶ For more information on the demographic statistics of the southern Mediterranean states, see Table No: 2

²⁷ Ian O. Lesser, 'Southern Europe and the Maghreb: U.S. Interests and Policy Perspectives,' *Remarks Delivered at the Conference on 'Employment, Economic Development and Migration: European and U.S. Perspectives,' at the Luso-American Development Foundation*, Lisbon, 28 April 1995, p.4.

²⁸ Speech by Dr. Javier Solana, Former Secretary General of NATO, at the International Conference on The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative,' Rome, 10 November 1997, see <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s971111oa.htm>.

European countries, believe that migration poses severe economic and social challenges and cultural threat to their societies, furthermore they perceive migration as the biggest ever danger to their internal security and stability. The extremist rightists in Europe feel insecure about their national identity and national stability. Due to this feeling of insecurity certain southern European governments have taken anti-immigration measures. Migration is perceived to be one of the most direct security challenges to Europe. The migratory movement from the southern Mediterranean countries towards southern Europe have helped the right wing and nationalist forces in Europe to strengthen. Furthermore, there is a growing fear that in time these nationalist and even sometime racist tendencies may produce conflicts of ethnic sources within the Western European societies.²⁹

Against this migratory pressure from the south, Europe has formulated a ‘policy of reducing unwanted immigration’. Europeans see the issue of migration as a question of control rather than an area of opportunity. It is now widely accepted in Europe that underlying causes of northward immigration, which are mainly socio-economic, are not only southern Mediterranean concerns but also European concerns. Therefore, the European institutions tried to develop policies designed to eliminate all factors that motivate immigration. Within this framework, policies promoting external aid, liberalization of trade relations and economic cooperation gained significant importance. In this context, the European Investment Bank in cooperation with the World Bank initiated the Mediterranean Environmental Assistance Program in 1990, which mainly focused on the development of energy, wastewater management, and transportation and telecommunication sectors in the southern Mediterranean countries.³⁰ To these efforts should be added the efforts of the EU to establish a free-trade

²⁹ Lesser, (note 26), p. 6.

³⁰ Charles, T. Barber, ‘Creating a Mediterranean Community: Euro-Maghrebi Cooperation,’ *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 4, (Fall 1998), p. 162.

zone with the Mediterranean partner countries and those of the International Monetary Fund's.

2.2. SECURITY CHALLENGES VIEWED BY THE SOUTHERN SHORE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA

2.2.1. The Concept Of Security, A Northern Innovation?

In most of the bibliographical references concerning the Mediterranean security, the term 'security' is usually associated with internal problems in the southern Mediterranean states. This is mainly because the fact that for many years security in the Mediterranean was left to define and identify by external forces, which were sometimes peripheral to Mediterranean's security concerns. The Mediterranean was the area where the West had vital interests and security concerns of the non-European Mediterranean states were left out of emerging European structures.

The fact that southern Mediterranean states are vulnerable to any sorts of economic crises, increasing religious fundamentalism and rejection of modernity, instability stemming from significant population growth are cited as the major sources of insecurity in the Mediterranean. According to the northern concept of security, these could best be detained by the conclusion of military pacts. The southern Mediterranean countries found it necessary the re-examination of this concept of security, if a Mediterranean-wide partnership and cooperation is set as the goal.³¹ This tendency to contain sources of insecurity and instability through forming political and military alliances has often dominated Europe's relations with the region. This has led to frustrations on the part of southern states, and has formulated a

³¹ Ben Yahia, (note 6) p. 6.

rapid reaction against the club of rich northern Mediterranean states, which are in the process of closing their borders to the south, while building a 'European social and economic fortress'.³²

The peace-making and military operations of the northern security organizations in the post Cold War have been sources of suspicion and mistrust. Political elites and public opinion in the southern states perceive these kinds of interventions as manifestation of Western hegemonic supremacy. They are also questioning the continuation of NATO as a military pact, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Since the *raison d'être* of NATO has disappeared, why is then the NATO members are still insisting to keep it alive? The transformation of NATO to adapt the parameters of the post Cold War world and the desire of the EU members to develop their own security and defence capabilities, especially the ongoing work on the European Security and Defence Identity, are sources of concern and suspicion for the southern Mediterranean countries.

