

INTRODUCTION

It is definitely obvious that the modern world is rapidly changing in the majority of its spheres, especially in the field of international cooperation and interaction. The reason of the changes is clear enough: the break-up of the socialist system, as a result - growing differences in economic principles, ideological background etc., and dangerous tendencies in the demographic and ecological environments' development. All those problems compel the countries of the world to search the ways of closer kind of cooperation. With this end in view highly developed states tend to exercising joint (international, intercoalitional) projects. For example space researches, scientific challenges in the field of high-technologies etc. Such joint projects were likely to be regarded as nonsense during the Cold War period due to the fact that both opposite alliances considered any sort of information on the potential foe as another mean of influence to be used in armed conflict.

Now the new multi-polar world is being shaped, chances of unleashing a global war are not taken into consideration any longer, and the world common attention is drawn to other existing forms of threat. Consequently, it is time for Russia to expand its range of the operations conducted as internal humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. It is time to participate in joint international ones.

In the light of all these changes we are faced a task: in the new global environment any kind of partnership is to be transformed into effective cooperation and

interaction via accelerating share of information and extending its volume. This is to be carried out in the military political sphere with thorough understanding of the core of any system i.e. its basic elements, its philosophy and strategy, form of control and organization, general planning methods and characteristics of the decision-making process. These aspects need research in former socialist alliance (taking into account proper socialist principles) and the Western block (with its NATO's concept previously to be applied in any situation).

Therefore, this research looks at the differences of the Russian and US control system to be taken into consideration. The emphasis is made on the heuristic aspect , not the technical one.

Still the author does not leave out of account the possibility of direct conflict between the two systems in the predictable future and has no illusions of «absolutely ideal and sincere friendship».

The problem raised here is effective and efficient partnership in the confines of the objectively existing global environment.

CHAPTER 1

Russia has always exercised historically established tendencies of control by force due to its geographical characteristics. Another subjective factor was the tsar's personal preferences and the traditional form of reign.

«The Official Life Essay» (1) looks at such examples of the strategy practiced by Nicholas the First. He regarded the state as a military political institution and its control system as a military bureaucratic body. That is why a great deal of ministries and departments were headed by generals. «These tendencies reached such excessive dimensions that even The Department of education was assigned Admiral A. Shishkov as its chief, and Colonel N. Protasov assumed the office of the First Procurator of the Holy Synod. Thus, during the reign of Nicholas the First 55.5% of the Ministers' Committees, 49% of the State Council, and 30.5% of the Senate were represented by the military with the rank of general.»

That is why Russia in the previous and the current century as well as the Soviet Union had an inclination to ignore the western model of civil control over state institutions, let alone power structures. The western perception was considered pure nonsense during the Stalin's period, marked, for instance, by the department NKVD with unlimited power and control in all spheres. Even later, during the period of the Soviet General Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, this tendency remained dominant and all-encompassing. «All through the Soviet period, civil authorities surely held control over power structures, including the Department of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Committee of State Security. It is no longer a secret that all the Party leaders had high military ranks. For example, Stalin was a generalissimo; Brezhnev was appointed with the rank of marshal. It also refers to the majority of the Political bureau of the

Communist Party members. All of the high Party members were given military ranks as well. The First Secretary of the District Party Committee was either a major or lieutenant- colonel, the leading secretary of the Regional Party Committee was a major-general. They were high-standing leaders , numbering in the hundreds. The members of all the Armies and Military District Committees had civil status and military rank as well, being leaders of the Soviet Republic regions . There were at least 25 or 30 ministries in the Soviet Government directly relating to the military-industrial complex and accordingly, lobbying in support of the decisions they needed . Together with the so-called power ministries , there was a total of 35 or 40 generals who assumed ministers office. Is there any other country that practiced such a close convergence of civil and military structures (except the Korean People's Democratic Republic and China)?

The status of the «Defender of the Motherland» changed as a result of the «perestroyka» policy that developed from the late 80s to the early 90s. The change was notably obvious and could be seen «with a naked eye» to the western analysts . The statement below belongs to one of them: «... The Russian military has lost not only manpower, money ,and mission but also a war, an alliance , and a country. The result is a thoroughly disorganized and demoralized military, which is not only incapable of conducting a war but also so divided against itself that it is, in all probability, incapable of conducting a coup. The Russian armed forces seem to be thoroughly politicized into factions and personalistic cliques. To

compensate for a lack of funds, soldiers increasingly turn to commercial activities and sale of military supplies... At the same time, however, politicization of the military has been accompanied by the broadening of civilian influence in the form of much greater transparency, supervision by Duma, public and legislative debates over issues of policy, regarding the military, diffusion of the military expertise beyond the limited confines of the general staff. Nonetheless, it would be hard to argue that civilian control mechanisms in Russia today are in better shape than they were in the Soviet Union.»

