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**FINAL REPORT
OF THE STUDY**

**THE SECURITY & DEFENSE OF EUROPE
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(NATO, WEU, OSCE)**

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FOREWORD

It's a customary tradition that the author of a written work justifies in some words the ideas, reasons or feelings that have led him to choose the subject which is treating.

*Being faithful to this practice, I will try to explain some of my personal motives for having chosen **"The security and defense of Europe in the XXIst Century (NATO, WEU, OSCE)"***

For those of us born and grown up in Europe, the fact of War is something familiar, because we learnt of it not only through the history books, where fights, conflicts, and wars fill thousands of pages, but also because we may see their traces in the form of castles, fortresses, trenches and ruins almost everywhere.

Even more, most of adult Europeans have had a real experience of war, either by themselves or by members of their families, which have suffered the tragedy of war.

So, it could be asked, is war something inseparable of the nature of men? Is it perhaps a divine malediction that accompanies the course of civilization? Or is war the normal condition of society and peace only a short repose to get strong and ready for another war? Perhaps it is a transitional, accidental maladjustment of the social equilibrium among groups, tendencies, interests, or ideologies, which do not find in due time the proper intelligent solution?

*Now it is a common answer to these questions that **when taken at the initial stage and with good will, conflicts or crisis can be solved and war avoided.***

In any case, War is a human phenomenon that has for centuries fascinated philosophers, sociologists, religious men, and of course militarymen, because it has been the cause of enormous disgraces. War was the greatest destructive agent of all cultures. But, at the same time, it has been considered as a means to purify decadent societies, a source of the greatest virtues of heroism and self-denial, and the impelling force for the most dramatic changes of mankind.

The Two World Wars that took place on the European soil have caused the decline of that proud Europe which conquered other continents, which set the pace of the world, and which was the cradle and the splendor of Western Civilization. Now it is in a rang behind the most powerful nations.

Fifty years of uninterrupted peace since the end of W.W.II –such a long a period of peace has no precedent in eight centuries- have created among the European peoples the absolute need to live united and in peace.

*It is this wish of everlasting peace what moved us to think, to investigate and to write about the form and conditions which could and should have a **security and defense system** to give Europe a durable peace in a society of freedom, justice and prosperity.*

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PRESENTATION

By placing this study into the XXIst Century it seems advisable, if not necessary, to formulate some questions that will have to be answered along the study, even on the certitude of the enormous lack of precision of any future perspective, specially nowadays when the acceleration of changes in the technological, military and social worlds are so impressive.

Among the many possible questions that could serve to orientate the study, the following ones have been subjects of permanent reflection:

-*What* could the main ideas and feelings be, what the worries and hopes of people, what the way of living of Western society at the beginning of the century, and how could all they change along with time into the century?

-*What* kind of “Europe” should be considered?: the one which integrates *all* nations of the Continent, or only that part of it generally called “*The West*”? Certainly, after the 1999 Alliance’s Strategic Concept, as a consequence of the recent accessions of nations to NATO, and with Institutions like EAPC, PFP, EU/WEU and OSCE, most if not all nations are or will come into a *pan-Euro-Atlantic security community*.

-*What* will the future Great Power(s) be ?. What the Hegemonic(s) Nation(s) of the world ?. And what the place of Europe in relation to those Powers?

-*How*, in which way, and at what speed, will the European Union and other related Institutions expand and deepen along the century?

-*How* could the European citizens increase their faith on the future of the Union, and feel more secure, more integrated and prouder of being Europeans?

-*What* would be the risks, dangers, or threats to be faced to in the near future? From what directions, in what regions and of what nature could they be?. What challenges shall we face, and with what strategies should be confronted?

-*What* type of security and defense architecture will be needed?

-*In what* sort of Alliances, Institutions, or Political Organizations should Europe participate, or even promote or impulse to improve its security.?

-*What* type of Armed Forces could better defend Europe?: National Armies, partially Integrated National Armies, a unique European Army, or an Allied Army?

-*How* would the future doctrine, organization, armaments, and equipment be best suited for those Armed Forces?

-*What* type of man –of military man- would be needed for the Armed Forces?
And finally, *how could we best help to create a more peaceful and secure world in which the European society would be an example of stability, justice, freedom, democracy and happiness far into the XXIst Century?*

I. TOWARDS A NEW ORDER

I.1 THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SOCIETY

Thomas Robert Malthus expressed his thoughts in 1798 into a paper titled “*An Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society*”, which was published in London and would make him famous.

His main thesis was that “*the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man*”. The “pessimistic” Malthus felt that the human condition would worsen, with the gap between those who “have” and those who “have-not” increasing by people’s pressure upon the earth’s resources. The result, he feared, would be starvation, mass deaths through famine, disease, and the disruption of the social structure.

The debate between **optimists** –who have full confidence in the human intelligence and capacity to overcome difficulties- and the **pessimists** -who follow Malthus's thesis- has come even up to our days. Contrary to Malthus’s prediction, however, the “*power of the earth*” was able then, and has been able until now to match “*the power of population*”. But, could it be the same for the next century, when 10.000 million people or more will need to be feed?. Nowadays we face two interrelated issues: overpopulation, migration, and social instability, in one hand; and technological power to increase productivity on the other hand. Both are affecting us with greater force ever.

To have an approximate idea of the world we live on, it may be useful to follow the image drawn by Gen. John S. Sheehan, USMC, (in the Strategic Review. Summer 1997.pag 7), which has written that *if we reduced the earth’s population to a small village of only 100 people (with the human ratios remaining the same), there would be 57 Asians, 21 Europeans, 14 North and South Americans, and 8 Africans. Seventy of these “villagers” would be “non-white”. Thirty inhabitants would be Christians. Fifty per cent of their entire wealth would be in the hands of only six people, all of them from the US. Seventy people would be unable to read, fifty would suffer from malnutrition and eighty would live in substandard housing. Only one person would have a college education... Never before has the wealth disparity been so great, and never before has this disparity been equally visible to those at the top and at the bottom of the economic continuum...*”

The main test for human society, as it enters the twenty-first century, is how to use “*the power of technology*” to answer the increasing demands raised by the “*power of population*”. According to one estimation by the World Bank, the total population of the earth may “stabilize” at between 10 and 11 billion in the second part of the twenty-first century, although others put the total as high as 14,5 billion people.

In the related and essential area of the environment, the earth is under a twofold attack from the human beings: the excessive demands and wasteful habits of the populations of developed countries, and the millions of new mouths born in the developing world, who aspire to increase their own consumption and comfort levels. Some experts consider the entire issue as a course against time. In their view, if we do nothing to stabilize the worlds total population and control the damage to the environment, then before long we will pay a heavy price for our collective carelessness.

All those issues, the overpopulation, the destruction or pollution of the earth's environment, and the accelerated consumption of raw materials will have **enormous impacts on the national and international security**. That may be the case for the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean region, where the populations of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are expected to double over the next decades, while those of some European nations have a null or negative replacement fertility. This situation was ironically described by *The Economist* as "*the perfect match*", -the excess of some, fills the lack of others- and it will be the cause of illegal immigration movements that will create, no doubt, heavy tensions and conflicts among the countries of north and south Mediterranean coasts. As population pressures erode forests and other plant habitats, the mankind's reliance upon laboratory biotechnology rather than natural produce, will be every time greater.

To answer the question of "*Why should rich societies care about the fate of distant poor peoples?*" The response is not only because of the prime moral responsibility of men on their brother men, but also because the earth's thin layer of life is entire and interconnected, and the damage inflicted upon the atmosphere by harmful activity in the tropics could have serious effects everywhere. The environmental issue means that for the first time the South can hurt the North, and viceversa.

As we enter the twenty-first century, these trends will most probably increase. The population surge in the developing countries has already advanced on jungles, wetlands and broad grazing regions. The pressure is intensified by further industrialization in Asia and elsewhere: new factories, assembly plants, road systems, airports, and housing complexes not only reduce the amount of natural fertile land, but also contribute to the demand for more energy, more automobiles and trucks, more paper, cement, steel, and so on. All this increases the ecological damage: polluted rivers, dead lakes, smog-covered cities, industrial waste, soil erosion and devastated forests.

Since mid-XX century it has been estimated that the earth has lost nearly one-fifth of its tropical rain forests and some tens of thousands of its plant and animal species. And all this is happening so quickly!! According to an alarmed appeal sent to the American Presidents by García Marquez and other distinguish signatories "*by the year 2000 three-quarters of America's tropical forests may have been felled, and 50% of their species lost forever. What Nature created in the course of millions of years will be destroyed by us in little more than forty years*" . And that prediction may have become true. While the local and national damages produced by acid rain, overgrazing and water depletion are serious enough, the most profound threat -according the ecologist experts- seems to be the "*greenhouse effect*" of global warming, with vast consequences for the earth's entire ecosystem and for the way of life of all rich and poor societies alike.

But, why are all these disturbing "facts and figures" mentioned in a study on security?

THESE TRENDS DO AFFECT SECURITY

At the height of the Cold War, when both the URSS and the US poured billions of dollars each year in defense spending, observers were concerned by the massive diversion of capital to R&D into the arms race. Scientists, engineers and technicians feared the effect upon long term national competitiveness and the world security. At

that time it was easy to argue that threats to one's people were primarily of security and military nature. However, others experts on international trends were pointing out to different causes for concern and to other risks, dangers or threats to security.

Overpopulation in the poorer countries could provoke resource wars, exacerbate ethnic tensions, contribute to social instabilities and fuel external expansionism. A migratory flood from the poorer and more troubled parts of the globe to the richer and more peaceful countries will not only have enormous social costs, but also racial antagonisms. The effects of the population explosion on the ecosystem might threaten national interests. In addition to increasing the risk of resource wars over diminishing stocks of water, grazing land, timber, and the like, environmental damage threaten economic prosperity and public health. Moreover, such damage cuts global food production as world population increases by almost a billion per decade, and could cause a massive global hunger, leading to further social and political instabilities, as well as to resource conflicts and deteriorated relations between the richer and the poorer peoples of the earth.

The nation-state and its traditional security are also potentially affected by the new international connection of labor and production. The logic of the global marketplace pays no attention to where a production is made, but defense planners – with their traditional national security thinking- are concerned by the new situation.

Is it not **vital** for a country –some planners argue- to maintain its **own** electronics and computer industry, to preserve its **own** aerospace know-how and to be able to produce its **own** software for both military and nonmilitary purposes?.

The international financial revolution brings also its own challenges to the assumed sovereignty of the nation. Our now almost borderless world implies a certain cession of a nation's control over its own currency and fiscal policies. That cession might bring prosperity, but if the international financial system is unstable, there is not yet any superior authority to control potential massive currency flows.

Although very different in nature, these various trends -from the global warming of the earth, to the twenty-four hours-a-day trading and financial flows- are mainly transnational and have serious implications for the national security. And moreover, they cannot be met by military force, which was the normal way how states had handled threats to their security up to now.

Certainly, carrier task forces, armored divisions and aircraft squadrons have their uses, but they are unable to prevent the global demographic explosion, stop the greenhouse effect, halt the foreign-exchange dealings, ban automated factories, control biotech farming, stop the nuclear pollution, and so on... While all these factors have an increasing incidence on the stability and security of the populations.

These developments, together with the secondary challenges of international terrorism and drugs illegal traffic, have suggested to some analysts that the attention of governments should be directed to those new dangers to national and international security that are taking the place of the "*old threats*" of nuclear warfare and large-scale conventional war. However, it seems to make more sense to think that these newer threats are coming alongside the older and more traditional threats, rather than replacing them. In fact, there are still thousands of nuclear weapons on this planet, and if attempts

to halt proliferation fail, new states as India and Pakistan –already posers of the “bomb”- will join in the near future the up to now short list of nuclear powers.

Armed forces will continue to be in place to fulfill their mission, if necessary. But this traditional military dimension of security will increasingly co-exist with other nonmilitary issues. For example, the slowing down of the nuclear arms race, now demands attention to two distinct types of threat: how to avoid hundreds of former soviet warheads and missiles from falling into the wrong hands, and how to deal with masses of nuclear waste, which create a most serious hazard.

Thus, in a larger and more integrated sense, “*national security*” becomes increasingly inseparable from “*international security*”, and both assume a much broader definition. Indeed, we may eventually come to agree that a threat to national security means something to the world, if it challenges peoples’ health, economic well-being, social stability and political peace.

The problem with such a wide definition is, however, that it lacks the clarity and the immediacy of a military threat to national security, because when an enemy army is ravaging one’s homeland public opinion is easily mobilized, but when it is question of economic conflict, terrorism, fundamentalism, or nationalism, it is more difficult to convince the public opinion and the politicians to make the necessary sacrifices to meet those threats.

Some two centuries ago, Kant rather optimistic observed that within time, the progress of civilization would finally lead to a peaceful agreement among all men and peoples. Perhaps it will one day. But the evidence at present suggests that we still have a long way to go.

I.2 LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE

It is a common saying that the future is important because it is *there* where we all are going to spend the rest of our lives, and so it is *there* where we focus all our hopes and fears. That is why we try to influence that future, “**our future**”, in any possible favorable way.

Even what we do today is affected by our expectations of tomorrow. But the future should not be viewed as unique, unforeseeable, or inevitable; there are, instead, a multitude of possible futures (idealized as “*scenarios*”) with associated probabilities of realization.

The general perception is that not only society, technology and the environment are changing, but that the changes are accelerating at a rate without precedent. It is recognized that when dealing with the future, specially in the “*soft*” areas, such as those of the social, political or economic sciences, there are no firm laws that could provide the kind of predictions that are associated to physics, chemistry or biology, in which experimentation and repeated tests are possible. Instead, the forecasts on the Social Sciences must rely largely on the predictive power of the experts on the relevant areas.

Some experience in the systematic use of expertise was gained with the development of the **Operations Research Techniques**, -combining mathematics, statistics, probabilities, computers and staff knowledge-, which were used for military purposes during and after W.W.II. Other methods were also developed and employed to help analysts and decision-makers to establish complex defense or economic plans, like the “Delphi technique”, “cross-impact analysis”, “simulation”, “war gaming”, and “scenarios-writing”...

While the complexity of political, social, or economic life, and the rapid rate of change, require a closer examination of the future trends, a new positive factor present today is the intellectual change on the attitude of the decision-makers towards the future, because it is now widely accepted that through proper planning something constructive can and ought to be done about the future.

The usual objection to attempting any analysis on the future in the sphere of international relations, defense and security, is the claim that good prediction is impossible, since the scene is dominated by unforeseeable events, such as a new armament or explosive discovery, the death of a statesman, the outcome of an election, a financial crisis, new alliances, etc. But, when placed in the proper perspective, an analysis of the future is both possible and necessary. It is necessary because, whether we like it or not, whenever long-range plans have to be formulated, a decision – or better, a series of successive decisions- should be taken among some alternative options. It is therefore inappropriate to speak of the future in singular, as something to be discovered. Rather, there are many possible “futures”, and it will be **through proper prospective planning and sound decisions** that the desired objectives could be approached or even reached.

Foreign policy planning, and most precisely planning for a defense and security system, requires to go through a series of successive steps, starting from a) an inventory of current situation –risks, dangers, stability-, then b) the identification of possible future weakness and strength factors, friends, neutrals and possible adversaries, c) a statement of policy in terms of priorities –partnerships, alliances-, d) goals to be achieved in the form of a list of objectives and consequent actions to be taken; e) an assessment of costs –monetary and others- and finally, f) the determination of an optimal program and the sequence of stages to arrive at the desired result, which –in this case- would be **the best possible system of defense and security for Europe in the next century**. (However, the level and extension of this paper, does not permit us to follow the steps described here)

The degree of guaranty attained on the essential or vital European values may be called the “level of European security”, and the increment in its security due to a given action or event, will be a measure of the “security worth” of such an issue. Similarly it is possible to speak of the “military worth” of any factor, resulting in an increase of the “military strength” of the European security.

We can finally conclude that, to think, work, and “plan the future” is a must for the leaders of the nations that want to play an important role in the next century.

I.3 WHAT SCENARIO WILL PREVAIL?

During the long period of the Cold War any conflict in Europe was considered as a potential clash of superpowers' interests. Fearing the extension of local conflicts into a global confrontation, Western states stood by as the Soviet Union suppressed liberation and democratic movements in Central and Eastern Europe, with the Soviet Army "restoring order" in East Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), and Prague (1958).

As the Berlin Wall crumbled and the URSS collapsed, Europe entered in a period of euphoria, in which many policy-makers wished to take profit of the extraordinary convergence around the values of democracy, human rights and collective security, to design and establish a new world order.

Now, at the year 2000, after the long lasting experience of the Cold War and after ten years of reshaping the international political balance, we are sure that *the desired order for the next century cannot be based on **the law of power**, but rather on **the power of law***".

The disappearance of *the old bi-polar order* was a starting point for a number of propositions on how should be that future security system of the XXI century.

President Bush defined the desired world order as founded on the principles of *the rule of law, the peaceful settlement of all disputes, the strength of democracy, the solidarity against aggression, the reduction and control of arsenals, the effectiveness of the United Nations, and a just treatment of all peoples.*

However, the conflicts of last years on the Balkan peninsula, the Caucasus (Chechnya) and elsewhere have shown that such a hope of a new world order based on those principles will not be easily accomplished.

One of most original features of the coming new order is that for the first time in history it will not be the result of a hegemonic war, but for the end of an ideological clash between the free world and the soviet-communist societies. Such a new situation presents, however, the difficulty on how to project trends and build scenarios into the future world power politics.

In fact, experts and analysts have presented a variety of models, theories, images, paradigms, and historical analogies, in an effort to build a credible schema of the future distribution of power. It is not easy to know if the present uni-polar or the futurist -yet undefined system-- will have greater or less stability than what the bi-polar system had. Kissinger wrote that the new world order "*is still in period of gestation, and its final form will not be visible until well into the next century*".

(Along the following pages a close reference will be made to the article titled "Future International Systems" written by Robert E. Harkavy, and published on ORBIS, vol 41, num. 4, Fall 1997, which covers in a very extensive manner the different views on the future world order scenarios)

I.3.i MODELS OF THE FUTURE WORLD POWER

Among the different models or paradigms which their defenders propose as the future schema of world power, it could be considered:

- the “*uni-polar*” system, as a continuation and reinforcement of the present international situation, led by the US.
- the “*clash of civilizations*” paradigm, which may mean the upraising of another culture face to the Western Civilization,
- the widening gap between the rich and the poor countries, between the developed and the developing countries, between the “*zones of peace*” and the “*zones of turmoil*”.
- the “*global village*” situation, in which the sovereignty will shift from the States to the International Governmental (IGO) and Non-governmental Organizations (NGO),
- the “*bi-polar*” model, with the US’s power challenged by any of the big nations or group of nations, as China, Japan, Russia or the European Union.
- and the “*multi-polar*” or balance of power system, following the traditional division of “realists” or “neo-realists” concepts of international relations.

Samuel Huntington has also proposed a world characterized by one or some of the following models: “*One World*”: harmony, “*Two worlds*”: US and the others, “*Two hundred states*”, and finally the “*Fragmented Chaos*”.

I.3.ii. THE “THREE-BLOC” GEO-ECONOMICS MODEL

It seems evident nowadays that the international system is mainly characterized by the crucial determinant of **geo-economics** in the relations of nations or group of nations, in a similar way as were **geo-politics** and **strategy** the fundamental elements of “yesterday” system. At the same time, it seems evident that the **military power** has become less relevant in the context of global competition.

Hence, the “*end of history*” thesis of Fukuyama, based on the fact that the democratic system and the importance of the economy will make that those ideological conflicts that dominated the global stage in most part of XX century, will disappear, - hopefully forever?- to be replaced by economic rivalries. The assumption of this thesis means that modern democratic states with high per capita income will not fight each other, giving thus birth to what Karl Deutsche calls a “*security democratic community*”.

In the center of this “*geo-economics imagery*” as expressed by several analysts is the belief that the world is evolving into three competitive economic blocs, mainly: (1) a Japan-led Pacific Rim region plus Korea, Southeast Asia (and presumably China?); (2) a US-led Western Hemisphere bloc centered on US Canada and Mexico, and potentially incorporating Ibero America; and (3) a German-led European bloc, assumed to include Russia, other ex-soviet nations and some parts of the North African region.

This “*three-bloc*” system is not consistent with the presumed trend toward a global market-interdependence, multinational industries and enterprises, free-flow of investments, etc. However, Lester Thurow predicts that: “*In the race ahead, one of the three great economic powers is apt to pull ahead of the other two. Whichever pulls ahead is apt to stay ahead. That country or region of the globe will own the twenty-first century, in the sense that the UK owned the nineteenth and the US the twentieth century*”. And in the competitive struggle that it is assumed to occur, both Mead and Thurow seem to suspect that **the US-led bloc may ultimately be the weakest and the European bloc the strongest.**

Another vision of the future trends is expressed by Mead, who believes that Europe has more interest in “bloc politics” than in global economy. So, as the former Comecon countries move toward market economy, they may serve as sources of low-wage industries for Europe, similar to the role of Mexico for the US. In such an scenario Europe could import raw materials from these countries, Russia and Africa, and oil from the Middle East and the former URSS.

Thurow concurs that “*while having been the slowest mover in the 1980’s, Europe starts the 1990’s with the strongest position on the world economic chessboard*” and it can become the dominant economic power in the twenty-first century, regardless of what Japan and the US do. As he points out, some 850 million people could come to shape the “**House of Europe**”.

He also thinks that the US will remain the world’s military superpower into the next century, but makes the point that “*to be a double superpower, the US will have to be willing to invest what others invest in being economic superpowers and, on top, make whatever investments are necessary to remain a military superpower*”. It means that to reach the double-leading position, the US will have to shift dramatically from consumption to investment.

Perhaps the most apparent weakness of the “*three-bloc*” thesis is that some of its key assumptions have already been disapproved by events. In effect, during the recent years the US economy has rebounded sharply and has again attained the world’s highest productivity, while at the same time Germany and most of Europe have been afflicted by stagnation and unemployment, because of the inflexibility in the labor market, the social welfare, and the aging population.

By the mid-1990’s forecasters in the Pentagon and some think-tank extrapolating from the China’s own dynamic growth rates, projected the Chinese GNP on a par with that of the US and Japan early in the twenty-first century.

But Joseph Nye has made some basic criticisms to the “*three-bloc*” thesis: a) it runs counter to global trends, b) the concept of blocs is against small nations, that need a global system to defend themselves, and c) finally that it overlooks the security concerns.

I.3.iii. THE “BALANCE OF POWER” MODEL

The defenders of the realist school of international relations believe that the future will not differ too much from the one envisaged by the geoeconomists. According to those scholars, security and power relations –together with the economic competition- always function as the most fundamental determinants of the international systems, and the end of the Cold War will make a return to *multi-polarity* and *balance of power* almost inevitable.

The “**The Economist**” wrote on Jun. 8, 1994 and reiterated on Jan 3, 1998, that the four powers that are likely to define the emerging pattern of the twenty-first century are the US, China, Russia and Europe. The article also proceeded to compare the advantages and disadvantages of all of them in the coming geo-political competition: America was described as strong and resurgent. European power was dubious. Russia’s possibilities of being a superpower again were smaller. So, only China appeared

upwardly moving, with a rapidly growing economy that could be transformed into military power.

The Henry Kissinger's analysis of a new, emerging *balance of power* is similar. He sees a gradual decline of America's relative power. "The US would remain *Primus inter pares* as **"the greatest and most powerful nation, but a nation with peers"**. Kissinger thinks that *"the absence of both an overriding ideological or strategic threat frees nations to pursue foreign policies based on their immediate national interest"*, so that the return to a balance of power schema is the future world system.

Richard Rosecrance questions the formulation of the *"balance of power"* system for the present and future age. He thinks that it gave rise in the past to the world wars of our century, and sees *nuclear deterrence* and *the rule by a central coalition* as alternative mechanisms to regulate the anarchy of the international system. He also warns against the possible revival of Russia, humiliated by its loss of the Cold War, the near-collapse of the economy, and the territorial dismemberment, that could well play the role of a disruptive expansionist.

For its part, China nourishes territorial aims with respect to some of the South China Sea Islands, part of Siberia and perhaps of Kazakhstan, all of which were once in the Chinese orbit. Japan's territorial ambitions do not appear to go beyond the Kurile Islands. But Japan, too, cannot forever repress the legacy of defeat, occupation and condescending treatment of America.

Finally it can be said that given the revisionist potential of Russia and in Asia, **a multi-polar balance of power world might be a dangerous one indeed.**

I.3.iv. THE "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS" MODEL

The idea that has more deeply dominated the scholars' discourse on the future world in recent times has been the **"Clash of Civilizations"** proposed by Samuel P. Huntington: *"..The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic...the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations or group of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future"*

According to the Huntington thesis, the last century' wars that occurred among Western powers were, in fact, *Western civil wars*. What makes the coming age unique is that **henceforth the great conflicts may occur between not within civilizations.**

Huntington identifies seven or eight major civilizations existing today: Western, Confucian or Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African. He focuses on the cultural (or fault) lines of demarcation between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity in Europe, and between the latter and Islam. What he calls *"torn countries"*, like Turkey, -where large populations of different civilizations have to live together-, show the tensions that could erupt between them at any time.

Other lines that contain enough potential for large-scale future conflict include the Arab Islamic and the animist or Christian Africa to the south, and between the Muslim and Hindu civilizations in South Asia. Also, one might interpret potential conflict lines between the US and Japan, or between Western and Confucian civilizations. With the recent conflicts in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and the more recent of Kosovo –and Chechnya- in mind, Huntington predicts that the next world war, -if there is one- will be a war between civilizations.

Among the criticism provoked by Huntington's thesis, **The Economist** pointed out that *"it is striking that the new wave of self-awareness in the Muslim world has not yet produced any serious move towards a merger of the Muslim states"* and that *"in the Orthodox Christian part of the world, the recent tendency has been for things to fall apart, not to come together"* and finally, that *"only in Western Europe is there any ...plan to dissolve existing nation-states into something bigger, and even this European experiment may now be running into the sands"* None of these situations would suggest that the world is *"heading for that fearful sounding clash of civilizations"*, but rather that global alignments would continue to be determined by the play of interests among nation-states of whatever civilization.

I.3.v. THE "US HEGEMONY" MODEL

In contradiction with the already mentioned models of the future international system, there is the notion of a continuing US *uni-polar* dominance. This model was suggested even when the impressive performance of the American military power in Desert Storm had not yet been seen.

Charles Krauthammer's thesis is showed in the following words: *"The most striking feature of the post Cold World is its uni-polarity. No doubt multi-polarity will come in time. Perhaps in another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the US, and the world will resemble the pre-World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will be for decades. "Now is the uni-polar moment"*.

As stated by Huntington: *"In contrast to other countries, the US ranks extraordinarily high in almost all the major sources of national power: population size, education, natural resources, economic development, social cohesion, political stability, military strength, ideological appeal, diplomatic alliances and technological achievement. It is, consequently, able to sustain reverses in any one area while maintaining its overall influence stemming from other sources."*

America's ability to maintain its hegemony will depend to a great extent on the form in which it uses the now widely commented Military Technical Revolution or the Revolution in Military Affairs (MTR/RMA), which was showed initially in the Gulf War. The great leap forward made by the United States in military affairs is the **"System of Systems"**, where space technology, smart weapons, computers and communications are integrated over a wide theatre in which real-time information and commanders' decisions take place in a minimum lapse of time. That is, evidently, well beyond the reach of any competitor today. In sum, the *"uni-polar moment"* may last, but only so long as Russia, Europe, Japan and China are unable or unwilling to contest the high technology warfare pioneered by the United States.

I.3.vi. THE “CHAOS” PARADIGM

The “*zone of peace*” versus the “*zone of turmoil*” dichotomy is one of the possible images of the future world “disorder”, that was popularized by Max Singer in “The Real World Order”, which holds that *“the key to understanding the real world order is to separate the world into two parts, one part of which -the zone of peace, wealth and democracy- includes Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan and the Antipodes, comprising some 15% of the world population, and the other part –the zone of turmoil, war and development- that includes the lands of the former Soviet Empire, and most of Asia, Africa and Latin America.*

The author of this theory of **world order/disorder**, expect permanent tranquility in the first “zone of peace”, because “*a central pillar of the next world system is that modern democracies..do not even seriously imagine the possibility of being at war with one another*”. By comparison, the “zone of turmoil”, poor, overpopulated, disaster-prone, is virtually ungovernable. In the work entitled “The Coming Anarchy”, its author Dr. Kaplan, shows how scarcity, crime, tribalism, overpopulation, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet. The most important points of Kaplan’s work are that the national and international frontiers are being eroded, and that private armies, transnational terrorist groups and drug cartels will increasingly challenge the authority of traditional States and international law.

There is no mention to the possibility of a north-south conflict. The burden of the “*chaos theory*”, rather, is that the wealthy, peaceful nations will increasingly become armed ghettos or camps in the midst of a sea of violent, suffering humanity, unable to help the “zone of turmoil” and ultimately unable to remain unaffected by it. Compared to such a pessimist vision of demographic and ecological collapse, the great power competition would seem beside the point.

I.3.vii. THE “GLOBAL VILLAGE” MODEL

Perhaps the coming age will be the one in which unity –“**The Global Village**”- is finally realized. This is the vision offered by theorists who identify the ongoing advances in telecommunications and data processing as the strongest forces in world affairs. They note that the whole world is adopting the technologies, values, lifestyles and aspirations of the West. They mention **Internet**, stress global interdependence –not only in matters of trade, investments and raw materials-, but also with regard to such global issues as pollution, water shortages, weather and population movements, whose solutions could only be found through global cooperation.

Numerous scientists suggest the evolution toward “global (sectorial) regimes” to govern the nations and peoples behavior in critical areas, such as nuclear proliferation, environment, civil aviation, etc., going in the direction of **a world government**. Others think that the increasing power of multinational corporations are on the verge of transcending the range of nations.

According to Bernet and Cavanagh “*the fundamental political conflict in the opening decades of the new century, we believe, will not be between nations or even between trading blocs, but between the forces of globalization and the territorial based forces of local survival, seeking to preserve and redefine community*”

This image of the future, contrasts with the ones already discussed, like the balance of power, the three-bloc thesis, the clash of civilizations, and even the chaos theory, since in this one the major fault lines lie between those who are part of the new global “**web**”, and those who are not.