In this respect, the creation of two intervention forces, Eurofor (land-based) and Euromarfor (sea-based) in 1995 by the four Mediterranean members of the WEU, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, in order to achieve a balance in the European defence policies in favour of the Mediterranean and also to conduct coherent actions, have been regarded by the southern Mediterranean states as the new instruments of Western domination. The creation of these forces was also a message by Europe that if a conflict occurs in the southern Mediterranean, the region may become a potential area for military action of the European forces. The southern states don't understand how Mediterranean security could be maintained by bringing some kind of policeman into the region. They don't understand the relevance of these forces to the Mediterranean security, and since they are not part of them and have no

³² Ibid. p.2.

influence over these processes their suspicion grow rapidly. Therefore, it is essential for the Mediterranean region to promote cooperative efforts in order to minimise suspicions.

The case of Eurofor and Euromarfor reminds us that any kind of arrangement to bring security and stability to the Mediterranean should be made within the framework of transparency and confidence building. The northern countries should be more sensitive concerning the negative perception and threatening evolution of European security institutions for the southern Mediterranean countries.

Since the two shores of the Mediterranean have different security concerns, the region lacks a uniform and commonly accepted definition of 'security'. While the northern Mediterranean security perception is built on the military aspect, the southern states associate the concept of security with internal problems or with non-military issues. However, any kind of security threat could only be detained by the effective application of regional policies that is based on a common definition of risks and responses, which in turns necessitates the establishment of a structural consultation process.

2.2.2. Legacy Of The Past And The Exclusion Of Some Arab States From Some Mediterranean Cooperation Initiatives

The states of the northern Mediterranean are comprised of former colonial powers. The memories of the British occupation of Egypt and Palestine, French and Italian wars of hegemony over the North Africa are still fresh in the minds of the southern Mediterranean states. History has prevented the development of a climate of trust between Europe and the Muslim world. Starting form the conquest of Islam to crusades and to colonialism, the nature of the relationship between Europe and the Muslim world has been based on antagonism.³³

³³ De Lipkowski, (note 15), p. 16.

The establishment of the Israeli state in the Arab lands with the approval of Western powers, and the inclusion of Israel in all initiatives to promote regional security and stability while excluding some Arab states is a major source of concern on the part of the southern Mediterranean states. The countries of the southern Mediterranean endured years of colonialism and stemming from their colonial past they remain suspicious of the Western values, norms, structures and institutions.

Any initiative to establish a Mediterranean partnership should be comprehensive. The exclusion of such countries as Libya and Mauritania from regional security frameworks strengthens the already existing suspicion and mistrust with regard to the European countries. This is an important point that the southern European states should bear in mind.

2.2.3. Cultural Insecurity Of The Southern Mediterranean States

The insistence of northern Mediterranean countries on the deficiencies of the political, economic and cultural models used in the southern Mediterranean countries creates a sense of insecurity in the south. They perceive that their independence, national identity and self-esteem are endangered because of the growing exchange and relations with Europe. The imposition of Western models of democracy and economic liberalization are perceived with great suspicion by the southern Mediterranean countries as a great challenge to their cultural identity. The imposition of such Western values against the will of the southern Mediterranean states could increase political tensions and social fragmentation in the region. As stated in the Joint Report of the Euromesco Working Group, 'some of the public opinion in the North African and Middle Eastern societies has great suspicions about the West willing

to impose civilisation and its hegemony under the guise of democratic principles as if they were universal in character'.³⁴

The Mediterranean is cited in many political analyses as the major fault line between Islam and the West. The Mediterranean is a problematic region in the sense that there exist two contradictory worlds with clearly defined borders. Today Mediterranean is a dramatic illustration of complex inequality: Islam versus Christianity, religiously conservative, economically backward South versus secular, economically prosperous North. These strict definitions of the two worlds make the sides more sensitive to each other's behaviours. The realities of the Mediterranean reminds the famous article by Samuel Huntington, which argues that the twenty-first century will be characterized by the clash of civilizations. According to Huntington, cultural differences, rather than ideological or economic, will be the major source of conflict in our century. Therefore, the Mediterranean is an interesting test case for this argument, since each of the two sides saw a certain degree of threat to their cultural identity.

Northward immigration has increased the anxiety of the receiving states over their cultural identity. The imposition of strict barriers to their migration and trade has been perceived by many southern states as the factor, which destroys all possibility of partnership in a common Mediterranean heritage and environment.³⁵ It is stressed by many European scholars that the impossibility of assimilation and integration of immigrants, especially those of Islamic origin, creates great cultural divides within the Western societies. The northward immigration has been an important factor in the resurgence of xenophobia, racism and intolerance in Europe. These tendencies pose great challenge to the existence of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe, and also to the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean region.

