

## Abstract

The Final Report for the Project Titled **“The Attitudes and Roles of Turkey in NATO’s Extending Relations with the East-Central European Countries”** by Assistant Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkes.

The research attempts to shed lights on the attitudes and roles of Turkey in NATO’s extending relations with Eastern Europe. It argues that the understanding of the security has changed as the Cold War ended. Throughout the 1990s NATO played a major role in establishing a dialogue mechanism with East European countries. This endeavor is further strengthened when NATO launched its enlargement policy, which culminated into the Madrid Summit decision, incorporating three East-Central European states; Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This study shows that the political elite of Turkey support the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Western security architecture. There are, however, some significant issues which are major concerns for the Turkish elite. The modalities of the enlargement and the process of reconstruction of the Western security architecture are important matters for Turkey. The paper argues that the search for consolidation of stability and peace through the incorporation of East-Central and South-Eastern Europe into the Western security architecture is the common concern for all the concerning parties. The materialization of it depends on a consensus reached on the two relevant issues: fully incorporation of Turkey, East-Central and South Eastern Europe into all major political and security organizations, and a workable framework in which major security organizations can be organically linked. The paper urges that NATO has to set a timetable to integrate South East European countries too, otherwise it may create a feeling of being left aside, which in turn may delay consolidation of stability and peace in the region. Such a trend can play a dividing role in the region. Equally important concern of Turkey is the restructuring of the relationship between the major Western organizations. The Turkish elite desire to see NATO playing a central role in the Western security architecture. The Turkish elite are supportive of the cooperation among the major Western organizations, but are very much concerned with the inequalities resulted from the way in which such cooperation are designed to take effect. The envisaged cooperation, on the one hand, expects Turkey to contribute in it and, on the other hand, it tends not to fully include Turkey in it. This approach is contributing to build up tension among the Turkish opinion makers. It is the main conclusion of this research that these two issues are likely to have impact on the nature of the attitudes and roles of Turkey towards the reconstruction of Western security architecture.

**THE FINAL REPORT FOR THE PROJECT TITLED  
“THE ATTITUDES AND ROLES OF TURKEY IN NATO’S  
EXTENDING RELATIONS WITH THE EAST-CENTRAL  
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES”**

**by**

**Assistant Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkes**

**Department of International Relations,  
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey**

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**Introduction**

A substantial change in the international system and the collapse of the security network of the Soviet bloc necessarily led to the questioning of the concept of security. The concept of security, during the Cold War, was predominantly associated with external aggression, the threat perception, defense against attack and control of military force. Conflict management, stability and peace were regarded to be secondary to these perceived threat and military capabilities. Implication of this understanding of security was that a secure environment could be maintained only by means of military capacity sufficient to defeat or at least to deter the adversary. On the morrow of the Cold War, the definition of security tended to be expanded beyond merely military defense. The prevention of conflicts, the crisis management and the creation of a stable and dynamic international environment became milestones of the understanding of security.

A second significant issue is that following the end of the Cold War, ethnic-nationalism as a regional destabilizing factor reemerged particularly in the South Eastern Europe and Caucuses, which necessarily affected the regional states in particular, and forced the Western security organizations to address the problems.

Equally significant change that occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War is that both the Western security organizations and the former members of the Soviet security network, including Albania, saw a necessity to restructure relationships between the West and East European states and expressed their willingness to do so.

All of these led the Western leaders to go beyond the 1967 twin track policy of collective defense and dialogue with the adversary. NATO decided to launch a new strategy, making several attempts to rehabilitate and strengthen its relations with East European states. In

June 1990, at the London summit meeting, NATO decided to establish regular diplomatic relations with the former members of the Warsaw Pact countries, including Albania. In the following year, NATO formed the NACC, an institution that bridged NATO and the former members of the Warsaw Pact. This would then be transformed to EAPC in 1997. In December 1994, the PfP (Partnership for Peace) was introduced in order to keep alive the hope of eventual NATO membership to the East European states and others, as well as making clear that Russia is not to be isolated from the whole process. NATO's attempt to strengthen relationships with Eastern Europe was welcomed by the concerning states, though some of them expressed their dissatisfactions with the limitations of the whole process.

In the meanwhile, the East-Central European states sought to reinforce their political capacities by means of, first, concluding bilateral political and military accords with neighboring states as well as with major Western powers, which normalized their relations, and in the second place, they formed sub-regional political forums, such as the Visegrad triangle (in 1993 quadruple), the Central European Initiative, the Baltic State Council, Balkan Multilateral Cooperation Initiative (which had begun earlier), hoping that they could join their battle to accomplish their incorporation into the Western political and security organizations, and perhaps they contemplated that they could give a message to potentially hostile actors not to create obstacles.

These parallel developments are primary concerns for Turkey. Broadening of the concept of security to include conflict management, stability and peace is a significant development for Turkey in the context of Turkey's relations with Eastern Europe for a reason that Turkey's mainstream policy towards the region is to accomplish a stability and a durable

peace in the region. Turkey cannot distance herself from instability in Eastern Europe not only because of her geographic proximity but also because of her historical links and existence of the Turkish minorities in the Balkans, as well as Turkey's relations with the Western organizations. Turkey is an important member of the well established security organization, NATO, a member to the OSCE, has been striving to become a full member of the WEU and concluded Customs Union with the EU, hoping that Turkey will be full member of the EU.