I.3.viii. AN “INCIPIENT BI-POLARITY” SITUATION

The eventual possibility of a return to the *bi-polarity* cannot be discounted. A new US-Russian rivalry could result from a reversal of current political trends in Russia and a successful attempt by the latter to reestablish some semblance of the old Soviet Union. Also the bi-polarity US-Japan could happen. But some current analyses announce the Chinese challenge to US hegemony. What is more, a bi-polar bloc system might evolve from the current or anticipated *multi-polar* one as a China-Russia bloc faces a US-Europe combination, or an all-Asia bloc confronts a US-Europe-Russia one, ending so with the hopes of the “Global Village” once for all.

I.3.ix. COULD SEVERAL SYSTEMS COEXIST?

All these proposed models of the emerging international system differ radically but are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it may happen that the forces and tendencies stressed by several models could coexist.

Nye describe a possible image of the distribution of power in world politics on several layers: *“The top military layer is largely Uni.-polar, for there is no other military power comparable to that of the United States. The economic middle layer is tri-polar and has been so for two decades. The bottom layer of transnational interdependence shows a diffusion of power..”*

In relation to this “third layer” of diffused power, multinational corporations continue to grow in both numbers and in total economic power. According to the Wall Street Journal (26th, Sept. 1996) more than half of the 100 largest “economies” of the planet are in fact **corporations**, not countries: General Motors’ sales revenue is larger than Denmark’ GNP; Ford’s is bigger than South Africa’s; and Toyota’s bigger than Norway’s.

In the past few years the literature on US foreign policy “schools of thought” has become diffuse and unpredictable. As Alan Tonelson has summed up: *“In foreign affairs, the old dividing lines between theories are blurring or being ignored, and with good reason... Familiar classifications such as interventionist and aislacionist, hawk and dove, realist and idealist,..(as least as they have been used since the end of W.W.II) no longer make much sense..”*

To the extend that the US resists the temptation to exploit its “*uni-polar moment*” and accepts the ineluctable drift towards a *multi-polar system*, it would presumably try to minimize the risks inherent to such an international system, by pushing the other great powers to embrace diplomacy and avoid coercion. Henry Kissinger accepts the inevitability of such a trend, and recommends that the US should

conduct a subtle but forceful balancing diplomacy to prevent domination by a single power of either Europe or Asia.

Brzezinski, by contrast, seems to agree with the proponents of the “Global Village” model, with a dominant US playing the role of a “catalytic nation” acting as “agent of history”.

I.3.x. WHICH SCENARIO WOULD BE BEST?

It is easier to say which ones will be worse: those of *Fragmented Chaos*, and *The collision between the Hegemon Power and the Challenger of the bi-polar system*, for world’s domination. Both could mean the loss of millions of lives and the destruction of an irrecoverable patrimony of Mankind.

The only scenario acceptable is that which promotes peace, justice and prosperity. The one that proposes the *world governance* presents two advantages: first, it suggests the development of a truly transnational society, advancing to reach a well integrated global society under a reformed and reinforced United Nations, IGOs and NGOs; second, it will be more able to face the complex challenges of the future than any other system which leaves the important world tasks only on the mains of the national governments.

Nevertheless, some “realists” and “neo-realists” theoreticians affirm that world politics still is -and will continue to be for long time- a struggle for power. States are, for them, the only subjects and the main key actors of the international relations, whose only but is to maximize their national interests. On the contrary, some “idealists” and “neo-idealists” maintain that national sovereignty is a deeply eroded myth.

Certainly, a **transnational society** is evolving: Common values, as those of political choice, the rule of law, trust on the free market, and the respect for human rights, are shared by a great majority of mankind, although not always these principles are put into practice. That is why a theory of international relations based on the common nature of all men and women, on their basic rights and needs, will be more useful than pure realism or idealism, to analyze and plan for the future.

I.3.xi. TODAY’S “UNI-MULTI-POLAR” WORLD

Mr. Huntington, -the already mentioned and well-known Professor and Director of the Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at Harvard-, has recently described the present and near world situation as the **Uni-Multi-Polarity**, characterized by the presence on the international stage of the US as the sole leading superpower, -recently called “*the indispensable nation*” by Madeleine K. Albright, and the “*Hyperpower*” by the French Foreign Affairs Minister M. Vedrines-, but who needs to count on some of the Regional Powers to solve important questions and security problems on their respective areas, to maintain world stability and security.

Global politics –according to Mr. Huntington- have moved from the *bi-polar*” system of the Cold War, through a “*uni-polar*” moment highlighted by the Gulf War, to

a “*uni-multi-polar*” structure, which could last for one or two decades, before entering on a truly “*multi-polar*” system in the twenty-first century.

I.4. WILL THE “WEST” LEAD THE WORLD?

One of the most serious –although treated with humor- inspired prospective analysis on the next century’s Balance of Power was published by **The Economist** on January the 3rd 1998.

Although it’s true that nobody can foresee what is going to happen to Big-Power’s politics in the next 30 or 40 years, it is always possible to make a reasonable guess at how power will be redistributed around the world in those decades of the coming century.

The basic ideas of the article are retained in synthesis, although the interpretation and comments do not necessarily coincide with them.

Four questions are supposedly addressed to each one of the main great powers, and their answers suggest, among other things, that **America is unlikely to remain the only superpower for all that long into the 21st century.**

These questions are, in summary:

A) *Will the Great Power’s economy be rich enough to build a military force that could be deployed and used far afield?. (A global military force, including nuclear armory of intercontinental range, large enough and well protected to be reasonably sure of surviving a surprise attack by another nuclear power, plus an expeditionary force of several divisions, which could be swiftly sent to distant parts of the world?.)*

B) *Will the Great Power have a government capable of running a vigorous foreign policy?. (A government that could decide what to do and, if necessary, to use its global military force?)*

C) *Will the Great Power’s people want a muscular foreign policy? (And will they be ready to march behind their leaders?)*

D) *Will the Great Power have some solid and practical reasons for getting involved in what goes on outside its frontiers?. (Might be something out there it badly needs, like oil, gas, food or water for its growing population, or to safeguard the sea lanes for its vital export-import commerce?.)*

Now let’s take these four questions and apply them to the possible Great Power nations or group of nations around the year 2030:

It is highly unlikely that **Africa** south of the Sahara could produce any major power within this period. Perhaps the same is almost certain of **Latin America**. It is probably true even of **India**, whose near a billion population, its growing economy, nuclear capacity and efficient armed forces, are held back however by a weak sense of national identity.

1. That leaves five or six real contenders. Of these, the place that scores highest is, beyond much doubt, **China**.

a) **China's** economy might not be able to maintain its enormous growth rate of the past 15 years, but even at a 5% or 6% growth a year, it would be enough to create a big military power-projection capacity over the next quarter of a century. That means that a Chinese navy could reach into the Pacific, that its Army and Air Force could be capable of putting an expeditionary force onto a foreign battlefield, and that **China's** long range nuclear armory will continue in expansion.

b) **China** will also probably have the sort of government that can use this power.

c) Most Chinese people may want a leading class that stands up for them in the world. A country that has so clear-cut a sense of national identity, with 93% of the population belonging to the same ethnic group, and that has suffered so much humiliation at foreigners' hands, may be ready to march ahead.

d) Finally, **China** whose need for oil and gas will by the next century far exceed its own supplies may look with particular interest at the huge new energy fields of Central Asia, east of the Caspian Sea.

So, **China** scores high on every count.

2. The **Islam**, however, does not count so high. It is true that the forty or more Muslim countries of the world include several ones rich enough to equip themselves with modern armaments, even with nuclear weapons, as is the case of the Islamic Republic of **Pakistan** which has already exploded a A-bomb. It is also true that most Muslims resent what other people have done to them, but so far this does not add up to an "Islamic threat", because they do not have those other features needed for the great power rank, like a central organization that could give them the capacity to work together for a shared purpose, and a decided interest in global policy. *The real danger of the Muslim world, indeed, may not be its unity, but its fragility.*

3. **Russia**, the next contender, even with its economy still a disaster at the beginning of 2000, will one day recover enough wealth to be able to support very strong armed forces. And Russia has clear interests in what happens in China and Central Asia. But it will probably fail other areas. It is by no means clear when or even whether Moscow will have a central government with enough authority to make all regions to agree upon a single foreign policy. And ordinary Russians so far seem uncommonly disinterested about the outside world. Whether Russia will ever really rejoin the superpower's club in a reasonable period remains a doubt.

4. The same is true of **Japan** for different reasons. The Japanese have much of what it takes to be a Great Power. Their military technology and their defense spending are comparable to that of China. Their government generally knows what it wants to do in the world. However, the ordinary Japanese is nowadays reluctant to support any action abroad that looks risky. Japan's main, and practically insoluble problem, is its awkward place on the geopolitical map. It is composed of several small, vulnerable, islands lying between China and America. If the US intends to remain the guardian of the western Pacific, it will not wish Japan to become too strong, because the other Asian countries do not want a strong Japan. But if the US "returns" to its own shores, China

will want a Japan militarily weak, because China desires to become the region main power.

5. That leaves one other contestant to the US's hegemony: the **European Union**. The chief question at the beginning of 2000 is whether Europe and America will remain a foreign-policy strong partnership, or if they will ignore the XX century experiences and go their separate ways.

If they hold together they can be the chief shaper of the 21st century. If they do not, they may end up as merely two of the five or six competitors in the global power contest, which would be a far more dangerous prospect.

Together EU and US:

- A) Have that long military reach.
- B) Their democratic governments have already showed to have the will to pursue essential and righteous goals.
- C) Their peoples do not relish sending soldiers into foreign fields,
- D) The Gulf and Bosnia/Kosovo suggest that EU and US generally act when a human principle or a major interest is under attack. So long as they remember what experiences have taught them in this century, they will be unbeatable.

Separated US and EU, -Europe apart from America-, that suggestive prospect vanishes. The Americans by themselves will still have the means to act, but they will have fewer material interest in the outside world to feel concerned about, and the shock of the break with Europe could push them back to their old dream of hemispheric self-sufficiency.

The Europeans by themselves will have plenty to fear in the world, because they depend on south-west Asia's oil much more than America does, are much closer to the wilder sorts of Islamism, and so far they do not have nor the military equipment, neither the political unity to look after their interests properly.

The transatlantic break would hurt the Americans, but the Europeans even more, because it would affect the way in which Russia reacts to the growing power of China. The stronger China gets, the more Russia will worry about the new giant taking shape alongside remote Siberia. It will probably look to the West for support, both political and military. But if NATO becomes weak or do not give enough attention to Russia, then Russia will have to fall back on the only alternative, which is to rebuilt its own military power, until it is strong enough to cope with China on its own. But a Russian superpower is not the sort of neighbor that Europeans want near them.

There are, to be sure, plenty of uncertainties about the geopolitics of the future: whether biological weapons will join chemical and nuclear ones in the WMD armory, and in what modern war really will consist. But the broad outlines of **the coming world Power-Pattern** are by now decipherable. **It will be a pity if Europe and America shut their eyes to what lies ahead.**

I.5 US & EU: LOOKING TO EACH OTHER

The relations between the US and the EU are without any doubt *the fundamental question which is going to shape the future of the Western Alliance on the 21st century and to exert a decisive influence on the rest of the world.*

Their connections, dealings and contacts are like a “*double way street*”: there is a vision from the American élites on the Europeans, and another different from these about the Americans. Both are equally important because they are going to conform together the international community ahead.

There is however a sharp contrast between the level and number of studies, analysis, articles and declarations from the American side on the European attitudes and thinking, and rather less numerous about the American allies from the institutions and publications of Europe.

It is certainly impossible to summarize in few lines the complex relations and opinions existing between the US-Canada and their seventeen European allies, or with the fifteen members of the EU. Some examples, nevertheless, may serve as an orientation to know the feelings and thinking of the Europeans toward their “hyperpower’s colleges of the other side of the Atlantic, and vice-versa.

The French, the Germans and the British on the European side, and the US and Canada’s officials, Universities and other institutions’ opinions from the other side, will give us a synthetic view of these transatlantic relations so vital for the future.

I.5.i Some ideas expressed from the American side :

One of the best known and talented “think tank” of the US, specialized on political and security studies, is that chaired by Mr. Brzezinski under the sponsorship of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which had published a report on the “**Foreign Policy into the 21st Century: The US Leadership Challenge**”, whose Appendix B: **The United States and Europe**” contains ideas of particular interest, some of which are mentioned or summarized here:

“In Eastern, Central and South-Eastern Europe, the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire have brought back of life a European past that had been left for dead (Bosnia, Chechnya,..) ...

“In short, coming out of the Cold War, the US must continue to assert the role it assumed in the Continent, however reluctantly, after 1945. Europe presents the US with a unique combination of geopolitical, economic, social and cultural interests. After the Cold War, the totality of these interests remain vital to our security. The rapid reemergence of certain conflicts issues underscores the persistence of geopolitics in Europe and, more specifically, the continuing need for a transatlantic security framework that keeps America directly involved in the defense of Europe...”

*“The US and the States of Europe must preserve and strengthen the common political, economic and cultural space created in Europe and across the Atlantic during the Cold War. **This is the challenge of continuity.** But they must expand this space to*

*other States that belong to similar traditions and that are asking membership, now that the Cold War is over. **This is the challenge of change**”...*

*“Moving into the twenty first century, a Treaty between the US (and Canada) and the European Union’ states would be desirable, to confirm the US-EU ties. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the symbolic meaning of such a Treaty would be no less significant than that of the North Atlantic Treaty after WWII. If that Treaty could be signed in April 1999, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Washington Treaty, and on the last year of this century, such Treaty would reaffirm America’s commitment to Europe, in the combined context of intra-European integration, -even wider-, and Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, -even deeper”. This proposal, as we already know, has not taken the form of a **New Treaty** as was suggested by Mr. Brzezinski, but of an effective reinforcement of the liens between EU and US, and the extension of the NATO area to a wider although less defined “Euro-Atlantic region”, by the new Strategic Concept approved at the Washington Summit on the 23/24 April 1999.*

*As a conclusion, the Report affirms that “The job that the US-led NATO set out to do in Europe fifty years ago, is well on their way, but it is only half done. The time that remains from one century to another, and from one millennium to another, is short. It is, however, likely to be decisive. A time for decisions. It must be **a time for leadership.**”*

There is, nevertheless, a clear difference in the prospective thinking of both US and EU: In effect, US has a global strategy which redefines continuously by a “*Bottom Up Review*” process, while the EU has not been until now able to adopt a common foreign policy to give a joint answer to the most important international issues. The recent designation of **Mr. CFSP/ M. PESC** is certainly going to change this situation, but the lack of profound debates about the future roles of the EU contrast with the extensive intellectual formulations in Universities, “think tanks” and institutions of North America.

Recently, (14.01.1999), Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, has written that “*the challenges we face, compared with those by previous generations are harder to categorize, more diverse and quicker to change. But the stakes have not changed*”.

It is difficult, not to say impossible, to conceive Europe’ security isolated from that of North America. Firstly because the dangers, risks and threats that might affect Europe would necessarily be shared in great part by the American allies, and secondly because the isolationism would be a sure cause of the weakening of the most efficient liaison of recent world history.

At the same time, there are places outside Europe where the US and some European States can act together in the protection of their interests, as the Gulf crisis proved, and also in helping to solve conflict and humanitarian situations.

“The US wants and needs a Europe whose economies are growing, whose democratic institutions are solid and whose peoples look to the future with energy, commitment, optimism and self-reliance... A dynamic but stable order in Europe is vital for America”. by D.R.Gress as written in ORBIS n.1 winter 1997.

However, Americans tend to criticize the Europeans for playing down the role of military preparedness and the strategic modernization, while the Europeans censured the American allies for under-valuing the political opportunities offered by the “*détente*” and the “*Ospolitik*”, between Germany and the Eastern bloc since December 1970.

According to published statistics, “*whereas in 1990 a full 41% of US élites saw economic competition from Europe as a critical threat, only 11% thought so in 1995. And, European unification, once feared for the challenge it would pose to American power, is now welcome by 85% of opinion leaders*”. (as appeared in the International Journal n.1 winter 98/99, page. 14).

Mrs. Mary N. Hampton, associated Professor of Political Science at the University of Utah has written: “*When asked a public opinion poll how the Germans perceived the political relationship between the US and Germany, responders answering “good” –as opposed to “bad” or “no answer”- registered a high 92% in 1990, compared with 74% in 1984, 80% in 1988 and 89% in 1989*”, which shows a growing identification in that period of the Germans with the American policy.

I.5.ii. Some opinions from the European side :

“Les États-Unis ont été favorables à la construction européenne aussi longtemps que celle-ci servait le renforcement du bloc occidental face au bloc soviétique. Ils portent à présente sur elle un regard différent...A présent ils ne peuvent accepter que l’Europe ait un rôle qui lui soit propre, au risque de constituer un trouble-fête. Au reste, l’affaire yougoslave les a convaincues de l’incapacité de l’Union à assurer la stabilité de l’Europe elle-même. C’est donc à l’OTAN plus que jamais qu’il incombe de veiller à cette dernière sous leur égide” (propos de l’ancien Ambassadeur de France Francis Gutmann, dans la Revue de Défense Nationale: “Après Madrid.”. page 2)

Walter Leisler Kiep, former leading CDU politician said of the American-German alliance (as read in the “Security Studies revue of Spring 1999): “*In effect, it provides a second Constitution for our country. The values and norms of democracy and trans-Atlantism remain the cornerstone of the German military élite.. They are most supportive of the continual American role in Europe. Events such a as the Berlin Airlift in 1948 and the addresses delivered by the American Presidents at the Berlin Wall helped to tie the German identity to the US.. ”High level support for US-German relations, are a fact.*”

“A poll taken in 1996 revels that the US is the country with which the Germans sought better relations: 92% chose the US, followed by 90% for the French and the British”.

“The fact that the Bush Administration explicitly backed the German Unification in 1989 and 1990, reinforced the positive identity with the US among both the German élites and the public”.

Chancellor Kohl said to James Baker: “*I am filled with a feeling of gratitude. God save America*”

Mr. Hubert Vedrine, French Foreign Minister in an interview at “Libertation” on the 24th November 1999, “avait présenté comme *le fait majeur du monde global actuel le poids prédominant des États-Unis dans tous les domaines, et s’était inquieté de ce phénomène d’hyperpuissance*”.

“L’Europe ne doit se sentir coupable de n’être pas aussi forte militairement que les États-Unis. L’Europe a mieux à faire: développer au contraire et appliquer une conception politique et préventive à opposer à la notion de represi3n comme panacée”

“Europeans and Americans share common strategic concerns: a growing dependence on imported oil, particularly from the Middle East; a common desire to preserve an open-trade system; a vital interest on a global protection against WMD proliferation; and the belief that a transatlantic partnership will eventually yield the greatest benefits.” (writes Jamie P, Shea in Security on 9 July 1999)

“L’anti-américanisme est fonction en France de l’extraordinaire fascination que les États-Unis exercent sur nous.. l’anti-americanisme contemporain est la contrepartie de la pasi3n que nous vouons à ce pays, véritable laboratoire de la modernité”. “Soyons clairs: quelles que soient les divergences qui nous opposent à ella, l’Amérique reste pour moi la garantie de la démocratie en ce fin de siècle” Cela exprime d’après l’écrivain Paul Buckner en “L’Amérique diabolisée” (de la Revue de Politique Internationale du 2 decembre 1999) la perception actuelle d’une certain partie de peuple francais sur les États-Unis.

Finally, it is interesting to mention some lines of the article signed by Mr.Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the EU’s Commision, titled “Partenaires ou Rivaux”: *“En Europe, notre attitude à légard des États-Unis constitue une question strategique primordiale. À mesure que nous construisons l’Union Européenne, que nous la rendons plus forte à travers l’integration interne at plus influente sur le plan international, certains se pose la question suivante: ”notre objectif est-il de faire de l’UE un partenaire plus égal des États-Unis, ou un rival de la puissance et de l’influence américaines?.. Ma reponse est que..s’est un partenariat économique et politique, mais aussi un partenariat de valeurs. Il s’exprime à plusieurs niveaux..dans divers domaines de la politique, dans les échanges militaires y compris l’alliance militaire, et dans la constante evolution entre la UE elle-même et les États-Unis”.*

It’s evident that these few comments can not reflect exactly the state of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. Firstly because it’s a matter in *constant change*, and secondly because there are more than twenty different countries in question. They are only the expression of some general “*ideas-force*” to think about.

II. IN THE SECURITY-INSECURITY CONTINUUM

II.1 THE CHANGING MEANINGS OF SECURITY

The concept of “*national security*”, -which is now so familiar to us-, was the initial response of the Western World to the aggressive penetration of the communist ideology in the nations of the Third World after the WWII. But we consider today that “*national security*” is the peaceful status which enjoys a nation that has a high degree of internal and external stability, allowing the normal development and pursuit of the country’s goals, without threats to its sovereignty or institutions, or damages to persons and properties”.

Security is, in its most general sense, a multidimensional and multinational issue, that covers many areas of the political life of a state and the social life of a nation, while immerse in the international context. National security is influencing and is simultaneously affected by the circumstances of surrounding states and populations.

It is certain that the *conventional* view of security has been closely related to military matters, but it is now giving way to wider notions that cover also the “**non traditional risks**”, such as uncontrolled flows of refugees, trans-border activities of organized crime, illegal traffic of arms, environmental damages, international terrorism, economic crisis, some forms of religious fundamentalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), etc.

The political stability, economic progress and a peaceful change of society are among the main goals of security in both national and international levels. To strengthen those goals it is important to multiply security study centers and to organize conferences, seminars and expert meetings, to discuss those questions that are important to assure social peaceful life. But to reach that goal it is even more important to promote people’s respect of “the rule of law” in the national and international levels by all political and social leaders.

Although the thesis of the “*indivisibility of security*” is particularly attractive, there are as many areas of security as there are social factors in a nation, such as trade, transport, communications, finances, ecology, justice, public health, etc. In all these areas risks to security will have to be signaled, analyzed and reacted upon, to avoid greater deterioration of any situation that could lead to an open crisis.

Certainly, there are now more institutions that take an increasing interest and activity on security issues, because there is a growing conscience of its importance to assure social peace and welfare. So, there are among the European nations -as almost elsewhere- “thinking tanks”, Universities, lobbies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and official institutions, trying to improve security in all possible areas.

The leading official European Center on these matters is the **Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union**, whose works on the analysis of the conflict, the nature of violence, risks and challenges, security parameters, peace and war, etc., have been frequent terms of reference during last decade to all experts and political leaders. The “Chaillot Papers” and other publications are certainly an up-to-date bibliography to lead scholars and professionals into the multiple aspects of security

and defense. This Institute is scheduled to be incorporated into the EU to continue its studies and research on the same line of thinking.

One of the private European security-oriented institutions was established in Copenhagen in 1985, the now called “**Conflict and Peace Research Institute**”, which worked, among others, on a project titled “*Non military aspects of European security*”, whose research initial point was “*how to move security studies beyond a narrow agenda which focuses on military relations between States, while avoiding ending up with an all-embracing inflated concept dealing with all kinds of threats to existence, well-being or development of individuals, social groups, nations and mankind*”.

This School is primarily interested in **European security**, and the study group stressed the “**collective security problematic**”, instead of the national security one.

It is recognized that among the non-military dimensions of security, -mainly political, economic, societal and environmental-, the political one has to be prioritized, because security questions referring to risks, threats or dangers menacing the society, place a heavy challenge to the political capacity of the institutional leaders. Consequently, security problems take priority over other questions and will enter in the political agenda as urgent issues.

But, how could “security” be defined?. An interesting expression was that of Arnold Wolfers (in “*National Security as an ambiguous symbol*”), who wrote: “*In an objective sense, **security** means the absence of threats to acquired values; while in the subjective sense it is the absence of fear that such values will be attacked*”.

There is, however, a controversy on the widening of the security concept, because if it is taken to include all types of threats to the state and society –as mentioned before- it will become impossible to counteract them. However, on the other hand, not to expand it at all, will relegate security matters to a marginal position in the field of military studies.

What had characterized the “**realistic school**” approach to security was that the focus was placed on the state as the *object* of all security, as well as the principal *subject* and *actor* of their international relations theory.

An innovation occurred in the 80’s when the term “**common security**” was coined by Egmon Bahr who made it known through the Palme Commission 1982 Report, in whose view “*the security, and even the existence of the world (this was written at the highest nuclear race period of the Cold World) was recognized as interdependent*”. The logical conclusion was that security could only be attained by **common action**.

Other references to common security –as “cooperative security”, “mutual security”, etc.,- were made in the direction of the abandonment of competition, confrontation and conflict, in favor of enhancing dialogue, confidence and cooperation. An extension of the traditional concept, which is now gaining the attention of scholars and experts, is the idea of “**collective security**”, which appears to be more precise than “common security”, because it envisages a transfer of power and responsibility from the state to certain international authorities, implying a partial shifting of sovereignty from the state to other spheres.

Moreover, to the extent that the UN's forces –military, police and humanitarian- are not merely employed to restore peace **between** states, but also **within** states, and to safeguard human rights in them, the UN's intervention points towards a **‘new world order’**, no longer based on the absolute sovereignty of the state, but on a new situation of *“domestic politics on a global scale”* (Weltinnenpolitik), in which any humanitarian intervention in case of a massacre of population could take priority –under certain conditions- over the inviolability of the state's frontiers. To the extent that such interventions can be legitimated by promoting security, is it not the traditional concept of national security which is questioned?.

II.1.i. THE FIVE DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

As mentioned before, the **“realistic school”** of international relations has traditionally considered the **state** as the main or even the sole object of security and, to a certain extent, has neglected the people –as individuals or collectivities- whose well-being and survival ought to be, in any case, the final aim of all security's concerns and efforts. Whether security ought to be considered mainly at the **state level**, or at **societal level**, there are five dimensions on it which should be considered. Leaving the essential **military security** aside (for the moment), the *political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions*, are the main components of **collective security**.

In fact, the Rome Declaration on November 1991, NATO officially committed itself to. *“ a broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defense dimension ..”*

There are also different levels towards which is security has to be oriented: At the **state level** it is the sovereignty and power that matters, while at the societal or **collectivity level** it is the identity of common culture, ideology, or civilization that must be secured, and finally at the **individual level** it is the person welfare and survival which is the goal.

A). In the **Political dimension** there are two different aspects to be considered: the relation of the state with its citizens, and/or the state's rapports with the international community. During the long period of the Cold War, the ideological confrontation between the two incompatible systems of capitalism and democracy against communism and totalitarianism, showed the importance of the political dimension of security, not only by the needed union at the interior of each system of allied nations, but also by the internal political strength – loyalty and fidelity- of their own societies among themselves.

Few people would now contest the notion that democracy is a powerful antidote to aggression. Therefore, it could be affirmed that democratic societies form a community of free peoples that may lead other peoples and nations towards a more peaceful and rightful mankind.

As a result of *“the Western values of democracy, pluralism and market economy”* – (“the end of the history”, according to Fukuyama?), the rest of the world has a model to refer to, although it would not be wise to try to suggest or even to force an identical ensemble of *“Western democratic standards”* to other countries.

In any case, the increase on the degree of stability and security world-wide, will go pair with the extension of the dialogue, comprehension, cooperation and respect of human rights among the different states, peoples and cultures.

B) The **Economic dimension** may also be considered in two different aspects: As the main base of the military-industrial power of the state; or as a power in itself, because it constitutes a protective force and a latent threat to eventual adversaries. That was the case during the last part of the Cold War, when the “*economic warfare*” became a successful substitute to the use of military force against the Communist Bloc. Among the means traditionally used for the state to increase its economic security were the self-sufficiency, the diversification of productions, and a wider market. Nowadays, economic security is mainly increased as well by being a member of a great economic community, as are the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, etc..

C) The **Societal dimension** of security might be understood differently according to the pursued aim: If it is the individual, the citizen, the person, who really matters, the security will be oriented towards its well-being and survival. The state in this case is only a means, but never an end in itself. However, if it is the whole collectivity the but, then it could be defined as “*the ability of a society to persist on its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats*”.(Waver, Ole : “Societal Security: The concept”). Most of the risks that menace today the collectivity, like uncontrolled migrations, terrorist actions of nationalist, ethnic or religious fundamentalist movements, drugs smuggling, lack of essential resources, etc. are in fact aggressions against the society, which consequently has to take decided action against all these threats.

D) The **Environmental dimension** of security can be considered under three different aspects: a) As the consequences of unpredictable disasters caused either by natural elements or by war –like the “nuclear winter” resulting from an even small-scale nuclear war; b) As the critical scarcity of vital resources -water, food, energy- that could be provoked by a conflict, with deteriorating consequences for people and the environment. c) finally, As the dramatic effects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), that would kill and contaminate large populations and immense extensions of territory, water or air for a long time.

E) The **Military dimension** of security is, without any doubt, the most important and even the essential guarantee to the survival of a country and his society. To analyze its different aspects will be dedicated most of the following pages.

The military security is based upon a strong sense of the national community and more particularly on the moral and professional capacity of the militarymen and on the quality and quantity of the armament and materiel of the armed forces, designed, manned, organized, trained and equipped to deter aggression and, if necessary, to defeat any enemy forces..

The first contribution of the military instrument to security is not action, but prevention, because the only existence or presence of powerful armed forces, backed by the widely known politicians’ will to employ them without hesitation to defend the country’s vital interests, could serve to deter any hostile threat or action.

All along the evolution of a conflict, the armed forces play an increasing role. First, by following with its intelligence and information services, the growing tension or dangers. Then, by making visible the force in place or its potential deployment or projection. And finally, if prevention fails, by fully using the powerful military means to defeat the enemy and restore the previous situation, back to normal.

In Europe, and taking into consideration the possible W.M.D. scenario, this previous schema has to be shared and supported by the rest of the allied countries, because in our present and future time it will only be possible by joint action to confront the risks ahead

That is also why Preventive Security has to be based on a minimum but essential set of premises, as fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands, more democracies in more countries, more respect for human rights, more “rule of law”, more political stability, more free market’s economies and more institutions and organizations playing greater role on security issues.

