

**The Extension of the European Security Community to
the Periphery:
France in the Mediterranean and Finland and Sweden
in the Baltic Countries**

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INTRODUCTION

In 1957 Karl Deutsch, in co-operation with a number of other scholars, introduced the concept *security community* to the study of “the possible ways in which men some day might abolish war.”¹ By security community Deutsch et al meant a group of people that had become integrated to the extent that there is a “real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”² There are two types of security communities for Deutsch, one amalgamated – unified –security community of which the United States is an instance. The second type is a pluralistic security community where the member governments “retain[.]the legal independence of a separate government.”³ This study wishes to build on the pioneering work of Deutsch and his associates by analysing the related question of *how a security community might be extended to areas in its vicinity – peripheries – that are unstable.*

This paper is based on the assumption that as of the second half of the 1990s there is in Europe a stable “core of security.” To this core of security belong the countries that are members of NATO and/or the European Union (EU). What characterises this core of security is the absence of any risk of war between its members, it is – in other words – a pluralistic security community. Given this fundamental stability in the centre of European security, a crucial question becomes: how does one extend this security community in the core of Europe to its unstable peripheries? Because if the immediate peripheries are not stable, in principle their instability could spill over into the security core and thus threaten the gains already accomplished there in terms of stable security.

In this paper, I analyse how three governments in the European security core have attempted to contribute to the stabilisation of their respective peripheries, to the extension of the European security community. Apart from the intrinsic interest of the two specific cases, the paper also aims to contribute to the broader issue of the extension of stability to the peripheries by generalising from the strategies employed in the two cases. My intention is thus to contribute to a broader understanding of by what strategies European nations may alleviate the general problem of their unstable peripheries. My analysis covers the policies of the French Government to attempt to contribute to the stability of the Western Mediterranean – the Maghreb – and the policies of the Finnish and the Swedish Government in their efforts to stabilise one part of their neighbourhood –

¹ Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett claim that Richard Van Wegenen first introduced the concept in the early 1950s. See “Security communities in theoretical perspectives,” Adler and Barnett (eds.): *Security Communities* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge UP, 1998), p. 6. It was, however, Deutsch and his associates who developed the concept that we know today. The quote is from Karl Deutsch et al: *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957), p. 3.

² Ibid., p. 6.

³ Ibid.

the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the Maghreb, I focus on what I regard as the three core states: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

In one sense, the Cold War security system in Europe was very stable during the Cold War period, it has been characterised as a “Europe between the Superpowers,” to use the title of Anton W. DePorte’s well-known book.⁴ This security system had been based on bipolarity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or perhaps more correctly between the United States and the Soviet Union, a situation that brought stability in terms of preventing war, but that simultaneously meant that many European states were locked into an organisational framework not necessarily of their own choosing.

During the 10 years that have elapsed since the fall of the Berlin Wall a new security system has been under creation in Europe. This emerging system is one in which several organisations interact and complement each other. These organisations have differing mandates and different memberships. This European security system has not been settled at the dawn of the 21st Century.

As stated, this article proceeds from the starting-point that in the present European security community there is a very stable nucleus, in which war and the threat of war between members has for all practical purposes disappeared. To be precise, in my conception the states that are members of at least one of the three crucial organisations - NATO, the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU)⁵ – together form this security community.⁶

A second starting-point is that this core of European security is surrounded by several peripheries, some of which are very unstable. The Balkans is only the most obvious case where this is true. Members of the European security core that border such unstable regions, I further assume, have the ambition to extend the stability of the security core to their immediate vicinity, to lessen the risk of instabilities spreading to their own territories or immediate borders, thus potentially destabilising the security community itself. The efforts of the German Government to include its neighbours to the East in NATO and, over time, in the EU is a clear case in which this general strategy has been employed for several years.

The definition of the term *periphery* will not be problematized further here. I will simply note that it designates areas outside the European security nucleus, areas that are sufficiently close to the border of the security system to pose real problems of possible spillover of various problems, such

⁴ Anton W. DePorte: *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979).

⁵ The fact that the WEU only contains members who are also members of the EU, plus the fact that it will for all intents and purposes be merged into the EU in 2001 means that its inclusion here may be perceived as somewhat superfluous.

⁶ I do not regard the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as being sufficiently cohesive to form part of the security nucleus of the European security community.

as migration, terrorism, internal disturbances etc. In the present European security system, one can identify five peripheries that fulfil this conception. The first is the Baltic States, the second is the Ukraine, the third is the Balkans, the fourth is the Western Mediterranean, and the fifth is the Middle East.

Of the two cases analysed here, it is very likely indeed that the three Baltic States will be well on the way toward EU membership by 2005, if not earlier. The second case that of the security of the Western Mediterranean, is a very different one, with none of the three countries⁷ focused likely to become members of either the EU or NATO. In EU parlance, the goal of the first process is “accession,” whereas in the second the goal is “partnership.” While the second case is one where the region will remain a periphery to the European security core, the first case will presumably end with membership for all three Baltic States, thus integrating the former periphery into the security core, while at the same time creating a new “periphery.”

The starting-point, in both cases studied, is 1991, as the European Communities were on the verge of becoming the European Union, and as the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were collapsing.

One reason for the choice of the comparison between Sweden and France is that these are two states with a foreign policy orientation that has some similarities.⁸ They are both – or in the case of Sweden has been – regional great powers. This position has entailed that they have pursued foreign policies regarded by their immediate neighbours as self-serving and lacking in understanding for the needs of these neighbours. In this sense, this paper will also compare how two nations that have been used to pursue their own paths in foreign policy are increasingly forced to take into consideration the institutional framework in which they are acting, in particular that of the European Union. Indeed, I regard the co-operation within the EU as the process that is changing the relations between the European nations in a truly fundamental way. This paper has the aim of making a contribution to the study of this broader process as well.

My paper is thus explicitly not focused on the activities of the perhaps most important member of the European security community: the United States. It is my view that too many studies of European security focus more or less exclusively upon the policies emanating from Washington.

⁷ I have elected here to focus on France’s policies towards what I regard as the core of the Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The Maghreb, according to the *Encyclopædia Britannica DVD 2000* “now comprises essentially the Atlas Massif and the coastal plains of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.” I have elected to focus on the first three since I regard Libya as being an anomalous case both in the sense of being mainly outside the cooperation of the other three countries, and because Libya has pursued very particular external policies ever since the coming to power of Colonel Khaddafi in 1969.

⁸ I owe this point to my colleague Antonio Missiroli, of the Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris.

I have elected to place my analytical focus elsewhere - on European states working to make their immediate environments more safe and secure.

The Study of European Security from the Perspective of Security Community

One of the aspects that need to be clarified in this essay is the concept of *security*. The question is what does “security“ mean in the term “European security community?“ It is sufficient for my purposes here to say that, among a growing number of articles and books containing different definitions of the concept, I establish my own conception based on David Baldwin’s to my mind admirably clear exposition. Baldwin, basing his discussion on an earlier, seminal article by Arnold Wolfers, defines “security“ as “a low probability of damage to acquired values.“⁹

This definition, even if it includes an objective dimension, is clearly open to other empirical referents than simply the military ones. It is my contention that in the present (West) European political system, states regard both the traditional aspects of military security, as well as what may broadly be called economic security issues, as crucial questions to be pursued. This means that I assume that the governments under investigation here perceive a positive link between economic and political development, on the one hand, and traditional security, on the other. My conception of the working of the European security community in the 1990s is thus broadly compatible with that expressed by James Sperling and Emil Kirchner in their book *Recasting the European Order: Security architecture and economic co-operation*.¹⁰ In terms of my overall perspective on the study of international relations this means that I in the case at hand regard myself as a liberal institutionalist.

For a comparison of the two cases, it is necessary to have some type of analytical instrument to structure the analysis. In my conception, the strategies that governments may pursue may be seen in three dimensions. The *first* is the context within which the state pursues its strategy. Here I distinguish between *unilateral*, *bilateral*, and *multilateral/institutional* strategies. To illustrate, a strategy by which the Swedish Government supports the Government in Estonia directly is unilateral, a strategy where Stockholm and Helsinki explicitly co-operate is bilateral, and a strategy carried out within the context of the European Union (EU) is multilateral/institutional.

The *second* dimension concerns the *type of goal pursued* by the state or states. Note that what is important here is not the goals that the recipient country may have. The crucial aspect is the

⁹ David Baldwin: “The Concept of Security,“ *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (1997) pp. 5-26. The quote is from p. 13.

objective that the state that initiates the strategy pursues. Here I distinguish between *increased co-operation, membership (in the European security community)* and *institutional transformation*. The first two types here should be more or less self-evident. By the third type of goal, I mean an objective where the actor does not pursue the final goal – the stabilisation of a periphery – directly, but rather aims to contribute to the creation of an institutional framework by which it purports to contribute to the final goal: the stabilisation of peripheries. To put it differently, a transformational strategy is a strategy that aspires to change fundamentally one or more the institutional contexts in which European nations co-operate.

The *third* dimension of strategy distinguishes between the *type of issue-area* in which the strategy is conducted. The established convention, carried out in the Helsinki process, forms my basis here. The first type of strategy thus contains diplomatic and security matters. In the second category, issues of economic co-operation and interchange are included. Thirdly, there are cultural, academic and other issues that have latterly often been referred to as pertaining to the development of “civil society.” In this paper, I assess which of these strategies that have been employed by the three states studied, and I also attempt to evaluate to what an extent the strategies employed have been successful as of this writing in the early summer of 2000.

In research on international co-operation, scholars such as Oran Young have emphasised the role of leadership.¹¹ Typically, the leaders of such efforts are the very strongest states, most often the United States. In this case, I extend the concept of leadership to the study of smaller members of the security community. France is of course an important power in this context. Finland and Sweden are, however, quite a bit smaller and weaker than France. An important question in this context is thus: to what an extent can the governments of small members of a security community, working together, influence the process by which this community extends to include new members, or to tie them strongly to the community?

Finland and Sweden as Actors in the Baltic Region

During the post-World War II period Finland and Sweden applied the same label to their respective security policy postures: neutrality. Beneath this superficial similarity there were, however, important differences. While Sweden had selected its own foreign and security policy

¹⁰ Sperling and Kirchner: *Recasting the European Order: Security architecture and economic cooperation* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997).

¹¹ Most of Oran Young’s best research on international regimes are printed, or in some cases reprinted, in *idem.*: *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP,

posture, and also defined its practical contents unilaterally, Finland had its security policy essentially forced upon it by the Soviet Union, which emerged as victorious in two bilateral wars waged between them during the Second World War. The Agreement of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which Finland was in practice forced to enter by Moscow in 1948, clearly circumscribed the room for manoeuvre of the Finnish Government in foreign and security affairs.¹²

Nils Andrén notes a second distinction between the neutrality policies of the two nations that gradually became more clear as the years went on: "...one difference between the Finnish and the Swedish neutrality policy is that the former was always totally pragmatic, which was also understood by public opinion, while the latter was portrayed as ideological and principled."¹³

Despite these differences, there was a widespread view in the region that there were links between the international postures of the two nations, indeed that the security policies of Denmark and Norway as well were tied to those of their Nordic neighbours. This view was sometimes stated to be a "theory:" such as in "the Theory of the Nordic Balance."¹⁴ While the theoretical aspects of this reasoning were clearly exaggerated in some cases, still even in retrospect there appears to have been a nucleus of truth to it in terms of describing the linkages between the security policy strategies of the Nordic countries. The essence of the argument was that the governments of the other three Nordic countries took Finnish interests into consideration when fashioning their security alignments. This meant that Denmark and Norway restricted their NATO memberships in that they refused to accept the stationing of either troops from other NATO countries on a more permanent basis or any deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil. In the case of Sweden, one argument for continued "non-alignment in peace with the aim of neutrality in war"- as the official doctrine had it for several decades - was that membership in NATO for Sweden would more or less automatically have meant more severe pressure from the Soviet Union on Finland. Analogously, any abolition of either restriction on NATO membership by either Norway or Denmark, might, it was believed, have had similarly negative consequences for Finland.

Research and other revelations after the end of the Cold War have shown that there were secret aspects of Swedish neutrality, such as far-reaching preparations for receiving military aid

1989) and idem.: *International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1994).