Thus, the understanding and implementation of conflict prevention, crisis management, stability and peace are major concerns for Turkey<sup>1</sup>. As evident in the recent cases in the Balkans, such as War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey clearly showed her determination to prevent spreading of the conflict in the region as well as cooperating with the international organizations, in particular NATO, in order to achieve a political and a military stability in the region<sup>2</sup>. Turkey played a very constructive role in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, in the process of broadening and implementation of the concept of security, Turkey can play important roles, and considering Turkey's mainstream policy towards the region, in fact, this is in the interests of both Turkey and the West<sup>3</sup>.

Ensuring stability and security, it is argued, can be sustained if a workable framework of cooperation between NATO, WEU, OSCE and EU is established and maintained. As noted above, Turkey is a member of NATO, OSCE, associated member of the WEU and has been striving to become a full member of the WEU, concluded Customs Union with the EU and determined to be full member of the EU. Therefore, both the evolution and the implementation of the stability and security are major concerns for Turkey. Besides, Turkey can play a constructive role in the extension of security to a larger Eurasia. In the process of achieving

stability and security, in its implementation and in NATO's extending relations with the East European states, Turkey can play important roles. It is evident that without Turkey's consent they may not successfully be applied and without Turkey's contribution, security and stability in the region as a whole cannot be achieved.

Any instability in Eastern Europe affects Turkey's relations with Eastern Europe as well as her relations with the West. Any polarization in Eastern Europe, which is open for deepening unless the process is transformed into an endeavor to reach out cooperation among the East European states, affects Turkey. Here too, Turkey's attitudes towards the polarization in the region and her roles in pacification of the polarization are important matters for the construction of stability and achievement of a durable peace in the region. There is enough evidence to assume that Turkey has been trying to pacify polarization and trying to transform the process into cooperation rather than cultivating it to deepen. This also indicates that Turkey can play constructive roles in this respect. As to the enlargement of NATO, the modalities of the enlargement have important implications for East European states, Turkey and the process of reconstruction of the Western security architecture.

### **Section I: The Initial Assumptions of the Research**

The followings are the initial assumptions of the research. As the Cold War ended, both NATO and East European countries realized that there was a strong need to ensure stability in Eastern Europe in particular and in Europe as a whole. The political stability in region could help initialize the military stability in the region, which in turn might contribute to the Western security architecture. This argument is widely shared by the political elite of Turkey and thus the Turkish

policy makers support the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Western security architecture. There are, however, some significant issues which have been affecting the above-noted mainstream policy of Turkey; such as the formation of European Security and Defense Identity itself, Turkey's place in it and the emergence of invisible lines between the East-Central and South-East European countries. It may therefore be argued that the search for stability through the incorporation of East-Central and South-Eastern Europe into the Western security architecture is the common concern for all the concerning parties, the materialization of such stability is depended on a consensus reached on the two relevant issues: one is the definition of European Defense and Security Identity to which all concerning parties have to be satisfactorily accommodated, and the second is how to ensure that the invisible lines, emerged by the mid 1997 between East-Central and South-East European countries may not become permanent and may not play a dividing role in the region. It is the main assumption of this research that these two issues are likely to have impact on the nature of the attitudes and roles of Turkey in NATO's extending relations with the East-Central European and Southeastern European countries.

## **Section II: Conduct of the Research**

In order to assess the attitudes and roles of Turkey in NATO's extending relations with East-Central and Southeast European countries, first, I carried out a comprehensive literature survey about the nature of extending relations and the perception of Turkish elite on the subject in question. In the light of the literature survey, it may be stated that as early as 1990 NATO decided to establish formal relations with East European states. Intense dialog mechanisms,

created and implemented by NATO, led to the establishment of ongoing extending relations between NATO and the East-Central and South East European states. In the following years, this was transformed into institutionalized relations between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries. This process culminated into the decisions taken in the Madrid Summit of July 1997. In the Madrid Summit three candidates from East-Central Europe were named; Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and at the end of 1997 the accession protocols were signed between NATO and these states and then the ratification was completed. The Madrid Summit made it clear that the membership for other countries is open, however, it failed to remove the feeling that some of the countries in the region, in particular South East European countries, are left for future considerations. Nor did it set a timetable for further enlargement. It is argued that this, in a sense, created an invisible lines between the East-Central and South-East European countries. If this feeling is consolidated in the region, it is likely to be a source of instability, contradicting the initial aim of the NATO's extending relations with the countries in the region. In a similar fashion, it is short of accomplishing greater stability in larger area. It is also important that Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were accepted to NATO as a result of an open support of USA and Germany. Germany is surrounded by NATO members, providing further security and stability. This invites the question of whether the modality of enlargement is to be paused or stopped as the USA and Germany are satisfied. In other words, it is not clear whether or not, or at best when the next wave of enlargement is to be carried out, though the Madrid summit of 1997 and the subsequent Washington summit of April 1999 stated that membership to NATO is open to the interested parties. All these are important issues for Turkey.