It seems evident the interdependence of all those five security dimensions - already mentioned- as well as their multiplying effect. Effectively, for example, a strong emphasis on military security, will put a great strain on the economy of the country, which at the same time will tend to undermine its economic security. In a similar way, economic problems may cause political instability and the neglecting of urgent ecological measures. Also, in many cases, political instability will tend to divert public opinion towards external foes, which may lead to further militarization, or even to provoke an international crisis.

As a summary, the Alliance Strategic Concept formulated on the 23-24th April 1999 in Washington affirms that “23. *The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, societal and environmental factors, in addition to the indispensable defense dimension*”

II.1.ii. A MULTI—DIMENSIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

As the previous reasoning shows, there is a need for a comprehensive approach to security, that could serve as a guideline for a **multi-dimensional security strategy**. The first political-military thinking on security at a large pan-European level was formulated in the 70’s by the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE), improved during the following years, and later courageously innovated by Gorbachev’s “*Perestroika*” with the idea of “*the common house*”, and by the U.S. Presidents, George Bush and Bill Clinton, with new friendly gestures, as “*the extension of NATO’s hand in friendship to former foes*” at the London Declaration.

That regional way of thinking was behind the decision to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC), in order to provide all 44 countries of that area with an overarching framework for expanded political relations and close practical cooperation, as was expressed by “*our commitment to consultation, partnership and practical cooperation through EAPC and PFP (Partnership for Peace)*”

On this line, the Washington Summit Communiqué of 24th April 99, states that one of the allied fundamental tasks is “**Security**: *to provide one of the indispensable*

foundations for a stable “Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other “through the threat or use of force....”.

Finally, the new thinking on security that express the ideas of many nations, and that will probably last for many decades of the next century, could be summarized as: ***“a positive attitude towards interdependence; a new awareness on the global problems and the shared responsibility of all states to solve them; a new military strategy which gives priority to war prevention over war fighting; the superiority of political cooperation over any type of confrontation; and the priority of the defense of human rights over other political traditional rights”.***

II.1.iii. THE “SHELTERS” OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Several International Governmental Organizations (IGO) have as their main responsibility the security of Europe, or at least of a part of the Continent, while many other Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) have also among their purposes to establish or preserve favorable conditions to the normal development of social life in certain areas of Europe.

A) THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is the unique, global, Security Institution, formed by all States of the international community, whose main aim is written down in the *first* line of the *first* paragraph of the *first* article of the Charter, which reads: “The purposes of the United Nations are: **1.To maintain international peace and security**, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace...”

For that purpose the UN has been working during more than half a century, with a variable fortune, as the idea of a global order in which international institutions led by the UN could set up a permanent peace has not yet succeeded, partly because it lacked the great powers’ full cooperation and because many nations have not always been ready to risk lives and to employ expensive resources to strengthen security and maintain peace in their regions.

But “*there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict*” according to **Kofi Annan’s 1999 Report**. However, armed conflicts have broke out or erupted anew in many places. Moreover, the impact of the last wars on civilian populations has worsened because internal struggles, -now the most frequent type of conflict-, generally take a heavier toll on civilians than inter-State wars, because combatants increasingly made the targeting of non-combatant people a strategic objective.

If, until now the most common action of the international community lead by the UN Security Council to solve a conflict was the suppression of the aggression acts or other breaches to peace, from now on the accent is going to be placed on the strategies and means capable of **preventing the situations** and circumstances before they escalate into aggressions. For that purpose, the use of **preventive diplomacy, preventive**

deployment and preventive disarmament may be the “weapons” of the future UN actions.

Long-term prevention strategies designed to address the root causes of a conflict are seeking to avoid situations from mounting into high tension or crisis, by using the useful diplomatic tools of **mediation, conciliation, and negotiation**. In a word, by using non coercive, low key and diplomatic approach to restore a difficult situation back to normal.

Early warning is also an essential component of preventive strategies. In this area, NGOs may play an important role, as they are fully in contact with the social realities of a country, -human rights, economic or political | worsening situations-, that are usually at the origin of a conflict.

Complementing preventive diplomacy are preventive deployment and preventive disarmament. Like peacekeeping, preventive deployment is intended to provide a “*thin blue line*” of blue UN’s helmets, to help contain tensions between highly polarized communities. Preventive disarmament seeks to reduce the number of small arms and light weapons in conflict bound areas. Eliminating yesterday’s weapons prevents their being used in tomorrow’s conflicts.

It must again be mentioned that the overwhelming majority of today’s armed conflicts take place within -not between- states. So, according to the UN Secretary General, “*it makes good security sense in many cases, to shift some of the resources allocated to expensive external defense programs, to relatively low cost initiatives that enhance human –and hence national- security*”

Collective Security in the international system is, of course, the responsibility of the UN Security Council, so to respond to crisis and emergencies will always be a major focus of its activity. “*Yet - says the UN Secretary General- (until now) reaction, not prevention, has been the dominant approach of the Security Council to dealing with conflict. Today no one disputes that prevention is better and cheaper than reacting to crisis after the fact*”...“*The transition –he continues- from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention will not be easy,.. but the difficulty does not make it any less imperative*”.

Conflict prevention policies are reinforced with what is usually called “*good governance*”, as promoting the rule of law, tolerance of minorities and opposition groups, transparent political processes, independent judiciary, impartial police force, military that is strictly subject to civilian control, and free elections. But above all, it should mean respect for human rights.

As a summary, there might be mentioned two propositions that resume all these elements of good governance: First, the so called “*democratic peace thesis*”, according to which “*democracies rarely go to war against each other*”, and second, that “*democracies have low levels of internal violence, as compared with the non-democratic systems*”.

Although the first thesis is still a subject of debate among politicians and experts, because of the different meanings of democracy across time and geography, the

second one is more widely accepted, as *“democracy is a non-violence form of internal conflict resolution”*.

The way to democracy may lead, thus, to a better, more peaceful and more secure world.

B) THE REGIONALIZATION OF SECURITY

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows in (Art. 52) *“the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security...provided that their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN.”*, although art. 53 says that: *“no enforcement action shall be taken ...without the authorization of the Security Council”*.

According to these principles, during the 90's Regional Organizations have played an increasingly active role in regional security. It is true that the relationship between the UN and Regional Organizations is complex, fruitful, but sometimes difficult, although it has permitted the emergence of some lessons from recent experience. Mainly that: a) it is imperative that regional security operations be mandated by the Security Council, if the legal basis of the international law and security system is to be maintained; and b) that today's complex humanitarian emergencies require equally complex multidisciplinary responses, which only the UN has the qualifications and experience to provide, or coordinate..

A fundamental principle of common International Law has been up to now the identical sovereignty of all states, independently of their territorial dimension, population or force. The states are the basic subjects of the political and juridical relations on the international scene. That means that there is no superior authority to that of the state, that nobody has the right to intervene on the internal affairs of a state and that no legal use of force could be contemplated against the will of the state. All these principles were well established and accepted up to the last years of the century, as part of the “traditional international law”. But, do they continue to be valid?

Thus, the controversy if a state or group of states could intervene against the will of another state to help its population in case of genocide, massive exodus or great distress, *on the name of the moral superiority of the human rights to be defended by the international community* over other considerations, has been at the base of the last events in the Balkans, Rwanda and more recently in Eastern Timor *“In Kosovo –says Kofi Annan- a group of States intervened without seeking the authority of the UN Security Council. In Timor the Council has been authorized intervention, but only after obtaining invitation from Indonesia”*, but due to the retard *“many hundred, probably thousands of innocent people have perished..”* *“Neither of these precedents is satisfactory as a model for a new millennium”*.

Certainly the state's sovereignty needs to be redefined, as it is now considered that **the state is the fundamental instrument at the service of its people, and not vice-versa**

This decision to take military action by Regional Organizations without Security Council approval is rarely conceivable and critical, but it could be only in case of Security Council's lack of decision to act, and in base of the UN Res.377, called

“Uniting for Peace”, and when affirmatively voted by a majority of two-thirds of the General Assembly.

C) THE PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY CHART

“The security of Europe and of that of North America are indivisible”
(The Alliance Strategic Concept 23.04.1999)

The Alliance has dedicated much of its recent Strategic Formulation to security:

26. *“Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance’s contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, and the contribution of these other international organizations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crisis”.*

This statement is part of the official strategic formulation of the Alliance in security matters, whose zone of influence now expands to cover a wider region, although rather undefined. At the interior of this vast space there are other Institutions that have security as their main purpose or responsibility. They are, as it is well known, NATO, EU/WEU, and OSCE. Other institutions, with similar aim and coverage but without a established structure are the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP). There are also other Organizations of sub-regional level, indirectly related with security questions, as will be mentioned later.

We could certainly say that no other region of the world is so repeatedly covered by security Organizations as Europe, where so many joint their efforts to avoid any new war-like adventures, as those that made the European’s landscape the place of devastating wars, tragedies and sorrow, during great part of this century.

At the base of those security-oriented Organizations there is one whose but is not “conflict avoidance”, but instead to promote a type of democratic society in which the “rule of law” and “the human rights respect” could be the sure base of a European peaceful society: This is The Council of Europe, which forms the common social structure of the European societies over which has been possible to build a free society,.

D) SUB-REGIONAL EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS

As well as the Regional Organizations whose aim is the European’s security, already mentioned (and which will be treated later in great detail), there are other Organizations of different nature, purpose, and membership, but whose existence is favorable to improve the peaceful relations, stability and security on the Continent. They are, mainly:

- 1) **The Nordic Council**, founded in 1952, with siege in Stockholm, which groups five States (Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland and Sweden)
- 2) **The Council of the Baltic Sea States**, created in 1992, which groups Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Finland, Poland, Sweden, Iceland and Russia.
- 3) **The Economic Cooperation of the Black Sea**, established in 1992, which counts eleven member, plus two observers.

- 4) **The Visegrad group**, created in 1992, by the Check Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland.
- 5) **The South-East European Cooperation Initiative**, set up in 1996, by the US, with Albania, Bosnia-H, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldavia, Rumania and Turkey.
- 6) **The Community of Independent States (CIS)**, established in 1991 by Russia, which at the end of 1998 grouped all ex-URSS Republics, except the Baltic States.
- 7) And, at the south-eastern limits of the Continent, **The Organization of Central Asia**, created in 1985 by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, which since 1992 groups also the six Muslim ex-URRS Republics.

It seems evident that all these Institutions cooper in different measure to strengthen political liens, as well as other type of relations among the member countries, aiding so to the stability and security of the whole European region .

II.2. THE EUROPEAN INSECURITY AREAS

Although the “security-insecurity” dilemma is a continuum along the two dimensions of time and space, there is a certain persistency directly related to the geographical area under study. Accordingly, and only for analytical purposes, the European region can be differentiated in several zones, which maintain through time some instability characteristics.

These zones are the Mediterranean, the Central-East, the Baltic, the Balkans, and the South-Eastern Europe.

The Middle East, Russia and China are also matter of deep concern, but merit a separate consideration.

It seems evident that “the West” forms the base of the “**security community**” of Europe. The Western countries are united in the strongest political and military alliances of NATO and WEU, are members of the OSCE, and are also part of the political, economic and social European Union. All these essential bonds mean that they enjoy the highest possible level of security for any nation, and that are well prepared to face any external threat or danger that could challenge their security, stability, or well-being.

However, face to “*non-traditional*” risks, such as the illegal flows of refugees, international terrorism, uncontrolled arms traffic, drugs, fundamentalism, transnational environmental damages, shortage of raw materials, etc., and those represented by the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) the Western countries will have to keep *alert and ready to react in time and in solidarity*.

Hereunder are summarily commented some very basic concepts that will help to identify the security-insecurity situation of the neighboring European areas.

II.2.i. THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN

The first remark on the countries of the southern Mediterranean coast -mainly Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and to a certain extent, Mauritania, and even Egypt at the most south-eastern coast- is that they do not have a common or similar Defense or Security policy, but instead that they are mainly oriented toward the internal stability of their own society. Nevertheless, it seems that they evolve toward some security concepts that could be shared by the northern Mediterranean countries, particularly Spain, France and Italy.

However, the difference of culture, religion, GNPs and demography between the countries of both coasts –north and south-, is a matter of long term concern for the European nations.

It would be desirable for the security in that area, that the Magreb countries could overcome the economic and social crisis that they suffer, in different degrees, since long date, and that are due in part to their imperfect democratic systems. It seems that the educated and influent minorities of those countries have three different poles of attraction: the nostalgia of the Marxist ideology, the seduction for the occidental way of live, and the return to the fundamentals of their Islamic beliefs. That is at the base of their unstable political and social situation..

It is well known that the Mediterranean region has traditionally been one of the world's most conflict-tendency areas and has, in consequence, been subject to a number of initiatives to reduce its conflict potential. Since the end of the Cold War, this sea has often been considered Europe's strategic backwater. A region where the Alliance might be likely to face new challenges. In fact, NATO leaders meeting at the Washington Summit in April 1999, recognized that the Mediterranean Dialogue –initially launched in 1994 and currently involving six countries –Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia- is an integral part of the Alliance's approach to cooperative security. In 1999 two Major NATO Commands had organized 49 military activities with participation by these countries, including observation of PFP activities in the field of search and rescue, exercises related to peace support and humanitarian relief. It is worth mention that Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have participated in the IFOR, and the subsequent SFOR to secure peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is also worth mentioning that at Valencia (Spain) it was organized in the 24-25 February 1999, a Conference on "*The Mediterranean Dialogue and the new NATO*", where it was discussed among the Ambassadors of NATO and the six Mediterranean partner countries the way ahead toward a greater integration among the allies and their partners.

This NATO Dialogue complements other international efforts in the region, mainly the European Union Barcelona Process, the Middle East Peace Process, the Mediterranean Initiatives of the Western European Union, and the contributions to the security in the area of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

While the focused attention of the Alliance is now clearly oriented to the Central and East European enlargement, and while the Balkans conflict remain for NATO a top priority, the allies efforts should be complemented by a greater outreach to the south, to manage the challenges ahead.

The question, not yet solved, of the *Western Sahara self determination* is a matter of permanent tension, as it can give origin to an open conflict between Algeria and Morocco, with further implications in the Magreb region. In relation to the Spanish towns of Ceuta and Melilla, situated on the north-western African coast sometimes claimed by Morocco, they should not be cause of any conflict, as they have been under the Spanish Crown for almost five hundred years, long before the present Alahuita Monarchy was established in Rabat or Fez..

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative marks a shift in the EU policy from the bilateral economic approach to a multilateral type of cooperation. It should be mentioned that about two thirds of the economic activity of the Magreb countries are directed to and from Europe, a 30% is internal to each country, and only about the 3% takes place among them. The importance of the gas and oil reserves of the central-northern African zone, can not be overestimated for the economic life of the European countries.

The European interest on the political stability of the area may be proved by its willingness to favor its economic, social and political development, as was shown by the Barcelona Conference, *where all Mediterranean nations –south, north and east- were present* and decided measures for a co-ordinate way ahead..

The WEU had similarly set up a Specific Group for the Mediterranean activities, to follow the dialogue initiated with the six non-WEU Mediterranean partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. That Group ensures that its work is co-ordinate with that carried out in NATO.

For its part, OSCE maintains close relations with six Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, which usually take part, with some others in seminars, related mainly to the Confidence Building Measures, the Security Model for the Twenty-first Century, the Human Dimension of Security, the promotion of Democracy, etc.

At the same time, the EU is considering certain proposals to approach these Mediterranean countries to the Union, even to contemplate their adhesion to it.

All the attention that the main European Organizations NATO, WEU, OSCE and EU are consecrating to the southern and east coast of the Mediterranean, should give as a result a zone of peace and prosperity durable at the arrival of the third Millennium.

II.2.ii. THE EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Being part of the Soviet-Union “*outer empire*” until only a few years ago, three countries of Central Europe -Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary- are since march the 12th, 1999- full members of NATO, while the rest of the nations of the region –those long time known as “PECOS”- are candidates to become part to the Alliance in the near future. Remarkably, this transformation has occurred without any political pressure or exterior danger. After a short period maintaining a neutral attitude, their rapid reorientation toward the West has been a sort of compensation for almost fifty years under the Soviet Union domination.

This East-Central European zone is not homogeneous, as it is not the rate of progress of those countries toward the formation of “a pan-European security architecture” under NATO, WEU and OSCE, which could fill during the 21st Century the traditional “*security vacuum*” that has been a permanent cause of instability in that “*gray zone*” of Europe.

Their partnership to the EAPC and the FPF allows a framework for dialogue and cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries in this area. The EAPC is basically an inter-governmental forum for regular consultation and cooperation between them and the nineteen NATO countries, and the PAP covers a wide range of defense-related activities, including air defense, communications, crisis management, democratic control of defense structures, defense planning and budgeting, military training and exercises, peacekeeping and logistics, etc. Thus, a preventive knowledge of any tense situation could avoid further deterioration of the stability and security of the region.

II.2.iii. THE BALTIC STATES

The three Baltic States -Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia- have reasons to be concerned about their security. Their geo-strategic vulnerability, low military potential, and the presence of important Russian minorities, give serious ground for being subjects to the external influence and pressure from Russia.

Their declared desire to join the Western Security systems had initially provoked a severe reaction from Moscow, because the Russian access to the Baltic Sea and to the isolated province of Kaliningrad are of great importance for Russia. Excellent preventive diplomacy efforts have given for result a steady reinforcement of the stability in the region.

A positive step to reduce tensions would be the development or reinforcement of a regional cooperation, as was the creation in 1992 of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which groups eleven riparian countries, including four NATO members and Russia. Also the Nordic Council set up forty years before by five Nordic countries and counting three NATO members, serves to give stability and security to the Baltic area. All that is a clear demonstration that the West interests in the area are not against those of Russia, but of friendship and cooperation.

II.2.iv. THE BALKANS

It seems evident that in terms of security the most unstable zone of Europe is the Balkans, and will most probably continue to be so at the beginning of the next century. The war in former Yugoslavia has showed the high conflict potential of combining extreme nationalism feelings, historic hatred and religious antagonism. The future of the region is certainly unclear, because forced migration of entire populations suppose the added danger of spilling the conflict over the neighboring countries.

It should be stressed the fact that it has been here, for the first time in its fifty years of existence from March the 24th, 1999, where NATO had used its weapons to

impose the reason of the force, as it was impossible to convince the Yugoslav leaders of the force of the reason to respect the lives and human rights of the Kosovar people.

Precisely because the long date unstable equilibrium of the zone has been one more time destroyed, causing ancient claims to surface, and new ones to appear as a consequence of recent wars, no country of the region can feel secure now. This situation could spiral, at any time, into new and more deadly military confrontations, despite United Nations, OSCE, WEU/EU and NATO efforts. Particularly affected by the future events seems to be the state of Montenegro –a federate member of the Servian Republic- and even the FR of Macedonia.

II.2.v. THE SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Greece and Turkey, two NATO and WEU (Turkey associate) members, and also OSCE, EAPC and FPF partners, appeared however to have entered a prolonged phase of differences over territorial waters, air space over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. That places the zone in a state of almost permanent unstable situation. Turkey feels not only its growing isolation from Europe, but even more the negative consequences for its political and economical development, while at the same time continues to be a strong pillar for the West interests on the Near East region. However, these two countries are *condemned* not only to be allies but also become friends. Their interest and the interest of Europe and of the Atlantic Alliance is signaling strongly in this direction.

Against this background, Greece appears to be interested in seeking its closeness with other partners, particularly with Russia, which maintains political differences with Turkey.

Given the fact that permanent instability is one of the characteristics of the South-Eastern region in terms of security, it will be necessary to apply diplomatic efforts to fully incorporate Turkey in the whole political and economic European and Western organizations, to increase the security on the region..

II.2.vi. THE EVOLVING SECURITY SITUATION.

The definition, for analysis purpose, of five security areas in Europe is an oversimplification of the real world of tensions, risks, threats and movements that are already present or that may appear on different areas of the Continent. There are also overlaps among them, as it is the case for Russia, Kaliningrad and the Baltic states, or of Greece and Turkey with the Balkans. There are also certain actual or forecasted shifts, as Slovenia moving toward Central Europe, and Bulgaria and Romania approaching Western Europe, etc. In a certain way, all areas have a *transitional security character*, that may evolve in a near future into something different from the present security geometry.

The three Central Region members recently integrated in the Western Defense architecture, mean that the adaptation to *new concepts of security based on an efficient partnership*, is a strong dynamic movement that shakes all nations of the European continent and its “near abroad”..

The NATO, WEU/EU and OSCE clearly operate now as the most important security and political structures in and for Europe. However, the perceived domination of the whole zone by the Western powers is a matter of serious concern for Moscow, which considers unacceptable that Russia could be absent from the important decisions on the European political and security issues. That is why the controversial question of NATO enlargement is presented as related more directly to the evolving political organization of Europe, rather than a simple question of security.

II.3. THE MIDDLE EAST: A MULTI-CONFLICT AREA

Although Israel geographically belongs to the Mediterranean area, from the geopolitical point of view it has to be considered mainly as part of the Middle East convulse region.

Surrounded by hostile Arab countries, Israel has lived half a century in a permanent conflict since the 14th of May 1948, when the Israeli state declared itself independent and was established on a land that belonged to the Palestinian people.

It is difficult to go through the endless series of agreements, disagreements, peace conferences, crisis, wars and UN' unfulfilled resolutions, that have marked the recent history of the region. A realistic perspective of the future does not permit to contemplate a prompt, just and durable end of that conflict, as it is only part of a deeper confrontation of historical, cultural and religious nature between the Juif and Arab communities in the Middle East, with the enormous oil and gas reserves as a background, and with the European nations in a continuous longing of energy to maintain its industrial growing needs.

For the time being, serious political and socioeconomic difficulties may continue to afflict many Middle East Arab states, which are failing the challenge of development. Bad governments are the principal breeding ground for Islamist extremism, as they have not been able to provide stable patterns of social and economic improvements. Some of those governments have also failed to rationalize essential public services, and many are corrupt or nepotistic. At the same time, demography has created a rapidly growing youthful population, with poor employment and career perspectives. Net demography growth often exceeds the three per cent annually, so that population pressure together with chronic mismanagement have exacerbated internal social tensions in South Arabia and in other Gulf states.

The most visible result of these problems is Islamic extremism. Just as the proposed model of "Arab socialism" has been discredited by the real world, a new source of radicalism has become its substitute to fill the political and ideological vacuum. But a radical Islam is not a solution to the problems that divide the Middle East region and cripple its development.

At the same time, the extremist attitude of some ultra nationalist parties of Israel toward the Palestinian people and the permanent failure to comply with the UN Resolutions are causes of the high state of tension in the region.

II.3.i. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE REGION

Weapons proliferation and militarism are also region-wide security problems. Conventional arms transfers from Russia, China, North Korea, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and elsewhere continue to pour into the region. Although some transfers of light arms to moderate states could contribute to regional stability, the selling of long range missiles, strike aircraft, and mainly dual-use of nuclear, chemical and biological warfare technologies to radical regimes are a source of future grave conflicts.

Naturally, the question of Israel nuclear capability has become a high profile issue, as frequently presented by various Arab governments, especially Egypt. It is certainly going to remain a major question in arms control negotiations and in the efforts to improve the effectiveness of the NPT. But at the same time, Syria's acquisition of modern weapons, and the threat of proliferation of WMDs in Iran and Iraq, makes more difficult for Israel to give up its nuclear capability.

It is clear that the stability in the region is of direct interest to the Western states, so that these must encourage the political and economic reforms thorough the region. But Iran continues to build up its capability to threaten naval and tanker movements through the Gulf, and to use its military capabilities as a means of political pressure onto its southern neighbors. At the same time, Iran's development of fissile nuclear technology could lead to build a nuclear weapon in a short time.

Iraq continues to pose a danger, not only to its neighbor countries but also to its own population, mainly the Kurds and marsh Arabs. It permanent strives to get a preeminent place among the Arab countries, as it considers that a strong conventional and WMD arsenal could be the best tool for that purpose.

In summary, the West and particularly the EU has a vital interest in the peace and stability on the region, which requires a permanent effort to stop the proliferation of WMD and to change the behavior of the regimes of Iraq and Iran, by mainly making them, as well Israel and the other states of the area, to comply with the compulsory UN resolutions as the best means to institute a durable peace and prosperity in the Middle East.

II.4. PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS ON RUSSIAN FUTURE

(Some strategic thinking on Russia, as seen from the West)

Last generations of Russians had been raised on the belief that they were the privileged people of an exceptional nation. However, they have not had recent democratic experience, no *"rule of law"*, no real history of true Parliaments, or separation of powers. They were not familiar with individual property rights, free press or civic society. But they are demonstrating now that they have an extraordinary ability to endure all types of difficulties.

For the Russian's diplomatic and defense leaders the shock of change must have been even more dramatic than for common people. Although these leaders – starting with the era Gorbachev- recognized the need for a change at the mid eighties, they had expected to be able to modernize the country while retaining their nation's

great power status. However, in a few years, they saw their immense country split, and their government, economic system and much of its territory in crisis. And this tremendous change took place without any battle: *just took place*.

Even though the Russian future is uncertain, its possibilities are evaluated with deep respect. Russia is a land of great potential. Its people are highly educated. It enjoys vast natural reserves. And, above all, it has a long tradition of rising above calamities of man and nature, and of being capable of exerting great influence over the peoples of Europe and Asia.

II.4.i. POSSIBLE STRATEGIC SCENARIOS

It will not easy to describe with any reasonable degree of reliability what is going to happen in Russia during the coming decades. But for the purposes of this analysis, however, it would be useful to consider **three different scenarios** whose probabilities are very difficult to evaluate.

1) Mixed Up Reforms

The first scenario is the tendency of Russia to continue muddling through the reform process, eventually developing a relative stable market economy and a democratic society. Nevertheless, the rampant crime, the great disparities between the few rich and the great mass of poor Russians, the collapse of the health care system, the war on its own territory and even the every day struggle for survival, leaves the Russian people thoroughly dissatisfied with the reform process. In summary, although political and economic reforms might go ahead on their difficult way, these reforms have a very unstable base.

2) A Continuous Weakening of State and Society

A second possible scenario is a continuing disintegration of the old Soviet state, to which neither reformers nor their opponents will be able to halt and to forge some type of new system. In this scenario the government may issue orders and parliament may pass legislation, but words will not be translated into actions. In the absence of the “*rule of law*” individuals and groups will be forced to get in touch with one another through ties of kinship, habits, customs and power relations.

The military, already deeply dissatisfied, could lose some of their cohesion and broke into a new version of the “private armies”. Nuclear weapons, and even raw plutonium, could become a high risky trade off resource in the world black market. The further break down of that weak state and little cohesive society, could lead to territorial fragmentation. Various regions, stirred by nationalism, religion, or simply by the sense of being better off on their own, might quit responding to central authorities. Parts of Russia might even ask for their independence, as Chechnya did.

While this scenario is not likely to happen, it cannot be completely discarded.

3) A Firm Authoritarian Rule

The frustration of the first scenario or the fears arising from the dramatic consequences of the second, could promote an authoritarian response of Russian leaders. Indeed, to counter both the frustration of a muddling reform process and of a state in a phase of disintegration, a severe, firm response could seem to be the unique solution.

This “*strong man*” scenario might rely on pure nationalist appeals to build the firm system and needed bureaucratic architecture to continue the implementation of the hard reforms needed to recover much of the past power and to expand Russian influence to the neighboring countries.

II.4.ii. RUSSIAN PRESUMED STRATEGIC GOALS

None of the three scenarios, by themselves, have a strong possibility of realization. In the next coming years it is most likely that a blurred combination of all the three of them will happen. In any event, the near term implications of Russian foreign policy are basically similar under those scenarios. So, their main objectives, *as seen from the Western side*, could be among the following:

1) Preserving Russian Territorial Integrity

At present, and probably for some time, Russia’s primary security objective will be to preserve the territory of the Russian Federation. The Russian political and military leaders are well aware that international threats, especially if combined with internal support, could further dismember their state. And given the very recent experience of Chechnya they will take nothing for granted.

2) Reintegrating the “Near Abroad”

As a second objective and close behind, comes the Russian vital interest in the stability and pro-Russian orientation of the other states of the former Soviet Union, that form the so called “*Near Abroad*” and where more than twenty million Russians live. The strategic goal is to reintegrate them by one means or another to the Russian orbit, and particularly by strengthening the institutions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S), of which they all are members, in matters as border control, air defense, armament design and production, and other military issues, as well as by a strong cooperation in trade and communications.

But as each region has some special characteristics and interests for Russia: a) *Ukraine is the closest brother nation to Russia.* b) *The Caucasus is its buffer zone in the south.* c) *The Baltic States are the window to the Sea.* And d) *The Belarus is the shortest way to Central Europe.* They resume the strategic interests of Russia on these territories

3) Maintaining Close Ties With The West

To maintain cooperative relations with the West nations and Organizations are now a priority for Russia. It is even more, a necessity. Both the Russian leaders and the common people are deeply disappointed by what they believe was the West failure to comply with their promises of strategic partnership and economic support.

The prevailing view seems to be that the West wanted a “*one-way-street*”; that is to say, the Russian retreat from Central and Eastern Europe, while at the same time showing a lack of sensitivity for the Russian interests or needs. Until the Russians forced their way in the negotiations with Serbia in the Yugoslavian conflict, they did not perceived evidence that the West took their interests in due consideration.

It seems evident that the common Russian people now believe that the Western promises have been cynical. They never saw -in practical way- the economic aid, although they believe that the money showed in the hands of “*mafias*” and criminals. For the average Russian, the West never really meant to help, and some even suspect that the West manipulated Russia with the aim to weaken its power.

Moreover, the Russian Defense and Security leaders see that the EU, NATO and WEU are coming closer to its borders, while still keeping Russia at arms’ length.

4) The Future Looks On Asia

Russia recognizes the importance of the ascending Asian powers. As a consequence, the Russian leaders show a growing interest to follow closely the strategic advancing position of the Asian nations, although certain politicians, economists and military men regard China not as an hegemonic competitor in Asia, but as an eventual partner, if the West presses on both great powers.