¹² For the circumstances surrounding the signing of the treaty see Max Jakobson: *Finland in the New Europe* (Westport, CT/London: Praeger with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1998), pp. 55-63. The assessment of the treaty and its birth is in this book, to be sure, more nuanced and less harsh than my necessarily brief characterisation.

¹³ Nils Andrén: "Jakten på vårt förflutna (The Search for our Past)," *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift*, No. 2, 1999, p. 208. All translations from Swedish are by the author.

¹⁴ Erik Noréen: "The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept in Theory and Practice," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. XVIII, No. 1, (1983), pp. 43-56.

from NATO in the case of a Soviet attack, that were not known during the Cold War.¹⁵ To this author, nothing that has been shown so far indicates that Finland did not play an important role for Swedish security policy.

Finland and Sweden in the New Europe

After 1989, two nations that were once part of the same Swedish realm, and that have nearly always been close in their foreign and security policies after the break-up of that union, have had to adjust those policies to a radically changed external environment. While there are no doubt differences in these two countries' approaches to European co-operation, this article proceeds from the basic assumption that the many parallels in the foreign and security policies pursued by Helsinki and Stockholm are even more important.¹⁶ Another study might have chosen to contrast and compare the differences in the strategies employed by Helsinki and Stockholm, respectively, to the building of an even more stable Europe. My study instead highlights the similarities.¹⁷

During the 1990s, the foreign and security policies of the two Nordic nations have changed in important ways, once again largely in parallel but in parallels that hide differences. One such difference has to do not really with policy itself, but with the causes behind the common policy change of applying for membership in what is now the European Union. Thus, Sweden was the first of the two in deciding to seek membership, a decision that was officially announced by the Government in October of 1990. For Finland, the decision to seek EC membership proved somewhat more difficult to take but in 1992 the country's politicians had also decided to enter upon the road to Brussels. It could be argued that for Sweden this decision was, to an important extent, motivated by a sense of failure of the Swedish model for running the economy. In other words, the main reason on the part of the Swedish Government for seeking EU membership was economic. The strong and consistent growth that had characterised the Swedish economy between 1945 and the beginning of the 1970s had been replaced by more erratic economic trends after 1973. The Swedish Government saw an economic slump coming in the early 1990s. EC membership was, in

¹⁵ See SOU 1994:11: *Om kriget kommit...Förberedelser för mottagande av militärt bistånd 1949-1969. Betänkande av Neutralitetspolitikkommisionen (If War had occurred..Preparations for the reception of Military Assistance 1949-1969. Report from the Commission on Neutrality Policy).*

¹⁶ For insightful reflections on the shifting relationships between the two "brotherly peoples" see Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe*, pp. 94-99. See also, for more recent events, Hanna Ojanen: "Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam development of the CFSP," *Occasional Papers 11*, Institute for Security Studies – Western European Union, January 2000.

¹⁷ For a very interesting analysis focusing on the differences in Finnish and Swedish approaches to the EU from 1995 through 1999 see Jennifer Novack. "Finnish and Swedish Experiences Inside the European Union: Attempts to Increase Regional Security and Cooperation," Paper for the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science

this context, seen as a way to alleviate an expected economic slow-down, as well as to create better conditions for future growth.

In the Finnish case, it is at least an equally acceptable simplification to state that for Helsinki the main motivation for seeking EC/EU membership was concern for the country's security in a traditional sense.¹⁸ An additional and related motive behind the Finnish decision to join the EU is well stated by David Arter: "accession was viewed as a way of anchoring Finland to the West European mainstream and institutionalising its position as a member of a bloc of West European states to which it had belonged by dint of its politico-economic system, if not geography, from the earliest days of independence."¹⁹

Another fundamental step for Finland in changing its security policy was the demise of the agreement of friendship with the Soviet Union, which happened gradually and was finalised with the collapse of the Soviet State. Both nations have also taken part in the new avenues for co-operation that have opened up with NATO, with Finland joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)²⁰ in 1992, Sweden in 1994, and, subsequently, both countries joining the Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994.²¹

In all these steps it has been more or less taken for granted by the political authorities in both countries that if one of them entered an international organisation or other international framework with implications for security policy, the other had to follow. Traditionally, and again manifested in the case of application for membership of the EC, Sweden has taken the lead. The logical next step in this sequence of entering various political organisations in Europe would be membership for both countries in NATO. Whether and, if so, when such a step might be taken by either country, and if the other would then feel "forced" to follow is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

Finland, Sweden and the Baltic States before 1991

The links between the two Nordic neighbours and the three Baltic States have been many and varied throughout history. For several centuries, Sweden and Finland were united in a large state

Conference in Stockholm, 14-16 May 2000.

¹⁸ See Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe*, pp. 110-111, 116. For the Swedish process leading to application for EC membership see Bengt Sundelius: "Changing Course: When Neutral Sweden Chose the European Community," in *European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 177-201. For an explicitly comparative analysis of the two processes see Christine Ingebritsen: *The Nordic States and European Unity* (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell UP, 1998), pp. 96-102.

¹⁹ David Arter: "The EU Referendum in Finland on 16 October 1994: A Vote for the West, not for Maastricht," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 35, No.2. (June 1997), p. 362, as quoted in Jennifer Novack: "Finnish and Swedish Experiences Inside the European Union," p 2.

²⁰ Transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.

that – during a shorter period - also incorporated what is now Estonia and Latvia. The most extended Swedish realm existed from 1629 through 1721.

These brief notes from the history of the Baltic Region have left out one crucial factor: Russia – the Soviet Union – and then Russia again. For Sweden this country, in whatever incarnation, has been regarded as the main threat to its security for 300 years. For Finland, the relationship with Russia has been still more crucial, as the Finns belonged to the Russian Empire from 1809 until 1917. Thereafter, Finland fought two wars with its immense neighbour in 1939-1940 and again between 1941 and 1944.

For the three Baltic States, their relationship with Russia – the Soviet Union – has been at least as traumatic as has been the case for Finland. For two hundred years, from the beginning of the 18th Century until after World War I, what later became three independent nations belonged to the Russian Empire. Thereafter followed a period of roughly 20 years of independence, before what was then the Soviet Union reoccupied these states in 1944. In the collapsing Soviet Empire the three Baltic republics gradually regained their independence, before finally becoming fully independent again in 1991.

With the renewed independence of the three Baltic States, the period begins where my analysis starts. In the eyes of the Finnish and Swedish Governments, the new situation in the Baltic region was unstable. The Soviet giant - for so long dominant in the region - had collapsed, to be replaced by a Russian state that searched for both internal stability and a new international role. To this large element of uncertainty was added the precarious independence of three small states whose future was also unclear, both in terms of domestic political development and in terms of their regional roles. It is an unchangeable fact of geo-politics that the three Baltic States have to co-exist with a neighbour to the East that will always be immensely larger and more powerful than they are, even if they are taken together.

The Finnish and Swedish Governments, regardless of their composition, have seen it as a crucial foreign and security policy goal to attempt to contribute to the stabilisation of the three Baltic States ever since their independence in 1991.

²¹ Ojanen, "Participation and Influence," p. 5.

Finland, Sweden and the Growth of Co-operation around the Baltic Sea after 1991

During the years after the decisions had been made in Helsinki and Stockholm to seek EC membership, but before the issue had been formally settled, the two Governments pursued three strategies in their efforts to extend some stability to the three Baltic States. The first was the bilateral aid given by Helsinki and Stockholm, respectively, to one, two or all three of the Baltic States. The second strategy was bilateral, in that the two governments co-operated in supporting one, two or all three countries in various projects. The third was a multilateral/institutional strategy, pursued by both capitals, to some extent in parallel, to some extent unilaterally. One overall objective that characterised many of the strategies applied by the Finnish and Swedish Governments in this region was the establishment of multifaceted co-operation around the Baltic Sea.

The unilateral strategies pursued by Finland and Sweden in their support for the stabilisation of the security situation of the Baltic States included several steps. In this respect, there have been distinctions between the approaches taken by the two countries. Sweden has made an effort to be even-handed in its support to all three states. Finland has, to a much larger extent, concentrated its aid on the country that is its closest neighbour among the three: Estonia. In 1995 Sweden initiated an important national programme to assist the growth of democracy and market economy in several of the countries in the former Warsaw Pact, with a particular focus on the Baltic States. In addition to the adoption of a multiyear programme of economic assistance, Stockholm also created a separate “SIDA East,” inside the Swedish International Development Authority, an agency that had up to then been focused on North- South issues.²² During the period 1991 through 1998, Sweden gave somewhat more than 1.500 Million SEK (circa \$200 million) in bilateral economic assistance to the three Baltic States taken together.²³ The Swedish bilateral aid was fairly evenly split between the three countries.

Since the first half of the 1990’s both countries have also provided security assistance to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In the beginning, this aid largely did not include materiel that could be regarded as strictly military. Over time, however, both countries loosened their restrictions in this regard. An official source²⁴ states that Sweden had four goals with its aid in the security sphere to the Baltic States during the 1990s:

²² See Ingvar Andersson: “Svensk kunskap på export: Baltikum får hjälp att bygga upp demokrati och marknadsekonomi, (Swedish knowledge for export: The Baltic States get assistance to build democracy and market economy),” *Dagens Nyheter*, October 10, 1996.

²³ Figures from the Swedish Foreign Ministry “Country Strategy for Estonia,” “Country Strategy for Latvia,” “Country Strategy for Lithuania,” all published in August and September 1999.

²⁴ “Effektivare totalförsvarsstöd i Östersjöområdet (More Effective Support for Total Defence in the Baltic Sea

- “● to support the creation of a security community
- to deepen democratic culture
- to support a socially acceptable economic transformation
- to support an ecologically acceptable development.”²⁵

The official Swedish documents provide several examples of aid to support the reaching of the first goal above. Among these may be mentioned support to create a Defence College for the three states taken together – BALTDEFCOL, located in Tartu, Estonia. Another has been support for the creation of a common battalion to be used for peacekeeping operations – BALTBAT. Further aid has included the donation of some “superfluous military materiel”²⁶ as well as support for mine-clearing operations. The same document states that Swedish security aid totalled some 85 million SEK per year in the second half of the 1990s.

Finland has, as in other fields, concentrated its aid on Estonia. In the security and defence area, Helsinki has, in particular, supported the training of Estonian military officers. Only a small proportion of direct defence materiel aid has been given to Estonia. In addition, there have been trilateral activities in which Helsinki and Stockholm have co-operated to aid Estonia in the defence and security field.²⁷ The total aid given by Finland to Estonia in this sector amounts to “tens of millions of Finnish Marks.”²⁸

One linchpin around which the multilateral/institutional strategies of the two countries in the Baltic Region evolved was the Nordic Council, established in 1953. Due partly to the special security situation of Finland this co-operation did not include foreign and defence policies during roughly four decades.²⁹ This changed, however, in the 1990s, when Nordic co-operation ventured onto a “a post-Cold War pursuit of collective foreign relations.”³⁰ One aspect of this venture was the establishment of institutional co-operation between the Nordic Council and the Baltic Council, comprising the three Baltic States, in 1992. Finland and Sweden, as active members of the Nordic Council, were to be sure active in this process.

It must be noted here that the initiatives to start and increase co-operation around the Baltic Sea was by no means the unique preserve of Finland and Sweden. Other countries also were active,

Region)” *Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU) 1999:6*.

²⁵ Ibid. pp. 5-6.

²⁶ Ibid. p. 33.

²⁷ Ibid. pp. 71-72.

²⁸ “Säkerhetsutvecklingen i Europa och Finlands försvar (The Security Development in Europe and Finland’s Defence)” Statsrådets redogörelse till riksdagen 17.3.1997, Helsinki, 1997, pp-37-38. (translation by the author).

²⁹ Olav F. Knudsen: “Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea Region,” *Chaillot Papers 33* (November 1998), (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union), p. 31.

³⁰ Carl-Einar Stålvant: “The Council of Baltic Sea States,” *Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe: Building Security, Prosperity, and Solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea*, ed. Andrew Cottey (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p.53. Cf also Knudsen, “Cooperative Security,” pp. 37-38.

some of which, like Danish Government, may perhaps be regarded as being even earlier in their actions in this direction than either Helsinki or Stockholm.