Recurring to the Civil-Military Cooperation term, it is necessary to have understanding of its meaning in the broad and narrow sense of the word, since the Western and the Russian interpretation differ (2).

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in its broad sense means close cooperation between the civil and the military or power structures and their specialists in the interests of the national security. Its narrow sense implies civil (public) control over the entire spectrum of actions carried out by federal power structures.

There is a difference between the Russian perception which gives a considerable emphasis to interaction and mutual influence between military organization and civil society and the Western approach, that is more likely to consist in «...healthy civil-military relations and democratic control of defense forces» as achieved, in part, through the adequate defense reform; these are admittedly different categories, though highly interdependent ones...»

In Huntington's fundamental research (3) the emphasis is placed on the certain aspect of the civil-military relations. That aspect defines civil control as the principle of a state's internal policy and as a complex of measures taken by the federal and the social institutions to ensure due political stability in a democratic society.

The essence of Huntington's theory consists in the following thesis: «A real professional serviceman realizes the necessity of social division of labor . It means that there are professionals in the military society and the civil society possesses professionals of its own kind as well, and both of these categories have distinct spheres of responsibility, competence, and power.» That's why Huntington considers military professionalism as a feature that transforms the military into a politically neutral force, permanently ready to conduct any task assigned by the state's civil legitimate power without paying attention to the details of political issues.

However, there exists a different viewpoint. The statement given above refers to periods of conventional wars. But when it comes to the wars of the last part of the 19th century and the early period of the 20th the following tendency turns out to be dominant: conflicts and the methods of their elimination increasingly assume the form of OOTW (operations other than war).

Therefore CIMIC of the OOTW period undergoes some transformations and becomes an object of the research.

The «Military agencies» category is broadly defined as a state military organization armed with weapons (including non-lethal sorts) and designed for influence by

force. The examples of such agencies are given in Chapter 2 and 3.

As a rule, different countries establish their own military structures, but they all generally depend on the following: the country's historical peculiarities of form of state and its condition (stability, transition period endurance, or, as for Russia, the state system disintegration tendencies).

It is commonly accepted that CIMIC possesses specific facets, that have nothing to do with the procedures at the federal level:

- Shaping of the policy of the Armed Forces establishment and construction
- Maintaining the military and political values
- Preserving the military mentality and traditions
- Observing civil rights of the military (4)

Since a nation itself (not federal agencies) tends to preserve military experience and traditions ,and active social associations founded by people basing on their convictions and interests that are the core of any society. Power structures (especially existing within the confines of voluntary common service) are another example of such associations.

Power structures of any state provide security against any threat and at the same time embody sources of danger and conflicts themselves(for instance , as a subject of political struggle). Thus Russian power structures such as the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are considered as dangerous for both internal and external interests.

The activities of the left-wing Army-supporting movement are an example of the former kind of danger. It had been led by the well known general and deputy L. Rokhlin before he was assassinated, its present leader is the Duma deputy A. Nikolaev.

As an independent political party it comprises thousands of regular servicemen (although it sharply contradicts the Russian Law), the leading managers of the military-industrial complex and representatives of the Secret Service.

When it comes to the external kind of danger, that can possibly derive from a military organization, we may place an example of the military action of force-projection to Grozniy in 1994 conducted under the pretence of the Chechen opposition force. Of the same kind is the Russian troops reprojction from Bosnia in 1999 to other states of former Yugoslavia (Kosovo). It had happened before the Federation Council made its decision.

Civil control as a basis of CIMIC goes on attracting attention in Russia and is increasingly being applicated today. The emphasis is placed exactly on the right of the state 's citizens for control over power structures (or at least, for being informed of their actions). It is the essence of the difference between this perception and the traditionally narrow view that concerns pure dependence of military leaders on civil power's decisions.

Which aspects of the power structures' activities should be limited in Russia today?

The basic ones are:

- Involving the military into the political struggle
- Lack of control over economic activities including conversion and weapon export
- Interference in creating democratic institutions , for example

not governmental (« The committee of soldiers' mothers»)

- Classifying projects to possibly affect the environment.

- Classifying every fact pertaining weapons of mass destruction (taking into account specific

Russian

mentality)

- Informational isolation

Up to now the Russian society is characterized by an extremely introverted form of mentality and almost puritanic approach apropos the spheres previously shrouded in secrecy. For instance, all the topographical maps of 1:100000 scale (in the metric measures) are secret, and 1:25000 or 1:10000 ones are top secret that notoriously limits basic democratic rights of free moving across the country.