In relation to Japan the situation seems frozen by the impasse over the Northern Territories. And the great boom of East Asia nations’ economies -“*the Asian tigers*”-, seem too far away to matter anyhow in Russia’s present difficult situation.

IN SUMMARY, As a result of the previous reflections, for the foreseeable future Russia will have to attend in priority the delicate situation “*at home*”, and on the immediate neighborhood. That is its primary and vital objective. But as Russia returns to passed strength, it will contemplate other national interests more coldly, perhaps even resentfully. And among them, without any doubt, it will be to strengthen ties with the West, and particularly, those with the US and the EU, whose influence extends over almost half the world.

II.4.iii. WESTERN INTERESTS ON RUSSIA

1) The control of Nuclear Risks

Although Europe no longer faces the mortal threat of an overwhelming nuclear attack from the Soviet Union, there still exists the menace of multiple dangers stemming from the old nuclear arsenal.

Even after full implementation of the Arms Control Agreements, the dismantling programs, the purchases of enriched uranium and the ongoing diplomatic pressure, experts estimate that some twelve thousands tactical and strategic nuclear weapons still remain within the territorial Russia and at sea. They claim, however, to be dismantling about 2.000 to 3.000 annually, which incidentally creates a new

problem, because any terrorist group could build a nuclear weapon, according to the experts opinion, with as little as eleven pounds of plutonium.

These nuclear military risks are as well as the ones of civilian nuclear reactors built many years ago, with a poor design, aging facilities and little maintenance, which brings the possibility of new Chernobyl-type disasters.

2) To Limit Russian Military Threats

During the past three centuries Russia has been a major participant in the European history in policy, wars, coalitions and in security. And since the eighteen century, the Russian acquisition of vast territories in Asia has also made it a power in the Orient affairs.

In the Asian-Pacific area, the Russian Fleet clashed disastrously with Japan's navy at the beginning of this century, although later the Russians seized the Northern Islands of Japan.

In summary, it may be said that *Russia remains today a powerful nation with a double dimension European and Asian*. It would be to the advantage of Europe to have Russia as a partner in the twenty-first century, rather than an enemy, because many of the political and security challenges that the West faces now are located around the rim of Russia, from North Korea, through the powerful China, to South Asia, the Islamic world of Central Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans.

While Russian support would be important to Europe, it is vital that Russia does not emerge as a threat to the Eurasian stability.

3) The Relations of Russia with Ukraine

Russia's relations with Ukraine are essential to the future of European stability. In effect, if Ukraine were integrated into Russia it could create an international wave in Europe, that would reach Poland, Belarus, Moldavia, Romania, Bulgaria and the rest of Central states. Although most Russian people do not accept Ukraine's temporary secession, the Russian government has until now avoided any conflict with the brother nation, on matters as the territory of Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet

4) Democracy, Free Market, Justice

We should underline the benefits of a democratic Russia for a peaceful international system, and even more for the European stability. Although the possibilities of affecting the course of events in Russia by the European Institutions and nations are limited, relatively small amounts of political and economic aid to its democratic leaders could be meaningful.

One dimension of this convenient support would be to offer Russia all possible opportunities to participate in European, transatlantic and global initiatives and adventures, in the fields of finances, economy, research, development, space and any other enterprise in which Europeans and Russians could work together.

5) Preservation of the Baltic States

The three Baltic states are increasingly tied to the rest of Western Europe through their own efforts and with the Scandinavian support. That is why the simple menace to their sovereignty and independence could create a disruption of relations of Russia with the European states. At the same time, it is important that the Baltic states develop co-operative relations with Russia, including the sort and protection of the Russian minorities living in those countries, according to the established rules of the Council of Europe and of the O.S.C.E.

6) Respect for the Former URSS States

Russia should respect the sovereignty of Kazakhstan and the other states of former URSS to avoid any conflict in the Asian area. In a certain way, the attitude of Russia toward these states could be a test of whether Russia intends to be a democratic nation or instead to rebuild its empire. Understandable *influence and integration* should not be translated into *domination or absorption*. These states could benefit greatly with the opportunities to transport oil and gas through pipelines or water routes outside Russia.

7) Stable Relations with China

China is without discussion the main rising power in Asia. In the past, the asymmetry between such two powerful nations with common frontiers had led to tension, and even to conflict. It is rather surprising, however, that now most Russian leaders seem relatively inattentive to the potentially growing security problem with China. In fact, given the size of China's population and the sparse settlement of Russians in the Eastern and Central Asia, *Russia might show some anxiety about the future of the region*.

IN SUMMARY, As members of the Western European nations, as European citizens, *we believe and most welcome the Russian engagement in the regional and global security efforts*, as well as its active participation in all political and economic arrangements, whose results would be mutually beneficial.

We, Westerners, should continue to stress our support of the Russian internal reforms, while at the same time expecting that certain requirements should be observed, such as a firm support against nuclear, chemical or biological weapons proliferation, and the fully acceptance of the independence and sovereignty of all nations that were members, or were under the influence of the former Soviet Union.

II.5. THE CHINESE SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

CHINA is for a majority of experts on international relations "*the rising sun on the world scene*", because of its huge demographic and territorial dimensions, strong economic growth and a singular culture based on five thousand years' civilization.

In July 1998 appeared the document "**The National Defense of China**" published by the Council of State, which came to complement the ideas of its 1995

“White Paper” on “**Armaments Control and Disarmament**”. The new document covers the international security situation, the national policy of defense, the construction of national defense, the cooperation to the world security, the control of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the de-militarization of the space .

In all its pages, there is a constant preoccupation on the subject of control of all types of weapons, to avoid proliferation with their implicit increasing risks of conflict.

A particular attention is given to the problem of Taiwan, which is considered as “*part of the Chinese territory*”. To the Chinese government, the solution to the situation of the island is “*the pacific reunification of a single country with two systems*”, and is firmly opposed to any intent or action leading to the division of the country. Taiwan is “*a Chinese internal question*”. China also considers that “*any intent of inclusion of the Taiwan Strait into the cooperation security sphere of any state or military alliance constitutes the violation of the Chinese sovereignty*”.

“The Chinese Government –says the document- applies with persistence an independent and peaceful international policy, trying to establish and develop friendly and cooperative relations with all countries,... ..and is ready to do, together with other countries, tireless efforts to defend world peace and promote the international security and stability.

Certainly, the Asian security panorama at the end of the century is very different from what it was thirty or twenty years ago. Today the political and security atmosphere among the East Asian-Pacific countries is much relaxed, and the danger of conflict has visibly diminished, in contrast with what is happening in other close regions, like the Indian-Pakistani, whose nuclear capability is a growing concern. At the same time, this East Asian-Pacific area is widely recognized as having one of the most dynamic and fastest economic growth of the world.

While the social wealth of Asia lies in its diversity of traditions, religious faith, ways of life and social systems, its economic success underlines the similar traditional values and ideals shared by Asian countries, which are now bringing a new sense of Asian multiple-single identity, and decided efforts to enhance collective peace and prosperity through cooperation among themselves and with other countries and regions.

Of the five declared nuclear-weapons states of the world, China is the only one in Asia, and is keenly aware of its ineluctable responsibility toward international arms control and disarmament. China identifies itself with other Asian nations in pursuit the common objectives of peace, stability and development of the region.

However, the nuclear explosions on May 1998 of India and Pakistan have increased the concern over the danger of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Preventing the proliferation of those arms has been the declared goal of China’s policy. But to fulfill its legitimate self defense needs, China justifies the possession and development of nuclear arms and missiles, although its arsenal seems to be relatively small in comparison with those of the US and Russia.

China is also different from the other nuclear powers in that it had adopted and permanently maintains a long standing “**no-first-use**” policy, since the very moment it

became a nuclear-weapon state in 1964, when it declared that *at no time and under no circumstances would be the first nation to use nuclear weapons.*

So, China takes the most radical approach towards complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction and consequently proposed to the UN Assembly already in 1994, that a Convention should be concluded on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, in the same way as the existing conventions banning all biological and chemical weapons.

As a developing country in the Asian-Pacific region, China attaches great importance to the maintenance of peace and stability in its surrounding areas.

Its declared policy is never to seek hegemony or spheres of influence, nor establish military bases abroad. The use of force or threat of force in the region can never be accepted. It was in this spirit that China conducted negotiations with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the reduction of military forces in the border areas and on confidence building measures. With regard to efforts toward security arrangements in the region, China's policy is to adapt such arrangements to the diversity and complexity of the many countries of the Asian-Pacific area.

But, could that declared peaceful policy last long into the next century?.

It seems evident that the power of China, as well as those of India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Japan, North and South Korea, and other Asian nations, will increase in an almost consistent trend, not only in economic wealth, but in population rates, technological advances, and in nuclear and conventional military strength. As a result of that rapid improvement, the Asian-Pacific Region will soon pass to occupy the front line in world affairs. But at the same time, the new nuclear and missile powers, their race in weapons research and development, and their longing for more energy resources, will be cause of serious concerns for the peace and stability in the region in the coming century.

In very recent times, in fact, as recent as February the 24th, 2000, the Deutsche weekly "Der Spiegel" has published a so called "*secret document of the Central Military Commission of China*" in which the high command studies the possibility of a war against USA, up to the nuclear level, if the Americans interfere an hypothetical occupation of Taiwan by China.

"Will the Chinese "*raising sun*" be a favorable event or a misfortune for the world?"

III. THE “WEST” EFFORTS FOR A SAFER WORLD

III.1. WEU, NATO, OSCE WITH A COMMON GOAL: THE EUROPEAN SECURITY

III.1.i. A “FLASH” ON THEIR CONVERGING PAST

It is almost an impossible task to resume in some few pages the interconnected histories of the three security-bound institutions that for several decades have tried, according to their own perspectives and capabilities, to give Europe a cover against the enormous threats that were hanging over their nations and peoples, like a Damocles' Sword, during the Cold War.

On January the 22nd, 1948, Mr. Ernest Bevin, the then UK Foreign Office Secretary, suggested a formula for a Western Union, consisting of a network of bilateral agreements on the lines of the Dunkirk Treaty that had been signed on March the 4th, 1947, by France and the UK “*of alliance and mutual assistance*” for a fifty-year period.

But the Prague “*coup'état*” that happened only some days later, in February 1948, reminded the Western nations that common defense action could not wait, and the first multinational structure to give security to a disrupted post-war Europe, was born in Brussels on March the 17th, 1948, with the signature by five countries –France, U.K., Belgium, the Netherlands and the Luxembourg- of a Treaty, in which they pledged themselves to build up a common defense system. Article IV stated that, should any of the contracting parties be the objects of an “*armed aggression in Europe*”, the other signatories would afford to the attacked party “*all the military aid and assistance in their power*”. The **Treaty of Brussels** was signed for duration of fifty years.

However, with the creation of the **Atlantic Alliance** a year later –in April the 4th, 1949- and with the further development of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** Command structure, the Treaty of Brussels became more a formal than an essential organization.

On May the 6th, 1954, the Treaty of Brussels was modified to incorporate two more members: the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, and received a different name: the Western European Union (WEU). A new version of Art IV of the Treaty stated:

“In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty, shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

“Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information on military matters”

As a result of this, WEU had no military staff of its own before 1993, and consequently WEU's activities were mainly formal for most of the three decades since 1954, and until the end of the eighties there were very few requirements to develop working *effective* relationships with NATO and with the European Communities.

However, all along that period, frequent informal contacts existed between WEU, NATO and the European Communities, to promote peace and prosperity on the West.

It must be signaled that in the middle of the Cold War took place one of the major events in the field of the Continent's security: the signature on August the 1st, 1975, of the Final Act of the Helsinki **Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe** (then **CSCE**, now **OSCE**), which included as members all former Cold War adversaries, as well as those neutrals and non aligned countries (then 35, now numbered 54). (*OSCE will be further treated in detail*).

The neat division of objectives and activities between WEU, NATO and OSCE in relation to the European Communities did not survive the end of the Cold War, because the three security institutions had to adjust their principles and structures to the new world situation.

Unlike the two World Wars, in which a good deal of time was spent in planning for the “post war arrangements”, there was very little, if any, preparation for the post-Cold War period. And certainly, it was needed a new definition of *objectives* and *priorities* of the foreign security and defense policies of the Western countries, and to adapt the *institutional frameworks* to them.

The beginning of the 90's will be a time of impressive changes. In November 1991, NATO agreed on a new strategic concept setting out the *risks* –no longer called threats- that its member states faced in the post-Cold War Europe, asserting: “*The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense..*”

At that same time, the member states of the EC were busy preparing the texts of the **Treaty of the European Union** (TEU), and the members of the WEU were finalizing the **Declaration** to be made at Maastricht in December 1991. These two Documents were basic to the future Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), and gave a prominent position to the WEU.

While there were no new references to the working relationship between NATO and the WEU, the position of this last one within the EU was established in Article J.4.2. of the TEU, which stated :

*“The Union requests **the WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the Union**, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications”*

It is worth considering that:

*“WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defense identity (**ESDI**) and a greater European responsibility on defense matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of development of the EU, and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the long term perspective of a common defense policy within the EU, which might in time lead to a common defense, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance”.*

“WEU will be developed as the defense component of the EU, and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defense policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.”

The “December 1991 WEU Declaration” in relation to the EU made five specific proposals:

- the synchronization of dates and places of meetings,
- closer cooperation between the Council and the Secretariat of the WEU with the similar Organisms of the EU,
- the harmonization of the sequence and duration of respective Presidencies,
- the arrangement of necessary means to ensure that the EU Commission is regularly informed by WEU on security items,
- the encouragement of closer cooperation between the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly.

This same Declaration made also proposals *“to develop further the closer working links between WEU and NATO”* and, in particular, WEU will:

- intensify the coordination on those Alliance issues which represent an important common interest,
- synchronize, when possible, dates and places of meetings and working methods,
- establish close cooperation between the Secretariat General of the WEU and that of NATO.

The results of this approximation effort were not brilliant. In effect, the only occasion when a WEU Ministerial happened on the same day and at the same place of a NATO Ministerial, -namely in the margins of the CSCE Summit in Helsinki on July the 10th 1992- the “coincidence” seemed to be more motivated by competition, than by a spirit of cooperation.

WEU was based in London until 1993, and even when it was moved to the Continent, its small organizational size compared to those of NATO and the EU, did not help much to close the gap with those Organizations. It took until May 1996 to get a Security Agreement between NATO and WEU, to permit the exchange of classified information and documents.

Between 1992 and 1995 there were several examples of failure to use the three Institutions -NATO, WEU and OSCE with the EU- as mutually reinforcing security bodies. And when some Western nations did work in cooperation in the Yugoslavia conflict, it was outside and bypassing the institutional established structures, as was the case of the “Alba Operation”: on April the 11th, 1997, an Italian advance force went ashore in Vlora to restore the situation of chaos and violence that reigned in Albania, followed by some 6.000 troops of a “handful” of EU members and non EU members, which joined in a coalition of the *“willing and able”* nations, to solve the situation.

During all the years after the foundation of the **Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)**, it had been developing an intense activity, by creating an expanding an ensemble of procedures, norms, mechanisms, forums, missions and envois, to improve the capacity for early warning on those areas with ascending tensions, using preventive diplomacy to avoid crisis or human right offenses,

and establishing multiple international relations with the UN, the Council of Europe, the European Communities, the Northern and Central European Countries, NATO, PFP, the CIS, the OECD, and last but not least, with the WEU. The OSCE's meetings at some six months intervals, on the form of Summits or Review Conferences, were advancing the importance and improving the structure of the Organization.

It was on June the 19th, 1992, when took place the "Declaration of Petersberg" where the called *Petersberg missions: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making-*, were defined and considered to be carried out for WEU-led forces.

The picture continued to evolve at the 1995 January Summit of the WEU, where the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) was established, to permit that military units and headquarters available to NATO *-forces separable, but not separated-* could be deployed and operated on certain circumstances, under European command and control. This was intended to provide a mechanism for the effective cooperation of NATO with WEU.

In some ways, the experience of IFOR *-similar to CJTF-* was going to help improve the situation. France, which had been outside the NATO integrated command structure since 1966, announced on December the 5th 1995, that it would follow "the Spanish model" and fully participate in the work of the Military Committee and in the International Military Staff. The change was demonstrated at the NATO Ministerial held in Berlin on June the 3rd 1996, in which it was established "*the creation of military coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU*".

Since the Ostend Ministerial in November 1996, WEU begun to play an active role in NATO's defense planning process. It can be said that due to the change on the French attitude towards NATO, the relationship between both NATO and WEU had significantly improved. It was thought that a satisfactory "*Europeanisation*" of NATO' Command structure would clearly facilitate the future relationship, as would also be the practical experience in the employ of CJTF by the WEU.

However, there was at the same time less progress in the working contacts of WEU with the EU, mainly due to two reasons: in the first place, the difficulty of defining what kind of "*foreign policy actor*" the EU should be, and in the second place, how far the security policy of the EU could go, either in the place of the individual member states, or as an addition to them.

At the International Governmental Conference (IGC) of Amsterdam on June 16/17th, 1997, more progress in the interconnection of WEU and the EU were accomplished, and then confirmed with the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty on October the 2nd that year, to enter in force on May the first 1999.

III.1.ii. EUROPEAN SECURITY–DEFENSE AFTER AMSTERDAM

Member states agreed in Title V, Article 17 (ex-TEU Art J.7) of the Amsterdam Treaty that:

1. *The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide...*

The Union shall...foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide..

2. *Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making.*

3. *The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union that have defense implications.*

.....

In the Protocol to Article 17, Member states agreed upon the provision that:

“The European Union shall draw up, together with the Western European Union, arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them, within a year from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam”

Even before the entry into force of the Treaty, a lot of progress had already been achieved in strengthening partnership between the EU and WEU.

On December the 4th, 1998, United Kingdom and France issued a “Joint Declaration on European Defense” at their bilateral meeting in Saint Malo, agreeing that: *“It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP”*

However, the NATO military aerial intervention on the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo, which started on March 24th, 1999, after the expulsion by Servian authorities of the OSCE observers, had changed and accelerated the planned progress of the relations between NATO, WEU, OSCE and the EU,.

Of particular importance to the advance of the process of consolidating the efforts of WEU-EU and NATO on the European security, had been the designation of Mr. Javier Solana –already in post of Secretary General of the EU’s Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (M.PESC/Mr.CFSP)- as the new Secretary General of the WEU, to start his functions from the 25th November 1999.

Under this spirit of close cooperation, the first joint WEU-EU/NATO exercise executed in April 2000.will help to conclude a *framework agreement*, about conditions on the release, transfer, control and return of the NATO assets used in the event of an European crisis management operation, under WEU/EU leadership and command.

In all circumstances, a process of successive well-defined steps to advance in *the incorporation of WEU into the EU* is right underway. This is one of the most promising lines for streamlining the security structure of Europe for the next century.

Another line of future progress on the European security is the new “**Charter for European Security**”, which was approved in the OSCE’s Summit at Istanbul on November the 19th, 1999. The Charter includes the commitment by the States members *“to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area, where participating States are*

at peace with each other, and individuals and communities live in freedom, prosperity and security". It also includes their will to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible and lists the steps they agree to take to implement their commitments.

Nevertheless, and even with: A) all the events, declarations, and commitments of **NATO** with its new Strategic Concept, new Command structure, new and foreseen member States and the close parental Organizations of EAPC and PFP; B) all efforts of the **WEU-EU**, in an accelerated process of joining their two Organizations, to be able to conduct operations –mainly type Petersberg- with the help of NATO; and C) all activities of **OSCE**, with the commitment of its fifty-four members to avoid conflicts and respond quickly to people's demands for assistance; **WEU, NATO, OSCE and EU** have not yet been able to avoid, or to cope with the grave situations created in the Balkan peninsula or in the Caucasus (Chechnya), whose difficult solutions will leave so impressive humanitarian and material wounds that it will take a great part of the coming century to heal.

III.2. NATO'S EASTWARD EXPANSION

When the Berlin Wall came down, inevitably the impulse of the Central and Eastern nations, –or even their desire-, to join NATO came not from the judgement that they were facing any new external threat, but rather to hedge against uncertainty, and to affirm their links to Western Europe's cultures and values.

The process of NATO enlargement may have begun at the January 1994 Summit when the Alliance leaders declared that they would welcome new members, as part of an evolutionary process aiming to build a wider structure of security and defense in Europe. But the process definitively started as NATO agreed in December that year –at US initiative- to begin discussions on the accession of the future members.

Although the formal accession to the Alliance of the three new countries – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic- took place on March the 12th 1999, it was only the starting point of a longer and more ambitious plan.

In effect, Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote as early as December 1997 that “ *The expansion of NATO and the EU should advance according to established phases. Supposing that the compromises of the US and of the EU are maintained, a speculative program could be the following: in 1999 there will be admitted the three first Center-European countries (already NATO members), although their accession to the EU will not probably occur before 2002 or 2003. In this year it is possible that the EU could have started conversations with the three Baltic Republics, as could also NATO, and with Romania and Bulgaria, whose accession would be completed before 2005. Between 2005 and 2010, the question of Ukraine could be on the table..*”

Although the plan is now well underway, it had been one of the most controversial subjects in the political Western circles during the first part of the 90's.: “*Le Pentagone était au départ résolument opposé à l'élargissement de l'Alliance qui, selon lui, réduirait sa cohésion et son efficacité*” (wrote Mme. Denise Artaud in Défense Nationale Janvier 99, pag 16).

That is why it has been considered interesting to go over the reasons given in support of the different alternatives. In this context, a very exclusive document is the written debate that took place between the Clinton Administration and the US Congress.

On September the 10th, 1997, the Clinton Administration provided written responses to the **eleven questions** asked by twenty US Senators. As those questions and answers cover the entire ensemble of critiques and rationale for the decision of **NATO** enlargement, -a process that is still going on with other candidates to the accession-, they are presented here in an abridged way.

Q: *What is the military threat that **NATO's** expansion is designed to cover?*

A: It is a key **NATO's** strategy to build an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe, for the first time in history.

Q: *How will **NATO's** expansion strengthen stability in Europe when the nations that face the greatest potential threats to their own security will not be included in the first step?*

A: First, **NATO's** expansion is not a one-time event, but a process that will continue after the first round. Second, **NATO** is taking a range of direct steps to improve the security of those states not initially admitted, as the PFP, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the **NATO-Ukraine** Chart. Finally, **NATO** will continue to promote stability beyond the borders of its members.

Q: *Shall not that expansion create a new dividing line in Europe?*

A: No. **NATO** is erasing the old, artificial dividing line and fostering integration and partnership in its place.

Q: *Under Art. V of the Washington Treaty, **NATO's** security guaranties will extend to all new members. But, could not a border dispute be so vital as to put at risk **NATO's** lives?*

A: That Article states that members will consider an attack against one as an attack against all. But it does not define what actions constitute "an attack", or prejudge what decisions should be taken. Already we have seen several major accords in the region settling old border disputes:

- The 1991 Border Agreement between Poland and Germany
- The 1991 Good Neighborhood and Cooperation between both states
- The 1992 Treaty between Poland and Ukraine
- The 1994 Mutual Cooperation Agreement between Poland and Lithuania
- The 1996 Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia
- The 1996 Bilateral Treaty between Hungary and Romania
- The 1997 Joint Declaration on Czech-German Relations
- The 1997 Treaty between Romania and Ukraine

Besides that, bringing Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into **NATO** will make it less likely that allied troops might be drawn to a war in Europe.

Q: *The nations of Central Europe have had a long history of border, ethnic, nationalist and religious disputes. How could an expanded **NATO** solve these types of disputes?*

A: **NATO** enlargement will make such disputes less likely, and increase the chances that they will be peacefully resolved. While **NATO** core mission is *collective defense*, **NATO** normal operations also function as a *conflict prevention mechanism*.

Q: *According to the 1997 Report to the Congress, the new **NATO** members should pay 35% of their bill of enlargement costs. But, would they pay?*

A: It is almost certain that **NATO**'s expansion will precipitate a bitter row over sharing the defense burden among the allies. In the end, either the US will pay most of the expansion costs, or **NATO** will be saddled with second class military forces.

Q: *Would EU's membership be a better option to achieve the economic stability which **NATO** aspirants are also seeking?*

A: There is no reason for a choice between EU enlargement and **NATO** enlargement. Both are independent contributions to European prosperity and security.

Q: *Will **NATO**'s membership force the new states to spend more money for arms?*

A: Alliances save money over the long term. Many leaders in the region have said that they might well spend more money, if they were not included in **NATO**, because of feeling less secure outside the collective defense structure.

Q: *Will Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic make a positive contribution to the security of **NATO**, or they will be "net consumers" of it?*

A: It has been estimated that they can achieve a "mature capability" within a decade after joining the Alliance. Moreover, they have already demonstrated their readiness to contribute to the security beyond their borders.

Q: *By expanding eastward, is not **NATO** creating an incentive for Moscow to withdraw from the Arms Reducing Conventions, and even to develop an early "first-use nuclear policy"?*

A: The objective of the Trans-Atlantic security policy is an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. And also to support a democratic and prosperous Russia, at peace with its neighbors and cooperative in security issues. The signing of the **NATO**-Russian Founding Act has been an important step in that direction.

Q: *What has **NATO** given up in terms of freedom of action to deploy its forces, in order to obtain Russia acquiescence to the expansion plan?*

A: The Founding Act provides the basis for an increased cooperation, consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, for joint decision and action.

The mentioned accession to **NATO** of the three new members in March 1999, has been the first confirmation of the rightfulness of the reasons expressed in the quoted document and on the assurance of **NATO**'s **future**.

From the actual perspective of the year 2000, it is already well known that the all Alliance's members decision -*as willing and able states*- to extend its range and influence to the pan-Euro-Atlantic area, represents an extraordinary impulse to the security and defense of Europe in the Third Millennium.

III.3. NATO FACE TO THE 3rd MILLENNIUM

III.3.i FIFTY YEARS OF SUCCESS

The half-a-century history of NATO is well known in general terms by most Europeans, because the Atlantic Alliance has been the basic instrument during all those years for the security and defense of the Continent, while the civil societies of Western Europe were steadily building an unprecedented economic growth and lasting social stability.

“Fifty years ago –says the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair- NATO was born in difficult times. The Iron Curtain divided Europe in two. Stalin was securing his grip over Eastern Europe. Democracy and freedom were being extinguished in country after country. Having suffered an unspeakable war, peace was looking increasingly grim for many Europeans. Military confrontation between East and West seemed all too likely....Today, Europe has changed beyond all recognition. NATO deserves much of the credit for this remarkable transformation. After so many years of division and repression, we are now creating a common European home, based on the common values of freedom and democracy.”

The success of NATO’s goals established on the Washington Treaty on April the 4th, 1949, -*“to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”*- has been such, face to the soviet communist world, that some writers have spoken of *“a total victory without a single shot”*.

Many leaders of the most important international organizations of the United Nations and Europe have joined their praises in the celebration of that event, to emphasize the fulfillment of NATO’s goals, and to advance ideas for the collaboration of their Institutions with the Alliance in the future. Here are some of those comments:

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, said that he wants...*”to look forward working with its (NATO) leaders to improve our cooperation in the tasks of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building. And ..I know that the skill, experience and resources of NATO will prove invaluable”*.

The Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Giancarlo Ancona, believes that OSCE and NATO share the same aims: *“The 50th Anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance marks a growing partnership between OSCE and NATO. In the complex European security architecture of the end of the Millennium, the two Organizations share the aim of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, based on democracy and cooperative security”*.

The Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Daniel Tarschys, affirms that the future is on the cooperation between the main European institutions: *“The new Europe free of dividing lines, requires a coherent policy for European cooperation and unification. If it is to succeed, it must develop into a solid community of partners, into which everyone feels tightly knit...Thus, the formula of interlocking institutions, between the OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, European Union, WEU, as well as specialized UN bodies, must be made a reality.”*

The President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, pays tribute to the *“farsightedness of the founding fathers of the great Euro Atlantic community of Institutions of the post-war era. The success of both the Atlantic Alliance and the Union must both help to develop a European security and defense pillar.. Sharing responsibilities between the two sides of the Atlantic, and organizing defense cooperation, are the great challenges for the foreseeable future”*.

The Secretary General of the Western European Union, Jose Cutileiro, considers that the WEU is well placed and ready to become the “European Pillar”: *“Since the end of the Cold War we have been able to draw the non-EU European allies, the non-NATO EU members and ten Central European partners, into a wider WEU structure making the most of all their contributions”*

III.3.ii. THE KOSOVO TURNING POINT

At 2000 hours on the 24th March 1999, the allied air campaign started over Serbian territory to end the systematic process of ethnic cleansing, oppression and terror on the population of Kosovo. It will take eleven weeks of coordinated 37.500 air attacks by aircraft, cruise missiles, and bombings against the Serbian forces, military installations and infrastructures, to get Belgrade’s regime to accept the international coalition conditions.

That was the first military intervention of NATO’s history, and it separated from the accepted Washington Treaty principles of only “defense in case of armed attack” and only “on NATO territory”. That military intervention would soon raised a diversity of controversies on the political and legal justification of such an attack against a sovereign country.

No one doubted of the well done of the “operational” conduct of the air campaign, although there were serious objections on the selection of targets that were cause of tragic consequences –“*collateral damages*”-- on civilians and essential civilian infrastructures. But what was seriously criticized was the lack of UN Security Council’s decision and approval for that intervention, which had compelled NATO to divert from the established international order created after WWII by the UN Charter. Nevertheless, by its Resolution 1244 (1999) the Security Council finally welcomed the agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the G8, and accordingly authorized, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the security military presence in Kosovo to enforce it.

Nobody, on the contrary, objected the moral and humanitarian right to intervene. Václav Havel, the President of the Czech Republic, in a speech given in Canada said that *“NATO’s campaign in Kosovo was the first in history to be fought by entirely humanitarian purposes. NATO –he argued- had no economic, political or strategic interests in Kosovo, and was acting purely for altruistic reasons. This made the campaign “a just war”*. But, to be considered so, the theory of “a just war” has traditionally required the campaign to be fought by “*a legitimate authority*”, for “*a just cause*”, “*as a last resort*”, and “*by ethical means*”. If that has been the case in the Kosovo crisis, is subject to prolonged controversy.