³⁴ Roberto Aliboni, Abdel Monem Said Sly, and Alvaro de Vasconcelos, *Joint Report of the Euromesco Working Group on Political and Security Cooperation and Working Group on Arms Control, Confidence-Building and Conflict Prevention*, April 1997.

³⁵ Judith S. Yaphe, 'Do No Harm: Thoughts on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative,' *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 1999, p. 58.

All these expressions don't help the building of an environment of partnership and trust between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

The expression of Islamic fundamentalism as the biggest ever challenges to the Western values and way of life after Communism is another source of suspicion and distrust of the West: Perception of a new Cold War between Islam and the West. The Muslim states of the Mediterranean conceive this as an additional sign of European lack of understanding of the specific nature of the Muslim world and its problems, and believe that Europeans are blaming unfairly Islam. The rise of anti-immigration and anti-Islamic tendencies in European policies is also perceived as European unwillingness to understand Islam.

The position of Muslim communities in Western European countries is a source of concern for the southern Mediterranean countries. It is indeed an important factor that shapes the public opinion in the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean. The Bosnian example has been an important turning point, which confirmed the widespread suspicions of the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean with regard to European policies on the Muslim communities residing in European continent.

2.2.4. Suspicion On The Degree Of Importance The West Attaches To The Mediterranean

The West, and especially the Europeans, should state explicitly the importance they attach to the Mediterranean region. After the collapse of the Communist bloc, the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe stated their desire to become members of Western institutions. Therefore, the newly independent and emerging economies of the Central and Eastern Europe

may be classified as the 'Mediterranean archrivals'.³⁶ NATO's and the EU's enlargement debates were focused on the possible membership of these countries. Most of the EU's financial assistance was devoted to this region. While all of the EU members show support with regard the eastward enlargement, many member countries have doubts on allocating financial resources to the Mediterranean region.

The process of eastward enlargement of the Western institutions will be realized under the current parameters. If such an eastward enlargement weren't accompanied with a policy southward, it would increase the southern Mediterranean countries' fear of marginalization. This would be a furthering factor in reinforcing the existing cultural, economic, political, social and psychological division in the Mediterranean.³⁷

This chapter tried to analyse the difference in the perception of threats of the two shores of the Mediterranean. In current European politics, the southern Mediterranean is perceived to be a direct threat to the North simply because of its capacity to export chaos and instability. Whereas the southern Mediterranean states consider the West as willing to impose its hegemony over the region. It seems that two sides have completely different concerns and lack of information with regard to each other's realities. This lack of information and state of mutual distrust could only be overcome by the increase in direct contacts of the two shores under an international framework.

Many Western institutions tried to formulate Mediterranean policies in order to bring stability and peace to this turbulent region. The OSCE's efforts, EU's Barcelona Process and NATO's Mediterranean dialogue have been important initiatives in this respect. Having presented the difference of security perceptions in the two shores of the Mediterranean, the next chapter will focus on NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the prospect of the dialogue to overcome the existence of the psychological barrier to the establishment of a regional

³⁶ Stephen Calleya , 'Post-Cold War Regional Dynamics in the Mediterranean,' by Stephen C. Calleya, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3, (Summer 1996), p. 48.

partnership and dialogue. The chapter will also cover certain observations and recommendations.

CHAPTER 3

NATO'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

The Cold War parameters overshadowed the importance of the Mediterranean region for the Atlantic Alliance. Throughout the Cold War the emphasis of NATO's policy was mainly concentrated on the Central and Eastern Europe. During the years of enduring rivalry between the West and the Communist bloc, the Mediterranean remained to be seen as the 'southern flank' of NATO. However the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, which opened the way for a new world order, brought to the scene new forms of threats and risks. The region in Europe's periphery began to gain strategic importance. In this respect, Mediterranean, which is a region characterized by the existence of low-intensity conflicts and great discrepancies between the two shores gained strategic importance.

These dramatic changes in the world politics had also significant repercussions for NATO. Throughout the Cold War, NATO remained a closed security alliance, which aimed at defending its members against any attack from the Communist bloc. With the dismantlement of the Soviet Union, the Alliance lost its basic *raison d'être*. But NATO was able to transform and adapt to the changing circumstances of the world politics. The Alliance has started a series of cooperation and partnership building processes with the former Communist states.

³⁷ Ibid. p. 48.

Within this transformation process, Mediterranean region and its security gained increasing recognition by NATO allies. Many of the NATO member countries are also Mediterranean countries, thus it was acknowledged that the establishment of peace and stability in the Mediterranean would also have positive influence for Europe and the whole Atlantic area.

The consequence of these developments was the creation of Mediterranean dialogue, which is part of the NATO's overall cooperative approach to security. The Mediterranean dialogue was announced on 8 February 1995 to include Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, and leaved the door open for other Mediterranean countries to join later. Another Mediterranean country, Jordan, expressed her desire to join the initiative later that year.³⁸ The intension in initiating a Mediterranean dialogue was to achieve an understanding between the dialogue countries and to contribute to the strengthening of the Mediterranean security and stability by communicating the aims of the Alliance to the southern Mediterranean countries, which would help to eliminate misperceptions about the Atlantic Alliance.

For many southern Mediterranean countries NATO is the major instrument to contain Soviet expansionism. Since there is no more a Soviet Empire, which poses threats to the vital interests of the Western countries, the southern Mediterranean countries don't understand why the Alliance members are still insisting on the necessity of such an Alliance. Many of the Arab states regard the Mediterranean dialogue as the new instrument of the West to contain risks of the new world: drug smuggling, terrorism, migration, organized crime and any kind of social, political or economic explosion that may stem from the instability in the southern Mediterranean. Many of the North African states believes that the underlying factor which led the Alliance to open up a dialogue with the southern Mediterranean countries is to keep the problems of the North African states at arm's length, rather than trying to promote a

³⁸ Stephen Larrabee, Jerold Green, Ian O. Lesser and Michael Zanini, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative*, Santa Monica: Rand, 1998, p. 46.

process of partnership and dialogue with them.³⁹ As it can be understood, the image of NATO is quite different in the Mediterranean differing from that in the Central and Eastern European, where there is strong support for NATO.⁴⁰ In the southern and eastern Mediterranean, there is a strong mistrust and suspicion concerning the aim and intentions of NATO. The public opinion in these countries considers NATO as a Cold-War institution, which is searching its new enemy.⁴¹ Unless the goals and purposes of NATO in general, and the aim in establishing a Mediterranean dialogue in particular is better understood, the suspicion and distrust will hamper the establishment of a zone of stability and security in the Mediterranean.

3.1. Principles of the Mediterranean Dialogue

First of all, the dialogue has a progressive nature. There are no restrictions or limitations on the number of dialogue countries; additional countries may join the dialogue in the future. The addition of new dialogue countries may bring with it the evolution of the content of the dialogue. Each dialogue country may bring to the agenda its own subject of interest.

Secondly, the dialogue has a bilateral structure. The dialogue countries cannot be labelled as a coherent group: Three Maghreb countries (Mauritania, Tunisia and Morocco) and three Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan and Israel). It isn't possible to form a united whole out of the dialogue countries, and also they prefer the bilateral structure of the dialogue. The bilateral character enables them to assert their individuality and sovereignty as nation-

³⁹ Ibid. p, 59.

⁴⁰ De Santis, (note 12), p. 34.

⁴¹ Larrabee, (note 38) p. 79.

states. Yet another positive contribution of this character is the fact that the dialogue would not be vulnerable to the regional disruptions.⁴² For example, other initiatives to promote Mediterranean partnership have remained vulnerable to the developments in the Middle East Peace process. Any initiative aiming to create a region-wide Mediterranean dialogue, which includes all states bordering the Mediterranean is bound to fail if the Middle East Peace Process doesn't progress, every effort in this respect will be in the shadow of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Another point that should be kept in mind that due to its multilateral nature, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process launched by the EU didn't go beyond a forum of dialogue between the EU and Arab states. Countries such as Turkey remained marginalized in this process. The bilateral structure of NATO's dialogue will not produce a feeling of marginalization on the part of the dialogue countries.