While NATO's extending relations with East-Central European states are being publicly discussed, a process of redefinition of European Security and Defense Identity is launched. Parallel to this, an organic link is established between NATO and WEU while WEU is becoming an integral part of European Union and being Turkey, as well as new members of NATO, not a full member of the WEU. Both processes had a significant effect on Turkey's political and security priorities. Among the Turkish political elite some strongly argue that there are direct links between EU and NATO's enlargements. Some of them even went on arguing that Turkey's quest for EU membership should be linked to NATO's enlargement<sup>4</sup>. This argument initially found room in official circles, however, was then withdrawn, though there is a growing anxiety among the political elite for such a consideration, especially after the Luxembourg Summit decision which created a feeling of exclusion of Turkey from the EU enlargement<sup>5</sup>.

A stronger view shared by vast majority of political elite in Turkey is the lack of a constructive attitude on the part of European allies to facilitate Turkey a full membership status in WEU. Many Turkish political elite argue that there is a direct link between NATO and WEU when European security is concerned, and NATO and WEU decided to establish organic links, providing WEU to use NATO's assets, though it is subject to consent of NATO Council of Ministers. The question then is posed; if Turkey is not regarded and is not facilitated a full membership status at the heart of ESDI, what benefit Turkey is to get out of NATO's relations with WEU. It is also argued that contrary to the initial aim of ensuring stability in Europe as a whole, such a relationship may bring out instability. Thus, the literature survey suggests that Turkey's attitudes and roles towards NATO's extending relations with the East-Central

European countries are depended on consensus reached on two issues: a) South-East European countries should be ensured that NATO membership is to be extended to them as well b)the inclusion of Turkey into emerging ESDI has to be consolidated through providing full membership for Turkey in WEU.

To test the findings of the literature survey, I decided to undertake in-depth interviews with senior members of the Turkish political elite and consulted on the official views of East-Central and South-East European countries. The research suggests that first, the Turkish political elite think that NATO has an important political and security roles in the present international system. Second, there is a growing fragmentation of perceptions of Turkish political elite on the question of Turkey's treatment and place in the emerging European Defense and Security Identity. While Turkish policy-makers had a clear perception of NATO's extending relations with the East-Central and South Eastern European countries, that is supportive, there is a growing anxiety among the political elite on the question of Turkey's place and treatment in the West. The exclusion of Turkey from European Union is one of the sources of bitterness of the Turkish political elite. This is coupled with the fact that Turkey is not yet given a full membership status in the Western European Union, though NATO and WEU strongly wish to develop greater organic links. So the Turkish political elite see a clear and concrete links between NATO's enlargement and Turkey's desire to be full member of the WEU. Third, most of the Turkish political elite argue that NATO's role is more important in regional problems. Having supported membership of East-Central European states, the Turkish political elite wish to see extension of NATO membership to the South Eastern European states. The Turkish

political elite also emphasize that NATO should play more constructive roles in ensuring stability in Caucasus. It is appropriate to examine these discussions in some details.

### **Section III: Modalities of the Enlargement and the Turkish Attitudes and Roles**

The modalities of the enlargement are examined below. Whichever modality of the enlargement is sustained, the following questions have to be taken into account: What are the benefits of NATO's enlargement to the East European countries and Turkey? What are the burdens of the enlargement to the East European states and Turkey? To what extent can NATO's extending relations with the East European states contribute to the strengthening of the Western security architecture? Can the process create an atmosphere of division or can it contribute to already insecure environment between the states in the region, and if so, what are the implications for the polarization in the region? Does the process contribute to a feeling of being left out among the East European states even if the process does not intend to do so in the long run? How do the rest of East European states perceive the process of incorporation?

The implications of these issues are important for Turkey's relations with the East European states as well as for her relations with the Western institutions. Turkey naturally is to link NATO's extending relations with Eastern Europe with that of Turkey's efforts to strengthen her relations with the other Western political, security and economic institutions. This is a legitimate linkage. The study of NATO's extending relations with Eastern Europe cannot thus be separated from the study of Turkey's relations with the other Western institutions. Evidently,

the task of NATO's extending relations with Eastern Europe is a complicated one and requires a scholarly study.

As NATO opened the discussions for enlargement three views were put forward. It was argued that enlargement should be based on certain criteria and whoever meet the criteria may be accepted to NATO. This view did not find room in NATO for a basic reason that none of the aspirants was ready to meet the desired criteria for the NATO membership. This view then gave way for a discussion that group of states may be accepted to NATO. This was an indirect reference to the Visegrad states who are assumed to be more or less similar and above all were backed by the USA and Germany. Here there was the problem of Slovakia, which is a member of the Visegrad states, however, is considered to be not fitting into the general picture for a reason that democratization was so slow in Slovakia. Therefore, the discussions led to the conclusion that the applicants are to be considered case by case. This gave a leverage to NATO not to give a misleading message to those who were not yet accepted, providing the USA and Germany to press for the membership of Czech, Hungary and Poland and an opportunity to test the Russian reaction as well as ease Russian reaction to the enlargement of NATO. Before publicizing the three candidates who would be accepted to NATO in the first place, NATO decided to reach out Russia, easing her tension especially in Russian domestic politics. Thus, the NATO-Russian Founding Act was concluded in 27 May 1997, which promised Russia to consult any major issue concerning NATO, as well as promising that nuclear weapons would not be installed in any newly accepted NATO members and also signaling that military standardization would not be required for the new members (familiarity is required). The last point may well be interpreted as an indirect reference to the Russian concern