III.3.iii. AN “HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DILEMMA”

Ove Bring, Professor of International Law at the Stockholm University, maintains that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo aimed to reverse the Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing and to ensure the safe return of Kosovar Albanians, had brought into collision some fundamental principles of international law, mainly the State’s sovereignty and the non use of force, with the paramount respect of human rights. This author –(NATO Review, 3/99)- proposes that the Alliance should take the lead to establish a new formulation of a doctrine on the humanitarian intervention which could take precedence over the State’s sovereignty in certain extreme circumstances.

The question might be put squarely like this: “*Sovereignty*” of the People or Sovereignty of the State: which one must enjoy priority?. The requirements for such a “*legal and exceptional*” military intervention should include as a minimum: to be a case of gross human rights violations, considered as crimes against humanity; the previous use of all possible peaceful procedures and means; the lack of action of the local government to stop the massacre; the inability of the Security Council to take the proper decisions; the use of minimal force to solve the humanitarian situation; and to be taken by an International Regional Organization only in the case of having the legal backing of the UN General Assembly, according to the Res.377 “Uniting for Peace”.

In this direction also points the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan when he writes (The Economist, 18.09.99): “*State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined ...States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty, by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN...has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse of them*”.

And in another paragraph he adds: “*It is essential that the international community reach consensus –not only on the principle- that massive and systematic violations of human rights must be checked, wherever they take place, but also on ways on deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom.*” On the dilemma of the so-called “humanitarian intervention”, he raises the question if “*is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate?*”, and at the same time, “*is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked?*”

The important question is if should not be time now to start discussing a modification of the international law, that gave in the past and still gives the maximum preeminence to the state, and to start *considering the person as the main subject of international legal protection* and material defense. And, if so, should not be precisely the Atlantic Alliance –as a most distinguished international defender of the principle of the “rule of law”- the leading institution on this enterprise in favor of mankind?

It is a fact that the struggles intra-State have been increasing in number and on victims during the last decade, and causing more military conflicts than those inter-States. The reason might be that the ideological confrontation –Free World versus Communism; East versus West- is no longer the main cause of antagonisms between the Third World’s countries. They are now the racial, religious or nationalist forces that

drag an entire population to fight against other people of the same or neighboring State. And all indexes point to a continuing trend in this direction.

No big war is in the horizon over the pan-European territory. Since the well deserved and celebrated fiftieth NATO's anniversary a new era of wishful peace has began. A new era in which the world situation is rather different from what Europe had lived during the precedent years: Less great threats hanging over the Europeans heads, more politically stable populations, more determination of NATO members to uphold the principles of freedom, democracy and peace; more nations joining the Alliance and other European security Institutions...

Through its enlargement with new allies and partners, the Alliance is demonstrating that there are no more dividing lines in Europe. With the same principles and goals, NATO is building some ever-stronger partnerships with virtually every country in the pan-European area, from North America to Vladivostock.

But, still there are the Balkan tragedies where hundred, thousands have died, victims of ethnic hatred, religious fundamentalism, or extreme nationalism, and where thousands of soldiers, have risked or lost their lives to maintain the people living in freedom and justice.

III.3.iv. BROADER MISSIONS, WIDER AREA

One of the clear consequences of the meeting at the Summit in Washington the 23/24th April, 1999, is that none of the nineteen allies has been willing to conclude that NATO has totally served its purpose and that consequently the Alliance has completed its task. Well on the contrary, they all have being unanimous to bet for another long life of peace and prosperity united under the Blue and White Star Flag of the Alliance.

But, what should the future tasks of the Alliance be?. To look for an answer means to review the world situation and how it might evolve in the coming decades. We have seen on another part of this paper in greater detail how the world order and the power scenarios will possibly change. Now, we will review in synthesis what might be the main features of that challenging future.

China is already regarded by the majority of experts as the ascending power to the front line of world politics. India will be next, possibly followed by Brazil. Russia with its enormous resources, vast spaces, high technology, educated population, and nuclear arms will remain a world power, and a **European power too!**. Japan, will also be a great power. And naturally, the European Union that has already reached the rang of superpower in the economic, technological and cultural fields, may also be so on the security and defense issues in the short to medium term.

Confronted with this vision of several powers and superpowers, most of them armed with nuclear capacity, both Europeans and North Americans conclude that the Atlantic Alliance and the close links existing between EU and US-Canada must be preserved at any price. *“The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible” (par. 27 of the Strategic Concept)*. In fact, problems like the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction, the control and distribution of vital energy resources –gas, oil, water, uranium-, the environmental risks, and the still unclear

effects of globalization, among others, are permanent motives of attention to the balance of power's changes.

But there are still other threats and risks of wider nature that can affect Alliance security interests, as those caused by ethnic and religious rivalry, extreme nationalism, terrorism, and political and economic bankrupts in the "near abroad". They may even be amplified by a combination of population explosion in the less developed parts of the world, grand migrations, massive hunger and natural disasters.

The last decade has seen more than twenty wars throughout the world, from Bosnia to Chechnya, Zaire or Kosovo. All these wars took place "**out-of area**", that is, outside the territory covered and protected by the Article 6 of the Washington Treaty. Some Parties to the Treaty have intervened in these wars, although the Alliance as a whole has being only militarily involved in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, where NATO's intervention offers a variety of examples of the complex problems confronting allied military activities **outside the Art. 6.** and operating with other non-NATO members.

The American government seems to regard these interventions as precedents for possible future actions in other areas, without necessarily requiring a UN Security Council resolution. But not all allies agree that the North Atlantic Treaty does provide for actions beyond the territory of NATO's members without specific UN Security Council backing. In fact, in par.15 of the Strategic Concept it's written: "*The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and as such plays a crucial role in contributing to the security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic Area*".

If the United States and may be other parties to the Treaty are willing to broaden the tasks of the Alliance and the duties of the allies, to include the joint armed actions in defense of their interests, or humanitarian missions in "**out-of-area**" territories, that would require –according to distinguished politicians and legal experts- an additional Protocol to be signed by all Treaty members.

Nevertheless, it is true that the Alliance's Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government at the Washington Summit on the 23-24 April 1999, has open the Alliance to new functions: –29. *Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations.* and to the possibility to act in a wider but not clearly defined area: 12. *The Alliance operates (with the)..determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area,* but it will have to be always under the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council.

III.3.v. NATO's MAIN EVOLUTION LINES

For almost half a century *the* Western Allied's task has been to prevent a global war. Today the probability of such a war has been substantially reduced, but the risk of escalation of minor conflicts has increased both in number and intensity, horizontally and vertically.

A main effect of the reduction of the nuclear threat has been to liberate tensions and problems that were concealed during years in many countries. Now and for the time being, NATO would have to direct its political system and its military capabilities to avoid the appearance of conflicts by an early warning attitude and by using preventive diplomacy, while always maintaining the forces ready to act if the situation sorted out of control.

What would be, thus, the main, essential lines of NATO's evolution?

They may be taken from the several documents approved by the Allies on occasion of the 50th NATO's Anniversary:

First, to continue the Alliance's expansion process with the gradual accession of new members from those 25 countries associated to the EACP and PFP, according to the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

Second, to proceed to a revision of present capabilities to upgrade the military forces, to adapt them to the changes in the strategic scenario and NATO missions, by making them more mobiles, interoperable, sustainable and effective. This concept is incorporated in the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) document.

Third, to reaffirm political bonds and institutional contacts with those Organizations whose aims are also to enhance the European security and stability, as is the case of the UN, EU/WEU, OSCE and the Council of Europe, as those of Sub-Regional character, well as with those nations which enjoy a special relationship with NATO, as Russia and Ukraine.

Fourth, to give particular attention to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucasus-Caspian area, where essential Western interests are at stake.

Fifth, to continue exercising a strong non-proliferation attitude, inviting countries to adhere, honor and ratify the many Treaties and Conventions established to limit or eliminate the proliferation of armaments and critical materials, mostly nuclear, biological and chemical. Among them may be cited the CFE (1990), the BTWC, the CFE-IA (1992), the CWC (1997), the PNET (1976), the PTBT (1974), the ABM (1972), the INF (1987), the START I, II, ¿III?, the CTBT (1996), and the one whose ratification is most needed: the NTP (1995). Each Treaty represents an intent to reduce the level of tension, to enhance the stability or security of a region and to avoid the risk of escalating to higher levels of confrontation.

Sixth, to co-ordinate the high technology and defense industry of both sides of the Atlantic, to allow for a more rational use of limited resources, and to insure the interoperability of all armament and equipment.

A key feature of the future NATO will be the successful, although may be difficult, development of the ESDI, which would permit "**the second pillar**" of the EU to become an efficient actor of Allied and European policies, in the field of Security and Defense.

III.3.vi. NATO's MAIN DIFFICULTIES AHEAD

NATO enjoys good health; even a very good health. Fifty years of permanent and efficient vigilance, a peaceful victory against the most powerful adversary, a growing list of applicants to join the Alliance, and the praise of the leaders of the main countries and organizations of the world, give testimony of that success. There is not a record of such an event in recent history.

But, are there no risks, difficulties or problems on the way ahead? Certainly, there are. Let's consider some of the more evident:

The change of strategic scenario places now the NATO countries in very different situations. Iceland, for example, that had a front-line position in the naval confrontation during the high tension period of the Cold War, is now rearguard. In an opposed situation is Germany, that was occupying the vanguard of the allied Armies, and is now near the center of allied territory. Turkey at NATO's south-eastern border is now confronted with the majority of the risks mentioned in NATO papers, as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, religious fundamentalism, illegal arms traffic, international terrorism, political troubles, and mass movements of refugees.

The great differences among allied countries could be sources of future tensions. If we consider, for example, the defense expense per capita, Norway's figure of 728 \$, can hardly be compared with the 46 \$ of Poland. Or the number of troops, which runs from the 797.000 of Turkey to the 25.000 of Denmark. Or even, the type of armed forces, that are professional in the United Kingdom, and conscript on different ratios in many allied countries. Or the technology and quantity of their armament and equipment, which vary greatly among allies, making interoperability a true nightmare.

The differences and "deficits" in the "culture of security" among allied countries are also another subject of concern. The experiences of military actions of the UK and France in the Gulf War, for example, make these countries more "security-minded", and more ready to accept some economic or human sacrifices on behalf of the common security of the Alliance, than other countries without such up-to-date experience.

Could be useful a "convergence defense plan" –similar to the economic Euro plan- to approach the existing differences of the allies to more equal facts and figures?. We believe that it could be so.

Another new feature of the future "European pillar" or of the ESDI, which is being considered is the possibility of a "variable geometry" when affronting the execution of a Petersberg mission. However, the principle of **solidarity**, if it has to be of any value on the great occasions, should be demonstrated in **all** occasions.

The Pentagon **National Missile Defense** (NMD) and **Theatre Missile Defense** (TMD) projects, promoted by the US President, pending decision until next June 2000 and to be implemented –if so decided- from now on until the year 2005, has reopened the doubts of the European allies over a possible "break" in the transatlantic bond, if the level of protection of the allies is not the same on both sides of the Atlantic against the big threats. At the same time Russia has also raised the voice, that the projects lack of conformity with the ABM Treaty. As the previous one of the "Galaxys War", the new projects will require a detailed discussion and description if it ought to be, not only

approved by the US national authorities, but heartily accepted and supported by all European allies.

The excessive delay in the ratification by Russian authorities of the SALT II Treaty and the retard in the conversations on SALT III certainly means lack of political will to comply with the provisions of these strategic Treaties, that were established to advance important steps in the direction of reducing the possibility of war.

If the European Identity has to be strong enough, not to create an additional charge to the American allies, but to serve as a positive addition to the common defense effort, the division between “higher tech” allies and “lower tech” ones, should be avoided by building industrial bridges, like “joint ventures” between research, development, and defense industries of North America and Europe, and between the European industries themselves. Cooperation ought to overcome extreme competition, recognizing that in general, the situation of the European firms in the defense industry is in need of a strong impulse to be in line and in time with the future needs. Avoiding the “Twin fortress” philosophy between America and Europe, will help to built a “Common fortress” for the defense of the Alliance..

Recently, Mr. Kofi Annan has affirmed that there is a lack of progress on the established compromise (TNP) of non-proliferation nuclear, and more generally on the process of disarmament, giving the impression of a general stagnation in these matters.

Abounding on that impression, the news that president Vladimir Poutine has signed on January 10th, 2000 a new “**Concept of National Security**” where Russia announces to resort to all means and forces available –including nuclear weapons- if all other means are exhausted or inefficient, means that for Russia “the level and range of the threat in the military domain are increasing”. However, According to the US President, since 1991, nearly 5.000 nuclear weapons have been dismantled, and retired from the CIS countries.

In the construction of the ESDI, the mechanisms for the consultation and decision process of integrating the EU/WEU countries with those six OTAN Europe, but non-EU (Island, Norway, Turkey, Poland, Austria and the Czech Republic) will have to be clearly defined, to incorporate them to the planning and eventual participation in operations of the Petersberg type.

A key element of the future European security is the participation of the 26 partners of the EAPC and PFP, together with the 19 allies in the established “Action Plan for 2000-2002”, which covers the most important issues of Europe of the South-East and Caucasus, The Stability Pact, Cooperation with OSCE, Political Planning, Armament, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, the Maintenance of Peace, and several other questions related to economy, science and technology.

III.4. OSCE AT THE DAWN OF THE 21st CENTURY

III.4.i. THE HELSINKI PROCESS

Along its twenty-five years of fertile history, the CSCE –now OSCE- has gone through an intense change of its structures and capabilities, to follow the evolving international situation, although its main goals have remained essentially the same.

The idea of a pan-European Security Conference was presented by the URSS in the 1950's, although the first concrete proposal came in 1954, along with the Soviet pre-conditions of recognizing the GDR, precluding the FRG accession to NATO, and the de-linking Europe from American security interests. As the Western powers considered that such proposals were unacceptable, it was not until much later, in 1969, that the Atlantic Alliance indicated its willingness to join the Conference, but only if the full participation of US and Canada, the recognition of the legal status of Berlin, the discussion of conventional disarmament, and the human rights issues, were duly included in the Agenda.

Finally, the preliminary talks began on the 22nd November 1972 at Helsinki, and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) formally opened on the 3rd July 1973, with the participation of thirty-five States –the whole of Europe plus US and Canada, a exception of Albania- launching thus “**the Helsinki process**”, which was going to be the first ever multilateral East-West negotiation process and whose end result would be the **(CSCE) Helsinki Final Act**, signed by all Heads of State or Government on the 1st August 1975.

The Helsinki Final Act encompassed three main sets of recommendations, commonly referred as the “baskets”:

*The first set (or **basket I**) was related to politico-military aspects of security: principles guiding relations between and among participating States (The “Decalogue”) and military confidence-building measures.*

*The second set (or **basket II**) concerned co-operation in a number of fields including economics, science, technology and the environment.*

*The third set (or **basket III**) dealt with “co-operation in humanitarian and other fields”, a formula covering human rights issues under the headings of “human contacts”, “information”, “co-operation in the field of culture” and “co-operation in the field of education”. It also included a specific set of recommendations related to Mediterranean issues.*

In that document the member states agreed to continue and improve the multilateral process by a periodical exchange of views on the provisions of the Act, as well as by deepening their mutual relations and improving the general security and co-operation among them. Thus, a series of follow-up meetings took place in Belgrade (4.10.77-8.3.78), Madrid (11.11.80-9.9.83), and Vienna (4.11.96-19.1.89). In addition, a **Conference on Security and Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe** was held in Stockholm (17.1.84-19-9-86), which represented an important element for the military security in the Continent.

With the crumbling of the Berlin Wall on 9-10 November 89 and the collapse of Communism, the CSCE states could look forward to a brighter future, although they would still have to overcome the legacy of forty-five years of a tense past.

The CSCE was unique and innovative in many respects: Firstly, in that era characterized by Bloc-to-Bloc confrontation, the CSCE had a wide membership of states from both sides and non-aligned, and all were participating as “*sovereign and independent States and in full equality*”. Secondly, at a time when most negotiations had a piecemeal approach to security, the CSCE endorsed a ample, comprehensive view of European security. Thirdly, the decisions of the Conference were taken by consensus, thus often making the OSCE's decision-process as important as the decisions themselves. Finally, as the CSCE had no institutional structures, the very impetus needed to keep the process going was an end in itself.

The **Paris Charter for a New Europe**, signed on 21st November 1990, -a landmark on the Helsinki process-, was the first multilateral instrument to take act of the end of the Cold War, and the opening of a new security and stability period for the Continent. The document was dedicated to institutionalize the CSCE through the establishment of mechanisms for political consultation as well as by the setting up of permanent institutions.

These institutions included the **Summit** meetings, to take place every two years, the periodical meetings of the **Council of Ministers** of Foreign Affairs, and the occasional meetings of the **Committee of Senior Officials**. To support these bodies a permanent administrative infrastructure was organized, including: a **Secretariat**, a **Conflict Prevention Center**, and an **Office for Free Elections**. They were small units composed by three or four people, assisted by national administrations, and with their sieges fixed in different places: Prague, Vienna and Warsaw, respectively. In April 1991 the CSCE **Parliamentary Assembly** was established.

Although the Paris Charter spoke of *“the end of the era of confrontation in Europe”*, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the break down of the Soviet Union presented some unexpected destabilizing risks and challenges to the security in Europe. In order to cope with them, the process of CSCE institutionalization was accelerated, new mechanisms were created and operational capabilities were enhanced. Major meetings in Vienna, Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow set down specific provisions on free elections, freedom of the media and the protection of persons belonging to national minorities.

At the first Council meeting in Berlin (19.6.91) a **special mechanism for emergency consultations** was established: the so called **‘Berlin mechanism’** that would be used almost immediately to confront the situation in Yugoslavia. The following Council meeting, which took place in Prague (30.1.92) produced a substantive **“Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures”**, where it was established an exception to the rule of consensus, providing that *“decisions could be taken in the absence of the consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of CSCE commitments relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms”*. That will be known as the rule of **“the consensus minus one”**, and was invoked for the first time in July 1992, to suspend Yugoslavia from the CSCE.

In the Helsinki follow-up Meeting (24.3.92-8.7.92) new institutions were established, as the **Forum for Security Cooperation**, the **High Commissioner on National Minorities**, the **Economic Forum** and an informal **Financial Committee of Experts**. Also the functions of the **Chairman-in-Office** (CiO) were fixed, making him responsible for *“the co-ordination of and consultation on current CSCE business”*. And the post of **Secretary General** was created nearly after, at the Stockholm Ministerial Council (14.12.92).

Such permanent structures were necessary as the CSCE was carrying out a growing number of tasks, many of which needed daily support. In effect, the first OSCE Mission of Long Duration was dispatched to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina in the autumn 1992, and by the end of 1994 there were already eight missions in the field. It is also worth to be mentioned that *in 1992 the CSCE declared itself to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter*.

With all this institutional developments, the CSCE had, *de facto*, evolved from being a *process* into an *organization*. As a result, it was renamed the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**. This decision was adopted at the Budapest Summit on 5-6 December 1994, and took effect the first January 1995. There OSCE was recognized by its proven institutions, field activities and active political bodies, as “*a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management*” on the vast area that goes from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This Summit formally endorsed a **Code of Conduct** on the politico-military aspects of security, laying down the principles guiding the role of armed forces in democratic societies.

The OSCE has occupied a singular place in the world of international organizations and plus particularly among the European security institutions. This stems from: a) its broad membership, of 55 states (*minus one*), b) a comprehensive approach to security, c) some conflict prevention instruments, d) a deeply established tradition of dialogue and consensus, e) shared norms, principles and values among member states, and f) well developed patterns of contacts and co-operation with other organizations and institutions. (UN, NATO, EU, WEU, NGO, etc)

High profile operations in Bosnia, Albania, Croatia, Chechnya and Kosovo, have thrust OSCE up to a first line on the European public opinion. With an increasing range and number of field operations, which now sum twenty missions and other field activities, OSCE is already considered as much for its operational effectiveness as for its political role and commitments.

In order to better define the OSCE role in the future, participating states decided in 1998 to elaborate a Document, called the “**Charter for European Security**”, whose aim will be to prepare the Organization for the changes and challenges that it will face while entering the next century.

III.4.ii. OSCE’s VIEW OF SECURITY

Since the beginning of the **Helsinki process**, CSCE had taken a broad and inclusive view of security: The protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with economic and environmental co-operation, have been considered to be as important for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, as the politico-military issues.

The OSCE has also considered that the different aspects of security are interconnected and interdependent. Thus, a continuous effort is made to enhance the mutual influence of the various dimensions of security among the States.

Other characteristic of the comprehensive nature of security in OSCE’s conception is that it takes part in all phases of the conflict cycle, (except open military involvement) since the early warning, to conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

Starting from the premise that **security is indivisible**, member states have a common stake in the security of Europe and should therefore co-operate to prevent crisis from happening and to reduce the risks of those already existing of getting worse. The fundamental assumption is that co-operation in security can bring benefits to all

participants, while insecurity in one State or region can affect the well being of all others. Thus, **the key message is to work together to achieve security together, not against the others.**

“We are determined to learn from the tragedies of the past and to translate our vision of a co-operative future into reality by creating a common security space free of dividing lines in which all States are equal partners. We face serious challenges, but face them together” Lisbon Declaration, 1996.

This also means that no state should strengthen its security at the expenses of other members. Co-operative security presupposes non-hegemonic behavior on the part of any participant state, and is reflected in the fact that all members have equal status and that decisions are made on the basis of **consensus**.

Certainly, **the status** of OSCE is **unique** and **singular**. On the one hand it has no legal status under international law, so that its decisions are politically but not legally binding. On the other hand, it possesses however most of the normal attributes of an international organization: standing decision-making bodies, permanent headquarters, permanent staff, regular financial resources and field offices. Most of its instruments, decisions and commitments respond to the legal language and are in accord with the principles of international law. But that does not detract OSCE’s commitments of their efficiency. Moreover, because it has been declared by OSCE itself to be a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, it is a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in the pan- European region.

III.4.iii. OSCE’s INSTRUMENTS TO SOLVE SITUATIONS

When confronted with a situation that has the possibility to evolve into a crisis or a conflict, the OSCE has an array of instruments to help solve the problem. They consist in: a) rapport missions, b) permanent missions, c) personal representatives of the CiO, d) “ad hoc” steering groups, e) special mechanisms, and f) peace-keeping operations.

A) **Fact-finding missions** are short-term visits by experts and personalities with the task of establishing facts, reporting their findings and making recommendations to the decision-making bodies.

B) **Missions or field activities** are the OSCE’s principal instrument for long-term prevention, early warning, crisis management, conflict resolution and further rehabilitation. The mandates, size, and duration of the various missions vary greatly, reflecting the flexibility of this instrument to adapt to the field situations. Thus, for example, the Liaison Office in Central Asia had four persons, while the OSCE Kosovo verification mission had nearly two thousand. The missions and field activities are the front line of OSCE’s work. They give the Organization an active presence in countries that require assistance, and are the usual vehicle through which political decisions are translated into actions. Their work covers all the range of the conflict cycle: early warning, preventive diplomacy, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. However, for all missions, human dimension issues, democracy and the rule of law are a central task.

C) **Personal Representatives of the CiO** are personalities from OSCE's participant states designated by the own CiO to assist him in dealing with a crisis or conflict.

D) **“Ad Hoc” Steering Groups** are designated on a case-by-case basis to assist the CiO in the specific situation, and are composed of a restricted number of participant States, including the “Troika”.

E) **Mechanisms for peaceful Settlement of Disputes** are several procedures that facilitate prompt and direct contact between the parties to the conflict, and help to mobilize concerted action by the OSCE members.

And F) **Peace-Keeping Operations** constitute an important element of the overall OSCE's capability to act in *a conflict within or among member States* to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort to a political solution. So far, however, this option has not been made use of.

III.4.iv. OSCE's INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

With the end of the Cold War a conceptual consensus developed on the need to widen and deepen its external contacts and co-operations. That resulted from the multi-dimension nature of security, that accordingly necessitated of a multi-institutional response.

“We affirm that European security requires the widest co-operation and co-ordination among participating States and European and Transatlantic organizations...The OSCE will act in partnership with them, in order to respond effectively to threats and challenges in its area”
(Lisbon Summit, 1996)

The 1994 Budapest Document entitled **“Towards a genuine Partnership in a New Era”** marked the beginning of a discussion on a model of common and comprehensive security for Europe for the twenty-first century. This process received impetus by the 1996 **Lisbon Declaration** in which the participant States pledged “to strengthen co-operation with other security organizations”

A). One of the OSCE's closest partners is the **United Nations**. As a matter of fact, the OSCE's Secretary General reports at each annual session of the UN General Assembly, while the UN Secretary General regularly addresses OSCE summits.

B). Relations are very close with the **Council of Europe**. Since 1993 high level meetings (“2+2”) have been held annually between their respective Chairmen plus Secretaries General. There is also close co-operation in matters of election monitoring and human right issues. Both Organizations occasionally co-organize meetings, workshops and conferences on issues like the role of the media in conflict situations, education on conflict prevention, etc. The OSCE and the Council of Europe pursue, on equal footing and according to their own methods, a common goal: the promotion of stability on the basis of democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights in Europe. Most OSCE missions have close contacts with the Council of Europe, as it's the case for the missions to Estonia, Latvia, Moldavia, Skopje, Ukraine, Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Croatia, the AMG in Belarus, the OSCE Presence in Albania and the Kosovo Verification Mission.

C). The OSCE also co-operates with the **European Union**. The fact that the EU usually speaks with one voice in the OSCE, is an illustration of the “common foreign and security policy” (CFSP) in action. The interaction of both Organizations in the field began very early, during the Yugoslav conflict, as OSCE was involved in the implementation of the Brioni Accords (7.7.91). They have also worked closely in assisting the application of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on the FYR. The OSCE established Sanctions Assistance Missions that were coordinated by a Brussels-based Sanctions Committee, financed and partially staffed by the EU.

D). The **Stability Pact**, which established regional round-tables aimed at settling the relations among **Central European and Baltic States**, facilitates a further development interaction. The Paris Conference on 21.3.95, entrusted OSCE as *depository* of the Stability Pact.

E). Since 1996, the OSCE and **NATO** have been engaged in an expanding process of interaction and co-operation. Regular contacts take place between the CiO and the NAC. The OSCE officials regularly participate in NATO meetings, such as those of the Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad hoc Group on Co-operation in Peace Keeping, while the NATO’s Secretary General (or one of his representatives) attends appropriate OSCE meetings. There is also regular information exchange on the implementation of CSBMs between the OSCE Secretariat and the correspondent section of NATO.

As a matter of fact, the steady development of OSCE/NATO relations is one of the most significant features of post-Cold War patterns in inter-organizational co-operation. Both have worked in synergy in the monitoring of sanctions and verification of arms control in the Balkans. NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and, subsequently, Stabilization Force (SFOR), had provided vital support for the OSCE in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This included security for OSCE personnel and human and material support to the election efforts. Co-operation has been very close in Kosovo, where OSCE verification on the ground took place in synergy with NATO aerial observation. A NATO extraction force in the FYROM had been established in parallel with the deployment of OSCE verifiers in Kosovo.

F). Co-operation with the **Western European Union** has been established in Albania, where the WEU has deployed a Multinational Advisory Police Force, whose task is to give appropriate information, advice and training to the Albanian police authorities.

G). The OSCE also maintains contacts with a number of other organizations, including several **UN Agencies** and the **Community of Independent States (CIS)**, as well as with intergovernmental groups formed on a sub-regional basis, as the Central European Initiative (CEI), the **Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)**, the **Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC)**, etc.

H). The OSCE attaches great importance to its relations with **Non Governmental Organizations (NGO)**, as they are important sources of information on the field, particularly in relation to human rights, environment, economy and security

matters. Simultaneously, the OSCE through its commitment to the development of civil societies, provides support to basic organizations working on a wide variety of issues. The main focal point of these contacts is the ODIHR, whose activities include civil society assistance programs in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, carried out in co-operation with local and international NGOs. Also NGOs participate actively in OSCE Seminars, in the Economic Forum and in other OSCE meetings. Apart from the ODIHR, several other institutions have developed close relationship with the ONG community. And naturally, the OSCE Missions maintain close contact and co-operation with NGOs in areas relevant to their mandate.

I). OSCE's Partners For Co-operation are called those countries that maintain specific relations with the Organization. In this sense, it is clear that there is a **Mediterranean dimension to European security**. Thus, already at the beginning of the Helsinki process, there was a chapter included in the "Helsinki Final Act" (1975) entitled "*Questions related to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean*", in which the participant States shared their conviction that:

"Security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with the security in the Mediterranean as a whole, and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe, but should extend to other parts of the world, and in particular to the Mediterranean area"

This was the expression of the political will of CSCE's Participant States and of the Non-Participant Mediterranean States (NPMS) –as they were initially called and later changed to Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (MPCs)- to co-operate in a number of fields. Since then, the relation between the security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean has been underscored time and time again, in CSCE/OSCE documents, in dialogues, in seminars and in meetings, which have been centered on the Mediterranean dimension of security.

A significant development in the OSCE/NPMS relationship took place with the adoption at the Budapest Summit in 1994 of an open-ended **Contact Group** at expert level within the framework of the Permanent Council, "*in order to facilitate the interchange of information of mutual interest and the generation of ideas*". Today, there are six Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, which have usually taken part, with some others, in several OSCE Seminars.

III.4.v. OSCE's CHARTER FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

On November the 19th, 1999, the OSCE's Heads of State and Government assembled in Istanbul, issued at the end of the Summit, an important document called "**Charter for European Security**", with 52-points, where it is described the organization' common challenges, common foundations, common responses, common instruments, and partners for co-operation for the years to come..

The most innovative aspects of this declaration are:

A) The adoption of a **Platform for Co-operative Security**, in order to strengthen co-operation between OSCE and other international Organizations and Institutions.

“2. The OSCE will work co-operatively with those organizations and institutions whose members individually and collectively act in a manner consistent with the modalities appropriate to each organization or institution, now and in the future”.

“Adhere to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the OSCE principles and commitments as set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, the Helsinki Document 1994, the Budapest Document 1994, the OSCE Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security and the Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the twenty-first century....”

B) To Develop OSCE’s role in Peacekeeping, to better reflect the Organization’s comprehensive approach to security.