As another example , we may point to such a complex situation, when a retired serviceman has trouble getting a civilian international passport and as a result is prohibited to leave the country for a certain period. The permission can only be given by the Interdepartmental committee of the Ministry of External Affairs.

Still this decision depends not on the Federal Security Service, but on the Department of Defense experts. And there is just a great deal of such examples of the

unprecedented arbitrariness , practiced by the Russian power structures.

As stated above, civil control is a kernel of CIMIC (civil-military cooperation, as it is more likely to be called in Russia). In its turn civil control comprises state control (political, including parliamentary and representative control, administrative and judicial control), social and personal form of control.

The last two or three years the problem of civil control over power structures has been of particular concern. There is one glaring example given in the N.I.Ryzhak's outstanding work (6). It is an example of parliamentary control given to a military institution in 1917. On the 20th of December 1917 the Government (then it was called « The Council of National Commissars») created a new structure named VChK and delegated it the authority of large-scale criminal investigation and preliminary investigation. In February it gained additional power and in September 1918, according to the «Red terror» decree , adopted by the National Commissars Committee it was given authorities even beyond terms of legal proceeding.

After the Civil War its power was partially limited in the favor of the Communist Party. In accordance with the Constitution issued in 1924, a new structure called State Political Control Department, organized within the Government and the Procurator's office of the USSR Supreme Court exclusively possessed people's destinies and lives. In the end of the 20s and the beginning of the 30s Stalin unleashed unprecedented bloody terror against his nation and the Communist Party managed to restore its controlling function after his death only.

Since the 60s till the 80s the Supreme Soviet of the USSR used a proper committee for that purpose that further transformed into the Supreme Soviet Committee which existed since 1988 till 1991. In 1994 Duma began working out «The Law on the Civil Control over Military Organizations»(Appendix 2) but has not approved it yet(!).

There are certain goals to be achieved by a democratic state in the course of governmental control implementation (and parliamentary control in particular):

--Converting state power structures into more effective organizations.

--Coordination of efforts of power structure which in Russia include the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Federal Service of Tax Police, the Federal Guarding Service, the Federal Border Troops (undergoes reorganization today), the External Intelligence Service, The Central Department of Intelligence of the Department of Defense, the Federal Service of the Governmental Communication and Information.

--Setting control (or at least monitoring) over new structures creating process in order to maintain their spectrum of activities in accordance with their original designation.

The example of disorder in power structures coordination is the way of performance of the hostages-recovery mission conducted in the stanitsa of Pervomaiskaya in 1995. Although the task was accomplished by the Army elements and the Federal Security Service units and other services being involved with the total of 2500 servicemen and managed by the

three generals (Stepashin, Barsukov, and Kvashnin) versus only 300 Chechen terrorists, the dissonance reached its highest mark so that the band successfully escaped the surrounded stanitsa. All that resulted in the armed clash that entailed up to 30 casualties.

There are several methods of control over power structures practiced by democratic states and for the most part observed in Russia:

--Influencing the development and the implementation of strategy , doctrines , and long-term programs.

--Financial control (over the budget and essential material and technical resources) including proper estimation of requirements and proper financing.

--Control over personnel selection including selection, appointment and engaging the leading cadres ;

observation of provisions concerning military service .

Broadly speaking , the Russian power structures (especially the Armed Forces always have tended to historically established and quite unacceptable form of so called «caste approach» in cadre selection policy. For example, till the middle of the 90s «Privileged Group»(official definition- the group of the prime inspectors the General Staff) existed and anyone to be assigned with the rank of General of the Army or Marshal Service was automatically permitted to enrolled in this category. They had absolutely no trouble serving (to be more exact, remaining in the group and being appointed with all the privileges and proper salary) all life long.

However, this group could afford accepting some colonel-generals as its members and has always remained at the approximate total of 60 persons.

When it comes to the general-colonels, all of them represented the caste that kept on striking difference in the privileges and salary in comparison with the remainder of the generals.

The next group comprised lieutenant-generals and major-generals and several colonels whose posts equaled generals' appointments.

Accordingly, the lower group consisted off all range of officers

(the officers' caste) with nearly no difference in status privileges and salary, and warrant officers and enlisted men.

On the one hand, the unofficial differentiation and the division of the Russian officers into groups resulted in dissidence in its solidity, on the other hand, it complicated objective control over cadre policy aspects, intrinsic and significant to power structures.

What kind of state power structure do we currently have in Russia and what are the ways to improve for the foreseeable future?

The general diagram illustrating the cooperation between institutions is attached in Appendix 1.