that Russia would not be excluded from the arms market in Eastern Europe. The third important point to keep in mind is the fact that accepting Hungary to NATO is thought to be contributing to stability in East-Central Europe for a reason that leaving Hungary behind might have led to building up of irredentist aspirations in Hungary that the governments in Hungary were caught up between irredentist and liberals. In other words, potentiality of Hungary in destabilizing the region played a positive role in her eligibility to NATO. In addition to this, Hungarian political elite showed a clear tilt towards incorporation into NATO, in particular opening the Tzsar base for the usage of NATO during the Bosnian crisis which contributed to transporting NATO logistics from Germany to Bosnia<sup>6</sup>. The nomination of Czech, Hungary and Poland for the first wave of enlargement is considered to be a test for both NATO and Russia. As the other aspirants hoped that there would be next time for their membership to NATO, there did not emerge much resentment to the way in which the first wave of enlargement was concluded. As the Madrid summit made it clear that membership to NATO is open for other aspirants, South East European countries did not so far loose their hope for membership. Following the Madrid summit, the South East European countries geared up their relations with NATO and PFP activities in order to accommodate themselves into NATO. At this stage it would be appropriate to consider about why South East European countries look for NATO membership. As my interviews<sup>7</sup> with political elite of South East European countries suggests there are three reasons for this: economic, political and military reasons. The political elite of South East Europe see NATO not only a political and military matter but put emphasize on the economic dimension of the NATO membership. Basically they argue that foreign capital inflow into South Eastern Europe is low because foreign investors first of all want to see a secure

environment, without which they tend not to invest in that region. If South Eastern Europe becomes incorporated into NATO, they argue, the foreign investors may become more interested in investing South Eastern Europe, feeling that there is enough security in South Eastern Europe. This argument has a merit in the sense that the enlargement of NATO has also a direct link with incorporation of semi periphery of Europe into the world economy. It appears that there is a convergence of NATO's eventual aim and the reason that the elite of South Eastern Europe see why they wish to be a member of NATO. The elite in South Eastern Europe also argue that as their membership to NATO is delayed their economic integration into Europe is likely to be affected negatively. This in turn may delay their incorporation into the Western world. The elite of South Eastern Europe see also political reason in their quest for NATO membership. As the Cold War ended, the South East European countries have been striving for the establishment democracy. They had to transform all of their political institutions from one party rule to a multi-party representative democracy. If there is not a sufficient international support to multi-party representative democracy, their endeavor may not easily be accomplished in the face of economic difficulties they are undergoing. The military reason for their quest for NATO membership is more or less resulted from insecurity feeling which is not necessarily resulted from actual threat, but there is no guarantee that the potential threat may not turn into an actual one. Therefore, they tend to argue that South East European countries must be incorporated into the Western security architecture before it is late. In addition to these reasons, the elite of South Eastern Europe argue that NATO membership may strengthen regional stability that there is growing trust and a clear trend for regional cooperation among the South East European states. The NATO membership will cultivate this trend, they argue.

Taken as a whole, the three factors indicate that the elite of South Eastern Europe have been emphasizing that NATO membership for them is a matter of westernization. The NATO membership also meant a strong US involvement into the region which is desired by the states in the region as they are committed to take part in the Western world.

The South East European elite are also concerned with the invisible division between East-Central European and South Eastern European regions, which is felt as none of the South East European states is nominated as a candidate in the first wave of enlargement. Although this is not expressed loudly, there is a growing believe among the elite that the West put priority to the East-Central Europe's incorporation into the Western security architecture. This in turn created resentment among the elite of South Eastern Europe. The argument, it appear, is based on the assumption that all of the Eastern European countries were more or less similar in the beginning of the 1990s and stability is the main concern for all of them and the question is posed why the three (Czech, Hungary and Poland) were decided to be nominated, rather than other options. This reasoning has a merit insofar as the main objective of NATO is concerned. If the main goal is to accomplish stability in Eastern Europe as a whole, the South Eastern Europe should have been taken into consideration too. Such a discussion is likely to be deepened if the next wave of enlargement is so delayed.

All these points were also discussed by the political elite in Turkey. Some argued that NATO enlargement should have been extended to the South Eastern Europe first of all, because the membership to NATO could help bringing stability to the South Eastern Europe. However, as it became clear that the three East-Central European countries were to be given priority, then the Turkish elite tended to put emphasis on the necessity to keep open the

membership to NATO. All these seem to have effect on the official view of Turkey that while ratifying the membership of the three newly accepted states in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Committee on Foreign Affairs insisted that a clause has to be inserted to the ratification process, stating that in the next wave of enlargement Bulgaria and Romania have to be given priority. This is a clear indication that Turkey desires to see at least two of the South East European states being accepted to NATO in the next wave of enlargement. This is clearly expressed in a paragraph inserted to the ratification report.<sup>8</sup>

#### **Section IV: The Washington Summit and Recent Debates**

The Washington summit reaffirmed the two fields to which NATO has been putting emphasis: NATO is going to play a more active role in the crisis management, response to regional crises. In addition to these, it, first, asserted to reaffirm the central role of NATO in the Western security architecture. Second, it reaffirmed the notion that NATO membership is open to new aspirants. These two issues at the same time revived the two important debates on NATO's enlargement, NATO's role in the Western security architecture, and opened up one more discussion; the position of new members of NATO in relation with their status in WEU. All of which are important issues for Turkey, thus deserve to be examined in details.

In the Washington summit it was stated that "we reaffirm today our commitment to the openness of the Alliance under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration. We pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. This is part of an evolutionary process that takes

into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Our commitment to enlargement is part of a broader strategy of projecting stability and working together with our Partners to build a Europe whole and free. The ongoing enlargement process strengthens the Alliance and enhances the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. The three new members will not be the last. At the Summit in Madrid we recognized the progress made by a number of countries aspiring to join the Alliance in meeting the responsibilities and obligations for possible membership. Today we recognize and welcome the continuing efforts and progress in both Romania and Slovenia. We also recognize and welcome continuing efforts and progress in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since the Madrid Summit, we note and welcome positive developments in Bulgaria. We also note and welcome recent positive developments in Slovakia. We are grateful for the co-operation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with NATO in the present crisis and welcome its progress on reforms. We welcome Albania's co-operation with the Alliance in the present crisis and encourage its reform efforts. We welcome the efforts and progress aspiring members have made, since we last met, to advance political, military and economic reforms. We appreciate the results achieved, and look forward to further progress by these countries in strengthening their democratic institutions and in restructuring their economies and militaries. We take account of the efforts of these aspiring members, together with a number of other Partner countries, to improve relations with neighbors and contribute to security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. We look forward to further deepening our co-operation with aspiring countries and to increasing their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of

membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability. To give substance to this commitment, NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that have expressed an interest in NATO membership as well as those who may wish to seek membership in the future. Those nations that have expressed an interest in becoming NATO members will remain under active consideration for future membership. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on its own merits. All states have the inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security. Furthermore, in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all Allies.”<sup>9</sup>

Here it is restated the Madrid summit decision. The Washington summit did not set timetable for the next enlargement. However, the Washington summit clearly indicated that the next wave of enlargement will be dependent on the progress made by the aspirants in accordance with the Membership Action Plan, which is approved by the Washington summit.

The Membership Action Plan seems to have laid down criteria to which the aspirants will have to meet. It includes the followings: “- the submission by aspiring members of individual annual national programmes on their preparations for possible future membership, covering political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects; - a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries' progress on their programmes that includes both

political and technical advice, as well as annual 19+1 meetings at Council level to assess progress; - a clearinghouse to help co-ordinate assistance by NATO and by member states to aspirant countries in the defence/military field; - a defence planning approach for aspirants which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.”<sup>10</sup>

The Washington summit decisions clearly suggest that the NATO enlargement is to be more institutionalized and to be dependent on the implementation of the Membership Action Plan. Thus, a set of criteria is established. What is more is that there will be no enlargement until the next summit, which is not before 2002. This decision may well be understood as that NATO tends to put emphasis on deepening, rather than widening, until the next summit.

Following the Washington summit, all these led to revival of the old discussion between opponent and advocates of the enlargement, as is expressed by two leading prominent figures; Michael E. Brown and Robert E. Hunter. Brown argues that “in the run up to alliance’s April 1999 summit, American officials argued that NATO’s expansionist agenda had to be extended and that yet another new mission had to be added to the alliance’s repertoire. The United States, they maintained, was spending a lot of money on power-projection capabilities that would enable them to help the United States address its security concerns outside of Europe. The result, they argued, is that Europe has been getting a free ride. They contended that this state of affairs could not be sustained in the long run because the American public and the U.S. Congress would not tolerate it. These ‘globalists’ argue that a new transatlantic bargain is needed to keep the alliance alive. If the United States is to stay in Europe, they say, NATO’s European members must help the United States address its global concerns: NATO must go

out of Europe or out of business. Both new agendas, however, the expansionist and the globalist, are wrong and dangerous for the alliance. They are wrong because they emphasize highly problematic missions. And they are dangerous because changing NATO's main mission has made the alliance's demise more likely." Brown continues to argue as follows "I believe that NATO's leaders have been going and are continuing to go in the wrong direction: NATO is more likely to thrive if it adopts a minimalist strategy. ... Leaders of NATO should tie further enlargement of the alliance to strategic circumstances: they should offer membership to additional central and east European states if and only if Russia begins to threaten its western neighbors militarily. ... Therefore, NATO's leaders should make a concerted effort to minimize the damage they have done to the alliance by linking NATO's *raison d'etra* to the promotion of stability throughout the continent. They can do this by scaling back their public claims about what they are likely to authorize NATO to do. They should state that, when the alliance's members are able to form "coalitions of the willing," they will draw on NATO's formidable organizational capacities in order to make joint undertakings more effective. However, they should not suggest that these problems are NATO responsibilities, and they should not suggest that the alliance's rational and relevance are linked to out-of-area activities." Brown proposes that "the NATO alliance and the EU are the twin pillars of peace in Europe, but they have distinct, complementary roles to play. The alliance is the key to keeping the United States involved in European security affairs and thereby reassuring Germany and the rest of western Europe about their security. The EU is the key to promoting stability in central and eastern Europe. Unlike NATO, the EU is deeply involved in the development of democratic institutions, the rule of law, the protection of minorities, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the

development of economic ties among states. In addition, the EU is composed of a wide range of political institutions—the European Commission, the European Council, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament—that contribute to its conflict management and conflict resolution capacities. Unfortunately, NATO and EU leaders are on the wrong path. The alliance has been given primary responsibility for promoting stability in central and eastern Europe, and it has accepted new members. The EU’s leaders have dragged their feet on bringing former members of the Soviet bloc into the union. Indeed, NATO and EU leaders have it backwards: NATO enlargement should be discouraged; EU enlargement should be encouraged. The alliance should adopt a minimalist strategy, and the EU should adopt an expansionist one. What this means in practical terms is that the EU’s leaders should accelerate their timetable for bringing central and east European states into the union.”<sup>11</sup>

Brown’s argument is the reflection of revival of the old argument, but this time it proposes that EU has to take responsibilities, shouldering the economic burden posed by the NATO enlargement. It also signaled that there is a growing resentment among the Congressmen on the US involvement in Eastern Europe, where there is little American interests at stake.

Hunter, on the other hand, advocates the NATO enlargement and draws attention to critical points as follows: “the alliance’s renewal requires that it not remain static but continue to refine its interests and activities. First comes the commitment to take in more members. Despite the declaration of an open door, many allies do not really want further enlargement in the near future, and certainly not this year. Prudence argues for a careful approach to enlargement; in particular, the alliance needs time to integrate Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. But what next? The rationale worked out among the allies during the long run-up to the Madrid

summit continues to make sense: European security is no longer premised on a known threat or geopolitical calculation that presumes a line of potential confrontation. Thus NATO's goal is to be an encompassing institution, without predetermined limits, provided that aspirants can meet the rigorous membership requirements and the alliance can maintain its strength and purpose. This last provision centers on whether allies are able and willing to defend new members under challenge, whether they will underpin the domestic political and economic development of new entrants, and whether a much larger alliance can continue to take decisions and act on them. But if NATO is to support its basic objective and sustain the credibility of its commitments, time taken to integrate three countries and prepare for the next must not be turned into a pause that becomes indefinite. ... To reassure aspirants, NATO is adopting a Membership Action Plan, including special arrangements possibly limited to the aspirants countries. But to be credible, sustain the larger vision of inclusive security, and focus attention and effort, this plan must also set a target date for the next enlargement decisions. That should be at a NATO summit in late 2001, following the next US presidential election. Anything less will call into question the serious purpose behind the "open door".

On the question of NATO-EU relations, Hunter argues that "the EU clearly shares with NATO a commitment to promote stability in central Europe and to incorporate its peoples fully into the West. In practice, EU and NATO efforts are inseparable; neither can succeed fully unless the other does as well. Yet no formal NATO-EU relationship exists, nor does coordination of their work in central Europe and with Russia, nor any direct consultation even on enlargement. These arm's length relations reflect each institution's ambition to make sovereign decisions. ... Starting now, NATO and the EU must begin cooperating

openly and directly. And from now on, they should hold their summits in tandem and produce joint declarations, covering the full range of transatlantic concerns.”<sup>12</sup>

The recent debate, reflected in the articles of Brown and Hunter, shows the fact that the next wave of enlargement requires more time and new sets of considerations. Both of which are direct concerns of South East European countries and Turkey. South East European states are concerned that if this required time is delayed so long, then it will not be constructive. Therefore, there has to be a target date to accomplish the Membership Action Plan. In a similar fashion, the next wave of enlargement has to take into account the geographical balance, otherwise it will be extremely difficult to get consensus among the NATO members. Equally important concern, expressed by the South East European elite, is that the provisional pause should not turn into a permanent pause. First, such a thing may deepen the diversity between East-Central and South east European states, second, it may evaporate the hope that South Eastern European states are likely to be incorporated into the Western world.

## **Section V: Restructuring the Western Security Architecture and Its Implications**

Following the end of the Cold War, all political and security organizations strove for adapting themselves to the new requirements. How did the change affect the Western security architecture? First, the change led all of the political and security organizations to revise their scopes of objectives, second, it brought about new considerations for a new sets of cooperation between the Western security organizations and third it is likely to bring about a new division of labor between the organizations. Each western organization started to redefine

its priorities. For NATO the preservation of transatlantic link and a central role in the western security architecture are priorities. The transatlantic link is continuing, but is subject to the attitudes of European allies as well as depending on how the US's larger security concerns evolve. For the time being both the US and the European allies are convinced that the transatlantic link has to be kept intact and if possible be consolidated. The crises in Bosnia, Albania and Kosova proved that NATO still has a central place in the western security architecture. These crises, at the same time, provided the European allies to consider about playing larger role, though they are not closer to pursue a common foreign policy. Here, the US involvement is proved to be crucially important. After the end of the Cold War, the US tended to put emphasis on the assertive multilateralism in that NATO occupies a central place. The assertive multilateralism also appeals to the European allies. Here is the common place to meet the Atlantic and European pillars of NATO. In the first half of the 1990s it was also debated whether it was meaningful to keep all the similar security organizations, which are expensive to keep up<sup>13</sup>. Such views were economically rational, but did not find enough support from the European allies. The European allies, in particular France, opted for reviving the formation of European security architecture. Thus the discussions on the European Security and Defense Identity started to gain ground. This was not necessarily as an alternative to NATO. This was the starting point in the restructuring of western security architecture. The discussions then turned into consideration for the establishment of an organic links between the western organizations. This was a common ground for Europe and the US as well as not distancing the Russian Federation from the whole discussion. The establishment of organic links between the western security organizations became a priority in the mid 1990s. In the second half of the

1990s the process took a more concrete form by means of declarations, however, the declarations are not binding. This was reinforced in the Washington summit. The Washington summit decisions includes important clauses on the subject in question. It reads that “we reaffirm our commitment to preserve the transatlantic link, including our readiness to pursue common security objectives through the Alliance wherever possible. We are pleased with the progress achieved in implementing the Berlin decisions and reaffirm our strong commitment to pursue the process of reinforcing the European pillar of the Alliance on the basis of our Brussels Declaration of 1994 and of the principles agreed at Berlin in 1996. We note with satisfaction that the key elements of the Berlin decisions are being put in place. These include flexible options for the selection of a European NATO Commander and NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations, as well as specific terms of reference for DSACEUR and an adapted CJTF concept. Close linkages between the two organizations have been established, including planning, exercises (in particular a joint crisis management exercise in 2000) and consultation, as well as a framework for the release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities. We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defense by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in the WEU and - following the St. Malo Declaration - in the EU, including the Vienna European Council Conclusions. This is a process which has implications for all Allies. We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard: a. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged; b. As this

process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU; c. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defense capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication; d. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. We also note Canada's interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed. On the basis of the above principles and building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address: a. Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; b. The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations; c. Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities; d. The further adaptation of

NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations."<sup>14</sup>

The process of the establishment of organic links between the western organizations are becoming institutionalized and the process is taking more concrete form. This necessarily has a direct implication on Turkey as well as on East-Central and South East European states. This process on the one hand consolidating the links between the western organizations, thereby reinforcing dialogue, but on the other hand it created an inequality between the NATO members, for a reason that Turkey and newly accepted NATO members are not full members of the WEU, nor are they members of the EU. That means that the EU members of the NATO countries will benefit more, while non EU member NATO countries will be deprived of such benefit. This inequality is so obvious and likely to create troubles in the future. In the light of such trend, the Turkish delegation in the Washington summit rightly advocated to secure an amendment to the final declaration which the European Union will not be able to use NATO for military operations if they are not approved by the NATO Council. The Turkish delegation strongly resisted any provision that would enable NATO to automatically implemented military decision taken by the EU, of which Turkey is not a member. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs told to the press that "it was a very tough negotiation. If we had backed off, if we had not maintained our determination until the very end, we would have failed". It appears that the US and Britain supported Turkey's efforts to change the final text despite the resistance put up by the French delegation<sup>15</sup>. Turkey's concern is reflected in the article 30 of the NATO's New Strategic Concept. It says that "the Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defense of its members and through which common security objectives will be pursued wherever

possible, remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defence field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, **on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations** in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.”<sup>16</sup>

The Turkish reservation in a sense eased and delayed the potential source of friction between the NATO countries. Such a potentiality of friction may come out as the EU members of NATO countries try to bypass the Turkish reservation. The points made by the Turkish delegations are also of important concerns for the newly accepted NATO members, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, though they have not yet raised their voices. It will further be a concern for the potential candidates. An easy solution to this problem would have been a principle that NATO members could be automatically full member of the WEU. This view is widely shared by the Turkish elite<sup>17</sup>. This could have strengthened the process of the

establishment of organic links between the western organizations. Anything less than this move will deepen the anxiety already built up among the Turkish elite since the Turkish opinion leaders have been expressing that Europe betrayed Turkey, despite Turkey paid the highest price as being a front line country in the defense of Europe throughout the Cold War years. This is also an important lesson for the newly accepted NATO members. If Turkey is kept at arm's length in the process of restructuring of the European Security and Defence architecture, this will profoundly affect not only the Turkish elite but also the elite of Eastern Europe.

Equally important but yet to be redefined issue is the role of NATO in the larger area. What is becoming clear is that there soon will be a debate on the division of labor among the western security organizations. The NATO members will have to face the reality that regional instability is not confined with the South Eastern Europe and that there are instabilities in Caucuses. Will NATO get involved in this region? If so how? If not, how will NATO justify its existence in the face of the fact that it is an expensive organization to keep it up. How will it be possible to extend stability and security in a larger area of Eurasia? These are some of the coming issues that NATO will have to address.

## **Conclusion**

In the 1990s the definition of security changed. The prevention of conflicts, the crisis management and the creation of a stable and dynamic international environment became milestones of the understanding of security. In all these endeavors, NATO played important roles. NATO's attempt to strengthen relationships with Eastern Europe paved the way in which

a dialogue mechanism was established between the West and the former members of Eastern bloc. This study shows that the Turkish attitude was supportive on the extending relations between NATO and Eastern Europe.

The political elite of Turkey and the Turkish policy makers support the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the Western security architecture. There are, however, some significant issues which are major concerns for the opinion leaders of Turkey. The emergence of invisible lines between the East-Central and South-East European countries, which is clearly felt as none of South East European countries is accepted to NATO in the first wave of the enlargement. This is also a major concern for the elite of South Eastern Europe. The Turkish policy makers seem to be determined that there has to be a next wave of enlargement, not too late, and at least two of the South East European countries must seriously be considered for NATO membership. They are Bulgaria and Romania. Equally important concern of Turkey is the restructuring of the relationship between the major Western institutions. The Turkish elite desire to see NATO playing a central role in the Western security architecture. The Turkish elite are supportive of the cooperation among the major Western institutions, but are very much concerned with the inequalities resulted from the way in which such cooperation are designed to take effect. The envisaged cooperation, on the one hand, expects Turkey to contribute in it and, on the other hand, it tends not to fully include Turkey in it. This approach is contributing to building up of tension among the Turkish opinion makers. The Turkish elite is very much concerned with Turkey's treatment in Europe and Turkey's place in it.

In short, the modalities of the enlargement and the process of reconstruction of the Western security architecture are important matters for Turkey. The search for consolidation of

stability and peace through the incorporation of East-Central and South-Eastern Europe into the Western security architecture is the common concern for all the concerning parties. The materialization of it is depended on a consensus reached on the two relevant issues: fully incorporation of Turkey and East-Central and South Eastern European countries into WEU and EU. The second is that the invisible lines, which emerged by the mid 1997 between East-Central and South-East European countries, should not become permanent. Such a trend can play a dividing role in the region. It is the main conclusion of this research that these two issues are likely to have impact on the nature of the attitudes and roles of Turkey towards reconstruction of western security architecture.

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<sup>1</sup> Ömür Orhun, "The Uncertainties and Challenges Ahead: A Southern Perspective", Perceptions, Special Issue on NATO, March-May, 1999, pp. (23-31).

<sup>2</sup> See White Paper Defense 1998, Ministry of National Defense, Turkey, 1998.

<sup>3</sup> Mustafa Türker, "Türkiye Avrupa Ýlişkilerinde Balkanlar Faktörü ve Yeni Eðilimler", Türkiye ve Avrupa, Yayýna Hazýrlayan, Atila Eralp, (Imge Yayýnlarý, Ankara), ss. 305-349

<sup>4</sup> Mensur Akgün, "Kaçýrýlmýþ Bir Fýrsat Olarak NATO Geniþlemesi", Onbir Aylýk Saltanat, Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Dýþ Politikada Refahiyol Dönemi, Yayýna Hazýrlayan Gencer Özcan, (Ýstanbul: Boyut Kitaplarý, 1998), ss.(243-255); Ali Karaosmanoðlu, "NATO Enlargement, Does it Enhance Security?", Dýþ Politika, 1-2/1996, pp. (23-33); Ali Karaosmanoðlu, "NATO Geniþlemesi Zararýmýza", Zaman, 31 Mayýs 1997; Cumhuriyet, 27, 28 ve 29 Mayýs 1997.

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<sup>5</sup> Mustafa Türkeþ, “Doksanlý Yýllarda NATO’nun Öncelikleri ve Türkiye”, En Uzun Onyýl, Derleyenler, Gencer Özcan, Þule Kut, (Boyut Kitaplarý, Ýstanbul, 1998), ss. (199-224).

<sup>6</sup> See Murat Tüzünkan, NATO’s Extending Relations with East-Central European States: the Case of Hungary, Unpublished MA Thesis (Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, 1998).

<sup>7</sup> I carried out interviews with some of the NGO’s as well as opinion leaders of Eastern Europe during my several visits to the countries in the region in 1998 and early 1999.

<sup>8</sup> See T.C. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Dýþiþleri Komisyonu Raporu, Esas No: 1/728, karar No: 61, Kanun No: 4383, 28. 10.1998.

<sup>9</sup> Washington summit communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1999

<sup>10</sup> Washington summit communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1999

<sup>11</sup> Michael E. Brown, “Minimalist NATO: A Wise Alliance Knows When to Retrench”, Foreign Affairs May/June 1999, pp. (205-218).

<sup>12</sup> Robert E. Hunter, “Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, pp.(190-203).

<sup>13</sup> Anne-Else Hojberg, “The European Security Structure. A Plethora of Organizations?”, NATO Review, No: 6, November 1995, ss.(30-35).

<sup>14</sup> Washington summit communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1999.

<sup>15</sup> Turkish Daily News, 26 April 1999.

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<sup>16</sup> The Alliance's Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, on 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> April 1999.

<sup>17</sup> Cumhuriyet, 4 Mayıs 1998

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