“46. We remain committed to reinforce OSCE’s key role in maintaining peace and stability throughout our area...we confirm that the OSCE can, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, decide to play a role in peacekeeping, including a leading role..”

C) To create Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT), to enable the OSCE to respond quickly to demands for assistance and for large civilian field operations.

“42. We recognize that the ability to deploy rapidly civilian and police expertise is essential to effective conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation..”

D) To Expand OSCE’s ability to carry out police-related activities in order to assist in maintaining the primacy of law.

“44. We will work to enhance the OSCE’s role in police monitoring, police training, improving operational capabilities, providing new and modern policing skills (such as anti-drug, anti-corruption, and anti-terrorist capacities), creating a multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious composition, and promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

E) To Establish an Operation Center, in order to plan and deploy OSCE field Operations.

“43....we decided to set up an Operation Center within the Conflict Prevention Center, with a small core staff, having expertise relevant for all kinds of OSCE operations, which can be expanded rapidly when required...”

F) To Strengthen the Consultation Process within OSCE by establishing the Preparatory Committee under its Permanent Council.

“14...We are therefore determined to co-operate within the OSCE and with its institutions and representatives and stand ready to use OSCE instruments, tools and mechanisms. We will co-operate in a spirit of solidarity and partnership in a continuing review of implementation. Today we commit ourselves to joint measures based on co-operation both in the OSCE and through those organizations of which we are members, in order to offer assistance to participating States to enhance their compliance with OSCE principles and commitments.

The same day, November the 19th, 1999, another important document was signed at Istanbul: **The Platform for Co-operative security**, whose goal is to strengthen the mutually reinforcing nature of relationships between those organizations and institutions concerned with *the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area.*

Also that very day, a revised text on the **OSCE Final Act On Conventional Arm Forces In Europe Treaty** was signed in Istanbul by thirty nations parts on the Treaty.

The now revised Text of the Treaty adopts a new structure of the armaments limitations, no longer based on a “Block-to-Block” principle, but rather on “national

maximums”; it also calls for greater transparency, as the states should give more information on their armaments; and reinforce the need of acceptance by the host nation to the presence of foreign forces.

III.4.vi. CSCE/OSCE’s DECALOGUE

These are the basic Principles governing the conduct and relations of the nations members of the Organization, that were established at Helsinki in 1975 and maintained since then:

1. *Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent to sovereignty*
2. *Refraining from the threat or use of force.*
3. *Inviolability of frontiers.*
4. *Territorial integrity of States.*
5. *Peaceful settlement of disputes.*
6. *Non-intervention in internal affairs.*
7. *Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.*
8. *Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.*
9. *Co-operation among States.*
10. *Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.*

III.4.vii. OSCE’s SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS

There are some comparative advantages of OSCE in relation to other Security Institutions, as could be deduced from the previous considerations:

A) It is a very nearly **all-inclusive**. Certainly, no other institution or organization covers so completely over the pan-European area. With its 54 member states, OSCE extends over the whole region from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

B) The participation of all States is on terms of **equality**. When it is necessary to vote, all states have the right to one vote, and all votes are equal.

C) OSCE is a **flexible** Organization. No legal bounds limit the actions or the decisions taken. There is no need to consult the Charter to verify if the contemplated action is permitted: maximum value is placed on the ability to react quickly and effectively to solve the situation.

D) When an issue has to be decided, **consensus** is required. While this certainly may seem a weakness, it helps to ensure that whatever action is decided, it will be implemented.

E) Finally, OSCE represents a perfect image of how and what could be the integrated Europe of the future.

III.4.viii. OSCE's FUTURE

Without any doubt, OSCE has fulfilled an important role in promoting stability and enhance confidence among the pan-European countries. But there is still a large margin to continue exercising its role, particularly to help solve situations of internal crisis of political, economic, social, human rights or environmental nature.

Certain well-experienced voices predict an important evolution of OSCE in the coming century, to approach the type of a Regional Organization within its area, with similar functions, capabilities and responsibilities to those of United Nations on the global level.

In any case, OSCE is, and will certainly continue to be, a useful instrument for negotiations, a permanent forum for arms control, a credible referee in political controversies, and a positive peace and security promoter in the pan-European region covered by the Final Act of Helsinki.

IV. TOWARDS A ‘PAN-EUROPEAN’ SECURITY

IV.1. EUROPE, WHAT EUROPE? Where does it begin and where does it end?

Europe is our motherland. Its fertile valleys, high mountains, long smooth undulating rivers, secure ports and tempered climate have attracted for centuries many different peoples that left their cultural traces in all European institutions and in every corner of the Continent. The result of this process is a singular, unique, multicultural Europe. A splendid puzzle of the heritages of Greeks, Romans, Jews, Arabs, Turks, Slavs, Norman, Celts, Francs, Germans,. .which have all together produced the *Western Civilization*.

Today, the European citizen is a person with a strong sense of freedom and justice, proud of his culture and historical heritage and with a rationalist and innovative spirit in permanent search for the truth of the material and spiritual worlds.

This Europe is a unique and, at the same time, a multiple reality. It's unique in the basic, common, shared principles of the Western Civilization, and multiple in the diverse national singularities of language, religion, philosophy, art and history, that have all shaped the great cultural wealth of our Continent and that remain happily alive.

It is often seen the name *Europe* mentioned under different meanings: the Geographical Europe -“our Continent”-, the Conceptual or Ideal Europe, the European Union, the Common European Market, the Europe of Liberties, the Europe of Security and Defense...

First of all, what are the boundaries, the limits of physical Europe?. Could they be clearly traced?. Europe certainly is the great Western Peninsula of the Eurasian continental mass, separated from Asia by the Ural Mountains, which run from the Kara Sea at the north to the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus at the south, and that extends westwards to the Atlantic islands of Azores, Madeira, and Canary and the northern great islands of Iceland, Ireland and Great Britain. Between the iced vastness of the north and the mild climate of the Mediterranean in the south, our melted culture has been taking form during centuries. This rich and varied **geographical entity** has been present at different degrees all along the European history and should be considered as **the desirable European unity** in the future.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish the precise limits of what could be called the Conceptual or “Ideal” Europe. That is the vast multicultural entity, cradle and summit of the Western Civilization, which extends further than the geographical boundaries of the Continent, to embrace those wider spaces where people think and feel, speak and pray with the same European languages, expressing similar thinking and feelings. The Anglo-Saxon-America, the Ibero-and-Latin-America, Australia and other regions of the world are part of that “conceptual” Europe, which will enter the next Millennium with big momentum, outstanding capabilities and a great hope on its future.

But Europe is also a political construction. The European Union is now the basic foundation of an original political system, around which will be built the complete structure of the future European entity. A new generation of Europeans will live to see

how the now “fifteen member nations” give birth to a future “**All-European Nations Unity**” of nearly thirty countries, during the XXI century. It will not be easy, nor will it be reached soon, neither without difficulty, but through different degrees of compromises between countries, advancing at different speeds and on different areas, but always going toward a common set of political and social values, based on the respect of human rights and progress under the rule of law. Tony Blair’s “*third way*” could well be the “meeting point” of the different political concepts of most of those countries, because “*Europe has to find its own way by combining economic dynamism with social justice*”

But Europe is also a great “common” market. For the first time in history such a complex, vast and unified commercial, economic and monetary system is functioning, and functioning well. To such a point that has become a pole of attraction and an example to other regions of the world. Its expected expansion to the rest of candidate nations could give the European Union an almost planetary influence.

“*What is Europe?*” asks the editor of *The Economist* (12-18 Feb 2000) who, after some considerations on geography, economy and politics, answers that *Europe is a cooperative venture, is a work in progress which must constantly debate its direction, its speed and its geometry. Its goals are, or should be –he concludes- peace and prosperity in the region. For the foreseeable future, Europe will need no bigger ideas than these.*”

Last, but not least, the European Union is now, after centuries of wars and tragedies, a space of security and stability. But all the human and material wealth amassed through history by the European peoples would be spoiled if a lasting peace could not be maintained, if an Apocalyptical war could bring down again Europe to ashes. It is, thus, a must for all peoples of Europe, and particularly for its leaders, to make any necessary effort to build a strong **European Security and Defense System** that could avoid any tragedy to hamper its progress in peace into the next Millennium.

IV.2. A NEW EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

One of the most talented thinkers *on the future*, -already mentioned- Paul Kennedy, has dedicated a chapter of his book “Preparing for the twenty-first century” to *Europe and the future*, where he writes: “*A few years ago, Professor Huntington suggested that “the baton of world leadership in the next century may pass from America not to Japan, or China, but to a European Federation”... “The European Community, if it were to become politically cohesive, would have the population, resources, economic wealth, technology and actual and potential military strength to be the preeminent power of the twenty-first century.*”

If this suggestive possibility could be confirmed by other prospective studies of analysts and experts, and above all by the trends of the real world, it might give us the certitude that Europe is going to play a leading role in the world. In all circumstances, it seems evident that either American or European, the world leadership could definitively be “Western” in the century ahead.

IV.2.i. WHAT ARE THE MAIN CHALLENGES AHEAD?

In the minds of the Brussels planners, as on those of the fifteen EU member nations, the debate over its future **unity** takes precedence over such problematic questions and risks as the world population changes, the globalization of the economy, the environmental deterioration, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to which also the policy-makers will have to find the proper answers.

Thus, two questions seem to be paramount at this time:

- a) What organizational form will the European Union adopt at the beginning of the next century with almost thirty states?
- b) How will the EU react face to the transnational forces that are changing the world?.

From the early ideas and principles of the “Fathers of Europe” –Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer: *“to advance at little pas, from the basic common economic interests up to reach the most ambitious aims”*-, to today’s defenders of a more closely linked political and security structures, the *leit motiv* that has driven the European Union is to recover the leading role that it merits for its history, culture, social and economic dimensions.

Today, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice, form the skeleton of a new form of a political supranational unity, which is not a Federation nor a Confederation, but certainly an original entity, a UNION, which is trying to define its future structure, well adapted to the new era: *“The EU is not, and probably never will be, a Federation....We were not –nor are we now- trying to create “the United States of Europe”... The EU is not a Confederation... Nor does it even remotely resemble a “Unitarian State”. What is this?. Finally, we (the leaders of the 15 member states) decided that the EU is “a union of peoples”. (Felipe González, ex-Premier of Spain. in the review “Foreign Policy”. Summer 1999 :“Who is Europe”)*

However, in the transit from the present EU situation to its future political form, one of the problems to be solved is the diversity of European states’ membership to other international organizations, as it is the case of the majority of EU nations, which are also NATO members, while others like Iceland, Turkey and Norway are NATO members, but do not belong to the EU; of Ireland, which is member of the EU, but not of NATO; of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, newly members of NATO, but not yet of the EU; and of Sweden, Finland and Austria, that have recently become EU members, but are not yet members of NATO.

And this complex situation appears even more complex when other important European Organizations are taken into consideration, as the Council of Europe, the Western European Union (WEU) –with different types of membership: full members, observers, associated members and partnership members-, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), etc.

The planners and politicians that defend a strong Europe know that **full unity is the goal** or, better, **“the challenge”**, but that it will not be reached in the short term.

However, they all agree that **there is a compelling need to think and act politically as a unity, and to be ready and willing to act militarily as one.**

But, if the EU remains being what a Belgian minister defined as “*an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm*”, the historical opportunity to recover its leading role in the Western World, will have been lost for a long time. “*We acknowledge the fact –writes the Spanish ex Premier Felipe González- that the differences among the foreign policies of our countries were our greatest weakness*” Nevertheless, that situation is certainly changing, as was decided at the Helsinki Summit on the 10-11 December 1999, where the “Millennium Declaration” stated:

“New momentum has been injected in the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy with the arrival in Office of the Secretary General / High Representative, Mr. Solana. Further possibilities for action are now afforded by Common Strategies which will enable maximum coherence added value and efficiency”

Being important the EU’s economic dimension in the world market, even more important is to become and act as a single political entity in foreign affairs and security matters. If the cost of an hypothetical “non-common-European-market”, has been evaluated as a tremendous loss for the member nations, in a similar way it can be said that the “non-common foreign and security policy” has been having an increasingly greater cost to all European nations. Henry Kissinger used to say that when he wanted to call his European colleague, he didn’t know whom to telephone. But now, that situation is fortunately well behind.

As the same time, Europe has been approaching the US in overall wealth, so that many analysts think it could and should assure an ever greater share of the common allied defense. In effect, NATO-Europe GDP Defense % budget is 2,2, while NATO-North America GDP Defense % budget is 3,4, according to 1997 data (“Atlantic News n ° 3162 of 08.12.1999), which clearly means that the western side of the Alliance is over-charged with the burden of common defense. Moreover, the EU’ scientific and highly motivated military personnel, and its technical and technological structures could integrate some of the most powerful armed forces of the world, well able to perform any possible future missions.

This does not mean, in any case, any tendency to mark a distance with the North American allies but, on the contrary, the desire to share more adequately the defense burden of the Western World and to participate more actively at the decision process.

IV.2.ii. THE “GLOBAL” WORLD AHEAD

The demographic evolution in the next decades is bound to have an important effect upon the European societies and on the general stability and security of the Continent. Far from being something that Europe can safely ignore, global demographic trends can affect its social order, cause disturbances and certainly influence foreign and internal politics.

Over the short and medium term, migration from South to North through the Mediterranean Sea may become the single most permanent subject of relations and

conflicts with the Muslim and Arab populations. It is true that Europe needs immigrants to maintain its rate of economic growth, and even to compensate for the low birth rate of its population but, how could Europe avoid popular reactions against immigrants who penetrate illegally and when they do not comply with the laws and customs of the receiving state?. How could the cities retain their character if over the next decades large numbers of poor immigrants form mass ghettos there?. But, on the other hand, if a strict “European Fortress” policy were adopted, could that solve the problem of its own stagnating population, while some of the neighboring countries double every twenty-five years?

Similar conclusions about the vulnerability of Europe to events elsewhere may also be true with regard to other transnational trends. For example, some serious studies suggest and practical experience corroborate, that the Western climate is becoming drier, with decreased soil moisture affecting grain output, and hotter temperatures that could cause crops to move northward. That will hurt mainly the southern countries agriculture, although that might be partly balanced by the advances from new farming bio-techniques.

Nevertheless, Europe most serious environmental concerns come from elsewhere, particularly from the former East-bloc countries. The last decades heavy programs of industrialization imposed there, without little if any attention to the damages made to the soil, water and air, had left a legacy of poisoned lakes and streams, a soil full of chemicals and metals, unsafe nuclear plants and ravaged woodlands, which will take many years to correct.

On the positive side of the balance, however, new scientific adventures and discoveries may improve the European kind of life in the next century. The technological revolution, the robotics, the telecommunications, the space conquest, the nuclear **fusion** and other new sources of clean energy, as well as the medical science, the bio-genetics, etc., all of them will open unknown possibilities and challenges to the Europeans along the twenty-first century.

IV.2.iii. “INTEGRATIONISTS” VERSUS “CONSERVATIVES”

Turning now to the main question: to what extent a future thirty countries “**common pan-European home**” or a “**border-less Europe**” will render difficult the goal of a strong foreign policy and security of the EU?. There has always been tension between those analysts and policy makers that are in favor of a “**strong centralized EU**” (with *soft* internal and *hard* external frontiers), and those who want a “**EU of the nations**” (maintaining the national sovereignty, national sentiments and national frontiers).

To the former, “integrationists”, the EU should steadily eliminate internal differences and discriminations among its member states on tariffs, capital controls, subsidies, immigration barriers, workers transfers, civil regulations, currencies, etc., and move towards their full integration, while maintaining –and in some ways enhancing– the barriers between the EU and the non-EU member states. Because finally, they say, would there be any sense in creating a European Union if virtually everyone from the outside nations could enjoy the same rights, duties and privileges, that have taken so long and so hard to reach?.

To the “conservatives”, on the contrary, it would be preferable a less exclusive EU, as they do not consider constructive for the future to maintain walls between the EU and other nations or international bodies, like USA, the Commonwealth, the OSCE, CEI, etc. and plead, at the same time, to maintain most of the nation-state’s traditional full sovereignty.

Between these two ways of defining the idea of the future Europe, the firm internal cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and its selected openness toward the exterior, could serve as a good example.

On the whole, “integrationists” have been gaining ground with important consequences for the future of EU and for the international economy. They deny that they want to distance from the rest of the world, although their attitude generates certain mistrust among political and business circles in Japan and in USA, concerning European protectionism. However, there is no reason to forecast that a “Trade War” could replace something similar to the past antagonism of the Cold War.

As a matter of fact, both extreme positions are approaching toward a more central space, as a consequence of the open attitude of the European leaders to go ahead with the process to incorporate six new states in a short period (Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia), plus Turkey for special circumstances, and another six countries (Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta) in a second term. That means that in a few years nearly thirty countries will be members of the European Union, raising the EU’s population to about 540 million inhabitants.

IV.2.iv. THE EU: AN EXPERIMENT CLOSELY WATCHED

It is not simply for economic reasons that great attention is being paid to EU future, but because Europe is now engaged in a political experiment of enormous importance, concerning what values and in which ways the human societies base their relationship to others. As some experts in world affairs have pointed out, there is a decline in the traditional loyalties that had made nations the focal point of the political, cultural and economic identity. Instead, there is a relocation of authority, which concerns both larger (or transnational) political institutions, and smaller (regional, local, cultural) ones, as political and social leaders strive to discover what size and type of organization will fulfill best the people’s aspirations and hopes, in the near future. So, the European Union is an experiment closely observed for other nations and cultures. Are not, in fact, the upward and downward relocations of authority *complementary instead of contradictory*?

As we all know, the late twentieth century has been driven by two powerful master currents: one is pushed by technology, communications, information and trade, which tends towards an ever greater social and vast economic integration: it is *the ensemble of globalization forces*; the other is a revived tendency toward separatism, radicalism, exacerbated nationalism and religious fundamentalism, which represents *the ensemble of desegregation forces*.

Europe, and more precisely the European Union, has to be a decisive factor to impulse the constructive forces of welfare, security and prosperity which are going to be the base of a higher ethical, healthier and wealthier world ahead .

In the light of what has happened last years in world affairs – the disappearance of the URSS, the rise of the Asian “tigers”, the emergence of new nuclear powers after China, like India, Pakistan, Israel and possibly others, the demographic struggles in Africa, Asia and also in the rim of Europe!, the imbalances between North and South, the environmental damages, etc – the only alternative of Europe is to move forward to create a strong and influential Unity capable of meeting all these challenges collectively and successfully.

And also to serve as a guiding light in the future world for other countries.

IV.3.FOUR PRE-REQUISITES TO THE ESDI (EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY)

To be able to establish an efficient and coherent **European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)** there are some pre-requisites that should be implemented in due time. However, their implementation do not suppose that the ESDI will be well under way or even less that it had been established, because it will need as well the coordination with several other European Institutions, under the decided goal of leading a pan-European stability area.

IV.3.i. A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)

Among the pre-requisites, without any doubt, the first is to make reality the **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)** of the European Union, as was already proclaimed in the Maastricht Treaty and re-formulated in the Amsterdam Treaty (Art.J.7) which corresponds to Art.17 of the TEU, where it is written:

“1.The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which may lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide..”

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“2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping.”

But, what have been the results of the application of this principle up to now?. Not only there has not existed a united political front during the prolonged Balkan’s crisis, but even the coordinated action that was demanded in the Art. J.9 of the Treaty: “*Coordinated action in International Organizations*” has not always been followed by the EU’s members in the UN Security Council.

More precisely, Italy’s decision in April 1997 to organize and lead a peace enforcement mission in Albania –the **Alba Operation**, successfully completed- had

shown the lack of consensus among all European allies to implement joint action, and the little respect to the decided, desired, and needed CFSP. Judged by some possible criteria –ability to plan and act together, decision to intervene militarily, or full participation in crisis reaction- the degree of unity of the EU members on foreign policy matters, has not been up to now very satisfactory.

It is true that the designation of Mr. Solana, former Secretary General of NATO, as Secretary General of the European Council, in charge of the Common Foreign and Security Policy Mr. CFSP/PESC (Politique Extérieure et de Sécurité Commune), and appointed as well as Secretary General of the Western European Union, has been a definite step forward to accelerate the required attention of all EU members to the essential dimension of security and defense and for their joint action.. Mr. Solana had declared the 25th October 1999, at his first appearance before a commission of the EU Assembly: “*the Kosovo conflict has shown us that Europe must be able to act*”, and that “*it will be necessary to conduct a policy with less words and more action*”.

Lamberto Dini, Italy’s Foreign Minister has written (Nato Review Autumn, 99) that “*The Kosovo crisis has highlighted the need to shift the balance in favor of Europe for the future Euro-Atlantic security, by creating a credible common foreign and security policy, to give the Union a political language of its own, backed up when necessary by force*”

In effect, to implement an operative CFSP, it will be necessary to have the means to support the political and diplomatic initiatives of “Mr. Pesc” with the proper military capabilities. But it is in this field where prospects for further integration of the European allies are most doubtful. Even France, which initially urged its partners to joint in the creation of an independent European military capacity, has been afterwards very reluctant, when it seemed that its national independence could be constraint. The only major political compromise reached was to declare the WEU both “*the European pillar of the Alliance*”, and “*the defense arm of the EU*”.

At the meeting on June the 19th, 1992, in the Petersburg castle outside Bonn, the WEU leaders agreed to strengthen its operational role, in accordance with the decisions taken at Maastricht to develop the WEU as the defense component of the EU.

Four years later, at the NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin on June the 3^d, 1996, the leaders agreed –after more than two years debate- on the concept of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), developed to respond to the need for easily deployable multinational, multi-service military formations, that could be used in operations led by WEU. Even more important was the idea of establishing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance, designed to strengthen the European participation in security matters while reinforcing transatlantic cooperation.

However, in spite of all changes taking place within NATO and WEU, there are sufficient reasons to believe that Europe’s ability to back up militarily its foreign policy will remain limited, unless the insertion of the WEU into the EU takes place in time and with the desired schedule.

In fact, there are few signs that we, Europeans, are prepared to do much about the military dependence of the US. Some experts estimate that the cost of creating the military capabilities to conduct medium-scale “out-of- area” operations, -including

satellite intelligence, airborne and sea-borne headquarters, high speed big capacity air and sea transport, and enough logistic support- could be around 30 billion dollars, a figure unlikely to be added to the EU budget in a near future.

Other reason that retard this possibility and, not the least, is the fact that for nearly fifty years Europe has focused its security on the territorial defense of NATO area, which has created a kind of fixed strategic mentality, with a culture reluctant to send forces to undertake collective missions outside the NATO-European area, and without the leadership and participation of the US.

It seems, thus, that the conditions are not yet favorable for a genuine European common foreign and security policy. The question is: when will it be so? Is it a matter of time, or is it also a lack of political will?.

Up to now, the European states have been ready to transfer to the EU part of their most traditional sovereign rights in certain functional areas – economics, finances, frontiers, customs, etc.- but only when the perceived gains outweighed the estimated costs, or when the governments' preferences have converged to the point in which the potential costs and risks of taking common action seemed low, or when some fundamental principles of the political or social life of the EU, or a serious question of human rights were at stake.

The already extended number of EU members to fifteen, and the expected progressive extension up to even twenty-eight, will certainly bring a significant increase in the EU geographical and cultural diversity, and will also show big foreseeable differences in foreign policy. Is it not, then, legitimate to doubt that what was not attained at six, twelve, or fifteen members, is going to be easier with a more numerous group of states?. At the same time, wider frontiers will make the ensemble more vulnerable to regional instabilities.

So, it seems that the probable interests of all the EU members will not converge with the desired speed to make the integration of their foreign and security policies possible in the very short term. Or will they?. A very strong political will and the common decision to unite their actions are the only way to build the desired future of the Union.

IV.3.ii. THE EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP

With the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 *the European citizenship became the symbol of the democratic legitimacy of the European Union* and an useful political instrument for strengthening the liens among the persons of all the member States.

The Treaty had given to the people of the EU the juridical condition –“de jure”- of citizens, which included: *freedom of movements, the right of residence, the right of vote, to stand as a candidate at municipal and European elections, and shared diplomatic protection outside the Union*. But, even taking into account the importance of this initiative, the articles of the Treaty had not been able to transmit a strong feeling of pride and self-confidence of belonging to the European Union.

That was a consequence of the poor results of the economic and monetary policies of last decade, that moved the European meetings at Turin, Florence and Dublin to make the “*social dimension of the Union*” the central axis of the preparatory discussions of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of Amsterdam. As never before, the European Union desired to be “*the nearest possible to their citizens*” in order to answer in the best conceivable way their demands and concerns.

In fact, the Amsterdam Treaty, concluded at the end of the IGC on June the 16th and 17th, 1997, signed on October the 2nd that year and in force since May the first, 1999, certainly assumed this clear purpose of the member states. But the true question is now: has it taken place the expected, the desired and the needed advance towards the “**Europe of the citizens**”?

First of all, what is the deep meaning and real content of such “European citizenship in the **perception** of an European?”. A way to understand both meaning and content is to compare the *citizenship* of the EU with the *nationality* of a person in relation to his own state. Although these two concepts are so closely related that it is usually difficult to distinguish them, the citizenship is more properly considered as the democratic statute that gives to the person of a EU’ state an ensemble of rights and duties equal to those of the persons of the other EU’ states. Such condition does reference to the shared superior values of the community. *These values have to make the citizens feel themselves as members of the same political project, living under the same law, and taking part on the same common future of the European Union.*

The International Court of Justice has defined the “nationality” as *the legal expression of a unique lien between the individual and the state, on the base of his social condition, and as a vital connection of his interests and feelings with reciprocal rights and duties.*

In the process of the conceptual transition from “nationality” to the “European citizenship”, and because of the new great political entity of the EU, the idea of “citizenship” is enriched with an ensemble of *transnational rights and duties*, while at the same time the concept of “nationality” loses some of its local and precise meanings.

Some sociologists have expressed the idea that the European citizenship gives birth to a “post-national identity”, or even to a civil supranational society.

In any case, it seems evident that the main dispositions of the Amsterdam Treaty, in relation to the promotion of the employment and the reinforcement of the social policy, have given an increased importance to the democratic dimension of the EU. And now the legal text looks more for the progress in the social domain, than to follow the hard blind rules of the capitalist market.

Although with a slow improvement on that direction, the member states tend frequently to keep maintaining their differences, instead of reinforcing their common goals, expressed by the common European citizenship.

However, and above all, there is a vital need to enhance a strong *European feeling*, shared in common by all citizens, if we are going to be able to build **a security and defense system** that could respond to the important missions that lay ahead for Europe in the next century.

IV.3.iii. TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION

The history of the political ideas, systems and institutions would not be properly understood without the concept of “**Constitution**”, which is considered as the fundamental “rule” of any political organization, as the supreme legal structure of a collectivity. It is based on the superior values and principles of law, justice, utility, liberty, equality, democracy, human rights, etc., combined in different ways and priorities, according to the “leit motifs” of the society or the nation to which that Constitution must serve.

In the case of the European Union, could we speak of a Constitution?, or, more concretely, can the Treaties be considered as the “European Constitution?”.

According to the European Court in the “Van Gend en Loos case”, the European Community is: “*an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting parties,...a new legal order of international law for the benefice of which the states have limited their sovereign rights..*”. And in another paragraph of the same case, adds: “*Independently of the legislation of the Member States, Community Law...not only imposes obligations on individuals, but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.*”

Expressed in common words it means that in the Community (not still then the European Union) the subjects of the Treaties are not only the member states, but also their nationals.

It is argued that in Europe there is not a “Demos” (*people and/or nation*). Neither the subjective elements of a Demos –as the sense of a shared collective identity and loyalty-, nor the objective conditions that could produce them –as the kind of homogeneity of national-culture conditions on which the European tradition depend- (same religion, common language, similar sense of history, etc.), justify the existence of an European Demos.

It is evident that under that theory there is not any possibility of an European Constitution *of a national type*. But, is it necessary that the Demos be understood exclusively in terms of cultural homogeneity? Could we not separate from that tradition and to define *Demos’ membership* on the basis of shared values, on a shared understanding of rights and societal duties, on a shared rational, intellectual culture, which transcends national differences?.

The substance of an European Demos’ membership will then be a commitment to the shared values of the European Union, as expressed in its constituent documents, a commitment to the duties and rights of a civic society covering the areas of public life, a commitment to a polity which privileges exactly what is uncommon to the European states nationalism. That is to say, a commitment to those human qualities that transcend the *organic, ethnic, and cultural* differences among the nations of the European Union.

Under this concept, a person may feel as a “Spanish national” with a strong consciousness of his ethnic-cultural-historical identification, that is to feel as a member of the “Spanish Demos”, and at the same time feel as an European citizen in terms of his transnational affinities to shared values that surpass the national diversity, and that make

him subject not to any emotional identification, but to reflective, deliberate, rational choices and decisions. That is, to feel as a member of the “European Demos”.

Thus, we should not speak of the European Union as “a nation”, nor as a “melting pot”, as the Americans like to call their country, because Europe –the European Union- is not that. *“The EU is not a Federation- writes Felipe Gonzalez, ex-Premier of Spain- The EU is not “the United States of Europe”; is not a Confederation. Nor does it even remotely resemble a “Unitarian State”. Finally, we (the leaders of the EU) decided that **the EU is a union of peoples**”*

Europe remains happily committed to be a *stronger union in the diversity* among its nations and peoples. Nationality and Citizenship are thus two different concepts, but they both serve properly to the same person and to the same European Union.

The question now is, should not this singular condition of the EU and of the European person be written down in a Supreme Legal Corps –the European Constitution- that could guide the functioning the EU through its way into the twenty-first century, and be the inspiration for its citizens to live, work, and fight together, if necessary, under the same flag in the common European Forces?.

“Pour continuer d’avancer, il importe maintenant de faire de nouveau aimer l’Europe par les Européens” écrit Francis Gutmann, Ambassadeur de France

IV.3.iv. THE NEEDED EUROPEAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Of very little utility could be the three requisites previously mentioned if there were not the means to protect the life in liberty and the property of all European citizens; if the democratic institutions that have taken so long to be built by the European nations could not be allowed to progress in freedom; if the richest cultural heritage could be ruined and the cities destroyed.