Additionally, there is a list of basic laws pertaining to power structures activities. We should draw attention to the paradox of that the Russian power structures are not responsible to the Federal Assembly and Security and Defense Council of the Assembly. All the more, the legislative institutions are not given their own control over power structures.

The problem of choosing the optimum balance between trusting power structures and covering them with a

comprehensive and all-encompassing form of control is common. All the more it is paid a particular concern in Russia due to the tendencies endemic to some powers that try to reconstruct the soviet model of economy and policy. No less dangerous factors of risk are the regions headed by odious leaders who make attempts to get separated from the Federation (Chechnia).

Another urgent problem remaining in Russia is affairs with such countries as China and Japan in the light of the boundary tensions still being unsettled. All those threats to the Russian security are displayed below and the problem of CIMIC is to be researched from the national security point of view.

Since 1992 the structure of the Russian Government takes after many of its counterparts in democratic states and nominally comprised 24 federal ministries, 24 committees, and 20 federal services and departments. The amount of ministries always varies because since 1996 we have changed 6 governmental teams with term of administration for each of them 7 months at the average. Moreover, up to now we have no law on the Government and its functions are mentioned in the Constitution quite vaguely.

Three of those 48 ministries (the Department of Defense, the Ministry of External Affairs) and 6 services (the Federal Security Service, the External Intelligence Service, the Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information, the Federal Border Troops, the Federal Guarding Service, the Federal Tax Police Ministry) are considered power structures and 9 of

them report directly to the President . The remainder is under the immediate control of the Government.

In Russia we are more likely to consider our security dependent on the power structures mentioned above and the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Atomic Industries. But for all that the coordination of the state structures' efforts to ensure our security is carried out by the National Security Council, that lies beyond any of the three power branches.

The National Security Council of the Russian Federation consists of several recurrently transforming structures (7). The primary of them are:

- The Science Council
- The Center of Situations Estimation
- The Security Council Commission
- The Interdepartmental committees
- The Security Council Executive Body

Thus, the Security Council controls via power structures the following aspects:

--Internal Security(the Ministry of States of Emergency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Federal Guarding Service, the State Customs Committee, the Federal Tax Policy Ministry)

--External Security(the Federal Security Service, the External Intelligence Service, the Department of Defense, the Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information)

And it has to be the coordinating state agency to retain balance between unlimited power of law enforcement structures and pseudo- democratic control over them. In fair,

Russia still tends to conduct its control over military institutions through the Security Council without exerting any miserable effort in the direction of Civil control.

The Law « On the Parliament control over the Military Organizations in the Russian Federation» (9) was a considerable breakthrough towards the implementation of the traditional CIMIC form. It is hard to overestimate the importance of this law since it means a notable success to the further democratization in Russia. In order to coordinate the CIS member-states efforts in this sphere, a year later Russia had developed so called «model law» on «The parliamentary control over the Military Organization» , regarded suitable for all CIS member-states.

The basic provisions of those two laws are:

- Complete definitions of all the objects and subjects of control such as : «civil control», «state military organization», «political neutrality», «political activities».
- Goals of civil (parliamentary) control, its subjects and assignments.
- State administrative control (over president, government, courts, and procurator offices)
- Parliamentary control (its forms and functions).
Parliament's authorities. Rights and duties of the State Duma Authorized Agent in the affairs of the military.
- Public control. Authorities of the public associations and private citizens in the sphere of civil control. The public role of the mass media.
- Executive power elements cooperation with the subjects of civil control.

The world-known specialists in the sphere of CIMIC concluded in their expertise that the drafts of both laws

are sufficiently balanced and appropriate to the international standards. Thus, the primary purpose in the period of 1999-2000 is to approve the law to put it actively into practice.

CONCLUSION

CIMIC in Russia, its inceptive adjusting to the current situation, civil state and public control over state military organizations are absolutely new and previously unknown to our country features. Despite of the fact that only 8 years have passed since 1992 the mentality of the Russian «high» and «medium» class has undergone considerable changes in the direction of extension democracy in this sphere. This developing law is just another indication of the progress.

But for all that historically established nation's mental peculiarities and characteristics and a great deal of pseudo-military bureaucratic officials are pertinacious in their endeavors to deny effective presidential control over power structures and especially special services. Such tendencies revealed in the events of 1991, 1993 , 1994-1996, and 1999-2000 (the conflict in Chechnia). Those pseudo-military call their denying «anxiety for Russia's national security».

CHAPTER 2

Before giving explanation of such specific sort of power structures' activities as operations other, than war,

it is in place to take a brief look at the operations of standard type.

As mentioned in Chapter 1 , the basic provisions of the national security doctrine were defined in «The Conception of National Security» signed by the President of the Russian Federation in December 1995 and its latest version of December 1999. The examples explaining each power structure' s degree of responsibility in elimination of any threat to Russian national security are given below.

National security can conditionally be divided into internal national security (concerning threat from within the country) and external national security (accordingly dealing with extraneous threats) . Threat themselves are also of two kinds force threat

(external aggression, internal armed conflicts) and other threats

(involvement in liquidation of natural or technological disasters' consequences).

By way of example we may mention the obligations of Department of Defense and its degree of responsibility :
--95% of any external aggression is to be repelled by the Armed Forces.

--Regional conflicts are to be conducted by the Armed Forces to the extent of 90%

--Local conflicts- 90%

--International peacekeeping - 85%

--Evacuation of the Russian citizens from abroad- 80%

--Protection of economic zone-10%

--Informational and communicational provision-5%

In the framework of internal threat neutralization, Department of Defense has responsibilities to the following extend:

- Internal armed conflict-60%
- Social conflicts - 40%
- Unarmed social tensions to possibly entail disintegration of the Russian Federation- 20%
- Criminality (including terrorism and drug dealing)- 5%
- Natural and technological disasters relief- 5%

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has the following degree responsibilities in the external threats response:

- Regional conflict-5%
- Local conflict-5%
- International peacekeeping-10%
- Protection of economic zone-10%

In the internal contingencies:

- Internal armed conflict-30%
- Social conflict-40%
- Unarmed social tensions-70%
- Criminality-90%

The Ministry of States of Emergencies is involved in the external missions to the following extent:

- International peacekeeping-5%
- Evacuation of Russian citizens from abroad-10%

In internal ones:

- Social conflict-10%
- Natural and technological disasters relief-95%

The Federal Security Service (external missions):

- Regional conflict-5%
- Local conflict-5%
- Informational and communicational provision-5%

In internal missions:

- Internal armed conflict-5%
- Social conflict-5%
- Unarmed social tensions-10%
- Criminality-5%

The Federal Border Troops (external missions);

- Protection of economic area-60%

In internal contingencies:

- Internal armed conflict-5%
- Social conflict-5%

The External Intelligence Service bears a part in external aggression response to the extent of 5%, the State Customs Committee of the Federal Service of Tax Police is involved in protection of economic zone to the extent of 20%, and the Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information carries out 90% of informational and communicational provision.

When it comes to the OOTW conducted by the Russian power structures, in the light of the national security theory we can classify them in accordance with the following national security aspects: political, economic, military, ecological, and informational. The political types of threats are given below.

Types of standard and non-standard operations to be carried out by the Russian power structures given above are illustrated in the light of the national security theory that has partially been displayed in previously mentioned «The National Security Conception» .

But more detailed description of OOTW is given in «The principles of Russian Military Doctrine» (8) (including its 1999 version). Taking a brief dwell on this

primary document of the Russian Federation, it is pertinent to underscore its progressive tendencies. It means that the Doctrine has finally confessed the practical necessity of not only standard operations, for example « Strategic operation of repelling air-space enemy strike», but non-standard ones that seem to be gaining today the widest degree in 21 century's conflicts.

Broadly, «The principles ...» concern factors of military threats to a state, but they leave political, economic and other threats out of account. As stated in «The National Security Conception» these factors can spring out in a breeding ground of internal and external military (armed) conflicts . In their turn, they may result in direct military threat and , further on, in armed conflict. In this juncture, heads of the state and the Armed Forces are determined to expect the following ways of conflict's development:

1. A war (in its increasing scale: local, regional, wide-scale war with only conventional weapons employment, wide-scale war with use of weapons of mass destruction. Since such conflicts remain standard we set aside their detailed description.

To all appearance, the new forms of conflicts (non-standard forms) may be the following:

--Border armed conflict

--Internal armed conflict

--All range of peacekeeping contingencies.

«The Principles...» display OOTW conducted by power structures without compiling them into discrete blocks, but list them alternately with standard types.

The list comprises the following:

1. Participation in settlement of regional and local conflicts (peacekeeping operations).
2. Terrorism and drug dealing (contraband) response.
3. Critical ecological states relief (nuclear and chemical aspects of security).
4. Protection of lives , rights, and liberties of Russian citizens living abroad (including Russian servicemen).
5. Prevention of military or civil information leak.
6. Bearing part in emergencies and relief of their consequences.
7. Participation in weapons of mass destruction non proliferation in adjacent states.
8. Observing obligations to the allies (including military-technical cooperation).
9. Counteraction to outlaw armed bands in conjunction with other forces and agencies.
10. Provision of support in border conflicts.
11. Participation in internal armed conflicts in conjunction with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the Internal Forces) and other agencies.
12. Supporting the provision of legality , law , and order.
13. Protection of Russia's interests in economic area and International Navigation Area.
14. Hostages liberation.

It is evident, that OOTW given in this list take after the types of OOTW described in FM-100-5 with only difference that in the latter they assume more generalized form and definition.

Russian OOTW can be classified in accordance with areas of their conduct: internal, internal and external, peacekeeping missions, purely internal conflicts. Each area

can be divided into different types in accordance with OOTW forms. Each form of OOTW can be divided into its components. This information is the most significant and advanced part of the research.

So the first type of OOTW (Internal contingencies) incorporate the following:

1. Observing obligations to the allies i.e.
--Special equipment trade (military weapons and equipment). Structures responsible for this type of OOTW are listed in accordance with their priorities: the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, the State Technical Control, the Central Department of International Military Cooperation (within the Department of Defense), the General Staff, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise «Rosvooruzhenie».

NON-STANDARD OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES.

External Missions

1. Observation of the obligations to the allies (including military-technical cooperation).
2. Participation in operations aimed at protection of the honor, dignity, rights , and liberties of the Russian citizens living abroad (including servicemen).
3. Participation in weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in the adjacent states.

External and Internal Contingencies

4. Participation in emergencies and disasters relief operations, offering assistance and rescue.
5. Prevention of leak of military data and other kinds of critical information.

Peacekeeping

6. Participation in peacekeeping operations (within or beyond the confines of the former USSR).

Internal Contingencies

7. Participation in terrorism, drug-dealing and contraband response.

8. Participation in operations aimed at outlaw armed bands suppression.

9. Participation in internal conflict response.

10. Protection of the Russia's interests in economic area and international navigation.

11. Assistance in ensuring of legality and order. Protection of the Russian Constitution.

CONCLUSION

State control is a complex of effective procedures, provided that all the aspects and provisions of its organization's are constantly and strictly observed. The basic of them are:

--Close cooperation between the 3 power branches in conjunction with departmental control observing the principle of power branches distinction and division of their spheres of authority. Division of authorities between the entire Russian Federation and its subjects.

--Elaboration of legal functional principles applicable to the power structures of the state.

CHAPTER 3

The subjects of CIMIC are: the Armed Forces, political heads of a state (political elite), and civil society (5).

Historical development of the contemporary existing states resulted in a variety of models of interdependence

between civil society and military organization. Each model implies an appropriate type of CIMIC based on a fixed legal and legitimate status. There are 4 types of CIMIC more likely to be practiced around the world.

1. Democratic. This one is characterized by coordinated and right-equal participation of CIMIC subjects in accomplishing defense and state military security missions with the dominant role delegated to civil society.
2. Totalitarian. It practices thoroughly organized supreme power control over civil society and military organization as well with all range of their activities to be strictly regulated by the ruling team.
3. Authoritarian Military. All civil institutions are totally overwhelmed by military structures. State and civil society are utterly directed to the goals and designs of the authoritarian political regime.
4. Transitional type. It is marked by weakening of the functional abilities of the all 3 CIMIC branches, lack of coordination in their procedures, decline in basic defense potentials and threat to internal political stability.

The primary indices that define type and form of CIMIC are:

1. The order of decision-making and its realization that first of all characterizes type of political regime and form of state political system.
2. Ways of staffing in the Armed Forces and other elements of the military organization. It is the most characterizing index of the coordination between all 3 subjects of CIMIC pertaining to the issues of military construction and state defense organization.

Russian social science encountered CIMIC problems only in the 90s.

In the course of the last 5 years (1993-1998) there have 83000 young officers below 30 of their age who retired from military service . The quantity is equal to nearly 3 of the 5 annual totals of graduates that were released in this period from military colleges. This tendency was still endemic in 1998 . During the first half of 1998 29600 officers retired and 24% of them were below 30 years of age. Additionally , 30%-70% of the platoon and company officers' posts are held by warrant officers or officers retransferred from reserve. The total of expulsions of cadets has lately increased by 3 or 4 times. Each year there are 33% or 35% (at times 50% and more) graduates missing from the nominal quantity . In other words, one third of military colleges make a dry run.

Russian Armed Forces are no longer a unite state institution . One of the democratization principles was the appeal for demilitarization. But having completed disarmament in the external sphere, Russia has notably gained military power within the country. Russia extends police functions of the state. Russian power ministries undergo active political engagement and decreasing of their loyalty to the political governing body.

The consultative bodies subordinate to the President of the Russian Federation comprise the Presidential Council, the Experts and Analysts Council, and the Cadre Policy Council.

The Presidential Council headed by the President and consisting of number of eminent scientists on political matters and public and economic men carries out sessions when necessary, as a rule, short of significant political events for thorough analysis of the situation. Additionally the

members of the Council assess considerable and long-term problems of the Russian Federation.

The Experts and Analysts Council headed by the Leader of the Presidential Administration and incorporating the members of administrative and analytic bodies , scientists on the political issues and public men is responsible for the firm coordination between the viewpoints on different problems within the Administration.

The Cadre Policy Council with its two subchairmen: the Federal Council Chairmen and the Leader of the Presidential Administration coordinates procedures of preparation of the Presidents' acts.

The provision of the federal state service bears evidence to the necessity of the approval of these acts.

The Leader of the Presidential Administration possesses the Control and Observation Council with its assignment to hold control over the federal and regional bodies of the executive power.

The President's approval of the provisions on the «Analytic Department of the President» in April 1995 allowed for concentration of the analysts endeavors. Before this provision was adopted, they had been obliged to exert efforts in the three distinct spheres: General Policy (the analysts on the external and internal political matters) , Social and Economic Policy (the specialists on social and economic conditions within the Russian Federation) and the President's Social Projects.

The President's assistants nominally report to the Leader of the Administration. Among them , the First Assistant deserves particular concern. He controls the Assistance Service, the President's Office, the Assistant on the matters

of the National Security, the Assistants responsible for the Presidents International Contacts, the Assistant responsible for the affairs with the internal political structures. There is the Academy of the state service attached to the President and originated in 1994.

The peculiarity of the presidential form of government lies in the fact that a certain number of the federal bodies of executive power report directly to the President. The following services fall into this category: External Intelligence Service, State Archives Service, the Primary Guard Department, Federal Agency of the Governmental Communication and Information, Federal Security Service, and President's Security Service.

The Federal Council consists of 10 committees and 5 of them pertain immediately to the issues of provision of the National Security : the Budget Committee , the CIS affairs Committee, the Security and Defense Committee, and the Social Policy Committee.

In regard to State Duma it comprises 23 committees . 8 of them bear part in the National Security provision in immediate manner, and 10 committees have a broader kind of relation to those issues.

The primary ministries and departments that deal directly with the matters concerning Russia's National Security and led by the Security Council are the following: the Department of Defense , the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Civil Defense Department, the Ministry of States of Emergency and Disasters Relief, the Federal Security Service, and the Federal Border Troops. Additionally the following organizations can be included into this category: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of External

Economic Contacts, the Ministry of Economy, the National and Regional Policy Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, the Atomic Energy Ministry, the Healthcare and Medical Industries Ministry, the Ministry of the Environmental Security and Natural Resources. The following State Committees should be mentioned here: the Committee of the Defense Industry Branches, the Military-Technical Policy Committee, the State Reserves Committee, the Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information, the State Tax Service, the Foreign Currency and Export Control Service, the Tax Police Department, the Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring Service, the Federal Nuclear and Radiation Security Observation Service, the Federal Employment Service.

FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BODIES

Federal executive bodies in Russia are divided into the category of Federal Ministries and other forms of federal executive organizations. There is a total of 24 Federal Ministries, 24 Committees and 20 Services and Department (the number can vary). Their functions let us divide them into the following categories and spheres:

1. Policy and Social policy
2. Economy
3. Environmental security and Health-Care
4. Science
5. Education and Cultural development
6. Power structures providing all range of survey

The following bodies provide security through the use of power structures:

1. The Department of Defense
2. The Ministry of Internal Affairs

3. The Civil Defense Department, States of Emergency and Disasters Relief
4. The Customs Committee
5. The Federal Guarding Service
6. The External Intelligence Service
7. The Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information
8. The Federal Border Troops
9. The Tax Police Department
10. The Federal Security Service

The importance of any department's role played in the confines of the federal executive bodies is defined by several regulations. Practically, one of those regulations is department's degree of subordination to the Government or the President. The President's Decree « On the Federal Executive Bodies Structure» defines that «The Federal Executive Bodies report to the Government, exclusive of the cases when it is obligatory to provide the President's constitutional authorities or when proper executive bodies report immediately to the President in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation». Thus, the President possesses under his direct control the following bodies:

1. The Department of Defense
2. The Ministry of External Affairs
3. The External Intelligence Service
4. The Federal Security Service
5. The Primary Department of Guard
6. The Federal Agency of the Governmental Communication and Information.
7. The Federal Service of TV and Broadcasting
8. The Federal Archives Service

The President's decree added to this list the Federal Committee on the Military Technical Policy. This fact bears immediate relation to the project of establishment a new unitary structure responsible for all spheres of technical control (Appendixes 1-5). It will be designed for provision the military community and the civil economic sphere with all range of data on technical aspects. The goals, objectives and methods of this structure are given in the Appendixes and demonstrate perfect integration between both military and civil interests and structures in the state. Consequently, the President immediately controls 3 political structures(the Ministry of External Affairs, the Federal TV and Broadcasting, and the State Archives), 1 military technical body («Goskomvoentekh»), and 5 Power structures (the Department of Defense, the External Intelligence Service, the Federal Security Service, the Primary Department of Guard, and the Federal Service of Governmental Communication and Information).