Thirdly, the dialogue aims at offering the same basis for discussions and activities to all participant countries. And fourthly, the dialogue is pursued to reinforce other international efforts aiming to establish cooperation in the Mediterranean. The dialogue does not present a challenge to other institutional efforts, but it is aimed to establish a complementary role to other initiatives. Complementarity and mutual reinforcement are the two principles that NATO attaches great importance.⁴³

3.2. Challenges To NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue

As stated in the first part of this chapter, NATO suffers from a serious 'image' problem in the public opinion of the dialogue countries. It is considered as the instrument of the West to contain the symptoms of the southern malaise. Unless this image remains

⁴² Jette Nordam, 'The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and Building Confidence,' *NATO Review*, Vol. 45, No. 4, (July-August 1997), p. 27.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

unchanged, there seems to be little prospect for NATO to achieve a good deal in the Mediterranean dialogue.

Another challenge that NATO faces is the nature of the security issues inherent in the Mediterranean region. Throughout the Cold War, the main focus of NATO was on the military containment of the Soviet Union. Therefore, NATO has a comparative advantage in, what today is called as 'hard security' issues. However, soft security issues dominate the current Mediterranean security situation. This creates a dilemma for NATO on whether the soft or hard security issues should have the priority. This variety in the perception of threat and security makes it difficult to unite the approach into a common denominator.

Several dialogue countries are in favour of soft security issues. Therefore to start with soft security matters might create the environment conducive to modify the image of NATO. Within this framework, cooperation can be broadened to include humanitarian emergencies, joint actions in training and education as well as people-to-people and civil-military contacts; joint seminars, workshops and expert meetings can also help to promote the convergence of the security perception in the region. This will contribute to achievement of a positive role for NATO, upon which further security cooperation, such as hard security issues would be built.

In fact the Mediterranean presents a number of areas for cooperation. Firstly, NATO can invite the participating states to NATO-sponsored meetings of scientific nature. The participation of representatives from dialogue countries will increase the understanding between the sides. Within this framework, NATO can provide scholarships and fellowships for the scientists of the participant countries.

Exchange of information and transparency should be developed among the dialogue countries. Participation from the dialogue countries to NATO sponsored conferences, seminars and visits to NATO headquarters and exchange between military academies should

be encouraged. The participation from dialogue countries in the NATO school in Oberammergau and NATO Defence College in Rome will create the environment conducive to the establishment of informal links and communication networks between the academicians, diplomats of the dialogue countries. Cooperation between participants in civil society from both sides of the Mediterranean is an important issue that needs to be stressed. It facilitates links between universities, NGOs, professional associations, the media, and in particular the citizens. It allows the development of information exchanges, the transfer of know-how, joint actions, and finally, a better mutual understanding between those having similar roles in their respective countries.

The initial soft security arrangements may prepare the ground for the inauguration of the hard security issues, such as the crisis management, peacekeeping and peace support activities. NATO's peacekeeping activities could be expanded to dialogue countries, dialogue itself can be strengthened to serve as an early warning procedure, the cooperation may be expanded to setting up conflict prevention mechanisms specific to the Mediterranean, observers from the dialogue countries may be invited to the large-scale NATO exercises.

It is important to keep in mind that it is not possible to apply in the Mediterranean basin, Confidence and Security Building Measures, CSBM thereafter, used in some other European forums. Under the present conditions, priority should be given social and confidence building mechanisms, because the southern Mediterranean is not ready for the elaboration of military confidence building measures. The realities of the Mediterranean are totally different than that of Europe and this makes the application of European CSBM experiences to the region merely impossible. The initial CSBMs should be based on expanding mutual knowledge and respect for religious and cultural values and the primary objective should be the establishment of security partnership. Sensitive issues can only be

brought to the agenda after the creation of a sound dialogue.⁴⁴ The security of cohabitation should also be part of discussions and this includes the good neighbourliness, openness in communication and the contribution of military forces to the civil activities in times of disasters. There is a need for institutionalisation of crisis management and conflict prevention, which requires early warning, changes in military policies, cautions regarding good-neighbourliness, information exchange, transparency in military manoeuvres and the invitation of observers to these manoeuvres.

The exclusion of some southern Mediterranean countries from the dialogue creates a sense of discomfort. The biggest example is the exclusion of Algeria from the dialogue. Several NATO members and also dialogue countries argued that Algeria should be part of the Mediterranean dialogue. Since Algeria is the largest country of the Maghreb, and more importantly she is one of the biggest exporter of energy and natural gas of the region whose destination is mainly Europe.

The promotion of peace-support missions in the Mediterranean region is also an important element of security that needs to be elaborated. Peace operations are a Mediterranean reality for a long period of time. Although the peace operations in the Mediterranean show great increase year-by-year because of the existence of regional instability, regional participation in these operations remains at a low profile.⁴⁵ The region is also home to many humanitarian tragedies. The participation in peace operations will increase military-to-military contacts and promotes the civil-military relations and the involvement in humanitarian operations will increase the possibility of achieving a Mediterranean-wide understanding on the use of military capacities in transport, logistics and other emergency assistance for humanitarian purposes. All these operations could be conducted under the guise

⁴⁴ Mustapha Benchenune, 'Le Partenariat Euro-Mediterraneen: La Securite par la Confiance et la Cooperation,' *Le Dossier D'Athens*, No. 4, 1997, p. 140.

⁴⁵ Fred Tanner, 'Joint Actions for Peace-building in the Mediterranean,' *International Spectator*, Vol. 14, No. 4, (October-December 1999), p.76.

of confidence building among the Mediterranean countries. The increasing interactions and cooperation at different levels of the Mediterranean societies will have a positive influence in narrowing the psychological gap between the two shores.

One final issue may challenge NATO's dialogue is the limited consensus within NATO to devote efforts to the Mediterranean security. Stemming from its principle of unanimity, NATO operations and activities regarding the Mediterranean may be endangered. It is difficult to obtain full consensus on this issue since only six of the NATO members are also Mediterranean countries. Despite the challenges, NATO's Mediterranean dialogue may be a suitable instrument to bring security, cooperation and partnership to the region. It is obvious that the fundamental problem of the region is the lack of coherence and unity in all dimensions. The dialogue may achieve greater understanding between NATO member countries and the dialogue countries, which will in turn help to overcome the psychological barrier.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Initiatives to establish a trans-Mediterranean international institution have always deemed to fail, because they rely on the non-existing premise of institutionalisation of regional patterns of friendship. Rather than patterns of friendship, the ‘psychological deficit’ is the only factor that governs many trans-Mediterranean relationships.⁴⁶ This lack of an ‘agreed language’ and common approach to security is the most significant factor that hinders the establishment of a security dialogue, and a factor contributing to the increasing misperceptions and misunderstandings between the two sides of the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean region has a complex character. There are competing loyalties, Arab countries are Arab before they are Mediterranean, and southern European countries are European before they are Mediterranean. Therefore it is not possible to show a country that is purely Mediterranean. The natural outcome of these different identities is the creation of diverse sub-regional security concerns. Although the countries of the Mediterranean region have shared a common destiny, common geography and a past, these most of the time

competing sub-regional security concerns prevented the formation of a Mediterranean identity and a Mediterranean community.

The existence of a triple disequilibrium, which consists of the demographic, economic and socio-cultural disequilibrium, and the existence of conflicts stemming from the history, such as the conflict between Turkey and Greece, Cyprus issue, opposition between Algeria and Morocco on Western Sahara, conflict between Tunisia and Libya, ethnic rivalries in the Balkans, and the Arab-Israeli conflict characterize the Mediterranean region as one of the most unstable and insecure region, which is difficult to establish a framework of peace and stability. To these inherent factors of instability and insecurity has been added new sources of destabilization that has a southern and a northern approach.

The key that lies behind the achievement of a secure and stable environment in the Mediterranean is the accomplishment of the right combination of elements through the appropriate structures. This will gradually lead to the realization of goals, such as partnership, over time. But partnership necessitates the vision of shared goals and objectives for the future. However, for the time being the Mediterranean states do not have shared goals. Therefore any initiative in the Mediterranean should concentrate first and foremost on increasing mutual familiarity and understanding throughout the Mediterranean region.

Unfortunately, past initiatives have remained within the framework of Western perspective, which was far from elaborating southern security perceptions. All the bibliographical references on Mediterranean security were not able to go beyond formulating Western sensitivities on immigration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increasing demographic imbalance, drug trafficking, economic decline in the south and so on, which are viewed to be the evils of the southern world. It is perceived that the intra-state conflicts in the south cause instability, political vacuums, movements of people and economic

⁴⁶ Claire Spencer, 'Partnership-Building in the Mediterranean,' *The International Spectator*, Vol. 14, No. 4, (October-December 1999), p. 74.

underdevelopment with important spill over effects in Europe. It is not possible to base the security arrangements only on these parameters, because the southern part of the Mediterranean will continue to feel humiliated since their concerns were not addressed in the emerging security structures. However, once they are addressed there is the possibility to contain these challenges through mutual efforts.

The countries of the northern Mediterranean are facing huge social difficulties and witness the resurgence of nationalism, xenophobia and intolerance in which the southern Mediterranean immigrants are perceived to be the spacegoat for Europe's social problems.⁴⁷ However, through the mutual efforts of the two rims and a working partnership between them, open and tolerant societies in the North can be achieved. The establishment of a working partnership in turns necessitates the South to progress in the fields of democracy, human rights, 'good governance' and the rule of law.

The objective should be to give an equal consideration to the concerns of the both shores, by reducing divisions, misunderstandings and differences be it demographic, cultural, economic or political. The principles of peace and stability should be the cornerstones of any regional identity that would emerge out of the initiatives to establish a Mediterranean partnership. Furthermore, the strategic aim and the common good encompassing all the Mediterranean should be the establishment of peace, stability and security in the region.

The Mediterranean partnership should be founded on the principles of a common area of peace and stability, an area of shared prosperity, the development of human resources and understanding between cultures, religions and peoples of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the Mediterranean-wide security can only be achieved through a concrete level of coordination; the great disparity between the northern and southern shores should be

⁴⁷ Aliboni, (note 34) p. 9.

objectively expressed and the causes of this great division should be addressed within the framework of a partnership.

The inefficiencies of the past initiatives on Mediterranean in fostering a progress shows that instead of a multilateral cooperative endeavours; sub-regional bilateral relations are more feasible channels of communication for the region. These two worlds should learn to live together, they should try to understand each other's concerns and try to formulate a 'political identity', which will rely on a consensus of these two worlds on common norms and values and behaviours.

In this respect, NATO and its Mediterranean Dialogue can be an important instrument in developing a comprehensive and cooperative approach to the Mediterranean security in a bilateral context. But the sole NATO efforts in building an environment of peace and security in the Mediterranean will not be enough. NATO efforts should be reinforced by other international efforts, such as the EU and the OSCE.

The paper argued that there is a need to develop a comprehensive approach to security, taking into consideration the multidimensional nature of today's security and more importantly any initiative to establish a Mediterranean security framework should address the security concerns of the both shores by giving them equal emphasis and attaching same degree of importance. NATO can be the appropriate framework to build a sense of trust and confidence between the two shores of the Mediterranean. This will be a two-way relationship, since this will require the positive change of NATO's image vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean states, it will in turn be an additional success for NATO.

It will not be difficult for NATO to achieve such a result if it can communicate to the southern Mediterranean countries that their security concerns are as important as those of the northern security concerns. The countries of the southern Mediterranean, with some exceptions, will be more open to engage in any kind of cooperation with their northern

counterparts since they perceive any type of political, diplomatic, or economic activity with the powerful neighbours to the North as a unique opportunity to enhance their relations with Europe. Therefore, the long lasting problem of achieving confidence and mutual trust and eliminating all kinds of psychological barriers will not remain as the states goals of all institutions engaged in bringing peace and security to the Mediterranean.

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TABLES

A: WMD CAPABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Country	Nuclear	Biological-Toxicological	Chemical
U.S.A.	deployed	terminated	dismantling
Turkey	research	none	none
Iraq	weaponization	stockpiled	stockpiled, used several times
Iran	development	development	deployed, used
Syria	research	development	deployed (largest CW capability)
Israel	deployed	production capability	production capability
Egypt	research	development	stockpiled, used
Libya	research	development	deployed

Tunisia	-	-	-
Algeria	research	research	development
Morocco	-	-	-

Source: Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, see <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/index.htm>

B: DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS FOR THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

Country	Annual population Growth	Population below 15 years	Population (July 1998)	Life expectancy
Morocco	1.89%	36%	29 mill.	68.5
Algeria	2.14%	38%	30.5 mill.	68.9
Tunisia	1.43%	32%	9.4 mill.	73.1
Libya	3.68%	48%	5.7 mill.	65.4
Egypt	1.86%	36%	66 mill.	62.1
Jordan	2.54%	43%	4.4 mill.	72.9
Syria	3.23%	46%	16.7 mill.	67.8
Lebanon	1.62%	30%	3.5 mill.	70.6
Israel	1.91%	28%	5.64 mill.	78.4

Source : Brynjar Lia, 'Security Challenges in Europe's Mediterranean Periphery-Perspectives and Policy Dilemmas,' *European Security*, Vol. 8, No.4, (Winter 1999), p. 45.