That is why the **Security and Defense of Europe** becomes paramount to guarantee the lives and common patrimony of all Europeans.

And that is why at the very heart of the ESDI there will be a certain type of **European Armed Forces** (in the widest sense of a military instrument composed of Ground, Air and Naval Forces, with Head-quarters and Command and Control, Intelligence, Logistics etc, needed to fulfill their missions).

Many steps have already been given in that direction. The basic legal dispositions are in the Maastricht/Amsterdam Treaty, Art.J.7.3: *“The Union will avail itself of the Western European Union to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications”*... In addition, all WEU Members agreed at Maastricht *“ to strengthen the role of the WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defense policy within the European Union, which might in time lead to a common defense policy, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance”*. *“WEU will be developed as the defense component of the European Union, and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance”*.

Once the decision was already taken to integrate the WEU into the EU, and with the process now well on its way to implement that integration, the future of the European Armed Forces is starting to become a reality. Two main features point in that direction:

A) The Concept of **Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)**, which was launched in 1993, endorsed at Brussels in 1994 and reaffirmed in the Washington Summit 1999, reflects the decision of the Alliance to make NATO assets available, on the basis of case-by-case decisions, to WEU-led operations, mainly for humanitarian and peace-keeping actions. The wide variety of circumstances in which CJTFs might operate places considerable demands on command and control arrangements. Therefore, CJTF HQs “core staffs” are being established on a permanent basis within selected “parent” HQs of the NATO military command structure. These CJTF HQs will join with “augmentation” and “support” modules, appropriate to each particular operation, to form a CJTF HQ specifically structured to meet the requirements of the operation.

Trials and analysis have demonstrated that the CJTF concept is valuable, and NATO military authorities are now working in the full implementation issues. This process, which includes the acquisition of the necessary HQs with support and CCC equipment, is currently estimated for completion in 2004. The implementation process will take full account of the lessons learned from NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia.

B) The Assets already at EU/WEU disposal, that have been the result of the last decade awareness of the WEU future role in the European Defense. As a result of the intense activity of the WEU’ small staff from the time of starting the planning for the integration within the EU, there are now in different degrees of readiness and disposition to be transferred to the EU, the following assets:

A). The WEU Institute for Security Studies set up in on November the 13th, 1989 by the Council of Ministers, to develop the European thinking on matters related with he security and defense of the West.

B). The Agency for the Control of Armaments, set up to verify the respect of the member states’ commitments in the field of conventional, atomic, biological and chemical arms (WMD).

C). The Planning Cell, established on October the 1st 1992, to fulfill four missions: to prepare contingency plans for the employment of forces under EU/WEU auspices; to keep a list of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU); to compile an inventory of rules of engagement and operating procedures for the HQ; and to prepare exercises and evaluate their results.

In emergency and crisis situations, the Planning cell must: give the EU/WEU’s authorities its views on the practicability and nature of any involvement; prepare recommendations for the necessary CCC arrangements for each operation; coordinate the preparation for the deployment of forces under EU/WEU auspices; and monitor the situation in potential trouble spots and follow its development.

D). The Satellite Center, established on April, the 28th 1993 at Torrejon Air Base, near Madrid, is a subsidiary body of EU/WEU. It uses commercially available

imagery gathered by SPOT, LANDSAT and ERS, and will also use the high quality imagery produced by the French-Italian-Spanish “HELIOS” satellite system.

This is a very ambitious program, which counts already with two satellites, the last 1-B in orbit since December the 3rd, 1999, at 680 km of altitude with infrared capacity and high resolution. At Torrejon AB works a staff of around seventy experts and technicians.

E). The ensemble of Military Forces, placed on different degrees of availability and readiness by the member EU/WEU states, to fulfill the required missions:

1. The **Eurocorps**, integrated by forces of France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain.
2. The **Multinational Division** composed by forces of the U.K., Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
3. The **Amphibian British-Netherlands Force**
4. The **Eurofor** (Quick Reaction Force) made by formations from France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
5. The **Euromarfor** (European Maritime Force) composed of naval units from France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
6. The **HQ of the First Corps** by Germany and the Netherlands.
7. The **Amphibious Force of Italy and Spain**.
8. and **The European Air Group** integrated by units of France, Italy and the UK and recently of Spain.

This is the basic list of the inventory of the EU/WEU forces at the beginning of the year 2000, which “*should allow the European Union to manage a new crisis, like that of Kosovo, without calling for NATO’s support, if that were necessary,.. even in parallel with another operation of smaller intensity*”, according to Mr. Alain Richard, French Defense Minister, who added that: “*the EU members ought to be able to deploy for the time of a year hors EU’s territory, a ground rapid reaction force with air and naval support, equivalent to a Corps of about 50.000 to 60.000. men, 300 to 500 combat aircraft and some fifteen big combat ships.*”

In the EU’s Council Meeting at Helsinki on the 10/11 December 1999, it was said: “*The Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions, and were NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crisis. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European Army.*”

Also the Council agreed that: “*cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 30 days and sustain for at least a year military forces of up to 50.000-60.000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks*”..

That could be considered an advanced but realistic image of the future European Military Capabilities, with the vocation to become the sure support to the Foreign Security and Defense Identity of the European Union.

IV.4. ESDI: A GOAL BECOMING REALITY

The delay between the first proposition to identify the European components of NATO as something that should receive particular attention, and its concrete formulation, has been relatively short.

It was in the Treaty of the European Union, signed at Maastricht in December 1991, where the Union decided “*to define and implement a common foreign and security policy*” (Article J.1), which “*shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy...which may lead to a common defense..*” (Article J.7) and... “*The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union*”. In consequence, it will be the task of the WEU from that time on 3:.. “*to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications*”.

That supposed for the EU’s members of the Alliance to progressively assume a greater share of responsibility and participation on these matters, which will come to be known as the **European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)**.

For the first time at the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit, the Alliance leaders confirmed that the emergence of the ESDI would strengthen the European “pillar” of NATO, through the Western European Union, and stated that they were ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available for WEU’s operations undertaken by the European Allies in this context. For this purpose, the Alliance envisaged the development of capabilities which could both respond to European requirements and also contribute to the security of the Alliance. It will help the European allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defense, while reinforcing the transatlantic link.

In the Berlin 1996 Meeting the decision was taken of using “*separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities*” for WEU-led operations. On the basis of this Meeting, the European Security and Defense Identity will continue to be developed within NATO.

The process will require an increasing closer cooperation between NATO, the WEU, and the European Union, and it’s considered that under this ESDI process:

- the European allies will make a more coherent and effective contribution to the allied missions and activities, as an expression of the shared responsibilities.
- it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership, and
- it will assist the European allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a “case-by-case” basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance will not be engaged militarily, under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European allies if they were so to choose.

In 1997, with the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty, the condition of the Western European Union as an integral part of the EU was reaffirmed, *with the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide..* and also the types of operations were established, which shall include “*humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in*

crisis management, including peacemaking". All these tasks are known as "Petersberg missions" because they were established at the WEU Ministerial meeting on that German castle in June 1992.

Decisions were also taken by the WEU in Paris in May 1997 to facilitate the participation of all European Allies, not only in the conduct of WEU operations using NATO assets and capabilities, but also in the planning and preparation of such operations.

The growing closeness of NATO and WEU raised the debate of the consequences that ESDI would mean for NATO. In December the 7th, 1998, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote in the London Financial Times an article titled "The right balance will ensure NATO's future" where she advised that the Europeans should try to skirt three potential dangers in relation with NATO: a) the strategic **D**e-linking; b) the **D**uplication of force structures; and c) the **D**iscrimination among interested European states. These three "D", would be widely discussed and tried to be answered in the following months.

A great impulse was given to the process of developing the ESDI in the Summit bilateral talks of French President Chirac and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair in Saint Malo on December 1998, where questions were raised on the effectiveness and credibility of Europe's role in the world so long as the EU failed to back its words with military action.

Almost from the beginning of the process, the Alliance has been engaged in fulfilling the commitments to strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance in concrete terms. The process to advance in that direction has been marked by regular joint six-month meetings of NATO and WEU's Councils, where subjects as: the arrangements for NATO assets to be available to WEU; the mechanisms for the release, monitor and return to NATO of those assets; the joint planning; the requirements for WEU-led operations, etc., have been discussed and pre-established.

In the Washington Communiqué, on 24 April 1999, titled "**An Alliance for the 21st Century**", an important part was dedicated to the European dimension of the Alliance: "*..we reaffirm our strong commitment to pursue the process of reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance..*". And all NATO's Heads of State manifested their satisfaction for the way in which the key elements of the Berlin decisions were being considered, mainly "*the selection of a European NATO Commander and NATO HQ for WEU-led operations..*".

Among the decisions or intentions expressed at that Summit were:

- To acknowledge the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action, when the Alliance is not engaged.
- To promote an effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency.
- To support the determination of EU members and other European allies to strengthen their defense capabilities.
- To ensure the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led crisis operations, and
- To define and adopt the necessary arrangements for the EU access to collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance.

One of the fundamental principles that were underlined during the Washington Summit was that: **27. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible**". It is this respect that the Alliance' support for the ESDI takes all its sense:

30. *"...On the basis of the decisions taken by the Alliance ,...the ESDI will continue to be developed within NATO. ..It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance, in Berlin 1996 and subsequently, the ESDI will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if appropriate, the EU. It will enable all European Allies to make a coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were to choose.*

It has been considered of particular interest to mention literally this paragraph of the Strategic Concept for **"An Alliance for the 21st century"**, because it clearly shows the direction to be followed to make reality the **"European pillar"** of the Alliance. To that goal many decisions and actions will have to be undertaken, and among them: to carry the CJTF operational concept to the stage of operational reality; to identify and prepare the *"separable but not separate"* forces, staffs and assets best suited to EU/WEU-led operations; to provide the necessary flexibility to bring non-NATO members, -mainly EU' neutrals, and non-EU NATO ones-, into the ESDI and CJTF; to joint them to the associated planning, when contributing to specific operations; and to overcome the difficulties of confidentiality/transparency in opening the NATO intelligence to non-Allies Europeans.

One of the main difficulties that the political and military staffs leading the process will encounter to the advance toward an integrated European pillar of security and defense, is the different status of each country in relation to its formal compromises on the three involved Organizations: NATO, EU and WEU.

In effect, there are:

- NATO allies, but not Europeans: US and Canada,
- EU members and NATO allies: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK.
- EU members but non-NATO allies: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden.
- NATO, EU and WEU full members: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK.

This basic list becomes more complicated when the differences in WEU's membership (full member, observer status, associated member and associated partner) are taken into consideration, as well as when those countries aspirant to NATO association, EU's candidates, EAPC and PFP partnership are also counted.

Based on the Köhl Declaration and on an annexed report prepared by the German Presidency, on the 3-4th June 1999, the EU announced that:

"Today, it has been given the depart signal for the inclusion of the WEU in the EU. **It represents a great step in the history of the EU.**

-the EU would try to give itself the means for direct military action within the spectrum of the "Petersberg tasks" with or without the use of NATO assets, it but has no

intention to take under its responsibility the main missions of NATO –which are the collective defense of the territory of its members- but to play instead an active role in crisis management,

-the Europeans should strengthen their national, bi-national and multi-national defense capabilities, and their defense industrial collaboration to this end;

-that the EU members will assure the mutual consultations, cooperation and transparency of relations EU-OTAN

-and that measures to set in place for the necessary EU assets and decision-making structures, must be ready for implementation before the end of year 2000.

“In that event, the WEU as an organization would have completed its purpose”.

One of the most important events to consolidate the European pillar on these matters, was the designation on October the 18th,1999, of Javier Solana, -former Secretary General of NATO- as M. PESC/Mr.CFSP, High Representative for EU Common Foreign and Security matters, Secretary General of the European Council and at the same time Secretary General of the Western European Union. This decision to joint under a single authority all matters related to foreign policy, including security and defense issues, will certainly increase the chances for a smooth transition of the WEU into the EU, as well as for the relationship between NATO and the EU.

It seems, however, that among some political analysts exists the concern of the risks that lie in dismantling too quickly part of that valuable experience that WEU had got “during the long crossing of the desert”. To avoid those risks , all care should be taken to maintain the “know how”, the valuable experience of the WEU, and the formal, legal and friendly liaisons established among the twenty-eight countries –members, observers, associated and partners- that have made the force of the WEU during the last years.

One of the most recent actions of the EU has been its support of the South-East Europe Stability Pact, which could bring Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia closer to a future integration. This has been a clear demonstration of the open EU/WEU attitude toward a wider European security area, which may avoid the situation where European countries wanting to be part of the EU/WEU’s security and defense role –and even of joining the EU- had to pray NATO to be considered “good defense Europeans”, rather than from the EU itself.

Among the problems of staff or operational nature that are on the way to the full incorporation of WEU into the EU are:

a) the handling of highly classified NATO military materials, including intelligence, communications, industrial and armament information, etc.

b) the strengthening of operational capability –considered also as a goal in the NATO’s Capability Defense Initiative (CDI)- which covers all the “gaps” signaled during the “audit” carried out by WEU during 1999: mainly projection capability, interoperability, C4I, and sustainability.

c) the necessity to increase the national defense expenditure to make face to the new needs for any semi-autonomous operation, or at least to stop the decline of last years in the military budget of most European countries.

d) the process of *convergence* among all allies and member countries toward common procedures, operational plans and armaments.

e) the attention to the European armament industry, which will have to be strengthened to support the updating and compatibility of the different equipment of the European armed forces.

But there is a more delicate question: the legal situation of certain countries in relation to Article V of the Brussels Treaty, which establishes the *automatic military response* in case of attack to any one of its ten full members. Thus, is it considered difficult by some experts to develop a true European Security and Defense Identity into NATO, if it does not cover all European Allies (mainly those that are not yet members of the EU, as Turkey, Norway, Island, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary). But that difficulty could be solved by an additional Protocol signed by these WEU countries and open to the adhesion of other nations with WEU Observer status: Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Anyhow, to eliminate this Article V of the WEU, could be interpreted as a sensible lost in terms of solidarity.

Recently, the Conclusions of the European Council meeting at Helsinki on the 10-11 December, 1999, were a clear demonstration of the will to advance decisively toward the building of a true pillar for the European Defense and Security, able to prepare, launch and conduit EU operations in response to international crisis. On that meeting it was decided to be able by 2003 to deploy and sustain for a period of a year military forces up to 50.000–60.000 persons capable to the full range of Petersberg tasks. And to develop modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO.

The difficulties of these multiple questions could not represent any insurmountable obstacle for the ESDI, because the prize that a direct, frank and close relationship NATO/EU as the two basic pillars of the common security of the Western World, is worth all efforts.

IV.5. THE EURO-CENTRED SYSTEM OF SECURITY

Along the previous pages the topics “Security”, “Defense” and “Europe” have been cited many times. It’s now moment to discuss the word: “System”, and to put it in connection with the other three to explain the content of the expression: “**The European Security and Defense System**” (ESDS).

According to the definitions given by common dictionaries, and particularly by the OXFORD English, a System is: I “*an organized or connected group of objects*”; II “*a set of things connected, associated, or independent, so as to form a complete unity*”, and also III “*a whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to some schema or plan*”. Other dictionaries define a System as “*an ensemble of ideas coordinated or reduced to a short number of principles, which pursuit activities of a certain type*”. For our purpose, in the following pages, **the System is a group of International Organizations, all serving common principles and values, connected, associated or independents, aiming to reach and maintain a level of stability, security or defense in the region covered by them, enough to prevent, impede or coerce any open conflict.**

Our intention is now to study the availability of such a system based in establishing a meaningful, coherent and efficient relationship among all Organizations and activities related to the security of Europe.

IV.5.i. THE LONG MARCH TOWARD A BETTER AND SAFER EUROPE

To advance in this direction had been a permanent desire –always delayed or denied by the circumstances- of the Western leaders, since the aftermath of WWII when they immediately began their joint efforts to recover Europe from the human and material bankrupts of the most devastating struggle the world had ever suffered.

This process had taken from the beginning two different orientations: A) towards the building of a solid military defense, in order to avoid a new war on the Continent; and B) towards a steady economic and industrial recovery to raise Western Europe to the leading position which it merited.

A) On the field of security and defense, successive institutions were set up to counter the Soviet threat. From the Dunkirk Treaty (1947), passing through the Brussels Treaty (1948), the Washington Treaty (1949), the Western European Union (1955), the Partnership For Peace (1992), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1997), up to the lately European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), there have been continuous efforts to improve the security and defense of Western Europe.

B) For the economic and industrial recovery of Europe, the process started with the Marshall Plan (1947), followed by the Coal and Steel Community (1951), the Common Market (1957), the Euratom and CECA, the European Union (Maastricht,1992), the CIG (Amsterdam,1997), and the Amsterdam Treaty (May, 1999).

All along this double lengthy process, two other important Institutions were set up, aiming to improve the freedom, justice, and respect for human rights, among and inside the European nations, as well as to diminish the tensions and disputes left by the war between countries of the two sides. They were the Council of Europe (1949), and the Conference for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 1 August 1975 and OSCE, 1 January 1995).

The convergence of the Security and Defense process and of the Economic Industrial one, aided both by the positive actions of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, have permitted to arrive at our days in conditions to consider the possibility of a **global** system aiming to the security, defense and prosperity of Europe. That is why more frequent contacts and institutional relations have intensified during last years between NATO-WEU, WEU-EU, NATO-EU and of NATO, EU, WEU and OSCE with EACP, PFP, and other Organizations and nations of Europe (Russia, Ukraine, etc).

After the Balkans conflicts (1991-2000+), and mainly due to them (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo,..), the NATO and WEU allies and other European countries have felt the need to take the necessary steps to joint their efforts in such a coordinated way that an efficient response could be pre-established to prevent, impede or coerce any new conflicts in Europe, or on its “near abroad”.

That is the reason why WEU –according to the dispositions of the Amsterdam Treaty in Title V- is now in a process of being incorporated into the EU, and that is also why NATO has fostered the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), so as to let Europeans take all responsibility to plan and conduct operations type “Petersberg”, when the Alliance as such could not, or would not desire to intervene, and to have the

possibility to use the means and installations assigned to NATO, according to pre-established criteria, and in base to the CJTF operational concept.

A very important event on this long march toward the full recovery of Europe as a strong entity in the world politics, economic and military areas, has been the designation on the 18th October 1999 of Mr. Javier Solana as Mr. CFSP/PESC, Secretary General of the European Council, High Authority for Foreign Policy and Security, and at the same time Secretary General of the WEU.

IV.5.ii. THE EURO-ATLANTIC-EASTERN REGION

If we could take some minutes to regard the Northern Hemisphere above the 36° parallel in North America, over the 40° in Europe and over the 46° in Asia, we might see that most nations of this vast region are included in which is usually called in common politico-military language as the “pan-European”, the “Euro-Atlantic” or the “Euro-Asian” area. In effect, the half hundred countries existing there are members or partners to several important International Organizations, that were born –as already mentioned—to strengthen the wrecked situation of Europe after WWII, and to avoid any new military adventure. Would that military conflict start, the existing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missiles in the area, if employed, could mean the end of the history of our Continent, as we would like to imagine it.

Luckily, the efficiency shown by most of these Organizations had made it possible for us to live now in a democratic, highly developed and peaceful Europe. Nevertheless, the last ten years have shown in the Balkans and the Caucasus, that nothing so valuable as peace can be taken for granted, so that continued efforts and heavy resources will still be necessary to maintain security and allow the return to normal life in that part of Europe. That is why all nations and Organizations in Europe must play an active, decided role to strengthen peace, to prevent risks and to avoid conflicts.

It is evident that all share the basic principles of democratic societies, where the security, prosperity, the rule of law and the respect of human rights, are the basis above which all progress are possible. But they logically differ on the goals, means, priorities, or the “*tempo*” to reach their aims, which make them different.

Having the majority of these Institutions many countries in common, and extending their influence over several areas of the same vast pan-European region, *could it not be possible to establish some level of coordination and cooperation among their activities, procedures, or structures, to avoid any useless opposition, lacks of efficiency, or even unnecessary risks?*

VI.5.iii. WHAT I.G.O.s SHOULD BE COORDINATED?

The perspective, the point of view, or *the center of gravity* of the coordinated efforts on behalf of the security and welfare of the whole region, could evidently be either Western-Atlantic, Center-European or Eastern-European. But, let’s consider first those Organizations whose coordination would be desirable.

According to the UN Charter, it is the Security Council on behalf of the United Nations General Assembly, which holds the “*primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security*”(art.24), and consequently it will have to take action either by itself or by means of other UN subordinate bodies, to mediate or to intervene when the situation reaches a level of tension, crisis or conflict that so requires. However, the UN has a *global responsibility*. But, *what about the pan-European region?*. Let’s review, in syntheses those Organizations with interests or responsibility on European security..

A) **The Treaty of Brussels**, created in 1948 by six countries to raise the capacity of Western nations together to deter and resist any new military conflict. During the last fifty years it has passed through alternating periods of low and high activity. Now, as the Western European Union (WEU), it counts a total 28 nations, of which 10 are full members, 6 associated members, 5 observers and 10 associated partners. At this time, WEU has its seat in Brussels and is engaged in an accelerated process to become integrated into the European Union,

B) **The Council of Europe**, founded in 1949, with seat in Strasbourg, counts now 40 members, including Russia with its former Republics, plus some nations as observers like USA, Canada and the Holy See. Its aims are to protect human rights, pluralist democracies, the European cultural identity and to seek solutions to the problems facing their societies, as the protection of minorities against xenophobia, intolerance, etc.

C) **The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**, created in 1949 with initial seat in Washington, counts now nineteen members and forecast to increase their number in the coming years. Its goals are to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization, which are founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

D) **The European Union (EU)**, was set up in 1951 as the CECA (La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier) with its seat at Luxembourg. Its aims were, on the first epoch, to foster the economical and industrial recovery of Western Europe, and later to strengthen Europe’ political unity among the fifteen members, with the project to incorporate up to thirteen more, so to be able to speak with a single voice in the international polity, and to establish a common security and future defense system.

E) **The CSCE/OSCE** founded in 1975 at Helsinki by 35 members, counts now 54 nations of Europe, North America, Russia and Central Asia. Its goals were initially to deepen relations among the, at the time, antagonist and neutral nations, to improve the security in Europe and to advance in the process of cooperation. In the “Charter for European Security” (19 November 1999), OSCE has decided to advance further steps in its commitment to strengthen European security. Its main seat is in Vienna.

F) **The Community of Independent States (CIS)** was set up in 1991 at Minsk (Belarus) after the disappearance of the URSS. It counts now eleven nations besides the Russian Federation, and its aims are to foster cooperation in all matters among the member Republics.

G) **The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)**, established in 1992 with seat in Copenhagen, is formed by eleven states with the aim to foster cooperation among all those countries that are on the bank of the Baltic Sea.

H) **The Partnership for Peace (PFP)** created in 1992 with seat in Brussels, was a efficient way to help individual nations to approach the Western Organizations (NATO and EU). It includes 24 partners as well as those 19 NATO members. They work bilaterally NATO-partner, on subjects related to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic region.

I) **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)** -previously NACC-was established in 1997 and counts now 44 partners. It has also its seat in Brussels. It’s intended to serve as a forum and as an institutional link between NATO and the Central European and Eastern countries, to oversee the process of developing closer institutional links among them, and to cooperate on security subjects at all levels.

J) Other Organizations that have an important role on European matters –although not always directly related to security issues- are the **Nordic Council**, the **Economic Cooperation of the Black Sea**, the **Visegrad Group**, the **South-West Cooperation Initiative** and the **Organization of Central Asia**, with Turkey as the leader nation.

K) Last, but not least, many Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) play an important role in Europe, participating in many activities related with its stability and security, and at some time they should be incorporated to prevent or avoid the causes or consequences of conflicts.

IV.5.iv. WHERE SHOULD THE MAIN SEAT BE?

All these International European Institutions have their main or secondary seats on important capitals of their respective regions. Thus, the cities of Washington, London, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Copenhagen, Bonn, Istanbul or Moscow may be signaled as possible candidates to be chosen as cities for the main or secondary seats of the proposed system. It seems almost evident that, of all of them, clearly Brussels occupies a central geographical position and it's at the same time the main seat of NATO, EU, WEU, EACP and PFP, as well as the seat of many important IGOs and NGOs..

Thus, Brussels appears to be a good -even the best- place and a focal point of view for the seat of a **European-centered security and defense system.**

IV.5.v. THE COORDINATING ORGANIZATION

For the first time in half a century, an original form of political institution, the **European Union**, has full authority on political, legal, economical and military matters to act on foreign policy and on the interior questions of Western Europe, with possibility to exercise *influence* over those other Organizations that exist in the whole pan-European area.

Its main executive organs –**the European Council and the European Commission**- with the High Authority of Foreign Security and Defense Policy dispose of a high specialized corps of experts with the appropriate bureaucratic instruments to be able to coordinate and harmonize the activities of other Organizations with institutional interest or responsibility to promote peace and security in Europe.

At the same time, the EU's recently created interim Military Committee, Military Staff and military means, will allow to plan, organize and conduct limited–level operations with or without NATO assigned forces and facilities, according to the kind of conflict to be solved, and with the recent experience of the CMX/CRISEX 2000.

In this aspect, the military structure of the WEU, now being incorporated to the EU, is an important asset that allows the participation of planning staffs of other nations and the reception of units from other nations or Organizations to a joint operation.

Thus, the unique Organization that has all the required assets to be “*willing and able*” to act efficiently to prevent or solve crisis situations –sort of war- in the Western-Euro-Eastern Region, is the **European Union with the integrated Western European Union**.

IV.5.vi. ACTIVITIES TO COUNTERACT AN EVOLVING CONFLICT

It may be interesting to consider the successive steps of a typical conflict, along its evolutionary trajectory, from the initial phase of alert a raising tension, through the crisis, intervention, decreasing violence, to finally return to the initial situation, in order

to consider how and when closer contacts, mutual aid and reciprocal support should take place among the responsible Organizations to counter the worsening situation.

The most characteristic activities or attitudes of the ruling Organization to respond to the evolution of such a typical conflict – although there are not two equal conflicts- may be the following:

Early Warning, Good offices, Mediation, Negotiation, Arbitration and Conciliation, Sanctions, Economic and Humanitarian aids, Demilitarized zones, Arms embargoes, Disarmament, Confidence building measures, Pre-emptive police or military deployment, Peacekeeping, Show or Use of military force, Forceful military intervention, Cease-fire, Armistice, Peace agreements, Aids to reconciliation and to reconstruction, Social and economic aids.

It will be on each of these answers to the evolutionary stages of the conflict where the Institutions ought to work together, under the coordinate direction of the European Union to diminish or stop the escalation of the raising crisis.

IV.5.vii. A MINIMUM PERMANENT SECURITY FORUM

It should not be wise to set up a new bureaucratic structure to give appropriate response to this need of a coordinated response to any critical situation that could arise in the pan-European area, as we have just seen how densely charged is Europe of well structured Organizations. But, on the contrary, nothing can work efficiently without a minimum of institutional structure.

That is why a kind of a **General European Forum or Conference** with a minimum of representation of the other Organizations should be set up **on the seat and under the sponsorship of the European Union** to maintain permanent contact to exchange information, contrast opinions and establish, if possible, common attitudes and take decisions in the fields of stability, security and defense of the pan-European space.

This type of permanent personal contact at the level advisable to each particular situation in progress, could allow to all authorities responsible to be informed in real time of the feelings and actions taken or forecasted by all subjects and actors on the European scene. For that General European Conference it could serve as an example, the starting period of the CSCE, where no legal or juridical bonds existed, but with the political decided purpose to work towards a more secure Europe.

V. WAR AND FEAR OR PEACE AND HOPE?

V.1. THE ATTACK/DEFENSE WAR OF THE FUTURE

To know how the military affairs will look like in the next century we need to answer several questions, like: Will it change the *nature* of warfare?. Will it change the *structure* of the Armed Forces?. Will it be necessary to change the type of *professional soldier*?. Will it, as a consequence, change the nations' power position?, etc.

A) A fundamental change in warfare would mean a shift in the traditional relation between *offense* and *defense*, between *space* and *time*, between *fire* and *movement*.

A common military saying is now that “*what can be seen today on the modern battlefield can be hit, and that what can be hit, will be destroyed*”. In fact, the introduction of long range precision weapons –bombs or missiles- delivered by aircraft or launched from ships or ground systems, together with *intelligent mines* that can be activated from remote locations, means that sophisticated armies can inflict unprecedented levels of destruction on any target, whether large armored forces on the move, or on fixed protected sites.

When all countries gain access to the new forms of air power intelligence – *space-based reconnaissance*, and *unmanned aerial vehicles*-- the efforts to hide large-scale armored movements or to conceal safe rear areas will become useless or almost impossible. Another important change ahead is that the platform has become less valuable than what it carries –sensors, intelligent munitions, electronics, computers-. and also that the time of launching an attack has become critical, because the first blow can prove to be decisive. *The value of time, thus, has changed.*

A new form of combat, *the information warfare* –including the sabotage of computer and communications systems- is emerging. The information attacks to our modern sophisticated and vulnerable society, could have many purposes: blinding, intimidating, diverting, or confusing, and could be directed against either the civil structure of society –its political, economical, financial, and environmental sectors- or against its military forces and defense system. How such wars, -initiated by “*information strikes*”-, would develop in the future is a matter of great uncertainty.

B) In the recent past, and even more in the future, *the balance between quality and quantity of the armed forces* has shifted dramatically in favor of quality. And it has not been for economic reasons, that many countries gave up conscription to turn into professional armies. After a reign of almost two centuries, the era of mass military forces –manned by short service conscripts and equipped with enormous quantity of armaments, is coming to an end. It has been the need of fully professional men to man the everyday more costly and sophisticated weapons, that has produced the change.

The future military structure will be based on an increasingly *joint forces*, or at least on a less service-oriented forces. In many countries, the traditional divisions into armies, navies, and air forces has already begun to break down. Not only have air operations become inseparable from almost any action on the ground or at sea, but even

the naval forces will increasingly deliver fire and cruise missiles against a wide range of far away ground targets.