GENERAL CONCLUSION

In the course of the period this research was being accomplished (1998-2000), Russia underwent several changes in the field of civil-military relations and as a matter of fact, the bulk of those changes refer to OOTW. The main reasons for the acceleration of this process are the following:

1. Increasingly developing (and practically stimulated abroad) Chechen terrorism, against a background of the struggle aimed at separation of the Chechen Republic, Dagestan, and Ingushetia.

2. Sustained and redoubled efforts of the Russian Power Structures to suppress outlaw armed bands in Dagestan and , later ,in Chechnia.
3. Increasing number of terror cases all over the country (Moscow, Buinaksk, Makhachkala, Kaspyisk, Volgodonsk, etc.)
4. Ministry's of States of Emergency bearing part in the activities on terror actions response, technological and natural disasters relief.
5. Escalation of Political activities due to the elections to State Duma and the President's post.

The tendencies of the civil-military relations development were quite diversified in their directions.

One of the most evident and necessary directions is increasing efforts towards diminishing the extent of the power structures' control (the Department of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service in particular). Such process took place due to the fact that in the course of so called «inertly-conducted» anti-terror operation in Dagestan and Chechnia, the military authorities insisted on their inherent right of being not interfered by the politicians during the action. Practically, they succeeded. The main factor of their success is highly correlated with V.V.Putin's breakthrough into his new office. He employed his popularity to the best advantage on his way to the President's administration and in fact he achieved his goal.

However, during the pre-election campaign and especially after it, the military were likely to expect some unpleasant «surprises» from him, such as renewal of the previous methods of control over the Armed Forces through the party leadership system (including «Yedinstvo» («Unity»))

party). No doubt, such system will expand the Presidential and Executive Power's control over the entire range of power structures, that, broadly, is intrinsic to any democratic society.

The following obvious steps can be predicted for the foreseeable future of civil-military relations and OOTW:

1. During the nearest 3 or 4 years (till the next State Duma is elected) the Law «On the Civil Control Over Military Organizations» will probably be adopted, or in the worst, such arrangement will be taken through the complex of the President's decrees and Governmental Edicts.

The civil control arrangements will mostly consist in a strict dictation of the State Power (The Kremlin) over the Power Structures which is quite far from the generally accepted social democratic form of civil control. Due to lack of our country's readiness for such a quick transformation, the problem is likely to be solved in the course of the following 10 or 15 years.

2. The Powers of the Russian Federation will go on accelerating the progress of OOTW implementation with a view to embody 2 following ideas:
 - a. OOTW for political purposes(to justify priorities and some economic arrangements. Such actions will probably be designed to withdraw citizens' attention from objectively existing problems).
 - b. Provision of training for the power structures so they sustain permanently high level of readiness for internal contingencies .
3. The following priorities are to be defined for OOTW in Russia:
 - a. All forms of anti-terrorism operations.

- b. Suppression of outlaw armed bands .
 - c. Anti-drug dealing operations.
 - d. Power structures actions aimed at the protection of the Russian Federation's economic interests (sea shelf protection and pipelines security).
 - e. Disasters relief.
 - f. Peacekeeping operations.
 - g. Demonstration of force.
 - h. Rapid attacks and raids.
 - i. Other possible forms of actions.
4. CIMIC during possible OOTW in the next 3 or 4 years is likely to be marked by Power Structures' plans concealment in peacetime. OOTW themselves will be initiated by the Political State Power with precision of the missions assigned, goals firmly outlined, methods previously successfully practiced, and completion- time limited.

The Armed Forces will be divided into the following elements:

- a. Forces ready to encounter external threats (Strategic Nuclear Force, Navy, Strategic Air Force).
- b. Contingents designed to response internal threats in the course of OOTW conducted within the Russian Federation and adjacent areas.

The spheres of the bilateral mutual interests of both military and civilian community, such as military-technical cooperation, technical control will be divided into distinct levels of competence defined by the Central Governing Body without a slightest hint of purely democratic control.

Foreseeable and uncertain prospects in this sphere need further gradual research.