An early Swedish initiative toward the creation of a wide-ranging network of co-operation around the Baltic Sea was a conference chaired by then-Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson in Ronneby, Sweden, in 1990. This early conference – co-sponsored with Poland - focused on marine environmental problem.³¹ An even more important step was the creation of the Council of Baltic Sea States in early 1992. This was, however, not created by either Finland or Sweden, but was the result of a common initiative taken by Denmark and Germany, thus illustrating the fact that the initiatives for the creation of additional regional co-operation around the Baltic Sea have been shared among several nations.³²

Concern over environmental problems in the region proved to be a common denominator that gave the impetus for new regional co-operation. This was the creation of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992. The members in this organisation were initially Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden. The EC was also represented from the beginning, through the European Commission.³³ Gradually, the CBSS has taken on more tasks, adding economic, cultural and issues concerning crime to the original concerns for the environment in and around the Baltic Sea.³⁴ The CBSS is the most important new regional organisation created around the Baltic Sea after the fall of the Soviet Union from the perspective of increasing co-operation and stability in the region..³⁵

Finland and Sweden in the EU

The third track in the support that Finland and Sweden has given to the three Baltic States in terms of the latter's security situation has been the encouragement that Helsinki and Stockholm have given regarding the inclusion of at least one Baltic nation in the first group of states that are to enter the EU in the next step of the extension of that organisation. This is, however, one of those cases where the strategies of the two countries have differed. Initially, both countries supported the simultaneous entry of all three Baltic States into the EU. In July 1997, however, the European

³¹ Stålvant, "Council of Baltic Sea States," p. 50.

³² Ibid., p. 51.

³³ See "Berättelse om regeringens åtgärder under 1992 (Yearbook of Finnish Politics 1992)," Helsinki, 1993, pp. 538-539.

³⁴ For a brief overview of the development of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region see Bo Huld: "Introduction," in *Baltic Sea Security: Looking towards the 21st Century*, eds. Gunnar Artéus and Atis Lejins (Riga & Stockholm: Latvian Institute of Foreign Affairs & the National Defence College, Stockholm, 1998), pp. 8-17.

³⁵ Cf. Carl-Einar Stålvant, "The Council of Baltic Sea States."

Commission presented Agenda 2000, which included a recommendation that membership negotiations be started first with Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus. This meant that Latvia and Lithuania were left outside the group of countries with a fast track towards membership. As a result of this, Finland changed its position to support the Commission in starting membership negotiations with Estonia, while leaving Latvia and Lithuania for a later date. The Swedish Government, however, maintained its position and continued to argue for a process whereby the EU should start membership negotiations simultaneously with all three Baltic States.³⁶

In December 1997, the European Council decided at a summit in Luxembourg that the Union should commence a process of enlargement with eleven countries, but that the countries mentioned in the first group should be prioritised.³⁷ This case is thus an example where the Nordic neighbours started out with the same strategy, but where Finland proved more willing to adopt the EU strategy once it was set in place than Sweden was. It is, in other words, an example that illustrates that even though the two Nordic States initially had similar strategies as well as goals for the stabilisation of security in the Baltic Region, at the very least they differ at a later stage when the European Commission selects a strategy for the Union.

The fact that the Swedish Government prioritises the enlargement of the EU to the Baltic States is well illustrated in its yearly report *Berättelse om verksamheten i Europeiska unionen under 1995-1998* (Yearbook of Activities within the European Union). Two of the main goals that the Government in Stockholm claims to have pursued consistently have relevance for the Baltic States. One of these is general support for the enlargement of the EU. When it comes down to specifying which countries that ought to be part of the first batch of newcomers, the government in Stockholm invariably mentions all three Baltic nations.

A speech by Swedish Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallén to Parliament in February 1998 put these Swedish strategies into a broader, more comprehensive perspective:

“Sweden pursues many actions to promote a co-operative neighbourhood in its vicinity and a successful extension of the European Union. In March, the Government will present a new three-year programme for the co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe. This co-operation is now more and more focused on supporting the membership of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in the EU and on tying Russia closer to European structures of co-operation. To accomplish a united Europe - beyond historical, political and economic boundaries - all relevant states and organisations must unite their efforts. The engine in this process is the EU

³⁶ This development is well analysed in Jennifer Novack: “Finnish and Swedish Experiences Inside the European Union,” pp. 13-17.

³⁷ Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary, plus Cyprus. See, for example, *Årsboken om EU: Berättelse om verksamheten i Europeiska unionen under 1998 (The EU Yearbook: A Tale of the activities inside the European Union in 1998)* (Stockholm: Regeringens skrivelse 1998/99:60), pp. 33-34.

and its opening eastwards. Our recent decision to invite new members was a great step forward for Europe...
The most important motive for the inclusion of new members is to advance security in all of Europe.³⁸

A speech by Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen in August of 1997 provides a similar illustration of the strategies of the Finnish Government relevant for this article. It is also a good indication of the parallelism between Helsinki and Stockholm in terms of their overarching security strategies in Europe:

“Finland like the other Nordic countries advocates clearly the EU membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania...The European Union must constitute a constructive and uniting factor in international relations. Poland and the Baltic countries are involved in the same integration process. Our big neighbour Russia is an important partner in the building of our common Europe...Relations between the [EU] and Russia have become stronger in the political and economic fields. Dialogue and co-operation has become possible in sensitive political issues. Increasing support from the Union is required for Russian projects in the field of the economy and environmental protection, which have a major significance to the Baltic Sea region and even beyond. Co-operation and security in the Baltic Sea region require an active and constructive contribution from the part of Russia.”³⁹

Despite these strong similarities in terms of strategy and goals, the Governments in Helsinki and Stockholm did not consistently pursue the same strategies on the enlargement issue, as we have seen.

Yet another policy with implications for the stability in the Baltic Region, this time an explicitly common policy, has been pursued by Helsinki and Stockholm during the second half of the 1990s. This has to do with the extent to which the EU is to become an actor in crisis management in Europe, and how decisions about such operations are to be taken. In the parlance of European co-operation this has to do with the so-called “Petersberg tasks” within the Western European Union (WEU), the security organisation, now based in Brussels, with intimate ties to the EU.⁴⁰ In this context, the common position in Helsinki and Stockholm developed as a result of the discussions on the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty.⁴¹

³⁸ Foreign Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Foreign Policy Declaration, Swedish Parliament, February 11, 1998, “www.ud.se/utrpol/utrdekla/utrdek98.html”.

³⁹ Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, Nordic Council Conference on “Security in the Nordic countries and in their neighbouring regions,” Helsinki, August 25, 1997, “www.vn.fi/vn/english/speech/970825e.html”.

⁴⁰ The ties between the EU and the WEU have developed to the extent that at the summit in Cologne, Germany, in June 1999, the heads of State and Government of the EU made official what had previously been only speculated upon: that the EU would integrate the main functions of the Western European Union (WEU). On this development see Antonio Missiroli: “CFSP, Defence and Flexibility,” *Chaillot Papers 38* (February 2000), (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union.) This integration will in all likelihood occur in 2001.

⁴¹ For a clear manifestation of the common position of Helsinki and Stockholm on several security-related issues, see the article published by the two Foreign Ministers, Tarja Halonon of Finland and Lena Hjelm-Wallén of Sweden,

In this case, the two Governments had fairly pragmatic reasons for supporting each other. Their interests, as still militarily non-aligned, was to arrive at a system where the two countries could participate when they wanted to, and abstain from participating if they found this more convenient. If the WEU were completely integrated into the EU, as some member states suggested during 1996-1997, it would – in the assessment of Helsinki and Stockholm at that time - in practice become impossible to remain non-aligned for the two countries. In other words, this integration should be avoided, if at all possible.

At the same time, a flexible machinery set up for intervention in small-scale crises would obviously be in the interest of both Governments, not least since such a machinery could potentially be used for an intervention if, say, relations between a Baltic State and Moscow suddenly deteriorated. As it was proving difficult to arrive at a common position among the 15 EU member nations during the negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty, the Finnish and Swedish Governments presented a joint proposal. The essence of this proposal was a very flexible system, in which the non-aligned members could pick and choose as to whether, and if so, how, they were to participate in crisis management operations.⁴²

In the EU there is still another initiative that should be seen in the context of this article. This time it's a strategy that was originally pursued by the Finnish Government, an initiative called "the Northern Dimension." In the words of Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen:

"With the accession of Finland and Sweden, the European Union now extends from the Mediterranean to just a few kilometres from the Barents Sea. The Union has thus acquired a natural 'northern dimension.' My thesis this morning is: we need a policy for this dimension too."⁴³

It appears obvious that the Finnish Government sees its initiative as a parallel to the Mediterranean dialogue, which has been carried out by the EU, of which there will be more later in this paper. The Government in Helsinki wanted with its initiative to link the EU to partners in Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and Russia. In May 1999, the General Affairs

published in both *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Helsingin Sanomat*, March 15, 1997: "Finland och Sverige inför Natos utvidgning (Finland and Sweden and the Enlargement of NATO)". The activities of the two countries in connection with the "Petersberg initiative" is analysed in Ojanen, "Participation and Influence," pp. 6-9.

⁴² Catriona Gourlay and Eric Remacle: "The 1996 IGC: The Actors and Their Interaction", in Eliassen, Kjell A. (ed.): *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union* (London/Thousand Oaks, CA/New Delhi: Sage, 1998): 59-93. See pp. 86-90 in particular for the role played by Finland and Sweden in finding a solution. Ojanen, 2000, puts the initiative, and other Finnish and Swedish actions in this realm inside the EU, in the broader perspective of the strains that the gradual development from CFSP to CESDP (=Common European Security and Defense Policy) have created on traditional Finnish and Swedish "non-alignment" policies.

⁴³ Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, "The European Union Needs a Policy for the Northern Dimension", "Barents Region Today"- conference, Rovaniemi, Finland, 15 September 1997, "www.vn.fi/vn/english/speech/970915e.html".

Council of the EU supported the Northern Dimension as part of EU policy in the region.⁴⁴

Finland also used its presidency of the European Union, in the second half of 1999, as a vehicle to press for its Northern Dimension. This activity was in some respect quite successful, and in other respects, less so. A relative failure was the foreign ministers meeting at which the Northern Dimension was to be the main, if not the sole, topic on the agenda. Very few foreign ministers showed up at this meeting. A success was the fact that both Portugal and then Sweden have committed themselves to continue work on the Northern Dimension during their EU Presidencies in the first half of 2000 and the first half of 2001, respectively.⁴⁵

It is interesting to note that the two scholarly treatments of Finland's activities, available at this early stage, differ to some extent in their assessment of the success of the strategy. Hanna Ojanen regards the Northern Dimension as having been more or less a failure in her paper on the subject, whereas Jennifer Novack, by contrast, highlights the relative success of the venture. Partly, this divergence of views seems due to the fact that the Northern Dimension has only recently been adopted by EU as a long-term commitment. Partly, this divergence probably also reflects another characteristic that the scholar encounters when trying to make sense of policy-making in the EU context – the fact that so much of it is so very complex, and so prone to different interpretations. My solution here is to emphasise the fact that the Finnish Government did indeed succeed in getting the EU as an organisation to commit itself to the Northern Dimension, while acknowledging that the Finnish Government probably also hoped for a still more public support for the strategy from other EU member-states during its presidency.

The fact that Portugal and Sweden have both promised to work on the Northern Dimension during their respective EU presidencies means that the Finnish strategy is still alive. In a sense, Finland can also be said to have succeeded in making what was originally a unilateral Finnish strategy an EU strategy. This is an example whereby a small member of the European security community is able to influence the strategy of that whole community, or at least of its most important part - the EU. While the Finnish success is less than total on this issues, it is also clearly more than being negligible.

A third initiative within the EU that is relevant for this study is the Common Strategy on Russia, adopted at the Cologne Summit in June 1999. This was, by the way, the first common foreign policy strategy ever adopted by the EU.⁴⁶ It seems obvious that the Swedish and Finnish

⁴⁴ See Jennifer Novack: "Finnish and Swedish Experiences Inside the European Union," pp. 8-11. See also "A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the Union: An Inventory of Current Activities," Rev 6. date 19/06/00, European Commission, Working Document of the Commission Services," <http://presidency.finland.fi/dock/liite/invenen.rtf>".

⁴⁵ See Jennifer Novack: "Finnish and Swedish Experiences inside the European Union," pp. 9, 13.

⁴⁶ See Missiroli, "CFSP, Defence and Flexibility," p. 33.

political strategies in this respect have been at least parallel, if not even more strongly interconnected.⁴⁷ It is clear that both countries share an interest in the development of relations between the EU and Russia that are cordial, and that might contribute to the political and economic stabilisation of the latter. The renewed conflict in Chechnya, which started in late 1999, is yet another reminder of the problems associated with building stable relations between the West and Russia, whether this is seen bilaterally, or in terms of the EU. The ineffectiveness of the complaints from EU officials about the brutalities carried out by Russian troops in connection with this conflict also gives cause for reflection about the possibilities for the EU to influence policies that Russia regards as essential.

Finland, Sweden and EU Economic Assistance to the Baltic States

The section above covers EU activities regarding the Baltic States, in which Finland and Sweden can be assumed to have played an active role, in the issue-areas of politics and security, strategies of type 1 in my conception. In line with the structure of this paper, a second broad area of interest is the economic assistance to the Baltic States given by the EU to the three Baltic States. In this respect Helsinki and Stockholm have certainly been able to influence – at least to some extent – the level as well as the structure of such aid after their membership of the Union in 1995. What has been the extent of such aid to the Baltic States after 1991, and especially after 1995, and what has been its structure? Knowledge of the broader aspects of these two factors makes it easier to undertake the evaluation of the success of the effort on the part of the EU to create a stable economic development in all the three Baltic States. As in the case of France in the Maghreb – analysed later in this paper – it is hard to single out the specific role and influence of one or two actors in the EU on economic assistance of the kind discussed here. Still, I believe it can safely be said that assistance from European nations, that are members of the EU to states outside the Union, is to an ever-greater extent undertaken in the multilateral setting that is the EU. As compared to these multilateral/institutional undertakings, the unilateral and bilateral assistance projects on the part of EU member states are losing in scope and in importance. In this respect European foreign policy, on the part of the 15 EU members-states, is increasingly being conducted in a European framework.

The assistance given by the EU to the economic development of the three Baltic States has from the beginning been seen by Brussels in two interrelated steps. The first one has been a

⁴⁷ Cf. Ojanen, "Participation and Influence," pp. 20-21.

programme of economic aid to encourage the economic development of the partner countries. This assistance has taken place within the PHARE⁴⁸ programme, a programme that has, at most, been given to 14 nations. The three Baltic States entered into this programme in 1992. The second aspect has been that the PHARE programme has explicitly been aimed towards helping the PHARE partners who have applied for membership to the EU to prepare their membership. The two steps in this aid programme give it a very special character for the EU. As compared with other EU assistance programmes, where eventual membership in the Union is not on the agenda, the situation for the EU vis-à-vis the PHARE partners, in this case the Baltic States in particular, is very special. Given the interest that the PHARE partners that have indeed applied for membership must have in the achievement of this goal the chances for the Union to apply positive pressure for change in the applicant countries must be regarded as very large indeed.

The PHARE programme has during the 1990s been allocated some 10 billion Euros for the 14 partners taken together.⁴⁹ This is quite a large sum indeed. Out of this sum, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had received roughly 7% as of the end of 1997.⁵⁰ Of this total, Estonia had received 160 million Euros in commitments, of which 95 million Euros had been paid out by the end of 1998. Comparable figures for Latvia were 206 million and 115 million, and for Lithuania 272 million and 146 million. This means that, for all three countries, more than 50% of sums committed in the PHARE programme have indeed been paid out. If seen during the period from 1992, when the Baltic States were included into PHARE; until the end of 1998, the figure is higher than 55%. This is a quite high proportion of practical implementation of the planned economic aid. It is a strong indication of a programme that exists not only in plans, but that is also implemented in practice to a significant extent.

Given the fact that these are small countries, with fairly small economies, the sums involved could still be important for their economic, and thereby conceivably democratic, development. The underlying logic of this assistance, as so often in similar matters in the EU, has been that economic aid intended to encourage economic development and the creation and perfection of the market, will, if successful, also contribute to the political development of the country in question, which should, following this logic to its conclusion, assist the country in question in becoming a democracy. The PHARE programme, plus the applications for membership, the adjustment process by the applicant countries, the negotiations between the Commission and the applicant countries, all

⁴⁸ PHARE = Action plan for co-ordinated aid to Poland and Hungary.

⁴⁹ The number of partners is a bit tricky to pin down. First, there is the problem of what was until 1992/1993 Chechoslovakia becoming two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Second, Croatia, which was for some time a partner in PHARE, was suspended in 1995 due to its activities in the war in Bosnia.

⁵⁰ See "What is PHARE?", "europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/wip/index.htm".

these activities are in a sense a giant laboratory experiment in the creation of market economies and liberal democracies. If ultimately successful, they may – in the terms of this paper – be regarded as a successful extension of the European security community to a periphery that has hitherto been unstable. The structure of the programme, with its extensive procedures including a large amount of regular assessments, makes it feasible to make at least a preliminary appraisal of its success or failure.

A second assessment that can be made concerning the development of the three Baltic States is to what an extent their economic growth has increased after the initiation of the fairly massive economic aid. In terms of overall economic growth for the period 1990 through 1998, the picture does not look good for the three Baltic States. The *World Development Report 2000* shows that all three countries had negative growth if seen yearly during this period, Estonia – 2,2%, Latvia –6,3% and Lithuania –5,0%.⁵¹ However, during the latter years of the decade, figures looked better. Estonian GDP grew by 11,4% in 1997 and by 5,4% in 1998, Latvia grew by 3,6% in 1998 and Lithuania by 5,7% in 1997 and 5,2% in 1998.⁵² While this crude measure does not prove that the three Baltic States have embarked on any steady growth, still together they indicate that the economic situation is improving.

Evaluating the Success of Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Region

How does one evaluate the success of policies, policies carried out unilaterally, or, even more difficult, policies undertaken in multilateral settings? There are several questions that may be posed here. The first is: to what an extent can one regard the unilateral policies of Finland and Sweden as having contributed to the stabilisation of the security of the three Baltic States? The second is: the policies pursued in parallel by Helsinki and Stockholm, outside of those carried out within the EU, can these be said to have contributed to the stabilisation of the security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania? The third question is: to what an extent have Finland and Sweden contributed to the decisions taken by Brussels to, one, start a large programme of economic aid called PHARE to these three states, among others, and, two, to regard first Estonia, and thereafter, also Latvia and Lithuania as candidates for membership in the EU? The fourth question has to do with the effectiveness of the EU programmes taken together as regards the Baltic States: to what an extent can the PHARE programme, and the prospects for membership associated with this programme, be

⁵¹ *World Development Report 2000* (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2000), pp. 182-183.

⁵² Figures from “The PHARE Programme, Annual Report 1998,” European Commission, COM (2000) 183 final, p. 34

regarded as a success in terms of, first, accelerating the economic development of these three countries, and, second, in terms of encouraging the democratic development of these countries, and, third, in terms of contributing to the stabilisation of the security situation of these countries.

The number of strategies employed, and goals pursued, by Finland and Sweden in this case is impressive. There are unilateral strategies, bilateral strategies as well as institutional/multilateral ones. There is security-related assistance, economic assistance, and cultural social aid. Most important, perhaps, there is strong support from both Helsinki and Stockholm for the inclusion of all three Baltic States inside the European security community, by way of membership in the European Union. Indeed, the only goal that has not been pursued by the two capitals is the institutional transformation of one of the three crucial security institutions in Europe.

It seems obvious that the greatest successes of the Finnish and Swedish policies with respect to the stability of the three Baltic States were when the European Union in two steps gradually accepted all three states as candidates for membership 1997-1999. Both Helsinki and Stockholm had for several years pursued the goal of integrating all three countries into the EU. After the position taken by the EU Commission in mid-1997 to include Estonia, but not Latvia and Lithuania, in the first group of countries negotiating for full EU membership, the reaction of the Nordic Neighbours differed. While Finland accepted the new EU line, Sweden maintained its position that all three Baltic States should be included in the first group eligible for membership.

A second success, although probably with less ramifications for the security of the Baltic States, was the process by which the EU made the Northern Dimension - originally a unilateral Finnish initiative - an EU strategy. It is difficult to be precise in any assessment on the Northern Dimension. Still, on balance I believe that it must be counted as a success for Finland in anchoring an initially unilateral strategy inside the European Union. It is instructive that there is no equivalent case for Sweden in which the government in Stockholm has been able to anchor a unilateral strategy inside the Union. Perhaps it should be added that the Swedish Government would in all likelihood say that it has had successes with its strategies regarding enlargement, where all three Baltic States are by 2000 negotiating for full membership. This, however, was hardly any unilateral Swedish strategy.

The issue then becomes: how does one determine to what an extent Finnish and Swedish efforts in this respect contributed to EU decision-making? In an article that addresses this specific issue, Knud Erik Jørgensen makes several interesting points.⁵³ One is that the evaluation of the

for Estonia, p. 44 for Latvia and p. 50 for Lithuania.

⁵³ Knud Erik Jørgensen: "Possibilities of a 'Nordic' Influence on the Development of the CFSP?" *European Security Integration*, ed. Mattias Jopp and Hanna Ojanen (Helsinki/Bonn/Paris: Finnish Institute for International Affairs/Institut

possible influence of the two Nordic neighbours on the decision to enlarge the Union to all three states of course depends upon the analyst's perspective on international relations, including one's perspective on the European Union. If the analyst has what in international relations is called a "realist" perspective then he or she would tend to downplay the possible influence of smaller states, focusing instead on the perceived dominance of large states. In this article, I have a different perspective, a perspective I previously called liberal institutionalist. While I certainly acknowledge that the larger states in the EU have a larger influence on the development of the CFSP and of related issues than do the smaller ones, still I believe that it would be wrong and unempirical to exclude initially the possible influence of countries such as Finland and Sweden, particularly when taken together, on the development of the CFSP.⁵⁴

There are to be sure several arguments to support the notion that small states have very limited influence on the development of the CFSP. At the same time there are, however, other arguments in favour of such an influence, in particular in the specific case of Finland and Sweden vis-à-vis the Baltic States. One such argument is that the former two countries have been very active indeed in the Baltic Sea Region, not only within the EU, but also in terms of other types of co-operation, ranging from unilateral assistance, over bilateral assistance, all the way to acting within multinational/institutional frameworks. It seems difficult to deny that this kind of sustained activity gave Helsinki and Stockholm a legitimacy on these issues that was undeniable,⁵⁵ and that, at least on the margin, can be surmised to have contributed to the decisions of the EU to accept all three countries as candidates for EU membership.

The second success, the Finnish initiative on the Northern Dimension is in a sense a very illustrative example of how a state can anchor what is originally a unilateral strategy inside the crucial institutional framework that is the European Union. As Jennifer Novack notes, this initiative and the success that Helsinki has had with it fulfil several objectives of the Finnish Government.⁵⁶ First, by anchoring a strategy it wishes to pursue even unilaterally in an institutional framework, Finland is able to increase the chances for reaching goals it has determined to be important on its own. Second, by showing the Union that it wishes to pursue this strategy inside the EU framework, Helsinki has also been able to show itself to be a "good European."

Compared to this overriding success, the other strategies pursued by Finland and Sweden

für Europäische Politik/Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1999), pp. 103-136.

⁵⁴ For a nuanced discussion of this issue see *ibid.* pp. 110-114. See also Gunilla Herolf: "The Role of Non-Aligned States in European Security Organisations: Finland and Sweden," in Jopp and Ojanen (ed.): *European Security Integration*, pp. 137-166, in particular at pp. 160-162 and Novack, "Finnish and Swedish Experiences Inside the European Union."

⁵⁵ Cf. Herolf, "Role of Non-Aligned States," pp. 161-162.

towards the three Baltic States – such as bilateral aid, co-operation with the Nordic Council, various strands of multilateral co-operation around the Baltic Sea – must in the end be considered as having been of less importance in terms of stabilising the development of the Baltic States. This is not to deny that these forms of co-operation may very well have been necessary as a starting-point and thus as contributing – at least in some measure - to the overriding strategic success of the decision for membership for Tallinn, as well as for Riga and Vilnius. In particular they may, as stated above, have been important to the extent that they contributed to the legitimacy that the Finnish and Swedish Governments had when they argued the case for candidature for membership for all three Baltic States within the EU.

A related issue on which Finland, in particular, can be argued to have influenced the policy of the EU has to do with the first Common Strategy the Union has ever adopted, the one concerning Russia in the spring of 1999.⁵⁷ Again, it is hard to find specific evidence about the influence of either country, or of the two taken together, but Finland, especially, seems to have been active in trying to work for the implementation of such a strategy.

France and the Maghreb Before 1990

France is very different from the two Northern European states in its relationship to its “unstable periphery,” in two respects. The first is that France was, until less than 40 years ago, a colonial state, having granted Algeria independence as late as 1962, after a terrible war that lasted some 8 years. The other two countries in the Maghreb selected for study – Morocco and Tunisia – became independent from France in 1956. Even if there are some parallels with Sweden – which during that country’s international heyday in the 17th and 18th centuries was a master of what is now Finland as well as, for a time, of what is now Estonia and Latvia – the French memory of colonialism is much more recent than is the case for Sweden. The second difference is the fact that France is a founding member of the EU, as well as a founding member of the NATO alliance. The other two countries did not enter the EU until 1995, and they are as of early 2000 still not members of NATO, even if they do participate in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) framework.

This legacy means for France has had complications in its relationships with all three Maghrebi capitals after their respective independence. This relationship, has been most difficult with Alger, following the Algerian war.

If one factor strongly influencing French policy toward the Maghreb is thus the colonial

⁵⁶ Cf. Novack, “Finnish and Swedish Experiences Inside the European Union,” pp. 8-12.

heritage another factor of importance is French competition with the United States.⁵⁸ I will return to this factor in the next section – on French politics toward the Maghreb after 1991 – but wish to mention its importance at the outset.

French policy toward the three states of the Maghreb has ever since their independence been unilateral, multilateral, as well as enveloped within the context of what in 1993 became the European Union. While political and diplomatic relations between a former colonist and the newly independent states to be sure always are delicate to handle, it can – with some simplification – be said that France, after 1956/1962, has taken particular care to manage correctly the relations with the respective capitals. In this respect, it seems that the personal political relations between the respective French Presidents and the rulers in the three countries have been very important.⁵⁹ While such *diplomatic* issues form a basis for the bilateral relations between all types of countries, they cannot really be seen as crucial to the problem that is at the centre of this study, the contribution that France might make to the stabilisation of the security situation of the three countries.

A second issue that has been based in bilateral relations between Paris and the three respective capitals – and that also has been seen in broader contexts – has been that of *migration*. It is probably correct to state that this issue only truly arrived on the French policy agenda during the first seven-year term – *septennat* - of President Mitterrand, from 1981 to 1988. Thereafter, it has constantly been regarded as important for French politicians, not least for reasons of domestic policy.⁶⁰ At least indirectly, this issue must also be linked to the stabilisation of regional security that forms the basis of this analysis.

It would be impossible to exclude a third type of issue in French relations with the Maghreb, particularly with Algeria, that has acquired importance during the 1990s and that is tied to that of migration, namely *terrorism*. The fact that the serious disturbances – if not Civil War – in Algeria have “spilled over” into France must be taken into account here.⁶¹ It is obvious that this issue has serious implications for French security.

⁵⁷ Cf. Ojanen, “Participation and Influence,” pp. 21-22.

⁵⁸ For a competent overview of the U.S. – French rivalry in the Mediterranean prior to the initiation of the Barcelona Process see Stephen C. Calleya: *Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area* (Aldershot/Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1997), pp. 165-186.

⁵⁹ Laurent Meyrade: “France’s Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean,” in *The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries*, eds. Stelios Stavridis, Theodore Couloumbis, Thanos Veremis, Neville Waites (Houndmills, Macmillan, 1999), pp. 42-45.

⁶⁰ Cf. Meyrade: “France’s Foreign Policy,” pp. 54-55 Security issues in the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean region more generally are competently outlined in Brynjar Lia: “Security Challenges in Europe’s Mediterranean Periphery – Perspectives and Policy Dilemmas,” *European Security*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 1999), pp. 27-56.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 47. See also Jolyon Howorth; “France and the Mediterranean in 1995,” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn 1996), pp. 165-166.

A fourth issue in bilateral relations between Paris, on the one hand, and Rabat, Tunis and Alger, on the other, has been that of *trade*. While general trade with these three countries has never been crucial for France, it has been very important for each of the three Maghrebi States. I will return to this issue in the context of French policies toward the Western Mediterranean in the EU context, where it plays a crucial role. As stated from the outset in this paper, I regard economic issues as having important implications for the gradual creation of regional security.

A fifth issue is linked to general trade, but has such importance that it must be regarded separately, namely *energy*. In particular, energy deliveries – in the form of natural gas – are important for the relationship between France and Algeria, especially after the first half of the 1980s.

Against the background of the colonial past, the French rivalry with the United States, and the general French strategic interest in the region, these five issues form the structure of French relations with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. The bilateral aspects of relations with these countries, as well as some extra-EU multilateral relations, still have a role to play in French foreign policy. However, after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, if not earlier, the essence of French foreign policy is now being conducted in a European context.⁶²

One difficulty in assessing French policies towards the Maghreb is similar to the case of Finland and Sweden in the Baltic region. This is the difficulty of making a distinction between unilateral French initiatives for a broader, West Mediterranean region, on the one hand, and France's actions in broader more multilateral contexts, on the other.

France in early 1990 launched the West Mediterranean Forum, which eventually came to be called the 5 + 5 process. The name is derived from its five Southern European participants (France, Spain, Italy, Malta⁶³ and Portugal) and the five members of the Arab Maghreb Union – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). This was a flexible dialogue between governments from around the Mediterranean about security, which did not aim to be all-inclusive, as some other efforts around the Mediterranean have been. Nor did the 5 + 5 talks involve any military aspects. This process stopped when a planned meeting in Tunisia failed to take place in 1992.⁶⁴

There were to be sure other political suggestions and initiatives concerning co-operation around the Mediterranean than those pursued by France. Among those was an Egyptian initiative

⁶² One of my interviewees told me that French foreign policy was in essence subsumed into the EU during Mitterrand's second presidential period (1988-1995). Interviews with French academic specialists and diplomats at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, March 2000.

⁶³ Malta did not join until 1991. See Calleya, *Navigating Regional Dynamics*, pp. 145-148. On the West Mediterranean Forum see also Meyrede, "France's Foreign Policy," pp. 57-58; and John Calabrese: "Beyond Barcelona: The Politics of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," *European Security*, Vol. 6, No. 4, (1997), p. 96.

building on the original French project of a Mediterranean Forum. Within this framework several meetings have been held.⁶⁵ An additional project, the most ambitious one before the start of the Barcelona process, was a Spanish-Italian initiative in the early 1990s to start a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). Building on the CSCE/OSCE process, this proposal envisioned a Conference in which “all political entities without exception, active in the Mediterranean Basin would be associated”⁶⁶ with the end result envisioned as a system of rules similar to those existing the CSCE/OSCE framework. For several reasons, however, the initiative never resulted in any conference or process.⁶⁷ One of the most important reasons for this failure was that the CSCE/OSCE member-states could not on agree on which Mediterranean states to include and which to exclude. Another reason was that the CSCE/OSCE process was a clearly defined process concerning European security, whereas it was difficult to come up with an equally precise definition of the CSCM initiative was to cover in the end, both in terms of issues and in terms of actors

France in the European Union

Since the EU in my conception plays such a crucial role for the development of European security, it is necessary to say something also about the role of France within this organisation. The centrality for France of this organisation is well known. The question is not whether the EU during the period studied here played a crucial role for French politics, the question is rather whether or not France had the ability to conduct anything resembling a national (foreign) policy toward the Maghreb region, or if European integration had by about 1990 developed to the degree that any such policy was in essence always conducted within the framework of the EU.⁶⁸ It is not possible to answer this question within any finality in this paper. What can be said, however, is that the impression that I got from my interviews in Paris at the Quai d’Orsay and at the Defence Ministry during February and March of 2000, it was that from around the time mentioned, French foreign policy generally, as well as the French approach towards the Maghreb was for all intents and

⁶⁴ Calleya, *Navigating Regional Dynamics*, p. 146.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

⁶⁶ Claire Spencer “Building Confidence in the Mediterranean,” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1997): pp. 32-33. See also Richard Gillespie: “Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Med Partnership Initiative,” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol 2, No. 1, (1997), pp. 34-35.

⁶⁷ Spencer, “Building Confidence,” p. 33.

⁶⁸ Among the vast literature on European integration only a few works particularly pertinent to this study can be mentioned. On the specific role of France in the EU see, however, Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin and Ella Ritchie: *France in the European Union* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), in particular “Introduction,” Chapter 1 “The French Contribution to Building the EU” and Chapter 4 “Common Foreign and Security Policy.”

purposes largely conducted within a European framework, rather than as a national policy.

A second aspect concerning France's general position within the EU should also be mentioned early. This pertains to the fact that since the autumn of 1998, a long-term strategy that France has pursued within the European Union, to some extent before the Treaty of Rome in 1957, is coming into fruition. This project can be labelled with various French titles of which *l'Europe puissance* is perhaps the most common and apt one. The goal with this French strategy can be caught with another French phrase *L'Europe de la défense et de l'armement*.⁶⁹ What is at stake is thus a Europe, or rather an EU that has not only political tasks and powers, but also military ones. The capacity that is most relevant for this study is the creation of a capacity for the intervention into military crises. This is epitomised by the decision taken at the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999 "to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises."⁷⁰ Toward this end, the European Council also decided to create a force "of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg operations."⁷¹ This force is to be ready by 2003, to be able to deploy in 60 days and to sustain its operations for one year. Taking into account that the phrase "Petersberg operations"⁷² is sufficiently flexible to cover a wide range of military activities, this is potentially a very significant commitment indeed for the EU. At the summit in Feira, Portugal, in June 2000, the EU took further steps in implementing the commitments made at Helsinki, and to some extent already at the Cologne Summit. Among these were the following;

"6. The European Council reaffirms its commitment to building a Common European Security and Defence Policy capable of reinforcing the Union's external action through the development of a military crisis management capability, as well as a civilian one, in full respect of the principles of the United Nation Charter...

8. Improving European military capabilities remains central to the credibility and effectiveness of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The European Council is determined to meet the Headline Goal targets in 2003 agreed in Helsinki. In this context, it looks forward to the Capabilities Commitments Conference later this year, where Member States will make initial national commitments, and to the creation of a review mechanism for measuring progress

⁶⁹ Cf. Jacques Texier: "L'Europe de la défense et de l'armement: mythe ou réalité," *Défense Nationale* (Juin 2000), pp. 24-40.

⁷⁰ "Presidency Conclusions," Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, as reprinted in Antonio Missiroli: "CFSP, Defence and Flexibility," *Chaillot Papers* 38, February 2000 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union), p. 56.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, respectively, military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." WEU Ministerial Meeting at Petersberg, Final Communiqué, as reprinted in Stephan de Spiegeleire: "The European Security and Defence Identify and NATO: Berlin and Beyond," in Mattias Jopp and Hanna Ojanen (eds.): *European Security Integration: Implications for Non-alignment and Alliances* (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs/Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik/Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies/, 1999) p. 61.

towards the achievement of those targets. The necessary transparency and dialogue between the Union and NATO will be ensured and NATO expertise will be sought on capability goal requirements.”⁷³

The developments presented in the previous paragraph have important implications for European security, including for the transatlantic security relationship. Their significance in the context of this paper are that they may play a role for the expansion of the European security sphere, if not the security community itself. In particular, I find it very conceivable indeed that one of the regions in which these forces might be used is in the Maghreb. Even if this development thus does not imply any change in the fundamental relationship between the EU and the Maghreb countries, still I regard it as one tool by which the EU from 2003 on may project a new capacity into an unstable periphery. In other words, this development is here seen as contributing to the extension of European security. Its geographical area might cover both peripheries highlighted here, the Baltic States and the Western Mediterranean. In my estimation, however, there is no doubt that the French authorities view such a force as primarily important for their unstable periphery: the Maghreb. For France, the capacity that is being developed must also be put into the context of the old rivalry with the U.S. for influence in the Mediterranean. An EU with the military components being envisioned will, in all likelihood, be a much stronger competitor to the U.S. for influence in the region. In this way, the French Government will have used the EU as a vehicle for a long-term strategy that is previously as pursued largely on its own.

The developments in the sphere of security and defence policy inside the EU have been very rapid between the autumn of 1998, when this process got under way, and June 2000, when this paper is being completed. I do not make the claim that France has controlled all the important aspects of this process. I do claim, however, that it is France that is the intellectual and political force behind this drive. To my mind, a blueprint for these developments may be found in a book published by Pierre Lellouche in 1996. Lellouche was at the time an adviser of French President Jacques Chirac:

”Les pays européens ne sauraient donc laisser de telles zones d’instabilité perdurer dans leur voisinage immédiat et contaminer leur environnement, sans prendre le risque de vivre constamment sous une menace grave contre leur propre sécurité, et de voir aussi compromise leur prospérité pendant des décennies. Ce qui implique que les Européens devront s’avérer capables de prévenir d’éventuelles crises par la coopération économique et politique tout d’abord, mais aussi de les maîtriser tant par la diplomatie que par l’emploi de la puissance militaire si nécessaire, afin de rétablir la paix ou d’empêcher l’extension des conflits.”⁷⁴

⁷³ ”Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000,” available at ue.eu.int/en.summ.htm. See also Annex 1 of this report “Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy.”

⁷⁴ Pierre Lellouche: *Légitime défense: Vers une Europe en sécurité au XXIème siècle* (Paris: Patrick Banon, 1996), pp. 117-118.

In this plea for what in France is called the "Completion of the European Construction" the developments inside the European Union from the autumn of 1998 fit very well. The official aims of the French Presidency of the EU are, on this topic:

"La construction de l'Europe de la défense et de la sécurité, et l'affirmation d'une politique extérieure commune

* L'émergence d'une Europe plus forte sur la scène internationale passe par le développement de la dimension de sécurité et de défense de l'Union européenne. Dans cette perspective, la Présidence française se fixe les objectifs suivants:

- renforcer les capacités militaires, en concrétisant, par des engagements nationaux, les objectifs de capacité définis à Helsinki;
- préparer le passage aux structures politiques et militaires définitives de l'Europe de la défense;
- mettre en oeuvre les décisions relatives aux relations avec l'OTAN et avec les pays tiers;
- poursuivre les travaux engagés concernant le renforcement des instruments civils des gestion de crises."⁷⁵

There is no doubt that, if the EU is able to implement what it has decided to undertake by 2003, the Union will be able to act much more forcefully to stabilise unstable peripheries, such as the Western Mediterranean, in a military way than has been the case up to now. In addition, the emphasis on civilian crisis management also contribute to a Union that in the future will in all likelihood be able to act across a wide spectrum of activities to attempt to stabilise its vicinity. This author also believes that the development sketched here has potentially profound implications for the future of the transatlantic security relationship. That is, however, another story.

France, the EU, the WEU, NATO and the Maghreb

During the 1990s each of the three international institutions based in Europe that are here regarded as together forming the European security regime have launched initiatives that at least to some extent concern the three Maghreb countries. France belongs to all three organisations which means that some effort must be undertaken to clarify to what an extent Paris has contributed to the initiation of the strategies undertaken by the organisations, as well as to their implementation.⁷⁶ In addition, an effort will be made to evaluate the respective importance of the three initiatives, for French foreign policy, as well as for the possible chances for success of each of the initiatives.

The first of these new initiatives was undertaken by the WEU in 1992.⁷⁷ In the communiqué issued at the Petersberg summit, the WEU Council of Ministers made the commitment to start a

⁷⁵ "Priorités de la présidence française," available at "www.presidente-europe.fr".

⁷⁶ My task in this respect is made easier by the Final Report of a previous NATO Fellow. See Dr. Richard G. Whitman: "Securing Europe's southern flank? A comparison of NATO, EU and WEU policies and objectives," NATO Individual Research Fellowships 1997-1999, "www.nato.int/acad/fellow/htm."

⁷⁷ This was at the same meeting that adopted the so-called "Petersberg Tasks." See Whitman: "Securing Europe's

dialogue with, initially, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Later Egypt, Mauritania, Israel and then Jordan were included. This dialogue centres on security and defence issues, but since it has remained just a dialogue, its political importance has remained fairly small.⁷⁸

In addition to this political dialogue, the WEU has created forces related to it – FAWEU (Forces Answerable to the WEU) –, which raise the issue of a potential WEU operation in the Mediterranean. These are the European Maritime Force (Euromarfor) and the European Rapid Operational Force (Eurofor). Both were established in 1995 and became operational in 1996. The initial participating countries were Italy, Spain, Portugal and France.⁷⁹

It seems obvious that the French Government has played an important role in this process of starting a security dialogue with a group of Mediterranean countries that prominently included the three countries under focus here. Pierre Lellouche's argumentation quoted above can be applied to the early phases of the WEU dialogue with the Mediterranean as well. As developments within the EU in the defence field have accelerated, and as the plans for unification between the EU and the WEU have become ever more concrete, the French emphasis has clearly focused on the EU.

NATO initiated a security dialogue with several Mediterranean countries in 1995. The countries invited to take part first were Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, later joined by Jordan. The structure of this dialogue has been 16 + 1 (from 1999 19 + 1) that is the dialogue is carried out between NATO as a whole and one of the Mediterranean countries at a time. In 1997, a Mediterranean Co-operation Group (MGC) was created to have overall responsibility for what is called the Mediterranean Dialogue.⁸⁰

During the second half of the 1990s, this Dialogue has taken on new aspects. The Mediterranean partners have been allowed to participate in various NATO activities, such as science and civil emergency planning, as well as to send representatives to attend classes at NATO schools. Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have also sent troops to take part in SFOR – the NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia. The special role of Morocco among the three Maghreb nations focused here is further underlined by the fact that it has a Field Medical Battalion in Kosovo.⁸¹

In addition, NATO as an organisation and several individual NATO countries have maintained important military forces in and around the Mediterranean throughout the period studied here. This includes both a large fleet – Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean

southern flank?", pp. 18-21.

⁷⁸ Whitman: "Securing Europe's southern flank?", p. 20.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 10-11. See also Jette Nordam: "The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling misconceptions and building confidence," *NATO Review*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (July 1997), pp. 26-29.

⁸¹ Information from "kforonline.com/kfor/nations/default/htm".

(STAVNARFORMED) and nuclear weapons, controlled by both the U.S. and France.⁸² France has been a partner in these NATO activities in the Mediterranean. One indication of the interest that Paris has in the Mediterranean has been its interest in getting the command of what is now called Regional Command South (RC South), formerly Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), to go to a European commander, instead of being headed by a U.S. officer. The fact that France explicitly made the fulfilment of this demand a necessary condition for its full inclusion into the integrated military command in NATO – which France has been out of since 1967 – is a further illustration of the strategic importance of the Mediterranean for France. The fact that France failed to get even its European NATO allies to support this decision was a defeat for Paris. The end result was that the process by which France had gradually been reintegrated within NATO's military co-operation came to halt by the NATO Madrid summit in 1997.⁸³

Altogether, the presence and role of NATO in the Mediterranean region has been much larger than that of the WEU. Still, I'm not convinced that the contribution of NATO to the stabilisation of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia has been much bigger than the almost negligible contribution by the WEU. France has been involved to some extent in the NATO initiatives, but it is hard to believe that Paris has regarded these efforts as absolutely crucial to the strategy that is investigated here, the French efforts – through whatever channel – to stabilise the security position of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. As will be further illustrated below, it is my contention that the only initiative with a potential really to contribute to the stabilisation of the three Maghreb states is the Barcelona Process carried out by the EU since the autumn of 1995.

During the first 10 years of the existence of the EU, relations with the three nations of the Maghreb were not very developed. Algeria was regarded as a part of France until 1962, and even received funding from the EU Regional Fund from 1958 in its capacity as a part of the "home country."⁸⁴ In 1969, Morocco and Tunisia signed association agreements with the EU. This was the first phase of a pattern that was to be continued into the latter-day Barcelona Process. The association agreements made industrial exports from the two Maghrebi nations into the EU nearly totally open. The export of agricultural goods was, however, heavily restricted.

In other words, the then six-member European organisation was prepared to let the two

⁸² Whitman: "Securing Europe's southern flank?", p. 8.

⁸³ The French position on this issue is outlined in Paul Taylor: "France," in *Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security*, ed. Ronald Tiersky (Lanham, MD/Boulder, CO/New York/Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 84-86. A broader analysis is in Adrian Treacher: "New Tactics, Same Objectives: France's Relationship with Nato," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (August 1998), pp. 91-110.

⁸⁴ Jon Marks: "High Hopes and Low Motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (1996), pp. 7-8. This article forms the basis for my account of the first three decades of EU-Maghrebi relations.

Mediterranean nations export freely into the EU market industrial goods in which those two countries in practice had no chance at all to compete with either European producers or other international competitors. In the sector where the two nations could indeed conceivably be competitive with European producers, that of agricultural goods, the restrictions on imports into the European market were, however, very cumbersome. This set a pattern that has continued to this day in EU-Maghrebi relations.

While the EU of six had a natural focus on relations with the Maghreb, given the French historical legacy, things changed somewhat with the entry of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland in 1973. The UK had a traditional interest in the Middle East, which meant that the Union for the first time tried to fashion a “global Mediterranean approach”⁸⁵ This approach resulted in several bilateral agreements between the Union, on the one hand, and a Mediterranean country, on the other. Essentially, however, these agreements contained the same distinction between an open trade in industrial goods and a clearly restricted one in agricultural products that had existed before.

The Union added three new members with particular interests in the Mediterranean during the 1980s, starting in 1981 with Greece and then in 1986 adding Spain and Portugal. This meant both that the Mediterranean became more important than before to the EU and that, within the Mediterranean, the Western part was more in focus once again, in part because of the interest of Spain. Partly as a result of these developments, the third set of financial protocols between the EU and non-member states in the Mediterranean (1986-1991) contained larger amounts of grants than had the previous two. When it came to trade, however, essentially the same distinction was maintained between a liberal regime in the trade of industrial goods, and a much more restricted one for agricultural goods.

In 1988, there were serious riots in Algeria. This partly reflected the rise of Islamists in that country, a development that could also be seen, albeit in less developed form, in the other two countries of the Maghreb focused here. At the same time, the EU as well as other international organisations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, continued to issue depressing economic data concerning the development of the three Maghreb nations. As a result of these experiences, and as a result of activities by France and Spain, in particular, the European Commission started work on a “renovated...Mediterranean Policy”⁸⁶ in 1989. During the first half of the 1990s, serious disturbances continued in Algeria, while economic prospects failed to improve in the region.

⁸⁵ Marks: “High Hopes and Low Motives,” p. 8.

France and the Barcelona Process

In the first half of the 1990s, as sketched above, several strands were coming together in EU policy which led in the direction of a new initiative on the part of Brussels to try to improve security and stability within the Mediterranean region. The role of France in this respect should not be underestimated. Paris brought both a long-standing historical link with the Southwestern Mediterranean as well as a renewed security interest – following the Algerian troubles – to bear on the initiatives within the EU. To these activities were added those of a relative newcomer to the EU – Spain. It is obvious that Spain, to an even greater degree than France, saw its interests as centred in the Mediterranean basin, rather than in Central and Eastern Europe, a region that was increasingly in focus within the EU following the collapse of first the Warsaw Pact and then, in December 1991, of the Soviet Union.⁸⁷ Indeed, part of the reason why several countries within the EU worked so hard for a new Mediterranean policy during this period was precisely because a lot of EU interest, not least that of its most powerful member state – Germany – was focused not on the Mediterranean but on Eastern and Central Europe. The representatives of France and Spain, among others, saw a clear risk that this process could lead to neglect on the part of the EU of the Mediterranean in favour of Central Europe.

One of the difficulties in assessing the specific role of France in the process leading up to the Barcelona Conference in 1995 is how to evaluate the role and influence of the activities of Paris, as compared to those of Madrid. Analysts make somewhat differing assessments in this respect, but most seem to agree that even if there was some working at cross-purposes, or perhaps even jealousy about the role of the other, early in the process, soon the leadership in the two capitals realised that if they were to get any practical results out of their initiatives, they had to co-operate.⁸⁸ As mentioned above, the European Commission had been tasked with fashioning a new Mediterranean policy already in 1989. These plans gradually became clearer during the 1992 and 1993, but there remained some obstacles, not least when it came to financial matters. One aspect was a consistent part of the French Government's strategy during the construction of the Barcelona Process: the determination to keep the U.S. completely out of whatever form of strategy that emerged. In this endeavour, Paris was successful.⁸⁹

The EU had by that time already decided on a large package of financial support for the

⁸⁶ Marks: "High Hopes and Low Motives," pp. 10-11.

⁸⁷ On the role of Spain in the process leading up to the Barcelona Conference in 1995 see Richard Gillespie: "Spanish Protagonismo," pp. 33-48.

⁸⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 38-39 and Esther Barbé: "The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (1996) pp. 28-29.

⁸⁹ Howorth; "France and the Mediterranean in 1995," pp. 169-170.

countries that had left the Warsaw Pact. The question was now how generous the support for the Mediterranean countries could be, given the fact that the Union had already reserved huge funds for Eastern and Central Europe. Countries that expressed reservations about the need for vast new expenditures for the Mediterranean Basin included the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany. As so often in European affairs during the 1980s and 1990s, the key to success lay in pressuring or convincing Chancellor Kohl in Bonn to go along. The analysts of this process are agreed on the crucial role played by Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales in this respect.⁹⁰ Partly by threatening to delay the prospective enlargement of the EU to new members in Central and Eastern Europe, Gonzales succeeded in bringing Chancellor Kohl to support a total expenditure on the Mediterranean initiative, for the coming five-year period (1995-1999) that was 70% of the funds that had been reserved for a similar program for Central and Eastern Europe. The sum agreed was some 3.400 million Euros for the Barcelona process during these five years.⁹¹ The comparative sum for the previously mentioned PHARE programme was 6,700 million Euros.⁹²

The large political manifestation that started what came to be known as the Barcelona Process was kicked off by an international conference in that city in November, 1995. The fact that France, Spain and Italy chaired the EU for six-months period adjacent to each other during the co-operation and preparations for the conference was, in the eyes of most analysts, crucial to the success of the conference. For a success it was. In Barcelona the foreign ministers of 15 EU member-states met with representatives of 11 countries from the South Mediterranean, plus the PLO, to launch a historic initiative aiming towards *partnership* between the EU and its 12 Mediterranean associates.

The Barcelona process in its construction resembles the CSCE/OSCE framework. It is based on three types of baskets, in which co-operation is to develop between the parties.⁹³ The first basket contains a declaration of principles relating to the security of the partners and the stability of the region. In this basket the idea of a Stability Pact was also brought up, a pact which could eventually be entered between the EU, on the one hand, and its 12 partners, on the other.⁹⁴ The second section dealt with economic and financial co-operation. This is the most developed of the three sections. It contains both financial aid from the EU and a plan for a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, covering most manufactured goods and services, between the partners, which is to enter into force about 2010. It should be added that one important sector missing in this context is agriculture. There

⁹⁰ Gillespie, "Spanish Protagonismo," pp. 39-40; Barbé, "The Barcelona Conference," p. 32.

⁹¹ "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Information Note, MEDA Statistics" available at .

⁹² "What is Phare?", available at "europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/wip/index.htm".

⁹³ See Barbé, "The Barcelona Conference," pp. 30-32.

⁹⁴ The 12 partners are: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority.

is no agreement to include this sector in the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area in the original Barcelona agreement. The third section deals with social and human dimensions, such as co-operation among civil societies between the partners. The official goals of the Barcelona Process are formulated in this way:

- ” ● The creation of an **area of peace and stability** based on fundamental principles including respect for human rights and democracy
- The creation of an **area of shared prosperity** through the progressive establishment of free trade between the EU and the partners and among the partners themselves, accompanied by substantial EU financial support for economic transition and to help the partners confront the social and economic challenges which this implies
- The improvement of **mutual understanding** among the peoples of the region and the development of a free and flourishing civil society.”⁹⁵

Richard Youngs, a British diplomat and academic working on the Barcelona Process during the British Chairmanship of the EU in the first half of 1998, expresses well the logic of the Barcelona Process from the EU point of view:

“In designing the Barcelona Process, the EU’s philosophy was that economic and political would give a further boost to economic performance, the latter helping to stem any potential unsustainable levels of migration and thereby enhancing security objectives for.”⁹⁶

It is obvious that the Barcelona Process aims to include several other countries, apart from the three in Maghreb that are at the heart of this analysis. At the same time, it is clear that EU policy toward Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia is, after November 1995, for all intents and purposes part of the Barcelona process. Since French foreign policy is also – at least to a very large extent – a part of the CFSP and other external activities of the EU, any assessment of the success of French efforts to stabilise the security situation in the three Maghreb nations must focus on the Barcelona process.

Despite the important omission of agriculture from the plans for a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, the Barcelona Process must be regarded as a multi-faceted process of aid and co-operation that is impressive in its breadth and width. Even if criticism can be directed at various deficiencies in the process, still the undertaking is on a very large scale. In all three tracks – the political and security partnership, the economic and financial partnership and the social, cultural and human partnership – the Barcelona Process contains not only promises of future actions, but also many current deeds. Compared to this breadth of activities in the Barcelona Process, the efforts made by NATO to stabilise the Mediterranean region pale into relative insignificance. The fact that

⁹⁵ “Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process,” Working document of the European Commission services for the “think tank” meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers, Lisbon, 25-26 May 2000, p.2, emphasis supplied. The document is available at “www.euromed.net”.

⁹⁶ Richard Youngs: “The Barcelona Process after the UK Presidency: the Need for Prioritization,” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1999) p. 17.

the EU is also in the process of acquiring some military capacity for crisis management only underscores my judgement that it is this organisation through which France most efficiently can contribute to the stabilisation of its Mediterranean periphery.

France in the Mediterranean: Evaluating the Success of the Barcelona Process

A first attempt at approaching the large question of to what an extent the Barcelona process – if evaluated by the middle of the year 2000 – has been a success in terms of stabilising the security situation in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia must highlight the importance of the second issue-area: economic affairs. Even if this is the central cluster of issues in the Barcelona process, it must be kept in mind that the undertaking is very broad indeed and that these various strategies may come to support each other over time.

It seems safe to say that initiatives in the political and security partnership- such as the idea for a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean region⁹⁷ - have not advanced very far. The Stability Pact, potentially a very important part of an eventual progress toward a more stable Mediterranean Basin, seems to suffer from not only problems between the EU, on the one hand, and the 12 partners, on the other, but also from intra-EU disagreements.⁹⁸ While the exchange of scholars and specialists, and the support of the EU for the development of civil society in the three Maghreb partners, as well as in the other MNCs, are doubtless in principle worthwhile, it still appears clear that the basket of the three that has had some practical chances to contribute on its own to the economic development, and from there to the political stabilisation and perhaps liberalisation in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, that is basket two – the economic one.

A comparison between the two cases of potential stabilisation in this article must always be undertaken in the light of the previously mentioned and fundamental difference between them: in terms of practical politics, it is only in the case of the three Baltic States that membership in either or both of the EU and NATO are possible. Even if Morocco has applied for membership in the EU at least once – in 1987 – this appears more to be an indication of the willingness of the political leadership of that country to be as closely linked to the Union as possible, rather than as a really serious attempt to enter the Union as a full-fledged member.

The basic analytical question that must be posed regarding the Barcelona process is thus: to what an extent has the second basket in that process contributed to the economic development, and – thereby – to the political development and stabilisation that I believe it to be logical to expect as a

⁹⁷ Based on interviews at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, March 2000.

result of economic development? Further, what assessment can be made in terms of future developments on the same two parameters, given the fact that the Barcelona process will in all likelihood continue? The next crucial step will be taken at the fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference to be held in Marseille in November of 2000, under the EU chairmanship of France.

As stated before, this evaluation of the economic – and thereby presumed political – success of the Barcelona process is undertaken based on a conviction on the part of this researcher that economic development, via the growth and functioning of the market, is indeed an appropriate and feasible way to economic and political development, a development which will, in turn, increase the security of the country in question. Even though my parameters for judging the Barcelona process are thus based on a fundamental sympathy for the logic of the undertaking, my assessment is still that its success, in terms of the economic stabilisation of the situation in the three Maghreb states, has been small. The political situation in Algeria, with civil disturbances at the very least verging on civil war at certain junctures, is of course one factor weighing on this assessment. Even if no Algerian whatever had been killed in civil disturbances after the Barcelona Conference of November 1995, however, I believe that the essence of my assessment would have been the same.

To give an overview of the economic aid involved in the Barcelona Process, the period between 1995 and 1999 meant a total economic commitment of some 3,400 million Euro, roughly the same in sum in US\$.⁹⁹ Of this sum, about 890 million Euros were actually paid out, which represents 26% of commitments. The political situation in Algeria seems to be the main explanation why that country has received fewer funds than either Morocco, or even than Tunisia, which has a much smaller population than Algeria. It is also notable that the proportion of funds actually paid out, in relation to those committed, is much higher in the case of the Baltic States in the PHARE programme, than is the case for the three Maghreb States in the Mediterranean process. The three Baltic States had, during the period from 1992 through 1998, received more than 55% of the funds that had been committed by the PHARE programme in actual payments. The equivalent figure for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia taken together is 26% for the years 1995 through 1999. It could be noted that even if the percentage of actual payments is lowest for Algeria, their figure is only a fraction lower than that of Morocco. These gross figures, particularly as they are taken during different time periods, are not strictly comparable. Still, I believe that they do indicate that the Maghreb States are not as ready to receive economic aid as are the three Baltic States.

⁹⁸ Based on interviews at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, March 2000.

⁹⁹ All figures in this section are from "Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process," Working document of the European Commission services for the "think tank" meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers, Lisbon, 25-26 May 2000, pp. 3-5.

The three Maghreb countries highlighted here had a population of about 65 million taken together in the mid-1990s. Algeria and Morocco had similar population, about 27-28 million, while Tunisia had about 9 million. The GNP per capita at this time ranged from \$1.290 in Morocco, to \$1.520 in Algeria, with Tunisia having the highest \$1.930. During the period from 1995 through 1999 Morocco received some 127 million Euros, while Tunisia, with one third of Morocco's population, had received 168 million Euros. Algeria, by contrast, during the same period only received 28 million Euros in outright payments.¹⁰⁰ Particularly in the case of Tunisia, the sum received is not negligible. A process of economic assistance has after all been started. Even if its scope is not huge as of this writing, still it cannot be denied that gradually it might make an impact, most likely in Tunisia first if present trends continue.

If one were to expect a direct positive effect on the growth rate of these countries as a result of the Barcelona Process, then economic growth should begin to accelerate in each of these countries, Algeria perhaps excepted, by the end of the 1990s. The macro-economic data provided by the latest *World Development Report* from the World Bank, do not provide any indication of this, however. The growth of GDP per year is lower in the 1990s in both Algeria and Morocco than it was in the 1980s. The exception is Tunisia where growth per year was 3,3% in the 1980s and 4,4% in the 1990s.¹⁰¹

The problems that are connected to the Barcelona process in terms of fulfilling the goals can be classified in two distinct categories. The first has to do with the very Barcelona process itself. The second category pertains to the fundamental economic structures prevailing in the Maghrebi states.

The first problem is that the economic model that forms the basis of the Barcelona process – the liberalisation of trade leading to the development of an industrial sector in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean¹⁰² – seems not be well adjusted to the economic, as well as political, structures in existence in today's Algeria,¹⁰³ Morocco and Tunisia.

The second problem is that in practice, the Barcelona process has – at least up to the first half of 2000 – excluded the only sector in which the three Maghrebi nations might seriously be able to compete with the EU states, if not immediately, then over a relatively short time-frame, that is

¹⁰⁰ "Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process."

¹⁰¹ See *World Development 2000* (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstructing and Development, 2000), p. 182 for Algeria, p. 183 for Morocco and p. 184 Tunisia.

¹⁰² For a succinct description of the economic and political logic forming the basis for these aspects of the Barcelona Process see Eberhard Kienle: "Destabilization through Partnership? Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the Barcelona Declaration," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1998), pp. 3-4.

¹⁰³ In this part of my analysis, I disregard the specific impact of the civil disturbances in Algeria. In my view, they complicate a situation further, a situation that would have been very complex and difficult even without them.

agriculture. To put this problem another way, I believe that one condition that must be fulfilled before the Barcelona process can be really successful in terms of contribution to, in the first instance, the economic development of the three Maghreb nations, is a thorough reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) within the EU. I should note here that this assessment brings us back to the policies of France. It is my conviction that the main hindrance to such a reform of the CAP is the resistance of the French farmers, a resistance that makes the French Government act as a constraint on change of the agricultural policies inside the EU. Paris knows that if it proposes, or accedes to, fundamental changes to the CAP, entailing the chances of a considerable increase in the import of agricultural goods, then the French farmers will create havoc inside France.

A third problem inherent in the Barcelona process is that one precondition for the possible success of the whole scheme is ever more developed economic ties not just between the EU-15 and each of the Mediterranean partner countries, but also among the MNCs themselves. There is very little evidence that such a development is taking place, whether in the case of the broader context of the 12 non-members of the EU in the Mediterranean (MNCs) or in the more specific context of the three Maghreb countries.

Furthermore, it appears clear from the literature that the economies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are not at the present time ripe for “the magic of the marketplace,” which is in essence what is offered by the EU to these three countries. There are structural economic problems that lead to such an assessment. One of these is the fact that “the liberalization of foreign trade such as it is envisaged may expose local producers to a degree of competition which they are unable to cope with.”¹⁰⁴ Even if there is an element of gradualness in this process, still it can reasonably be feared that local Maghrebi producers will not be able to survive the competition with their potential competitors on the Northern Mediterranean shores.

A second problem grounded in the structure of these economies is the extent to which power over the companies are granted based on seniority, rather than on competence.¹⁰⁵ An economy where power to decide rests on seniority, rather than on competence, will simply not be able to adapt in the way necessary to create modern economic activities able to survive in international competition.

George Joffé, an eminent specialist on the Barcelona process at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, points to yet another potential problem in which the economic

¹⁰⁴ Kienle, “Destabilization through Partnership?”, p. 5. Cf. Alfred Tovias: “The Economic Impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area on Mediterranean Non-Member Countries,” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1997), pp. 113-128.

¹⁰⁵ Kienle, “Destabilization through Partnership?”, pp. 5-6.

assistance given by the EU to the Maghrebi states may combine with structural problems inside those economies. This is the risk for the creation of enclave economies inside the Mediterranean states, economic sectors constructed only to serve the interests of the developed economic partners in the EU but without any real ties to the other sectors of the domestic economy.¹⁰⁶ This is a well-known problem in the economics of development: the creation of sectors of the economy that live on their own, with ties only to developed partners, and with no real positive effects for the broader economic developments of the developing nation in question. It can be assumed that the risk for the creation of enclave economies may be especially big in countries such as those of the Maghreb, with a strong influence by the state and a leading role in the economy of what perhaps be called cronies of the regime in power, that the risk for the creation of such exclusive sectors might be especially pronounced there.

The various problems mentioned above, both regarding the system of EU aid and the structural problems of the economies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, tie to a broader political problem within these three countries. Despite many important differences in terms of political structures, I believe that it can be said that Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia share a political structure in which power is held by authoritarian leaders unwilling to submit to the vagaries of the democratic process. This basic structure – shared by all three states - must here be conceived as an impediment to the development of modern, market economies.

A question then becomes, to what an extent can the EU, by way of the Barcelona process, influence the political structures here very broadly called autocratic? Again, it seems to this author that the most important carrot provided by the Barcelona process to the leaderships in the Maghreb is the enticement, if not promise, of future economic development of these countries. It should be recalled here that the Barcelona process contains the plan for a Mediterranean Free Trade Area, to be implemented by about 2010, but also a program of structural aid for the 12 MNC.

There is also a very broad argument that works positively in terms of the ability to lead to positive changes in the economies and politics of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. This is the fact that the Barcelona Process – whatever its limitations – is a broad-based political process carried out for the long term. One of the strongest international organisations in the world is committed to this process. For this reason, any assessment made in 2000 of the success of the Barcelona Process can only be tentative. It appears clear to this author that not all expectations by far, have been fulfilled during its first four and a half years in existence. At the same time, the objectives of the process are so hard to reach, and the changes required reaching them so complex, that it is difficult to imagine

¹⁰⁶ Georg Joffé: "Southern Attitudes towards a Integrated Mediterranean Region," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No.

that any assessment made after less than five years could be anything but tentative.

The continued commitment of the EU to the Barcelona Process was demonstrated at the EU summit at Feira, Portugal in June 2000. There, the Union adopted one of its very first common strategies on foreign and security policy: “4.This Common Strategy builds on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established by the Barcelona Declaration and its subsequent acquis, the Berlin Declaration and the European Union’s long-standing policy towards the Mediterranean with its bilateral and regional components.”¹⁰⁷

Conclusion: Extending Stability to the Baltic States and the Maghreb

This paper has studied an issue that is pertinent both to today’s European security community, and to the security community that can be envisioned in five or ten years time. The issue is: how can a state, or two states working in parallel, act to stabilise a region outside the security community that borders them, and that is unstable? As stated at the outset in this paper there are several peripheries to the present European security core, in addition to the two studied here the Balkans must be mentioned. Given the plans of the European Union to expand during the coming decade, the question of the extension of security to the peripheries will remain, but some of the peripheries will be new.

In assessing and comparing the two cases here, I am struck by the fact that the case of the Baltic States appears to be very close to the ideal from the perspective of the ability to extend the security. This was a case in which there were three small countries, which had at least some democratic traditions. The cause of their security and stability was addressed in each and every way conceivable among the smorgasbord of strategies that I have set up for this study. The Baltic States have two neighbours – Finland and Sweden – for whom the security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania lies high on the agenda of foreign and security policy. Finland and Sweden have elected to pursue this basic goal by just about every political strategy and tactic conceivable, excepting massive direct military aid. From 1995 onwards, activities within the EU have become increasingly important for both Helsinki and Stockholm in the pursuit of the overall purpose of stabilising their Baltic periphery. The end result of this process, from the perspective of this paper, was the decision by the Union, taken in two steps, to classify all three Baltic States as applicants for membership of the EU. It is very hard indeed to assess to what an extent the two Nordic States have influenced

1, (1997), pp. 26-28.

¹⁰⁷ “Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000,” available at “[ue.eu.int.en.summ.htm](http://ue.eu.int/en.summ.htm)”. See Annex V: “Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region.”

these decisions. I would argue, however, that at least at the margin Helsinki and Stockholm have indeed been able to influence this policy process. In my assessment, the case of the three Baltic States is not only a case of a successful extension of security to a periphery of the European security community. It is also a case of a successful effort by two of the newer members of this community to reach this overall goal.

A second interesting case of at least relative success is the originally Finnish initiative to create a Northern Dimension among the external policies of the EU. Among the areas that were intended to be covered by this strategy that of the Baltic States figured prominently. Even if the direct results of this policy have perhaps not been very many as of this writing, still the Finnish Government has succeeded in getting the EU as an organisation to commit itself to the continuation of the Northern Dimension. There is, to my knowledge, no such example where the Swedish Government unilaterally initiates a foreign and security policy strategy that it anchors inside the EU. It is tempting to see this in the light of Sweden being a “reluctant European,” as opposed to the more positive attitude taken by Finland and by the Finnish Government.

A third overall result that is striking is the extent to which both cases showed efforts on the parts of the members of the European security community to extent stability to their respective peripheries by just about any means conceivable. Admittedly, such an overall judgement may hide insufficiencies within and among the particular program. This notwithstanding, the breadth and scope of the efforts are in both cases striking. The only really significant differences, perhaps, pertain to the goals pursued in the two cases. It is only in the case of the Baltic States that membership of the European security community has really been pursued. This goal was always excluded for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

A second difference in terms of goals is the fruition that is gradually coming to the long-standing French strategy to create *l'Europe puissance* out of the European Union. Even if this strategy has much broader ramifications than simply any potential military or rescue actions in the Western Mediterranean, still their likely importance for the stabilisation of the Maghreb cannot be denied.

There are several other differences of note between the case of the two Nordic States and the Baltic periphery, on the one hand, and that of France and the Western Mediterranean, on the other. First, the three countries that France attempts to stabilise, they are much larger and more populated than the Baltic States. The three Maghreb States have a total population of some 67 million as of 1998, compared to some 7,5 million in the three Baltic States.¹⁰⁸ Second, if there is some tradition of

¹⁰⁸ All figures from *Encyclopædia Britannica DVD 2000*.

constitutional government and limited democracy in the Baltic States, there is less of this in the Maghreb. Third, and probably most important, there is no likelihood of the three Maghrebi States becoming EU members within the foreseeable future.

Against these structural differences between the two cases - which all work in the direction of making the case of the Maghreb states a much harder one - the types of strategies that may be employed by France, unilaterally, bilaterally or in an institutional context would appear to be less crucial. My results indicate that France has indeed been active regarding Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in a way that resembles how Finland and Sweden acted in the other case. France has given bilateral aid, it has worked with other countries in tandem for the same purpose, and it has been active inside the EU. Indeed, in the latter respect my research confirms the notion that even for a large European State like France, foreign policy is to an ever-increasing extent carried out within the institutional context that is the European Union. The result of the efforts of France within the EU, together with particularly Spain and to some extent Italy, has been the start of a very ambitious and multifaceted political process called the Barcelona process.

Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are but three of the 12 political entities around the Mediterranean that take part in the Barcelona process. The multilateral character of this process makes it difficult to look separate the three countries studied here from the other nine political entities supported under the Barcelona process. Still, a preliminary assessment is that the Barcelona process has not led directly to the goals that some of the most hopeful supporters perhaps had expected in 1995. The Barcelona process is, however, a multifaceted and long-term programme whose ultimate success cannot be judged after less than five years. The fact that the essence of the process is a long-term commitment on the part of the EU to support political developments in the 12 Mediterranean partners across a broad agenda of issues means more, in my assessment, than the limitations that are certainly there, in several respects. The Barcelona process, as assessed in the cases of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, certainly has not shown the amount of progress toward the stabilisation of an unstable periphery to the European security regime as has the case of the three Baltic States. This does not mean, however, that the Barcelona process cannot lead to a greater stability in the Western Maghreb. Even if the success of the Baltic States is very hard to achieve for Alger, Rabat and Tunis, a greater degree of stability at a lower level than that achieved in the first case is both very desirable and, to my mind at least, achievable given time and continued commitment.

One crucial question that remains to be answered, and for which I do not have sufficient basis for a truly considered response, is what happens if the developments in or immediately outside one of the six countries studied here becomes very threatening for the European security regime. In the

case of the Baltic States, my general belief is that the commitment of the EU to these countries is sufficiently large to prevent such developments, except possibly under the most extreme circumstances. In the cases of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, however, the periphery is not yet nearly stable enough to make such a positive assessment. The commitment of the EU is not sufficiently strong to stop a deterioration of the security situation in one of the three Maghreb countries at the present time. It is very hard indeed to know when, if ever, the commitment by the European security regime, as epitomised by the EU in my assessment, can be of a sufficient magnitude in this respect.

The commitments made by the European Union in terms of building a capacity for military and civilian crisis management must still be regarded as going at least some way towards fulfilling the need just discussed. How far this process will go, and how fast, are however questions that cannot be answered at the present time. The only provisional answer that can be given is that *L'Europe de la défense et de l'armement* has been developed from the autumn of 1998 to the early summer of 2000 at a much faster pace than anyone thought conceivable just two years ago. If anything like this pace of change continues in this field, the European security community may look very different at the end of this decade, if not earlier.

Interviews in Paris: February-March 2000

Didier Billion, Directeur des études, Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS);

Nicolae Chibaeff, Ministère des Affaires étrangères,

Frank Neisse, Délégation aux affaires stratégiques, Ministère de la Défense

Graham Paul, Direction des affaires stratégiques, Ministère des affaires étrangères;

Informal conversations with the research staff at the Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, February – March 2000.