Also “quasi-services” known as “*special forces*” have begun to emerge. Even regular army infantry formations have adopted the tactics of *special forces*. *That is to say, small units, dispersed, well armed, with extensive fire support brought from the air, sea, or far rear areas, and ready to deploy almost instantly, with all its armament and equipment..*

C) Another structural change is on the way. If in the classical organization chart of an Army Corps of the 1950’ showed a pyramidal structure, very similar to that of any leading commercial corporation or institution of that time, today the modern enterprise has stripped out layers of middle management, reduced or even eliminated many of the functional and social distinctions between management and labor, and abolished the policy of long term employment of personnel at the same posts. However, most military organizations have not yet done this. Military management still consists of General Officers, Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers, and although they performed different tasks that those during WWII, they still operate today within the rank, deference, and pay structures of a bygone time. So that the *radical revision of the military command structures* will be the manifestation of a deep change in military affairs, which will perhaps be the most difficult to implement.

D) In a period of rapid evolution in the conception and conduct of war, different kinds of people, -and not simply of the same kind differently trained- will rise to the top of the armed services. In the Air Forces of the Western countries, for example, their organizations were dominated in the 50’s and 60’s, by bomber and fighter pilots respectively. But now the number of General Officers in important positions, who are not combat pilots, has risen. *Missiles experts, electronic, communication and computers engineers, etc., will be also at the top of the hierarchy.* The new technologies will increasingly bring to the high levels of the forces experts in all those fields, and a fair percentage of them, sooner or later, will be female.

The professional and cultural challenge for the military organizations and for their elite soldiers will be to maintain a combatant spirit and the intuitive understanding of war that goes with it, even when their leaders are not, in large part, warriors themselves. Different eras of warfare give rise to different styles of military leadership. And one of the clear consequences will be the delegation of greater authority to the lowest levels of command, although this is something difficult to implement.

E) The contemporary revolution in military affairs offers great opportunities to countries that can afford to acquire *modern weaponry* and master the skills to use it properly. However, the transformation in one area of military affaires does not mean the irrelevance of others. Just as nuclear weapons did not render conventional power obsolete, this technological revolution will not render guerrilla tactics, terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction useless. Indeed, the reverse might be true.

F) Revolutionary changes in the art of war stem not simply from the ineluctable march of technology, but from an adaptation of the military instrument to political purposes. Moreover, in peace time, military institutions will normally evolve rather than submit to radical change. World politics, in that sense, will also shape the revolution in military affairs as, for example, is the case of the predominance of

conventional warfare for limited objectives. Until the end of the Cold War, the possibility of total war dominated the planning of the USA and URSS military establishments. But, with it seems that *military conventional actions for limited goals seems more likely to be the type of war in the years ahead.*

G) Military power remains important in some domains of international relations. The **information technology** has some effects on the use of force that benefit the small states, and some others that benefit the powerful ones. The “*off-the-shelf*” commercial availability of equipments that used to be of costly technology benefits small states, but increases the vulnerability of the great ones. Information systems are lucrative targets for terrorist groups. However, the revolution in military affairs caused by applications of the information technologies, --*as space-based sensors, direct broadcasting, high speed computers, and complex software-*, provide the ability to gather, process, transfer, and disseminate information to the high command and to the units operating on a wide area, in a such a way that instant knowledge of the situation allows a rapid strategic or tactical decision. That dominance of the battlespace awareness, combined with the precision effects of “intelligent armaments”, gives the commander the most powerful advantage. *This conception of interconnecting all information systems available in a given area, was developed by Admiral Owens (former vice-Chief of the US JCS), and is known as “the system of systems”.*

In the nineteen and early twenty centuries, the saying went that God had not always been on the side of the bigger battalions, but the victory usually was. Now, it could certainly be said that *technology is the last God’s creature to fight and win the battle.*

V.2. THE “NUKE ERA”

Towards a *zero-tests?*, or even towards a *zero-weapons* goal?

We all know that we live at risk. Nuclear, chemical, biological, and environmental disasters may happen in some part of the world at any time. Do not show the probability laws the inevitability of tragic events, like that of Chernobil?. The “Murphy law” expresses the same idea in more simple words: “*What may happen, will some time happen*”. It’s true that the nuclear era has represented the biggest jump in scientific history, but its effects have been even greater and far reaching in the political and security fields, than in the mere scientific areas.

The first use of the new energy for military purposes, half a century ago over two Japanese cities, had brutally shown the power of the atom released forces. Those nuclear bombings had probed their efficacy to end a war, and during the Cold War their threat capacity was able to preserve world peace, although at great risks.

But once the “Pandora Box” had been open, nothing could locked it again, as the ancient *myth* said, announcing that *big troubles would plague mankind for a long time.*

So, we are sentenced “*to live nuclear*” forever, sharing hopes and fears that such a tremendous force of nature in the hands of men could lead us to a new era of rightful universal reason. The **nuclear** is the sign of our era, for good or for bad, for the best or

for the worst. And our future will be nuclear-dimensional in many fields of human thinking, knowledge, experience and activity, and very precisely in those of security, defense and war. That is like a permanent *Damocles' Sword* suspended over the heads of millions of people.

NATO, Russia, U.K., and France are nuclear European powers, either as owners of weapons, or as authorized users of their allies' nuclear weapons in case of war. That is considered for many other nations a privileged situation, which is encountering a growing critical general opinion. In effect, is it reasonable that non-nuclear countries voluntarily renounce to get their own nuclear weaponry, while others continue to enjoy their overwhelming power?.

To avoid the dreadful proliferation of new nuclear-armed powers, it will be necessary that definite steps be taken by the international community represented by the UN, and most precisely by those nations that are already nuclear powers. Two measures seem possible: a) **to keep the process of reduction of the nuclear arsenals** going down to the minimum level compatible with their national or allied essential security needs, and b) to renounce to the **“the first-use”** of that armament in case of crisis or conflict. If these two measures are not taken, it is possible –or even certain- that the number of nations non signatories of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and even some of those who have signed it but have not yet ratified, could change their position and decide **“go nuclear”**, as recently did India, and Pakistan, and might others do the same, while at the “waiting list”.

The most recent declaration of the Atlantic Alliance at the Washington Summit of 23rd April 1999, affirms that *“the fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Alliance is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war”*. For that purpose, NATO nuclear forces *“will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability”*

At the present and foreseeable future in Europe, the circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons might be contemplated are extremely remote. In any case, those NATO weapons no longer target any country, because *“the Alliance does not consider itself to be any country's adversary.”*

It's true that effective steps have been taken by NATO and Russia to respond to the new security environment, as the elimination of nuclear artillery, ground launched short range nuclear missiles, and the decrease on the readiness status for the nuclear forces in their contingency plans.

According to reliable documents the size of the nuclear arsenals has decreased dramatically: On NATO's side the deployment of US tactical weapons has declined from about 7.000 assigned to the three Services, to only 180 gravity bombs to be launched from aircraft. On Russia's side it has withdraw thousands of tactical nuclear weapons from Central and Eastern Europe, back to its own territory. U.K. has also retired its air-based systems, and only retains its nuclear-missile submarines. France, for its part, has dismantled its land based nuclear missiles (*le plateau d'Albion*).

The question now is: Will all that be enough to consider already reached the desired level of *nuclear risk reduction* in Europe?. And, will all that be enough to stop the nuclear proliferation on other parts of the world?

The fact that the US Senate has rejected the ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty lets free many nations to continue their tests or even to go ahead with the production of nuclear weapons. However, if all the powerful nations made a formal declaration of “**no first use**” of their nuclear weapons, it could certainly have a great impact on those “still no-nuclear” nations, convincing them to change their trend to denounce or not to join the NPT.

That policy of “**no first use**” will approach the nations to the ideal situation of a world free of the terrible fear of a future global nuclear war.

It seems reasonable, with the dramatic memories of two World Wars on Europe still alive, and with the world engaged in an ambitious globalization process, to ask for **a progressive reduction to zero of the nuclear arsenals, encompassing the parallel increase on world security**. It certainly is an ambitious and very difficult goal, but it would show that mankind had finally reached the majority of age.

V.3. WMD: THE NEXT CENTURY’S NIGHTMARE

Of all the risks, dangers and threats that will endanger the European nations and their populations during all the coming century, no one can compare with that represented by the **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)**, including nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical arms, and the long-range ballistic missiles able to project them to distant areas.

Simply expressed, the WMD is the most complex and fundamental menace to the world’s security in the years ahead. The use of these weapons, or even the threat of their use, will change the context in which important decisions have to be taken. We can say that since the Hiroshima bomb attack “*the genie is out of the bottle*”, and to avoid its fury many efforts have to be done to encourage a serious search for effective means to prevent the proliferation of those deadly weapons.

The number of countries capable of obtaining the technology and materials needed to produce those weapons is growing. Despite certain success in impeding proliferation, the post-Cold War period is characterized by an always larger list of states already possessing, or trying to acquire, such weapons and their delivery systems. The relative discipline of the “bipolar” Cold War relationship has been replaced in several areas of the world by the multiplication of regional arms races, including the WMD.

In the Persian Gulf and the Middle East there seems to be little limits on the ambitions of certain unstable actors to acquire the most advanced and deadly weapons available, including WMD and long range missiles. These weapons are perceived not only as a measure of real political and military power, but also as status symbol for the pursuit of their hegemonic objectives. India, Pakistan, Iran and Irak, as well as Israel, have already either fully developed nuclear weapons, or the capability to assemble and deliver them in short notice using ballistic missiles developed and produced by them.

In addition, there is a growing concern about WMD coming into the hands of terrorists and organized crime groups, which have proliferated in recent years.

As an example, it can be mentioned a partial loss of control over the former URSS's stocks of nuclear material, that led to fears that crime elements could begin to traffic in these materials, as they have already done in other arms.

Some potential proliferating countries are pursuing active development programs on chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW), while at the same time progressing on the nuclear weapons (NW) field. The (CW) and (BW) have a number of advantages over the (NW), as it is their cost. In effect, as the expense of producing large quantities of Chemical Weapons can be substantial, a small arsenal can be acquired relatively inexpensively. Also Biological Weapons are a low-cost option, in part because their suitability for unconventional delivery. Besides that, these Biological Weapons are much more lethal than a similar quantity of Chemical Weapons. A small stockpile of biological warheads can have a devastating effect over a densely populated area..

At the same time, the materials and technologies required to produce (CW) or (BW) are of dual civilian and military use and *widely available "off-the-self"*, due to their employ in commercial purposes. There is another advantage of (CW) and (BW): their development programs are much easier to conceal from outside inspectors, and more secure from air strikes, as their production facilities do not have distinct signatures, as those of the (NW), and can be concealed in relatively small spaces, even within legitimate chemical or pharmaceutical industrial plants.

Finally, the majority of WMD proliferators see the ballistic missiles as their best delivery systems. But, as cruise missile technology becomes available with navigational aids, such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), cruise missiles will become more attractive as a low-cost but most highly effective delivery system.

What should be done?

The diffusion of advanced technologies has become exceptionally difficult to control, despite the strengthening of export restriction regimes directed to prevent WMD and missile proliferation, as was illustrated in the case of Iraqi nuclear weapons program. As with Arms Control Treaties, export controls can be an important non-proliferation tool but, by themselves, will not stop aggressive nations.

Another approach used has been diplomatic dissuasion, as a permanent element of Western WMD policy, which has given fairly good results in the past and has to be employed consistently in the future.

Still **deterrence** is a sound method to maintain WMD proliferation under control. The logic of deterrence still applies: if those who would contemplate the use of WMD against the Western targets know that this is likely to result in a quick, sure, and devastating retaliation, they may well consider the price of such actions to be unacceptably high. And consequently, they would assess the relatively limited interest of pursuing WMD programs, which require, as well as the proper weapons, sophisticated command-and-control facilities and complex measures to ensure weapon survivability.

However, we know that **proliferation of WMD is occurring**. So, it is a must to prepare the population and the military forces to prevent and, if necessary, to meet the consequences of that fact, not only on the battlefield, but also on the civilian population, in the cities, on the sea, on the fields, on the air and water.

This is, no doubt, the greatest danger that will hang over the world in the next century. But, if we can not "*put the genie back into the bottle*", let's try the best we can to keep it dormant forever.

VI. AS A WAY OF CONCLUSION

“The future is already written in the present,
“But nobody except the Good Lord knows how will it be.
“So, it is to us, men, to try hard to imagine it and to make it come true.”

It is now a widely shared perception that we live in an *Age of Accelerated Change*, in ideas and feelings, in hopes and fears and in the way of every day life.

With the change of the Century and the Millennium, could also be expected a change for a better understanding among peoples, among cultures, among nations, which would eradicate conflict and war forever?

1. Many objective data show that good perspectives are ahead for the majority of nations. The extension of the principles of democracy to many new states and the spreading of the “democratic culture” in people’s social behavior is good news for the future of mankind. At the same time, technology is increasing the capacity to produce more food and goods, to improve health, to prolong life and to allow more free time to all. We believe, -contrary to Robert Malthus’ thesis- that *the power of men is greater than the power of earth*, or at least that it will be so for many decades to come. However, *the destructive action of men may also be greater than the recovery capacity of nature*, and there will have to be in the near future a dramatic change on the way nature has been treated by men along this century, where the thin layer of fertile land, the wooden areas, the clean rivers and lakes have suffered tremendous deterioration, with thousands of species of living creatures disappeared for ever.

2. Certainly, poverty, injustice, ignorance and anguish will continue to be the undesired partners for a certain part of mankind. And while such situations persist there will be causes of tension, crisis and conflicts. Thus, for the time being, while trying to improve the living conditions of all peoples, a parallel and continuous effort should be made by the political leaders of the main powers to guarantee that no nation can break peace, cause systematic violation of human rights or let misfortune and injustice persists on large numbers of people.

3. We do not know what main Powers are going to run the world in the next decades, as we have already seen how many *scenarios* are possible, but we want the Western World to take a leading attitude in the International Society. Not because we might be proud of our common and rich heritage, but because we have confidence on the moral principles that are inspiring and guiding the actions of the Western nations. And because we believe that *the desired order for the next century cannot be based on the law of power, but on the power of law*.

4. **The West, as a solid union of Europe and North America**, may offer the rest of the world a guiding way to a better mankind. Particularly, the slow but strong recovery of Europe from the ashes of Second World War, both in the economic-industrial area, as in the security and defense fields, gives an example to those other peoples that are suffering from economic depression or the trauma of internal conflicts, on how to steadily progress in peace. The Western World shows that in *a democratic community of nations* is almost impossible to enter in conflict, or as the UN Secretary General has said: *“in essence, democracy is a non-violent form of internal conflict management”*. (31.August 1999)

5. Among the many visions of the future world order, the most clearly perceived as closest to our present reality, is the expressed by the “*uni-multi-polar*” thesis, where “*the US plays the hyper-power primus inter pares role*”, but on a brotherly partnership with the EU, leading together the rest of Western Hemisphere nations, with influent projection to the rest of the world. This vision is not only very realistic, but it is also the one that -we believe- could assure the greatest stability to the world, grace to the human resources of its seven hundred million citizens, with all their enormous moral and material strength. Certainly, Europe represents for the US “*a unique combination of geopolitical, economic, social and cultural interests, that remain vital to the US security*”. During the Cold War, to support Europe was for the US *the challenge of continuity*. Now, to be side-by-side Europe is to go ahead for *the challenge of change*.

6. Europe, Europe, but *what thing is Europe for us?. Is it "a melting pot" of cultures, religions, languages, or interests?*. No. It is much more: It is a cooperative enterprise, **a joint venture of fifteen nations**, a suggestive work in progress which must constantly debate its direction, its speed and its future membership, looking to promote peace, security and prosperity to the peoples of the European Continent, as the “*mother land*” of all Europeans. And to extend both, security and prosperity, to the neighboring countries. Europe has been, from the beginning of this study, the “*leit motiv*”, the center of our thinking and researches. Two questions, permanently open, are waiting for answers: *Will it be possible to incorporate in a harmonic way the thirteen states that are calling at the door of the European Union?* and *How will Europe react to the global forces that are changing the world?*. One of the most promising initiatives to respond to the first question would be to promote the writing of a Supreme Law –the European Constitution- that could give a legal framework to all present and future *citizens*, a framework to live on it, and even to fight or if necessary to die for it. To the second question, the answer would be to move decidedly forward on the main fields of *technology –civilian and military-* and to advance even more on the knowledge of the *human sciences*, to be able to built a better society where men and women could feel as *citizens* of a free, sure, respectful and worthy community.

7. Because we still live in a dangerous world, where tensions, crisis or conflicts may erupt almost anyplace, anytime –as it is now the case at the Balkans heart of our Continent, or in Chechnya at the southeastern border-, we know how far we are from the ideal of a fraternal mankind. Thus, *security* is a must for us, as for all societies that want to live and progress in peace under the rule of law. Even more, the European societies who have suffered two “Hot” World Wars and a dangerous “Cold” War in this century are well aware of what values are at stake and what the consequences might be of such situations.

8. Security is a multi-dimensional concept, which needs to be considered and approached on its political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defense dimension. There are also, at least, three levels at which security may be considered: the state level, the societal level and the individual level. At the first level it is the sovereignty and power of the nation that has to be protected, while at the societal or collectivity level is the identity of common culture, ideology, environment or civilization that might be secured, and at the lowest level it’s the personal welfare and survival which has to be preserved. It should be underlined the interdependence of those dimensions and levels of security. Thus, a strong emphasis on the military security will put great strain on the economy of the country, which at the same time will tend to

undermine the economical security of that nation. In a similar way, economic problems may cause political instability with tendency to neglect urgent issues, like ecological measures. Or, political instability will tend to divert public opinion towards external foes, which may lead to a further militarized society. etc

9. The main consequence is that attention has to be given to all those dimensions and levels to safeguard peace and stability, mainly by the use of the **“soft power”** of *preventive diplomacy*, open dialogue, confidence and cooperation, and by using all means to avoid confrontation, as good offices, mediation, negotiation, arbitration, conciliation, economic sanctions, humanitarian aid, disarmament, or even to make a demonstration of military forces. In a word, using those instruments that the intelligence and “well doing” of political, social, economic and military leaders could take. But all these means of the “soft power” might not be enough to stop the growing conflict. That will be the time of the *coercive diplomacy* and of **“hard power”**, essentially by the deterrent effect or the employment of well organized, well trained, well equipped and capable Armed Forces, ready to launch any military intervention on the site or at hundred miles of the home land and to support it during all time needed.

10. The maintenance of a peaceful world society was considered so important at the aftermath of WWII, that the most decisive efforts of the United Nations have been directed to assure international stability and peace since the time of its creation more than half a century ago. Thus, the *first* line of the *first* paragraph of the *first* article of the Charter reads: *“The purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security...”*. But it was already understood that other Organizations could and should cooperate to reach that ambitious goal, and the Chapter VIII of the Charter allows the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the international peace and security. However, according to art 53, *no enforcement action shall be taken...without the authorization of the Security Council.*_

11. Under these provisions, on the *Euro-Atlantic-Eastern* region several important Institutions have been working for years to guarantee peace, stability and security in the area. By chronological order they are the Treaty of Brussels (now Western European Union), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (now OSCE). At the same time, other Institutions have also had a decisive influence in assuring the progress of Europe in peace under the rule of law, mainly the Council of Europe and the European Union (previously CECA, CM, CE), as well as some others of sub-regional coverage, - although not mainly security oriented- as the Nordic Council, the Council of the Baltic States, the Community of Independent States, the Economic Cooperation of the Black Sea, the Visegrad Group, the South-East European Cooperation Initiative etc The result of the activities of all these Organizations is that Europe has been and still is, without any doubt, the most protected region of the world, as well as the most conflicted at its borders.

12. In fact, the heart of the Euro-Atlantic region is surrounded by other spaces and countries in which instability or tension are almost permanent situations, as the southern Mediterranean, where many efforts of the EU, WEU, NATO and OSCE converge to establish a zone of peace and prosperity; or the East-Central states, still with a certain feeling towards old loyalties, but where NATO is gaining ground by progressively expanding its membership to these countries; or the Baltic States always under a lasting influence of their great eastern neighbor and with important Russian

populations; or the Balkans, the most unstable and permanent conflict-shaken area of the Continent; or the South-Eastern region, a crucial point of political, economic and religious differences...

13. Still farther, other regional instabilities affect the security of Europe. They are mainly the explosive situation on the Middle East, where the existence of weapons of mass destruction, the enormous oil reserves and the hatred hostility between Arabs and Israelis make this area a powder arsenal ready to go; the economic crisis of Russia, whose uncertain future requires the closest follow-up and sympathy of the European leaders; and finally China –“*the rising sun at the East*” -whose impressive material and technological improvements are announcing a powerful future, *perhaps friendly?*

14. One of the fundamental principles of international law has been until now the identical sovereignty of all *states*, independently of their territorial dimension, population or force. The *states* are, thus, the basic subjects and main actors of the political and juridical relations on the international scene. That means that no superior authority exists above the *state*, that nobody has the right to intervene in its internal affairs and that no legal use of force is possible against the will of the *state*. All these principles have been well accepted up to the last years of the 20th century, but will they continue to be valid in the next century?

15. The idea of the priority *to defend and protect men* in case of continual violations of human rights, genocide, exodus or great distress, *over the non-intervention rule*, has been taking corps during the most recent years, raising an important controversy, which was clearly signaled by the UN S.G.:“*In Kosovo -says Kofi Annan- a group of States intervened without seeking the authority of the UN Security Council*” (trying to avoid a massive ethnic cleansing). “*In East Timor the Council has been authorized intervention, but only after obtaining invitation from Indonesia*”, and due to the retard, “*many hundred, probably thousands of innocent people have perished*”. “*Neither of these precedents is satisfactory as a model for a new Millenium*”.

16. Certainly, the *absolute sovereignty of the state* needs to be redefined, because the *state* has to be considered an instrument to serve the security and welfare of its people, and not the people to be at the service of the *state*: *The sovereignty of the state, or the sovereignty of the people, which one must enjoy priority?*. The next century will be open with this international controversy on the table of jurists and politicians.

17. After many years of a slow converging process, the three main Western Organizations -WEU, NATO and EU- have arrived to the point of defining a new European Identity in the Security and Defense fields (ESDI), that opens an original chapter in their relations. The formal occasion to reaffirm the ESDI concept –already previously approved- had come on the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Washington, where the new strategic concept for the Euro-Atlantic Alliance had been defined. The ESDI is a clear demonstration of the Allies’ faith on the capability and will of the European Union –on all the Europeans- to take care of those crisis or conflicts, *sort of war*, that could endanger the stability or security of the pan-European region.

18. The co-existence of several Organizations –UN, EU, WEU, NATO, OSCE, CIS, etc- trying to assure stability, security and peace to the same pan-European territory -Balkans, Chechnya, etc- might present a singular situation of “*over-booking*”,

that has already given origin to some problems in Bosnia and Kosovo. And that will surely raise questions of leadership, mission definition, sharing responsibilities, assigning personnel, material and financial means, etc., to solve any situation of conflict.

19. Such situation will require some sort of close cooperation among permanent representatives of all potentially participants Organizations *prior* to take any decision or action, to have all members well informed of the evolution of the circumstances, in such a way that maximum efficiency could be reached with minimum efforts, material or financial means and human lives. To this purpose, it will be necessary at least a simple organizational structure just to be able to communicate and exchange ideas, opinions and solutions in real time.

20. Of all Organizations that have similar vocation, but different means, to intervene in situations of tension, crisis o conflict –like those previously mentioned, plus EAPC and FPF- almost all of them have their main seats in Brussels, which results to be the most convenient place to establish a “*Coordination Center for Preventive Diplomacy and Follow-on Actions*” on conflicting situations. Brussels would be, thus, the ideal seat to locate such proposed Coordination Center, that could use the facilities of the EU, which is well equipped with the most extensive bureaucratic structure of all European Organizations..

21. A profound change on the nature of warfare and on the future strategy is silently taken place in the high staffs and think tanks of the main military powers. The traditional relation between offense and defense, between space and time, between fire and movement, between quantity and quality, will be altered in any future war. The massive destructive weapons, the “*intelligent*” missiles and bombs, the exterior space use for reconnaissance, the “*electronic-computer-information*” warfare, mean a new step in the history of war. The “*system-of-systems*” concept is the best expression of the expected way to conduct operations on the field.

22. Last, but not least, **the future war**, -if such a tragedy ever becomes reality- will be fought with means barely shown in the past conflicts –nuclear weapons, chemical and biological arms- that would produce enormous loses of human lives, in a scale never known before, as well as the vast destruction of nature, extinguishing plants and animals and contaminating all means needed for the survivors, during decades or centuries. *Could that forecasted scenario be accepted by the responsible leaders of the Main Powers?* If the answer is no, then all means to diminish the risks would have to be used, to convince or even to press other leaders, by showing them the own reductions of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), by stopping the nuclear, chemical or biological tests, by promoting the “no-first-use” of the atom or of other radiological, gaseous, or massive lethal weapons, and by leading a world campaign of public opinion to ban all these arms..

Madrid, May 2000

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II. MAIN PAN-EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS' MEMBERSHIP

COUNTRY	OSCE	EAPC	PFP	C of E	EU	WEU	NATO	CBSS	CIS
ALBANIA	☆	☆	☆	☆					
ANDORRA	☆			☆					
ARMENIA	☆	☆	☆	*					☆
AUSTRIA	☆	☆	☆	☆	☆	*			
AZERBAIJAN	☆	☆	☆	*					☆
BELARUS	☆	☆	☆	*					☆
BELGIUM	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆		
BOSNIA-HER	☆			*					
BULGARIA	☆	☆	☆	☆		■			
CANADA	☆	☆	◆☆	*			☆		
CROATIA	☆			☆					
CYPRUS	☆			☆					
CZECH REP	☆	☆	◆☆	☆		◆	☆		
DENMARK	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	*	☆	☆	
ESTONIA	☆	☆	☆	☆		■		☆	
FINLAND	☆	☆	☆	☆	☆	*		☆	
FRANCE	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆		
GEORGIA	☆	☆	☆	*					☆
GERMANY	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆	☆	
GREECE	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆		
HOLY SEE	☆			*					
HUNGARY	☆	☆	◆☆	☆		◆	☆		
ICELAND	☆	☆	◆☆	☆		◆	☆	☆	
IRELAND	☆			☆	☆	*			
ITALY	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆		
KAZAKHSTAN	☆	☆	☆						☆
KYRGYZSTAN	☆	☆	☆						☆
LATVIA	☆	☆	☆	☆		■		☆	
LIECHTESTEIN	☆			☆					
LITHUANIA	☆	☆	☆	☆		■		☆	
LUXEMBOURG	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆		
MALTA	☆			☆					
MOLDOVA	☆	☆	☆	☆					☆
MONACO	☆								
NETHERLANDS	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆		
NORWAY	☆	☆	◆☆	☆		◆	☆	☆	
POLAND	☆	☆	◆☆	☆		◆	☆	☆	
PORTUGAL	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆		
ROMANIA	☆	☆	☆	☆		■			
RUSSIAN FED	☆	☆	☆	☆				☆	☆
SAN MARINO	☆			☆					
SLOVAK REP	☆	☆	☆	☆		■			
SLOVENIA	☆	☆	☆	☆		■			
SPAIN	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆		
SWEDEN	☆	☆	☆	☆	☆	*		☆	
SWITZERLAND	☆	☆	☆	☆					
TAJKISTAN	☆	☆							☆
FRY OF MACED	☆	☆	☆	☆					
TURKEY	☆	☆	◆☆	☆		◆	☆		
TURKMENISTAN	☆	☆	☆						☆
UKRAINE	☆	☆	☆	☆					☆
UNITED KINGD.	☆	☆	◆☆	☆	☆	☆	☆		
USA	☆	☆	◆☆	*			☆		
UZBEKISTAN	☆	☆	☆						☆
YUGOSLAVIA	☆+								

Symbols: Full member: ☆ Observer: *
 Assoc. Member: ◆ Assoc. Partner: ■
 Suspended: † Date: April 2000

III. EU's PRESIDENTIAL CONCLUSIONS AT HELSINKI **11.12.1999 (partial text)**

INTRODUCTION: The European Council met in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999. It adopted the Millennium Declaration. It has taken a number of decisions marking a new stage in the enlargement process...//

...// Common European policy on security and defence

The European Council adopts the two Presidency progress reports (see Annex IV) on developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence.

The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.


Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council and on the basis of the Presidency's reports, the European Council has agreed in particular the following:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;
- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;
- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;
- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;
- a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.


The European Council asks the incoming Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs Council on all aspects of the reports as a matter of priority, including conflict prevention and a committee for civilian crisis management...

...//


IV. NATO'S NEW MILITARY STRUCTURE




ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC



ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE



V. CONFLICT CYCLE



VII. GLOSSARY of abbreviations used in the text

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty of 1972)
BTWC:	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
C-i-O:	Chairman in Office
CJTF:	Combined Joint Task Force
CFE:	Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (Treaty of 1990)
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPX:	Command Post Exercise
CSBM:	Confidence and Security Building Measure
CWC:	Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)
EAPC:	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC:	European Community
ESDI:	European Security and Defense Identity
EU:	European Union (previously EM, CM, EC)
FAWEU:	Forces Answerable to the Western European Union
FYROM:	Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
HCNM:	High Commissioner on National Minorities
IFOR:	Implementation Force
IGC:	Inter-Governmental Conference
IISS:	International Institute for Strategic Studies
MBFR:	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MPC:	Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation
NAC:	North Atlantic Council
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC:	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
NPMS:	Non-Participant Mediterranean States
NPT:	Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Weapons (1968)
ODIHR:	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD:	Office for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE:	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP:	Partnership for Peace
PTBT:	Partial Test Ban Treaty
R&D:	Research and Development
RMA:	Revolution on Military Affairs
RRF:	Rapid Reaction Force
SACEUR:	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT:	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SALT:	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SFOR:	Stabilization Force
SHAPE:	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
START:	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Treaties (I, II, III?)
TEU:	Treaty of the European Union
TMD:	Theater Missile Defense
UN:	United Nations
USJCS:	United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
WEU:	Western European Union
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction

